Indian Copyright Act, 1957; Ss.2 (k), 13, 17 and 52: Copyright in Law Report - Publishing of copy edited version of judgments, order and proceedings of Supreme Court by appellant - Copying by respondents - Claim of copyright in the publication/published work - Held: Originality in work is a requirement of copyright - It is a right to stop others from exploiting the work of owner without his consent - There is no copyright in the facts per se - All literary works have to be original/primary work for claiming such protection - However, derivative/secondary work would qualify for claiming such protection provided skill, labour and capital involved in its creation and creativity in the end product is such as to create a new work so as to make the creator of derivative work author of it - The Courts have only to evaluate as to whether the derivative work involved substantial amount of skill labour and capital and need not to evaluate the creative aspect of the same - Law Report of Supreme Court Judgments is derivative work - Reproduction of judgments in public domain do not infringe the copyright - Innovative thoughts are necessary to establish copyright in the judgments - Copy-edited judgments would not satisfy the claim of copyright merely by establishing the amount of skill, labour and capital put in the inputs of the copy edited judgments excluding innovative thoughts for creativity - But it should be such and sufficient to import to the judgments printed, some quality which original judgment does not possess and which differentiate the original judgment from the one printed in the Report - Though appellants improved the readability of judgment of the copy-edited judgment by doing considerable labour etc. but that does not meet the minimum requirement of creativity required for claiming copyright in it - However, creation of paragraph and classification of opinion of judges would require extensive reading and careful study of the subject - It also requires considerable knowledge, sound judgment and legal skill - Hence, appellants have copyright in it - Respondents are directed not to use the paragraphs and classification of Judges' opinion as in the Report. Copyright Act - Object and scope of - Discussed. Principles: Principle of copyright - Applicability of. Supreme Court Judgments - Owner of for the purpose of copyright - Held: Government is the first owner of the copyright in the judgment. Words and Phrases: `Copyright Protection' - Meaning of in the context of Copyright Protection Act, 1957. Literary works - Classification of. `Original work' and `derivative work' - Meaning of. Appellant is the publisher of a law report publishing therein orders, practice directions, record of proceedings, short judgments and Judgments of the Supreme Court of India. After the initial procurement of the judgments, orders and proceedings for publication from the Registrar, Supreme Court of India, the appellants make copy-editing of the judgments, orders and record of proceedings procured and various inputs are put in the judgments and orders by making an addition of cross-references, formatting of the text, paragraph numbering, verification etc. to make them user friendly. The appellants also prepare the headnotes, which require considerable amount of skill, labour and expertise. And for the said work a substantial amount of capital expenditure on infrastructure, such as office equipments, computers and for maintaining extensive library, besides recurring expenditure on both the management of human resources and infrastructural maintenance has been made by the appellants. Appellants alleged that the Law Report, so prepared, constitutes an `original literary work' in which copyright subsists in terms of Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and thus the appellants alone have the exclusive right to make printed as well as electronic copies of the same under Section 14 of the Act. Any scanning or copying or reproduction done of or from the Reports or pages or paragraphs or portions of any volume of the Report by any other person, is an infringement of the copyright in the Report within the meaning of Section 51 of the Act. Appellants further alleged that respondent No. 2, another publisher, has brought out a software called "Grand Jurix" published on CD-ROMs and the other respondent, also a publisher, has brought out software package called "The Laws" published on CD-ROMs; and that all the modules in the respondents' software packages have already been lifted verbatim from their work; copied the sequencing, selection and arrangement of the cases coupled with the entire text of copy-edited judgments as published in the Law Report, along with and including the style and formatting, the copy-editing paragraph numbers, footnote numbers, cross-references, etc.; and such acts of the defendant-respondents constitute infringement of the appellants' exclusive right to the same. The appellants moved the High Court for issuance of temporary injunction by filing applications in the Suit against the respondents. Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the applications for interim injunction. However, before the Single Judge, the respondents conceded that the appellants have copyright in the headnotes and as such they undertook not to copy these headnotes in their CD-ROMs. Aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge of the High Court refusing to grant interim injunction, the appellants preferred appeals before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court and the applications praying for interim relief were also filed in both the appeals. The applications praying for the interim relief were disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court directing that during pendency of the appeals the respondents would be entitled to sell their CD-ROMs with the text of the judgment of the Supreme Court along with their own headnotes which should not in any way be a copy of the headnotes and the text of the plaintiff-appellants. Disposing of the matter, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that the appellants were not the author of the Supreme Court judgments and by merely making certain corrections therein or giving paragraph numbers, the character of a judgment does not change and it does not become materially different from the original judgment; that once a person has a right to obtain certified copy of the judgment from the Registry of the Court and to publish it, it cannot be said that others have no right to take text of the judgment from the journal where it is already reported; that the act of reproduction of any judgment or order of the Court, Tribunal or any other judicial authority under Section 52(1)(q) of the Copy Right Act, is not an infringement of the copyright. Any person can, therefore, publish judgments of the Courts, however, there would be copyright in the headnotes to the judgments prepared by the appellants. So far as footnotes and editorial notes are concerned, it cannot be denied that these are the publisher's own creations and based on publisher's own research and, thus, will have a copyright of the appellants. Hence, the Division Bench modified the judgment of the Single Judge by allowing the respondents to sell their CD-ROMs with the text of the judgments of the Supreme Court along with their own headnotes, editorial notes, if any, which should not in any way be copy of the headnotes of the appellants. Thus, the High Court has not accepted the case of the appellants that they have a copyright in the copy-edited judgments of the Supreme Court. Hence the present appeals and the Contempt Petition. In the present case, the questions which require determination by the Court were as to what shall be the standard of originality in the copy-edited judgments of the Supreme Court which is a derivative work and what would be required in a derivative work to treat it the original work of an author and thereby giving a protected right under the Copyright Act, 1957 to the author of the derivative work and as to whether the appellants would be entitled for a copyright as an original literary work in the entire version of the copy-edited text of the judgments published in the appellants' law report or as to whether the appellants would be entitled to the copyright in some of the inputs which have been put in the raw text. Appellants contended that the copyright subsists as a law report in their publication `SCC' as a whole based cumulatively and compendiously on all the substantial contributions of skill, labour and capital in the creation of various parts of the Report; that the copyright subsists in the copy-edited version; that they do not claim copyright in the raw text of the judgments, certified copies of which are being obtained from the Registry; that they do not claim a monopoly in publishing judgments of the Supreme Court as they are being published by other publishers also without copying from each other publication; that their copyright is in the copy-edited version of the text of judgments as published in SCC which is a creation of their skill, labour and capital and there are contributions/inputs/ additions in creating the version of the text of judgments as published in the report; that Section 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Act does not bar the recognization of copyright in the copy-edited version of the text of judgments of the courts as published in law reports; that the Government is the first owner of copyright in the judgments of the courts as per Section 2(k) read with Section 17 and Section 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Act provides that any person wanting to reproduce or publish judgments would not infringe the copyright of the Government, but Section 52(1)(q)(iv) does not imply that in case a person has expended independent skill, labour and capital on the judgments of the courts to create and publish his version of the judgments, any other person is free to copy that person's version of the judgments, substantially or in its entirely; that Copyright subsists in the copy-edited version of the text of judgments of the courts as published in law reports, which have been created by the application of skill, labour and capital which is not trivial or negligible; that the inputs put in the copy-edited judgments in SCC, is a derivative literary work created from pre-existing material of the judgments of the court which is in public domain; that the exercise of independent skill, labour and capital in its creation by the author of such work, and the derivative literary work so created is by their independent skill, labour and capital, which gives them copyright in such creations; that it is not necessary that work created should have a literary merit; that the courts can only evaluate whether the skill, labour and capital actually employed, required in creating the work, is not trivial or negligible; that in deciding whether a derivative work qualifies for copyright protection, it must be considered as a whole, and it is not correct to dissect the work into fragments and consider the copyrightability of each such fragment piecemeal and individually apart from the whole; and that the respondents if wish to reproduce or publish a work already in public domain was obliged to go to the public domain/common source of such work rather than misappropriating the effort and investment of the appellants by copying the version of such work which was created by them by their independent expenditure of skill, labour and capital. Respondent submitted that the judgment of the court is a Government work as defined under Section 2(k)(iii) of the Act; that on account of Section 17 (d) of the Act, the Government in the absence of any agreement to the contrary be the first owner of the copyright therein; that in terms of Section 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Act, publication of the judgments of the apex court by the respondents would not tantamount to infringement of the copyright of the appellants; that the judgments published in the Supreme Court Cases is nothing but merely a derivative work based upon the judgments of the court, which lacks originality as it does not depict independent creation even a modicum of creativity; that the inputs put by the appellants is nothing but expressing an idea which can be expressed in a limited way and as such there cannot be a copyright in it; that filling the blanks or gaps by providing names of the parties or citations of the judgments, both of which are well known and unchangeable parts of that idea, are not original work to warrant copyright protection, either singly or in combination; and that the additions made in the reported judgment by the editors of the Report are only the well known extensions of the reported decision. These extensions lack even the minimal degree of author's creativity or originality or intellectual labour nor does it create additional knowledge, the protection of which is the very basis of the copyright protection. Respondents in the connected Civil Appeal submitted that there is a distinction between a `law report' as understood in England and a `law journal' as printed in India; that the appellants' journal `SCC' is not a law report in the strict sense, inasmuch as it reproduces the judgments of the court verbatim along with inputs. However, a law report known in the traditional English sense is when a law reporter present in the court would record in his own words and language the arguments of the counsel on both sides, give a summary of the facts and incorporate into the said report his transcript of the speech of the Judge. Thus, the appellants' work could only be a law journal and not a law report; that the judgments were specifically made a part of the exception to copyright infringement and thus find place in Section 52(1)(q) of the Act; that for claiming protection of copyright in a derivative work, under the Indian law originality is a pre-condition and originality means only that the work was independently created by the author as opposed to copied from other works, and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity; that reporting of the judgments of the Supreme Court with certain inputs could only be said to be a discovery of facts already in existence; that to create a copyright by alterations of the text, these must be extensive and substantial practically making a new version; that the copy-editing inputs of the appellants are only discoveries/facts and there are limited ways/unique of expressing the various copy- editing inputs and thus no copyright can subsist in such limited/unique expressions; that the facts which are discovered could be expressed in limited ways and as such ways adopted cannot give copyright protection to the inputs or the judgments as a whole; that recognizing the copyright in the copy-edited version of the law reports would amount to giving the appellants a monopoly in the judgments of the courts which is against the intendment of Section 52(1)(q)(iv) and would defeat the purpose of putting judgments in the public domain; that for a derivative work, the originality test as applied in United States Supreme Court should be made applicable whereby the author of a derivative work would satisfy that the work has been produced from his exercise of skill and judgment; and that the exercise of skill and judgment required to produce the work must not be so trivial that it could be characterized a purely mechanical exercise. The work should be independently created by the author as opposed to copied from the other works and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.

2008 AIR 809 , 2007(13 )SCR182 , 2008(1 )SCC1 , 2007(14 )SCALE191 , THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.S.NARAYANA C.R.P. NO.2801 OF 2006 11-06-2007 Kesari Goutham Reddy Velpula John Victor Macaulay Respondent/Appellant. 2.Yellampalli Sobhadevi Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri Prabhakar Peri Counsel for the Respondent : Sri S.Srinivas Reddy :ORDER: Heard Sri Prabhakar Peri, the learned counsel representing the revision petitioner-proposed party and Sri S.Srinivas Reddy, the learned counsel representing the first respondent. 2. The CRP is filed as against the order, dated 28.04.2006, made in I.A.No.221 of 2004 in A.S.No.30 of 2001 on the file of IV Additional District Judge, Nellore. The application was filed under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code' for the purpose of convenience) for impleading the petitioner-proposed party as one of the respondents in A.S.No.30 of 2001. The learned Judge recorded certain reasons and, ultimately, dismissed the said application. Aggrieved by the same, the present CRP is preferred. 3. This court, on 22.06.2006, granted stay of pronouncement of judgment in the said appeal and adjourned the matter to 13.07.2006 and the interim order was extended and the counsel for petitioner is permitted to take out notice and file proof of service. Thus, the matter is coming for admission and at the request of both the counsel on record, the CRP is being disposed of finally. 4. Sri Prabhakar Peri, the learned counsel representing the petitioner-proposed party would submit that it is an unfortunate case where the proposed party purchased the property under a registered sale deed dated 05.06.1998. The counsel also would submit that the respondent in the appeal who had been successful in the suit is not interested in contesting the appeal and, as a purchaser pendente lite, the petitioner with a view to safeguard his interest filed the present application. The learned counsel also would submit that though the petitioner filed O.S.No.807 of 2002 on the file of III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Nellore, the pendency of the said suit not come in the way in deciding this application, since any adverse judgment which may be made in this appeal may affect the petitioner-proposed party in any other pending suit as a whole. The counsel placed a strong reliance on RAJ KUMAR v SARDARI LAL AND OTHERS1 and AMIT KUMAR SHAW AND ANOTHER v FARIDA KHATOON AND ANOTHER2. 5. Per contra, Sri Srinivas Reddy, the learned counsel representing the first respondent had taken this Court through the reasons which had been recorded. The counsel also would submit that the property, which is being claimed by the petitioner, and the subject matter of O.S.No.108 of 1992, appear to be different plots. The learned counsel also would submit that already a suit O.S.No.807 of 2002 on the file of the III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Nellore had been instituted and, hence, there is no need to allow the said application while permitting the petitioner-proposed party to come on record in A.S.No.30 of 2001. 6. Heard both the counsel. 7. It is the case of the revision petitioner that he purchased an extent of 100 ankanams of vacant site bearing plot No.3 comprised in S.C.No.347 of 2001 of Kondayapalem, Nellore town within the limits of Nellore Municipality by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 05.06.1998 for a consideration of Rs.1,08,000/- from the respondent in A.S.No.30 of 2001 and, thus, he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same with absolute rights. It is also stated that on 31.7.2002, there was an attempt to encroach upon his site and since he was unable to resist the highhanded acts of the first respondent, who is the appellant in A.S.No.30 of 2001, he had filed O.S.No.807 of 2002 on the file of III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Nellore against him for perpetual injunction and obtained interim injunction orders in I.A.No.864 of 2002 in the said suit. It is also stated that recently it came to his knowledge that there is collusion between the appellant-respondent in A.S.No.30 of 2001 and they are trying to create certain documents to defeat his rights relating to plot No.3. 8. The appellant in the appeal, the first respondent in the application, resisted the same denying the allegations. It is stated that the first respondent is the absolute owner of 100 ankanams in plot No.2 the suit schedule property in O.S.No.108 of 1992 and it was purchased by him through a registered sale deed dated 16.07.1990 from M.Sugunamma and after purchase of the property on physical verification of the property at the spot, there appears to be some changes as to the boundaries. As such, a rectification deed, dated 10.2.1992, was executed by Ch.Raja Babu, G.P.A. of M.Sugunamma. It is also stated that the first respondent started construction of the house in his site and he began to construct the compound wall. At this stage, the second respondent tried to encroach upon the site belonging to first respondent, as such the first respondent i.e the appellant in A.S.No.30 of 2001 was constrained to file O.S.No.108 of 1992 on the file of III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Nellore and after trial, the suit was dismissed. It is also stated that the proposed party has got knowledge of the filing of O.S.No.108 of 1992 and he was supporting the defendant in the suit, the respondent in A.S.No.30 of 2001. The alleged sale deed is only sham and nominal document and several other factual details also had been narrated. 9. The learned Judge recorded reasons at paras 6 and 7 and, especially, in the light of the pendency of O.S.No.807 of 2002 relating to the same subject matter and also on the ground that there appears to be some doubt relating to the subject matter of these litigations, the application was dismissed. It is needless to say that in the light of the respective stands taken by the parties, whether the subject matter of these suits overlap, whether the identity is one of the same and whether these are different plots, these aspects may have to be further gone into at the appropriate stage. The main contention of the revision petitioner is that his vendor, the defendant, who was successful in the suit, is not interested in contesting the appeal and there appears to be some collusion between these two parties to defeat his right. No doubt, the appellant in the appeal is taking a stand that the document in question is a sham and nominal document. This Court is not inclined to express any opinion relating to these details. Be that as it may, as a purchaser pendente lite, the proposed party filed the application to come on record to safeguard his interest. It may be that an other suit already might have been instituted by him as against the appellant in this appeal praying for the relief of perpetual injunction. 10. In the decision one supra, the Apex Court observed thus ; A lis pendens transferee from the defendant, though not arrayed as a party in the suit, is still a person claiming under the defendant. The same principle of law is recognized in a different perspective by Rule 16 of Order 21 CPC which speaks of transfer or assignment inter vivos or by operation of law made by the plaintiff decree-holder. The transferee may apply for execution of the decree of the court which passed it and the decree will be available for execution in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by the decree-holder. It is interesting to note that a provision like Section 146 CPC was not to be found in the preceding Code and was for the first time incorporated in CPC of 1908. In Order 21 Rule 16 also an explanation was inserted through amendment made by Act 104 of 1976 w.e.f.1.2.1977, whereby the operation of Section 146 CPC was allowed to prevail independent of Order 21 Rule 16 CPC. A decree passed against the defendant is available for execution against the transferee or assignee of the defendant judgment-debtor and it does not make any difference whether such transfer or assignment has taken place after the passing of the decree or before the passing of the decree without notice or leave of the court. The law laid down by a four-Judge Bench of this Court in Saila Bala Dassi v Nirmala Sundari Dassi3 is apt for resolving the issue arising for decision herein. A transferee of property from the defendant during the pendency of the suit sought himself tobe brought on record at the stage of appeal. The High Court dismissed the application as it was pressed only by reference to Order 22 Rule 10 CPC and it was conceded by the applicant that, not being a person who had obtained a transfer pending appeal, he was not covered within the scope of Order 22 Rule 10. In an appeal preferred by such transferee, this Court upheld the view of the High Court that a transferee prior to the filing of the appeal could not be brought on record in appeal by reference to Order 22 Rule 10 CPC. However, the Court held that an appeal by is a proceeding for the purpose of Section 146 and further, the expression "claiming under" is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in Order 22 Rule 10. Whoever is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under Order 22 Rule 10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed therein if his assignor could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against it in the Code. A person having acquired an interest in suit property during the pendency of the suit and seeking to be brought on record at the stage of the appeal can do so by reference to Section 146 CPC which provision being a beneficent provision should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense. Their Lordships held that being a purchaser pendente lite, a person will be bound by the proceedings taken by the successful party in execution of decree and justice requires that such purchaser should be given an opportunity to protect his rights." 11. In the decision second supra, the Apex Court observed thus: "The object of order 1Rule 10 is to discourage contests on technical pleas, and to save honest and bona fide claimants from being non-suited. The power to strike out or add parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. Under this rule, a person may be added as a party to a suit in the following two cases: 1. When he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not joined so, or 2. When, without his presence, the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided. The power of a court to add a party to a proceeding cannot depend solely on the question whether he has interest in the suit property. The question is whether the right of a person may be affected if he is not added as a party. Such right, however, will necessarily include an enforceable legal right. The application under Order 22 Rule 10 can be made to the appellate court even though the devolution of interest occurred when the case was pending in the trial Court. In the instant cases, the suit was decreed in favour of Fakir Mohammad by judgment and decree dated 3.11.1989. The suit was contested by two sets of defendants, one set of defendants was Birendra Nath Dey and Kalyani Dey and the other set of defendants was Jagat Mohan Das alone. The appeals were preferred by the parties. Both the appeals were heard and by a common judgment and order dated 25.6.1992, the said appeals were allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif was set aside. By a deed of assignment dated 15.12.1995, the said Birendra Nath Dey assigned his lease hold right in respect of 132-A, Circular Garden Reach Road, presently known as 132-A, Karl Marx Sarani, Kolkata in favour of the appellants. By a deed of sale executed on 15.12.1995, duly registered with the Additional Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta, Kalyani Dey sold the property being No.132-B of the above address to the other appellant. The second appeals filed by the parties were pending on the file of the High Court at Calcutta. The appellants had no knowledge of the second appeals. Thereafter on verification, the appellants came to know of the pendency of the appeals which necessitated them to file the applications for substitution in the second appeals. In the meanwhile, the appellants filed the applications before the municipal authorities for the mutation of their names in respect of the property on 24.12.2002 and the municipal authority informed the appellants that they were not in a position to mutate the names of the appellants of the property in question because of the pendency of the two second appeals before the High Court at Calcutta. Thereafter the appellants engaged an advocate to find out whether any such appeals have been filed by the parties. The advocate so engaged informed the appellants that two appeals being SAs Nos.631 and 632 of 1993 were filed by Fakir Mohammad, Farida Khatoon and others, respondents herein. It was also informed that the said appeals were admitted by the High Court but the impugned judgment and other order was neither prayed for stay nor stayed. Therefore, it was also submitted by the appellants that since the appellants have become the absolute owners of the property, their interest will be highly prejudiced and they will be vitally affected, if any order is passed by High Court without hearing the appellants in the matter. Therefore, they prayed that the appellants are to be substituted in place and stead of the present respondents, since they have no existing and subsisting right, title or interest in the property. Under Order 22 Rule 10, no detailed inquiry at the stage of granting leave is contemplated. The court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit by or against the person on whom the interest has devolved by assignment or devolution. The question about the existence and validity of the assignment or devolution can be considered at the final hearing of the proceedings. The court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit. In this connection, the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which has been extracted above may be noted. An alienee pendentelite is bound by the final decree that may be passed in the suit. Such an alienee can be brought on record both under this rule as also under Order 1 Rule 10. Since under the doctrine of lis pendens a decree passed in the suit during the pendency of which a transfer is made binds the transferee, his application to be brought on record should ordinarily be allowed." 12. In the light of Section 146 of the Code read along with Order 1, Rule 10 also Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code, this Court is of the considered view that in a matter of this nature, where a purchaser pendente lite intends to come on record to safeguard his interest in a pending litigation, it would not be just and proper to dismiss such application. 13. In the light of the same, the impugned order is hereby set aside. Accordingly, the CRP is hereby allowed. No order as to costs. ?1 (2004)2 SCC 601 2 (2005) 11 SCC 403 3 AIR 1958 Supreme Court 394 SCR 1287