REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5448 OF 2006
Fida Hussain & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5382 OF 2006
Dhyan Singh & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
1
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5387 OF 2006
Het Ram (Dead) through LRs. ................Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5388 OF 2006
Sompal & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5389 OF 2006
Vipin Chandra & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
2
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5391 OF 2006
Mohan Singh & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5394 OF 2006
Hari Singh (Dead) through LRs. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5395 OF 2006
Roshan & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
3
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5397 OF 2006
Ram Ratan & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5412 OF 2006
Lalman (Dead) through L.R. ................... Appellant
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5421 OF 2006
Gaj Ram (Dead) through LRs. ...................Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
4
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5428 OF 2006
Chandan & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5429 OF 2006
Hussain Bux (Dead) through LRs. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5432 OF 2006
Waheed (Dead) through LRs. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
5
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5436 OF 2006
Sunil Kumar Sharma alias Sonu & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5444 OF 2006
Karan Singh & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5445 OF 2006
Mahesh & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
6
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5446 OF 2006
Ram Chandra & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5455 OF 2006
Komal Singh .............. Appellant
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5457 OF 2006
Laloo Singh alias Baloo Singh & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
7
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5499 OF 2006
Khoob Chand & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5501 OF 2006
Babu Ram & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5502 OF 2006
Harbansh & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
8
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5504 OF 2006
Dori Lal & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Ors. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5506 OF 2006
Jafsar .............. Appellant
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5507 OF 2006
Bal Kisan & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
9
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5508 OF 2006
Bankey Lal & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5511 OF 2006
Jai Pal & Ors. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5533 OF 2006
Abhay Kumar Bhatnagar & Anr. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
10
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5452 OF 2006
Ram Lal & Anr. .............. Appellants
versus
Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents
J U D G M E N T
H.L. Dattu, J.
1) This batch of appeals is directed against the separate orders passed
by the High Court of Allahabad in Regular First Appeals filed by
land owners for enhancement of compensation awarded by the
Reference Court for the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, [hereinafter referred to as `the Act'] in the villages of
Harthala and Mukkarrabpur. There are in all 30 appeals before us,
out of which, 23 are in relation to the village of Harthala and 7 in
relation to the village of Mukkarrabpur.
11
2) In view of the orders we propose to pass in all these appeals, we
deem it unnecessary to state the facts giving rise to the present
appeals in greater details and a brief reference thereto would suffice
to appreciate the controversy.
3) Lands in Village of Harthala:- There are twenty three appeals
relating to this village. Under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the
Act, Notification dated 20.09.1990 was issued and published by the
State Government for the acquisition of the lands of the appellants.
Subsequently, a declaration dated 10.06.1991 was published in the
Gazette, under Section 6 of the Act. The lands acquired were taken
physical possession by the State Government. In accordance with
Section 11 of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer [hereinafter
referred to as `the LAO'] assessed the market value of the acquired
lands at `80 per sq. meter vide order dated 18.09.1993 as
compensation. Dissatisfied with the award of the LAO, the land
owners filed objections, inter-alia claiming that the market value of
the acquired lands is `1000 per sq. meter, due to the proximity of the
lands to the city of Moradabad. After scrutinizing the evidence on
record, the Reference Court had come to the conclusion that the
market value of the nearby land was `550 per sq. meter, however,
12
taking into consideration the location and potentiality of the lands
and also proximity of the lands from the city of Moradabad and other
relevant factors, enhanced the compensation awarded to `270 per sq.
meter. The State preferred appeals against the enhancement so made
by the Reference Court and the High Court has allowed the same in
the light of the judgment of the Court in First Appeal No. 247 of
1997 dated 05.03.2004.
4) Lands in village of Mukkarabbpur:- Seven of the present appeals
relate to the village of Mukkarabbpur. A Notification for acquisition
of the lands under the Act was issued and published on 20.08.1992.
In pursuance of the Notification, the State took possession of the said
lands on 06.05.1997 by paying 80% of the estimated compensation
at the rate of `150 per sq. meter. However, vide order dated
29.08.1997, the LAO fixed the compensation at the rate of `92.59 per
sq. meter. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants moved the
Reference Court and produced evidence in support of their claim that
the prevailing rates of land in that village and its roundabouts were
much higher. After giving due consideration to the claim made and
the evidence on record, the Reference Court enhanced the
13
compensation to `350 per sq. meter. The respondents preferred
appeals to the High Court, and the same came to be allowed,
reviving the award passed by the LAO.
5) Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior counsel, appears for the appellants,
and Shri. M.P. Shorawala, learned counsel, holds the brief for the
respondents.
6) At the outset, it is relevant to note that the question of adequacy of
compensation for the lands acquired in these two villages under the
same notification has been gone into by this Court in the case of
Gafar and Ors. v. Moradabad Development Authority, (2007) 7 SCC
614. In that case, this Court made a detailed enquiry into the method
of valuation adopted by the LAO and the enhancement of
compensation by the Reference Court. This Court took the view that
the evidence relied upon by the Reference Court while enhancing the
compensation were not reliable, and, therefore, the High Court was
justified in setting aside the order passed by the Reference Court and
restoring the award passed by the LAO.
14
7) In Gafar's case for the lands acquired in the village of Harthala under
Notification dated 13.09.1991, after a detailed consideration of the
compensation awarded by the LAO, this Court held:
"15. We find that the Awarding Officer had taken note of a
sale deed, which was at a time proximate to the date of
notifications in these cases and it related to a piece of land,
though a small extent, which was not distant from the
acquired lands, to borrow the language of the Awarding
Officer. We are inclined to see some force in the stand
adopted by the High Court that the Awarding Officer
himself had been generous in his award. Since he has
adopted such a rate, the question is whether this Court
should interfere with the decision of the High Court
restoring that Award or award any further compensation.
16. The scope of interference by this Court was delineated
by the decision in Kanta Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar
wherein this Court held that there was an element of guess
work inherent in most cases involving determination of the
market value of the acquired land. If the judgment of the
High Court revealed that it had taken into consideration
the relevant factors prescribed by the Act, in appeal under
Article 133 of the Constitution of India, assessment of
market value thus made should not be disturbed by the
Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding whether we
should interfere, we have taken note of the position adopted
by the Awarding Officer, the stand adopted by the
Reference Court and the relevant aspects discussed by the
High Court. On such appreciation of the facts and
circumstances of the case as a whole, we are of the view
that the sum of Rs. 80 per square meter awarded as
compensation in these cases is just compensation paid to
the land owners. Once we have thus found the
compensation to be just, there arises no occasion for this
Court to interfere with the decision of the High Court
restoring the award of the Land Acquisition Officer.
15
17. In view of our conclusion as above, all the appeals
relating to Harthala have only to be dismissed."
8) In respect to the lands acquired in village of Mukkarabbpur, this
Court, in Gafar's case, held:
"18. In respect of the lands at Mukkarrabpur, the claim for
enhancement was allowed by the Reference Court in spite
of the finding that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 adduced
on behalf of the claimants was unreliable. It also found that
the two sale deeds relied on by the claimant in support of
the claim for enhancement were also not comparable or
reliable in the light of the evidence of the claimant himself
and that it has not been shown that the lands involved
therein were comparable to the lands acquired. In spite of
it, the Reference Court granted an enhancement only based
on its award in L.A.R. No. 134 of 1988 and on that basis
the award was made at Rs. 192/- per square meter.
Obviously, the award in L.A.R. No. 134 of 1988 was set
aside by the High Court. Hence, the award of the Reference
Court in the case on hand became untenable. Once no
reliance could be placed on that award to enhance the
compensation, it is clear that even on the finding of the
Reference Court, no claim for enhancement has been made
out by the claimants. In that situation, the High Court was
fully justified in setting aside the award of the Reference
Court and in restoring the award of the Land Acquisition
Officer.
19. We may incidentally notice that the lands were
agricultural lands being used for cultivation and even the
method of valuing it on the basis of price per square meter
does not appear to be justified. All the same, the award has
adopted that method and the State cannot go back on it. In
the absence of any acceptable legal evidence to support the
claim for enhancement, no grounds are made out for
interference with the decision of the High Court in the
appeals relating to village Mukkarrabpur."
16
9) This Court also held that it could not be said that the High Court had
adopted an erroneous approach or employed the wrong principles in
regard to the claim for enhancement of compensation, or that, it has
so erred as to warrant interference under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India.
10) A review petition filed by the appellants therein was also
dismissed by this Court.
11) Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior counsel, submits that the findings
and the conclusions in the judgment of this Court in the case of
Gafar are flawed for the reason that the exemplars relied on for
deciding the compensation was for inundated land, and hence, the
same could not reflect the true value of the land. He further submits
that relevant sale deeds were not taken into consideration by the
Court while concluding that the Reference Court had erred in
enhancing the compensation and that the High Court was correct in
setting aside the same. The learned senior counsel also submits that
this Court should have remanded the matters to the High Court in the
case of Gafar, as the High Court, being the first appellate Court, was
required to give a reasoned judgment while allowing appeals against
17
the order of the Reference Court enhancing the compensation. In the
alternative, Shri. Varma contends that the decision in Gafar's case
does not operate as a binding precedent on the present set of appeals,
since this Court has not decided any legal issue. It is also stated that
the decision does not operate as a res judicata, as the parties were
different. It is further argued that out of the thirty appeals that are
listed before us, in the seven appeals relating to the acquisition of
lands in the village of Mukkarrbpur, the matters were not shown on
the cause list on the day they were disposed of. He further states that
in some other cases (six appeals), the learned counsel appearing for
the respondents before the High Court (appellants before us) had
submitted an "illness slip" and had not appeared on the day, the
matters were disposed of. Shri. Varma further contends that in as
many as seventeen appeals before us, the Development Authority
had filed applications for substitution to bring on record the legal
representatives of the deceased land owners and without considering
and deciding the applications, the High Court could not have passed
the impugned orders. Despite all these procedural infirmities, the
High Court could not have allowed the Regular First Appeals filed
by the State, is the contention of learned senior counsel Shri Varma.
18
12) Pursuant to the direction issued by this Court, an affidavit has been
filed by Shri. V.P. Rai, learned counsel, who had appeared before the
High Court, in support of factual assertion made by Sri Varma.
Learned counsel in his affidavit has stated that seven appeals before
the High Court (listed as C.A. No. 5502/2006, C.A. No. 5499/2006,
C.A. No. 5501/2006, C.A. No. 5404/2006, C.A. No. 5507/2006,
C.A. No. 5508/2006 and 5511/2006 before us, all relating to the
village of Mukkarrabpur) were not shown on the cause list of the
High Court on the day they were disposed of, and hence, he had no
knowledge about the hearing of the appeals. Shri. Rai, has further
stated, that as many six appeals (listed as C.A. No. 5448/2006, C.A.
No. 5391/2006, C.A. No. 5397/2006, C.A. No. 5445/2006, C.A. No.
5452/2006 and C.A. No. 5455/2006 before us) in which he was
appearing, were disposed of on the day, he had submitted an "illness
slip" due to his ill health.
13) Per contra, Shri. M.P. Shorawala, learned counsel, has argued that
there is no legal or factual infirmity in the judgment of this Court in
the case of Gafar. He submits that this Court has already dealt with
the merits of the matter at length in the case of Gafar and the same
need not be gone into, once over, again by this Court. With regard to
19
the point of non-listing of cases, the learned counsel contends that
the cause lists are prepared under the authority of Hon'ble the Chief
Justice of the High Court, and it was not the practice of the Court to
send the files of matters that were not listed, to the Court Hall, let
alone hear them and dispose them of.
14) Having carefully considered the submissions of the learned senior
counsel Shri Varma, we are of the view that the judgment in Gafar's
case does not require reconsideration by this Court. In Gafar's case,
this Court had meticulously examined all the legal contentions
canvassed by the parties to the lis and had come to the conclusion
that the High Court has not committed any error which warrants
interference. In the present appeals, the challenge is for the
compensation assessed for the lands notified and acquired under the
same notification pertaining to the same villages. Therefore, it
would not be proper for us to take a different view, on the ground
that what was considered by this Court was on a different fact
situation. This view of ours is fortified by the Judgment of this Court
in the case of B.M. Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, (1970) 2 SCC
267, wherein it is held that a decision of this Court is binding when
the same question is raised again before this Court, and
20
reconsideration cannot be pleaded on the ground that relevant
provisions, etc., were not considered by the Court in the former case.
15) With regard to the contention that the decision of the Court in the
case of Gafar did not operate as res judicata for the present batch of
cases, we are of the view that the principles of Resjudicata would
apply only when the lis was inter-parties and had attained finality of
the issues involved. The said Principles will, however, have no
application interalia in a case where the Judgment and/or order had
been passed by a Court having no jurisdiction thereof and/or
involving a pure question of law. The principle of Resjudicata will,
therefore, have no application in the facts of the present case.
16) To examine the other limb of the contention of the learned senior
counsel that the judgment in the case of Gafar did not operate as a
precedent for the present batch of cases, as no point of law was
decided, this issue requires to be considered in the light of the
judicial pronouncement of this Court.
17) In the case of Shenoy & Co. v. CTO, (1985) 2 SCC 512, a number of
writ petitions were allowed by the High Court. However, the State
chose to file appeal only in one case, which came to be allowed by
21
this Court in the said case. In this fact situation, this Court took the
view that the decision of this Court was binding on all the writ
petitioners before the High Court, even though they were not
respondents in the appeal before this Court. It was held:
"22. Though a large number of writ petitions were filed
challenging the Act, all those writ petitions were grouped
together, heard together and were disposed of by the High
Court by a common judgment. No petitioner advanced any
contention peculiar or individual to his petition, not
common to others. To be precise, the dispute in the cause
or controversy between the State and each petitioner had
no personal or individual element in it or anything personal
or peculiar to each petitioner. The challenge to the
constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical
grounds common to all petitioners. This challenge was
accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and it
was this common judgment that was the subject-matter of
appeal before this Court in Hansa Corporation case. When
the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act
constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal
in Hansa Corporation case alone, but petitions in which the
High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent ground
that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It is,
therefore, idle to contend that the law laid down by this
Court in that judgment would bind only the Hansa
Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the
State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so is to
ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court under
Article 141 of the Constitution. Article 141 reads as
follows:
"The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be
binding on all courts within the territory of India. A
mere reading of this article brings into sharp focus
its expanse and its all pervasive nature. In cases
like this, where numerous petitions are disposed of
22
by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed,
the parties to the common judgment could very well
have and should have intervened and could have
requested the Court to hear them also. They cannot
be heard to say that the decision was taken by this
Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the
fact that an appeal had been filed by the State
against the common judgment. We would like to
observe that, in the fitness of things, it would be
desirable that the State Government also took out
publication in such cases to alert parties bound by
the judgment, of the fact that an appeal had been
preferred before this Court by them. We do not find
fault with the State for having filed only one appeal.
It is, of course, an economising procedure."
23. The judgment in Hansa Corporation case rendered by
one of us (Desai, J.) concludes as follows:
"As we are not able to uphold the contentions
which found favour with the High Court in striking
down the impugned Act and the notification issued
thereunder and as we find no merit in other
contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondent
for sustaining the judgment of the High Court, this
appeal must succeed. Accordingly, this appeal is
allowed and the judgment of the High Court is
quashed and set aside and the petition filed by the
respondent in the High Court is dismissed with
costs throughout."
To contend that this conclusion applies only to the party
before this Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of
the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141
illusory. But setting aside the common judgment of the High
Court, the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered
ineffective not only in one case but in all cases.
24. A writ or an order in the nature of mandamus has
always been understood to mean a command issuing from
the Court, competent to do the same, to a public servant
amongst others, to perform a duty attaching to the office,
23
failure to perform which leads to the initiation of action. In
this case, the petitioners-appellants assert that the
mandamus in their case was issued by the High Court
commanding the authority to desist or forbear from
enforcing the provisions of an Act which was not validly
enacted. In other words, a writ of mandamus was
predicated upon the view that the High Court took that the
1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. Consequently the
Court directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear
from enforcing the provisions of the Act qua the petitioners.
The Act was subsequently declared constitutionally valid by
this Court. The Act, therefore, was under an eclipse, for a
short duration; but with the declaration of the law by this
Court, the temporary shadow cast on it by the mandamus
disappeared and the Act revived with its full vigour, the
constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having
been removed by the judgment of this Court. If the law so
declared invalid is held constitutionally valid, effective and
binding by the Supreme Court, the mandamus forbearing
the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become
ineffective and the authorities cannot be compelled to
perform a negative duty. The declaration of the law is
binding on everyone and it is therefore, futile to contend
that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties
against whom appeals were not filed.
25. The fallacy of the argument can be better illustrated by
looking at the submissions made from a slightly different
angle. Assume for argument's sake that the mandamus in
favour of the appellants survived notwithstanding the
judgment of this Court. How do they enforce the
mandamus? The normal procedure is to move the Court in
contempt when the parties against whom mandamus is
issued disrespect it. Supposing contempt petitions are filed
and notices are issued to the State. The State's answer to
the Court will be: "Can I be punished for disrespecting the
mandamus, when the law of the land has been laid down by
the Supreme Court against the mandamus issued, which
law is equally binding on me and on you?" Which Court
can punish a party for contempt under these
circumstances? The answer can be only in the negative
24
because the mandamus issued by the High Court becomes
ineffective and unenforceable when the basis on which it
was issued falls, by the declaration by the Supreme Court,
of the validity of 1979 Act.
26. In view of this conclusion of ours, we do not think it
necessary to refer to the other arguments raised before the
High Court and which the learned counsel for the
appellants attempted to raise before us also. The appeals
can be disposed of on this short point stated above. The
judgment of this Court in Hansa Corporation case is
binding on all concerned whether they were parties to the
judgment or not. We would like to make it clear that there
is no inconsistency in the finding of this Court in Joginder
Singh case and Makhanlal Waza case. The ratio is the same
and the appellants cannot take advantage of certain
observations made by this Court in Joginder Singh case for
the reasons indicated above."
18) In the case of Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, (2002)
4 SCC 638, this Court held:
"7. So far as the first question is concerned, Article 141 of
the Constitution unequivocally indicates that the law
declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all
courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article
empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law. It is,
therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a
legislation. The statements of the Court on matters other
than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts of
two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the
ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the
principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a
whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that
forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence...
A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of
questions which arose for consideration in the case in
which the judgment was delivered. ... The law which will be
25
binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all
observations of points raised and decided by the Court in a
given case..."
19) The position was made clear by the decision of this Court in the case
of Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453. In this
case, 14 properties were notified for acquisition under the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1898. Only two persons, namely
Banwari Lal & Sons and Shakuntala Gupta, had previously
challenged the validity of the acquisition by filing writ petitions
before the High Court and having the cases decided in their favour
finally by this Court. This Court held that the decisions in the earlier
cases were a binding precedent for this subsequent appeal that was
preferred by the Union of India. This Court held:
"12....The decision in Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta
of this Court in relation to the same notification may not be
binding on the principle of res judicata. The argument,
however, cannot be accepted that those decisions are not
binding being "property-specific" in those cases. In our
considered opinion, the decisions are binding as precedents
on the question of validity of the notification, which invokes
urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act. We find
ourselves in full agreement with the ratio of the decisions in
those cases that urgency clause, on the facts and
circumstances, which are similar to the present cases,
could not have been invoked. The two decisions are,
therefore, binding as precedents of this Court. We are not
able to find any distinction or difference as to the ground of
26
urgency in regard to the properties covered by these
appeals."
20) It is now well settled that a decision of this Court based on specific
facts does not operate as a precedent for future cases. Only the
principles of law that emanate from a judgment of this Court, which
have aided in reaching a conclusion of the problem, are binding
precedents within the meaning of Article 141. However, if the
question of law before the Court is same as in the previous case, the
judgment of the Court in the former is binding in the latter, for the
reason that the question of law before the Court is already settled. In
other words, if the Court determines a certain issue for a certain set
of facts, then, that issue stands determined for any other matter on
the same set of facts.
21) The other reasons given by Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior
counsel, for contending that the case of Gafar does not apply as a
precedent in other cases are threefold: (a) that seven of the present
appeals relating to Mukkarrabpur were not heard due to non-listing;
(b) in six matters relating to Harthala, the matters were disposed of
in the absence of the counsel, who was absent due to his ill health
and submission of "illness slip"; and (c) in some of the cases, the
27
applications for substitution was pending before the High Court, and
these matters could not be disposed of by allowing the appeal against
the dead persons. We are not impressed by these contentions.
22) In the factual matrix of the present case, the adequacy of
compensation for the acquisition of land, in the aforesaid villages,
was the issue before this Court in the case of Gafar and in these
appeals also. The issue is now settled by this Court in the case of
Gafar and Ors. (supra). The decision of co-equal Bench is binding
on this Court. We may usefully note the decision of this Court in the
case of Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (1989) 178 ITR 548. The
Court observed that the pronouncement of law by a Division Bench
of this Court is binding on a subsequent Division Bench of the same
or a smaller number of Judges and in order that such decision be
binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by
the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of this Court. Judicial
decorum and certainty of law require a Division Bench to follow the
decision of another Division Bench and of a larger Bench and, even
if, the reasons to be stated, a different view was necessitated, the
matter should be only referred to Hon'ble The Chief Justice for
referring the question to a larger Bench.
28
23) The learned senior counsel emphasizes the fact that the present
appellants were not heard when the appeals were decided by the
High Court, due to non-listing or disposal of the matters when their
counsel had submitted "illness slip" and was not present in Court. He
further states that in several cases, the appellants had died, and the
applications for substitution of legal heirs were filed by the
Development Authority, which were pending in all but in one case.
In the one case [presently numbered as C.A. No. 5421/2006], Shri.
Varma states that the application was dismissed by the Court. He
contends that the rules of natural justice of providing a fair hearing
have not been followed. He states that it would be in the interest of
justice to remand the matters back to the High Court to decide the
appeals on merits, keeping in view the parameters while disposing of
the first appeals by the High Court. Shri. Shorawala, learned counsel
for the respondent, does not seriously dispute the issue of non-listing
raised by the appellants, except stating that the cause list was
published under the authority of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the
High Court, and it was not the practice of any Court to dispose of a
matter without it being listed.
29
24) We have considered the contention canvassed by Shri. Varma,
learned senior counsel and the affidavit filed by Shri. V.P. Rai in
this regard. It is possible that due to the same nature of the matters,
the learned Division Bench sitting in appeal may have considered it
proper to dispose of the matters though they were not listed on the
said day or the advocate for the appellants was not present. This
issue is raised only in thirteen appeals filed before us. With regard to
seventeen appeals, the appellants have contended that the
substitution of legal heirs had not happened, and that the matter had
abated.
25) It is in C.A. No. 5421 of 2006, in which the appellants have
contended that the application for substitution was rejected, and by
that order, the appeal had abated. We have perused the appeal paper
books, and do not find any ground taken in this regard. Even the
order dated 7/1/2004, by which the application for substitution was
supposedly rejected by the High Court, has not been annexed. In the
light of this, we are not inclined to accept the argument that the
appeal had abated.
26) On perusal of the appeal paper books of the thirty appeals before us,
we find that in some of the appeals [namely C.A. Nos. 5429/2006
30
and 5457/2006], the presence of the learned counsel is recorded
Though some of the appellants before us may not have been heard
by the High Court due to non-listing of the matter or disposal in the
absence of the advocate, it is clear from the impugned orders
enclosed in some of the appeal paper books that the learned counsel
for some of the appellants have been heard. It is settled position that
the Court speaks through its order and whatever stated therein has to
be read as correct and, therefore, we will go by what is recorded in
the impugned judgment, rather than what the counsel have stated at
the time of hearing of these appeals. In this view of the matter, we
are not inclined to accept that the learned counsel were not heard in
all the matters against which appeals are filed.
27) Having regard to the submissions urged on behalf of the appellants
in so far as not considering the application for substitution of the
L.Rs. of deceased appellants, we would have remitted the matter
back to the High Court to give an opportunity to the appellants
herein, who are the legal representatives of some of the deceased
appellants to afford an opportunity of hearing and decide the appeals
on merits. That, however, would only be a formality because having
regard to the law laid down by this Court in Gafar's case, the High
31
Court is bound to follow that decision, since the notification for
acquiring the lands in respect of the villages are one and the same.
28) The learned senior counsel may be, as a last salvo, submits that in
the event, we are not inclined to grant any of the reliefs that he has
asked for, then we may direct that the amounts paid by way of
compensation pursuant to the judgment of the Reference Court need
not be recovered and the securities furnished by some of the
appellants need not be enforced. This prayer is contested by the
learned counsel for the respondents. This request of Shri. Varma
appears to be reasonable. The land acquisition in question is of two
decades old, and it is plausible that the landowners have utilized the
compensation amount paid for one purpose or the other. In such
circumstances, we are not inclined to put an extra burden of
repayment on them. Therefore, while dismissing the appeals, we
clarify that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in
the interest of justice, we restrain the respondents from recovering
the amounts paid as compensation or enforcing security offered
while withdrawing the compensation amount pursuant to order
passed by the Reference Court.
32
29) In light of the above, the appeals are dismissed with the rider as
indicated by us at paragraph 28 of the judgment. Costs are made
easy.
..............................J.
[ D.K. JAIN ]
........................
......J.
[ H. L. DATTU ]
New Delhi,
July 19, 2011.
33
