LawforAll
advocatemmmohan
- advocatemmmohan
- since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws
WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD
WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
whether the arbitrator can grant interest inspite of prohibition in the agreement - On 16.05.1988, the respondent was awarded with a contract for the work of Provision of Signaling Arrangements at "C" Class Stations on Igatpuri-Bhusawal Section and 2 "C" Stations on Bhusawal-Badnera Section of Bhusawal Division of Central Railway at the cost of Rs.18,10,400/-. On completion of the contract, the respondent raised certain disputes/claims by filing Suit No. 2822 of 1993 before the High Court and demanded for adjudication through arbitration. The High Court directed the General Manager of the Central Railway to appoint an arbitrator and refer the disputes for adjudication. Since the Arbitrator appointed could not deliberate the matter within the time limit, the respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the Umpire. The Umpire, by order dated 26.04.2005, gave award for Claim Nos. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13 and rejected Claim Nos. 2, 5, 7 & 14 and
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2005 OF 2007
Union of India .... Appellant (s)
Versus
M/s Krafters Engineering & Leasing
(P) Ltd. .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) This appeal by Union of India arises out of the final
judgment and order dated 24.04.2006 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 219 of 2006
in Arbitration Petition No. 274 of 2005 whereby the
Division Bench of the High Court dismissed their appeal.
1
2) Brief facts:
(a) On 16.05.1988, the respondent was awarded with a
contract for the work of Provision of Signaling
Arrangements at "C" Class Stations on Igatpuri-Bhusawal
Section and 2 "C" Stations on Bhusawal-Badnera Section
of Bhusawal Division of Central Railway at the cost of
Rs.18,10,400/-. On completion of the contract, the
respondent raised certain disputes/claims by filing Suit
No. 2822 of 1993 before the High Court and demanded for
adjudication through arbitration. The High Court directed
the General Manager of the Central Railway to appoint an
arbitrator and refer the disputes for adjudication. Since
the Arbitrator appointed could not deliberate the matter
within the time limit, the respondent invoked the
jurisdiction of the Umpire. The Umpire, by order dated
26.04.2005, gave award for Claim Nos. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12 & 13 and rejected Claim Nos. 2, 5, 7 & 14 and
2
mentioned that a bank guarantee towards security deposit
against claim No. 4 is to be returned.
(b) Challenging the award given by the Umpire for Claim
Nos. 11 & 13, the appellant herein filed Arbitration
Petition No. 274 of 2005 before the High Court. The
learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide order dated
06.12.2005 dismissed their petition.
(c) Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned single
Judge, the appellant herein filed an appeal being
Arbitration Appeal No. 219 of 2006 before the Division
Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench, by
impugned order dated 24.04.2006, dismissed the appeal.
Challenging the said order, the Union of India preferred
this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
3) Heard Mr. A. S. Chandhiok, learned Additional
Solicitor General for the Union of India and Mr. Ramesh
Babu M.R., learned counsel for the respondent.
3
4) Before the High Court as well as before us, the
appellant projected their case only with regard to interest
that was granted by the arbitrator and confirmed by the
High Court. Therefore, the only point for consideration in
this appeal is whether an arbitrator has jurisdiction to
grant interest despite the agreement prohibiting the same?
5) Though the appellant has challenged the award of the
Umpire in respect of Claim Nos. 11 and 13, they are
mainly concerned about grant of interest; hence there is
no need to traverse all the factual details except the
required one which we have adverted to. According to Mr.
A.S. Chandhiok, learned ASG, in view of clause 1.15 of the
General Conditions of the Contract between the parties,
the arbitrator does not have the power to award interest
pendente lite. The said clause reads as under:
"1.15 Interest on Amounts - No interest will be payable
upon the Earnest Money or the Security Deposit or
amounts payable to the Contractor under the Contract
but Government Securities deposited in terms of clause
1.14.4 will be repayable with interest accrued thereon."
4
According to the learned ASG, in view of the above-
mentioned clause, no interest is payable on the amount
payable to the Contractor under the contract. On the
other hand, Mr. Ramesh Babu M.R., learned counsel
appearing for the respondent submitted that irrespective
of the bar in the contract arbitrator has power to award
interest for which he strongly relied on the decision of this
Court in Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta vs.
Engineers-De-Space-Age, (1996) 1 SCC 516 and
Madnani Construction Corporation Private Limited vs.
Union of India and Others, (2010) 1 SCC 549.
6) We have already extracted the relevant clause
wherein the words "amounts payable to the Contractor
under the contract" are of paramount importance. If there
is no prohibition in the arbitration agreement to exclude
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to entertain a claim for
interest on the amount due under the contract, the
arbitrator is free to consider and award interest in respect
5
of the period. If there is a prohibition in the agreement to
pay the interest, in that event, the arbitrator cannot grant
the interest. Clause 1.15 prohibits payment of interest on
the amount payable to the contractor under the contract.
7) It is not in dispute that the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 alone are applicable to the case on
hand. Now, let us consider various decisions of this Court
dealing with similar prohibition in the agreement for grant
of interest. In Secretary, Irrigation Department,
Government of Orissa and Others vs. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1
SCC 508, the Constitution Bench had considered Section
29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which deals with interest
pendente lite. After analyzing the scheme of the Act and
various earlier decisions, the Constitution Bench
considered the very same issue, namely, whether an
arbitrator has power to award interest pendente lite and, if
so, on what principle. The relevant paragraphs are
extracted hereunder:-
6
"43. The question still remains whether arbitrator has the
power to award interest pendente lite, and if so on what
principle. We must reiterate that we are dealing with the
situation where the agreement does not provide for grant of
such interest nor does it prohibit such grant. In other words,
we are dealing with a case where the agreement is silent as
to award of interest. On a conspectus of aforementioned
decisions, the following principles emerge:
(i) A person deprived of the use of money to which he
is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the
deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest,
compensation or damages. This basic consideration is as
valid for the period the dispute is pending before the
arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator
entering upon the reference. This is the principle of Section
34, Civil Procedure Code and there is no reason or principle
to hold otherwise in the case of arbitrator.
(ii) An arbitrator is an alternative form (sic forum) for
resolution of disputes arising between the parties. If so, he
must have the power to decide all the disputes or differences
arising between the parties. If the arbitrator has no power to
award interest pendente lite, the party claiming it would
have to approach the court for that purpose, even though he
may have obtained satisfaction in respect of other claims
from the arbitrator. This would lead to multiplicity of
proceedings.
(iii) An arbitrator is the creature of an agreement. It is
open to the parties to confer upon him such powers and
prescribe such procedure for him to follow, as they think fit,
so long as they are not opposed to law. (The proviso to
Section 41 and Section 3 of Arbitration Act illustrate this
point). All the same, the agreement must be in conformity
with law. The arbitrator must also act and make his award
in accordance with the general law of the land and the
agreement.
(iv) Over the years, the English and Indian courts have
acted on the assumption that where the agreement does not
prohibit and a party to the reference makes a claim for
interest, the arbitrator must have the power to award
interest pendente lite. Thawardas has not been followed in
the later decisions of this Court. It has been explained and
distinguished on the basis that in that case there was no
claim for interest but only a claim for unliquidated damages.
It has been said repeatedly that observations in the said
judgment were not intended to lay down any such absolute
7
or universal rule as they appear to, on first impression. Until
Jena case almost all the courts in the country had upheld
the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente lite.
Continuity and certainty is a highly desirable feature of law.
(v) Interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive
law, like interest for the period anterior to reference (pre-
reference period). For doing complete justice between the
parties, such power has always been inferred.
44. Having regard to the above consideration, we think that
the following is the correct principle which should be
followed in this behalf:
Where the agreement between the parties does not
prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest
and that dispute (along with the claim for principal amount
or independently) is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have
the power to award interest pendente lite. This is for the
reason that in such a case it must be presumed that interest
was an implied term of the agreement between the parties
and therefore when the parties refer all their disputes -- or
refer the dispute as to interest as such -- to the arbitrator,
he shall have the power to award interest. This does not
mean that in every case the arbitrator should necessarily
award interest pendente lite. It is a matter within his
discretion to be exercised in the light of all the facts and
circumstances of the case, keeping the ends of justice in
view."
8) In Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor
Irrigation Division, Orissa and Others vs. N.C
Budharaj (deceased) by LRs and Others, (2001) 2 SCC
721, another Constitution Bench considered payment of
interest for pre-reference period in respect of cases arising
when Interest Act, 1839 was in force. The following
conclusion in para 26 is relevant which reads thus:
8
"26. For all the reasons stated above, we answer the
reference by holding that the arbitrator appointed with or
without the intervention of the court, has jurisdiction to
award interest, on the sums found due and payable, for the
pre-reference period, in the absence of any specific
stipulation or prohibition in the contract to claim or grant
any such interest. The decision in Jena case taking a contra
view does not lay down the correct position and stands
overruled, prospectively, which means that this decision
shall not entitle any party nor shall it empower any court to
reopen proceedings which have already become final, and
apply only to any pending proceedings. No costs."
(Emphasis supplied).
9) In the earlier paras, we have referred to the stand
taken by the learned counsel for the respondent and
reliance based on the decision reported in Board of
Trustees for the Port of Calcutta (supra). It is true
that in that decision, this Court has held that arbitrator
has jurisdiction to interpret the clauses of the contract
and to decide whether interest pendente lite could be
awarded by him. The short question that arose in that
case was that the arbitrator had awarded interest
pendente lite notwithstanding the prohibition contained in
the contract against the payment of interest on delayed
payments. Ultimately, the two-Judge Bench of this Court
has concluded that irrespective of the terms of the
9
contract, the arbitrator was well within his jurisdiction in
awarding interest pendente lite. It is useful to point out
that the ratio in that decision was considered by this
Court in Sayeed Ahmed and Company vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2009) 12 SCC 26. While
considering the very same issue, particularly, specific
clause in the agreement prohibiting interest pendente lite,
this Court considered the very same decision i.e. Board of
Trustees for the Port of Calcutta (supra). After
adverting to the clause in the Board of Trustees for the
Port of Calcutta (supra) and the Constitution Bench in
G.C. Roy's case (supra), this Court concluded as under:
"23. The observation in Engineers-De-Space-Age that the
term of the contract merely prohibits the
department/employer from paying interest to the contractor
for delayed payment but once the matter goes to the
arbitrator, the discretion of the arbitrator is not in any
manner stifled by the terms of the contract and the
arbitrator will be entitled to consider and grant the interest
pendente lite, cannot be used to support an outlandish
argument that bar on the Government or department paying
interest is not a bar on the arbitrator awarding interest.
Whether the provision in the contract bars the employer
from entertaining any claim for interest or bars the
contractor from making any claim for interest, it amounts to
a clear prohibition regarding interest. The provision need not
contain another bar prohibiting the arbitrator from awarding
10
interest. The observations made in the context of interest
pendente lite cannot be used out of contract.
24. The learned counsel for the appellant next contended on
the basis of the above observations in Engineers-De-Space-
Age, that even if Clause G1.09 is held to bar interest in the
pre-reference period, it should be held not to apply to the
pendente lite period, that is, from 14-3-1997 to 31-7-2001.
He contended that the award of interest during the pendency
of the reference was within the discretion of the arbitrator
and therefore, the award of interest for that period could not
have been interfered with by the High Court. In view of the
Constitution Bench decisions in G.C. Roy and N.C. Budharaj
rendered before and after the decision in Engineers-De-
Space-Age, it is doubtful whether the observation in
Engineers-De-Space-Age in a case arising under the
Arbitration Act, 1940 that the arbitrator could award interest
pendente lite, ignoring the express bar in the contract, is
good law. But that need not be considered further as this is
a case under the new Act where there is a specific provision
regarding award of interest by the arbitrator."
10) Considering the specific prohibition in the agreement
as discussed and interpreted by the Constitution Bench,
we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in
Sayeed Ahmed and Company (supra) and we cannot
possibly agree with the observation in Board of Trustees
for the Port of Calcutta (supra) in a case arising under
the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the arbitrator could award
interest pendente lite ignoring the express bar in the
contract.
11
11) In Union of India vs. Saraswat Trading Agency
and Others, (2009) 16 SCC 504, though it was under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court has
considered elaborately about the legal position in regard to
interest after adverting to all the earlier decisions and
basing reliance on clause 31 of the agreement held:
"33. In the case in hand Clause 31 of the agreement is
materially different. It bars payment of any interest or damage
to the contractor for any reason whatsoever. We are, therefore,
clearly of the view that no pre-reference or pendente lite interest
was payable to the respondent on the amount under Item 3 and
the arbitrator's award allowing pre-reference and pendente lite
interest on that amount was plainly in breach of the express
terms of the agreement. The order of the High Court insofar as
pre-reference and pendente lite interest on the amount under
Item 3 is concerned is, therefore, unsustainable."
12) At the end of the argument, learned counsel for the
respondent heavily relied on the recent decision of this
Court in Madnani Construction Corporation Private
Limited (supra) which arose under the Arbitration Act,
1940. There also, Clause 30 of SCC and Clause 52 of
GCC prohibits payment of interest. Though the Bench
relied on all the earlier decisions and considered the very
same clause as to which we are now discussing, upheld
12
the order awarding interest by the arbitrator de hors to
specific bar in the agreement. It is relevant to point out
that the decision of Madnani Construction Corporation
Private Limited (supra) was cited before another Bench
of this Court in Sree Kamatchi Amman Constructions
vs. Divisional Railway Manager (Works), Palghat and
Others, (2010) 8 SCC 767, wherein the decision in
Madnani Construction Corporation Private Limited
(supra) was very much discussed and considered. After
adverting to all the earlier decisions including the
Constitution Bench judgments, this Court has analyzed
the effect of Madnani Construction Corporation Private
Limited (supra). The following discussion and ultimate
conclusion are relevant:
"17. In Madnani the arbitrator had awarded interest
pendente lite, that is, from the date of appointment of
arbitrator to the date of award. The High Court had
interfered with the same on the ground that there was a
specific prohibition in the contract regarding awarding of
interest. This Court following the decision in Engineers-De-
Space-Age reversed the said rejection and held as follows:
(Madnani case, SCC pp. 560-61, para 39)
13
"39. In the instant case also the relevant clauses,
which have been quoted above, namely, Clause 16(2) of GCC
and Clause 30 of SCC do not contain any prohibition on the
arbitrator to grant interest. Therefore, the High Court was
not right in interfering with the arbitrator's award on the
matter of interest on the basis of the aforesaid clauses. We
therefore, on a strict construction of those clauses and
relying on the ratio in Engineers find that the said clauses do
not impose any bar on the arbitrator in granting interest."
18. At the outset it should be noticed that Engineers-De-
Space-Age and Madnani arose under the old Arbitration Act,
1940 which did not contain a provision similar to Section
31(7) of the new Act. This Court, in Sayeed Ahmed held that
the decisions rendered under the old Act may not be of
assistance to decide the validity of grant of interest under
the new Act. The logic in Engineers-De-Space-Age was that
while the contract governed the interest from the date of
cause of action to date of reference, the arbitrator had the
discretion to decide the rate of interest from the date of
reference to date of award and he was not bound by any
prohibition regarding interest contained in the contract,
insofar as pendente lite period is concerned. This Court in
Sayeed Ahmed held that the decision in Engineers-De-Space-
Age would not apply to cases arising under the new Act. We
extract below, the relevant portion from Sayeed Ahmed:
(SCC p. 36, paras 23-24)
"23. The observation in Engineers-De-Space-Age that
the term of the contract merely prohibits the
department/employer from paying interest to the contractor
for delayed payment but once the matter goes to the
arbitrator, the discretion of the arbitrator is not in any
manner stifled by the terms of the contract and the
arbitrator will be entitled to consider and grant the interest
pendente lite, cannot be used to support an outlandish
argument that bar on the Government or department paying
interest is not a bar on the arbitrator awarding interest.
Whether the provision in the contract bars the employer
from entertaining any claim for interest or bars the
contractor from making any claim for interest, it amounts to
a clear prohibition regarding interest. The provision need not
contain another bar prohibiting the arbitrator from awarding
interest. The observations made in the context of interest
pendente lite cannot be used out of contract.
14
24. The learned counsel for the appellant next
contended on the basis of the above observations in
Engineers-De-Space-Age, that even if Clause G 1.09 is held to
bar interest in the pre-reference period, it should be held not
to apply to the pendente lite period, that is, from 14-3-1997
to 31-7-2001. He contended that the award of interest
during the pendency of the reference was within the
discretion of the arbitrator and therefore, the award of
interest for that period could not have been interfered with
by the High Court. In view of the Constitution Bench
decisions in G.C. Roy and N.C. Budharaj rendered before and
after the decision in Engineers-De-Space-Age, it is doubtful
whether the observation in Engineers-De-Space-Age in a case
arising under the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the arbitrator
could award interest pendente lite, ignoring the express bar
in the contract, is good law. But that need not be considered
further as this is a case under the new Act where there is a
specific provision regarding award of interest by the
arbitrator."
The same reasoning applies to the decision in Madnani also
as that also relates to a case under the old Act and did not
independently consider the issue but merely relied upon the
decision in Engineers-De-Space-Age.
19. Section 37(1) of the new Act by using the words "unless
otherwise agreed by the parties" categorically clarifies that
the arbitrator is bound by the terms of the contract insofar
as the award of interest from the date of cause of action to the
date of award. Therefore, where the parties had agreed that
no interest shall be payable, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot
award interest between the date when the cause of action
arose to the date of award.
20. We are of the view that the decisions in Engineers-De-
Space-Age and Madnani are inapplicable for yet another
reason. In Engineers-De-Space-Age and Madnani the
arbitrator had awarded interest for the pendente lite period.
This Court upheld the award of such interest under the old
Act on the ground that the arbitrator had the discretion to
decide whether interest should be awarded or not during the
pendente lite period and he was not bound by the
contractual terms insofar as the interest for the pendente lite
period. But in the instant case the Arbitral Tribunal has
refused to award interest for the pendente lite period. Where
the Arbitral Tribunal has exercised its discretion and refused
15
award of interest for the period pendente lite, even if the
principles in those two cases were applicable, the award of
the arbitrator could not be interfered with. On this ground
also the decisions in Engineers-De-Space-Age and Madnani
are inapplicable..."
13) Inasmuch as we have already expressed similar view
as mentioned above and conveyed our inability to apply
the reasoning in Madnani Construction Corporation
Private Limited (supra), we fully endorse the view
expressed in Sree Kamatchi Amman Constructions
(supra).
14) In the light of the above discussion, following
conclusion emerge:
Reliance based on the ratio in Board of Trustees for
the Port of Calcutta (supra) is unacceptable since the
said view has been overruled in Sayeed Ahmed and
Company (supra) and insofar as the ratio in Madnani
Construction Corporation Private Limited (supra)
which is also unacceptable for the reasons mentioned in
the earlier paras, we reject the stand taken by the counsel
for the respondent. On the other hand, we fully accept the
16
stand of the Union of India as rightly projected by Mr. A.S.
Chandhiok, learned ASG. We reiterate that where the
parties had agreed that no interest shall be payable, the
arbitrator cannot award interest for the amounts payable
to the contractor under the contract. Where the
agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of
interest and where a party claims interest and the said
dispute is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the
power to award interest pendent elite. As observed by the
Constitution Bench in G.C. Roy's case (supra), in such a
case, it must be presumed that interest was an implied
term of the agreement between the parties. However, this
does not mean that in every case, the arbitrator should
necessarily award interest pendente lite. In the
subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench, i.e., N.C.
Budharaj's case (supra), it has been reiterated that in
the absence of any specific stipulation or prohibition in
the contract to claim or grant any such interest, the
17
arbitrator is free to award interest.
15) In the light of the above principle and in view of the
specific prohibition of contract contained in Clause 1.15,
the arbitrator ceases to have the power to grant interest.
We also clarify that the Arbitration Act, 1940 does not
contain any specific provision relating to the power of
arbitrator to award interest. However, in the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996, there is a specific provision with
regard to award of interest by the arbitrator. The bar
under clause 1.15 is absolute and interest cannot be
awarded without rewriting the contract.
16) For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the award of
the arbitrator granting interest in respect of the amount
payable to the contractor under the contract as well as the
order of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
of the High Court confirming the same.
17) Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent
pointed out above with no order as to costs.
18
..........................................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
..........................................J.
(A.K. PATNAIK)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 12, 2011.
19