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Thursday, July 14, 2011
WHAT IS ARRIVED SHIP, WHAT IS LAY TIME. WHEN DAMAGE ARISE = the Charterers had accepted the responsibility for the failure of the vessel to discharge her cargo at Vadinar and had agreed to bear all the expenses for the delay in diversion of the vessel from Vadinar to Mumbai, including the time spent at 51 Vadinar port and the expenses incurred towards pilotage, tugs and other port expenses. 49. Apart from the above, Clause 4(1) of Part II of the Charter Party specifically provides that extra expenses incurred on account of any change in loading or discharging ports, has to be paid by the Charterers, and any time thereby lost to the vessel shall count as used lay time. We are not inclined to accept Mr. Gupta's submission that the aforesaid clause has to be read in the context of Clauses 4(a) and 4(b) which refer to ports other than Indian Ports in a different context.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.19461 of 2006
SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. ... PETITIONER(s)
VS.
MARE SHIPPING INC. ... RESPONDENT(s)
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
1. The Special Leave Petition arises out of the
Judgment and Order dated 24.10.2005 passed by the
learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in
2
A.P.No.531 of 2003 affirming the Award of the
Arbitral Tribunal dated 8.9.2005, and the judgment
and order dated 20.1.2006 passed by the Division
Bench dismissing A.N.No.1158 of 2005 filed by the
Petitioners herein.
2. On 9.11.1999 the Petitioners and the
Respondent(s) entered into a Charter Party in
respect of the Respondents' vessel, "m.t.
Prestige", for carriage of minimum 8150 metric
tonnes of crude oil from the Egyptian Red Sea port
of Ras Sukheir to one/two safe
anchorage(s)/lighterage points/SBM(s)/one/two safe
port(s)one/two safe berth(s) anywhere in India.
The vessel was described in Clause 41 of the
Charter Party as being fitted with "AK Tongue Type
Bow Chain Stopper of min SWL 2000 Mts."
3. Clause 9 of the Charter Party provided for
settlement of all disputes arising out of the
3
Charter Party by arbitration under the Arbitration
& Conciliation Act, 1996, and the Maritime
Arbitration Rules of the Indian Council of
Arbitration (ICA).
4. The vessel arrived at Ras Sukheir at 4.00 a.m.
on 19.11.1999 and tendered Notice of Readiness
(NOR). The loading commenced at 10 p.m. on
20.11.1999 and was completed by 3.15 p.m. on
21.11.1999. The total lay time provided for
loading and discharge of cargo was 72 running
hours. Out of the said lay time hours, the lay
time used at Ras Sukheir was 37 hours and 30
minutes. On account of a mishap involving the
vessel's anchor and the submarine pipe-lines, the
vessel was delayed at Ras Sukheir for fourteen days
and could leave the port only on 4.12.1999. On
6.12.1999 while the vessel was sailing, the
Respondents nominated Vadinar Single Berth Mooring
(SBM) for discharge of the cargo. Port of
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discharge had not been nominated earlier. The
vessel arrived at Vadinar and the Master tendered
NOR at 8 p.m. on 15.12.1999. Since the vessel had
only one chain stopper/Bow Panama Chock, which had
been specified in the Charter Party, the vessel
could not be safely moored at the SBM and the
Master was asked by the Receiver, Indian Oil
Corporation on 21.12.1999 to take away the vessel
from the Vadinar SBM.
5. On 21.12.1999 a message was sent to the
Petitioners' Agents, M/s. J.M. Baxi & Co. by the
Manager of the Respondents drawing attention to the
fact that the vessel could not be berthed at the
SBM and requesting that immediate steps be taken to
berth the vessel. In the absence of any positive
response to the said letter, the Respondents'
lawyer, Mr. Prashant Pratap, sent a legal notice to
the Petitioners on 24.12.1999 indicating that the
vessel continued to await discharge incurring
5
demurrage for which the Petitioners were held
responsible. The Petitioners were also informed
that on account of the detention of the vessel at
Vadinar, there was a serious possibility of the
vessel missing its next engagement.
6. Finally a decision was arrived at on 28.12.1999
and Addendum No.1 to the Charter Party dated
9.11.1999 was drawn up and signed by the Owners and
the Charterers containing the following further
conditions agreed upon, namely,
a) m.t. Prestige will be diverted by the
Charterers from Vadinar to L.P.O. Mumbai for
discharge.
b) Charterers will pay freight basis Ras
Sukheir/LPO Mumbai where cargo will be
discharged into a daughter vessel and
Charterers will pay all the expenses of the
daughter vessel, M.T. Maharaja Agrasen.
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(c) Charterers will bear the cost of deviation
of m.t. Prestige basis Ras Sukheir/LPO Mumbai
v/s Ras Sukheir/Vadinar/LOP Mumbai which
included time at the demurrage rate.
d) The extra cost of bunkers incurred as a
result of the deviation will be on Charterers'
account, subject to the Owners submitting
documentary evidence.
(e) All direct expenses incurred by the Owners
at Vadinar towards pilotage, tugs and other
port expenses and Agency fees, will be settled
by the Charterers.
(f) Demurrage to be settled as per Charter
Party terms.
7. Pursuant to the above arrangement, m.t.
Prestige sailed from Vadinar at 1 a.m. on
29.12.1999 and arrived at Mumbai Lighterage point
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on 30.12.1999 at 2 p.m. The vessel tendered Notice
of Readiness at 2 p.m. on 30.12.1999 and completed
discharge at 3.30 p.m. on 1.1.2000. The
Respondents/Owners submitted their demurrage claims
along with supporting documents to the Charterers
on 3.2.2000. As the said claim was disputed,
arbitration was invoked by the parties under the
provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act,
1996, hereinafter referred to as "the 1996 Act".
Both the parties appointed their Arbitrators and
the two Arbitrators appointed a third as the
Presiding Arbitrator. The Arbitrators made and
published their Award dated 26.8.2003 by which they
allowed the Respondents' demurrage claim in full.
Certain other amounts payable under the Addendum
dated 28.12.1999 were also awarded in favour of the
Claimants/Respondents.
8. The said Award was challenged by the
Petitioners/Charterers in the Bombay High Court on
8
the ground that the Respondents had not proved that
the Notice of Readiness had been tendered at
Vadinar and consequently the Respondents were not
entitled to demurrage for the period that m.t.
Prestige was detained at Vadinar. The learned
Single Judge of the High Court accepted the
submission made on the Petitioners' behalf and by
his order dated 25.4.2005 remitted the matter to
the Arbitration for a proper finding in this
regard, with leave to the Respondents/owners to
lead evidence to prove tender of the Notice of
Readiness to the Petitioners/Charterers.
9. After remand, the Arbitrators passed another
Award on 8.9.2005 after admitting fresh evidence,
including documentary evidence, holding that the
service of the Notice of Readiness by the Master of
the vessel on the Agents of the Petitioners at
Jamnagar had been duly proved in view of the
evidence of the Petitioners' witness, Mr. Sunil
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D'Souza that he had asked Captain Jude D'Souza for
a copy of the Notice of Readiness sent by the
Master to the Petitioners' Agents at Jamnagar. The
said fact was also confirmed by Mr. S.J. Joshi
during his evidence before the Tribunal. The
Arbitrators also noted that no attempt had been
made by the Charterers to rebut Mr. Sunil D'Souza's
evidence by producing Captain Jude D'Souza.
10. The Tribunal accordingly held that the
Respondents/Owners were entitled to receive
demurrage in the amount of U.S. $220376.48,
together with interest and costs, as awarded in the
earlier Award of 26.8.2003.
11. On receiving a copy of the Award of the
Tribunal dated 8.9.2005, the Petitioners applied
for amendment of the Petition under Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. However, by order dated 24.10.2005
the learned Single Judge dismissed the Arbitration
10
Petition No.531 of 2003. An appeal, being No.1158
of 2005, was filed by the Petitioners before the
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court which
dismissed the same on 20.1.2006.
12. The present Special Leave Petition has been
filed against the said Award of the Arbitration
dated 8.9.2005, as well as the judgments and orders
dated 24.10.2005 and 20.1.2006 passed by the
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court confirming the Award.
13. Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, who
appeared for the Petitioners, focused his
submissions on the sustainability of the
Respondents' claim for demurrage. Urging that a
claim for demurrage can only arise after the expiry
of the "lay days", namely, the time specified for
loading or discharging the cargo from the vessel,
Mr. Gupta submitted that the all-important question
11
in respect of such a claim is when do the lay days
commence and when are they used up. Mr. Gupta
submitted that the commencement of lay days depends
on three factors :-
a) Firstly, the ship must be an "arrived
ship" in order to give Notice of
Readiness.
b) Secondly, she must have given the
prescribed notice to load or
discharge, as the case may be.
c) Thirdly, she must be ready to load or
discharge, as the case may be.
14. Mr. Gupta submitted that whether the ship is an
"arrived ship" or not depends on the point
designated as the destination in the mutual
understanding of the parties in the Charter Party
itself or the terms thereof - the degree of
precision being a matter of agreement between the
12
parties. Mr. Gupta urged that in practice, the
destination is usually a part or a specified area
within the port such as a basin, a dock, or a buoy
at a certain distance from the shore or a river. A
still more precise point would be where the loading
or discharge is to take place, e.g., a particular
quay, pier, wharf or mooring. Mr. Gupta submitted
that a ship is said to be an "arrived ship" only
when she has reached the particular point and has
moored there. Mr. Gupta urged that the said
propositions are well-established and have been
laid down in (1) Leonis Steamship Company Ltd. Vs.
Rank Limited (1908) 1 K.B. 499; (2) Armament Adolf
Deppe Vs. John Robinson & Company Ltd. [1917] 2
K.B. 204; and (3) Owners of S.S. Plata Vs. Ford &
Co. (1917) 2 K.B. 593. We shall have recourse to
refer to the aforesaid decisions later in this
judgment.
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15. Mr. Gupta submitted that Clause `D' of the
Charter Party dated 9.11.1999, specifies
"discharging port" as one/two safe
anchorage(s)/lighterage point(s)/SBM(s), 1/2 safe
Ports, 1/2 safe Berth(s) and full India. Mr. Gupta
also submitted that the Charter Party provides that
on arrival of the vessel for discharge at Vadinar,
the vessel was to maintain 70% of her deadweight on
board for safe mooring at a SBM.
16. Mr. Gupta urged that by a communication dated
6.12.1999, the Petitioners/Charterers designated
Vadinar SBM as the destination and not a `Port'.
The destination was, therefore, a specific point
and not a large area like a Port. Vadinar SBM,
therefore, became the destination as if
incorporated in the Charter Party itself. Mr.
Gupta submitted that inspite of the best efforts of
the Terminal Authorities, IOC, who were also the
receivers of the cargo, m.t. Prestige was unable to
14
moor at the Vadinar Single Berth Mooring (SBM) on
account of the fact that it had only one bow chain.
It may be of interest to note that Vadinar is the
only SBM in the whole of India. Mr. Gupta urged
that inspite of the various attempts of the Port
Authorities, the vessel could not be berthed at the
Vadinar SBM and was asked to move away. Mr. Gupta
contended that since the vessel could not be moored
at Vadinar, it was not an "arrived vessel' and "lay
time" could not be said to have commenced running
on 15.12.1999. The Notice of Readiness given by
the Petitioners could not, therefore, be treated as
valid and the period spent at Vadinar could not be
taken into consideration while computing the number
of lay days utilized.
17. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr.
Gupta referred to and relied on the decision of the
House of Lords in the case of Johanna Oldendorff,
(1973) 11 LLR 285, in which Viscount Dilhorne laid
15
down ten tests for determining when a ship is an
arrived ship. Mr. Gupta referred to the first and
fifth tests as being relevant in the context of
this case and the same are extracted hereinbelow :
(i) That under a port Charter Party to
be an "arrived ship", that is to say
a ship at a place where a valid
Notice of Readiness to load or
discharge can be given, she must
have ended her voyage at the port
named; and
(ii) A vessel has not reached her port of
destination until it has ended its
voyage within the port, either in its
legal, or if it differs, in its
commercial sense. If it is refused
permission and ordered to wait
outside the port by the Port
16
Authority, it is not an "arrived
ship".
18. Mr. Gupta submitted that the mere fact that the
vessel had arrived near the SBM and had anchored
there would not make the vessel an "arrived ship",
because the destination was the SBM and not the
port and the vessel could end her voyage only when
she was moored at the SBM, which the vessel was
unable to do. Mr. Gupta submitted that the
decision in Johanna Oldendorff's case was an
affirmation of the Kings Bench decision in the case
of Leonis Steamship Company Ltd. Vs. Rank Limited
(1908) 1 K.B. 499. Mr. Gupta urged that not having
been allowed to berth at the SBM, the vessel could
not be categorized as an "arrived ship" for the
purpose of issuing Notice of Readiness, which Mr.
Gupta submitted had not been served on the
Petitioners in the first place.
17
19. By way of an alternative argument, Mr. Gupta
submitted that under Clause 6 Part II of the
Charter Party, the delay at Vadinar could not be
counted as lay time, because it was the receivers
(I.O.C.) and not the Charterers who declared that
safe berthing of the vessel at Vadinar was not
possible because of infra-structural deficiencies
and not because of any fault on behalf of the
Petitioners since the Petitioners had no control
over the situation. Accordingly, the entire time
from the tender of the Notice of Readiness on
15.12.1999, if at all tendered, till the vessel
started discharge in Bombay, had to be excluded in
calculating lay time.
20. Mr. Gupta submitted that service of the Notice
of Readiness had not been proved even after remand,
as the only evidence tendered was that of Sunil
D'Souza which, in any event, did not prove anything
beyond the fact that he had been asked to get a
18
copy of the Notice of Readiness from the Agent.
Furthermore, the entire evidence of Sunil D'Souza
was hearsay.
21. On the question of Safe Port Warranty, Mr.
Gupta contended that only after all attempts had
been made to berth the vessel at the SBM that it
was asked to move away from the mooring.
Consequently, even if the finding of the
Arbitrators that the Petitioners had failed to
designate a safe port was accepted, at best the
ship owners could be entitled to damages and not
demurrage and would be subject to the ordinary
rules as to remoteness, mitigation etc., as
available under Section 73 of the Contract Act.
Mr. Gupta submitted that the Respondents had
claimed damages before the learned Arbitrators who,
however, allowed demurrage in their Award on the
ground that demurrage is a genuine pre-estimate of
damages. Mr. Gupta submitted that even if there
19
was a breach of warranty on the Petitioners' part,
the same would give rise to a claim for damages and
not demurrage within the scope of Sections 73 and
74 of the Contract Act.
22. Mr. Gupta submitted that in the Addendum dated
28.12.1999 to the Charter Party dated 9.11.1999
since the Charterers had agreed to bear the cost of
deviation basis Ras Sukheir/LPO Mumbai vs Ras
Sukheir/Vadinar/LPO Mumbai, which included time at
the demurrage rate, there could not be a separate
claim for demurrage as that would amount to double
jeopardy. Mr. Gupta submitted that it is the said
provision contained in Clause (f) of the aforesaid
Addendum which has given rise to this arbitration.
Mr. Gupta submitted that although the Award has
relied on Clause 4(1) of Part II of the Charter
Party, which provides that extra expenses incurred
in connection with any change in loading or
discharging ports, has to be paid by the
20
Charterers, and any time thereby lost to the vessel
shall count as used lay time, the said clause would
have to be read in the context of Clauses 4(a) and
4(b) where certain ports, other than any Indian
Port, have been named.
23. On the question of mitigation of damages, Mr.
Gupta urged that the Petitioners/Owners had done
everything in its power to safely berth the vessel
at the SBM Vadinar, which was perhaps the only SBM
in operation in India at the relevant point of time
and would otherwise have been ideal for discharge
of the cargo of crude oil. Mr. Gupta contended
that it was IOC, the receiver, who had taken almost
two weeks to decide to redirect the vessel from
Vadinar to Mumbai. Mr. Gupta submitted that it was,
in effect, the Respondents who did not take any
steps to mitigate the damages.
21
24. On the quantum of demurrage or damages, Mr.
Gupta submitted that since the demurrage rate was
fixed at US $16000 per day and the same has really
a genuine pre-estimate of damages, the Tribunal
should have awarded damages at a reasonable rate,
instead of making its Award on the consideration of
damage as fixed in the Charter Party. Mr. Gupta
urged that the Tribunal had gone completely wrong
in giving a go-bye to the provisions of Sections 73
and 74 of the Contract Act in awarding compensation
in keeping with the provisions for fixed demurrage
in the Charter Party, particularly when all the lay
days had not been used up.
25. Mr. Gupta submitted that the scope of a
petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act had been
considered by this Court in detail in Oil & Natural
Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. [(2003) 5
SCC 705], and it was indicated therein that if the
Award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal was contrary
22
to any of the provisions of the Act or the
substantive law governing the parties or was
against the terms of the contract, the same could
be set aside. Mr. Gupta urged that even in the
instant case, the law had been misapplied by the
Arbitrators who had missed considering the all-
important issue that no valid Notice of Readiness
could have been tendered by a ship which was not an
"arrived ship". In such circumstances, the
petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was
clearly not maintainable.
26. In conclusion, Mr. Gupta drew our attention to
the wording of Clause 6 of the Charter Party which
deals with Notice of Readiness and in particular,
to the last sentence thereof where delay in getting
a berth for a vessel after giving Notice of
Readiness, for any reason over which the Charterer
has no control, shall not count as used lay time.
Mr. Gupta submitted that the facts of the case
23
would clearly indicate that the Arbitral Tribunal
failed to take into consideration the facts in
their true sequence and ended up in a "cart before
the horse" situation, since no demurrage, which is
the consequence of using up all the lay time, could
have been awarded without a correct computation of
the used "lay time".
27. Going to the heart of the matter, Mr. Prashant
Pratap, learned Advocate, submitted that the case
of the Petitioners/Charterers of the vessel
depended primarily on the terms and conditions of
the Charter Party on the basis whereof the Arbitral
Tribunal had awarded demurrage to the
Respondents/Owners of the vessel. As was also done
by Mr. Gupta, special emphasis was laid by Mr.
Prashant Pratap on Clause 6 of the Charter Party
relating to Notice of Readiness. Learned counsel
emphasized the fact that in terms of the said
clause, the Master of the vessel or his Agent would
24
give the Charterer or his Agent notice by letter,
telegraph, wireless or telephone that the vessel is
ready to load or discharge cargo, berth or no
berth, and lay time would commence upon the
expiration of six hours from receipt of such notice
or upon the vessel's arrival in berth, which would
mean finished mooring when at a sea loading or
discharging terminal and all fast when loading or
discharging alongside a wharf whichever first
occurs. Then follows the rider that, however,
where the delay is caused to the vessel getting
into berth after giving Notice of Readiness for any
reason over which the Charterer has no control, the
delay caused could not be counted as used lay time.
28. Mr. Prashant Pratap referred to Clauses 8 and 9
of the Charter Party dealing with Demurrage and
Safe Berthing Shifting. Clause 8 provides that the
Charterer shall pay demurrage per running hour and
pro rata for a part thereof at the rate specified
25
in Part I for all the time taken for loading and
discharging when the time taken for discharging the
cargo exceeds the allowed lay time specified. If,
however, delay in discharge of the cargo is caused
at the port of loading and/or discharge by reason
of fire or other unavoidable circumstances, the
rate of demurrage would be reduced to one-half of
the amount stated in Part I per running hour or pro
rata for part of an hour for demurrage so incurred.
It was also stipulated that the Charterer would not
be liable for demurrage for delay caused by strike,
lockout, stoppage or restraint of labour for
master, officers and crew of the vessel or tugboat
or pilots. Mr. Prashant Pratap also pointed out
that Clause 9 of the Charter Party which provides
for Safe Berthing Shifting indicates that the
vessel shall load and discharge at any safe place
or wharf, or alongside vessels or lighterage point
reachable on her arrival, which shall be designated
26
and procured by the Charterer, provided the vessel
could proceed thereto, lie at and depart therefrom
always safely afloat. Clause 9 also enables the
Charterer to shift the vessel at ports of loading
and/or discharge from one safe berth to another on
payment of towage and pilotage for shifting to the
next berth and other expenses and the time consumed
on account of such shifting would count as used lay
time, except as otherwise provided in Clause 15.
29. Mr. Prashant Pratap then contended that the
question as to whether M/s. m.t. Prestige was an
"arrived ship" or not at port Vadinar, had never
been raised either before the learned Single Judge
or the Division Bench of the High Court, nor was it
taken as a ground in the Special Leave Petition.
Learned counsel submitted that even the ground
taken with regard to the Notice of Readiness being
invalid, as the vessel was allegedly not ready in
all respects to discharge its cargo, was neither
27
argued before the learned Single Judge or the
Division Bench nor was the ground taken in the
Special Leave Petition before this Court.
30. Coming to the question as to what constitutes
an "arrived ship", Mr. Prashant Pratap submitted
that the said question was extensively considered
by the House of Lords in the case of Johanna
Oldendorff (supra), which was also relied upon by
Mr. Gupta, where the House of Lords was of the view
that the vessel should have reached a position in
the port where she is at the immediate and
effective disposition of the Charterers and for
practical purposes it is so much easier to
establish that if the ship is at the usual waiting
place within the port where waiting vessels would
normally lie before proceeding to the berth
nominated by the Charterers for discharge of cargo.
If the vessel is at such a place, then the vessel
is considered to be an "arrived ship". It is only
28
thereafter that the vessel can tender Notice of
Readiness. Furthermore, if the Charter Party
provides for the location where the vessel should
arrive and tender Notice of Readiness, then if the
vessel has reached that location, the vessel is
considered to be an "arrived ship". Mr. Prashant
Pratap submitted that in the present Charter Party,
the parties have expressly agreed in Clause 6 for
the vessel to arrive at customary anchorage
(emphasis supplied) at the port of loading or
discharge and tender Notice of Readiness.
Accordingly, once the vessel arrived at anchorage
at Vadinar, it became an arrived ship in terms of
Clause 6 of the Charter Party and was entitled to
tender Notice of Readiness.
31. Mr. Prashant Pratap submitted that it was not
disputed that M/s. m.t. Presitge was at customary
anchorage at Vadinar Port when Notice of Readiness
was tendered. Mr. Prashant Pratap also placed
29
emphasis on the expression "berth or no berth",
included in Clause 6 of the Charter Party which
meant that even if a berth was not available or the
vessel had not reached the berth, the vessel is
entitled to tender Notice of Readiness. Mr.
Prashant Pratap submitted that the term had been
explained in the case of the NOTOs where dealing
with a clause identical to Clause 6 of the Charter
Party, it was held that the meaning of the said
words indicated that the Notice of Readiness could
be given upon arrival at the customary anchorage
and could take effect whether or not a berth was
then available or not for the vessel.
32. Mr. Prashant Pratap then argued that the
submission made on behalf of the
Petitioners/Charterers that since the destination
in the Charter Party had been shown as "SBM" and
the vessel had failed to be moored at the SBM, no
demurrage could be claimed, was wholly erroneous on
30
account of the fact that such notice could be
tendered on the arrival of the vessel at the
customary anchorage. The vessel is not, therefore,
required to be at the destination within the port
for the purpose of becoming an "arrived ship" and
for tendering of Notice of Readiness.
33. Referring to Mr. Gupta's submissions that for
the purpose of tendering Notice of Readiness, the
vessel must be an arrived ship, Mr. Prashant Pratap
submitted that the vessel, therefore, must be at
the effective disposal of the Charterers who would
have unrestricted access to the vessel's cargo
tanks and the vessel pumps must be in working order
to pump out the cargo upon the hoses being
connected, provided that the Charterers were ready
to receive the cargo. In this regard, Mr. Prashant
Pratap referred to the decision in the Leonis
Steamship Co. Ltd. (supra), where it was observed
by Lord Justice Kennedy that "the ship's
31
obligations, therefore, under such a Charter Party
the performance of which much precede the
commencement of the lay days (as the fixed loading
period is commonly termed) are three : Firstly, the
ship must have arrived at her destination and so be
within the designation of an arrived ship. Till
then she is not entitled to give a Notice of
Readiness to load. Secondly, she must have given
the prescribed Notice of Readiness to load.
Thirdly, she must, in fact, be so far as she is
concerned, ready to load. The ship owner cannot
claim against the Charterer that the lay days begin
to count until the ship is an arrived ship; ..............."
Mr. Prashant Pratap submitted that the aforesaid
passage made it clear that the vessel has to be
ready to load or discharge, as the case may be.
The Tribunal's findings are that the vessel was
ready, but the terminal was not. The Tribunal held
that the vessel was at the immediate and effective
32
disposition of the Charterers when Notice of
Readiness was given.
34. Mr. Prashant Pratap then urged that from the
Charter Party it is quite clear that the
responsibility of providing a berth where the
vessel could moor safely was that of the Charterers
and the same would be clear from the use of the
word "safe" in Clause D of Part I of the Charter
Party which precedes the words
"Ahchorage/Lighterage Points/SBM". Even in terms
of Clause 9 of the Charter Party, the place of
discharge must be safe and has to be designated and
procured by the Charterers. Mr. Prashant Pratap
referred to various other judgments such as the Sea
Queen [(1988) Vol.1 KKR 500] and Fjordaas [(1988)
Vol.1 LLR 336]. In the later case, it has been
indicated that "reachable" or "arrival" are well-
known expressions and mean precisely what they
say. It was further observed that if the berth
33
cannot be reached on arrival, the warranty is
broken, unless there is some relevant protecting
exception. Such berth, in its term, is required to
have two characteristics: it has to be safe and it
also has to be reachable on arrival. By nominating
SBM at Vadinar as the destination of the vessel and
also the place for discharge of the cargo, it was
the responsibility of the Charterers to ascertain
as to whether the vessel could be moored there
safely and be in a position to discharge the cargo
safely.
35. Apart from the aforesaid questions regarding
the vessel being an arrived ship, Mr. Prashant
Pratap urged that service of the Notice of
Readiness by the Master on the Agents of the
Charterers have been duly proved and is a finding
based on appreciation of evidence by the
Arbitrators, which has been upheld by the learned
34
Single Judge and the Division Bench, whose orders
were under challenge in the Special Leave Petition.
36. Mr. Prashant Pratap urged that if the Notice of
Readiness was valid, as had been found not only by
the Arbitral Tribunal but also by the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court, then lay time commenced six hours after
the tender of Notice of Readiness. Accordingly,
lay time expired on 17.12.1999, and, thereafter,
the vessel was on demurrage all throughout, till
discharge of the cargo was completed. Since in
the instant case, the Charterers had failed to
nominate a safe berth at which the vessel could
safely lie and discharge the cargo and failing to
provide a berth which was reachable upon arrival of
the vessel at Vadinar, the consequent delay in
berthing and discharge of the cargo, was the
responsibility of the Charterers for which
demurrage was payable by them. Mr. Prashant Pratap
35
pointed out that at no stage did the Charterers
question the validity of the Notice of Readiness
tendered at Vadinar either on the ground that the
vessel was not an arrived ship, or on the ground
that the vessel was not ready to discharge the
cargo. On the contrary, the Charterers signed the
Addendum dated 28.12.1999 by which they agreed to
bear all the expenses incurred by the vessel at
Vadinar and also agreed to pay additional freight
charges for discharge of cargo at Mumbai.
Significantly, the Charterers also agreed that the
time taken for the vessel to proceed from Vadinar
to Mumbai would count as demurrage time. Mr.
Prashant Pratap urged that the Charterers would not
have agreed to the terms and conditions of the
Addendum if it was their contention that the vessel
was not an arrived ship or that the Notice of
Readiness was invalid.
36
37. Mr. Prashant Pratap then submitted that the
only requirement as far as the vessel was concerned
was that it had to maintain 70% of the dead weight
on board for safe mooring at the SBM at Vadinar and
it is nobody's case that the vessel did not conform
to such condition.
38. On the question of designation of the SBM as
the destination point within Vadinar Port by the
Charterers, Mr. Prashant Pratap contended that the
Charterers had been put on notice regarding the
berthing arrangement both in the Charter Party as
well as in the questionnaire setting out the
vessel's mooring arrangements provided to the
Charterers. Learned counsel submitted that it was
for the Charterers to check the vessel equipment
vis-`-vis facilities available at the Port of
loading and discharge, before nominating the same.
Since the Charterers had failed to undertake such
an exercise, there was a resultant problem faced at
37
Vadinar whereby the vessel could not discharge its
cargo at Vadinar but had to be diverted to Mumbai.
Mr. Prashant Pratap also pointed out that while the
entire Indian coastline was available to the
Charterers to nominate a safe port for discharge of
the cargo, it made a conscious decision to nominate
the SBM at Vadinar which ultimately turned out to
be unsafe for mooring of the vessel, given the
equipment available on board the ship.
39. Mr. Prashant Pratap submitted that it had been
agreed on behalf of the Charterers that demurrage
is a genuine pre-estimate of damages and even if
the Charterers' argument is to be accepted that the
owners are entitled to damages and not demurrage,
the calculation of such damages would have to be
the demurrage rate in the facts and circumstances
of the case.
38
40. Mr. Prashant Pratap, accordingly, submitted
that the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, as upheld
both by the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court, did not warrant any
interference and the Special Leave Petition was
liable to be dismissed with appropriate costs.
41. Having gone through the submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties in the background
of the facts as disclosed, it is clear that we are
required to consider two basic questions for the
purpose of deciding the present Special Leave
Petition, namely :-
(a) Whether on arriving at anchorage point at Port
Vadinar, despite the destination point being
the SBM mooring, it could be said that it was
an arrived ship which was competent under the
Charter Party dated 9.11.1999, to issue Notice
of Readiness of discharge of its cargo?
39
(b) If the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal that
the vessel was an arrived ship at Port Vadinar,
as upheld by the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is
accepted, would the Respondents/Owners of the
vessel be entitled to damages or demurrage?
42. Various ancillary questions connected with the
aforesaid two questions also crop up, which we
shall consider shortly.
43. From the undisputed facts, the position that
emerges is as follows :-
(i) The Charter Party dated 9.11.1999 was in
respect of a transaction which provided for
carriage of crude oil from Ras Sukheir to a
safe port on the Indian coastline. The
Charterers were given the choice of
40
nominating such port for discharge of the
aforesaid cargo of crude oil.
(ii) In the absence of any named port of
destination in the Charter Party itself, it
was only after the vessel left Ras Sukheir
that an intimation was given by the
Charterers for discharge of the cargo at the
SBM at Port Vadinar in Gujarat.
(iii) That the aforesaid nomination was a
conscious decision on the part of the
Charterers, despite having knowledge of the
equipment available on board the vessel for
mooring at a SBM, and in keeping with such
decision m.t. Prestige set its course from
Ras Sukheir to Vadinar.
(iv) The fiasco at Vadinar was occasioned by the
fact that no prior checking had been done to
see whether with the mooring equipment on
41
board, the vessel would be able to safely
berth at the SBM for discharge of its cargo.
(v) Who was responsible for the detention of the
vessel at Vadinar since its arrival at the
anchorage point and its final departure from
the said Port? Whether there was
contributory negligence on the part of both
the parties in the cause of such delay?
44. The concept of an arrived ship in shipping
terminology requires that a vessel should reach a
destination in a port where she could be safely
berthed and thereupon be ready to either discharge
or load cargo from and on to the vessel. That is a
general concept, but the Charterers and the Owners
of the vessel could in the Charter Party agree to a
specific destination point within the port area for
discharging or loading of cargo. Once the vessel
arrived at the said spot and was ready to discharge
42
its cargo, it could be described as an "arrived
ship" with the authority to issue and tender Notice
of Readiness. In the instant case, the nominated
port for the arrival of the vessel was Vadinar
Port, but the destination point was the SBM where
the vessel was to be moored and was to discharge
its cargo of crude oil. In fact, in the Charter
Party dated 9.11.1999, Clause 6 specifically
provided for arrival of the vessel at the port of
loading or discharge and cast an obligation upon
the Master or his Agent to give the Charterer or
his Agent Notice of Readiness in relation to
discharge of the cargo. Since the decision in this
case will to a large extent depend on the
interpretation of Clause 6, the same is extracted
hereinbelow :
"Clause 6 Notice of Readiness :
Upon arrival at customary anchorage at
each port of loading or discharge, the
Master or his Agent shall give the
43
charterer or his Agent notice by letter,
telegraph, wireless or telephone that the
vessel is ready to load or discharge cargo
berth or no berth and lay time as
hereinafter provided shall commence upon
the expiration of six (6) hours after
receipt of such notice or upon the vessel
arrival in berth - finished mooring when
at a sea loading or discharging terminal
and all fast when loading or discharging
alongside a wharf which ever first occurs.
However, where delay is caused to vessel
getting - berth after giving notice of
readiness for any reason over which
charterer has no control, such delay shall
not count as used lay time."
45. As will be evident from the above clause, the
Master of the vessel was under an obligation to
give Notice of Readiness on arrival at the
customary anchorage at the port of discharge. It
is a possibility that since no specific port in the
Indian coastline had been mentioned in the Charter
Party, the Master of the vessel or his Agent was
required to give Notice of Readiness upon the
vessel arriving at customary anchorage. It is only
after the vessel sailed from Ras Sukheir that the
receiver, IOC, nominated Vadinar to be the port of
44
discharge with the specific destination point being
the SBM within the port. In giving such Notice of
Readiness upon arrival at the customary anchorage
at Vadinar, the Master of the Vessel duly complied
with the conditions of Clause 6 of the Charter
Party and in terms of the aforesaid clause
irrespective of whether a berth was available or
not, lay time commenced upon the expiry of six
hours after receipt of such notice. That the
vessel could not be moored at the SBM is a
different facet of the story. The Charterers had
full knowledge of the equipment on board m.t.
Prestige through the questionnaire provided by the
Respondents/Owners to the Petitioners/Charterers.
It could not be denied that despite having such
knowledge the IOC nominated the SBM as the
destination point for discharge of the cargo.
Obviously, the parties to the Charter Party had not
made any attempt to verify as to whether the
45
equipment on board the vessel was sufficient for
her to be safely moored at the SBM and to discharge
her cargo safely. As it turned out later on, the
vessel was not so equipped and could not,
therefore, be moored at the SBM and had to be
requested to move away therefrom. Although, an
attempt has been made on behalf of the Charterers
to convince us that it was really the duty and
responsibility of the Owner of the vessel to check
whether the vessel could be safely moored at the
SBM in Vadinar, we are unable to convince ourselves
that such a duty was that of the Owners of the
vessel and not the Charterers which had a choice of
all the ports in India for discharge of the cargo,
as was subsequently done in Mumbai port. As has
been held by the Arbitral Tribunal and subsequently
affirmed both by the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, the
responsibility for the failure of the ship to moor
46
at the SBM in Vadinar must lie squarely with the
Charterers and the receiver as it was they who had
nominated the SBM for the safe mooring of the
vessel. The lay time must, therefore, be held to
have recommenced after the expiry of six hours from
the tendering of the Notice of Readiness upon the
vessel's arrival at the customary anchorage at
Vadinar on 15.12.1999 in keeping with the
provisions of Clause 6 of the Charter Party. It was
not the case of the Charterers that the failure of
the vessel to discharge its cargo at the SBM at
Vadinar was for reasons beyond their control. It
cannot also be said that the owners of the vessel
contributed in any way to such failure since the
equipment on board the vessel had been made known
to the Charterers when the Charter Party was
signed.
46. In the face of the specific conditions
indicated in Clause 6 of the Charter Party, the
47
theoretical and/or academic exercise of what
constitutes an "arrived ship" loses much of its
relevance. The terms of the Charter Party were
agreed upon by the parties with their eyes wide
open. What is also significant and cuts at the
root of the submissions advanced on behalf of the
Charterers is that even after the vessel was denied
mooring at the SBM for safety reasons on
21.12.1999, no steps were taken on behalf of the
Petitioners to either arrange for an alternate safe
berthing in Vadinar or to give instructions as to
where the cargo was to be discharged. In fact, on
behalf of the Respondents/Owners a legal notice was
addressed to the Petitioners on 24.12.1999 pointing
out that the vessel continued to await discharge
incurring demurrage. It is only thereafter that
Addendum No.I to the Charter Party was drawn up and
signed on 28.12.1999 by the Owners and the
Charterers, whereby m.t. Prestige was diverted by
48
the Charterers from Vadinar to a Lighterage point
at Mumbai port for discharge and it was
specifically agreed that the Charterers would bear
all the costs of discharge, including freight
charges and the expenses of the daughter vessel,
m.t. Maharaja Agrasen. It was also agreed that
demurrage would be settled as per the terms of the
Charter Party. In our view, the various decisions
cited on behalf of the Petitioners/Charterers do
not help them in the facts of this case. We do
not, therefore, think it necessary to consider all
the decisions cited on behalf of the respective
parties and those referred to hereinbefore are
sufficient for our purpose. The decisions relied
upon by the parties lay down certain propositions
of law which are well-established and with which
there cannot be any disagreement, but for the
purposes of this case they are basically academic.
49
47. Once we have affirmed the finding that m.t.
Prestige was an arrived ship on reaching the
customary anchorage at Vadinar port and once we
have also held that it was the Charterers who
having the choice of a safe port, had selected the
SBM at Vadinar as the discharge point, the
suggestion made on behalf of the Charterers that it
was the responsibility of the Owners of the vessel
to check whether the ship could be safely moored at
the SBM, is untenable. The responsibility of the
Owners of the vessel ended with the declaration of
the equipment available on board for mooring and
berthing for the purpose of discharge of its cargo.
Consequently, all the other ancillary issues which
arise have to be answered in favour of the
Respondents herein. As indicated hereinbefore, the
fiasco at Vadinar was occasioned by the fact that
no prior checking had been done by the Charterers
to ascertain as to whether with the mooring
50
equipment on board the vessel she would be able to
moor safely at the SBM for discharge of her cargo.
Even the subsequent deviation of the vessel from
Vadinar to Mumbai was not on account of any laches
on the part of the Owners of the vessel who were
awaiting instructions once the vessel had been
asked to move away from the SBM. In fact, it took
a notice from the Owners of the vessel and a week
for the Charterers to galvanize themselves into
action, which ultimately resulted in the Addendum
No.1 dated 28.12.1999.
48. Read with Clause 6 of the Charter Party, the
Addendum dated 28.12.1999 makes it abundantly clear
that the Charterers had accepted the responsibility
for the failure of the vessel to discharge her
cargo at Vadinar and had agreed to bear all the
expenses for the delay in diversion of the vessel
from Vadinar to Mumbai, including the time spent at
51
Vadinar port and the expenses incurred towards
pilotage, tugs and other port expenses.
49. Apart from the above, Clause 4(1) of Part II of
the Charter Party specifically provides that extra
expenses incurred on account of any change in
loading or discharging ports, has to be paid by the
Charterers, and any time thereby lost to the vessel
shall count as used lay time. We are not inclined
to accept Mr. Gupta's submission that the aforesaid
clause has to be read in the context of Clauses
4(a) and 4(b) which refer to ports other than
Indian Ports in a different context.
50. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with
the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal and the
decisions, both of the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench, confirming the Award of the
Arbitral Tribunal and, accordingly, dismiss the
Special Leave Petition. In the facts of the case,
52
the parties shall bear their own costs as far as
these proceedings are concerned.
................................................J.
(ALTAMAS KABIR)
................................................J.
(A.K. PATNAIK)
NEW DELHI
DATED:JULY 13, 2011