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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4922 OF 2011
[Arising out of SLP [C] No.8497 of 2007]
Smt. Ramkanya Bai & Anr. ... Appellants
Vs.
Jagdish & Ors. ... Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellants claim to be the owners of lands bearing Khasra
Nos.29/2/2 and 29/1. The first respondent Jagdish claims to be the owner of
Khasra Nos.36/3 and 36/4. The first respondent made an application to the
Naib Tahsildar, Tappa Betma, Depalpur, Indore District, under section 131
of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (`Code' for short)
claiming a right of way over Khasra Nos.29/2/2 and 29/1 of the appellants,
to reach his lands bearing Khasra Nos.36/3 and 36/4. The Naib Tahsildar
made on order dated 25.10.2001, under section 131 of the Code, holding that
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first respondent, with his agricultural equipments, bullock-cart etc., was
entitled to pass through the Government Road, Khasra No.21 (East to West)
of the village Salampur and thereafter pass through Khasra Nos. 29/1 and
29/2/2 belonging to the appellants, for reaching his land bearing Khasra
Nos.36/3 and 36/4 and the appellants shall not obstruct such passage. The
appeal by the appellants filed against the said order under section 44 of the
Code was dismissed and the subsequent revision filed by the appellants
under section 50 of the Act was also dismissed.
3. Thereafter appellants filed Civil Suit No.66A/2002 on the file of the
Civil Judge (Class II), Depalpur, Indore district for the following reliefs : (a)
a declaration that the first respondent did not have any right of way over
their lands bearing Nos.29/2/2 and 29/1 to reach his lands bearing Khasra
Nos.36/3 and 36/4 and that they are entitled to enjoy their lands without any
interference from first respondent; (b) for a declaration that the order dated
25.10.2001 passed by the Tahsildar creating a new passage, over khasra
Nos.29/1 and 29/2/2, was illegal; and (c) for a consequential injunction
restraining first respondent from creating/ constructing any new passage,
over their lands. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court, by judgment
dated 4.12.2004 on the ground that having regard to section 131 read with
section 257 of the Code, the revenue court (Tahsildar) alone had jurisdiction
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to grant relief on the basis of custom and convenience of parties, and it did
not have any jurisdiction. The appeal (Appeal No.3-A/2005) filed by the
appellants was dismissed by the first appellate court on 19.4.2005. The
subsequent second appeal filed by the appellants was also dismissed by the
High Court on 19.1.2007. The said judgment is under challenge in this
appeal by special leave.
4. On the contentions urged by the parties, the following questions arise
for our consideration:
(a) Whether the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for
declaration or injunction, claiming a customary easement of right of way or
right to take water, through the land of a servient owner, is barred by section
257 of the Code, on the ground that it is a matter which the Revenue Officer
(Tahsildar) is empowered to decide under section 131 of the Code?
(b) Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the
owner of a land for a declaration that the defendant does not have an
easementary right, customary or otherwise, over his property and the order
of Tahsildar under section 131 of the Code recognizing such right, is illegal
and erroneous?
5. Section 131 of the Code deals with rights of way and other private
easements. It is extracted below :
"131. Rights of way and other private easements.--(1) In the event of a
dispute arising as to the route by which a cultivator shall have access to his
fields or to the waste or pasture lands of the village, otherwise than by the
recognized roads, paths or common land, including those road and paths
recorded in the village Wajib-ul-arz prepared under section 242 or as to
the source from or course by which he may avail himself of water, a
Tahsildar may, after local enquiry, decide the matter with reference to the
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previous custom in each case and with due regard to the conveniences of
all the parties concerned.
(2) No order passed under this section shall debar any person from
establishing such rights of easement as he may claim by a civil suit."
Section 257 deals with the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities in
regard to revenue matters under the Code, and bar of jurisdiction of civil
courts in regard to such matters. The relevant portion thereof is extracted
below :
"257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities.--Except as
otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time
being in force, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or
application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the
State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code,
empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and
without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall
exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters--
(a) to (z-2) xxxxx [not extracted as not relevant]"
6. An analysis of section 131 of the Code shows that it provides for the
adjudication by the Tahsildar, in respect of disputes raised by a cultivator,
relating to any of the following three private easementary rights:-
a) the route by which a cultivator shall have access to his fields;
b) the route by which a cultivator shall have access to waste or
pasture lands of the village; and
c) the route by which a cultivator shall have access to the source from
which, or the course by which, he may avail himself of water.
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Section 131 provides that such disputes shall be decided in each case, by the
Tahsildar, after a local enquiry, with reference to the previous custom and
with due regard to the convenience of all parties concerned. The disputes
relating to recognized roads, paths or common land including those roads
and paths recorded in the village Wajib-ul-arz prepared under section 242 of
the Code are expressly excluded from the scope of section 131 of the Code.
It is thus clear that what could be decided under section 131 of the Code is a
dispute relating to a claim for a customary easement over a private land,
relating to a right of way or right to take water, which is not recognized and
recorded as a customary easement in the village Wajib-ul-arz.
7. The definition of different easements, the manner of imposition and
acquisition of easementary rights, the incidents of easements and the
remedies in case of interference or disturbance with easements are governed
by the provisions of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Easement Act refers to
the different methods by which easements are acquired or imposed, that is,
namely easements by grant, easements of necessity, easements by
prescription and customary easements. Acquisition of an easementary right,
by any of the aforesaid methods, requires fulfillment of the conditions
prescribed under the Easements Act. A private easement, including a right of
way to a person's land or right to take water from a source to his land,
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cannot be acquired in a manner not contemplated or prescribed by the
Easement Act. Easements by grant require a grant by the owner of the
servient heritage. Easements of necessity are based on implied grants or
reservations made by the owner of a servient heritage, at the time of
disposition such as transfers and partitions. Easements by prescription can
be acquired only by peaceable and open enjoyment, without interruption for
twenty years. Customary easement can be are acquired by virtue of a local
custom.
8. Having regard to section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a civil
court can entertain any suit of civil nature except those, cognizance of which
is expressly or impliedly barred. In Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay
[AIR 1965 SC 1942] this court held :
"The normal rule prescribed by section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
that the courts shall (subject to the provisions contained in the Code) have
jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred......... Whenever it is
urged before a civil court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly
or by necessary implication to entertain claims of a civil nature, the Court
naturally feels inclined to consider whether the remedy afforded by an
alternative provision prescribed by a special statute is sufficient or
adequate. In cases where the exclusion of the civil Courts' jurisdiction is
expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in
question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided for
by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion is
pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such considerations would
be very important, and in conceivable circumstances, might even become
decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a special right or a liability and
provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by
tribunals specially constituted in that behalf, and it further lays down that
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all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the
tribunals so constituted, it becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies
normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said
statute or not."
(emphasis supplied)
In Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh - 1968 (3) SCR 662, a
Constitution Bench of this Court held that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the
civil court is not readily to be inferred with, unless the following, among
other conditions apply :
"(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special
tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there
is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit.
Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the
provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the
statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure............
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an
examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or
the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not
decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.
Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and
the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes
necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case,
it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and
provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays
down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be
determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally
associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or
not."
9. The Code nowhere bars the jurisdiction of civil courts to decide upon
easementary rights relating to agricultural or other lands. The Madhya
Pradesh Land Revenue Code neither creates nor recognizes any new
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category of private easementary rights either by way of right of way or right
to take water, which is not covered by the provisions of the Easements Act
or which is not required to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the
Easements Act. An easement cannot be acquired otherwise than in the
manner provided in the Easement Act. Section 131 of the Code does not
provide for or recognize a new type of easement which is not contemplated
or recognized in Easement Act, but merely deals with customary easements
covered by section 18 of the Easements Act. Nor can it be said that the
elements of an easement required to be fulfilled under the Easement Act are
not required in respect of a private easement under section 131 of the Code.
Apart from the fact that section 131 of the Code does not deal with
acquisition of any special easement by some method which is not referred in
the Easements Act, sub-section (2) of section 131 expressly provides that
irrespective of any order passed by the Tahsildar under section 131, any
person can establish any right relating to an easement by a civil suit. There is
nothing in section 131 or any other provision of the Code, which makes the
decision of the Tahsildar final and not open to question in a civil court.
Therefore, the decision of the Tahsildar will not bar a subsequent civil suit
by either party to a proceeding under section 131 of the Code, in respect of
the easement claimed in the proceedings under section 131 of the Code.
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10. When a person (dominant owner) has an easementary right, and the
servient owner disturbs, obstructs or interferes with his easementary right, or
denies his easementary right, the remedy of the dominant owner is to
approach the civil court for the relief of declaration and/or injunction.
Similarly, when a person who does not have an easementary right, tries to
assert or exercise any easementary right over another's land, the owner of
such land can resist such assertion or obstruct the exercise of the
easementary right and also approach the civil court to declare that the
defendant has no easementary right of the nature claimed, over his land
and/or that the defendant should be prevented from asserting such right or
interfering with his possession and enjoyment.
11. Section 257 relates to the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue
authorities. Any statutory provision ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts
should be strictly construed. A suit for enforcement of an easementary right
or for a declaration that the defendant does not have any easementary right
over plaintiff's property or a suit for injunction to restrain a defendant from
interfering with the possession of plaintiff or exercising any easementary
right over plaintiff's property, is not barred by the Code. Such suits do not
fall under any of the excluded matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (z-2) of
section 257 of the Code. Section 257, no doubt, also provides that no civil
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court shall entertain any suit instituted to obtain a decision or order on any
matter which the State Government, the Board or any Revenue Officer is
empowered to determine by the provisions of the code. But this is subject to
the opening words of the section "except as otherwise provided in this Code
or in any other enactment for the time being in force". We have already
noticed that sub-section (2) of section 131 of the Code reserves and retains
specifically the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits relating to any
easements, irrespective of the decision of the Tahsildar on a similar issue.
Sub-section (2) of section 131 provides that no order passed under section
131 shall debar any person from establishing such rights of easements as he
may claim by a civil suit. Therefore the right to decide upon the nature of
easements and enforcement of easements is expressly preserved for decision
by a civil court in a civil suit. The two fold object of sub-section (2) of
section 131 is to declare that section 131(1) of the Code does not deal with a
matter which is in the exclusive province of revenue authorities and also to
enable either party to approach the civil court in regard to any easementary
right, irrespective of the decision under section 131(1) by the Tahsildar. The
effect of section 257 and section 131(2) is that the enquiry and decision by
the Tahsildar based on "previous custom" and "conveniences of parties" in
regard to any private easementary rights relating to right of way or right to
water will always be subject to the decision of the civil court in any civil suit
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by any party relating to that matter. Therefore it has to be held that section
257 providing for exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court in regard to certain
matters, does not apply to any suit involving or relating to easementary
rights.
12. But some decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court have
proceeded on the assumption, rather erroneously and without any basis, that
the private easements including right of way referred under section 131 of
the Code, are not the easements which are dealt with in the Indian Easement
Act, but are a new type of easement unknown to general law of easements,
which require to be decided by the Tahsildar only with reference to the
previous customs and conveniences of parties. A distinction is sought to be
drawn by those decisions, between easements under the Easement Act and
easements under section 131 of the Code, by holding that the Easement Act
deals with easements perfected by prescription, whereas section 131 of the
Code refers to private easements, which are not perfected by prescription.
They also proceed on the basis that in view of section 131 of the Code
providing for a Revenue Authority, that is a Tahsildar, to deal with the
special type of private easements provided for in section 131 of the Code,
civil courts will have no jurisdiction to entertain or decide any matter
relating to such type of private easements, having regard to the bar contained
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in section 257 of the Code; and consequently any decision of the Tahsildar
under section 131 of the Code is amenable only to an appeal and thereafter a
revision provided under the Code itself, and is not open to challenge in a
civil suit [See : Nathuram v. Siyasharan - 1969 JLJ 115 and Rambai v.
Harchand - 1979 RN 532].
13. On the other hand, other decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
have taken the view that a civil court is not barred from entertaining suits for
declaration and/or injunction, against a person who has secured an order
under section 131 of the Code, to declare such order of Tahsildar as illegal
and not binding or to restrain the defendant from exercising the right
recognized by the Tahsildar [Gopidas (Mahant) v. Ram Krishna Pandey -
1971 JLJ 825 and Fakka v. Hariram - 1984 RN 422]. In Gopidas (supra), a
learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (A.P. Sen, J., as he
then was) explained the position succinctly, thus:
"The scheme underlying the section, envisages a suit under section 131(2)
by the claimant for the establishment of his right, if such right is not
recognized by the Tahsildar. This necessarily implies that the correctness
of the finding reached by the Tahsildar may be questioned in subsequent
legal proceedings in the ordinary Courts of law. No doubt, the language of
section 131(2) is susceptible of the construction suggested by the learned
counsel that the right of a suit is confined to the claimant. This, however,
does not result in the consequence that a person, on whose property a right
of way is declared by Tahsildar to exist, should have no remedy for the
protection of his rights in property, against an arbitrary or erroneous
assumption of jurisdiction by the Tahsildar."
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We respectfully agree with the said observations. The decisions in
Nathuram and Rambai are not good law.
14. At this juncture we may refer to the relevance of Wajib-ul-arz while
dealing with cases of customary easements. Section 242 of the Code deals
with Wajib-ul-arz and is extracted below :
"242. Wajib-ul-arz.--(1) As soon as may be after this Code comes into
force, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall, in the prescribed manner, ascertain
and record the customs in each village in regard to -
(a) the right to irrigation or right of way or other easement;
(b) the right to fishing;
in any land or water not belonging to or controlled or managed by the
State Government or a local authority and such record shall be known as
the Wajib-ul-arz of the village.
(2) The record made in pursuance of sub-section (1), shall be
published by the Sub-Divisional Officer in such manner as may be
prescribed.
(3) Any person aggrieved by any entry made in such record may,
within one year from the date of the publication of such record under sub-
section (2), institute a suit in a civil court to have such entry cancelled or
modified.
(4) The record made under sub-section (1) shall, subject to the
decision of the civil court in the suit instituted under sub-section (3), be
final and conclusive.
(5) The (Sub-Divisional Officer) may, on the application of any person
interested or on his own motion, modify an entry or insert any new entry
in the Wajib-ul-arz on any of the following grounds :
(a) That all persons interested in such entry wish
to have it modified; or
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(b) That by a decree in a civil suit it has been
declared to be erroneous; or
(c) That being founded on a decree or order of a
civil court or on the order of a Revenue Officer it is not in
accordance with such decree or order; or
(d) That being so founded, such decree or order
has subsequently been varied on appeal, revision or review; or
(e) That the civil court has by a decree
determined any custom existing in the village."
Rules have been made under section 242 relating to Wajib-ul-arz vide
notification dated 2.2.1966, Rule 2 thereof is extracted below :
"2. Customs under sub-section (1) of section 242 shall be ascertained and
recorded in the Wajib-ul-arz under the following heads, namely : -
(i) Right to irrigation;
(ii) Other water-rights;
(ii) Right to fishing;
(iv) Rights of way, village roads, paths, drains and the
like;
(v) Rights of persons of other villages over the lands of
the village;
(vi) Rights of the villagers over the lands of other villages;
(vii) Other easement - (a) Burial and cremation ground, (b) Gaothan,
(c) Encamping-ground, (d) Threshing-floor, (e)
Bazars, (f) Skinning-grounds, (g) Rights to
graze and take fuel, (h) Manure and rubbish;
(viii) Other miscellaneous rights."
15. Wajib-ul-arz is thus the record of customs in a village in regard to (i)
easements (including the right to irrigation and right of way); and (ii) the
right to fishing in privately owned/held lands and water bodies. The entries
therein could be modified in the manner provided in sub-section (5) of
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section 242 of the Code. Though the Code provides for maintaining a record
of all customary easements imposed upon privately held lands and water
bodies, significantly the Code does not provide the remedies available in the
event of disturbance or interference with such easements recorded in Wajib-
ul-arz, as the remedy is only way of a suit before the civil court. Customary
easements are the most difficult to prove among easements. To establish a
custom, the plaintiff will have to show that (a) the usage is ancient or from
time immemorial; (b) the usage is regular and continuous; (c) the usage is
certain and not varied; and (d) the usage is reasonable. If the Wajib-ul-arz
(where such a record is maintained) records or shows the customary
easement, it would make the task of civil courts comparatively easy, as there
will be no need for detailed evidence to establish the custom. Be that as it
may. If the remedy for violation of a customary easement recognized and
recorded in the Wajib-ul-arz is by way of a civil suit, it is inconceivable that
in regard to violation of a customary easement not recognized or recorded
in the Wajib-ul-arz, the remedy would be only by way of a summary enquiry
by the Tahsildar under section 131 of the Code, and not by a suit, before the
civil court.
Conclusion
16. In the circumstances, we reject the contention that Tahsildar alone has
the jurisdiction, and not the civil court, to decide upon the existence or
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otherwise of a customary easement (relating to right of way or right to take
water, to a person's land). The decision of the Tahsildar after a summary
enquiry with reference to the `previous custom' and with due regard to the
conveniences of all parties, under section 131(1) of the Code, is open to
challenge in a civil suit and subject to the decision of the civil court. The
jurisdiction of the civil court to try any suit relating to easements is not
affected by section 131, 242 or section 257 of the Code. In view of the
above, this appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees of the courts
below are set aside and it is declared that the civil court has the jurisdiction
to try the suit filed by the appellants. The trial court is requested to dispose
of the suit expeditiously.
............................J
[R. V. Raveendran]
............................J
[A. K. Patnaik]
New Delhi;
July 4, 2011.
