REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 94889489 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.55815582 of 2019)
University of Delhi .…Appellant(s)
Versus
Union of India & Ors. …. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred by the
appellantUniversity of Delhi through its Registrar to
challenge the common judgment and order dated
29.10.2018 whereby, the High Court of Delhi declined to
condone the delay of 916 days in filing the appeal to
challenge the judgment dated 27.04.2015 whereunder, the
learned Single Judge had dismissed the W.P (C)
No.2743/2012 filed by the University of Delhi.
3. The challenge in the writ petition was, inter alia, to
the decision dated 12.5.2011 of the Delhi Development
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Authority (hereinafter referred to as the, “DDA” for short)
who had allowed respondent no.13M/s Young Builders
(P) Ltd. to construct a highrise multistory group housing
society in the control zone of ZoneC in the University
campus, without any height restriction. The construction
permission was allowed on the plot leased out to the Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the,
“DMRC” for short) by permitting segregation of 2 hectares
as a separate entity from the total 3 hectares of land,
acquired for the metro station.
4. The principal contentions of the appellantUniversity on the merits of the challenge were as follows:
a) the permission sought by Respondent No. 13
(namely, M/s Young Builders Private Limited)
for the proposed construction of a group
housing society on the land originally owned by
the Ministry of Defence in the University
enclave is violative of the MPD2021 and is
against the larger public interest, given the fact
that the project site in question and its vicinity
are within the North Campus of the University
and that it contains various historical and
archaeological buildings, apart from it being
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the centre of higher education and advanced
learning; and
b) the change in the character of the subject land
is impermissible in law, since the land having
been acquired for public purpose for
construction of the metro rail project, has
suddenly been diverted to private commercial
use and auctioned to private builder for
building a group housing society in a manner
contrary to the purpose and charter of
incorporation of the Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation (DMRC)
c) The restriction on certain developments for
Metro Station prescribed under Master Plan of
Delhi – 2021 (‘MPD’ for short) was also a
contention raised by the writ petitioner which
imposed ban on construction of highrise
buildings in the control zone of the Delhi
University. The location of various ladies’
hostels of the University in close vicinity of the
proposed construction site was highlighted as
an important privacy concern. The impediment
to access of thousands of students, teachers at
the entrance of the University was the other
main contention raised in the writ petition.
5. On the other hand, the DMRC had projected that
after construction of the University Metro Station, 2
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hectares of land remained surplus and the housing project
was intended to generate revenue for the DMRC as per the
policy of the Government. The formal application made to
the authorities for change of land use and approval
secured for conversion of the land for residential use, was
also highlighted by the DMRC.
6. The learned Single Judge having noticed the entire
sequence refused to entertain the writ petition of the
University including on the ground of delay and laches. In
the judgment dated 27.04.2015 the Court however
observed that DDA is the master of the formulation and
implementation of the Master Plan and, necessary
approvals have been taken from various statutory
authorities for the housing project. It was also observed
that the change in the land use from “public” to
“residential” is permissible by adverting to the Delhi High
Court’s Division Bench Judgment in Adil Singh vs.
Union of India (2010) 171 DLT 748. According to the
Writ court, since it was a policy decision taken by the
Government body and since the appellantUniversity has
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failed to demonstrate any illegality, impropriety, mala fide
in the decision making by the authority, interference of the
Court with the policy decision, would not be justified.
7. It is the case of the appellant that following the
dismissal of the writ petition and being concerned about
the future use of the subject land, the University
Authorities constituted a Committee to recommend the
appropriate course of action to be taken by the University.
The Committee’s report furnished on 11.11.2016 is stated
to have been laid before the Executive Council of the
University and after due consideration of the report and
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Executive
Council of the University through their resolution dated
28.02.2017/07.03.2017 decided to prefer an intraCourt
Appeal in the High Court.
8. While the above deliberations were on, accessibility
concern to the University’s Metro Station area was raised
under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 by
persons with disabilities. The University also received a
report on preventive measures to be taken in the accidentprone area of the Metro Station. With these and other
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projection, the appeal in LPA No.89/2018 came to be filed
on 01.03.2018 after a delay of 916 days, together with the
C.M.No.8654/2018 for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal.
9. The delay of 916 days caused in preferring the
Appeal was explained in the application seeking delay
condonation and the rejoinder to the reply to said
application to the following effect;
(i) Nonconvening of Executive Council and delay
occasioned due to nonavailability of ViceChancellor. The case in the present LPA is
different from other routine litigation preferred or
contested by the appellant. It is the only case
where, the approval from the Executive Council of
the University of Delhi was required to be taken
and before such approval, various deliberations
preceded so as to appraise the Executive Council
of the different shades of the subject matter.
Being a statutory body, an adherence to the just
method of decision making requires consultations
with affected departments of the University itself
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and therefore, the final say in the matter rests
with the Executive Council which is constituted
under Section 21 of the Delhi University Act,
1922. The Council includes the senior most
Deans, democratically elected representatives of
teachers, the Visitor’s nominee, the Registrar, and
the ViceChancellor.
(ii) The judgment of learned Single Judge was
sent by the Counsel representing the University
quite late and it was, then, place before the Legal
Cell of the University for examining the matter.
After going through the voluminous paper book, it
was opined that the matter be referred to the ViceChancellor for consideration and pursuant
thereto, a meeting was held, wherein it was
decided that the matter needs to be dealt with
holistically, having regard to all the issues decided
and connotations thereof. The issue could not be
taken up for consideration as the post of ViceChancellor had fallen vacant w.e.f. 28.10.2015
and could be considered only after the new VicePage 7 of 34
Chancellor had assumed office and taken stock of
things. On 10.03.2016, the new ViceChancellor
joined the office and in order to ensure democratic
functioning of the University, he decided to
constitute a Committee comprising of senior
faculty persons representing different sections of
the University. The terms of reference of the Fivemember Committee were, to recommend the
course of action to the University in the light of
the dismissal of the Writ Petition filed by the
University in the DMRC matter.
(iii) On 11.11.2016, the above constituted
Committee gave its Report. Based on the Report
of the fivemember Committee, it was decided by
the Competent Authority that the subject matter
of the present case be referred to the Executive
Council of the University for its final decision. In
the Executive Council meeting held on
28.02.2017, the matter was discussed. The item
was again discussed in the Executive Council
meeting held on 7.3.2017 (continued meeting),
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where the members of the Council referred to the
earlier discussions and decisions of both the
Academic Council and the Executive Council with
respect to the same matter and it was decided
unanimously to prefer an Appeal against the
Order of the learned Single Judge dated
27.04.2015 after adequate preparation.
(iv) In the meanwhile, reservation was strongly
put forth by the disabled students and faculty in
the light of the proposed project by the private
builder at the very main entrance of the University
of Delhi. Such representations were received from
individuals as well as groups which the University
had to consider and were therefore forwarded to
the Equal Opportunity Cell for consideration. The
Equal Opportunity Cell, University of Delhi, which
looks after the welfare of disabled students and
others, in the light of the new enactment on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016,
analyzed the probable outcome. After detailed
deliberations, the Equal Opportunity Cell
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submitted its Report on 28.04.2017 which was
brought to the notice of Competent Authorities for
their consideration. The Report was considered at
various levels of the University including the
Office of the Dean, Student Welfare, the
Department of legal affairs, the Office of the
Proctor, the Engineering Department, and the
Department of Environmental Studies. Holding
discussions and deliberations among these bodies
and considering their inputs involved further time
and it involved coordination and interaction with
various authorities and stake holders. All this
exercise involved a further period of five to six
months before a considered opinion could be
generated by the University of Delhi. Hence the
representations and the Report of the Equal
Opportunity Cell could be finally considered by
the University of Delhi around the end of year
2017.
(v) In the interregnum, the accidents occurred
at Chhatra Marg in December 2017 led to the
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need for the preparation of a Report by the Office
of the Proctor of the University dated 05.02.2018
wherein the Proctor recommended the area to be
declared as accident prone. Both the Reports
one by the Equal Opportunity Cell and the other
by the Office of Proctor were sent to the Counsel
concerned who was holding the brief for the
preparation of the Appeal memorandum.
Subsequently legal opinion was sought and the
draft appeal and petition was prepared which was
thereafter got vetted and settled by the Senior
Counsel. The finalized Appeal was thereafter again
considered at the highest level at the University to
take the final decision, which entailed some time.
On 01.03.2018, the LPA was filed before the Delhi
High Court.
10. The above explanation for the delayed filing was
however not accepted and the Division Bench of the High
Court on 29.10.2018 dismissed the LPA on the ground of
delay without considering the merits of the appeal. Thus,
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aggrieved the appellantUniversity has filed this appeal.
11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant submits that the implication of the rejection
of the writ petition and the LPA without considering the
substantial contention raised by the University on merits
would cause grave injury to the public institution. The
learned Senior Counsel submits that the University
Authorities have been pursuing the issue with due
diligence but decision had to be taken after consultation
with all the stakeholders and therefore, the delay in
preferring the LPA should not be attributed to any
inaction, much less a deliberate inaction. The endeavor of
the Courts according to Shri Parasaran should be to do
substantial justice to the parties by deciding the matters
on merits but in the present case, neither the learned
Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court had
considered the merit of the contention raised by the
appellantUniversity. Shri Parasaran argues that the
expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough to enable
the courts to apply the law of limitation in a meaningful
manner. He also projects that since the builders are yet to
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start their construction, the delayed filing of the LPA
should not have resulted in nonconsideration of the
contention on merits, as major public interest issues have
been raised in the present matter. The learned Senior
Counsel argues that important questions effecting public
interest cannot be defeated on technical objection,
inasmuch as the proposed site for construction was
originally owned by the Defence Ministry and the land was
acquired for public purpose at public expense but is now
sought to be given over to a private builder, for a profit
oriented motive. The said contentions are also
supplemented by Shri R. Venkataramani and Shri Ramji
Srinivasan, learned Senior Advocates.
12. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel
representing the applicants/intervenors submits that six
girl hostels are located near to the project site and if high
rise apartments are allowed to be constructed, the privacy
of the hostel residents would be compromised. Ms. Arora
also refers to the letter dated 25.10.1943 of the Joint
Secretary, Government of India, Department of Education
addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi conveying
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the decision of the Government of India to ensure that no
tall buildings are erected inside the Delhi University
Campus and also the necessity of protecting University
area, as an enclave. The Senior Counsel then refers to the
Zonal Development Plan for Zone“C” (Civil Lines Zone) of
the DDA as approved by the Ministry of Urban
Development to point out that the authorities have
recognized the existence of number of old historical
buildings of the colonial period within the Delhi University
Campus and effort should be made to convert the Delhi
University into an integrated Campus with restriction on
tall buildings.
13. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for
respondent No.13 M/s Young Builders would at the
outset contend that though the learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant has referred to the merits of the case,
keeping in view the position that the Division Bench of the
High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay
and laches, that aspect of the matter would require
consideration at the threshold. He would assert that the
delay of 916 days is an inordinate delay of more than two
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and a half years and in such event the principle of
applying the usual test for “sufficient cause” would not
arise as it is not merely the number of days requiring
condonation but also amounts to laches in filing the writ
petition, as well as the LPA. Mere contention that the
proceedings initiated by the appellant is in public interest
would not advance the case inasmuch as the learned
Single Judge having adverted to all these aspects has
arrived at the conclusion that the petition suffers from
laches in addition to there being no merit and in such
circumstance when the LPA was once again delayed by
916 days the Division Bench was justified in its
conclusion. It is pointed out that the said delay of 916
days is as against the period of 30 days which is allowed
in law for filing the LPA. It is contended that the cause of
action if any should be construed on 23.09.2005 when the
area was converted into residential, but the writ petition
was filed only on 07.05.2012 and despite the writ petition
having been disposed of on 27.04.2015 the LPA was filed
only on 01.03.2018 after a delay of 916 days. The reason
assigned that a decision to file the LPA could not be taken
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as the office of ViceChancellor had fallen vacant also
cannot be accepted since such vacancy arose only on
28.10.2015 while the writ petition had already been
disposed of on 27.04.2015 and there was sufficient time to
file the LPA if they had the intention to do so. The learned
Senior Counsel further refers to the large number of cases
that was filed on behalf of the University during the said
period. It is contended that while considering condonation
of delay the prejudice that would be caused to the opposite
side is also one of the aspects to be considered. If that
situation is kept in view, in the instant case the request
for proposal in favour of the respondent No.13 was notified
on 23.06.2008 and the Letter of Acceptance was issued on
13.08.2008 and the lease being for 90 years, already 11
years have passed and by such belated proceedings the
project is prejudicially hampered. The respondent No.13
has already spent Rs.233 crores being the lease amount
paid to the DMRC and also for securing appropriate
approvals. It is contended that the respondent No.13 had
to face earlier litigation as well which has been taken note
by the learned Single Judge and the respondent cannot be
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exposed to such repeated litigations.
14. Shri Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General
appearing on behalf of respondent No.11DMRC, has
contended that the Ministry of Urban Development as a
matter of Policy of the Government of India had permitted
the DMRC to generate its own resources through
property development and has accordingly permitted to
carry out property development on the land transferred to
it by the Government. In such event when the DMRC has
taken such steps not only in the instant case but also in
several other projects, any interference at this stage more
particularly when there is belated challenge of the
present nature, it would have a serious impact on the
projects undertaken. It was submitted that due to
certain changes affected in the manner in which the
Metro Rail Project was to be implemented there was some
excess land which has been put to use to generate
resources for the project and in that regard when there is
a contractual relationship with respondent No.13 if the
much belated petition is entertained at this stage, there
would be a great financial impact which is also a loss to
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the public exchequer and in such event the public
interest would be better served by not condoning the
delay in such matters. Moreover, it is not a case of mere
delay in filing the LPA but is a serious case of laches. It is
also noticed by the learned Single Judge that the writ
petition itself was filed after 78 years and in such event
if the discretionary orders passed in the writ jurisdiction
is interfered in the limited jurisdiction of this Court, it
would set a bad precedent.
15. Shri A.N.S. Nandkarni, learned Additional Solicitor
General would also refer to the aspect of delay and laches
and supplement the arguments advanced by the learned
Solicitor General. He would further contend that the
Union of India being the owner of the land which was
acquired does not have objection for the project and in
such event interference at the instance of the appellant
herein would not be justified. Ms. Binu Tamta, learned
Counsel submitted in support of the contentions raised
by the respondents.
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16. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel in
reply to the said contention would reiterate the
contentions put forth relating to the explanation of delay
and would contend that the conclusion of the learned
Single Judge that the writ petition was hit by laches is
fallacious inasmuch as the respondent No.13 themselves
had filed a writ petition raising certain disputes with
regard to the limit of FAR through the Notification dated
20.01.2005 and such challenge by the respondent No.13
had come to an end on 18.05.2011 and the NOC etc.
were obtained subsequently, after which the writ petition
was filed by the appellant herein in the year 2012. Hence
the delay and laches has been explained and it is not a
case of negligence. It is contended that the stand of the
DMRC that it would be put to financial loss cannot be
accepted at this point since the question as to whether
they would be liable to pay interest or not are matters
which would have to be considered in appropriate
proceedings. Hence, he contends that the High Court
ought to have condoned the delay and the matter should
have been considered on its merits.
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17. Though we have exhaustively referred to the
pleadings and the contentions of the parties, including
contentions put forth on merits, the same is only for
completeness and to put the matter in perspective before
considering the issue relating to delay and laches. In the
instant case, considering that the Division Bench of the
High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay
of 916 days, that aspect of the matter would require
consideration at the outset and the facts on merits is
noted to the limited extent to find out whether in that
background the public interest would suffer. The learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant in order to impress upon
this Court the principle relating to consideration of
“sufficient cause” for condonation of delay and the factors
that are required to be kept in view, has relied on the
decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag & Anr.vs. Katiji & Ors., 1987(2) SCC 107
wherein it is held as hereunder:
“3. The legislature has conferred the power to
condone delay by enacting Section 5 [ Any
appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be
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admitted after the prescribed period if the
appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that
he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making the application within such
period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in
order to enable the courts to do substantial
justice to parties by disposing of matters on
”merits”. The expression “sufficient cause”
employed by the legislature is adequately elastic
to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice — that being the life-purpose for the
existence of the institution of courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has been
making a justifiably liberal approach in matters
instituted in this Court. But the message does
not appear to have percolated down to all the
other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal
approach is adopted on principle as it is realized
that:
“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the highest
that can happen is that a cause would be
decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does
not mean that a pedantic approach should be
made. Why not every hour's delay, every
second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in
a rational common-sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides.
A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting
to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to legalize
injustice on technical grounds but because it is
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capable of removing injustice and is expected to
do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this
perspective, there was sufficient cause for
condoning the delay in the institution of the
appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which
was seeking condonation and not a private party
was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of
equality before law demands that all litigants,
including the State as a litigant, are accorded
the same treatment and the law is administered
in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant
for according a step-motherly treatment when
the “State” is the applicant praying for
condonation of delay. In fact experience shows
that on account of an impersonal machinery (no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt
by the judgment sought to be subjected to
appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making, filepushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on
its part is less difficult to understand though
more difficult to approve. In any event, the State
which represents the collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-nongrata status. The courts therefore have to be
informed with the spirit and philosophy of the
provision in the course of the interpretation of
the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the
same approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the end in
view to do even-handed justice on merits in
preference to the approach which scuttles a
decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the
matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are
satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the
delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the
appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set
aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is
remitted to the High Court. The High Court will
now dispose of the appeal on merits after
affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to
both the sides.”
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18. Further the decision in the case of M/s Dehri
Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. Vs. District
Board, Bhojpur & Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 598 is relied upon,
wherein this Court has indicated the real test to
determine the delay is that the petitioner should come to
Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse
of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence.
19. The learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.13, on
the other hand, has relied upon the decision in the case
of Postmaster General & Ors. vs. Living Media India
Limited & Anr. 1992 (3) SCC 563 wherein it is held as
hereunder:
“28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in
a matter of condonation of delay when there was
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack
of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several
notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The law
of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody,
including the Government.
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29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due
to considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process. The government departments are
under a special obligation to ensure that they
perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.”
20. From a consideration of the view taken by this
Court through the decisions cited supra the position is
clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken
in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration
for condonation of delay would not depend on the status
of the party namely the Government or the public bodies
so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate
consideration should be to render even handed justice to
the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long
delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or
the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to
be kept in perspective. In that background while
considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation
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would not be enough but it should be in the nature of
indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will
depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be
weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact
situation. In the case of Katiji (Supra) the entire
conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been
kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is
that the consideration therein was in the background of
dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay
in a case where there was delay of four days pitted
against the consideration that was required to be made
on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation
amounting to 800 per cent.
21. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts
in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the
consideration to condone can be made only if there is
reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be
merely because the appellant is public body. The entire
explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach
unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of
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the position of law. That apart when there is such a long
delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would
also come into play while noticing as to the manner in
which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In
addition in the instant facts not only the delay and laches
in filing the appeal is contended on behalf of the
respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but
it is also contended that there was delay and laches in
filing the writ petition itself at the first instance from
which the present appeal had arisen. In that view, it
would be necessary for us to advert to those aspects of
the matter and notice the nature of consideration made
in the writ petition as well as the LPA to arrive at a
conclusion as to whether the High Court was justified.
22. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of
916 days is twofold, i.e. the nonavailability of the ViceChancellor due to retirement and subsequent
appointment of new ViceChancellor, also that the matter
was placed before the Executive Council and a decision
was taken to file the appeal and the said process had
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caused the delay. The reasons as stated do not appear
very convincing since the situation was of availing the
appellate remedy and not the original proceedings
requiring such deliberation when it was a mere
continuation of the proceedings which had already been
filed on behalf of the appellant herein, after due
deliberation. Significantly, the ViceChancellor who was
at the helm of affairs when the writ petition was filed,
prosecuted and disposed of on 27.04.2015 was available
in the same office till 28.10.2015, for about six months
which was a long enough period as compared to 30 days
limitation period for filing appeal. In that circumstance
when the said ViceChancellor who had prosecuted the
writ petition was available, the submission of the learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant that unseen hands are
likely to have prevented the filing of the appeal also
cannot be accepted. Secondly, the reason sought to be
put forth about the decision required to be taken by the
Executive Council is also not acceptable when it was just
the matter of filing the appeal. In fact, in the writ petition
an affidavit was filed referring to Resolution No.56 and
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173 of Academic Council and Executive Council
authorising for filing writ petition. When the writ petition
was filed based on such authorisation and the stand of
the appellant, as the writ petitioner was put forth and
had failed in the writ petition, it cannot be accepted that
the appellant with all the wherewithal was unable to file
the appeal, that too when the same ViceChancellor was
available for six months after dismissal of the writ
petition. Hence the reasons put forth cannot in our
opinion constitute sufficient cause.
23. That apart, as rightly noticed by the Division
Bench in the LPA, the approval from the Executive
Council was obtained on 28.02.2017 / 07.03.2017, the
appeal was ultimately filed on 01.03.2018 after an year
from the said date which only indicates the casual
approach which is now sought to be overcome with the
plea of public interest despite there being no explanation
for the delay at every stage. It is true that as held in the
case of Mst. Katiji (supra) that every day’s delay need not
be explained with such precision but the fact remains
Page 28 of 34
that a reasonable and acceptable explanation is very
much necessary. The Division Bench apart from noticing
these aspects had also noted that the learned Single
Judge too found the writ petition to be hit by delay and
laches.
24. In that backdrop, a perusal of the order dated
27.04.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge would
indicate that the learned Single Judge in para – 65 of the
order with reference to his earlier observation has arrived
at the categorical conclusion that the petition suffers
from laches and has been filed with delay of 78 years.
The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant while
seeking to dispel such conclusion by the learned Single
Judge contended that the respondent No. 13 themselves
had filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the restricted
FAR and the said writ petition was disposed only on
18.05.2011 and the need for the appellant herein to file
the writ petition arose only thereafter. The said
contention is also not acceptable if the entire sequence is
noticed.
Page 29 of 34
25. In that regard there can be no dispute to the fact
that the Respondent No. 13 being aggrieved by the
decision of DDA had filed a petition bearing W.P.
No.3135/2010 assailing the letter dated 19.08.2009 and
the same was disposed of only on 18.05.2011 but the
appellant cannot take shelter under the same to explain
the laches. This is because much water had flown under
the bridge before the said development and those events
ought to have triggered action from the appellant in
challenging, more so when there were other litigations
relating to the same subject, as noticed in the order of
the learned Single Judge.
26. In the present matter, the land was converted to
residential use in 2005 and Respondent No.11 – DMRC
had invited bids and public auction was conducted on
28.07.2008 which ought to have awakened the appellant
herein for the first time since the fact of conversion of the
land into residential development was in public domain
even if is assumed that the earlier process of approval
etc. by the DDA on the approval request of DMRC are
Page 30 of 34
internal process and not be known to the appellant. In
fact, the learned Single Judge while taking note of the
challenge raised by the appellant herein has also taken
note of an earlier petition bearing W.P (C) No.8675/2011
filed by the Association of Metro Commuters wherein also
the residential development was an issue, which came to
be dismissed by order dated 14.02.2011. Similarly,
another petition in W.P(C) No.66246625/2012, though
challenging the acquisition was filed, the same was also
dismissed. Thereafter the writ petition of the appellant
filed in the year 2012 was pending till it was disposed on
27.04.2015.
27. Despite the writ petition having been filed
belatedly in respect of certain actions which had
commenced in the year 2005 and even though the writ
petition was filed after obtaining approval of the
Executive Council, no steps were taken to file the writ
appeal for 916 days after disposal of the writ petition. In
such circumstance, the cumulative effect of the delay and
laches cannot be ignored. The decisions referred by the
Page 31 of 34
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant noted Supra
cannot, therefore, be applied in the present facts and
circumstance inasmuch as the consideration hereunder
was not merely the explanation for the delay of few days
in filing the appeal. Though contention is put forth that
the delay is required to be condoned since public interest
is involved, the nature of the proceedings that have taken
place thus far would indicate that the matter has been
examined at different stages in the earlier litigations and
if the grounds on which the appellant was assailing the
action of the respondents were to be examined on merits,
they ought to have been more diligent in prosecuting the
matter before the Court.
28. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches,
the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of
the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. In that
regard, rather than taking note of the hardship that
would be caused to the respondent No.13 as contended
by the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be
taken note is the manner in which the respondent No.11
Page 32 of 34
– DMRC has proceeded in the matter. The respondent
No.11 DMRC is engaged in providing the public
transport and for the said purpose the Government
through policy decision has granted approval to generate
resources through property development and in that
regard the development as earlier indicated, is taken up.
Pursuant thereto the respondent No.11 has received a
sum of Rs.218.20 crores from respondent No.13 as far
back as in the year 2008. The said amount as indicated
is used for its projects providing metro rail service to the
commuting public. In such circumstance, if at this stage
the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the
lackadaisical manner in which the appellant has
proceeded in the matter, it would also be contrary to
public interest.
29. Therefore, taking into consideration all these
aspects of the matter, we are of the opinion that not only
the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the
writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and laches but the
decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA on
Page 33 of 34
the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the
orders do not call for interference.
30. Accordingly, the appeals being devoid of merits
stand dismissed with no order as to costs. All pending
applications shall stand disposed of.
……………………….J.
(R. BANUMATHI)
……………………….J.
(A.S. BOPANNA)
……………………….J.
(HRISHIKESH ROY)
New Delhi,
December 17, 2019
Page 34 of 34
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 94889489 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.55815582 of 2019)
University of Delhi .…Appellant(s)
Versus
Union of India & Ors. …. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred by the
appellantUniversity of Delhi through its Registrar to
challenge the common judgment and order dated
29.10.2018 whereby, the High Court of Delhi declined to
condone the delay of 916 days in filing the appeal to
challenge the judgment dated 27.04.2015 whereunder, the
learned Single Judge had dismissed the W.P (C)
No.2743/2012 filed by the University of Delhi.
3. The challenge in the writ petition was, inter alia, to
the decision dated 12.5.2011 of the Delhi Development
Page 1 of 34
Authority (hereinafter referred to as the, “DDA” for short)
who had allowed respondent no.13M/s Young Builders
(P) Ltd. to construct a highrise multistory group housing
society in the control zone of ZoneC in the University
campus, without any height restriction. The construction
permission was allowed on the plot leased out to the Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the,
“DMRC” for short) by permitting segregation of 2 hectares
as a separate entity from the total 3 hectares of land,
acquired for the metro station.
4. The principal contentions of the appellantUniversity on the merits of the challenge were as follows:
a) the permission sought by Respondent No. 13
(namely, M/s Young Builders Private Limited)
for the proposed construction of a group
housing society on the land originally owned by
the Ministry of Defence in the University
enclave is violative of the MPD2021 and is
against the larger public interest, given the fact
that the project site in question and its vicinity
are within the North Campus of the University
and that it contains various historical and
archaeological buildings, apart from it being
Page 2 of 34
the centre of higher education and advanced
learning; and
b) the change in the character of the subject land
is impermissible in law, since the land having
been acquired for public purpose for
construction of the metro rail project, has
suddenly been diverted to private commercial
use and auctioned to private builder for
building a group housing society in a manner
contrary to the purpose and charter of
incorporation of the Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation (DMRC)
c) The restriction on certain developments for
Metro Station prescribed under Master Plan of
Delhi – 2021 (‘MPD’ for short) was also a
contention raised by the writ petitioner which
imposed ban on construction of highrise
buildings in the control zone of the Delhi
University. The location of various ladies’
hostels of the University in close vicinity of the
proposed construction site was highlighted as
an important privacy concern. The impediment
to access of thousands of students, teachers at
the entrance of the University was the other
main contention raised in the writ petition.
5. On the other hand, the DMRC had projected that
after construction of the University Metro Station, 2
Page 3 of 34
hectares of land remained surplus and the housing project
was intended to generate revenue for the DMRC as per the
policy of the Government. The formal application made to
the authorities for change of land use and approval
secured for conversion of the land for residential use, was
also highlighted by the DMRC.
6. The learned Single Judge having noticed the entire
sequence refused to entertain the writ petition of the
University including on the ground of delay and laches. In
the judgment dated 27.04.2015 the Court however
observed that DDA is the master of the formulation and
implementation of the Master Plan and, necessary
approvals have been taken from various statutory
authorities for the housing project. It was also observed
that the change in the land use from “public” to
“residential” is permissible by adverting to the Delhi High
Court’s Division Bench Judgment in Adil Singh vs.
Union of India (2010) 171 DLT 748. According to the
Writ court, since it was a policy decision taken by the
Government body and since the appellantUniversity has
Page 4 of 34
failed to demonstrate any illegality, impropriety, mala fide
in the decision making by the authority, interference of the
Court with the policy decision, would not be justified.
7. It is the case of the appellant that following the
dismissal of the writ petition and being concerned about
the future use of the subject land, the University
Authorities constituted a Committee to recommend the
appropriate course of action to be taken by the University.
The Committee’s report furnished on 11.11.2016 is stated
to have been laid before the Executive Council of the
University and after due consideration of the report and
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Executive
Council of the University through their resolution dated
28.02.2017/07.03.2017 decided to prefer an intraCourt
Appeal in the High Court.
8. While the above deliberations were on, accessibility
concern to the University’s Metro Station area was raised
under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 by
persons with disabilities. The University also received a
report on preventive measures to be taken in the accidentprone area of the Metro Station. With these and other
Page 5 of 34
projection, the appeal in LPA No.89/2018 came to be filed
on 01.03.2018 after a delay of 916 days, together with the
C.M.No.8654/2018 for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal.
9. The delay of 916 days caused in preferring the
Appeal was explained in the application seeking delay
condonation and the rejoinder to the reply to said
application to the following effect;
(i) Nonconvening of Executive Council and delay
occasioned due to nonavailability of ViceChancellor. The case in the present LPA is
different from other routine litigation preferred or
contested by the appellant. It is the only case
where, the approval from the Executive Council of
the University of Delhi was required to be taken
and before such approval, various deliberations
preceded so as to appraise the Executive Council
of the different shades of the subject matter.
Being a statutory body, an adherence to the just
method of decision making requires consultations
with affected departments of the University itself
Page 6 of 34
and therefore, the final say in the matter rests
with the Executive Council which is constituted
under Section 21 of the Delhi University Act,
1922. The Council includes the senior most
Deans, democratically elected representatives of
teachers, the Visitor’s nominee, the Registrar, and
the ViceChancellor.
(ii) The judgment of learned Single Judge was
sent by the Counsel representing the University
quite late and it was, then, place before the Legal
Cell of the University for examining the matter.
After going through the voluminous paper book, it
was opined that the matter be referred to the ViceChancellor for consideration and pursuant
thereto, a meeting was held, wherein it was
decided that the matter needs to be dealt with
holistically, having regard to all the issues decided
and connotations thereof. The issue could not be
taken up for consideration as the post of ViceChancellor had fallen vacant w.e.f. 28.10.2015
and could be considered only after the new VicePage 7 of 34
Chancellor had assumed office and taken stock of
things. On 10.03.2016, the new ViceChancellor
joined the office and in order to ensure democratic
functioning of the University, he decided to
constitute a Committee comprising of senior
faculty persons representing different sections of
the University. The terms of reference of the Fivemember Committee were, to recommend the
course of action to the University in the light of
the dismissal of the Writ Petition filed by the
University in the DMRC matter.
(iii) On 11.11.2016, the above constituted
Committee gave its Report. Based on the Report
of the fivemember Committee, it was decided by
the Competent Authority that the subject matter
of the present case be referred to the Executive
Council of the University for its final decision. In
the Executive Council meeting held on
28.02.2017, the matter was discussed. The item
was again discussed in the Executive Council
meeting held on 7.3.2017 (continued meeting),
Page 8 of 34
where the members of the Council referred to the
earlier discussions and decisions of both the
Academic Council and the Executive Council with
respect to the same matter and it was decided
unanimously to prefer an Appeal against the
Order of the learned Single Judge dated
27.04.2015 after adequate preparation.
(iv) In the meanwhile, reservation was strongly
put forth by the disabled students and faculty in
the light of the proposed project by the private
builder at the very main entrance of the University
of Delhi. Such representations were received from
individuals as well as groups which the University
had to consider and were therefore forwarded to
the Equal Opportunity Cell for consideration. The
Equal Opportunity Cell, University of Delhi, which
looks after the welfare of disabled students and
others, in the light of the new enactment on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016,
analyzed the probable outcome. After detailed
deliberations, the Equal Opportunity Cell
Page 9 of 34
submitted its Report on 28.04.2017 which was
brought to the notice of Competent Authorities for
their consideration. The Report was considered at
various levels of the University including the
Office of the Dean, Student Welfare, the
Department of legal affairs, the Office of the
Proctor, the Engineering Department, and the
Department of Environmental Studies. Holding
discussions and deliberations among these bodies
and considering their inputs involved further time
and it involved coordination and interaction with
various authorities and stake holders. All this
exercise involved a further period of five to six
months before a considered opinion could be
generated by the University of Delhi. Hence the
representations and the Report of the Equal
Opportunity Cell could be finally considered by
the University of Delhi around the end of year
2017.
(v) In the interregnum, the accidents occurred
at Chhatra Marg in December 2017 led to the
Page 10 of 34
need for the preparation of a Report by the Office
of the Proctor of the University dated 05.02.2018
wherein the Proctor recommended the area to be
declared as accident prone. Both the Reports
one by the Equal Opportunity Cell and the other
by the Office of Proctor were sent to the Counsel
concerned who was holding the brief for the
preparation of the Appeal memorandum.
Subsequently legal opinion was sought and the
draft appeal and petition was prepared which was
thereafter got vetted and settled by the Senior
Counsel. The finalized Appeal was thereafter again
considered at the highest level at the University to
take the final decision, which entailed some time.
On 01.03.2018, the LPA was filed before the Delhi
High Court.
10. The above explanation for the delayed filing was
however not accepted and the Division Bench of the High
Court on 29.10.2018 dismissed the LPA on the ground of
delay without considering the merits of the appeal. Thus,
Page 11 of 34
aggrieved the appellantUniversity has filed this appeal.
11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant submits that the implication of the rejection
of the writ petition and the LPA without considering the
substantial contention raised by the University on merits
would cause grave injury to the public institution. The
learned Senior Counsel submits that the University
Authorities have been pursuing the issue with due
diligence but decision had to be taken after consultation
with all the stakeholders and therefore, the delay in
preferring the LPA should not be attributed to any
inaction, much less a deliberate inaction. The endeavor of
the Courts according to Shri Parasaran should be to do
substantial justice to the parties by deciding the matters
on merits but in the present case, neither the learned
Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court had
considered the merit of the contention raised by the
appellantUniversity. Shri Parasaran argues that the
expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough to enable
the courts to apply the law of limitation in a meaningful
manner. He also projects that since the builders are yet to
Page 12 of 34
start their construction, the delayed filing of the LPA
should not have resulted in nonconsideration of the
contention on merits, as major public interest issues have
been raised in the present matter. The learned Senior
Counsel argues that important questions effecting public
interest cannot be defeated on technical objection,
inasmuch as the proposed site for construction was
originally owned by the Defence Ministry and the land was
acquired for public purpose at public expense but is now
sought to be given over to a private builder, for a profit
oriented motive. The said contentions are also
supplemented by Shri R. Venkataramani and Shri Ramji
Srinivasan, learned Senior Advocates.
12. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel
representing the applicants/intervenors submits that six
girl hostels are located near to the project site and if high
rise apartments are allowed to be constructed, the privacy
of the hostel residents would be compromised. Ms. Arora
also refers to the letter dated 25.10.1943 of the Joint
Secretary, Government of India, Department of Education
addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi conveying
Page 13 of 34
the decision of the Government of India to ensure that no
tall buildings are erected inside the Delhi University
Campus and also the necessity of protecting University
area, as an enclave. The Senior Counsel then refers to the
Zonal Development Plan for Zone“C” (Civil Lines Zone) of
the DDA as approved by the Ministry of Urban
Development to point out that the authorities have
recognized the existence of number of old historical
buildings of the colonial period within the Delhi University
Campus and effort should be made to convert the Delhi
University into an integrated Campus with restriction on
tall buildings.
13. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for
respondent No.13 M/s Young Builders would at the
outset contend that though the learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant has referred to the merits of the case,
keeping in view the position that the Division Bench of the
High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay
and laches, that aspect of the matter would require
consideration at the threshold. He would assert that the
delay of 916 days is an inordinate delay of more than two
Page 14 of 34
and a half years and in such event the principle of
applying the usual test for “sufficient cause” would not
arise as it is not merely the number of days requiring
condonation but also amounts to laches in filing the writ
petition, as well as the LPA. Mere contention that the
proceedings initiated by the appellant is in public interest
would not advance the case inasmuch as the learned
Single Judge having adverted to all these aspects has
arrived at the conclusion that the petition suffers from
laches in addition to there being no merit and in such
circumstance when the LPA was once again delayed by
916 days the Division Bench was justified in its
conclusion. It is pointed out that the said delay of 916
days is as against the period of 30 days which is allowed
in law for filing the LPA. It is contended that the cause of
action if any should be construed on 23.09.2005 when the
area was converted into residential, but the writ petition
was filed only on 07.05.2012 and despite the writ petition
having been disposed of on 27.04.2015 the LPA was filed
only on 01.03.2018 after a delay of 916 days. The reason
assigned that a decision to file the LPA could not be taken
Page 15 of 34
as the office of ViceChancellor had fallen vacant also
cannot be accepted since such vacancy arose only on
28.10.2015 while the writ petition had already been
disposed of on 27.04.2015 and there was sufficient time to
file the LPA if they had the intention to do so. The learned
Senior Counsel further refers to the large number of cases
that was filed on behalf of the University during the said
period. It is contended that while considering condonation
of delay the prejudice that would be caused to the opposite
side is also one of the aspects to be considered. If that
situation is kept in view, in the instant case the request
for proposal in favour of the respondent No.13 was notified
on 23.06.2008 and the Letter of Acceptance was issued on
13.08.2008 and the lease being for 90 years, already 11
years have passed and by such belated proceedings the
project is prejudicially hampered. The respondent No.13
has already spent Rs.233 crores being the lease amount
paid to the DMRC and also for securing appropriate
approvals. It is contended that the respondent No.13 had
to face earlier litigation as well which has been taken note
by the learned Single Judge and the respondent cannot be
Page 16 of 34
exposed to such repeated litigations.
14. Shri Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General
appearing on behalf of respondent No.11DMRC, has
contended that the Ministry of Urban Development as a
matter of Policy of the Government of India had permitted
the DMRC to generate its own resources through
property development and has accordingly permitted to
carry out property development on the land transferred to
it by the Government. In such event when the DMRC has
taken such steps not only in the instant case but also in
several other projects, any interference at this stage more
particularly when there is belated challenge of the
present nature, it would have a serious impact on the
projects undertaken. It was submitted that due to
certain changes affected in the manner in which the
Metro Rail Project was to be implemented there was some
excess land which has been put to use to generate
resources for the project and in that regard when there is
a contractual relationship with respondent No.13 if the
much belated petition is entertained at this stage, there
would be a great financial impact which is also a loss to
Page 17 of 34
the public exchequer and in such event the public
interest would be better served by not condoning the
delay in such matters. Moreover, it is not a case of mere
delay in filing the LPA but is a serious case of laches. It is
also noticed by the learned Single Judge that the writ
petition itself was filed after 78 years and in such event
if the discretionary orders passed in the writ jurisdiction
is interfered in the limited jurisdiction of this Court, it
would set a bad precedent.
15. Shri A.N.S. Nandkarni, learned Additional Solicitor
General would also refer to the aspect of delay and laches
and supplement the arguments advanced by the learned
Solicitor General. He would further contend that the
Union of India being the owner of the land which was
acquired does not have objection for the project and in
such event interference at the instance of the appellant
herein would not be justified. Ms. Binu Tamta, learned
Counsel submitted in support of the contentions raised
by the respondents.
Page 18 of 34
16. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel in
reply to the said contention would reiterate the
contentions put forth relating to the explanation of delay
and would contend that the conclusion of the learned
Single Judge that the writ petition was hit by laches is
fallacious inasmuch as the respondent No.13 themselves
had filed a writ petition raising certain disputes with
regard to the limit of FAR through the Notification dated
20.01.2005 and such challenge by the respondent No.13
had come to an end on 18.05.2011 and the NOC etc.
were obtained subsequently, after which the writ petition
was filed by the appellant herein in the year 2012. Hence
the delay and laches has been explained and it is not a
case of negligence. It is contended that the stand of the
DMRC that it would be put to financial loss cannot be
accepted at this point since the question as to whether
they would be liable to pay interest or not are matters
which would have to be considered in appropriate
proceedings. Hence, he contends that the High Court
ought to have condoned the delay and the matter should
have been considered on its merits.
Page 19 of 34
17. Though we have exhaustively referred to the
pleadings and the contentions of the parties, including
contentions put forth on merits, the same is only for
completeness and to put the matter in perspective before
considering the issue relating to delay and laches. In the
instant case, considering that the Division Bench of the
High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay
of 916 days, that aspect of the matter would require
consideration at the outset and the facts on merits is
noted to the limited extent to find out whether in that
background the public interest would suffer. The learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant in order to impress upon
this Court the principle relating to consideration of
“sufficient cause” for condonation of delay and the factors
that are required to be kept in view, has relied on the
decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag & Anr.vs. Katiji & Ors., 1987(2) SCC 107
wherein it is held as hereunder:
“3. The legislature has conferred the power to
condone delay by enacting Section 5 [ Any
appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be
Page 20 of 34
admitted after the prescribed period if the
appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that
he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making the application within such
period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in
order to enable the courts to do substantial
justice to parties by disposing of matters on
”merits”. The expression “sufficient cause”
employed by the legislature is adequately elastic
to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice — that being the life-purpose for the
existence of the institution of courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has been
making a justifiably liberal approach in matters
instituted in this Court. But the message does
not appear to have percolated down to all the
other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal
approach is adopted on principle as it is realized
that:
“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the highest
that can happen is that a cause would be
decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does
not mean that a pedantic approach should be
made. Why not every hour's delay, every
second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in
a rational common-sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides.
A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting
to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to legalize
injustice on technical grounds but because it is
Page 21 of 34
capable of removing injustice and is expected to
do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this
perspective, there was sufficient cause for
condoning the delay in the institution of the
appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which
was seeking condonation and not a private party
was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of
equality before law demands that all litigants,
including the State as a litigant, are accorded
the same treatment and the law is administered
in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant
for according a step-motherly treatment when
the “State” is the applicant praying for
condonation of delay. In fact experience shows
that on account of an impersonal machinery (no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt
by the judgment sought to be subjected to
appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making, filepushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on
its part is less difficult to understand though
more difficult to approve. In any event, the State
which represents the collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-nongrata status. The courts therefore have to be
informed with the spirit and philosophy of the
provision in the course of the interpretation of
the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the
same approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the end in
view to do even-handed justice on merits in
preference to the approach which scuttles a
decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the
matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are
satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the
delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the
appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set
aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is
remitted to the High Court. The High Court will
now dispose of the appeal on merits after
affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to
both the sides.”
Page 22 of 34
18. Further the decision in the case of M/s Dehri
Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. Vs. District
Board, Bhojpur & Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 598 is relied upon,
wherein this Court has indicated the real test to
determine the delay is that the petitioner should come to
Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse
of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence.
19. The learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.13, on
the other hand, has relied upon the decision in the case
of Postmaster General & Ors. vs. Living Media India
Limited & Anr. 1992 (3) SCC 563 wherein it is held as
hereunder:
“28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in
a matter of condonation of delay when there was
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack
of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several
notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The law
of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody,
including the Government.
Page 23 of 34
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due
to considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process. The government departments are
under a special obligation to ensure that they
perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.”
20. From a consideration of the view taken by this
Court through the decisions cited supra the position is
clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken
in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration
for condonation of delay would not depend on the status
of the party namely the Government or the public bodies
so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate
consideration should be to render even handed justice to
the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long
delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or
the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to
be kept in perspective. In that background while
considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation
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would not be enough but it should be in the nature of
indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will
depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be
weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact
situation. In the case of Katiji (Supra) the entire
conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been
kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is
that the consideration therein was in the background of
dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay
in a case where there was delay of four days pitted
against the consideration that was required to be made
on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation
amounting to 800 per cent.
21. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts
in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the
consideration to condone can be made only if there is
reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be
merely because the appellant is public body. The entire
explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach
unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of
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the position of law. That apart when there is such a long
delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would
also come into play while noticing as to the manner in
which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In
addition in the instant facts not only the delay and laches
in filing the appeal is contended on behalf of the
respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but
it is also contended that there was delay and laches in
filing the writ petition itself at the first instance from
which the present appeal had arisen. In that view, it
would be necessary for us to advert to those aspects of
the matter and notice the nature of consideration made
in the writ petition as well as the LPA to arrive at a
conclusion as to whether the High Court was justified.
22. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of
916 days is twofold, i.e. the nonavailability of the ViceChancellor due to retirement and subsequent
appointment of new ViceChancellor, also that the matter
was placed before the Executive Council and a decision
was taken to file the appeal and the said process had
Page 26 of 34
caused the delay. The reasons as stated do not appear
very convincing since the situation was of availing the
appellate remedy and not the original proceedings
requiring such deliberation when it was a mere
continuation of the proceedings which had already been
filed on behalf of the appellant herein, after due
deliberation. Significantly, the ViceChancellor who was
at the helm of affairs when the writ petition was filed,
prosecuted and disposed of on 27.04.2015 was available
in the same office till 28.10.2015, for about six months
which was a long enough period as compared to 30 days
limitation period for filing appeal. In that circumstance
when the said ViceChancellor who had prosecuted the
writ petition was available, the submission of the learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant that unseen hands are
likely to have prevented the filing of the appeal also
cannot be accepted. Secondly, the reason sought to be
put forth about the decision required to be taken by the
Executive Council is also not acceptable when it was just
the matter of filing the appeal. In fact, in the writ petition
an affidavit was filed referring to Resolution No.56 and
Page 27 of 34
173 of Academic Council and Executive Council
authorising for filing writ petition. When the writ petition
was filed based on such authorisation and the stand of
the appellant, as the writ petitioner was put forth and
had failed in the writ petition, it cannot be accepted that
the appellant with all the wherewithal was unable to file
the appeal, that too when the same ViceChancellor was
available for six months after dismissal of the writ
petition. Hence the reasons put forth cannot in our
opinion constitute sufficient cause.
23. That apart, as rightly noticed by the Division
Bench in the LPA, the approval from the Executive
Council was obtained on 28.02.2017 / 07.03.2017, the
appeal was ultimately filed on 01.03.2018 after an year
from the said date which only indicates the casual
approach which is now sought to be overcome with the
plea of public interest despite there being no explanation
for the delay at every stage. It is true that as held in the
case of Mst. Katiji (supra) that every day’s delay need not
be explained with such precision but the fact remains
Page 28 of 34
that a reasonable and acceptable explanation is very
much necessary. The Division Bench apart from noticing
these aspects had also noted that the learned Single
Judge too found the writ petition to be hit by delay and
laches.
24. In that backdrop, a perusal of the order dated
27.04.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge would
indicate that the learned Single Judge in para – 65 of the
order with reference to his earlier observation has arrived
at the categorical conclusion that the petition suffers
from laches and has been filed with delay of 78 years.
The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant while
seeking to dispel such conclusion by the learned Single
Judge contended that the respondent No. 13 themselves
had filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the restricted
FAR and the said writ petition was disposed only on
18.05.2011 and the need for the appellant herein to file
the writ petition arose only thereafter. The said
contention is also not acceptable if the entire sequence is
noticed.
Page 29 of 34
25. In that regard there can be no dispute to the fact
that the Respondent No. 13 being aggrieved by the
decision of DDA had filed a petition bearing W.P.
No.3135/2010 assailing the letter dated 19.08.2009 and
the same was disposed of only on 18.05.2011 but the
appellant cannot take shelter under the same to explain
the laches. This is because much water had flown under
the bridge before the said development and those events
ought to have triggered action from the appellant in
challenging, more so when there were other litigations
relating to the same subject, as noticed in the order of
the learned Single Judge.
26. In the present matter, the land was converted to
residential use in 2005 and Respondent No.11 – DMRC
had invited bids and public auction was conducted on
28.07.2008 which ought to have awakened the appellant
herein for the first time since the fact of conversion of the
land into residential development was in public domain
even if is assumed that the earlier process of approval
etc. by the DDA on the approval request of DMRC are
Page 30 of 34
internal process and not be known to the appellant. In
fact, the learned Single Judge while taking note of the
challenge raised by the appellant herein has also taken
note of an earlier petition bearing W.P (C) No.8675/2011
filed by the Association of Metro Commuters wherein also
the residential development was an issue, which came to
be dismissed by order dated 14.02.2011. Similarly,
another petition in W.P(C) No.66246625/2012, though
challenging the acquisition was filed, the same was also
dismissed. Thereafter the writ petition of the appellant
filed in the year 2012 was pending till it was disposed on
27.04.2015.
27. Despite the writ petition having been filed
belatedly in respect of certain actions which had
commenced in the year 2005 and even though the writ
petition was filed after obtaining approval of the
Executive Council, no steps were taken to file the writ
appeal for 916 days after disposal of the writ petition. In
such circumstance, the cumulative effect of the delay and
laches cannot be ignored. The decisions referred by the
Page 31 of 34
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant noted Supra
cannot, therefore, be applied in the present facts and
circumstance inasmuch as the consideration hereunder
was not merely the explanation for the delay of few days
in filing the appeal. Though contention is put forth that
the delay is required to be condoned since public interest
is involved, the nature of the proceedings that have taken
place thus far would indicate that the matter has been
examined at different stages in the earlier litigations and
if the grounds on which the appellant was assailing the
action of the respondents were to be examined on merits,
they ought to have been more diligent in prosecuting the
matter before the Court.
28. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches,
the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of
the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. In that
regard, rather than taking note of the hardship that
would be caused to the respondent No.13 as contended
by the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be
taken note is the manner in which the respondent No.11
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– DMRC has proceeded in the matter. The respondent
No.11 DMRC is engaged in providing the public
transport and for the said purpose the Government
through policy decision has granted approval to generate
resources through property development and in that
regard the development as earlier indicated, is taken up.
Pursuant thereto the respondent No.11 has received a
sum of Rs.218.20 crores from respondent No.13 as far
back as in the year 2008. The said amount as indicated
is used for its projects providing metro rail service to the
commuting public. In such circumstance, if at this stage
the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the
lackadaisical manner in which the appellant has
proceeded in the matter, it would also be contrary to
public interest.
29. Therefore, taking into consideration all these
aspects of the matter, we are of the opinion that not only
the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the
writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and laches but the
decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA on
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the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the
orders do not call for interference.
30. Accordingly, the appeals being devoid of merits
stand dismissed with no order as to costs. All pending
applications shall stand disposed of.
……………………….J.
(R. BANUMATHI)
……………………….J.
(A.S. BOPANNA)
……………………….J.
(HRISHIKESH ROY)
New Delhi,
December 17, 2019
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