order of compulsory retirement = judicial officer of the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge -The appellant while posted as a Chief Judicial Magistrate granted acquittal to the accused on 17.09.2007 in Criminal Case No.4670 of 2005 “State vs. Mohd. Ayub” under Sections 467, 468, 1 471, 474, 420, 406 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. -A complaint was lodged against the appellant with regard to the acquittal. After calling for comments from the appellant, and perusing the judgement and the order of reversal in appeal, the Administrative Judge on 24.02.2009 recommended an enquiry. -The enquiry report dated 10.05.2012 was adverse to the appellant. His comments were called for on 28.06.2012. On 20.12.2012, the appellant was informed that on basis of the enquiry, a censure entry had been recorded in his character roll. The order of punishment was accepted by the
appellant without any challenge.- On 01.04.2016, a committee of three Hon’ble Judges constituted for screening of judicial officers for compulsorily retirement under the Rules recommended the compulsory retirement of the appellant which was endorsed by the Full Court on 14.04.2016 leading to the impugned order of compulsory retirement. The challenge laid out by the appellant to his order of retirement before the High Court was unsuccessful and thus the present appeal.= Quite apart from the scrutiny of his service records by the Screening Committee and again by the Full Court, the Division Bench again perused his ACRs and opined as follows:
“We have perused the expunged portion of the annual remarks of the petitioner and found that rating of the petitioner as fair officer has not been expunged. Likewise, in the year 200809, 200910, 201011, the petitioner was posted as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.8, Pratapgarh and his disposal of work prescribed as Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court was found inadequate. Censure entry, recorded against the petitioner and considered by the Screening Committee and Full Court, still has not been
expunged. The petitioner has never challenged the said censure entry, therefore, there is no substance in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that single censure entry relating to integrity could not be considered by the Screening
Committee and Full Court. The expositions of law relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner are of no help for the petitioner. The expositions of law relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.”
A person entering the judicial service no doubt has career aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory retirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having said so, we must also sound a caution that judicial service is not like any other service. A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf of the State in discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of
justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered as akin to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a very serious matter.
The standards of probity, conduct, integrity that may be relevant for discharge of duties by a careerist in another job cannot be the same for a judicial officer.
A judge holds the office of a public trust. Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral values embodied to the core are absolute imperatives which brooks no compromise. A judge is the pillar of the entire justice system and
the public has a right to demand virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function. Judges must strive for the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and
personal lives.
The standard or yardstick for judging the conduct of the judicial officer therefore has necessarily to be strict. Having said so, we must also observe that it is not every inadvertent flaw or error that will make a judicial officer culpable. The State Judicial Academies undoubtedly has a stellar role to perform in this regard.
A bona fide error may need correction and counselling. But a conduct which creates a perception beyond the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a trained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for itself.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 8875 OF 2019
(arising out of SLP (Civil) No(s). 22709 of 2018)
RAM MURTI YADAV ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND ANOTHER ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
The appellant, a judicial officer of the rank of Additional
District and Sessions Judge, assails his order of compulsory
retirement dated 03.05.2016 at 56 years of age under Rule 56 (C) of
the U. P. Fundamental Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’).
2. The appellant while posted as a Chief Judicial Magistrate
granted acquittal to the accused on 17.09.2007 in Criminal Case
No.4670 of 2005 “State vs. Mohd. Ayub” under Sections 467, 468,
1
471, 474, 420, 406 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. A complaint
was lodged against the appellant with regard to the acquittal. After
calling for comments from the appellant, and perusing the
judgement and the order of reversal in appeal, the Administrative
Judge on 24.02.2009 recommended an enquiry. A vigilance enquiry,
V.B. Enquiry No.26/2009, was held by the OSD, Enquiry, High
Court of Allahabad. The enquiry report dated 10.05.2012 was
adverse to the appellant. His comments were called for on
28.06.2012. On 20.12.2012, the appellant was informed that on
basis of the enquiry, a censure entry had been recorded in his
character roll. The order of punishment was accepted by the
appellant without any challenge. On 01.04.2016, a committee of
three Hon’ble Judges constituted for screening of judicial officers for
compulsorily retirement under the Rules recommended the
compulsory retirement of the appellant which was endorsed by the
Full Court on 14.04.2016 leading to the impugned order of
compulsory retirement. The challenge laid out by the appellant to
his order of retirement before the High Court was unsuccessful and
thus the present appeal.
2
3. Learned senior counsel Shri R. Basant, appearing on behalf of
the appellant, submitted that since joining the service in 199697 as
a Civil Judge (Jr. Division) his Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs)
till 201415 certify his integrity. The quota of cases allocated to the
appellant being inadequate, his percentage of work was considered
adequate. The adverse remark in 199697 for below performance
had been expunged. An error of judgment in deciding a criminal
case, while discharging judicial functions, cannot ipso facto lead to
an inference of dishonesty. There was in fact no material to infer
dishonesty or lack of integrity on part of the appellant in granting
acquittal in the criminal case. Merely because a different view was
possible does not justify the extreme step of compulsory retirement.
The order of compulsory retirement being stigmatic in nature, the
failure to hold departmental enquiry vitiates the same. The
appellant was promoted to the post of Additional District and
Sessions Judge on the basis of meritcumseniority and was
confirmed in 2013. He had also crossed the efficiency bar. The
punishment of censure therefore stands obliterated and was
irrelevant for the purpose of compulsory retirement. The conclusion
that the appellant had lost his utility and efficiency as a judicial
3
officer to be declared deadwood was unsustainable without
adequate consideration of his ACRs in the recent past years before
retirement, at least from 2012 to 2015. Reliance in support of the
submissions was placed on Ram Ekbal Sharma vs. State of
Bihar and Anr., (1990) 3 SCC 504; Baikuntha Nath Das and
Anr. vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and Anr.,
(1992) 2 SCC 299; P.C. Joshi vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2001) 6
SCC 491, and Ramesh Chander Singh vs. High Court of
Allahabad and Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 247.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the adverse
remarks against the appellant for the year 199697 was never
expunged as the explanation furnished was not found satisfactory
by the District Judge which was informed to the appellant on
12.10.1998. His disposal was also found to be inadequate in
subsequent years. The complaint against the appellant for granting
acquittal was examined at several levels before the impugned action
followed. The appellant never questioned the punishment of censure
in connection with the very same order of acquittal. The entire
4
service record of the appellant was considered by the Screening
Committee and again by the Full Court. The fact that the appellant
may have been promoted subsequently is irrelevant for the purpose
of consideration of compulsory retirement. Reliance in support of
the submissions was placed on Baikuntha Nath Das (supra);
Union of India & Ors. vs. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56; Union
of India & Ors. vs. Duli Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680; Nawal Singh
vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 117; Pyare Mohan
Lal vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 693; R.C.
Chandel vs. High Court of M.P. and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC 58, and
Punjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Hari Kishan
Verma, (2015) 13 SCC 156.
5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties
and also the precedents sought to be relied upon by them
respectively. The High Court also noticed that another vigilance
enquiry VB No.06 of 2009 had also been initiated but was dropped.
The enquiry which followed on the complaint against acquittal
manifests that the appellant was provided proper opportunity of his
5
defence at every stage. Quite apart from the scrutiny of his service
records by the Screening Committee and again by the Full Court,
the Division Bench again perused his ACRs and opined as follows:
“We have perused the expunged portion of the
annual remarks of the petitioner and found that
rating of the petitioner as fair officer has not been
expunged. Likewise, in the year 200809, 200910,
201011, the petitioner was posted as Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.8,
Pratapgarh and his disposal of work prescribed as
Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court was
found inadequate. Censure entry, recorded against
the petitioner and considered by the Screening
Committee and Full Court, still has not been
expunged. The petitioner has never challenged the
said censure entry, therefore, there is no substance
in the arguments of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that single censure entry relating to
integrity could not be considered by the Screening
Committee and Full Court. The expositions of law
relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner are
of no help for the petitioner. The expositions of law
relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent
is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances
of this case.”
6. The service records of the appellant have been examined by the
Screening Committee, the Full Court as also by the Division Bench
of the High Court. The scope for judicial review of an order of
compulsory retirement based on the subjective satisfaction of the
employer is extremely narrow and restricted. Only if it is found to be
6
based on arbitrary or capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides,
overlooks relevant materials, could there be limited scope for
interference. The court, in judicial review, cannot sit in judgment
over the same as an Appellate Authority. Principles of natural
justice have no application in a case of compulsory retirement.
7. The performance chart, as furnished by the appellant,
demonstrates that his assessment from 199697 till 201415 rates
him as a “fair” or “good officer” only, except for one entry of “very
good” in the year 201112. The submission that his integrity was
certified on each occasion leaves us unimpressed. There can hardly
be any direct evidence with regard to integrity as far as a judicial
officer is concerned. It is more a matter of inference and perceptions
based on the conduct of the officer. The inadequacy of the present
system of writing ACRs of judicial officers has deficiencies in several
ways, was noticed in Registrar General, Patna High Court vs.
Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Ors., (2012) 6 SCC 357.
8. The complaint against the appellant with regard to the
acquittal granted by him was first considered by the Administrative
7
Judge, who was satisfied that it is a matter for further enquiry. The
comments of the appellant were called for. A vigilance enquiry was
recommended by the Administrative Judge, who obviously was not
satisfied with the explanation furnished. The officer holding the
vigilance enquiry was also a judicial officer who opined that the act
of acquittal by the appellant was not above board. The comments of
the appellant were again called for. The Screening Committee
consisting of three Hon’ble Judges, on an overall assessment of the
appellant’s service record, recommended his compulsory retirement.
The Full Court scrutinised the service records of the appellant again
while considering the recommendation of the Screening Committee
and arrived at the conclusion that it was in public interest to
compulsory retire the appellant. It is undisputed that the
punishment of censure meted out to the appellant was never
assailed by him.
9. The submission of Shri Basant that compulsory retirement
could not have been ordered for mere error of judgment in decision
making merits no consideration in view of K.K. Dhawan (supra)
and Duli Chand (supra). Likewise, what has been euphemistically
8
described as "washedoff theory" by reason of any subsequent
promotion after adverse entry being relevant for further promotion
but not for compulsory retirement has to be rejected in view of
Pyare Mohan Lal (supra). A single adverse entry could suffice for
an order of compulsory retirement as held in Pyare Mohan Lal
(supra) as follows :
“29. The law requires the authority to consider the
“entire service record” of the employee while
assessing whether he can be given compulsory
retirement irrespective of the fact that the adverse
entries had not been communicated to him and the
officer had been promoted earlier in spite of those
adverse entries. More so, a single adverse entry
regarding the integrity of an officer even in remote
past is sufficient to award compulsory retirement.
The case of a judicial officer is required to be
examined, treating him to be different from other
wings of the society, as he is serving the State in a
different capacity. The case of a judicial officer is
considered by a committee of Judges of the High
Court duly constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief
Justice and then the report of the Committee is
placed before the Full Court. A decision is taken by
the Full Court after due deliberation on the matter.
Therefore, there is hardly any chance to make the
allegations of nonapplication of mind or mala
fides.”
10. This Court in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors. vs State of
Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 592, considering the
9
scope of judicial review of an assessment of the conduct of a judicial
officer approved by a Full Court, observed as follows:
“7. … As has often been reiterated by this Court,
judicial review is permissible only to the extent of
finding whether the process in reaching the decision
has been observed correctly and not the decision
itself, as such. Critical or independent analysis or
appraisal of the materials by the courts exercising
powers of judicial review unlike the case of an
appellate court, would neither be permissible nor
conducive to the interests of either the officers
concerned or the system and institutions of
administration of justice with which we are
concerned in this case, by going into the correctness
as such of ACRs or the assessment made by the
Committee and approval accorded by the Full Court
of the High Court.”
11. The question was again considered in Rajendra Singh Verma
(D) thr. Lrs. vs. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 10 SCC 1,
reiterating the principle laid down in High Court of Judicature at
Bombay vs. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 416, this
Court observed as follows:
“191. … in case where the Full Court of the High
Court recommends compulsory retirement of an
officer, the High Court on the judicial side has to
exercise great caution and circumspection in setting
aside that order because it is a complement of all the
Judges of the High Court who go into the question
and it is possible that in all cases evidence would not
10
be forthcoming about integrity doubtful of a judicial
officer….”
It was further observed that:
“192. … If that authority bona fide forms an opinion
that the integrity of a particular officer is doubtful,
the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged
before courts. When such a constitutional function is
exercised on the administrative side of the High
Court, any judicial review thereon should be made
only with great care and circumspection and it must
be confined strictly to the parameters set by this
Court in several reported decisions. When the
appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that
compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public
interest, the writ court under Article 226 or this
Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the
order.”
12. P.C. Joshi (supra) was a case relating to an order of
punishment in a departmental proceeding held to be vitiated for
want of any legally acceptable or relevant evidence in support of the
charges of misconduct. Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) related to
an order of bail dealing with exercise of discretionary powers
specially when a coaccused had been granted bail by the High
Court. An order of compulsory retirement not been a punishment,
much less stigmatic in the facts and circumstances of the present
case. Ram Ekbal Sharma (supra) was dealing with the issue that
11
the form of the order was not conclusive and the veil could be lifted
to determine if it was ordered as punishment more so in view of the
stand taken in the counter affidavit with regard to grave financial
irregularities, again has no relevance to the present controversy.
13. A person entering the judicial service no doubt has career
aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory
retirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having said
so, we must also sound a caution that judicial service is not like any
other service. A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf of
the State in discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of
justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered as akin
to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a very serious matter.
The standards of probity, conduct, integrity that may be relevant for
discharge of duties by a careerist in another job cannot be the same
for a judicial officer. A judge holds the office of a public trust.
Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral
values embodied to the core are absolute imperatives which brooks
no compromise. A judge is the pillar of the entire justice system and
the public has a right to demand virtually irreproachable conduct
12
from anyone performing a judicial function. Judges must strive for
the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and
personal lives.
14. It has to be kept in mind that a person seeking justice, has the
first exposure to the justice delivery system at the level of
subordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of injustice can have
serious repercussions not only on that individual but can have its
fall out in the society as well. It is therefore absolutely necessary
that the ordinary litigant must have complete faith at this level and
no impression can be afforded to be given to a litigant which may
even create a perception to the contrary as the consequences can be
very damaging. The standard or yardstick for judging the conduct
of the judicial officer therefore has necessarily to be strict. Having
said so, we must also observe that it is not every inadvertent flaw or
error that will make a judicial officer culpable. The State Judicial
Academies undoubtedly has a stellar role to perform in this regard.
A bona fide error may need correction and counselling. But a
conduct which creates a perception beyond the ordinary cannot be
13
countenanced. For a trained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for
itself.
15. In conclusion, we are of the considered opinion that the order
of compulsory retirement of the appellant calls for no interference.
The Appeal is dismissed.
.……………………….J.
(Ashok Bhushan)
………………………..J.
(Navin Sinha)
New Delhi,
December 10, 2019
14
appellant without any challenge.- On 01.04.2016, a committee of three Hon’ble Judges constituted for screening of judicial officers for compulsorily retirement under the Rules recommended the compulsory retirement of the appellant which was endorsed by the Full Court on 14.04.2016 leading to the impugned order of compulsory retirement. The challenge laid out by the appellant to his order of retirement before the High Court was unsuccessful and thus the present appeal.= Quite apart from the scrutiny of his service records by the Screening Committee and again by the Full Court, the Division Bench again perused his ACRs and opined as follows:
“We have perused the expunged portion of the annual remarks of the petitioner and found that rating of the petitioner as fair officer has not been expunged. Likewise, in the year 200809, 200910, 201011, the petitioner was posted as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.8, Pratapgarh and his disposal of work prescribed as Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court was found inadequate. Censure entry, recorded against the petitioner and considered by the Screening Committee and Full Court, still has not been
expunged. The petitioner has never challenged the said censure entry, therefore, there is no substance in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that single censure entry relating to integrity could not be considered by the Screening
Committee and Full Court. The expositions of law relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner are of no help for the petitioner. The expositions of law relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.”
A person entering the judicial service no doubt has career aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory retirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having said so, we must also sound a caution that judicial service is not like any other service. A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf of the State in discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of
justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered as akin to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a very serious matter.
The standards of probity, conduct, integrity that may be relevant for discharge of duties by a careerist in another job cannot be the same for a judicial officer.
A judge holds the office of a public trust. Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral values embodied to the core are absolute imperatives which brooks no compromise. A judge is the pillar of the entire justice system and
the public has a right to demand virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function. Judges must strive for the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and
personal lives.
The standard or yardstick for judging the conduct of the judicial officer therefore has necessarily to be strict. Having said so, we must also observe that it is not every inadvertent flaw or error that will make a judicial officer culpable. The State Judicial Academies undoubtedly has a stellar role to perform in this regard.
A bona fide error may need correction and counselling. But a conduct which creates a perception beyond the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a trained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for itself.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 8875 OF 2019
(arising out of SLP (Civil) No(s). 22709 of 2018)
RAM MURTI YADAV ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND ANOTHER ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
The appellant, a judicial officer of the rank of Additional
District and Sessions Judge, assails his order of compulsory
retirement dated 03.05.2016 at 56 years of age under Rule 56 (C) of
the U. P. Fundamental Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’).
2. The appellant while posted as a Chief Judicial Magistrate
granted acquittal to the accused on 17.09.2007 in Criminal Case
No.4670 of 2005 “State vs. Mohd. Ayub” under Sections 467, 468,
1
471, 474, 420, 406 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. A complaint
was lodged against the appellant with regard to the acquittal. After
calling for comments from the appellant, and perusing the
judgement and the order of reversal in appeal, the Administrative
Judge on 24.02.2009 recommended an enquiry. A vigilance enquiry,
V.B. Enquiry No.26/2009, was held by the OSD, Enquiry, High
Court of Allahabad. The enquiry report dated 10.05.2012 was
adverse to the appellant. His comments were called for on
28.06.2012. On 20.12.2012, the appellant was informed that on
basis of the enquiry, a censure entry had been recorded in his
character roll. The order of punishment was accepted by the
appellant without any challenge. On 01.04.2016, a committee of
three Hon’ble Judges constituted for screening of judicial officers for
compulsorily retirement under the Rules recommended the
compulsory retirement of the appellant which was endorsed by the
Full Court on 14.04.2016 leading to the impugned order of
compulsory retirement. The challenge laid out by the appellant to
his order of retirement before the High Court was unsuccessful and
thus the present appeal.
2
3. Learned senior counsel Shri R. Basant, appearing on behalf of
the appellant, submitted that since joining the service in 199697 as
a Civil Judge (Jr. Division) his Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs)
till 201415 certify his integrity. The quota of cases allocated to the
appellant being inadequate, his percentage of work was considered
adequate. The adverse remark in 199697 for below performance
had been expunged. An error of judgment in deciding a criminal
case, while discharging judicial functions, cannot ipso facto lead to
an inference of dishonesty. There was in fact no material to infer
dishonesty or lack of integrity on part of the appellant in granting
acquittal in the criminal case. Merely because a different view was
possible does not justify the extreme step of compulsory retirement.
The order of compulsory retirement being stigmatic in nature, the
failure to hold departmental enquiry vitiates the same. The
appellant was promoted to the post of Additional District and
Sessions Judge on the basis of meritcumseniority and was
confirmed in 2013. He had also crossed the efficiency bar. The
punishment of censure therefore stands obliterated and was
irrelevant for the purpose of compulsory retirement. The conclusion
that the appellant had lost his utility and efficiency as a judicial
3
officer to be declared deadwood was unsustainable without
adequate consideration of his ACRs in the recent past years before
retirement, at least from 2012 to 2015. Reliance in support of the
submissions was placed on Ram Ekbal Sharma vs. State of
Bihar and Anr., (1990) 3 SCC 504; Baikuntha Nath Das and
Anr. vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and Anr.,
(1992) 2 SCC 299; P.C. Joshi vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2001) 6
SCC 491, and Ramesh Chander Singh vs. High Court of
Allahabad and Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 247.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the adverse
remarks against the appellant for the year 199697 was never
expunged as the explanation furnished was not found satisfactory
by the District Judge which was informed to the appellant on
12.10.1998. His disposal was also found to be inadequate in
subsequent years. The complaint against the appellant for granting
acquittal was examined at several levels before the impugned action
followed. The appellant never questioned the punishment of censure
in connection with the very same order of acquittal. The entire
4
service record of the appellant was considered by the Screening
Committee and again by the Full Court. The fact that the appellant
may have been promoted subsequently is irrelevant for the purpose
of consideration of compulsory retirement. Reliance in support of
the submissions was placed on Baikuntha Nath Das (supra);
Union of India & Ors. vs. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56; Union
of India & Ors. vs. Duli Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680; Nawal Singh
vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 117; Pyare Mohan
Lal vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 693; R.C.
Chandel vs. High Court of M.P. and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC 58, and
Punjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Hari Kishan
Verma, (2015) 13 SCC 156.
5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties
and also the precedents sought to be relied upon by them
respectively. The High Court also noticed that another vigilance
enquiry VB No.06 of 2009 had also been initiated but was dropped.
The enquiry which followed on the complaint against acquittal
manifests that the appellant was provided proper opportunity of his
5
defence at every stage. Quite apart from the scrutiny of his service
records by the Screening Committee and again by the Full Court,
the Division Bench again perused his ACRs and opined as follows:
“We have perused the expunged portion of the
annual remarks of the petitioner and found that
rating of the petitioner as fair officer has not been
expunged. Likewise, in the year 200809, 200910,
201011, the petitioner was posted as Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.8,
Pratapgarh and his disposal of work prescribed as
Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court was
found inadequate. Censure entry, recorded against
the petitioner and considered by the Screening
Committee and Full Court, still has not been
expunged. The petitioner has never challenged the
said censure entry, therefore, there is no substance
in the arguments of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that single censure entry relating to
integrity could not be considered by the Screening
Committee and Full Court. The expositions of law
relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner are
of no help for the petitioner. The expositions of law
relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent
is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances
of this case.”
6. The service records of the appellant have been examined by the
Screening Committee, the Full Court as also by the Division Bench
of the High Court. The scope for judicial review of an order of
compulsory retirement based on the subjective satisfaction of the
employer is extremely narrow and restricted. Only if it is found to be
6
based on arbitrary or capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides,
overlooks relevant materials, could there be limited scope for
interference. The court, in judicial review, cannot sit in judgment
over the same as an Appellate Authority. Principles of natural
justice have no application in a case of compulsory retirement.
7. The performance chart, as furnished by the appellant,
demonstrates that his assessment from 199697 till 201415 rates
him as a “fair” or “good officer” only, except for one entry of “very
good” in the year 201112. The submission that his integrity was
certified on each occasion leaves us unimpressed. There can hardly
be any direct evidence with regard to integrity as far as a judicial
officer is concerned. It is more a matter of inference and perceptions
based on the conduct of the officer. The inadequacy of the present
system of writing ACRs of judicial officers has deficiencies in several
ways, was noticed in Registrar General, Patna High Court vs.
Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Ors., (2012) 6 SCC 357.
8. The complaint against the appellant with regard to the
acquittal granted by him was first considered by the Administrative
7
Judge, who was satisfied that it is a matter for further enquiry. The
comments of the appellant were called for. A vigilance enquiry was
recommended by the Administrative Judge, who obviously was not
satisfied with the explanation furnished. The officer holding the
vigilance enquiry was also a judicial officer who opined that the act
of acquittal by the appellant was not above board. The comments of
the appellant were again called for. The Screening Committee
consisting of three Hon’ble Judges, on an overall assessment of the
appellant’s service record, recommended his compulsory retirement.
The Full Court scrutinised the service records of the appellant again
while considering the recommendation of the Screening Committee
and arrived at the conclusion that it was in public interest to
compulsory retire the appellant. It is undisputed that the
punishment of censure meted out to the appellant was never
assailed by him.
9. The submission of Shri Basant that compulsory retirement
could not have been ordered for mere error of judgment in decision
making merits no consideration in view of K.K. Dhawan (supra)
and Duli Chand (supra). Likewise, what has been euphemistically
8
described as "washedoff theory" by reason of any subsequent
promotion after adverse entry being relevant for further promotion
but not for compulsory retirement has to be rejected in view of
Pyare Mohan Lal (supra). A single adverse entry could suffice for
an order of compulsory retirement as held in Pyare Mohan Lal
(supra) as follows :
“29. The law requires the authority to consider the
“entire service record” of the employee while
assessing whether he can be given compulsory
retirement irrespective of the fact that the adverse
entries had not been communicated to him and the
officer had been promoted earlier in spite of those
adverse entries. More so, a single adverse entry
regarding the integrity of an officer even in remote
past is sufficient to award compulsory retirement.
The case of a judicial officer is required to be
examined, treating him to be different from other
wings of the society, as he is serving the State in a
different capacity. The case of a judicial officer is
considered by a committee of Judges of the High
Court duly constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief
Justice and then the report of the Committee is
placed before the Full Court. A decision is taken by
the Full Court after due deliberation on the matter.
Therefore, there is hardly any chance to make the
allegations of nonapplication of mind or mala
fides.”
10. This Court in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors. vs State of
Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 592, considering the
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scope of judicial review of an assessment of the conduct of a judicial
officer approved by a Full Court, observed as follows:
“7. … As has often been reiterated by this Court,
judicial review is permissible only to the extent of
finding whether the process in reaching the decision
has been observed correctly and not the decision
itself, as such. Critical or independent analysis or
appraisal of the materials by the courts exercising
powers of judicial review unlike the case of an
appellate court, would neither be permissible nor
conducive to the interests of either the officers
concerned or the system and institutions of
administration of justice with which we are
concerned in this case, by going into the correctness
as such of ACRs or the assessment made by the
Committee and approval accorded by the Full Court
of the High Court.”
11. The question was again considered in Rajendra Singh Verma
(D) thr. Lrs. vs. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 10 SCC 1,
reiterating the principle laid down in High Court of Judicature at
Bombay vs. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 416, this
Court observed as follows:
“191. … in case where the Full Court of the High
Court recommends compulsory retirement of an
officer, the High Court on the judicial side has to
exercise great caution and circumspection in setting
aside that order because it is a complement of all the
Judges of the High Court who go into the question
and it is possible that in all cases evidence would not
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be forthcoming about integrity doubtful of a judicial
officer….”
It was further observed that:
“192. … If that authority bona fide forms an opinion
that the integrity of a particular officer is doubtful,
the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged
before courts. When such a constitutional function is
exercised on the administrative side of the High
Court, any judicial review thereon should be made
only with great care and circumspection and it must
be confined strictly to the parameters set by this
Court in several reported decisions. When the
appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that
compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public
interest, the writ court under Article 226 or this
Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the
order.”
12. P.C. Joshi (supra) was a case relating to an order of
punishment in a departmental proceeding held to be vitiated for
want of any legally acceptable or relevant evidence in support of the
charges of misconduct. Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) related to
an order of bail dealing with exercise of discretionary powers
specially when a coaccused had been granted bail by the High
Court. An order of compulsory retirement not been a punishment,
much less stigmatic in the facts and circumstances of the present
case. Ram Ekbal Sharma (supra) was dealing with the issue that
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the form of the order was not conclusive and the veil could be lifted
to determine if it was ordered as punishment more so in view of the
stand taken in the counter affidavit with regard to grave financial
irregularities, again has no relevance to the present controversy.
13. A person entering the judicial service no doubt has career
aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory
retirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having said
so, we must also sound a caution that judicial service is not like any
other service. A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf of
the State in discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of
justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered as akin
to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a very serious matter.
The standards of probity, conduct, integrity that may be relevant for
discharge of duties by a careerist in another job cannot be the same
for a judicial officer. A judge holds the office of a public trust.
Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral
values embodied to the core are absolute imperatives which brooks
no compromise. A judge is the pillar of the entire justice system and
the public has a right to demand virtually irreproachable conduct
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from anyone performing a judicial function. Judges must strive for
the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and
personal lives.
14. It has to be kept in mind that a person seeking justice, has the
first exposure to the justice delivery system at the level of
subordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of injustice can have
serious repercussions not only on that individual but can have its
fall out in the society as well. It is therefore absolutely necessary
that the ordinary litigant must have complete faith at this level and
no impression can be afforded to be given to a litigant which may
even create a perception to the contrary as the consequences can be
very damaging. The standard or yardstick for judging the conduct
of the judicial officer therefore has necessarily to be strict. Having
said so, we must also observe that it is not every inadvertent flaw or
error that will make a judicial officer culpable. The State Judicial
Academies undoubtedly has a stellar role to perform in this regard.
A bona fide error may need correction and counselling. But a
conduct which creates a perception beyond the ordinary cannot be
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countenanced. For a trained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for
itself.
15. In conclusion, we are of the considered opinion that the order
of compulsory retirement of the appellant calls for no interference.
The Appeal is dismissed.
.……………………….J.
(Ashok Bhushan)
………………………..J.
(Navin Sinha)
New Delhi,
December 10, 2019
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