REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3674 OF 2009
HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. ..... APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS ..... RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
The afore-captioned Civil Appeal impugns the judgment
dated 6th July 2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana which dismissed five writ petitions challenging the vires
of the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent
Recovery) Act, 1997 (‘Religious Premises Act’, for short).
2. The appellants before us are tenants in occupation of shops
located in Gurudwara Singh Sabha, a gurudwara at Kukar Majra,
G.T. Road, Mandi Gobindgarh, District Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab.
The appellants claim that they were inducted as tenants during the
period 1965-69 by Gurudwara Singh Sabha. However, no formal
lease or agreements were executed and albeit, over a period of
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time, rents were progressively increased. The appellants further
claim that they are small businessmen carrying on trade primarily
connected with steel industry, while one of the appellants runs a
dhaba. By the letter dated 2nd March 1978, the appellants were
informed that the affairs of the gurudwara had come under the
control of Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (‘SGPC’
for short) and they should, therefore, pay the rent to SGPC. It is
alleged that the appellants have been paying rent to SGPC or the
manager of the gurudwara but receipts have not been regularly
issued.
3. In the year 1997, SGPC had filed an eviction petition against one
of the appellants, Harbhajan Singh, under Section 13 of the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (‘East Punjab Rent Act’,
for short) on two grounds, viz., (i) failure to pay rent, and (ii) SGPC
needed the property for construction of shops. Harbhajan Singh
had, thereafter, deposited arrears of rent on the first date of
hearing. The eviction proceedings, however, had remained
pending and were not decided.
4. On 29th January 1998, the Religious Premises Act was enforced,
and thereby introduced a summary procedure for evicting
unauthorised occupants from the premises/property belonging to
the religious institutions. Thereafter, SGPC had filed ejectment
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 2 of 29
petitions under the Religious Premises Act before the Collector for
eviction of the appellants stating that the appellants were in
unauthorised occupation. The appellants, on receipt of notices
from the Collector under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act,
had filed the writ petitions challenging the vires of the enactment
before the High Court, which by the impugned judgment have
been dismissed. The primary challenge before the High Court
was to the explanation to clause (a) to Section 3 of the Religious
Premises Act on the ground that the provision creates an
unintelligible classification to the disadvantage of the tenants who
are otherwise entitled to equal protection as other tenants under
the East Punjab Rent Act.
5. The pleas raised by the appellants were rejected by the Division
Bench of the High Court after referring to the object and purpose
behind the impugned enactment, that is, to preserve the property
of religious institutions, by observing that public at large has an
inherent interest in the “religious institutions” which were prone to
maladministration and mismanagement. Referring to the definition
of “unauthorised occupants”, it was observed that a person who is
in occupation of the premises belonging to a “religious institution”
on a valid allotment, lease or grant is not to be treated as an
“unauthorised occupant” for the period of allotment, lease or grant.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 3 of 29
The explanation states that mere payment of rent by the tenant
who is in unauthorised occupation shall not raise any presumption
that such person had entered into possession as an allottee,
lessee or under a grant. Referring to the detailed and
comprehensive procedure for eviction under Sections 4 and 5 of
the Religious Premises Act, it was held that the Collector has to be
satisfied that the opposite party was in “unauthorised occupation”
and only thereupon an eviction order can be passed after
following the due procedure. A person aggrieved against the
order passed by the Collector can file an appeal before the
Commissioner under Section 8 of the Act. Referring to the factual
matrix, the High Court has observed that all contentions on merits
should be raised before the authorities under the Religious
Premises Act, in accordance with law.
6. The primary contention raised by the appellants before us is that
as tenants they are entitled to protection against eviction under
the East Punjab Rent Act, which protection it is submitted cannot
be withdrawn and taken away under the Religious Premises Act.
Further, the definition of “unauthorised occupants”, as a result of
explanation to clause (a) of Section 3, is highly unjust and unfair
as a tenant who has been paying rent over a long period is
deemed to be in “unauthorised occupation” because of the
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 4 of 29
termination of the lease, licence or grant, or the time stipulated in
the lease, license or grant has come to an end. This it is
submitted is unjust and unfair. The Religious Premises Act creates
an artificial classification as tenants of land and buildings
belonging to or owned by “religious institutions” are no longer
entitled to protection under the East Punjab Rent Act though such
protection continues to be available to other tenants. Expansion
or construction of a new building by a religious institution as was
pleaded by SGPC in their eviction petition under the East Punjab
Rent Act would not justify eviction. There is no public purpose or
objective in enacting the law, that is, the Religious Premises Act,
which has become a calculable device and means to increase
income of the religious institutions. This Court in Ashoka
Marketing Ltd. and Another v. Punjab National Bank and
Others1
had examined and rejected the challenge to the vires of
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971 (‘Public Premises Act’, for short) after recording that the
property belonging to the government would fall under a separate
class and that the government, while dealing with the citizens in
respect of the property belonging to it, would not act for its own
purpose as a private landlord but would act in public interest. This
is a crucial distinction between the government and private
1
(1990) 4 SCC 406
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 5 of 29
landlords and, therefore, for the same reasoning in inverse, the
present appeal should be allowed as the Religious Premises Act
creates an artificial distinction and discriminates against the
tenants of “religious institutions”, though “religious institutions” as
landlords are not a separate class. Thus, the Religious Premises
Act should be declared unconstitutional and illegal as it violates
Article 14 of the Constitution.
7. The respondents, namely, the State of Punjab and also SGPC,
have contested the said submissions and contentions. Their
submissions and contentions would be noticed in the subsequent
portion and in our reasoning below.
8. The East Punjab Rent Act was enacted in the year 1949, soon
after the Partition, with a view to protect tenants and to curtail the
right of the landlords to seek eviction notwithstanding the contract
under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
(“Transfer of Property Act”, for short) which is a general enactment
regulating landlord and tenant relationships. There cannot be any
doubt that the State legislature, that is, the Legislative Assembly of
the State of Punjab is entitled to enact the Religious Premises Act,
despite the fact that they had enacted the East Punjab Rent Act.
We must accept and take judicial notice by acknowledging that the
State legislature while enacting the Religious Premises Act was
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 6 of 29
aware that it has enacted East Punjab Rent Act, an existing
statute governing landlord and tenant relationship. However, the
State legislature in its wisdom has deemed it appropriate to enact
a law in respect of land and buildings belonging to “religious
institutions”. The vires of the Religious Premises Act, a special
enactment concerning landlord and tenant relationships, cannot
be challenged on the ground that there are already two other
enactments governing general landlord and tenant relationships
(Transfer of Property Act and East Punjab Rent Act). The
Constitution confers the power and authority on the State to enact
two separate enactments on a similar subject if they seek to
achieve different objectives and protect and preserve different
sets of rights and make necessary classification to serve such
varied ends. The Religious Premises Act, unlike the East Punjab
Rent Act and the Public Premises Act, concerns itself with the
administration of premises belonging to religious institutions and
seeks to regulate their rights as landlords vis-à-vis the tenants in
occupation. In this regard, reference can be made to the object
and purpose behind enacting the Religious Premises Act, which is
as follows:
“Since long various religious institutions have been
representing to the Government for vacation of their
premises under unauthorised occupation. On careful
thought being given by the Government, the State
Government is of the opinion that the religious
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 7 of 29
institutions are facing a lot of difficulties in this behalf. It
is, therefore, expedient for the State Government to help
the religious institutions in getting their premises which
are under unauthorised occupation vacated through
summary proceedings. Hence, the Punjab Religious
Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Bill,
1996.”
9. Section 2(d) of the Religious Premises Act defines “religious
institution”. Section 2(e) defines ‘religious premises’ and Section 3
defines “unauthorised occupation of religious premises by a
person”. These provisions read as under:
“(d) "Religious Institution' means any gurudwara,
temple, church, mosque, temple of Jains or Budhas -
which is registered under the provisions of the
Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Central Act No. XXI of
1860) or is established under any statute and includes
any other place of worship by whatever name, it may
be called, which is registered as aforesaid or is
established under any statute;
(e) "religious premises", means any land whether used
for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes, or any
building or part of a building belonging to a Religious
Institution and includes, -
(i) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any,
appertaining to such building or part of a building;
and
(ii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a
building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;”
xxx
3. Unauthorised occupation of religious premises. - For
the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to
be in unauthorised occupation of any religious
premises-
(a) where he has, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, entered into possession
thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any
allotment, lease or grant; or
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 8 of 29
(b) where he, being an allottee, lessee or grantee has,
by reason of the determination or cancellation of his
allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms
in that behalf therein contained, ceased, whether
before or after the commencement of this Act, to be
entitled to occupy or hold such religious premises; or
(c) where any person authorised to occupy any
religious premises has, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, -
(i) sub-let, in contravention of the terms of allotment,
lease or grant, without the permission of the Religious
Institution, the whole or any part of such religious
premises; or
(ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the
terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised
to occupy such religious premises.
Explanation. - For the purpose of clause (a), a person
shall not merely by reason of the fact that he has paid
any rent be deemed to have entered into possession
as allottee, lessee or grantee.”
“Religious institution” means any gurudwara, temple, church,
mosque or temple of Jains or Buddhists which is registered under
the provisions of the Societies Registration Act or established
under any statute. It also includes any place of worship by
whatever name called which is registered as aforesaid or
established under any statute. The definition is clear and no
contention or issue is raised that the definition of the term
“religious institution” is vague or incomprehensible. Similarly, the
expression “religious premises” has been defined in clear terms to
mean land used for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes or
any building or part of the building belonging to a religious
institution. The definition clarifies that the expression “religious
premises” would include garden, ground and out-house or any
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 9 of 29
fittings in the building or part of the building for more beneficial
enjoyment. The expression “unauthorised occupation” is of some
importance in view of the challenge and the contentions raised. A
person is deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any
religious premises if he has, before or after commencement of the
Religious Premises Act, entered into possession of a land or
building belonging to a religious institution otherwise than under or
pursuant to any allotment, lease or grant. A person who enters
into possession of the land or building belonging to or owned by a
religious institution and has valid and subsisting allotment, lease
or grant is clearly not an unauthorised occupant. Such allottees,
lessees or persons in whose favour there is a grant, allotment or
lease that entitles the person to retain possession are fully
protected and cannot be evicted. In other words, primacy to the
terms of allotment, lease or grant is not interfered, and is duly
accorded. The terms of the allotment, lease or grant would be
binding. Clause (b) states that if the allotment, lease or grant has
been determined or cancelled whether before or after the
commencement of the Religious Premises Act, occupation of the
person would be treated as unauthorised occupation. Clause (c)
states that where a person is authorised to occupy any religious
premises, before or after commencement of the Religious
Premises Act, has sublet the religious premises in contravention of
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 10 of 29
the terms of allotment, lease or grant, or otherwise acted in
contravention of the terms, express or implied, he shall be treated
as an “unauthorised occupant”. No contention, issue or objection
has been raised viz. clause (c) to Section 3. Explanation to
Section 3 states that for the purpose of clause (a), which makes
the term of allotment, lease or grant as a basis for determining
whether a person is in authorised or unauthorised occupation,
shall not be affected by the mere reason or the fact that such
person has paid rent and, therefore, is deemed to have entered
into possession as an allottee, lessee or guarantee. In other
words, payment of rent would not be a determinative and relevant
factor in deciding the issue and question of “unauthorised
occupation”. The tenure of allotment, lease or the grant and terms
and conditions as agreed or stated, and not mere payment of rent
would be the crucial and determinative criterion.
10. Under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act, a religious
institution can make an application before the Collector if it is of
the opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any
religious premises, situated within the Collector’s jurisdiction. The
Collector thereupon is required to issue notice in writing calling
upon the person to show-cause why the eviction order should not
be made. Sub-section (2) prescribes the requirement of a notice
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 11 of 29
and sub-section (3) to Section 4 prescribes the manner in which
the notice is to be served. Under Section 5, the Collector is
authorised and is competent to pass an order of eviction after
considering the cause, if any, shown by the person to whom notice
under Section 4 has been issued and after examining the
evidence that may be produced by such person. The person in
occupation has to be given reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The statutory requirement is that the Collector should be satisfied
that the religious premises are in unauthorised occupation before
he can make the order of eviction. The Collector must also record
reasons. The Collector is required to pass an order within a
period of 45 days from the date of receipt of the application under
Section 4 and the order passed has to be affixed on the outer door
or on some other conspicuous part of the religious premises. If a
person fails to comply with the order of eviction within 30 days
from the date of the order, the Collector, or any other officer duly
authorised by him, can evict the person and deliver possession of
the religious premises to the religious institution. He is entitled to
use force as may be necessary. The tenant, if aggrieved, can file
an appeal against the Collector’s order before the Commissioner.
Thereafter, the tenant is entitled to also invoke the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court under Articles 227 and 226 of the Constitution of
India if the grievance still persists.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 12 of 29
11. The issue of whether the properties of the religious institutions for
the purpose of rent control legislations can be treated as a
separate category is no longer res integra as this aspect was
examined in several decisions where this Court has held that
separate classification of properties of religious institutions for rent
legislations will pass a challenge under Article 14 of the
Constitution. In State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Nallamilli Rami Reddi and Others2
, this Court was faced with a
challenge to the validity of Section 82 of the Andhra Pradesh
Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act,
1987 which had cancelled the leases of tenants of properties
belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable
or any religious institution or endowment falling under the
enactment, notwithstanding the prevailing tenancy laws in the
State of Andhra Pradesh, in order to augment the rents payable
for such properties which stood frozen on account of the tenancy
laws and since sale of such lands was not feasible. While
examining the question of religious institutions as a separate and
distinguishable class, this Court had expounded on the scope of
Article 14 of the Constitution and the kind of classification that
would stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, as under:
2 AIR 2001 SC 3616
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 13 of 29
“8. What Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits is
“class legislation” and not “classification for purpose of
legislation”. If the legislature reasonably classifies
persons for legislative purposes so as to bring them
under a well-defined class, it is not open to challenge
on the ground of denial of equal treatment that the law
does not apply to other persons. The test of
permissible classification is twofold: (i) that the
classification must be founded on intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons grouped together from
others who are left out of the group, and (ii) that
differentia must have a rational connection to the object
sought to be achieved. Article 14 does not insist upon
classification, which is scientifically perfect or logically
complete. A classification would be justified unless it is
patently arbitrary. If there is equality and uniformity in
each group, the law will not become discriminatory,
though due to some fortuitous circumstance arising out
of peculiar situation some included in a class get an
advantage over others so long as they are not singled
out for special treatment. In substance, the differentia
required is that it must be real and substantial, bearing
some just and reasonable relation to the object of the
legislation.”
Holding the above, this Court in Nallamilli Rami Reddi (supra)
had reversed the decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court observing that religious institutions fall into a
separate category and land or property held by them have a
special character. Clearly, the tenants under a religious institution
would form a separate class by themselves and such
classification, if made, would achieve the object of promoting the
interests of the religious institutions. Therefore, classification of
properties of “religious institutions” as a separate and distinctive
class of properties would not fall foul or be violative of Article 14 of
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 14 of 29
the Constitution. It was elucidated that whether a tenancy act
should be applicable to religious institutions or should be kept out
is not an aspect which the Court would decide. It is instead for the
legislature to determine the extent of applicability of such tenancy
laws to religious institutions and the extent of protection that
should be made available. This Court has, therefore, rejected the
argument that religious institutions as landlords or tenants of
religious institutions cannot be treated and regarded as a separate
category in respect of whom protection as available to other
tenants under the rent law would not be available. Such
classification cannot be a ground or the basis to interfere with the
validity of an act or provision. However, the Courts can interfere
when the policy is irrational. Summing up the ratio, this court in
Nallamilli Rami Reddi (supra) had held:
“15. We may sum up the upshot of our discussion:
1. That charitable or religious institutions or
endowments fall into a separate category and form
a class by themselves. If that is so, tenants coming
under them also form a separate class. Therefore,
they can be treated differently from others.
2. In operation of the Act it is possible that it may
result in hardship to some of the tenants but that by
itself will not be a consideration to condemn the
Act.
3. The manner in which the charitable or religious
institution or endowment would deal with the
properties that are resumed after the provisions of
Section 82 of the Act come into force by cancelling
the existing leases, is in the region of speculation.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 15 of 29
4. Fresh tenancy can be entered into and there is no
material before the court as to what was the rent
paid by tenants at the time when the Act came into
force, in terms of Section 18(2) of the Act or as
provided under the Andhra Act or under the
Telangana Act. In the absence of such a material, it
would be hazardous for the court to reach any
conclusion, one way or the other, to state that the
tenants would be frozen and, therefore, there is no
likelihood of charitable or religious institution or
endowment getting higher rents. If there is no
material one way or the other, the presumption that
the Act is good should prevail.
5. It is a matter of policy with the legislature as to
whether all provisions of the Tenancy Acts should
be exempt in its application to the charitable or
religious institution or endowment in their entirety.
6. The identification of “landless poor persons” and
protection given to them is justified as enunciated
earlier.
7. It will be very difficult to predict at this stage that the
result of Section 82 of the Act would be so
hazardous as not to achieve the object for which it
was enacted. It would not only result in displacing
the old tenants by new tenants, it may also achieve
other social objectives in another manner. If
appropriate provisions are made under the Rules
and if the leases are given to small holders of land,
another social objective could be achieved.
8. In what manner charitable or religious institution or
endowment would deal with matters of this nature
is mere guesswork at this stage. On some
hypothetical approach the High Court could not
have declared a law to be invalid.”
Therefore, it was clearly held that tenants of religious
institutions fall in a separate class which is identifiable. Further,
on the question, whether cancellation of a “lease” in their favour
would achieve the objectives of the act in question, it was
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 16 of 29
observed, that there was no material before the Court to show that
such cancellation would not carry out the purposes of the
“religious institutions”.
12. There have been number of central and state legislations wherein
religious institutions with or without other charitable organisations
have been treated as a separate and distinct class and accorded
legal treatment concomitant to such distinctiveness within the
scope of the same enactment or other enactments. {See –
Sections 11 and 115BBC, the Income Tax Act, 1961; Karnataka
Rent Act, 1999 and Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and
Charitable Endowments Act, 1997; Orissa Hindu Religious
Endowments Act, 1951; Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984 as amended in
2018; Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent
and Eviction) Act, 1972 and Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings
(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968, among others}.
13. We would like to refer to a decision of this Court in S.
Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another3
wherein challenge was made to the exemption granted to
buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public
trusts and public charitable trusts from the provisions of the Tamil
3 AIR 1985 SC 257
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 17 of 29
Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, by delegated
legislation, in the form of an exemption notification issued under
Section 29 of the above Act. A three Judge Bench of this Court in
S. Kandaswamy Chettiar (supra) referred to the judgment of a
five Judge Bench of this Court in P.J. Irani v. State of Madras4
wherein identical provisions contained in earlier enactment,
namely, the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959
were upheld in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
on the basis that the Preamble and operative provisions of that Act
gave sufficient guidance for exercise of discretionary power
vested with the State Government. Whether a notification
granting exemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or
secular institutions would violate the equal protection mandate of
Article 14, it was observed, that Article 14 requires that the
classification must be based on rational grounds, that is, grounds
germane to carrying out the policy or the purpose of the Act and
by way of illustration it was stated that if such exemptions were
granted in favour of all the buildings belonging to charities,
religious or secular institutions, such classification would be
reasonable and proper being based on intelligible differentia
having nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Rent Act, it was
observed, would unquestionably be a piece of beneficial
4 AIR 1961 SC 1731
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 18 of 29
legislation intended to remedy the two evils, that is, rack-rentingꟷ
extraction of exorbitant rents and unreasonable eviction orders
generated by a largescale influx of population to big cities and
urban areas post the Second World War creating acute shortage
of accommodation in such areas. Rent enactments overtly protect
the rights of the tenants in occupation of buildings in such areas
from being charged unreasonable rents and from being
unreasonably evicted. Therefore, such enactments even protect
tenancy after determination or end of their contractual periods by
enlarging the definition of the term ‘tenant’. At the same time, the
rent enactments often contain other significant provisions which
indicate that the legislature itself felt that there may be areas and
cases where these two evils were neither prevalent nor
apprehended, and as such landlords’ freedom need not be
curtailed at all. It is in this context that several enactments give
wider latitude to the landlords of religious, charitable, educational
and other public institutions if the possession is required for
purposes of such institutions. In other words, the legislature is
entitled and can make rational classification of buildings belonging
to government and those belonging to religious, charitable,
educational and other public institutions which are accorded
different treatment on the well-founded assumption that such
landlords are not expected to and would not indulge in rackCivil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 19 of 29
renting or unreasonable eviction. Relying upon the observations
in P.J. Irani (supra), it was held that constitutional validity of
granting exemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or
secular institutions, from rent control legislation, would not offend
the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the Constitution as it is
a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and
also satisfies the test of nexus as such institutions not only serve
public purpose but disbursement of their income is governed by
the objects for which they are created. The income and activities
are not for private benefit. Reference in this regard was made to
the counter affidavit wherein the government had explained that
they were satisfied that the rents received by exempted religious
institutions were very low, meagre and that the provisions of
fixation of fair rent under the rent act would not meet the ends of
justice and would in fact result in the tenant exploiting the
situation. Consequently, withdrawal of protection to the tenants of
such buildings was justified. It was observed in S. Kandaswamy
Chettiar (supra) as under:
“11... In our view, the aforesaid material clearly shows
that buildings belonging to such public religious and
charitable endowments or trusts clearly fell into a class
where undue hardship and injustice resulting to them
from the uniform application of the beneficial provisions
of the Act needed to be relieved and the exemption
granted will have to be regarded as being germane to
the policy and purposes of the Act. In other words the
classification made has a clear nexus with the object
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 20 of 29
with which the power to grant exemption has been
conferred upon the State Government under S.29 of
the Act.
xx xx xx
14... It is obvious that if the trustees of the public
religious trusts and public charities are to be given
freedom to charge the normal market rent then to make
that freedom effective it will be necessary to arm the
trustees with the right to evict the tenants for nonpayment of such market rent. The State Government
on materials before it came to the conclusion that the
‘fair rent’ fixed under the Act was unjust in case of such
buildings and it was necessary to permit the trustees of
such buildings to recover from their tenants reasonable
market rent and if that be so non-eviction when
reasonable market rent is not paid would be
unreasonable and if the market rent is paid by the
tenants no trustee is going to evict them. It is,
therefore, clear that granting total exemption cannot be
regarded as excessive or unwarranted.
15. Apart from this aspect of the matter it is
conceivable that trustees of buildings belonging to such
public religious institutions or public charities may
desire eviction of their tenants for the purpose of
carrying out major or substantial repairs or for the
purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the State
Government may have felt that the trustees of such
buildings should be able to effect evictions without
being required to fulfil other onerous conditions which
must be complied with by private landlords when they
seek evictions for such purposes. In our view,
therefore, the total exemption granted to such buildings
under the impugned notification is perfectly justified.”
14. These two judgments were followed by the two Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Christ the King Cathedral v. John
Ancheril and Another5
wherein similar exemption notification
5
(2001) 6 SCC 170
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 21 of 29
under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
granting exemption in public interest to the buildings of all
churches/mosques of all minority religions and of all Dioceses,
Archdioceses, Monasteries, etc. was challenged. One of the
contentions raised was that no data or material was produced by
the State and hence the decision and ratio in S. Kandaswamy
Chettiar (supra) would not be applicable. Rejecting the said
contention, it was observed:
“6. The law had been stated by this Court to the effect
that public religious or charitable endowments or trusts
constitute a well-recognised group which serves not
only public purposes, but disbursement of their income
is governed by the objects with which they are created
and buildings belonging to such endowments or trusts
clearly fall into a class distinct from the buildings owned
by private landlords. It is in respect of three areas a
regulation would be made under the Act, as has been
done in other similar enactments and these areas are:
(i) with respect to regulation of lease of buildings
(residential or non-residential); (ii) control of rent of
such buildings; and (iii) control of eviction of tenants
from such buildings. A public trust, as has been held in
S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case is not likely to act
unreasonably either in the matter of enhancement of
rent or eviction of tenants being institutions of religion
or charity. On that basis, this Court upheld the validity
of the exemption granted under the Tamil Nadu Act in
favour of such trust or endowment. In the present case,
the contention has been specifically put forth that the
appellants fall into that very category which came up
for consideration before this Court in S. Kandaswamy
Chettiar case. Therefore, no distinction can be made
between that class of owners of the buildings in that
case and in the present case. We do not understand as
to what other material was required by the Court in a
matter of this nature if the contention put forth before
this Court is not that churches or mosques, dioceses,
archdioceses, monasteries, convents, wakfs and
madarsas are not religious and charitable in nature.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 22 of 29
7. Shri Nageswara Rao, the learned counsel
appearing for the contesting respondents submitted
that there is total non-application of mind by the
Government in the matter of grant of exemption and
the guidelines indicated in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar
case have not been followed in the present case and,
therefore, the exemption should not have been granted
in the present case. In S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case
an affidavit had been filed as to the lower rents that
were being paid and that the tenants were exploiting
the situation and had brought the charitable institutions
to a situation of helplessness and that position not
having been challenged the Court made those orders.
If we bear in mind the fact that the purpose of the Act is
apparently to prevent unreasonable eviction and also
to control rent and if the trustees of religious and public
charities are given freedom to charge normal market
rent with the further freedom to evict the tenants for not
paying such market rent, the result would be unjust and
cause hardship to them. But apprehension, by itself, is
not sufficient. There is no material on record to show
that in any of these cases the landlords would resort to
such a course of action. On the other hand, if the
building belonging to such public trust or religious
institution is exempt from the Act, the purpose of the
trust could be carried out much better, is quite clear. If
that is the object with which the Government has
granted exemption, we do not think there is any reason
to quash the notifications impugned before the High
Court.
xx xx xx
9. An argument is sought to be raised on the basis of
ownership of property that there should not have been
a distinction as is being made in the present case. That
was the very basis of distinction made in case of
statutory bodies like the Housing Board, local
authorities which was noticed in Jayakaran v. Kerala
Health R & W Society case or registered wakfs which
was considered in Lakshmanan v. Mohamood. When
such bodies or institutions fall into a distinct class by
themselves and exemption granted to them would
serve a public purpose, namely, to carry out the objects
of the trust or the endowment or religious activity in a
broad sense, we do not think that the fine distinction
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 23 of 29
sought to be made by the High Court in this regard is
justified.
15. Appropriate at this stage would also be reference to two earlier
decisions of this Court which had examined the provisions of the
rent control legislations, namely, Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti6
and Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava7
.
16. In Kewal Singh (supra), the challenge made was to the provisions
of summary eviction in case of bona fide requirement under the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It was observed that the rent control
legislations are a piece of social legislations and are meant mainly
to protect tenants from frivolous evictions but, at the same time,
they must do justice to the landlord and to this extent the
enactment should avoid placing such restrictions on their right to
evict the tenants so as to destroy the legal right to property.
Therefore, the landlords have been given certain statutory rights
under the rent enactments to seek eviction and these provisions
provide relief. In the absence of such rent control legislations, a
landlord has the right in law to evict the tenant either on the
termination of tenancy by efflux of time or other grounds after
giving notice under the Transfer of Property Act. Such rights have
been curtailed by the rent control legislations to give protection to
6 AIR 1980 SC 161
7 AIR 1984 SC 967
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 24 of 29
tenants having regard to the genuine and dire needs but these
should not be construed to destroy the rights which have been
given to the landlords. It was observed:
“21. There is yet another important aspect of the matter
which may be mentioned here. Prior to the enactment
of the rent control legislation in our country, the
relationship of landlord and tenant was governed by
our common law viz. the Transfer of Property Act
(Sections 107 to 111). The tenant was inducted with
his tacit agreement to be regulated by the conditions
embodied in the contract and could not be allowed to
repudiate the agreement reached between him and the
landlord during that period. The tenant was, therefore,
bound in law to vacate the premises either voluntarily
or through a suit after he was given a notice as
required by the Transfer of Property Act under the
terms and conditions of the lease. However, as a piece
of social reform in order to protect the tenants from
capricious and frivolous eviction, the legislature
stepped in and afforded special protection to the tenant
by conferring on him the status of a statutory tenant
who could not be evicted except under the conditions
specified and the procedure prescribed by the Rent
Control Acts. Thus to this extent, the agreement of
lease and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
stood superseded. At the same time, the Rent Control
Acts provided the facilities of eviction to the landlord on
certain specified grounds like bona fide personal
necessity or default in payment of rent, etc. Thus any
right that the tenant possessed after the expiry of the
lease was conferred on him only by virtue of the Rent
Control Act. It is, therefore, manifest that if the
legislature considered in its wisdom to confer certain
rights or facilities on the tenants, it could due to
changed circumstances curtail, modify, alter or even
take away such rights or the procedure enacted for the
purpose of eviction and leave the tenants to seek their
remedy under the common law.
22. Thus, we do not see how can the tenant challenge
the validity of such a provision enacted by the
legislature from which the tenant itself derived such
rights.”
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 25 of 29
17. Similar are the observations of this Court in Ravi Dutt Sharma
(supra) which had quoted several passages from Kewal Singh
(supra) to observe that it is open to the legislature to pick out one
class of landlords out of several covered under a specific provision
of a rent enactment so long as they form a class by themselves
and the legislature was free to provide benefit of a special
procedure to them in the matter of eviction against the tenants as
long as the legislation had the object to achieve and a special
procedure has reasonable nexus to the object to be achieved.
18. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (supra), the five Judge Constitution
Bench of this Court had upheld applicability of the Public Premises
Act to a corporation established by a Central Act that is owned
and controlled by the Central Government, therein a nationalised
bank. After referring to several judgments, this Court had
explained the effect of Article 14 of the Constitution observing that
the two statutes, namely, the Rent Control Act and the Public
Premises Act were enacted by the same legislature, that is, the
Parliament, in exercise of powers for matters enumerated in the
Concurrent List. The Public Premises Act being a later enactment
would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control Act in
respect of public premises. Referring to the provisions of the Rent
Control Act, it was observed:
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 26 of 29
“55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the
general law regulating the relationship of landlord and
tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act
inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of
standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a
landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes
the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords
and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed
in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can,
therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the
relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union territory
of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes provision for a
speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorised
occupants from public premises. As opposed to the
general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for
recovery of possession of property in a competent court
and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the
procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, the
Public Premises Act confers the power to pass an order
of eviction of an unauthorised occupant in a public
premises on a designated officer and prescribes the
procedure to be followed by the said officer before
passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises
Act is also a special statute relating to eviction of
unauthorised occupants from public premises. In other
words, both the enactments, namely, the Rent Control
Act and the Public Premises Act, are special statutes in
relation to the matters dealt with therein. Since, the
Public Premises Act is a special statute and not a
general enactment the exception contained in the
principle that a subsequent general law cannot derogate
from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in
accordance with the principle that the later laws
abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises Act
must prevail over the Rent Control Act.”
19. What has been said about the Public Premises Act would be
equally applicable to the legislations made by the State legislature
of the State of Punjab in respect of the two enactments under
consideration, that is, the East Punjab Rent Act and the Religious
Premises Act. No doubt, in this decision it has been observed that
the underlying reason for exclusion of property belonging to the
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 27 of 29
government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act is that the
government while dealing with the citizens in respect of property
belonging to it would not act as a private landlord but would act in
public interest, albeit this reasoning would equally apply to
“religious institutions” as defined. The religious institutions as held
are meant to carry out public purpose and the legislature can
proceed accordingly that the religious institutions would act in
public interest for which they were established. {See above S.
Kandaswamy Chettiar (supra) and Christ the King Cathedral
(supra)}
20. As noticed above, valid grants, leases and allotments are not
construed and treated as unauthorised occupation. It is only when
the terms of the grant, lease or allotment are not adhered to or
have been determined or the period of allotment, lease or grant as
fixed has come to an end, that the person in occupation is treated
to be in unauthorised occupation. This is a pre-condition which
confers the right on the religious institution to seek eviction of a
person in unauthorised occupation of the religious premises.
Further, an order passed by the Collector is appealable before the
Commissioner and if still aggrieved, a tenant can invoke the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court, as mentioned above. Therefore,
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 28 of 29
power of judicial review is always available and can be exercised
by the High Court when required and necessary.
21. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and
the same is dismissed. However, in the facts of this case, there
would be no order as to costs.
......................................J.
(N. V. RAMANA)
......................................J.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
......................................J.
(KRISHNA MURARI)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 04, 2019.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 29 of 29
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3674 OF 2009
HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. ..... APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS ..... RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
The afore-captioned Civil Appeal impugns the judgment
dated 6th July 2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana which dismissed five writ petitions challenging the vires
of the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent
Recovery) Act, 1997 (‘Religious Premises Act’, for short).
2. The appellants before us are tenants in occupation of shops
located in Gurudwara Singh Sabha, a gurudwara at Kukar Majra,
G.T. Road, Mandi Gobindgarh, District Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab.
The appellants claim that they were inducted as tenants during the
period 1965-69 by Gurudwara Singh Sabha. However, no formal
lease or agreements were executed and albeit, over a period of
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 1 of 29
time, rents were progressively increased. The appellants further
claim that they are small businessmen carrying on trade primarily
connected with steel industry, while one of the appellants runs a
dhaba. By the letter dated 2nd March 1978, the appellants were
informed that the affairs of the gurudwara had come under the
control of Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (‘SGPC’
for short) and they should, therefore, pay the rent to SGPC. It is
alleged that the appellants have been paying rent to SGPC or the
manager of the gurudwara but receipts have not been regularly
issued.
3. In the year 1997, SGPC had filed an eviction petition against one
of the appellants, Harbhajan Singh, under Section 13 of the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (‘East Punjab Rent Act’,
for short) on two grounds, viz., (i) failure to pay rent, and (ii) SGPC
needed the property for construction of shops. Harbhajan Singh
had, thereafter, deposited arrears of rent on the first date of
hearing. The eviction proceedings, however, had remained
pending and were not decided.
4. On 29th January 1998, the Religious Premises Act was enforced,
and thereby introduced a summary procedure for evicting
unauthorised occupants from the premises/property belonging to
the religious institutions. Thereafter, SGPC had filed ejectment
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 2 of 29
petitions under the Religious Premises Act before the Collector for
eviction of the appellants stating that the appellants were in
unauthorised occupation. The appellants, on receipt of notices
from the Collector under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act,
had filed the writ petitions challenging the vires of the enactment
before the High Court, which by the impugned judgment have
been dismissed. The primary challenge before the High Court
was to the explanation to clause (a) to Section 3 of the Religious
Premises Act on the ground that the provision creates an
unintelligible classification to the disadvantage of the tenants who
are otherwise entitled to equal protection as other tenants under
the East Punjab Rent Act.
5. The pleas raised by the appellants were rejected by the Division
Bench of the High Court after referring to the object and purpose
behind the impugned enactment, that is, to preserve the property
of religious institutions, by observing that public at large has an
inherent interest in the “religious institutions” which were prone to
maladministration and mismanagement. Referring to the definition
of “unauthorised occupants”, it was observed that a person who is
in occupation of the premises belonging to a “religious institution”
on a valid allotment, lease or grant is not to be treated as an
“unauthorised occupant” for the period of allotment, lease or grant.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 3 of 29
The explanation states that mere payment of rent by the tenant
who is in unauthorised occupation shall not raise any presumption
that such person had entered into possession as an allottee,
lessee or under a grant. Referring to the detailed and
comprehensive procedure for eviction under Sections 4 and 5 of
the Religious Premises Act, it was held that the Collector has to be
satisfied that the opposite party was in “unauthorised occupation”
and only thereupon an eviction order can be passed after
following the due procedure. A person aggrieved against the
order passed by the Collector can file an appeal before the
Commissioner under Section 8 of the Act. Referring to the factual
matrix, the High Court has observed that all contentions on merits
should be raised before the authorities under the Religious
Premises Act, in accordance with law.
6. The primary contention raised by the appellants before us is that
as tenants they are entitled to protection against eviction under
the East Punjab Rent Act, which protection it is submitted cannot
be withdrawn and taken away under the Religious Premises Act.
Further, the definition of “unauthorised occupants”, as a result of
explanation to clause (a) of Section 3, is highly unjust and unfair
as a tenant who has been paying rent over a long period is
deemed to be in “unauthorised occupation” because of the
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 4 of 29
termination of the lease, licence or grant, or the time stipulated in
the lease, license or grant has come to an end. This it is
submitted is unjust and unfair. The Religious Premises Act creates
an artificial classification as tenants of land and buildings
belonging to or owned by “religious institutions” are no longer
entitled to protection under the East Punjab Rent Act though such
protection continues to be available to other tenants. Expansion
or construction of a new building by a religious institution as was
pleaded by SGPC in their eviction petition under the East Punjab
Rent Act would not justify eviction. There is no public purpose or
objective in enacting the law, that is, the Religious Premises Act,
which has become a calculable device and means to increase
income of the religious institutions. This Court in Ashoka
Marketing Ltd. and Another v. Punjab National Bank and
Others1
had examined and rejected the challenge to the vires of
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971 (‘Public Premises Act’, for short) after recording that the
property belonging to the government would fall under a separate
class and that the government, while dealing with the citizens in
respect of the property belonging to it, would not act for its own
purpose as a private landlord but would act in public interest. This
is a crucial distinction between the government and private
1
(1990) 4 SCC 406
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 5 of 29
landlords and, therefore, for the same reasoning in inverse, the
present appeal should be allowed as the Religious Premises Act
creates an artificial distinction and discriminates against the
tenants of “religious institutions”, though “religious institutions” as
landlords are not a separate class. Thus, the Religious Premises
Act should be declared unconstitutional and illegal as it violates
Article 14 of the Constitution.
7. The respondents, namely, the State of Punjab and also SGPC,
have contested the said submissions and contentions. Their
submissions and contentions would be noticed in the subsequent
portion and in our reasoning below.
8. The East Punjab Rent Act was enacted in the year 1949, soon
after the Partition, with a view to protect tenants and to curtail the
right of the landlords to seek eviction notwithstanding the contract
under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
(“Transfer of Property Act”, for short) which is a general enactment
regulating landlord and tenant relationships. There cannot be any
doubt that the State legislature, that is, the Legislative Assembly of
the State of Punjab is entitled to enact the Religious Premises Act,
despite the fact that they had enacted the East Punjab Rent Act.
We must accept and take judicial notice by acknowledging that the
State legislature while enacting the Religious Premises Act was
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 6 of 29
aware that it has enacted East Punjab Rent Act, an existing
statute governing landlord and tenant relationship. However, the
State legislature in its wisdom has deemed it appropriate to enact
a law in respect of land and buildings belonging to “religious
institutions”. The vires of the Religious Premises Act, a special
enactment concerning landlord and tenant relationships, cannot
be challenged on the ground that there are already two other
enactments governing general landlord and tenant relationships
(Transfer of Property Act and East Punjab Rent Act). The
Constitution confers the power and authority on the State to enact
two separate enactments on a similar subject if they seek to
achieve different objectives and protect and preserve different
sets of rights and make necessary classification to serve such
varied ends. The Religious Premises Act, unlike the East Punjab
Rent Act and the Public Premises Act, concerns itself with the
administration of premises belonging to religious institutions and
seeks to regulate their rights as landlords vis-à-vis the tenants in
occupation. In this regard, reference can be made to the object
and purpose behind enacting the Religious Premises Act, which is
as follows:
“Since long various religious institutions have been
representing to the Government for vacation of their
premises under unauthorised occupation. On careful
thought being given by the Government, the State
Government is of the opinion that the religious
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 7 of 29
institutions are facing a lot of difficulties in this behalf. It
is, therefore, expedient for the State Government to help
the religious institutions in getting their premises which
are under unauthorised occupation vacated through
summary proceedings. Hence, the Punjab Religious
Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Bill,
1996.”
9. Section 2(d) of the Religious Premises Act defines “religious
institution”. Section 2(e) defines ‘religious premises’ and Section 3
defines “unauthorised occupation of religious premises by a
person”. These provisions read as under:
“(d) "Religious Institution' means any gurudwara,
temple, church, mosque, temple of Jains or Budhas -
which is registered under the provisions of the
Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Central Act No. XXI of
1860) or is established under any statute and includes
any other place of worship by whatever name, it may
be called, which is registered as aforesaid or is
established under any statute;
(e) "religious premises", means any land whether used
for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes, or any
building or part of a building belonging to a Religious
Institution and includes, -
(i) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any,
appertaining to such building or part of a building;
and
(ii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a
building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;”
xxx
3. Unauthorised occupation of religious premises. - For
the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to
be in unauthorised occupation of any religious
premises-
(a) where he has, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, entered into possession
thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any
allotment, lease or grant; or
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 8 of 29
(b) where he, being an allottee, lessee or grantee has,
by reason of the determination or cancellation of his
allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms
in that behalf therein contained, ceased, whether
before or after the commencement of this Act, to be
entitled to occupy or hold such religious premises; or
(c) where any person authorised to occupy any
religious premises has, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, -
(i) sub-let, in contravention of the terms of allotment,
lease or grant, without the permission of the Religious
Institution, the whole or any part of such religious
premises; or
(ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the
terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised
to occupy such religious premises.
Explanation. - For the purpose of clause (a), a person
shall not merely by reason of the fact that he has paid
any rent be deemed to have entered into possession
as allottee, lessee or grantee.”
“Religious institution” means any gurudwara, temple, church,
mosque or temple of Jains or Buddhists which is registered under
the provisions of the Societies Registration Act or established
under any statute. It also includes any place of worship by
whatever name called which is registered as aforesaid or
established under any statute. The definition is clear and no
contention or issue is raised that the definition of the term
“religious institution” is vague or incomprehensible. Similarly, the
expression “religious premises” has been defined in clear terms to
mean land used for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes or
any building or part of the building belonging to a religious
institution. The definition clarifies that the expression “religious
premises” would include garden, ground and out-house or any
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 9 of 29
fittings in the building or part of the building for more beneficial
enjoyment. The expression “unauthorised occupation” is of some
importance in view of the challenge and the contentions raised. A
person is deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any
religious premises if he has, before or after commencement of the
Religious Premises Act, entered into possession of a land or
building belonging to a religious institution otherwise than under or
pursuant to any allotment, lease or grant. A person who enters
into possession of the land or building belonging to or owned by a
religious institution and has valid and subsisting allotment, lease
or grant is clearly not an unauthorised occupant. Such allottees,
lessees or persons in whose favour there is a grant, allotment or
lease that entitles the person to retain possession are fully
protected and cannot be evicted. In other words, primacy to the
terms of allotment, lease or grant is not interfered, and is duly
accorded. The terms of the allotment, lease or grant would be
binding. Clause (b) states that if the allotment, lease or grant has
been determined or cancelled whether before or after the
commencement of the Religious Premises Act, occupation of the
person would be treated as unauthorised occupation. Clause (c)
states that where a person is authorised to occupy any religious
premises, before or after commencement of the Religious
Premises Act, has sublet the religious premises in contravention of
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 10 of 29
the terms of allotment, lease or grant, or otherwise acted in
contravention of the terms, express or implied, he shall be treated
as an “unauthorised occupant”. No contention, issue or objection
has been raised viz. clause (c) to Section 3. Explanation to
Section 3 states that for the purpose of clause (a), which makes
the term of allotment, lease or grant as a basis for determining
whether a person is in authorised or unauthorised occupation,
shall not be affected by the mere reason or the fact that such
person has paid rent and, therefore, is deemed to have entered
into possession as an allottee, lessee or guarantee. In other
words, payment of rent would not be a determinative and relevant
factor in deciding the issue and question of “unauthorised
occupation”. The tenure of allotment, lease or the grant and terms
and conditions as agreed or stated, and not mere payment of rent
would be the crucial and determinative criterion.
10. Under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act, a religious
institution can make an application before the Collector if it is of
the opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any
religious premises, situated within the Collector’s jurisdiction. The
Collector thereupon is required to issue notice in writing calling
upon the person to show-cause why the eviction order should not
be made. Sub-section (2) prescribes the requirement of a notice
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 11 of 29
and sub-section (3) to Section 4 prescribes the manner in which
the notice is to be served. Under Section 5, the Collector is
authorised and is competent to pass an order of eviction after
considering the cause, if any, shown by the person to whom notice
under Section 4 has been issued and after examining the
evidence that may be produced by such person. The person in
occupation has to be given reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The statutory requirement is that the Collector should be satisfied
that the religious premises are in unauthorised occupation before
he can make the order of eviction. The Collector must also record
reasons. The Collector is required to pass an order within a
period of 45 days from the date of receipt of the application under
Section 4 and the order passed has to be affixed on the outer door
or on some other conspicuous part of the religious premises. If a
person fails to comply with the order of eviction within 30 days
from the date of the order, the Collector, or any other officer duly
authorised by him, can evict the person and deliver possession of
the religious premises to the religious institution. He is entitled to
use force as may be necessary. The tenant, if aggrieved, can file
an appeal against the Collector’s order before the Commissioner.
Thereafter, the tenant is entitled to also invoke the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court under Articles 227 and 226 of the Constitution of
India if the grievance still persists.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 12 of 29
11. The issue of whether the properties of the religious institutions for
the purpose of rent control legislations can be treated as a
separate category is no longer res integra as this aspect was
examined in several decisions where this Court has held that
separate classification of properties of religious institutions for rent
legislations will pass a challenge under Article 14 of the
Constitution. In State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
Nallamilli Rami Reddi and Others2
, this Court was faced with a
challenge to the validity of Section 82 of the Andhra Pradesh
Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act,
1987 which had cancelled the leases of tenants of properties
belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable
or any religious institution or endowment falling under the
enactment, notwithstanding the prevailing tenancy laws in the
State of Andhra Pradesh, in order to augment the rents payable
for such properties which stood frozen on account of the tenancy
laws and since sale of such lands was not feasible. While
examining the question of religious institutions as a separate and
distinguishable class, this Court had expounded on the scope of
Article 14 of the Constitution and the kind of classification that
would stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, as under:
2 AIR 2001 SC 3616
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 13 of 29
“8. What Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits is
“class legislation” and not “classification for purpose of
legislation”. If the legislature reasonably classifies
persons for legislative purposes so as to bring them
under a well-defined class, it is not open to challenge
on the ground of denial of equal treatment that the law
does not apply to other persons. The test of
permissible classification is twofold: (i) that the
classification must be founded on intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons grouped together from
others who are left out of the group, and (ii) that
differentia must have a rational connection to the object
sought to be achieved. Article 14 does not insist upon
classification, which is scientifically perfect or logically
complete. A classification would be justified unless it is
patently arbitrary. If there is equality and uniformity in
each group, the law will not become discriminatory,
though due to some fortuitous circumstance arising out
of peculiar situation some included in a class get an
advantage over others so long as they are not singled
out for special treatment. In substance, the differentia
required is that it must be real and substantial, bearing
some just and reasonable relation to the object of the
legislation.”
Holding the above, this Court in Nallamilli Rami Reddi (supra)
had reversed the decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court observing that religious institutions fall into a
separate category and land or property held by them have a
special character. Clearly, the tenants under a religious institution
would form a separate class by themselves and such
classification, if made, would achieve the object of promoting the
interests of the religious institutions. Therefore, classification of
properties of “religious institutions” as a separate and distinctive
class of properties would not fall foul or be violative of Article 14 of
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 14 of 29
the Constitution. It was elucidated that whether a tenancy act
should be applicable to religious institutions or should be kept out
is not an aspect which the Court would decide. It is instead for the
legislature to determine the extent of applicability of such tenancy
laws to religious institutions and the extent of protection that
should be made available. This Court has, therefore, rejected the
argument that religious institutions as landlords or tenants of
religious institutions cannot be treated and regarded as a separate
category in respect of whom protection as available to other
tenants under the rent law would not be available. Such
classification cannot be a ground or the basis to interfere with the
validity of an act or provision. However, the Courts can interfere
when the policy is irrational. Summing up the ratio, this court in
Nallamilli Rami Reddi (supra) had held:
“15. We may sum up the upshot of our discussion:
1. That charitable or religious institutions or
endowments fall into a separate category and form
a class by themselves. If that is so, tenants coming
under them also form a separate class. Therefore,
they can be treated differently from others.
2. In operation of the Act it is possible that it may
result in hardship to some of the tenants but that by
itself will not be a consideration to condemn the
Act.
3. The manner in which the charitable or religious
institution or endowment would deal with the
properties that are resumed after the provisions of
Section 82 of the Act come into force by cancelling
the existing leases, is in the region of speculation.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 15 of 29
4. Fresh tenancy can be entered into and there is no
material before the court as to what was the rent
paid by tenants at the time when the Act came into
force, in terms of Section 18(2) of the Act or as
provided under the Andhra Act or under the
Telangana Act. In the absence of such a material, it
would be hazardous for the court to reach any
conclusion, one way or the other, to state that the
tenants would be frozen and, therefore, there is no
likelihood of charitable or religious institution or
endowment getting higher rents. If there is no
material one way or the other, the presumption that
the Act is good should prevail.
5. It is a matter of policy with the legislature as to
whether all provisions of the Tenancy Acts should
be exempt in its application to the charitable or
religious institution or endowment in their entirety.
6. The identification of “landless poor persons” and
protection given to them is justified as enunciated
earlier.
7. It will be very difficult to predict at this stage that the
result of Section 82 of the Act would be so
hazardous as not to achieve the object for which it
was enacted. It would not only result in displacing
the old tenants by new tenants, it may also achieve
other social objectives in another manner. If
appropriate provisions are made under the Rules
and if the leases are given to small holders of land,
another social objective could be achieved.
8. In what manner charitable or religious institution or
endowment would deal with matters of this nature
is mere guesswork at this stage. On some
hypothetical approach the High Court could not
have declared a law to be invalid.”
Therefore, it was clearly held that tenants of religious
institutions fall in a separate class which is identifiable. Further,
on the question, whether cancellation of a “lease” in their favour
would achieve the objectives of the act in question, it was
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 16 of 29
observed, that there was no material before the Court to show that
such cancellation would not carry out the purposes of the
“religious institutions”.
12. There have been number of central and state legislations wherein
religious institutions with or without other charitable organisations
have been treated as a separate and distinct class and accorded
legal treatment concomitant to such distinctiveness within the
scope of the same enactment or other enactments. {See –
Sections 11 and 115BBC, the Income Tax Act, 1961; Karnataka
Rent Act, 1999 and Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and
Charitable Endowments Act, 1997; Orissa Hindu Religious
Endowments Act, 1951; Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984 as amended in
2018; Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent
and Eviction) Act, 1972 and Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings
(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968, among others}.
13. We would like to refer to a decision of this Court in S.
Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another3
wherein challenge was made to the exemption granted to
buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public
trusts and public charitable trusts from the provisions of the Tamil
3 AIR 1985 SC 257
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 17 of 29
Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, by delegated
legislation, in the form of an exemption notification issued under
Section 29 of the above Act. A three Judge Bench of this Court in
S. Kandaswamy Chettiar (supra) referred to the judgment of a
five Judge Bench of this Court in P.J. Irani v. State of Madras4
wherein identical provisions contained in earlier enactment,
namely, the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959
were upheld in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
on the basis that the Preamble and operative provisions of that Act
gave sufficient guidance for exercise of discretionary power
vested with the State Government. Whether a notification
granting exemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or
secular institutions would violate the equal protection mandate of
Article 14, it was observed, that Article 14 requires that the
classification must be based on rational grounds, that is, grounds
germane to carrying out the policy or the purpose of the Act and
by way of illustration it was stated that if such exemptions were
granted in favour of all the buildings belonging to charities,
religious or secular institutions, such classification would be
reasonable and proper being based on intelligible differentia
having nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Rent Act, it was
observed, would unquestionably be a piece of beneficial
4 AIR 1961 SC 1731
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 18 of 29
legislation intended to remedy the two evils, that is, rack-rentingꟷ
extraction of exorbitant rents and unreasonable eviction orders
generated by a largescale influx of population to big cities and
urban areas post the Second World War creating acute shortage
of accommodation in such areas. Rent enactments overtly protect
the rights of the tenants in occupation of buildings in such areas
from being charged unreasonable rents and from being
unreasonably evicted. Therefore, such enactments even protect
tenancy after determination or end of their contractual periods by
enlarging the definition of the term ‘tenant’. At the same time, the
rent enactments often contain other significant provisions which
indicate that the legislature itself felt that there may be areas and
cases where these two evils were neither prevalent nor
apprehended, and as such landlords’ freedom need not be
curtailed at all. It is in this context that several enactments give
wider latitude to the landlords of religious, charitable, educational
and other public institutions if the possession is required for
purposes of such institutions. In other words, the legislature is
entitled and can make rational classification of buildings belonging
to government and those belonging to religious, charitable,
educational and other public institutions which are accorded
different treatment on the well-founded assumption that such
landlords are not expected to and would not indulge in rackCivil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 19 of 29
renting or unreasonable eviction. Relying upon the observations
in P.J. Irani (supra), it was held that constitutional validity of
granting exemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or
secular institutions, from rent control legislation, would not offend
the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the Constitution as it is
a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and
also satisfies the test of nexus as such institutions not only serve
public purpose but disbursement of their income is governed by
the objects for which they are created. The income and activities
are not for private benefit. Reference in this regard was made to
the counter affidavit wherein the government had explained that
they were satisfied that the rents received by exempted religious
institutions were very low, meagre and that the provisions of
fixation of fair rent under the rent act would not meet the ends of
justice and would in fact result in the tenant exploiting the
situation. Consequently, withdrawal of protection to the tenants of
such buildings was justified. It was observed in S. Kandaswamy
Chettiar (supra) as under:
“11... In our view, the aforesaid material clearly shows
that buildings belonging to such public religious and
charitable endowments or trusts clearly fell into a class
where undue hardship and injustice resulting to them
from the uniform application of the beneficial provisions
of the Act needed to be relieved and the exemption
granted will have to be regarded as being germane to
the policy and purposes of the Act. In other words the
classification made has a clear nexus with the object
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 20 of 29
with which the power to grant exemption has been
conferred upon the State Government under S.29 of
the Act.
xx xx xx
14... It is obvious that if the trustees of the public
religious trusts and public charities are to be given
freedom to charge the normal market rent then to make
that freedom effective it will be necessary to arm the
trustees with the right to evict the tenants for nonpayment of such market rent. The State Government
on materials before it came to the conclusion that the
‘fair rent’ fixed under the Act was unjust in case of such
buildings and it was necessary to permit the trustees of
such buildings to recover from their tenants reasonable
market rent and if that be so non-eviction when
reasonable market rent is not paid would be
unreasonable and if the market rent is paid by the
tenants no trustee is going to evict them. It is,
therefore, clear that granting total exemption cannot be
regarded as excessive or unwarranted.
15. Apart from this aspect of the matter it is
conceivable that trustees of buildings belonging to such
public religious institutions or public charities may
desire eviction of their tenants for the purpose of
carrying out major or substantial repairs or for the
purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the State
Government may have felt that the trustees of such
buildings should be able to effect evictions without
being required to fulfil other onerous conditions which
must be complied with by private landlords when they
seek evictions for such purposes. In our view,
therefore, the total exemption granted to such buildings
under the impugned notification is perfectly justified.”
14. These two judgments were followed by the two Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Christ the King Cathedral v. John
Ancheril and Another5
wherein similar exemption notification
5
(2001) 6 SCC 170
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 21 of 29
under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
granting exemption in public interest to the buildings of all
churches/mosques of all minority religions and of all Dioceses,
Archdioceses, Monasteries, etc. was challenged. One of the
contentions raised was that no data or material was produced by
the State and hence the decision and ratio in S. Kandaswamy
Chettiar (supra) would not be applicable. Rejecting the said
contention, it was observed:
“6. The law had been stated by this Court to the effect
that public religious or charitable endowments or trusts
constitute a well-recognised group which serves not
only public purposes, but disbursement of their income
is governed by the objects with which they are created
and buildings belonging to such endowments or trusts
clearly fall into a class distinct from the buildings owned
by private landlords. It is in respect of three areas a
regulation would be made under the Act, as has been
done in other similar enactments and these areas are:
(i) with respect to regulation of lease of buildings
(residential or non-residential); (ii) control of rent of
such buildings; and (iii) control of eviction of tenants
from such buildings. A public trust, as has been held in
S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case is not likely to act
unreasonably either in the matter of enhancement of
rent or eviction of tenants being institutions of religion
or charity. On that basis, this Court upheld the validity
of the exemption granted under the Tamil Nadu Act in
favour of such trust or endowment. In the present case,
the contention has been specifically put forth that the
appellants fall into that very category which came up
for consideration before this Court in S. Kandaswamy
Chettiar case. Therefore, no distinction can be made
between that class of owners of the buildings in that
case and in the present case. We do not understand as
to what other material was required by the Court in a
matter of this nature if the contention put forth before
this Court is not that churches or mosques, dioceses,
archdioceses, monasteries, convents, wakfs and
madarsas are not religious and charitable in nature.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 22 of 29
7. Shri Nageswara Rao, the learned counsel
appearing for the contesting respondents submitted
that there is total non-application of mind by the
Government in the matter of grant of exemption and
the guidelines indicated in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar
case have not been followed in the present case and,
therefore, the exemption should not have been granted
in the present case. In S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case
an affidavit had been filed as to the lower rents that
were being paid and that the tenants were exploiting
the situation and had brought the charitable institutions
to a situation of helplessness and that position not
having been challenged the Court made those orders.
If we bear in mind the fact that the purpose of the Act is
apparently to prevent unreasonable eviction and also
to control rent and if the trustees of religious and public
charities are given freedom to charge normal market
rent with the further freedom to evict the tenants for not
paying such market rent, the result would be unjust and
cause hardship to them. But apprehension, by itself, is
not sufficient. There is no material on record to show
that in any of these cases the landlords would resort to
such a course of action. On the other hand, if the
building belonging to such public trust or religious
institution is exempt from the Act, the purpose of the
trust could be carried out much better, is quite clear. If
that is the object with which the Government has
granted exemption, we do not think there is any reason
to quash the notifications impugned before the High
Court.
xx xx xx
9. An argument is sought to be raised on the basis of
ownership of property that there should not have been
a distinction as is being made in the present case. That
was the very basis of distinction made in case of
statutory bodies like the Housing Board, local
authorities which was noticed in Jayakaran v. Kerala
Health R & W Society case or registered wakfs which
was considered in Lakshmanan v. Mohamood. When
such bodies or institutions fall into a distinct class by
themselves and exemption granted to them would
serve a public purpose, namely, to carry out the objects
of the trust or the endowment or religious activity in a
broad sense, we do not think that the fine distinction
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 23 of 29
sought to be made by the High Court in this regard is
justified.
15. Appropriate at this stage would also be reference to two earlier
decisions of this Court which had examined the provisions of the
rent control legislations, namely, Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti6
and Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava7
.
16. In Kewal Singh (supra), the challenge made was to the provisions
of summary eviction in case of bona fide requirement under the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It was observed that the rent control
legislations are a piece of social legislations and are meant mainly
to protect tenants from frivolous evictions but, at the same time,
they must do justice to the landlord and to this extent the
enactment should avoid placing such restrictions on their right to
evict the tenants so as to destroy the legal right to property.
Therefore, the landlords have been given certain statutory rights
under the rent enactments to seek eviction and these provisions
provide relief. In the absence of such rent control legislations, a
landlord has the right in law to evict the tenant either on the
termination of tenancy by efflux of time or other grounds after
giving notice under the Transfer of Property Act. Such rights have
been curtailed by the rent control legislations to give protection to
6 AIR 1980 SC 161
7 AIR 1984 SC 967
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 24 of 29
tenants having regard to the genuine and dire needs but these
should not be construed to destroy the rights which have been
given to the landlords. It was observed:
“21. There is yet another important aspect of the matter
which may be mentioned here. Prior to the enactment
of the rent control legislation in our country, the
relationship of landlord and tenant was governed by
our common law viz. the Transfer of Property Act
(Sections 107 to 111). The tenant was inducted with
his tacit agreement to be regulated by the conditions
embodied in the contract and could not be allowed to
repudiate the agreement reached between him and the
landlord during that period. The tenant was, therefore,
bound in law to vacate the premises either voluntarily
or through a suit after he was given a notice as
required by the Transfer of Property Act under the
terms and conditions of the lease. However, as a piece
of social reform in order to protect the tenants from
capricious and frivolous eviction, the legislature
stepped in and afforded special protection to the tenant
by conferring on him the status of a statutory tenant
who could not be evicted except under the conditions
specified and the procedure prescribed by the Rent
Control Acts. Thus to this extent, the agreement of
lease and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
stood superseded. At the same time, the Rent Control
Acts provided the facilities of eviction to the landlord on
certain specified grounds like bona fide personal
necessity or default in payment of rent, etc. Thus any
right that the tenant possessed after the expiry of the
lease was conferred on him only by virtue of the Rent
Control Act. It is, therefore, manifest that if the
legislature considered in its wisdom to confer certain
rights or facilities on the tenants, it could due to
changed circumstances curtail, modify, alter or even
take away such rights or the procedure enacted for the
purpose of eviction and leave the tenants to seek their
remedy under the common law.
22. Thus, we do not see how can the tenant challenge
the validity of such a provision enacted by the
legislature from which the tenant itself derived such
rights.”
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 25 of 29
17. Similar are the observations of this Court in Ravi Dutt Sharma
(supra) which had quoted several passages from Kewal Singh
(supra) to observe that it is open to the legislature to pick out one
class of landlords out of several covered under a specific provision
of a rent enactment so long as they form a class by themselves
and the legislature was free to provide benefit of a special
procedure to them in the matter of eviction against the tenants as
long as the legislation had the object to achieve and a special
procedure has reasonable nexus to the object to be achieved.
18. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (supra), the five Judge Constitution
Bench of this Court had upheld applicability of the Public Premises
Act to a corporation established by a Central Act that is owned
and controlled by the Central Government, therein a nationalised
bank. After referring to several judgments, this Court had
explained the effect of Article 14 of the Constitution observing that
the two statutes, namely, the Rent Control Act and the Public
Premises Act were enacted by the same legislature, that is, the
Parliament, in exercise of powers for matters enumerated in the
Concurrent List. The Public Premises Act being a later enactment
would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control Act in
respect of public premises. Referring to the provisions of the Rent
Control Act, it was observed:
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 26 of 29
“55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the
general law regulating the relationship of landlord and
tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act
inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of
standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a
landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes
the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords
and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed
in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can,
therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the
relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union territory
of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes provision for a
speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorised
occupants from public premises. As opposed to the
general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for
recovery of possession of property in a competent court
and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the
procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, the
Public Premises Act confers the power to pass an order
of eviction of an unauthorised occupant in a public
premises on a designated officer and prescribes the
procedure to be followed by the said officer before
passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises
Act is also a special statute relating to eviction of
unauthorised occupants from public premises. In other
words, both the enactments, namely, the Rent Control
Act and the Public Premises Act, are special statutes in
relation to the matters dealt with therein. Since, the
Public Premises Act is a special statute and not a
general enactment the exception contained in the
principle that a subsequent general law cannot derogate
from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in
accordance with the principle that the later laws
abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises Act
must prevail over the Rent Control Act.”
19. What has been said about the Public Premises Act would be
equally applicable to the legislations made by the State legislature
of the State of Punjab in respect of the two enactments under
consideration, that is, the East Punjab Rent Act and the Religious
Premises Act. No doubt, in this decision it has been observed that
the underlying reason for exclusion of property belonging to the
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 27 of 29
government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act is that the
government while dealing with the citizens in respect of property
belonging to it would not act as a private landlord but would act in
public interest, albeit this reasoning would equally apply to
“religious institutions” as defined. The religious institutions as held
are meant to carry out public purpose and the legislature can
proceed accordingly that the religious institutions would act in
public interest for which they were established. {See above S.
Kandaswamy Chettiar (supra) and Christ the King Cathedral
(supra)}
20. As noticed above, valid grants, leases and allotments are not
construed and treated as unauthorised occupation. It is only when
the terms of the grant, lease or allotment are not adhered to or
have been determined or the period of allotment, lease or grant as
fixed has come to an end, that the person in occupation is treated
to be in unauthorised occupation. This is a pre-condition which
confers the right on the religious institution to seek eviction of a
person in unauthorised occupation of the religious premises.
Further, an order passed by the Collector is appealable before the
Commissioner and if still aggrieved, a tenant can invoke the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court, as mentioned above. Therefore,
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 28 of 29
power of judicial review is always available and can be exercised
by the High Court when required and necessary.
21. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and
the same is dismissed. However, in the facts of this case, there
would be no order as to costs.
......................................J.
(N. V. RAMANA)
......................................J.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
......................................J.
(KRISHNA MURARI)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 04, 2019.
Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 29 of 29
