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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Saturday, January 10, 2026

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 5, 34, 37 Scope of judicial interference — Appellate jurisdiction under S. 37 — Held, no wider than S. 34 — Reappreciation of evidence and re-interpretation of contract impermissible. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court under Section 37 of the Act is strictly circumscribed and is co-extensive with, and not wider than, the jurisdiction under Section 34. Where an arbitral award has been upheld under Section 34, the Appellate Court cannot interfere merely by adopting a different interpretation of contractual clauses or by reassessing the merits of the claim. (Paras 22, 30–37, 38–40, 50–52)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 5, 34, 37

Scope of judicial interference — Appellate jurisdiction under S. 37 — Held, no wider than S. 34 — Reappreciation of evidence and re-interpretation of contract impermissible.

The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court under Section 37 of the Act is strictly circumscribed and is co-extensive with, and not wider than, the jurisdiction under Section 34. Where an arbitral award has been upheld under Section 34, the Appellate Court cannot interfere merely by adopting a different interpretation of contractual clauses or by reassessing the merits of the claim.
(Paras 22, 30–37, 38–40, 50–52)


Arbitral award — Interpretation of contract — Finality

Construction of contractual clauses is within exclusive domain of arbitral tribunal — Courts cannot substitute their own interpretation.

If the Arbitral Tribunal has taken a plausible and reasonable view in interpreting the terms of the contract, and such interpretation has been accepted by the court under Section 34, the same cannot be substituted or varied by the Appellate Court under Section 37 merely because another view is possible.
(Paras 20, 29–31, 38–40, 46–48)


Idle time compensation — Dredging contract — Backhoe Dredger (BHD)

Claim for idle charges — Not confined to “major dredgers” — Conjoint reading of contractual clauses.

Clause 38 of the Licence Agreement, though referring to idle time charges for major dredgers, does not prohibit payment of idle time compensation for other equipment. On a conjoint reading of Clauses 38, 41.1, 41.2 and 51.1, idle time compensation is admissible for equipment including a Backhoe Dredger, where idling results from failure to provide timely access to site or interruptions contemplated under the contract.
(Paras 42–46, 49)


Patent illegality — Public policy — Ss. 34 & 37

Speaking award — No patent illegality — Interference unwarranted.

Where the arbitral award is a reasoned award, supported by interpretation of contractual clauses and evidence, and does not violate any substantive provision of law, fundamental policy of Indian law, or basic notions of morality or justice, it cannot be interfered with under Sections 34 or 37 of the Act.
(Paras 27–29, 41, 47–48)


Arbitration jurisprudence — Minimal court intervention

Object of Act reaffirmed — Excessive appellate scrutiny defeats arbitration.

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a special enactment aimed at expeditious resolution of commercial disputes with minimal judicial intervention. Multi-tiered scrutiny of arbitral awards on merits frustrates the legislative intent and must be eschewed.
(Paras 24–26, 51)


ANALYSIS (Issue-wise with Paragraph References)

I. Core Issue: Limits of Section 37 Jurisdiction (Paras 22, 30–37)

The Supreme Court identifies the decisive question as whether the Division Bench was justified in interfering under Section 37 after the arbitral award had already been upheld under Section 34. Relying on a consistent line of precedent, the Court reiterates that Section 37 does not confer ordinary appellate powers and does not permit re-examination of the merits of the arbitral award.


II. Finality of Arbitral Interpretation (Paras 29–31, 38–40)

The Arbitral Tribunal had interpreted the Licence Agreement and concluded that idle time compensation for the Backhoe Dredger was contractually permissible. This interpretation was accepted by the Single Judge under Section 34. The Supreme Court holds that once such acceptance occurs, the Appellate Court is bound by that interpretation and cannot substitute its own.


III. Patent Illegality and Public Policy Threshold (Paras 27–29, 41)

The Court clarifies that the respondent’s challenge was not founded on any recognised ground under Section 34, such as patent illegality or violation of public policy. The award was reasoned, speaking, and based on contractual construction. Hence, interference was legally impermissible.


IV. Contractual Clauses on Idle Time Compensation (Paras 42–46)

A detailed conjoint reading of Clauses 38, 41.1, 41.2 and 51.1 demonstrates that:

  • Clause 38 does not exclude idle time compensation for non-major dredgers;

  • Clauses 41.1 and 41.2 contemplate consequences of failure to give possession;

  • Clause 51.1 expressly provides for idle time compensation due to interruptions.
    The Tribunal’s conclusion was therefore a plausible contractual interpretation.


V. Ancillary Issues — Minor vs. Major Dredger (Para 49)

The Court holds that the debate on whether the Backhoe Dredger was a major or minor dredger is ultimately irrelevant, as the Licence Agreement permitted deployment of such equipment and did not bar compensation for its idling.


VI. Error of the Division Bench (Paras 38, 50–52)

The Division Bench exceeded its jurisdiction by re-interpreting contractual clauses and disturbing a concurrent finding of the Arbitral Tribunal and the Single Judge. This amounted to an impermissible appellate reassessment of merits.


RATIO DECIDENDI

An Appellate Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot interfere with an arbitral award that has been upheld under Section 34 by re-appreciating evidence or re-interpreting contractual terms; where the arbitral tribunal has adopted a plausible interpretation and the award is not vitiated by patent illegality or public policy violation, judicial interference is impermissible.