No person can be deprived to his job for which he was selected on the groud that he was a Juvniel offender
In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of
her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decided to pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him, resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts,
even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the
respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he
was a minor.
9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal
on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed
while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e.
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be
obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime committed by such person as a juvenile.
This is with the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal
person, without any stigma.
Further, the case against the respondent is not with regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been framed against him. The respondent had very fairly disclosed
about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant against the respondent.
In our considered view, the same can also not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected after following the due process and appointment having been offered to him.
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9109 OF 2019
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.26395 OF 2018]
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS …..APPELLANTS
VERSUS
RAMESH BISHNOI ……RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Vineet Saran, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal pertains to the appellants (Union of India)
denying appointment to the respondent, (even though selected) on
the post of SubInspector, on the ground of a criminal case having
been registered in the past against the respondent.
3. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of this case are that
in response to an advertisement dated 28.03.2015, for recruitment
on the post of SubInspector in the Central Industrial Security
2
Force (for short ‘CISF’) issued by the Staff Selection Commission
(SSC), the respondent had appeared in the written examination
and physical endurance test and was thus selected and offered
appointment on 15.09.2016. The respondent was then required to
submit a form, wherein there was a column relating to whether
any First Information Report (for short ‘FIR’) had been lodged
against the respondent in the past. The respondent had given the
details of the FIR (No.70/2009) under Sections 354, 447 and 509
of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) having been lodged
against the respondent and in the further column of the
questionnaire form, the respondent had clearly mentioned that on
the matter having been compromised, he was acquitted of the
aforesaid offence on 24.11.2011, as there was no evidence
adduced against the respondent. The respondent had thus
rendered all necessary information regarding the criminal case
lodged against him and did not conceal any material fact. The
case was then referred to the Standing Screening Committee,
which found the respondent unsuitable for appointment in CISF
on the aforesaid ground that a criminal case had been lodged
against him in the past. Consequently, on 03.06.2017 the
National Industrial Security Academy cancelled the appointment of
3
the respondent, on the ground of registration of a criminal case in
the past.
4. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ
Petition No.7522 of 2017, which was allowed by a learned Single
Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur vide judgment
dated 06.12.2017, and the case of the respondent was directed to
be decided afresh within 15 days in the light of the guidelines
issued by this Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India
(2016) 8 SCC 471. The case of the respondent was then reexamined by the Standing Screening Committee on 02.01.2018,
which by an order dated 16.01.2018, again rejected the claim of
the respondent, holding that the respondent was acquitted merely
for due to lack of adequate evidence and compromise, and that the
offence in the charge sheet falls in the category of serious offence,
and thus the respondent was not considered suitable for
appointment on the post of SubInspector in CISF.
5. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ
Petition No.1310 of 2018, which was allowed by an order dated
08.03.2018 with the following directions:
4
“……….. the impugned Order
dated 16.1.2018 (communicated
vide letter dated 17.01.2018)
(Annex.1) is recashed and set
aside; the respondents are
directed to activate offer of
appointment of the petitioner
earlier made to the Petitioner for
the post of SubInspector in
Central Industrial Security Force.
The order may be operated upon
within a period of thirty days
from today and all notional
benefits shall be prospectively
given.”
6. The appellants herein, challenged the order of the
learned Single Judge dated 08.03.2018 before the Division Bench
of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Special Appeal Writ
No.702 of 2018, which was dismissed by the Division Bench by
judgment dated 08.05.2018. Aggrieved by the said orders dated
08.03.2018 and 08.05.2018, passed by the learned Single Judge
and Division Bench respectively of the High Court of Rajasthan at
Jodhpur, this appeal has been filed by way of Special Leave
Petition.
7. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length
and have perused the material on record.
5
8. In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against
the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had
teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of
her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decided to
pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him,
resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts,
even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the
respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered
under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the
respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he
was a minor.
9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the
charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the
respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth
is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were
never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents
did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal
on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then
too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job
on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed
while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e.
6
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as
well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be
obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime
committed by such person as a juvenile. This is with the clear
object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal
person, without any stigma. Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 lays down guidelines
for the Central Government, State Governments, the Board and
other agencies while implementing the provisions of the said Act.
In clause (xiv) of Section 3, it is clearly provided as follows:
“……………..
(xiv) Principle of fresh start: All
past records of any child under
the Juvenile Justice system
should be erased except in
special circumstances.
………………”
In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the respondent
was a minor when the charges had been framed against him of
offences under Sections 354, 447 and 509 of IPC. It is also not
disputed that he was acquitted of the charges. However, even if he
7
had been convicted, the same could not have been held against
him for getting a job, as admittedly he was a minor when the
alleged offences were committed and the charges had been framed
against him. Section 3(xiv) provides for the same and the exception
of special circumstances does not apply to the facts of the present
case.
10. Further, the case against the respondent is not with
regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been
framed against him. The respondent had very fairly disclosed
about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the
basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant
against the respondent. In our considered view, the same can also
not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of
which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected
after following the due process and appointment having been
offered to him.
11. For the reasons given hereinabove, we do not find any
ground for interference with the orders passed by the learned
Single Judge as well as the Division bench of the High Court of
Rajasthan at Jodhpur. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.
8
The respondent shall be entitled to all the benefits of the judgment
of the writ Court within 30 days from today.
No orders as to cost.
………………………………..J
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
...…………………………….J
(VINEET SARAN)
New Delhi
Dated: November 29, 2019
In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of
her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decided to pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him, resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts,
even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the
respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he
was a minor.
9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal
on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed
while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e.
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be
obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime committed by such person as a juvenile.
This is with the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal
person, without any stigma.
Further, the case against the respondent is not with regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been framed against him. The respondent had very fairly disclosed
about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant against the respondent.
In our considered view, the same can also not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected after following the due process and appointment having been offered to him.
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9109 OF 2019
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.26395 OF 2018]
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS …..APPELLANTS
VERSUS
RAMESH BISHNOI ……RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Vineet Saran, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal pertains to the appellants (Union of India)
denying appointment to the respondent, (even though selected) on
the post of SubInspector, on the ground of a criminal case having
been registered in the past against the respondent.
3. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of this case are that
in response to an advertisement dated 28.03.2015, for recruitment
on the post of SubInspector in the Central Industrial Security
2
Force (for short ‘CISF’) issued by the Staff Selection Commission
(SSC), the respondent had appeared in the written examination
and physical endurance test and was thus selected and offered
appointment on 15.09.2016. The respondent was then required to
submit a form, wherein there was a column relating to whether
any First Information Report (for short ‘FIR’) had been lodged
against the respondent in the past. The respondent had given the
details of the FIR (No.70/2009) under Sections 354, 447 and 509
of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) having been lodged
against the respondent and in the further column of the
questionnaire form, the respondent had clearly mentioned that on
the matter having been compromised, he was acquitted of the
aforesaid offence on 24.11.2011, as there was no evidence
adduced against the respondent. The respondent had thus
rendered all necessary information regarding the criminal case
lodged against him and did not conceal any material fact. The
case was then referred to the Standing Screening Committee,
which found the respondent unsuitable for appointment in CISF
on the aforesaid ground that a criminal case had been lodged
against him in the past. Consequently, on 03.06.2017 the
National Industrial Security Academy cancelled the appointment of
3
the respondent, on the ground of registration of a criminal case in
the past.
4. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ
Petition No.7522 of 2017, which was allowed by a learned Single
Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur vide judgment
dated 06.12.2017, and the case of the respondent was directed to
be decided afresh within 15 days in the light of the guidelines
issued by this Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India
(2016) 8 SCC 471. The case of the respondent was then reexamined by the Standing Screening Committee on 02.01.2018,
which by an order dated 16.01.2018, again rejected the claim of
the respondent, holding that the respondent was acquitted merely
for due to lack of adequate evidence and compromise, and that the
offence in the charge sheet falls in the category of serious offence,
and thus the respondent was not considered suitable for
appointment on the post of SubInspector in CISF.
5. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ
Petition No.1310 of 2018, which was allowed by an order dated
08.03.2018 with the following directions:
4
“……….. the impugned Order
dated 16.1.2018 (communicated
vide letter dated 17.01.2018)
(Annex.1) is recashed and set
aside; the respondents are
directed to activate offer of
appointment of the petitioner
earlier made to the Petitioner for
the post of SubInspector in
Central Industrial Security Force.
The order may be operated upon
within a period of thirty days
from today and all notional
benefits shall be prospectively
given.”
6. The appellants herein, challenged the order of the
learned Single Judge dated 08.03.2018 before the Division Bench
of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Special Appeal Writ
No.702 of 2018, which was dismissed by the Division Bench by
judgment dated 08.05.2018. Aggrieved by the said orders dated
08.03.2018 and 08.05.2018, passed by the learned Single Judge
and Division Bench respectively of the High Court of Rajasthan at
Jodhpur, this appeal has been filed by way of Special Leave
Petition.
7. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length
and have perused the material on record.
5
8. In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against
the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had
teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of
her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decided to
pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him,
resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts,
even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the
respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered
under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the
respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he
was a minor.
9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the
charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the
respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth
is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were
never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents
did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal
on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then
too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job
on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed
while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e.
6
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as
well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be
obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime
committed by such person as a juvenile. This is with the clear
object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal
person, without any stigma. Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 lays down guidelines
for the Central Government, State Governments, the Board and
other agencies while implementing the provisions of the said Act.
In clause (xiv) of Section 3, it is clearly provided as follows:
“……………..
(xiv) Principle of fresh start: All
past records of any child under
the Juvenile Justice system
should be erased except in
special circumstances.
………………”
In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the respondent
was a minor when the charges had been framed against him of
offences under Sections 354, 447 and 509 of IPC. It is also not
disputed that he was acquitted of the charges. However, even if he
7
had been convicted, the same could not have been held against
him for getting a job, as admittedly he was a minor when the
alleged offences were committed and the charges had been framed
against him. Section 3(xiv) provides for the same and the exception
of special circumstances does not apply to the facts of the present
case.
10. Further, the case against the respondent is not with
regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been
framed against him. The respondent had very fairly disclosed
about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the
basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant
against the respondent. In our considered view, the same can also
not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of
which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected
after following the due process and appointment having been
offered to him.
11. For the reasons given hereinabove, we do not find any
ground for interference with the orders passed by the learned
Single Judge as well as the Division bench of the High Court of
Rajasthan at Jodhpur. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.
8
The respondent shall be entitled to all the benefits of the judgment
of the writ Court within 30 days from today.
No orders as to cost.
………………………………..J
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
...…………………………….J
(VINEET SARAN)
New Delhi
Dated: November 29, 2019
