Disqualification passed by the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly-
CONCLUSION
152. In light of the discussion above, summary of law as held herein
is as follows:
a. The Speaker, while adjudicating a disqualification petition, acts as a quasijudicial authority and the validity of the orders thus passed can be questioned before this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. However, ordinarily, the party challenging the disqualification is required to first
approach the High Court as the same would be appropriate, effective and expeditious.
b. The Speaker’s scope of inquiry with respect to acceptance or rejection of a resignation tendered by a member of the legislature is limited to examine whether such a resignation was tendered voluntarily or genuinely. Once it is demonstrated that a member is willing to resign out of his
free will, the speaker has no option but to accept the resignation. It is constitutionally impermissible for the Speaker to take into account any extraneous factors while considering the resignation. The satisfaction of the Speaker is subject to judicial review.
c. Resignation and disqualification on account of defection under the Tenth Schedule, both result in vacancy of the seat held by the member in the legislature, but further consequences envisaged are different.
d. Object and purpose of the Tenth Schedule is to curb the evil of political defection motivated by lure of office or rather similar considerations which endanger the foundation of our democracy. By the 91st Constitutional Amendment, Articles 71 (1B), 164(1B) and 361B were enacted to ensure that a member disqualified by the Speaker on account of defection is not appointed as a Minister or holds any remunerative political post from the
date of disqualification or till the date on which his term of office would expire or he/she is reelected to the legislature, whichever is earlier.
e. Disqualification relates back to the date when the act of defection takes place. Factum and taint of disqualification does not vaporise by tendering a resignation letter to the
Speaker. A pending or impending disqualification action does not become infructuous by submission of the resignation letter, when act(s) of disqualification have arisen prior to the member’s resignation letter.
f. In the earlier Constitution Bench judgment of Kihoto
Hollohan (supra), the order of the Speaker under Tenth
Schedule can be subject to judicial review on four grounds:
mala fide, perversity, violation of the constitutional
mandate and order passed in violation of natural justice.
g. Our findings on allegations of not granting specific time in
all the above cases are based on the unique facts and
circumstances of the case. It should not be understood to
mean that the Speaker could cut short the hearing period.
The Speaker should give sufficient opportunity to a
member before deciding a disqualification proceeding and
ordinarily follow the time limit prescribed in the Rules of
the Legislature.
h. In light of the existing Constitutional mandate, the Speaker
is not empowered to disqualify any member till the end of
the term. However, a member disqualified under the Tenth
Schedule shall be subjected to sanctions provided under
Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B of Constitution, which
provides for a bar from being appointed as a Minister or
from holding any remunerative political post from the date
of disqualification till the date on which the term of his
office would expire or if he is reelected to the legislature,
whichever is earlier.
i. There is a growing trend of the Speaker acting against the
constitutional duty of being neutral. Further horse trading
and corrupt practices associated with defection and change
of loyalty for lure of office or wrong reasons have not
abated. Thereby the citizens are denied stable
governments. In these circumstances, there is need to
consider strengthening certain aspects, so that such
undemocratic practices are discouraged and checked.
j. The existence of a substantial question of law does not
weigh on the stakes involved in the case, rather, it depends
on the impact the “question of law” will have on the final
determination. If the questions having a determining effect
on the final outcome have already been decided by a
conclusive authority, then such questions cannot be called
as “substantial questions of law”. In any case, no
108
substantial question of law exists in the present matter,
which needs reference to a larger bench.
153. In view of the discussion above, we pass the following order:
1. Orders dated 25.07.2019 and 28.07.2019 passed by the
Speaker in Disqualification Petition Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8
of 2019, are upheld to the extent of the disqualification of
the Petitioners therein.
2. However, the part of Speaker’s orders detailing the
duration of disqualification, viz., from the date of the
respective order till the expiry of the term of the 15th
Legislative Assembly of Karnataka, is accordingly set aside.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 992 OF 2019
SHRIMANTH BALASAHEB PATIL …PETITIONER
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
WITH
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 997 OF 2019
RAMESH L. JARKHIHOLI AND ANOTHER …PETITIONERS
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 998 OF 2019
PRATAP GOUDA PATIL AND OTHERS …PETITIONERS
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
REPORTABLE
1
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1000 OF 2019
DR. K. SUDHAKAR …PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY …RESPONDENT
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1001 OF 2019
ANAND SINGH …PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY …RESPONDENT
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1003 OF 2019
R. SHANKAR …PETITIONER
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1005 OF 2019
A. H. VISHWANATH AND OTHERS …PETITIONERS
2
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1006 OF 2019
ROSHAN BAIG …PETITIONER
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1007 OF 2019
N. NAGARAJU MTB …PETITIONER
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction A
Contentions B
3
Issues C
Maintainability of Writ Petition D
Rejection of Resignations E
Disqualification Proceedings After Resignation F
Validity of Disqualification order G
Power of the Speaker to direct disqualification
till the expiry of the term
H
Reference to Constitution Bench I
Individual Cases J
Conclusions K
N . V . RA M A N A , J .
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Reflecting on Indian parliamentary democracy, the words of
André Béteille, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, need to be
observed:
“In a parliamentary democracy, the
obligations of constitutional morality are
expected to be equally binding on the
government and the opposition. In India, the
same political party treats these obligations
very differently when it is in office, and
when it is out of it. This has contributed
greatly to the popular perception of our
political system as being amoral…”1
Although the framers of the Constitution entrusted ‘we the
people’ with the responsibility to uphold the constitutional
1 André Béteille, ‘Constitutional Morality’, Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 43 (40)
(4th October 2008).
4
values having attained freedom, the question which begs herein
to be answered is to what extent we have discharged our duty
and sustained our democratic and constitutional obligations.
2. In this context, the questions arising in this batch of Writ
Petitions concern the importance of party politics in a democracy
and the requirement to have stability within the government to
facilitate good governance, as mandated under the Constitution.
We need to keep in mind that the separating line between
dissent and defection requires to be made apparent, so that
democratic values are upheld in balance with other
constitutional considerations. In an endeavor to maintain such
balance, the role of the Speaker is critical in maintaining the
balance between democratic values and constitutional
considerations. In this regard, this Court’s role is only to
ascertain whether the Speaker, as a neutral member, upheld the
tradition of his office to uphold the Constitution.
3. These Writ Petitions are filed against five different orders passed
by the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly: two
orders dated 25.07.2019 in Disqualification Petition No. 01 of
2019 and Disqualification Petition No. 07 of 2019 respectively;
two orders dated 28.07.2019 in Disqualification Petition No. 05
5
of 2019 and Disqualification Petition No. 08 of 2019 respectively;
and a common order dated 28.07.2019 in Disqualification
Petition Nos. 3 and 4 of 2019.
4. Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the present
petitions are that the results of the 15th Karnataka Legislative
Assembly were declared on 15.05.2018. The contesting political
parties secured the following seats:
Party Seats Won
Bahujan Samaj Party 1
Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] 104
Indian National Congress [INC] 78
Janata Dal (Secular) [JD(S)] 37
Karnataka Pragnyavantha
Janatha Party [KPJP]
1
Independent 1
Total 222
5. The Petitioners herein were elected as members of 15th
Karnataka Legislative Assembly, as per the details given below:
W.P. (C)
NO.
PETITIONER(S) PARTY CONSTITUENCY
992/
2019
Shrimanth Balasaheb
Patil
INC Kagawad
997/
2019
1. Ramesh Jarkhiholi
2. Mahesh Kumathalli
INC 1. Gokak
2. Athani
998/ 1. Pratap Gouda Patil
2. B.C. Patil
INC 1. Maski
2. Hirekerur
6
2019 3. Arbail Shivaram
Hebbar
4. S.T. Somashekhar
5. B.A. Basvaraja
6. Munirathna
3. Yellapur
4. Yeshvanthapura
5. KR Pura
6. RR Nagar
1000/
2019
Dr. K. Sudhakar INC Chikkaballapur
1001/
2019
Anand Singh INC Vijayanagara
1003/
2019
R. Shankar KPJP
Independent
Ranebennur
1005/
2019
1. A.H. Vishwanath
2. K. Gopalaiah
3. K.C. Narayanagowda
JD(S) 1.Hunsur
2.Mahalakshmi
Layout
3.Krishanarajapet
1006/
2019
Roshan Baig INC Shivajinagar
1007/
2019
N. Nagaraju MTB INC Hosakote
6. Though the BJP was the single largest party, its attempt to form
the Government was not successful. A coalition government of
INC and JD(S) was formed under the leadership of Mr.
Kumaraswamy (one of the Respondents herein). This
Government had a short life of about 14 months. The events
leading up to the resignation of the Chief Minister, on losing the
trust vote on 23.07.2019, after several days delay, form the
backdrop to the case of the present Petitioners.
7
7. On 11.02.2019 Disqualification Petition No. 1 of 2019 was
instituted against Ramesh L. Jarkhiholi, Mahesh Iranagaud
Kumathalli, Umesh G. Jadhav and B. Nagendra. The main
allegations against the aforesaid persons were that they did not
participate in the meetings of the party and the proceedings of
the Assembly session held from 06.02.2019 onwards, and the
conduct of all the aforesaid members’ was in violation of the
whip issued by the INC in this regard. Thereafter, Petitioners in
Writ Petition (C) No. 997 of 2019, Ramesh L. Jarkhiholi and
Mahesh Iranagaud Kumathalli, are said to have submitted their
resignations to the Speaker on 06.07.2019.
8. Other Petitioners, including, Dr. K. Sudhakar, Pratap Gouda
Patil, B. C. Patil, Arbail Shivaram Hebbar, S. T. Somashekar,
B.A. Basvaraja, Munirathna, A.H. Vishwanath, K. Gopalaiah,
K.C. Narayanagowda, Anand Singh, N. Nagaraju MTB and
Roshan Baig submitted their resignations from the membership
of the House between 01.07.2019 to 11.07.2019.
9. However, the Speaker did not take any call on the resignation of
the above persons. Aggrieved by the fact that their resignations
were not accepted, and with the impending trust vote being
inevitable, most of the above persons approached this Court by
8
way of a Writ Petition, being Writ Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019.
This Court, on 11.07.2019, in the aforesaid Writ Petition
directed the Speaker to take a decision qua the resignations
forthwith, and further directed the same to be laid before this
Court. The relevant extract of the said order is as under:
“....Having regard to the facts of the case, we
permit the petitioners, ten in number, to
appear before the Hon’ble Speaker of the
Karnataka Legislative Assembly at 6.00 p.m.
today. We request the Hon’ble Speaker to
grant an audience to the ten petitioners at
the said time. The petitioners, if they so
wish and are so inclined, shall intimate the
Hon’ble Speaker of the Assembly their
decision to resign, in which event, the
Hon’ble Speaker shall take a decision
forthwith and, in any case, in the course of
the remaining part of the day. Such decision
of the Hon’ble Speaker as may be taken in
terms of the present order, be laid before the
Court tomorrow (12.07.2019)...”
10. Meanwhile, on 11.07.2019, members of the INC withdrew their
disqualification complaint against B. Nagendra in
Disqualification Petition No.1 of 2019. The Speaker, it appears,
did not take any decision on the resignation in spite of the order
of this Court. Simultaneously, a whip was issued by the INC and
the JD(S) on 12.07.2019 calling upon their members to attend
proceedings, and cautioning the members of disqualification if
9
they failed to attend the same. Further, Disqualification Petition
Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were filed against Dr. K. Sudhakar, Pratap
Gouda Patil, B. C. Patil, Arbail Shivaram Hebbar, S. T.
Somashekhar, B.A. Basvaraja, Munirathna, A.H. Vishwanath, K.
Gopalaiah, K.C. Narayanagowda, Anand Singh, N. Nagaraju
MTB and Roshan Baig between 10.07.2019 to 12.07.2019.
11. Subsequently, when the aforesaid Writ Petition came up for
hearing on 12.07.2019, this Court passed the order as under:
“Having regard to the weighty issues
that have arisen and the incomplete state of
facts, as indicated above, we are of the view
that the matter should be considered by the
Court further on 16th July, 2019.
In the meantime, the status quo as
on today, with regard to the ten
petitioners, be maintained, namely, that
neither the issue of resignation nor the
issue of disqualification will be decided
by the Hon’ble Speaker.
This order has been passed by this
Court only to enable the Court to decide the
larger constitutional questions arising as
indicated above.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Further, this Court on 17.07.2019, passed the following order:
“The issue arising in the case is
whether resignations submitted by Members
of the Legislative Assembly at a point of time
10
earlier than petitions for their
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule of
the Constitution should have priority in the
decision making process or whether both
sets of proceedings should be taken up
simultaneously or the disqualification
proceedings should have precedence over
the request(s) for resignation.
Arguments have been advanced by the
learned counsels for the parties on the
touchstone of Articles 164, 190, 191, 212
and 361B and the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution. We have considered the same.
Constitutional principles should not receive
an exhaustive enumeration by the Court
unless such an exercise is inevitable and
unavoidable to resolve the issues that may
have arisen in any judicial proceeding.
In the present case, having regard to
the stage at which the above issues are
poised in the light of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the same, we
are of the view that the aforesaid questions
should receive an answer only at a later
stage of the proceedings. The imperative
necessity, at this stage, is to maintain
the constitutional balance and the
conflicting and competing rights that
have been canvassed before us. Such an
interim exercise has become prudent in
view of certain time frame exercise(s)
that is in the offing in the Karnataka
Legislative Assembly, particularly, the no
trust motion against the present
Government, which we are told is due for
being taken up on 18th July, 2019. In
these circumstances, the competing
claims have to be balanced by an
11
appropriate interim order, which
according to us, should be to permit the
Hon’ble Speaker of the House to decide
on the request for resignations by the 15
Members of the House within such time
frame as the Hon’ble Speaker may
consider appropriate. We also take the
view that in the present case the discretion
of the Hon’ble Speaker while deciding the
above issue should not be fettered by any
direction or observation of this Court and
the Hon’ble Speaker should be left free to
decide the issue in accordance with
Article 190 read with Rule 202 of the
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of
Business in Karnataka Legislative
Assembly framed in exercise of the
powers under Article 208 of the
Constitution.
The order of the Hon’ble Speaker on
the resignation issue, as and when passed,
be placed before the Court.
We also make it clear that until further
orders the 15 Members of the Assembly,
ought not to be compelled to participate in
the proceedings of the ongoing session of the
House and an option should be given to
them that they can take part in the said
proceedings or to opt to remain out of the
same. We order accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. Disqualification Petition No. 7 of 2019 was filed against R.
Shankar on 16.07.2019 and Disqualification Petition No. 8 of
2019 was filed against Shrimanth Balasaheb Patel on
12
20.07.2019. The Speaker thereupon issued emergent notices
between 18.07.2019 to 20.07.2019 to all the Petitioners
regarding the pending disqualification petitions to appear before
him on the date of hearing fixed for 23.07.2019 and 24.07.2019.
The notices did not refer to the resignation letters which had
been submitted by 15 Petitioners, who are parties to the Writ
Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019 filed before this Court. The
Petitioners have alleged that the period given in the aforesaid
notices was too short and in fact some of them had not even
received notices within time to respond.
14. While the aforesaid disqualification petitions/resignation letters
were pending, the INC on 20.07.2019 had again issued a whip
requiring their members of the Legislative Assembly to attend
the proceedings of the House on 22.07.2019.
15. The trust vote was finally taken up for consideration on
23.07.2019. The 17 Petitioners did not attend the House. As a
result, the INC and JD(S) coalition Government, under the
leadership of Mr. Kumaraswamy was in a minority, resulting in
the resignation of Mr. Kumaraswamy as Chief Minister.
13
16. Further, as detailed above, on 25.07.2019 and 28.07.2019, the
Speaker passed the five impugned orders in Disqualification
Petition Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of 2019. In these orders, the
Speaker:
a. Rejected the resignation of the members asserting that they
were not voluntary or genuine
b. Disqualified all the Petitioners, and
c. Disqualified the Petitioners till the end of the 15th
Legislative Assembly term
17. Aggrieved, by the aforesaid disqualifications, all the Petitioners
herein have approached this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution.
B. CONTENTIONS
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL MR. MUKUL ROHATGI ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONERS IN W.P. (C) NOS.997, 998, 1006 AND 1007 OF 2019
Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, argued that the
members of the house have an indefeasible right to resign but
the speaker went beyond his constitutionally mandated duty
and gave an opinion on the motive of the members and
wrongfully rejected the resignations tendered by them. On the
contrary, the speaker has to accept the resignation once it has
been tendered in the correct format.
Explaining the connection between resignation and
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution,
14
Mr. Rohatgi stressed that once resignation was validly tendered,
there was no question of the Speaker exercising his jurisdiction
to disqualify a member. Disqualification under the Tenth
Schedule was only with respect to a person who was a member,
and not otherwise.
The learned Senior Counsel challenging the legality of the
disqualification order submitted that the same can be interfered
with, if the Court finds that the order is perverse, results from
nonapplication of mind, or is in violation of principles of natural
justice. It was contended that in the present case, all three of
the above infirmities are made out in the disqualification order
of the Speaker.
The Speaker, in issuing “emergent” notice returnable in 34 days
is in contravention of the requirement for 7 days’ notice under
the Karnataka Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Members
on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986. This makes the order of
the Speaker bad for noncompliance of the principles of natural
justice, particularly when the Petitioners had only sought time of
4 weeks to produce documents.
Lastly, learned Senior Counsel vehemently submitted that even
if disqualification is held to be valid in law, the same cannot take
away the right of the Petitioners to contest in the upcoming
elections, as there exists no bar on the right to contest elections
under Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL CA SUNDARAM ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER IN W.P. (C) NO. 1000 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the resignation
tendered in the present case was resignation from the House
and not from the party.
15
If resignation is tendered under Article 190, the Speaker’s role is
limited to the extent of determining voluntariness and
genuineness of the same. The inquiry of the Speaker as to the
“voluntariness” is limited in its scope to the question of whether
the member was coerced to resign or not. The enquiry as to
“genuineness” only related to whether the resignation letter was
forged, or not actually made by the member. Additionally, when
a member hands over the letter of resignation to the Speaker
personally and informs the Speaker that the same is voluntary
and genuine, then the Speaker has to accept the resignation
immediately.
The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the motive
behind the resignation is immaterial, as the proviso to Article
190(3) of the Constitution restricts the scope of inquiry by the
Speaker only to voluntariness and genuineness.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL V. GIRI ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER IN
W.P.(C) NO. 1003 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel distinguished the case of the
Petitioner on the basis that he had never tendered his
resignation. In spite of that, a separate disqualification order
was passed against him.
In the present case, the Petitioner belonged to KPJP. Although
the party had decided to merge with the INC and had intimated
the Speaker about the same, there was no formal order of
merger. When the whip was issued by the INC, the Petitioner
herein requested the Speaker to provide him with a separate
seat with the opposition members. But the Speaker refused the
same, recognizing the Petitioner to be affiliated with the INC.
16
The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner brought to the
notice of the Court the letter of intimation issued by the
Executive Committee of his party directing him to stay on the
side of the opposition. Therefore, without any formal order of
merger, the Petitioner was not bound by the whip issued by the
INC.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL V. GIRI ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER IN
W.P. (C) NO. 992 OF 2019
The case of the Petitioner can be distinguished factually from the
case of most of the other Petitioners as he had not tendered his
resignation. When the whip was issued, due to prevailing
medical conditions, the Petitioner had to urgently travel to
Mumbai, pursuant to which he failed to participate in the
proceedings of the House.
Although these facts were intimated to the Speaker with
supporting medical records, the Speaker passed the order of
disqualification in haste without giving due notice to the
Petitioner. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that such an
ex parte order of disqualification, without considering relevant
material on record and placing reliance upon extraneous
circumstances, is untenable.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL A.K GANGULY ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONERS IN W.P.(C) NO. 1005 OF 2019
This Court, vide its order dated 17.07.2019 in Writ Petition (C)
No. 872 of 2019, granted liberty to the Petitioners herein to
either participate or opt out of the proceedings of the ongoing
session of the House. But the aforesaid order was ignored by the
political party of the Petitioners herein by issuing the whip, and
17
by the Speaker in relying upon the same to disqualify the
Petitioners.
The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the sanctity of
the Petitioners’ resignation should be protected. The order of
disqualification rendered by the Speaker is mala fide and is not
supported by any cogent reasons.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL K.V. VISHWANATHAN ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONERS IN W.P. (C) NO. 997 OF 2019
The learned senior counsel submitted that on 11.02.2019, a
disqualification petition was filed against 4 MLAs including Dr.
Umesh Yadav and the Petitioners herein. Subsequently, during
the pendency of the said disqualification petition, Dr. Umesh
Yadav submitted his resignation which was accepted by the
Speaker. However, the Speaker, acting in a mala fide manner,
kept the resignation letter submitted by the Petitioners herein
pending until the disqualification petition was decided.
Despite the orders of this Court directing the Speaker to decide
the resignation, the Speaker kept the matter pending till the
decision on the disqualification petition. The learned Senior
Counsel further contended that the Speaker wrongly took into
consideration actions pursuant to the orders of this Court dated
17.07.2019, wherein the Petitioners were granted the liberty not
to participate in the ongoing proceedings of the house.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL SAJAN POOVAYYA ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER IN W.P. (C) NO. 1001 OF 2019
The Petitioner was a member of the INC who had resigned on
01.07.2019 in protest against certain land dealing in his
Constituency. However, he was put in the same group as the
other disqualified Petitioners by the Speaker. The learned Senior
18
Counsel contends that omnibus statements and allegations have
been rendered in the disqualification order and the same was
passed without taking into consideration the documents
submitted by the Petitioner herein.
The learned Senior Counsel reiterated the earlier contention that
the actions of the Petitioner stood protected by virtue of the
interim order dated 17.07.2019 passed by a Coordinate Bench
of this Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019.
LEARNED SOLICITOR GENERAL TUSHAR MEHTA ON BEHALF OF THE
SPEAKER:
The learned Solicitor General submitted that members of the
House have the right to resign.
The learned Solicitor General submitted that this was a fit case
for the matter to be remanded to the Speaker for fresh hearing.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL KAPIL SIBAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
NOS. 2 AND 3 IN W.P. (C) NOS. 992, 997, 998, 1000, 1001,
1003, 1006 AND 1007 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel firstly stated that the impugned
orders of disqualification can only be challenged under Article
226 and not under Article 32 of the Constitution, as these are
matters involving merely statutory rights. There is no alleged
violation of fundamental rights which mandates the invocation
of jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. Further, the
Speaker is a quasijudicial authority, the remedy against whose
order lies only under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The learned Senior Counsel emphasized upon the conduct of the
Petitioners to prove that their resignations were motivated. The
counsel urged this Court to take a note of the conduct of the
members both prior and subsequent to the act of resignation to
19
comprehend the motive behind such resignation. He stated that
motive has to be decided to determine the “genuineness” and
“voluntariness” of the resignation, as it is the motive which acts
as an umbilical cord between the issues of genuineness and
voluntariness. In light of the same, learned Senior Counsel
pointed out that the Petitioners, after tendering their
resignation, never went to the Speaker; rather they approached
the Governor and the Supreme Court. It ought to be noted that
the letters of resignation were tendered collectively.
The power vested in the Speaker is a judicial exercise of power.
The Court’s discretion in this arena is quite limited. Moreover,
the Speaker, being the master of the House, can impose any
restriction pursuant to the act of disqualification. It ought to be
noted that the acts of disqualification took place within the
House and therefore it is well within the inherent powers of the
Speaker to impose any sanction consequent to the act of
defection. Without such power of sanction, the position of the
Speaker is equivalent to that of a toothless tiger.
Additionally, it was submitted that although the Petitioners have
repeatedly contended that the rules of natural justice have been
violated, it ought to be noted that rules of natural justice cannot
be put in a straitjacket. Although, these principles are
immutable, yet they are flexible, and are not confined to
technical limits. The Petitioners herein have to show some real
injury or patent perversity in the order of the Speaker.
Moreover, when the whip was issued with respect to a motion of
confidence, the members are duty bound to accept the same.
The Petitioners, by violating the whip, have voluntarily given up
20
membership of the party. Even assuming that the liberty
granted by this Court in the earlier writ proceedings was correct,
with respect to noncompulsion of the members for attending
the Assembly, there was legal necessity to attend the Assembly
at such a determinative point. The learned Senior Counsel made
a distinction between ordinary whips and those which are more
essential, which were necessary for the survival of the
Government such as those pertaining to a trust vote, a noconfidence motion, or even a whip relating to the budget. He
submitted that such a whip must be followed per se, and that a
member could not refuse to appear/vote with respect to the
same.
The learned Senior Counsel proceeded to distinguish between
consequences of resignation with that of disqualification. He
stated that sole purpose of the Tenth Schedule is to check bulk
defections. In light of the same, the Petitioners cannot be
allowed to contest the byelections, as allowing them to contest
dilutes the effect of disqualification. There is a clear bar for
acceptance of the nomination of disqualified candidates under
Section 36 of The Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Therefore, the disqualified members should not be allowed to
contest fresh elections.
The learned Senior Counsel also contended that the Speaker has
the power to disqualify under the Tenth Schedule, which also
includes the power of the Speaker to command that the member
disqualified would not be eligible to stand for reelection, on the
seat falling vacant, till the end of the term of the House.
21
However, since the matter involves important questions in
relation to the power of the Speaker to decide the parallel
proceedings of resignation and disqualification, the power of the
Speaker to conduct inquiry as to the “voluntariness” and
“genuineness”, the interpretation of the terms “voluntary” and
“genuine”, the relevant material to be considered during an
inquiry under Article 190(3) of the Constitution, the relevant
period of inquiry, etc., the same is required to be considered by a
Constitution Bench.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL DR. RAJEEV DHAVAN ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NO. 2 IN W.P (C) NO. 1005 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel defended the order of
disqualification by stating that the Speaker exercises wide range
of power while acting in an adjudicatory capacity and the same
should not be reduced to a mechanical exercise. Therefore, while
deciding the issues regarding “genuineness” and “voluntariness”
behind the act of resignation, the Speaker can look to the series
of events leading to the resignation so as to decide the motive.
Pursuant to the above submission, the counsel stated that
taking into totality of facts into consideration there exist no
ground to claim that the order of the Speaker suffers from
perversity or that the same was passed mala fide.
The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that there exists no
indefeasible right of resignation as these Petitioners are acting in
their constitutional capacity as members of the Legislative
Assembly. Moreover, the resignations rendered in the present
case cannot be qualified as resignation simpliciter, rather they
indicate resignation for the cause of defection and in such a
22
situation, the Speaker could not have turned a blind eye to the
activities of the Petitioners.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL DEVADUTT KAMAT ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NOS. 2 AND 3 IN W.P. (C) NOS. 992, 997, 998,
1000, 1001, 1003, 1006 AND 1007 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel reiterated the views expressed above
by the other learned Senior Counsel and defended the orders of
the Speaker stating that he had duly complied with the orders of
this Court by deciding the resignations submitted by the
Petitioners under Article 190 of the Constitution. The learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the orders dated 11.07.2019 and
17.07.2019 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ
Petition (C) No.872 of 2019 only requested the Speaker to take a
decision on the resignations as per his discretion and within
such time frame as he may consider appropriate. Acceptance or
rejection of the resignations is dependent on the condition that
the same are voluntary and genuine.
Further, the disqualification orders passed by the Speaker were
based on a totality of circumstances prevailing in which the
conduct of the Petitioners was questionable. The absence of the
Petitioners from the proceedings of the House, when the trust
motion of their Government was being discussed, clearly shows
their intention to act against the party interest. The
disqualification orders were based on cumulative facts including
the absence of the Petitioners despite repeated notices to remain
present, and their actions and conduct in colluding with the BJP
to engineer the fall of the coalition government.
23
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL K. SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NOS. 2 AND 3 IN W.P. (C) NOS. 992, 997, 998,
1000, 1001, 1003, 1006 AND 1007 OF 2019
Learned senior advocate supported the arguments advanced by
the learned senior advocate, Mr. Kapil Sibal, and stated that the
disqualification order could not be reviewed by this Court.
Further, the Tenth Schedule is clear on the aspect of merger,
wherein he pointed out that there is no need to communicate
the factum of merger to R. Shankar [Petitioner in Writ Petition
(C) No. 1003 of 2019].
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL RAKESH DWIVEDI ON BEHALF OF
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
The learned Senior Counsel submitted that it has been a matter
of consistent practice that members disqualified under the Tenth
Schedule can participate in the next elections. Any bar for a
particular period is not anticipated by law with respect to
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule.
He further stated that the power of the Speaker is only limited to
the adjudication of the disqualification petition. Any
consequential action which flows from such disqualification is
beyond his jurisdiction. The Speaker cannot, at will, provide any
particular term of disqualification. Disqualification, and the
consequences thereof, being punitive, have to be sanctioned by
law.
When a member gets disqualified under the Tenth Schedule, a
consequential vacancy arises thereby. However, it is
impermissible for the Speaker to decide as to who can contest
for the said vacancy.
24
C. ISSUES
18. In view of the arguments contended, following questions arise for
our consideration herein:
1. Whether the Writ Petition challenging the order of the
Speaker under Article 32 is maintainable?
2. Whether the order of the Speaker rejecting the resignation
and disqualifying the Petitioners is in accordance with the
Constitution?
3. Even if the Speaker’s order of disqualification is valid, does
the Speaker have the power to disqualify the members for
the rest of the term?
4. Whether the issues raised require a reference to the larger
Bench?
D. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE WRIT PETITION
19. At the outset, it must be noted that learned Senior Counsel, Mr.
Kapil Sibal has contended that this Court does not have the
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India to deal
with this matter. Further, learned Senior Counsel, Dr. Rajeev
Dhavan, has supported the aforesaid argument by stating that
no fundamental right is violated, more so when the members of
25
Parliament or Legislative Assembly cannot invoke the ‘right to
freedom of trade and profession’ under Article 19 (1)(g) of the
Constitution of India.
20. The contours of this Court’s writ jurisdiction has been long
established in several decisions of this Court. Where the law
provides for a hierarchy of appeals, the parties must exhaust the
available remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction of this
Court [See U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey, (2005)
8 SCC 264]. At the same time, this Court in a catena of
decisions has held that this doctrine is not a rule of law, but
essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and thus
not a compulsion and where there is failure of principles of
natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction warrants, this Court may exercise its writ
jurisdiction even if the parties had other adequate legal
remedies. [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR
1958 SC 86; Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107]
21. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the Respondents have
challenged the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the
26
Constitution by placing reliance on the Kihoto
Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651, wherein this
Court, while dealing with the scope of judicial review stated as
under:
“109. In the light of the decisions
referred to above and the nature of
function that is exercised by the
Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6,
the scope of judicial review under
Articles 136, and 226 and 227 of the
Constitution in respect of an order
passed by the Speaker/Chairman
under Paragraph 6 would be confined to
jurisdictional errors only viz., infirmities
based on violation of constitutional
mandate, mala fides, noncompliance
with rules of natural justice and
perversity.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. We may note that writ jurisdiction is one of the valuable rights
provided under Article 32 of the Constitution, which in itself
forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. After the
decision in the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra), the Speaker,
while exercising the power to disqualify, is a Tribunal and the
validity of the orders are amenable to judicial review. On a
perusal of the judgment in the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra),
we do not find any explicit or implicit bar to adjudicate the issue
under the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
27
23. The Petitioners are alleging violation of principles of natural
justice and their right to a fair hearing. Principles of natural
justice and right to fair hearing can be traceable to right to
equality and rule of law enshrined under Article 14 of the
Constitution, read with other fundamental rights [refer to
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,(1978) 1 SCC 248].
24. A seven Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Ujjam Bai v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621, held that writ
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution is available
when principles of natural justice are violated. This view was
affirmed by a nine Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1967 SC 1, in the following terms:
“54. The scope of the jurisdiction of this Court
in dealing with writ petitions under Article 32
was examined by a Special Bench of this Court
in Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1963) 1
SCR 778]. This decision would show that it
was common ground before the court that in
three classes of cases a question of the
enforcement of the fundamental rights may
arise; and if it does arise, an application under
Article 32 will lie. These cases are: (1) where
action is taken under a statute which is ultra
vires the Constitution; (2) where the statute is
intra vires but the action taken is without
jurisdiction; and (3) where the action taken
28
is procedurally ultra vires as where a quasijudicial authority under an obligation to act
judicially passes an order in violation of the
principles of natural justice.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. In the context of disqualification orders, this Court has exercised
its writ jurisdiction under Article 32. A three Judge Bench of
this Court in Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC
1, has explicitly held that a challenge to an order of
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is available under the
writ jurisdiction of this Court. This Court held as under:
“11. The Speaker, while exercising power to
disqualify Members, acts as a Tribunal and
though validity of the orders thus passed
can be questioned in the writ jurisdiction
of this Court or High Courts, the scope of
judicial review is limited as laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Kihoto
Hollohan v. Zachillhu [1992 Supp (2) SCC
651]. The orders can be challenged on the
ground of ultra vires or mala fides or having
been made in colourable exercise of power
based on extraneous and irrelevant
considerations. The order would be a nullity
if rules of natural justice are violated.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. Reliance can be placed on the constitutional provisions and
debates thereupon which show that this Court can inquire into
the legitimacy of the exercise of the power. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
29
has described Article 32 as the very soul of the Constitution
very heart of it most important Article. Moreover, the
jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 32 is an important
and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution of
India and no act of Parliament can abrogate it or take it away
except by way of impermissible erosion of fundamental
principles of the constitutional scheme are settled propositions
of Indian jurisprudence.
27. This Court, as the highest Constitutional Court, has to, and has
always, functioned in accordance with the applicable judicially
determined parameters while performing its constitutional duty
to judicially review the acts of constitutional functionaries. It has
examined questions of both fact and law, so long as it has been
vested with the power to do so. The scrupulous discharge of
duties by all guardians of the Constitution include the duty not
to transgress the limitations of their own constitutionally
circumscribed powers by trespassing into what is properly the
domain of other constitutional organs.
28. In any case, we note that by challenging the order directly under
Article 32, the Petitioners have leapfrogged the judicial hierarchy
as envisaged under the Constitution [refer to Tamil Nadu
30
Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries (I) Ltd., 2019
SCC Online SC 221].
29. We do not appreciate the manner in which the petitioners have
knocked on the doors of this Court. Among other reasons, we
proceeded to hear the present matter due to the peculiar facts
presented before us, wherein certain interim orders were passed
herein by another Coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ
Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019 filed by some of the present
petitioners. We had heard the matter at some length on
25.09.2019 and 26.09.2019, when with the consent of the
counsel of all the parties, the matter was fixed for final hearing.
Since a substantial amount of time has passed in the
meanwhile, and to ensure that the same exercise need not be
repeated before the High Court, we are left with no option but to
hear these cases on merits.
30. Despite the fact that this Court has sufficient jurisdiction to deal
with disqualification cases under the writ jurisdiction, a party
challenging a disqualification order is required to first approach
the High Court as it would be appropriate, effective and
expeditious remedy to deal with such issues. This Court would
have the benefit of a considered judicial verdict from the High
31
Court. If the parties are still aggrieved, then they may approach
this Court.
31. Having ascertained that this Court has the jurisdiction to deal
with the subject matter of the present petitions, the question
concerning the extent of judicial review can be taken up later,
when we analyze and discuss the aspects concerning the validity
of the orders passed by the Speaker, disqualifying the Petitioners
and rejecting their resignations.
E. REJECTION OF RESIGNATIONS
32. In the present case, 15 of the 17 Petitioners had tendered their
resignation from the House before the disqualification petitions
were adjudicated. The Speaker vide orders dated 28.07.2019 in
Disqualification Petition Nos. 3 and 4 of 2019 and
Disqualification Petition No. 5 of 2019, and order dated
25.07.2019 in Disqualification Petition No. 1 of 2019, rejected
the resignation of the Petitioners therein, holding that they were
not voluntary and genuine.
33. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel, has contended that
rejection of the resignation by the Speaker was appropriate as
the same was given only to frustrate the object of
32
disqualification. He has submitted that the consideration before
the Court is limited considering the fact that the bonafides and
motive of the Petitioners to resign was appropriately dealt under
Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution. On the other hand, the
Petitioners have strenuously contended that the inquiry required
under Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution is limited to
“voluntariness” and “genuineness”, and not the motive or the
reason for resignation.
34. The first question we need to consider concerns the scope of
judicial review with respect to acceptance/rejection of the
resignation by the Speaker. The Respondents have contended on
this count that the Court cannot go into this aspect as the
acceptance/rejection of resignation is based on the subjective
satisfaction of the Speaker, which is immune from judicial
review.
35. We are unable to agree with this contention. It is true that 33rd
Constitutional Amendment changed the constitutional position
by conferring discretion on the Speaker to reject the resignation.
However, such discretion is not unqualified, as the resignation
33
can only be rejected if the Speaker is “satisfied that such
resignation is not voluntary or genuine”. Determination of
whether the resignations were “voluntary” or “genuine” cannot
be based on the ipse dixit of the Speaker, instead it has to be
based on his “satisfaction”. Even though the satisfaction is
subjective, it has to be based on objective material showing that
resignation is not voluntary or genuine. When a member tenders
his resignation in writing, the Speaker must immediately
conduct an inquiry to ascertain if the member intends to
relinquish his membership. The inquiry must be in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution and the applicable rules
of the House. This satisfaction of the Speaker is subject to
judicial review.
36. The next logical question which arises for consideration
concerns the ambit of the terms “voluntary” and “genuine” in
Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution. Prior to the 33rd
Constitutional Amendment, Article 190(3)(b) read as follows:
“(3) If a member of a House of the
Legislature of a State—
(a) …..
34
(b) resigns his seat by writing under his
hand addressed to the Speaker or the
Chairman, as the case may be.”
37. The 33rd Constitutional Amendment amended Article 190(3)(b) of
the Constitution and added a proviso. The revised clause reads
as follows:
“(3) If a member of a House of the
Legislature of a State—
(a) …..
(b) resigns his seat by writing under his
hand addressed to the Speaker or the
Chairman, as the case may be, and his
resignation is accepted by the Speaker or
the Chairman, as the case may be,
his seat shall thereupon become vacant:
Provided that in the case of any resignation
referred to in sub clause (b), if from
information received or otherwise and after
making such inquiry as he thinks fit, the
Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may
be, is satisfied that such resignation is not
voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept
such resignation.”
38. Thus, prior to the 33rd Constitutional Amendment, there was no
provision in the Article which required the resignation to be
accepted by the Speaker to become effective. Originally, the
position was that a member of a Legislative Assembly could
35
resign from office by a unilateral act, and the acceptance of
resignation was not required. [refer to Union of India v. Gopal
Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301; Moti Ram v. Param Dev,
(1993) 2 SCC 725]
39. First, as a starting principle, it has to be accepted that a member
of the Legislature has a right to resign. Nothing in the
Constitution, or any statute, prevents him from resigning. A
member may choose to resign for a variety of reasons and his
reasons may be good or bad, but it is his sole prerogative to
resign. An elected member cannot be compelled to continue his
office if he chooses to resign. The 33rd Constitutional
Amendment does not change this position. On the contrary, it
ensures that his resignation is on account of his free will.
40. Second, the 33rd Constitutional Amendment requires acceptance
of resignation by the Speaker. Thus, merely addressing a
resignation letter to the Speaker would not lead to the seat
automatically falling vacant. The Speaker has to accept such
resignation for the seat to become vacant. However, as discussed
above, the Speaker has limited discretion for rejecting the
resignation. If the resignation is voluntary or genuine, the
36
Speaker has to accept the resignation and communicate the
same.
41. Third, the Speaker can reject the resignation, if the Speaker is
satisfied that resignation was “not voluntary or genuine”. Herein,
our attention is drawn to the Chapter 22, Rule 202 (2) of the
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karnataka
Legislative Assembly, which is extracted as under:
“(2) If a member hands over the letter of
resignation to the Speaker personally and
informs him that the resignation is
voluntary and genuine and the Speaker has
no information or knowledge to the contrary,
and if he is satisfied, the Speaker may
accept resignation immediately.”
(emphasis supplied)
The rule states that the Speaker has to take a call on the
resignation letter addressed to him immediately, having been
satisfied of the voluntariness and genuineness. Reading the rule
in consonance with Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution and its
proviso, it is clear that the Speaker’s satisfaction should be
based on the information received and after making such inquiry
as he thinks fit. The aforesaid aspects do not require roving
inquiry and with the experience of a Speaker, who is the head of
the House, he is expected to conduct such inquiry as is
37
necessary and pass an order. If a member appears before him
and gives a letter in writing, an inquiry may be a limited inquiry.
But if he receives information that a member tendered his
resignation under coercion, he may choose to commence a
formal inquiry to ascertain if the resignation was voluntary and
genuine.
42. Fourth, although the word “genuine” has not been defined, in
this context, it would simply mean that a writing by which a
member chooses to resign is by the member himself and is not
forged by any third party. The word “genuine” only relates to the
authenticity of the letter of resignation.
43. Similarly, the word “voluntary” has not been defined. In this
context, it would mean the resignation should not be based on
threat, force or coercion. This is evident from the Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the 33rd Constitutional Amendment
which is extracted below:
1. Articles 101 (3) (b), and 190 (3) (b) of the
Constitution permit a member of either
House of Parliament or a member of a
House of the Legislature of a State to resign
his seat by writing under his hand
addressed to the Speaker or the Chairman,
as the case may be. In the recent past,
there have been instances where coercive
38
measures have been resorted to for
compelling members of' a Legislative
Assembly to resign their membership, if
this is not checked, it might become
difficult for Legislatures to function in
accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution. It is therefore, proposed to
amend the above two articles to impose a
requirement as to acceptance of the
resignation by the Speaker or the Chairman
and to provide that the resignation shall not
be accepted by the Speaker or the Chairman
if he is satisfied after making such inquiry
as he thinks fit that the resignation is not
voluntary or genuine.
(emphasis supplied)
The Speaker therefore has a duty to reject the resignation if
such resignation is based on coercion, threat or force.
44. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, has contended that a
Speaker, as a part of his inquiry, can also go into the motive of
the member and reject his resignation if it was done under
political pressure. We are unable to accept this contention. The
language of Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution does not permit
the Speaker to inquire into the motive of the resignation. When a
member is resigning on political pressure, he is still voluntarily
doing so. Once the member tenders his resignation it would be
“voluntary” and if the writing can be attributed to him, it would
39
be “genuine”. Our view is also supported by the debates on the
33rd Constitutional Amendment. It may be necessary to quote
the debate dated 03.05.1974 on the 33rd Constitutional
Amendment, which is extracted below:
H.R. Gokhale: I do not want to reply
elaborately to all the points because I know I
will have to deal with these points when the
Bill comes up for consideration. In a way, I
am thankful to the Hon. Members. They
have given me notice of what they are going
to say. I will deal with some points raised.
Sir, the idea that the Bill prevents any
member from resigning is absolutely wrong.
On the contrary, the basis on which the Bill
proceeds is, the right of resignation is
protected and the idea of acceptance of a
resignation is also subject to a proviso that
the acceptance is in the normal course and
the resignation can take place only in the
event of a conclusion being reached that
either it is not genuine or it is not voluntary.
Therefore, to proceed on the basis that the
right of a Member to resign is taken away, is
entirely wrong. This can be seen if the bill is
properly studied. The other thing they said
was, in the name of democracy, how do you
prevent people from resigning. Nobody is
prevented from resigning. On the contrary,
the basic idea is, the ordinary right of a
person to say ‘I do not want to continue to
be a Member of the House’ is maintained.
But, is it a democratic way, when a
Member does not want to resign, people
pressurise him to resign not political
pressure but by threats of violence as
had occurred in the recent past. The
40
person has no option but to resign. The
Speaker has no option but to accept the
resignation in the present setup. This is
a matter which was true in Gujarat. It may
be true elsewhere. It was true in Gujarat. It
had happened. A large number of people,
about 200300 people, went and indulged in
acts of violence, held out threats and under
duress, signatures were obtained. In some
cases, Members were carried physically from
their constituencies to the Speaker for giving
resignations.
(emphasis supplied)
In this regard, there is no doubt that the Petitioners have
categorically stated and have reaffirmed before the Speaker and
this Court, in unequivocal terms, that they have voluntarily and
genuinely resigned their membership of the House. This Court,
in the earlier Writ Petition, being Writ Petition (C) No. 872 of
2019, had also directed the Speaker to look into the resignation
of the members, but the same was kept pending.
45. In view of our above discussion we hold that the Speaker can
reject a resignation only if the inquiry demonstrates that it is not
“voluntary” or “genuine”. The inquiry should be limited to
ascertaining if the member intends to relinquish his
membership out of his free will. Once it is demonstrated that a
member is willing to resign out of his free will, the Speaker has
41
no option but to accept the resignation. It is constitutionally
impermissible for the Speaker to take into account any other
extraneous factors while considering the resignation. The
satisfaction of the Speaker is subject to judicial review.
46. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid observations clarify the
scope of the Speaker’s duty under Article 190(3)(b) of the
Constitution, and answer the contention raised by the learned
senior counsel regarding the same. However, since we are
deciding the question of disqualification, it might not be
necessary to make any observations on the merits of the
petitioners’ plea regarding the nonacceptance of their
resignation letters, in view of our subsequent findings on
disqualification.
F. DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS AFTER
RESIGNATION
47. It was also contended by the Petitioners that the Speaker did not
have the jurisdiction to deal with disqualification petitions, as
the Petitioners having resigned were no longer members who
could have been disqualified. This issue does not apply to the
42
Petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 992 of 2019 and Writ Petition
(C) No. 1003 of 2019 as they did not tender their resignation.
48. Before we proceed to record our reasons, it is pertinent to reflect
upon the statement of objects and reasons to the Constitution
(Fiftysecond Amendment) Act, 1985 which states that the issue
of defection has preoccupied the national conscience from the
1960s. The importance of the same stems from the fact that it
has the potential to cause extensive damage to the democracy.
In this regard, having experienced earlier Governments falling
due to such practice, the legislature introduced the bill inserting
the Tenth Schedule for discouraging such practice.
“The evil of political defections has been a
matter of national concern. If it is not
combated, it is likely to undermine the very
foundations of our democracy and the
principles which sustain it. With this object,
an assurance was given in the Address by the
President to Parliament that the government
intended to introduce in the current session of
Parliament an antidefection Bill. This Bill is
meant for outlawing defection and fulfilling the
above assurance.”
(emphasis supplied)
49. This court in the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) has clearly
enunciated the purpose behind the introduction of the Tenth
43
Schedule, wherein it is stated that “the main purpose underlying
the constitutional amendment and introduction of the Tenth
Schedule is to curb the evil of defection which was causing
immense mischief in our body politic.” The relevant extracts are
presented below:
“9. This brings to the fore the object
underlying the provisions in the Tenth
Schedule. The object is to curb the evil of
political defections motivated by lure of
office or other similar considerations
which endanger the foundations of our
democracy. The remedy proposed is to
disqualify the Member of either House of
Parliament or of the State Legislature
who is found to have defected from
continuing as a Member of the House. The
grounds of disqualification are specified in
Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule.”
(emphasis supplied)
50. Therefore, it can be clearly concluded that the Tenth Schedule
was brought in to cure the evil of defection recognising the
significant impact it has on the health of our democracy. The
91st Constitutional Amendment also strengthens the aforesaid
view that the law needed further strengthening in order to curb
the evil of defection. The aforesaid amendment introduced
44
Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B in the Constitution. These
provisions bar any person who is disqualified under the Tenth
Schedule from being appointed as a Minister or from holding
any remunerative political post from the date of disqualification
till the date on which the term of his office would expire or if he
is reelected to the legislature, whichever is earlier.
51. The intent of the amendment is crystal clear. The constitutional
amendment sought to create additional consequences resultant
from the determination that a person was disqualified under the
Tenth Schedule. If we hold that the disqualification proceedings
would become infructuous upon tendering resignation, any
member who is on the verge of being disqualified would
immediately resign and would escape from the sanctions
provided under Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B. Such an
interpretation would therefore not only be against the intent
behind the introduction of the Tenth Schedule, but also defeat
the spirit of the 91st Constitutional Amendment.
52. A five Judge Bench of this Court, in the case of Delhi
Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, 1991
Supp (1) SCC 600 ruled that an inhibition under the
Constitution must be interpreted so as to give a wider
45
interpretation to cure the existing evils. The relevant extract has
been provided below:
118. Legislation, both statutory and
constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
experience of evils. But its general
language should not, therefore,
necessarily be confined to the form that
that evil had taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and
purposes and new awareness of
limitations. Therefore, a principle to be
valid must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is particularly true of the
constitutional constructions. Constitutions
are not ephemeral enactments designed to
meet passing occasions. These are, to use
the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
“designed to approach immortality as nearly
as human institutions can approach it ….”.
In the application of a constitutional
limitation or inhibition, our interpretation
cannot be only of ‘what has been’ but of
‘what may be’. See the observations of this
Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration
[(1978) 4 SCC 494: 1979 SCC (Cri) 155].
(emphasis supplied)
53. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8
SCC 501, a five Judge Bench of this Court articulated the
principles of constitutional interpretation, stating that Courts
are obligated to take an interpretation which glorifies the
democratic sprit of the Constitution:
46
284.1. While interpreting the provisions of
the Constitution, the safe and most sound
approach for the constitutional courts to
adopt is to read the words of the
Constitution in the light of the spirit of
the Constitution so that the
quintessential democratic nature of our
Constitution and the paradigm of
representative participation by way of
citizenry engagement are not
annihilated. The courts must adopt such
an interpretation which glorifies the
democratic spirit of the Constitution.
284.5. The Constitution being the supreme
instrument envisages the concept of
constitutional governance which has, as its
twin limbs, the principles of fiduciary nature
of public power and the system of checks
and balances. Constitutional governance,
in turn, gives birth to the requisite
constitutional trust which must be
exhibited by all constitutional
functionaries while performing their
official duties.
(emphasis supplied)
54. In addition to the above, the decision of the Speaker that a
member is disqualified, relates back to the date of the
disqualifying action complained of. The power of the Speaker to
decide upon a disqualification petition was dealt by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Rajendra Singh Rana v.
Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270. This Court, reading
47
the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 6 of the Tenth Schedule, has
clearly held that the Speaker has to decide the question of
disqualification with reference to the date it was incurred. The
Court held that:
“34. As we see it, the act of disqualification
occurs on a member voluntarily giving up
his membership of a political party or at the
point of defiance of the whip issued to him.
Therefore, the act that constitutes
disqualification in terms of para 2 of the
Tenth Schedule is the act of giving up or
defiance of the whip. The fact that a
decision in that regard may be taken in
the case of voluntary giving up, by the
Speaker at a subsequent point of time
cannot and does not postpone the
incurring of disqualification by the act of
the legislator. Similarly, the fact that the
party could condone the defiance of a whip
within 15 days or that the Speaker takes the
decision only thereafter in those cases,
cannot also pitch the time of disqualification
as anything other than the point at which
the whip is defied. Therefore in the
background of the object sought to be
achieved by the Fiftysecond Amendment of
the Constitution and on a true
understanding of para 2 of the Tenth
Schedule, with reference to the other
paragraphs of the Tenth Schedule, the
position that emerges is that the Speaker
has to decide the question of
disqualification with reference to the
date on which the member voluntarily
gives up his membership or defies the
48
whip. It is really a decision ex post
facto...”
(emphasis supplied)
55. As such, there is no doubt that the disqualification relates to the
date when such act of defection takes place. The tendering of
resignation does not have a bearing on the jurisdiction of the
Speaker in this regard. At this point we may allude to the case of
D. Sanjeevayya v. Election Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1967 SC 1211, wherein this Court has held that:
“5.It is, therefore, not permissible, in the
present case, to interpret Section 150 of the
Act in isolation without reference to Part III
of the Act which prescribes the machinery
for calling in question the election of a
returned candidate. When an election
petition has been referred to a Tribunal by
the Election Commission and the former is
seized of the matter, the petition has to be
disposed of according to law. The Tribunal
has to adjudge at the conclusion of the
proceeding whether the returned candidate
has or has not committed any corrupt
practice at the election and secondly, it has
to decide whether the second respondent
should or should not be declared to have
been duly elected. A returned candidate
cannot get rid of an election petition filed
against him by resigning his seat in the
Legislature, whatever the reason for his
resignation may be…”
Therefore, the aforesaid principle may be adopted accordingly,
wherein the taint of disqualification does not vaporise, on
49
resignation, provided the defection has happened prior to the
date of resignation.
56. In light of the above, resignation and disqualification are distinct
mechanisms provided under the law which result in vacancy.
Further, the factum/manner of resignation may be a relevant
consideration while deciding the disqualification petition. We do
not agree with the submission of the Petitioners that the
disqualification proceedings cannot be continued if the
resignations are tendered. Even if the resignation is tendered,
the act resulting in disqualification arising prior to the
resignation does not come to an end. The pending or impending
disqualification action in the present case would not have been
impacted by the submission of the resignation letter, considering
the fact that the act of disqualification in this case have arisen
prior to the members resigning from the Assembly.
G. VALIDITY OF DISQUALIFICATION ORDER
57. The Petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the
Speaker disqualifying them. The Speaker has, after a detailed
analysis, categorically concluded that the present Petitioners
50
have voluntarily given up membership of the party, through
their undisputed conduct.
58. To examine the above contention, we need to refer to the scheme
of Tenth Schedule and other provisions of the Constitution.
There is no dispute that in India, since the framing of the
Constitution, there was a constant demand for formulating a law
on defection. It may be noted that India was one of the first
countries to legislate on an AntiDefection Law. Following the
example of India, many other countries including Israel, Canada
etc. have followed suit.
59. Relevant provisions of Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule
provide that:
“2.Disqualification on ground of
defection.—
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4
and 5, a member of a House belonging to
any political party shall be disqualified for
being a member of the House—
(a) if he has voluntarily given up his
membership of such political party; or
(b) if he votes or abstains from voting in
such House contrary to any direction issued
by the political party to which he belongs or
by any person or authority authorised by it
in this behalf, without obtaining, in either
51
case, the prior permission of such political
party, person or authority and such voting
or abstention has not been condoned by
such political party, person or authority
within fifteen days from the date of such
voting or abstention.”
That the Speaker can disqualify a member belonging to any
political party if he has voluntarily given up his membership of
such political party or if he votes against the wishes of his party.
It is in this regard that an appropriate meaning needs to be
given to the term disqualification.
60. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘disqualification’ is ‘to
officially stop someone from being in a competition or doing
something because they are not suitable, or they have done
something wrong’. However, under the Tenth Schedule this term
occupies a specific meaning wherein, a member is stopped from
continuing to be a member of a legislative body, if his actions fall
in one of the conditions provided under paragraph 2.
61. In order to analyze the case at hand, we need to briefly refer to
and understand the scheme of the Constitution with respect to
State Legislatures. Article 168 of the Constitution provides that
for every State there shall be a Governor and two Houses of
Legislature namely Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly
52
or where only one such Legislative House is there, then a
Legislative Assembly. Under Article 172 of the Constitution every
Legislative Assembly unless sooner dissolved shall continue for
five years from the date appointed for its first meeting. In order
to secure the membership of the State Legislature, such
members must comply and conform to three distinct
qualifications enlisted under Article 173.
62. Article 190(3) of the Constitution provides that the seat
belonging to a member of the Legislative Assembly becomes
vacant if such a member becomes subject to any disqualification
as mentioned in clause (1) or (2) of Article 191 of the
Constitution, or he resigns his seat by writing under his hand
addressed to the Speaker, and his resignation is accepted by the
Speaker in terms of the proviso to Article 190(3) of the
Constitution.
63. Article 191 provides for disqualification of a membership which
may be reduced as under:
“191. Disqualifications for membership.—
(1) A person shall be disqualified for being
chosen as, and for being, a member of the
Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council
of a State—
53
(a) if he holds any office of profit under the
Government of India or the Government of
any State specified in the First Schedule,
other than an office declared by the
Legislature of the State by law not to
disqualify its holder;
(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so
declared by a competent court;
(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent;
(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has
voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a
foreign State, or is under any
acknowledgment of allegiance or adherence
to a foreign State;
(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any
law made by Parliament.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this
clause, a person shall not be deemed to hold
an office of profit under the Government of
India or the Government of any State
specified in the First Schedule by reason
only that he is a Minister either for the
Union or for such State.
(2) A person shall be disqualified for being a
member of the Legislative Assembly or
Legislative Council of a State if he is so
disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.”
64. It is interesting to note that Article 191(1) of the Constitution
provides for disqualification of a person (a) for being chosen as
and (b) for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or the
Legislative Council if his actions or candidature attract the
grounds therein. We can therefore easily infer from the usage of
54
language under Article 191(1) that for disqualification such as
holding an office of profit, unsoundness of mind, insolvency,
etc., bars a person from continuing as a member as well as from
contesting elections. Article 191(2), on the other hand, bars a
person only “for being a member” of the Legislative Assembly or
the Legislative Council. This difference in phraseology would be
explained later when we consider the part of the order of the
Speaker which disqualified the present Petitioners for the rest of
the legislative term.
65. Article 192 of the Constitution provides that the Governor will be
the authority for determination of disqualification on the
grounds as contained under Article 191(1) of the Constitution.
In contrast, the decision as to disqualification on the ground as
contained in Article 191(2) of the Constitution vests exclusively
in the Speaker in terms of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule.
There is no dispute that provisions under Tenth Schedule are
relatable to disqualification as provided under Articles 102(2)
and 191(2) of the Constitution.
66. At this point we need to observe Article 164 (1B) and 361B of the
Constitution. Article 164(1B) of the Constitution reads as under:
55
“164. Other provisions as to Members
...
(1B). A member of the Legislative Assembly
of a State or either House of the Legislature
of a State having Legislative Council
belonging to any political party who is
disqualified for being a member of that
House under paragraph 2 of the Tenth
Schedule shall also be disqualified to be
appointed as a Minister under clause (1) for
duration of the period commencing from the
date of his disqualification till the date on
which the term of his office as such
member would expire or where he
contests any election to the Legislative
Assembly of a State or either House of
the Legislature of a State having
Legislative Council, as the case may be,
before the expiry of such period, till the
date on which he is declared elected,
whichever is earlier.”
Article 361B of the Constitution reads as under:
“361B. Disqualification for appointment
on remunerative political post.
A member of a house belonging to any
political party who is disqualified for being a
member of the House under paragraph 2 of
the Tenth Schedule shall also be disqualified
to hold any remunerative political post for
duration of the period commencing from
the date of his disqualification till the
date on which the term of his office as
such member would expire or till the date
on which he contests an election to a
56
House and is declared elected, whichever
is earlier.”
(emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provisions, it is clear that the
disqualification of a member, apart from the political taint,
results in two further restrictions as a means of punitive actions
against the members disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.
67. Having understood the meaning and ambit of disqualification,
we now need to concern ourselves with the extent of judicial
review of the order of the Speaker passed under the Tenth
Schedule.
68. Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule has an important bearing
upon extent of the judicial review in case of disqualification, and
the same is reproduced as under:
“6. Decision on questions as to
disqualification on ground of defection.—
(1) If any question arises as to whether a
member of a House has become subject to
disqualification under this Schedule, the
question shall be referred for the decision of
the Chairman or, as the case may be, the
Speaker of such House and his decision
shall be final:
Provided that where the question
which has arisen is as to whether the
Chairman or the Speaker of a House has
57
become subject to such disqualification, the
question shall be referred for the decision of
such member of the House as the House
may elect in this behalf and his decision
shall be final.
(2) All proceedings under subparagraph (1)
of this paragraph in relation to any question
as to disqualification of a member of a
House under this Schedule shall be deemed
to be proceedings in Parliament within the
meaning of Article 122 or, as the case may
be, proceedings in the Legislature of a State
within the meaning of Article 212.”
Disqualification is with respect to the status of being a member
of the House and can only be considered by the Speaker if such
question, through a petition, is addressed/ referred to the
Speaker. It is apparent from the reading of paragraph 6 of the
Tenth Schedule that the decision of the Speaker on
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is final.
69. However, the finality which is attached to the order of Speaker
cannot be meant to take away the power of this Court to review
the same. In the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) this Court
recognized the Speaker’s role as a tribunal and allowed judicial
review of the orders of the same on the grounds provided
therein. The Speaker, being a constitutional functionary, is
generally presumed to have adjudicated with highest traditions
58
of constitutionalism. In view of the same, a limited review was
allowed for the courts to adjudicate upon the orders passed by
the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule. Here, we need to
appreciate the difference in the meaning of the terms ‘final’ and
‘conclusive’, in the context that the order of the Speaker is final
but not conclusive and the same is amenable to judicial review.
70. Now we come to the principles that have been evolved by Courts
in deciding a challenge to the order passed by Speaker in
exercise of his powers under the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution. In the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) this Court,
while upholding the constitutionality of the Tenth Schedule of
the Constitution, held that the finality clause under paragraph
6(2) of the Tenth Schedule limits the scope of judicial review
available to an aggrieved person to certain limited grounds. This
Court, in this context, held that:
“109. In the light of the decisions referred
to above and the nature of function that is
exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under
Paragraph 6, the scope of judicial review
under Articles 136, and 226 and 227 of the
Constitution in respect of an order passed
by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph
6 would be confined to jurisdictional errors
only viz., infirmities based on violation
of constitutional mandate, mala fides,
59
noncompliance with rules of natural
justice and perversity.”
(emphasis supplied)
71. The Petitioners contend that the principles of natural justice
were breached when the Speaker provided for a threedays’
notice, in derogation of Rule 7(3)(b) of the Karnataka Legislative
Assembly (Disqualification of Members on Ground of Defection)
Rules, 1986, wherein a sevenday period is prescribed. On the
contrary, the Respondents have emphatically stressed on the
fact that there was adequate opportunity given to the
disqualified members to make out their case before the Speaker.
72. Principles of natural justice cannot be reduced into a
straitjacket formula. The yardstick of judging the compliance of
natural justice, depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case. In the case of R.S. Dass v. Union of India, (1986) Supp
SCC 617, this Court made following observations:
“25. It is well established that rules of
natural justice are not rigid rules, they
are flexible and their application depends
upon the setting and the background of
statutory provision, nature of the right
which may be affected and the
consequences which may entail, its
application depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case....”
60
(emphasis supplied)
73. This Court in the case of Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) held
that the Speaker decides the question as to the disqualification
in an adjudicatory disposition. This view received further
elaboration by this court in the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union
of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641 at page 653:
“20...An order of an authority exercising
judicial or quasijudicial functions passed
in violation of the principles of natural
justice is procedurally ultra vires and,
therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional
error. That is the reason why in spite of the
finality imparted to the decision of the
Speakers/Chairmen by paragraph 6(1) of
the Tenth Schedule such a decision is
subject to judicial review on the ground of
noncompliance with rules of natural
justice. But while applying the principles
of natural justice, it must be borne in
mind that “they are not immutable but
flexible” and they are not cast in a rigid
mould and they cannot be put in a legal
straitjacket. Whether the requirements of
natural justice have been complied with
or not has to be considered in the
context of the facts and circumstances of
a particular case.”
(emphasis supplied)
61
74. At this point, the Petitioners have placed reliance on the case of
Balachandra L. Jarkhiholi v. B. S. Yeddyurappa, (2011) 7
SCC 1 and argued that in that case, this Court had struck down
the disqualification order solely on the basis of the fact that only
three days’ notice was given to the members. However, it is
relevant to point out here, that in the Ravi S. Naik case (supra),
a disqualification order wherein the Speaker had granted two
days’ notice to the members was upheld. The question,
therefore, is not the number of days that were given by the
Speaker for answering the showcause notice, rather to see
whether an effective opportunity of hearing was provided. This
brings us back to the point already reiterated that the principle
of natural justice is not a straitjacket formula.
75. In this context, this aspect needs to be adjudicated in the
individual facts and circumstances having regard to the fact as
to whether the members received notice of hearing, the reason
for their absence and their representation before the Speaker.
Therefore, we will deal with the individual cases later, having
regard to the law laid down. [Refer to Chapter J]
62
76. The second contention raised by some of the Petitioners is that
the order of the Speaker was passed in violation of the
constitutional mandate. We are of the considered view that such
contention cannot be sustained.
77. The phrase “violation of constitutional mandate” speaks for itself
and does not need much elaboration. A “constitutional mandate”
can be understood as what is required under, or by, the
Constitution. For instance, in the Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble
Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184, the phrase
“constitutional mandate” is used in this sense:
“360...On a plain reading, Article 122(1)
prohibits "the validity of any proceedings in
Parliament" from being "called in question"
in a court merely on the ground of
"irregularity of procedure". In other words,
the procedural irregularities cannot be used
by the court to undo or vitiate what
happens within the four walls of the
legislature. But then, 'procedural
irregularity' stands in stark contrast to
'substantive illegality' which cannot be
found included in the former. We are of the
considered view that this specific provision
with regard to check on the role of the
judicial organ visàvis proceedings in
Parliament uses language which is neither
vague nor ambiguous and, therefore, must
be treated as the constitutional mandate
on the subject, rendering unnecessary
search for an answer elsewhere or
63
invocation of principles of harmonious
construction.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the context of the Tenth Schedule, and an order of
disqualification passed by the Speaker thereunder, the
“constitutional mandate” is therefore nothing but what is
constitutionally required of the Speaker. A “violation of
constitutional mandate” is merely an unconstitutional act of the
Speaker, one that cannot be defended on the touchstone of the
Tenth Schedule and the powers or duties of the Speaker therein
and is in contravention or violation of the same.
78. On the point of violation of constitutional mandate, although we
are of the opinion that there was an error committed by the
Speaker in deciding the disqualification petitions, the same does
not rise to a level which requires us to quash the disqualification
orders in their entirety. The specific error which we have
identified relates to the period of disqualification imposed by the
Speaker in the impugned orders. However, this error is
severable, and does not go to the root of the disqualification, and
thus does not require us to quash the disqualification orders in
toto. Our findings on this issue highlighted above are dealt with
in separate section of this judgment, for the sake of clarity.
64
79. The third contention of the Petitioners is that the orders of the
Speaker were passed with malafides, and therefore, the same
needs to be quashed. While there is no gainsaying that the
ground of malafides is available to an individual challenging the
order of the Speaker, the onus of proof regarding the same is on
the one who challenges the said action and has a very heavy
burden to discharge. [See E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3; Raja Ram Pal case (supra); SubCommittee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India,
(1991) 4 SCC 699]. In the present case, although the Petitioners
claimed that the Speaker acted malafide, they have neither
made any specific allegation, nor can it be said that they have
discharged the heavy burden that is required to prove that the
ground of malafide is made out.
80. The Petitioners have contended that the order of the Speaker is
perverse; however, they are not able to specifically point out any
such instance. “Perversity” has been understood by this Court in
a catena of judgments as relating to a situation where the
findings assailed before it have been arrived at on the basis of no
65
evidence, or thoroughly unreliable evidence, and no reasonable
person would act upon it.
81. Although, the learned Senior Counsel Dr. Rajeev Dhavan
contended that the “some material” test needs to be applied to
determine perversity. However, we are not expressing any
opinion on this issue as in the earlier case of Mayawati v.
Markandeya Chand, (1998) 7 SCC 517, a threeJudge Bench of
this Court expressed different views on the same. In our opinion,
the impugned orders of the Speaker can be sustained from the
challenge made on the ground of perversity as the Respondents
have been able to show that there was sufficient material
available before the Speaker to pass the impugned orders.
Further, on a consideration of the totality of the facts brought on
record before us, it cannot be held that the findings of the
Speaker are so unreasonable or unconscionable that no tribunal
could have arrived at the same findings. Additionally, it may be
noticed that the counsel for the Petitioners did not even
controvert before us, the material relied upon by the Speaker. In
view of the above, the Petitioners failed to show any illegality in
the orders of the Speaker.
66
82. Before we conclude we need to refer to Griffith and Ryle
on Parliament Functions, Practice and Procedure (1989
edn., p. 119) say:
“Loyalty to party is the norm, being
based on shared beliefs. A divided party
is looked on with suspicion by the
electorate. It is natural for Members to
accept the opinion of their Leaders and
Spokesmen on the wide variety of
matters on which those Members have no
specialist knowledge. Generally Members
will accept majority decisions in the party
even when they disagree. It is
understandable therefore that a Member
who rejects the party whip even on a single
occasion will attract attention and more
criticism than sympathy. To abstain from
voting when required by party to vote is
to suggest a degree of unreliability. To
vote against party is disloyalty. To join
with others in abstention or voting with
the other side of conspiracy.”
(emphasis supplied)
83. There is no gainsaying that the scope of judicial review is limited
to only grounds elaborated under the Kihoto Hollohan case
(supra). In this regard, the Petitioners have not been able to
establish any illegality in the orders passed by the Speaker. The
Speaker, in our view, had concluded based on material and
evidence that the members have voluntarily given up their
67
membership of the party, thereby accruing disqualification in
terms of the Tenth Schedule, which facts cannot be reviewed
and evaluated by this Court in these writ petitions. So, we have
to accept the orders of the Speaker to the extent of
disqualification.
H.POWER OF THE SPEAKER TO DIRECT
DISQUALIFICATION TILL THE EXPIRY OF THE TERM
84. The Petitioners have submitted that the Speaker, through the
disqualification orders, has prohibited them from contesting
elections and becoming members of the House for the remaining
duration of the 15th Legislative Assembly of Karnataka.
85. The impugned disqualification orders not only disqualify the
Petitioners, but also indicated the time period for which they
would be disqualified, viz., from the date of the order till the
expiry of the term of the 15th Legislative Assembly of Karnataka.
86. Learned counsel for the Petitioners have specifically challenged
this finding by asserting that the Speaker did not have the
jurisdiction. They contended that the Speaker’s orders have the
effect of disqualifying them from contesting elections and “being
68
chosen” as members. Learned Senior Counsel asserted that the
Constitutional provisions, particularly Articles 361B and
164(1B) of the Constitution, clarify that the disqualification of a
member under the Tenth Schedule does not bar him from
contesting elections, and on a member being reelected the bar
under the two Articles comes to an end.
87. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, defended the orders of
the Speaker barring the disqualified members till the end of the
term of the Legislative Assembly. He contended that the Speaker
was within his jurisdiction, as the master of the House, to
punish the members for having indulged in antiparty activities.
While the learned Senior Counsel was unable to point to any
specific provision in the Constitution allowing the same, he
submitted that the Speaker has the inherent power to maintain
the integrity and decorum of the House. The learned Senior
Counsel gave the example of the power of the Speaker to take
action against a member who commits a crime in the well of the
House, despite the absence of any specific provision allowing
him to do the same. The learned Senior Counsel lastly submitted
that unless the Speaker had such a power, the antidefection
69
law would be a toothless law and that constitutional morality
requires such interpretation.
88. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Election Commission of India submitted that as a matter of
practice, the Election Commission has always allowed a person
disqualified under the Tenth Schedule to participate in the next
election. The learned Senior Counsel substantiated his position
by indicating from the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution that the Speaker has only been given a limited
jurisdiction therein, that is, to decide on the question of
disqualification. The consequences of the same, however, are
separately provided for under the Constitution, and the Speaker
does not have the power to decide the same. The learned Senior
Counsel also took us through the phrasing of Article 191 of the
Constitution, which provides for disqualification, and Section 36
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to indicate that
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is not included in the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 as a ground for rejecting
the nomination of a candidate. Finally, the learned Senior
Counsel submitted that barring someone from contesting
elections is a very serious penal power which cannot be resorted
70
to by the Speaker in absence of an express and specific
provision of law.
89. The crucial question which arises is whether the power of the
Speaker extends to specifically disqualifying the members till the
end of the term?
90. The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution while dealing with
disqualification on account of defection, does not specify the
consequences or period of such disqualification. In fact, the
vacancy which results from the disqualification is provided
under Article 190(3) of the Constitution. The scope of the
Speaker’s powers on disqualification requires us to examine the
other provisions of the Constitution and relevant statutory
provisions.
91. Article 191 of the Constitution provides for disqualification from
the membership of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative
Council of a State generally. Article 191(1) of the Constitution is
a general provision providing for the disqualification from the
membership of the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative
Council of a State on the grounds mentioned therein. Article
191(2) of the Constitution specifically provides that a person
disqualified under the Tenth Schedule is disqualified for being a
71
member. It is relevant to note that Article 191(2) of the
Constitution, like the Tenth Schedule, does not provide that the
“disqualification” is to operate for a particular period or
duration.
92. The contrast in phraseology between Article 191(1) and Article
191(2) of the Constitution is crucial for deciding the present
controversy. Article 191(1) of the Constitution provides that a
person disqualified under any one of the clauses of Article 191(1)
is disqualified both “for being chosen as” and “for being” a
member of the house. In contrast, Article 191(2) only uses the
phrase “for being a member”, which is the language used in
paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule. The exclusion of the phrase
“for being chosen as” a member in Article 191(2) of the
Constitution suggests that the disqualification under the Tenth
Schedule is qualitatively and constitutionally different from the
other types of disqualification that are provided for under Article
191(1) of the Constitution. The phrase “for being chosen as” has
a specific connotation, meaning that a person cannot become a
member of the House, if suffering from a disqualification under
Article 191(1) of the Constitution. At the same time, the absence
of these words in Article 191(2) of the Constitution suggests that
72
a person who is no longer a member due to disqualification
under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution does not suffer
from the additional infirmity of not being allowed to become a
member subsequently. Therefore, such a person is not barred
from contesting elections.
93. This interpretation is further supported by the language
employed in Section 36(2) of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951, which provides for when a returning officer may reject
the nomination of a candidate. Section 36(2)(a), of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 states that the
nomination may be rejected if a candidate is disqualified “for
being chosen” to fill the seat under Article 191 of the
Constitution, echoing the language employed in Article 191(1),
and not Article 191(2) of the Constitution.
94. Apart from the above, Articles 164(1B) and 361B of the
Constitution, which were inserted by the 91st Constitutional
Amendment, also show that disqualification under the Tenth
Schedule does not bar a person from contesting elections. Both
the above constitutional provisions specifically indicate the outer
period for which the consequences indicated therein would
extend, which is, either till the end of the term or till the
73
disqualified member is elected, whichever is earlier. The fact that
the phrase “whichever is earlier” is used in both these
provisions, indicates that the Constitution contemplates a
situation where an election takes place prior to the end of the
term of the House. Further, the term “election” as used in the
above provisions has not been constrained by any other word,
which strengthens the view that a member who has been
disqualified under the Tenth Schedule is not barred from
contesting elections.
95. Parliament by way of an enactment under Article 191(1)(e) read
with Entry 72 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule can
make a law providing for disqualifications of persons from
contesting elections. It is in exercise of this power that the
Parliament enacted The Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The Preamble to the aforementioned Act makes it evident that it
was enacted for the purpose of “providing qualifications and
disqualifications for membership” to the Houses of Legislature.
“An Act to provide for the conduct of
elections to the Houses of Parliament and to
the House or Houses of the Legislature of
each State, the qualifications and
disqualifications for membership of
those Houses, the corrupt practices and
other offences at or in connection with such
74
elections and the decision of doubts and
disputes arising out of or in connection with
such elections.”
(emphasis supplied)
96. Chapter II of Part II of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 provides for the qualification for membership of the State
Legislature while Chapter III vide Sections 7 to 11 provides for
disqualification for membership of the Legislature. These
sections not only provide for the event of disqualification, but
also provide for the specific periods for which such
disqualification shall operate. For instance, under Section 8 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, different periods of
disqualification are provided depending on the specific offence
an individual is convicted under.
97. However, the provisions do not provide for and deal with
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. Clearly, Section 36 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 also does not
contemplate such disqualification. Therefore, neither under the
Constitution nor under the statutory scheme is it contemplated
that disqualification under the Tenth Schedule would operate as
a bar for contesting reelections. The language of clauses (1) and
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(2) of Article 191, Articles 164(1B) and 361B are contrary to the
contention of the Respondents.
98. Given this position, we conclude that the Speaker does not have
any explicit power to specify the period of disqualification under
the Tenth Schedule or bar a member from contesting elections
after disqualification until the end of the term of the Legislative
Assembly.
99. It is necessary for us to look at the submission of the learned
Senior Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, that the Speaker can still be
said to have inherent powers which allows him to pass
restrictions like the one impugned herein. On this point, the
counsel for the Petitioners argued that such a broad inherent
power does not exist with the Speaker. He contended that even
for granting leave of absence, the Speaker is required to present
the same before the Legislative Assembly, which needs to accept
the leave application before leave of absence is actually granted.
100. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, that the power of the Speaker to bar a
disqualified member from contesting reelection is inherent to
his role and is required to be read into the Constitution to
prevent the Speaker from becoming toothless. When the express
76
provisions of the Constitution provide for a specific eventuality,
it is not appropriate to read an “inherent” power to confer
additional penal consequences. To do so, and accept the
contention of the respondents, would be against the express
provisions of the Constitution.
101. This Court has repeatedly held that a person cannot be barred
from contesting elections if he is otherwise qualified to contest
the same. This legal position is vividly illustrated by the
Constitution Bench ruling in G. Narayanaswami v. G.
Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717. In dealing with the question
as to whether a nongraduate was qualified to be a candidate for
the graduate constituency for the Legislative Council, when such
a requirement was not prescribed either by the Constitution or
the Parliament, this Court reversed the judgment of the Madras
High Court which required the candidate to be a graduate. This
Court held that when the law does not require such a
qualification, it cannot be imposed by the Courts, and observed
that:
“20. We think that the language as well as
the legislative history of Articles 171 and
173 of the Constitution and Section 6 of the
Representation of People Act, 1951, enable
77
us to presume a deliberate omission of the
qualification that the representative of the
graduates should also be a graduate. In our
opinion, no absurdity results if we presume
such an intention. We cannot infer as the
learned Judge of the Madras High Court
had done, from the mere fact of such an
omission and opinions about a supposed
scheme of “functional representation”
underlying Article 171 of our Constitution,
that the omission was either unintentional
or that it led to absurd results. We think
that, by adding a condition to be
necessary or implied qualifications of a
representative of the graduates which the
Constitutionmakers, or, in any event the
Parliament, could have easily imposed,
the learned Judge had really invaded the
legislative sphere. The defect, if any, in
the law could be removed only by law
made by Parliament.
(emphasis supplied)
102. Similarly in the case of N.S. Vardachari v. G. Vasantha Pai,
(1972) 2 SCC 594, a threejudge bench of this Court reiterated
the above position, and held that once a candidate possesses the
qualifications and is not subject to any of the disqualifications
specified in the law, he is qualified to be a candidate and any
other consideration becomes irrelevant. The Court held that:
“18. The Representation of the People Act,
1950 prescribes qualifications for being
enrolled as an elector. Sections 8 to 10A of
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the Act set out the grounds which disqualify a
person from being a candidate. If a person
possesses all the qualifications prescribed in
the Constitution as well as in the Act and has
not incurred any of the disqualifications
mentioned therein then he is qualified to be a
candidate. It may look anomalous that a nongraduate should be a candidate in a
Graduates' constituency. But if a candidate
possesses the qualifications prescribed and
has not incurred any of the
disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution or in the Act other
consideration becomes irrelevant. That is
the ratio of the decision of this Court
in Narayanaswamy case.”
(emphasis supplied)
103. It is clear that nothing can be added to the grounds of
disqualification based on convenience, equity, logic or perceived
political intentions.
104. It is the contention of the Respondents that the Court should
consider desirability of having a stricter model of disqualification
wherein a person who has jumped the party lines should not be
encouraged and should be punished with severe penal
consequences for attempting to do so. Further, learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, has termed the actions of the
Petitioners as a constitutional sin.
79
105. We do not subscribe to such an extreme stand taken by the
learned Senior Counsel, considering the fact that such extreme
stand could have a chilling effect on legitimate dissent. In any
case, such a change in the policy cannot be looked into by this
Court, as the same squarely falls within the legislative forte. Any
attempt to interfere is better termed as reconstruction, which
falls beyond the scope of legal interpretation by the Courts. [refer
to G. Narayanaswami case (supra)]
106. It is clear that the power to prescribe qualifications and
disqualifications for membership to the State Legislature must
be specifically provided for under the Constitution or by the
Parliament by enacting a law. Since neither the Constitution nor
any Act provides for defection to another party as a bar from
contesting further elections, reading such a bar into the
nebulous concept of the inherent powers of the Speaker is
impermissible and invalid. Without commenting on whether the
Speaker has inherent powers or not, a Constitution Bench of
this Court in the Raja Ram Pal case (supra), while holding that
certain unwritten powers inure with the Parliament under
Article 105(3) of the Constitution, went on to observe even in
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case of expulsion, the expelled candidate is not barred from
contesting reelection.
107. Viewed from a different angle, although the Constitution may
not say everything, this Court is mandated to expound the
unsaid. However, such elaboration cannot be done in derogation
of separation of powers and in a drastic or radical fashion. In
this context, Benjamin Constant, a prominent SwissFrench
political writer, wrote in 1814 that:
“Constitutions are seldom made by the will
of men. Time makes them. They are
introduced gradually and in an almost
imperceptible way. Yet there are
circumstances in which it is
indispensable to make a constitution.
But then do only what is indispensable.
Leave room for time and experience, so
that these two reforming powers may
direct your already constituted powers in
the improvement of what is done and the
completion of what is still to be done.”
(emphasis supplied)
108. The contention of the Respondents that the political exigencies
required such measures to be taken needs to be rejected. The
Constitutional silences cannot be used to introduce changes of
such nature.
109. In Kihoto Hollohan (supra), this Court observed:
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48. The learned author, referring to cases in
which an elected Member is seriously
unrepresentative of the general constituency
opinion, or whose personal behaviour falls
below standards acceptable to his constituents
commends that what is needed is some
additional device to ensure that a Member
pays heed to constituents' views. Brazier
speaks of the efficacy of the device where the
constituency can recall its representative.
Brazier says: [Ibid. at 52, 53]
“What sort of conduct might attract the
operation of the recall power? First, a
Member might have misused his
Membership of the House, for example
to further his personal financial
interests in a manner offensive to his
constituents. They might consider
that the action taken against him by
the House (or, indeed, lack of action)
was inadequate …. Thirdly, the use
of a recall power might be
particularly apt when a Member
changed his party but declined to
resign his seat and fight an
immediate byelection. It is not
unreasonable to expect a Member
who crosses the floor of the House,
or who joins a new party, to
resubmit himself quickly to the
electors who had returned him in
different colours. Of course, in all
those three areas of controversial
conduct the ordinary process of
reselection might well result in the
Member being dropped as his party's
candidate (and obviously would
definitely have that result in the third
case). But that could only occur when
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the time for reselection came; and in
any event the constituency would still
have the Member representing them
until the next general election. A
cleaner and more timely parting of
the ways would be preferable.
Sometimes a suspended sentence
does not meet the case.”
49. Indeed, in a sense an antidefection law
is a statutory variant of its moral principle
and justification underlying the power of
recall. What might justify a provision for
recall would justify a provision for
disqualification for defection. Unprincipled
defection is a political and social evil...
(emphasis supplied)
110. From the above, it is clear that the Speaker, in exercise of his
powers under the Tenth Schedule, does not have the power to
either indicate the period for which a person is disqualified, nor
to bar someone from contesting elections. We must be careful to
remember that the desirability of a particular rule or law, should
not in any event be confused with the question of existence of
the same, and constitutional morality should never be replaced
by political morality, in deciding what the Constitution
mandates. [refer to Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992
Supp (3) SCC 217]
83
111. We, therefore, hold that part of the impugned orders passed by
the Speaker which specifies that the disqualification will last
from the date of the order to the expiry of the term of the 15th
Legislative Assembly of Karnataka to be ultra vires the
constitutional mandate, and strike down this portion of the
disqualification orders. However, this does not go to the root of
the order, and as such, does not affect the aspect of legality of
the disqualification orders.
112. Before parting, having ascertained the ambit of the Speaker’s
power, the only regret this bench has, is with respect to the
conduct and the manner in which all the constitutional
functionaries have acted in the current scenario. Being a
constitutional functionary, the Constitution requires them and
their actions to uphold constitutionalism and constitutional
morality. In this regard, a functionary is expected to not be
vacillated by the prevailing political morality and pressures. In
order to uphold the Constitution, we need to have men and
women who will make a good Constitution such as ours, better.
In this regard, Dr. Ambedkar on 25.11.1949 stated that:
… ‘As much defence as could be offered to
the Constitution has been offered by my
friends Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and
84
Mr T.T. Krishnamachari. I shall not
therefore enter into the merits of the
Constitution. Because I feel, however good
a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn
out bad because those who are called to
work it, happen to be a bad lot. However
bad a Constitution may be, it may turn
out to be good if those who are called to
work it, happen to be a good lot. The
working of a Constitution does not depend
wholly upon the nature of the Constitution.
The Constitution can provide only the
organs of State such as the Legislature, the
Executive and the Judiciary. The factors
on which the working of those organs of
the State depend are the people and the
political parties they will set up as their
instruments to carry out their wishes and
their politics. Who can say how the people
of India and their parties will behave? Will
they uphold constitutional methods of
achieving their purposes or will they prefer
revolutionary methods of achieving them? If
they adopt the revolutionary methods,
however good the Constitution may be, it
requires no prophet to say that it will fail. It
is, therefore, futile to pass any judgment
upon the Constitution without reference to
the part which the people and their parties
are likely to play.’
(emphasis supplied)
113. Dr. Rajendra Prasad reiterated the same on 26.11.1949, in the
following words:
… ‘Whatever the Constitution may or
may not provide, the welfare of the
country will depend upon the way in
85
which the country is administered. That
will depend upon the men who
administer it. It is a trite saying that a
country can have only the Government it
deserves. Our Constitution has provisions
in it which appear to some to be
objectionable from one point or another. We
must admit that the defects are inherent in
the situation in the country and the people
at large. If the people who are elected are
capable and men of character and
integrity, they would be able to make the
best even of a defective Constitution. If
they are lacking in these, the
Constitution cannot help the country.
After all, a Constitution like a machine is a
lifeless thing. It acquires life because of the
men who control it and operate it, and India
needs today nothing more than a set of
honest men who will have the interest of the
country before them.’
(emphasis supplied)
114. In view of the same, we can only point out that merely taking the
oath to protect and uphold the Constitution may not be
sufficient, rather imbibing the Constitutional values in everyday
functioning is required and expected by the glorious document
that is our Constitution. Having come to conclusion that the
Speaker has no power under the Constitution to disqualify the
members till the end of the term, we are constrained to make
certain observations.
86
115. In the end we need to note that the Speaker, being a neutral
person, is expected to act independently while conducting the
proceedings of the house or adjudication of any petitions. The
constitutional responsibility endowed upon him has to be
scrupulously followed. His political affiliations cannot come in
the way of adjudication. If Speaker is not able to disassociate
from his political party and behaves contrary to the spirit of the
neutrality and independence, such person does not deserve to
be reposed with public trust and confidence.
116. In any case, there is a growing trend of Speakers acting against
the constitutional duty of being neutral. Additionally, political
parties are indulging in horse trading and corrupt practices, due
to which the citizens are denied of stable governments. In these
circumstances, the Parliament is required to reconsider
strengthening certain aspects of the Tenth Schedule, so that
such undemocratic practices are discouraged.
I. REFERENCE TO CONSTITUTION BENCH
117. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel, has contended that the
matters herein involve substantial questions of law, which
require a reference to a larger bench. To support his argument,
87
he has referred to Article 145 (3) of the Constitution to state that
this Court is mandated under law to refer the matters to a larger
bench since a substantial question of law concerning the
interpretation of the Constitution has arisen in the instant case.
118. At this juncture, it may be beneficial to quote Article 145(3) of
the Constitution:
“145. Rules of Court, etc.
...
(3)The minimum number of Judges who are
to sit for the purpose of deciding any case
involving a substantial question of law as to
the interpretation of this Constitution or for
the purpose of hearing any reference under
Article 143 shall be five:
Provided that, where the Court hearing an
appeal under any of the provisions of this
Chapter other than Article 132 consists of
less than five Judges and in the course of
the hearing of the appeal the Court is
satisfied that the appeal involves a
substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of this Constitution the
determination of which is necessary for the
disposal of the appeal, such Court shall
refer the question for opinion to a Court
constituted as required by this clause for
the purpose of deciding any case involving
such a question and shall on receipt of the
opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity
with such opinion.”
88
119. There is no doubt that the requirements under Article 145(3) of
the Constitution have never been dealt with extensively and,
more often than not, have received mere lip service, wherein this
Court has found existence of case laws which have already dealt
with the proposition involved, and have rejected such references.
Normatively, this trend requires consideration in appropriate
cases, to ensure that unmeritorious references do not
unnecessarily consume precious judicial time in the Supreme
Court.
120. In any case, we feel that there is a requirement to provide a
preliminary analysis with respect to the interpretation of this
provision. In this context, we need to keep in mind two
important phrases occurring in Article 145(3) of the
Constitution, which are, ‘substantial question of law’ and
‘interpretation of the Constitution’. By reading the aforesaid
provision, two conditions can be culled out before a reference is
made:
i. The Court is satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of
this Constitution;
ii. The determination of which is necessary for the disposal
of the case.
89
121. We may state that we are not persuaded for referring the present
case to a larger bench as the mandate of the aforesaid Article is
that this Court needs to be satisfied as to the existence of a
substantial question of law on the Constitutional interpretation.
However, this does not mean that every case of constitutional
interpretation should be compulsorily referred to a
Constitutional Bench.
122. Any question of law of general importance arising incidentally, or
any ancillary question of law having no significance to the final
outcome, cannot be considered as a substantial question of law.
The existence of substantial question of law does not weigh on
the stakes involved in the case, rather, it depends on the impact
the question of law will have on the final determination. If the
questions having a determining effect on the final outcome have
already been decided by a conclusive authority, then such
questions cannot be called as “substantial questions of law”. In
any case, no substantial question of law exists in the present
matter, which needs reference to a larger bench. The cardinal
need is to achieve a judicial balance between the crucial
90
obligation to render justice and the compelling necessity of
avoiding prolongation of any lis.
123. Similar questions for reference to a larger bench had arisen in
the case of Abdul Rahim Ismail C. Rahimtoola v. State of
Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 1315, wherein this Court rejected the
reference as the questions sought to be referred were already
settled by an earlier five judge bench. Likewise, this Court in the
case of Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682, held that a substantial
question of interpretation of a provision of the Constitution
cannot arise when the law on the subject has been finally and
effectively decided by this Court. The same is provided
hereunder:
“11... Learned counsel suggests that the
question raised involves the interpretation
of a provision of the Constitution and
therefore the appeal of this accused will
have to be referred to a Bench consisting of
not less than 5 Judges. Under Article 145(3)
of the Constitution only a case involving a
substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution shall be
heard by a bench comprising not less than
5 Judges. This Court held in State of
Jammu and Kashmir v. Thakur Ganga
Singh, AIR 1960 SC 356 that a substantial
question of interpretation of a provision
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of the Constitution cannot arise when
the law on the subject has been finally
and effectively decided by this
Court…..As the question raised has already
been decided by this Court, what remains is
only the application of the principle laid
down to the facts of the present case. We
cannot, therefore, hold that the question
raised involves a substantial question of law
as to the interpretation of the Constitution
within the meaning Article 145(3) of the
Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
This Court sitting in a three Judge Bench in People's Union for
Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399, has
reiterated the above principle.
124. In light of the above pronouncements, we observe that question
of constitutional interpretation would arise only if two or more
possible constructions are sought to be placed on a provision. In
spite of the assertive arguments made by the learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, we are guided by the decisions
rendered by two Constitutional Bench decisions of this Court in
the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) and Rajendra Singh Rana
case (supra). These decisions form the authoritative framework
for understanding the Tenth Schedule and have been followed in
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a number of subsequent judgments and do not require
reconsideration.
125. At the cost of repetition, we may note that the ambit of this
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution is well
settled, which does not merit any further reference in this
regard. The Respondents have contended that the
disqualification issue cannot be dealt under the writ jurisdiction,
however, we have already pointed out that there is no bar for
this Court to deal with the same as portrayed by various
precedents cited above.
126. The case mostly turns on the fact that there is ample evidence to
portray that the defection of these Petitioners had occurred even
before they resigned. In the impugned orders, the Speaker has
made out a case that the acts of the Petitioners indicated
“voluntary giving up of membership”. Therefore, the question as
to the jurisdiction of the Speaker to deal with disqualification
after the members have tendered the resignation does not arise,
stricto sensu. In view of the aforesaid factual scenario, there is
no requirement to deal with the questions of law raised by the
Respondents.
93
127. Further, the power of the Speaker to disqualify has been
interpreted in a number of cases, and the present case does not
require any broadbased reference which would only prolong the
inevitable. Such casual and cavalier references should not be
undertaken by this Court in view of conditions prescribed under
Article 145(3) of the Constitution, which mandates a
responsibility upon this Court not to indulge in excessive
academic endeavors and preserve precious judicial time, and
effectively dispense justice in a timely fashion.
128. The last aspect, which relates to the power of the Speaker to
disqualify the members till the end of the term, has already been
dealt with extensively. At the cost of repetition, we may only
point out that the Respondents’ contention that a bar exists on
the members till the end of the term, falls within the domain of
the legislature. Therefore, we do not see any merit in referring
the aforesaid case to a larger bench. [Refer to Public Interest
Foundation v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 224]
129. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we decline to refer the case
to a larger bench considering that there is no substantial
question of constitutional interpretation that arises in this case.
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J. INDIVIDUAL CASES
W.P. (C) NO. 992 OF 2019
130. The Petitioner (Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil) accepts that he was
elected on the ticket of INC and claims that he proceeded to
Chennai for personal reasons without abstaining from his
presence in the ongoing Assembly Session. Admittedly, the
Petitioner had abstained from attending the proceedings in the
Assembly on 18.07.2019 and 19.07.2019. Pursuant to the same,
the disqualification petition was filed against him on 20.07.2019
and he was further directed to appear for hearing on
24.07.2019. Subsequently, the Petitioner had written a letter
dated 23.07.2019 addressing the Speaker and seeking four
weeks’ time to file appropriate reply to the contents of the
petition. Nevertheless, the Hon’ble Speaker proceeded and
passed the disqualification order on 28.07.2019 which has been
impugned in the instant petition.
131. It ought to be noted that the impugned order passed by the
Hon’ble Speaker, refers to the communication/letters addressed
by the petitioner of having gone to Chennai, but due to
discomfort and health reasons had contacted his doctor friend
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and accordingly proceeded to Mumbai where he was admitted. It
also records that the petitioner had attended the Assembly
sessions on 12.07.2019 and 15.07.2019 but thereafter had
abstained from attending the session on 22.07.2019 for which
whip had been issued on 20.07.2019. It was also admitted that
no formal leave was granted to the Petitioner. The Speaker had
earlier rejected the leave of absence tendered by the Petitioner as
the documents issued by the private hospital did not inspire
confidence. Pertinently, the petitioner’s letter dated 19.07.2019
written to the Speaker was not countersigned by any doctors of
the Hospital.
132. It is further recorded that the petitioner had not attended the
Assembly sessions on 18.07.2019, 19.07.2019, 22.07.2019 and
23.07.2019. So, the petitioner was aware that the motion
seeking the vote of confidence was on the floor of the Karnataka
Legislative Assembly. The petitioner accepts that he had sent
letter dated 23.07.2019, which refers to the disqualification
petition. The petitioner herein was clearly aware of the
disqualification proceedings.
133. The objections filed to the writ petition also refer to the fact that
the INC, to test the loyalty of its Members, in view of the pending
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trust vote, had categorically informed the party members not to
absent themselves from the proceedings of the Assembly, failing
which action under the Tenth Schedule would be taken.
134. We do not think that the order of the Speaker suffers from
perversity. Even the petitioner has not submitted material to
controvert the findings recorded by the Speaker in the impugned
order. With regard to the assertion that there was violation of
principles of natural justice would not also stand in view of the
fact that the Speaker has taken a holistic view and gave sound
reasons to disqualify the petitioner after providing him sufficient
opportunity to defend himself. Alleged violation of principles of
natural justice also do not carry any weight in view of the factual
background of the case read in light of the fact that trust vote
had to be voted upon.
W. P. (C) NO. 997 OF 2019
135. The Petitioners were elected to the 15th Karnataka Legislative
Assembly on the INC ticket. On 19.01.2019, showcause notices
were issued to the Petitioners by INC for having failed to attend
the party meeting on 18.01.2019, to which explanation was
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submitted by the Petitioners claiming that due to personal
exigencies and medical reasons they could not attend the
meeting. However, the Petitioners again failed to attend the
meeting held on 08.02.2019. The Petitioners also did not attend
the Budget session. On 08.02.2019, the Petitioner No.1 (Ramesh
Jarkhiholi) sought leave of absence in a letter addressed to the
Speaker, due to his daughter’s wedding fixed for 24.02.2019.
Similarly, the Petitioner No. 2 (Mahesh Kumathalli) had also
addressed a letter seeking leave of absence due to illhealth.
disqualification petition was filed against the two Petitioners on
11.02.2019 on the ground that the Petitioners had voluntarily
given up membership of the political party, i.e. INC and incurred
disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule.
Thereupon, notices were issued to the Petitioners on
14.02.2019, who duly filed their response disputing the contents
of the disqualification petition on 20.02.2019. While the
disqualification petition was pending, the two Petitioners
submitted their resignation to the Speaker along with ten other
MLAs belonging to INC/JD(S) on 06.07.2019. The Petitioners
were thereupon given notice to appear before the Speaker on
11.07.2019 in connection with the disqualification petition.
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136. The Speaker in the impugned order has taken note of the
surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the
Petitioners from February 2019 onwards. It ought to be noted
that sufficient opportunity of hearing was accorded to the
Petitioners herein who had also filed their responses. It ought to
be noted that, vide notice dated 16.01.2019, a meeting of the
INC legislative party was called for 18.01.2019. The notice stated
that the members must compulsorily attend the meeting
otherwise action would be taken against them under the Tenth
Schedule. The Petitioners did not attend the party meeting on
18.01.2019. Admittedly, the Petitioners also refrained from
attending the subsequent general body meeting dated
06.02.2019 as well as Assembly Sessions from 06.02.2019. The
resignations were submitted by the Petitioners nearly four
months after the Disqualification Petition had already been filed.
137. One of the contentions raised by the Petitioners is predicated on
the order of the Speaker in the case of Dr. Umesh Yadav who
was also named and served with the disqualification petition
filed on 11.02.2019. Dr. Umesh Yadav had tendered his
resignation on 04.03.2019, which was accepted by the Speaker
99
on 01.04.2019. Therefore, the Petitioners claim parity and equal
treatment. The contention deserves to be rejected as the Speaker
has given detailed reasons to why he was not bound by the case
of Dr. Umesh Yadav’s resignation.
138. As observed earlier, the Speaker had sufficient material before
him to pass the order of disqualification. There exist no
infirmities in the order, which calls for our indulgence and
interference.
W.P. (C) NOS. 998, 1000, 1001, 1005, 1006 AND 1007 OF
2019
139. The three Petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 1005 of 2019 were
members of the JD(S), against whom a separate Disqualification
Petition No. 5 of 2019 was moved. The Speaker passed a
separate impugned order dated 28.07.2019 against these
Petitioners.
140. Petitioners in Writ Petition (C) Nos. 998, 1000, 1001, 1006 and
1007 of 2019 were all members of the INC, against whom
Disqualification Petition Nos. 3 and 4 of 2019 were moved. A
common order dated 28.07.2019, disqualifying the 10
Petitioners, was passed by the Speaker.
100
141. Both the above orders are being dealt with together as there are
certain commonalities in the facts and circumstances which
need to be noted and highlighted, which led to the decision of
the Speaker. Between 01.07.2019 and 11.07.2019, the
Petitioners resigned from their posts as members of the
Legislative Assembly. However, the Speaker did not adjudicate
upon their resignation. Aggrieved by the fact that the Speaker
was not taking a decision, ten Petitioners approached this Court
in WP (C) No. 872 of 2019, wherein this Court on 11.07.2019,
passed an order directing the Speaker to take the decision
forthwith. The Speaker, on the other hand, did not take the
decision. The other five Petitioners impleaded themselves in the
pending Writ Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019 and again, on
17.07.2019, this Court granted protection to the Petitioners with
respect to being compelled to participate in the proceedings of
the House. As the Speaker, did not conduct the floor test, R.
Shankar [Petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No. 1003 of 2019]
approached this Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 929 of 2019,
wherein this Court passed following order on 23.07.2019:
“It has been stated that the Speaker expects
and is optimistic that the Trust Vote would
101
be taken up by the House in the Course of
the day, perhaps later in the evening. We,
therefore, adjourn the matter till tomorrow.
142. In this regard, it was imperative for the Speaker to pass orders
in view of the urgency indicated by this Court. In these facts and
circumstances, the reasonable opportunity of hearing needs to
be assessed.
143. A notice of three days with an opportunity for hearing would
have been sufficient in the facts and circumstances of this case,
when viewed in light of the decision in the Ravi S Naik case
(supra). In this regard, our attention was drawn to the fact that
notices were sent to their emails, and their permanent addresses
within their constituency. In view of the unique facts, it cannot
be said that an opportunity was not provided to the Petitioners
to appear before the Speaker.
144. It is altogether a different matter that the aforesaid Petitioners
were in Mumbai even though they were aware of the notice, and
some of them did not even bother to be represented before the
Speaker. In this light, we cannot say that effective opportunity
was not granted to the Petitioners. Consequently, it cannot be
102
said as well that there has been a violation of principles of
natural justice as against the aforesaid Petitioners.
W.P. (C) NO. 1003 OF 2019
145. The Petitioner (R. Shankar) claims that he is the sole elected
member of the House belonging to KPJP. As per the Petitioner,
KPJP had not merged with INC and consequently whip issued by
the INC on 11.07.2019 was not binding on the Petitioner. As a
result, the Petitioner had not incurred any disqualification under
the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
146. The Petitioner, however, accepts that he had addressed a letter
dated 14.06.2019 to the Speaker that he was the only legislator
elected under the KPJP ticket and he had agreed to merge his
party with the INC. The Petitioner had relied upon paragraph
4(2) of the Tenth Schedule stating that since he is the sole
elected member of his party there is a deemed merger under the
Tenth Schedule.
147. The Petitioner, however, claims that the said letter dated
14.06.2019 was not accepted by the Speaker and, therefore,
would be inconsequential. He relied upon the letter dated
17.06.2019 written by the Speaker requiring him to file on
record resolution of merger passed by KPJP, and to furnish
103
documents as per legal requirements. It was further stated that
is stated that no such document was filed.
148. The impugned order passed by the Speaker, on the other hand,
refers to the letter of the Speaker dated 25.06.2019 stating that
in terms of paragraph 4(2) of the Tenth Schedule, if two thirds of
the members of the party decides to merge with another party,
that decision would not attract provisions of the Tenth Schedule.
As the Petitioner had represented that he was the lone elected
member of the KPJP and had decided to merge with INC,
appropriate steps had been initiated. In this background, with
effect from 25.06.2019, the Petitioner would be considered as a
member of the INC legislative party. The Petitioner has disputed
this letter and has stated that this letter was not addressed to
him but was addressed to the Leader of the Congress Legislature
Party and the President of the Karnataka Pradesh Congress
Party. The letter dated 25.06.2019 is available on the file of the
Speaker.
149. The contention of the Petitioner may have carried weight in other
circumstances, but we find that it is an accepted and admitted
position that the Petitioner, after giving letter dated 14.06.2019,
had even become a Minister in the Government then in power.
104
Pertinently, the Petitioner does not deny the letter dated
14.06.2019 and the fact that he had become a Minister. The
impugned order passed by the Speaker further records that on
25.06.2019 a direction had been issued by the Speaker to the
Secretary, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, to treat the
Petitioner as a member of the INC and allot him a seat in the
forthcoming session. Further, on 08.07.2019, the Petitioner had
addressed a letter to the then Chief Minister tendering his
resignation from the Council of Ministers of which he was a part,
with a request that his resignation be accepted. This resignation
was also personally given to the Governor. On 12.07.2019, the
Petitioner had addressed a letter to the Speaker about
withdrawing support to the Government and had requested that
he be allotted a seat on the floor in the opposite benches. These
aspects have been highlighted in the impugned order, which
show that the contention of the Petitioner that the Speaker did
not apply his mind on the aspect of merger, is wrong and
incorrect.
150. We do not find any reason and good ground to hold that the
findings in the impugned order are perverse and based on no
evidence. Rather the stand and plea taken by the Petitioner is
105
devoid of merit. Similarly, the plea predicated on the violation of
principles of natural justice must fail in the light of the above
facts.
151. Our findings on allegations of not granting specific time in all
the above cases are based on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case. It should not be understood to
mean that the Speaker could cut short the hearing period. The
Speaker should give sufficient opportunity to a member before
deciding a disqualification proceeding and ordinarily follow the
time limit prescribed in the Rules of the Legislature.
K.CONCLUSION
152. In light of the discussion above, summary of law as held herein
is as follows:
a. The Speaker, while adjudicating a disqualification petition,
acts as a quasijudicial authority and the validity of the
orders thus passed can be questioned before this Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution. However, ordinarily,
the party challenging the disqualification is required to first
approach the High Court as the same would be
appropriate, effective and expeditious.
b. The Speaker’s scope of inquiry with respect to acceptance
or rejection of a resignation tendered by a member of the
legislature is limited to examine whether such a resignation
was tendered voluntarily or genuinely. Once it is
106
demonstrated that a member is willing to resign out of his
free will, the speaker has no option but to accept the
resignation. It is constitutionally impermissible for the
Speaker to take into account any extraneous factors while
considering the resignation. The satisfaction of the Speaker
is subject to judicial review.
c. Resignation and disqualification on account of defection
under the Tenth Schedule, both result in vacancy of the
seat held by the member in the legislature, but further
consequences envisaged are different.
d. Object and purpose of the Tenth Schedule is to curb the
evil of political defection motivated by lure of office or
rather similar considerations which endanger the
foundation of our democracy. By the 91st Constitutional
Amendment, Articles 71 (1B), 164(1B) and 361B were
enacted to ensure that a member disqualified by the
Speaker on account of defection is not appointed as a
Minister or holds any remunerative political post from the
date of disqualification or till the date on which his term of
office would expire or he/she is reelected to the
legislature, whichever is earlier.
e. Disqualification relates back to the date when the act of
defection takes place. Factum and taint of disqualification
does not vaporise by tendering a resignation letter to the
Speaker. A pending or impending disqualification action
does not become infructuous by submission of the
resignation letter, when act(s) of disqualification have
arisen prior to the member’s resignation letter.
f. In the earlier Constitution Bench judgment of Kihoto
Hollohan (supra), the order of the Speaker under Tenth
Schedule can be subject to judicial review on four grounds:
mala fide, perversity, violation of the constitutional
mandate and order passed in violation of natural justice.
107
g. Our findings on allegations of not granting specific time in
all the above cases are based on the unique facts and
circumstances of the case. It should not be understood to
mean that the Speaker could cut short the hearing period.
The Speaker should give sufficient opportunity to a
member before deciding a disqualification proceeding and
ordinarily follow the time limit prescribed in the Rules of
the Legislature.
h. In light of the existing Constitutional mandate, the Speaker
is not empowered to disqualify any member till the end of
the term. However, a member disqualified under the Tenth
Schedule shall be subjected to sanctions provided under
Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B of Constitution, which
provides for a bar from being appointed as a Minister or
from holding any remunerative political post from the date
of disqualification till the date on which the term of his
office would expire or if he is reelected to the legislature,
whichever is earlier.
i. There is a growing trend of the Speaker acting against the
constitutional duty of being neutral. Further horse trading
and corrupt practices associated with defection and change
of loyalty for lure of office or wrong reasons have not
abated. Thereby the citizens are denied stable
governments. In these circumstances, there is need to
consider strengthening certain aspects, so that such
undemocratic practices are discouraged and checked.
j. The existence of a substantial question of law does not
weigh on the stakes involved in the case, rather, it depends
on the impact the “question of law” will have on the final
determination. If the questions having a determining effect
on the final outcome have already been decided by a
conclusive authority, then such questions cannot be called
as “substantial questions of law”. In any case, no
108
substantial question of law exists in the present matter,
which needs reference to a larger bench.
153. In view of the discussion above, we pass the following order:
1. Orders dated 25.07.2019 and 28.07.2019 passed by the
Speaker in Disqualification Petition Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8
of 2019, are upheld to the extent of the disqualification of
the Petitioners therein.
2. However, the part of Speaker’s orders detailing the
duration of disqualification, viz., from the date of the
respective order till the expiry of the term of the 15th
Legislative Assembly of Karnataka, is accordingly set aside.
154. The Writ Petitions are disposed of in the aforestated terms. All
pending applications are also accordingly disposed of.
..........................J.
(N.V. Ramana)
...........................J.
(Sanjiv Khanna)
...........................J.
(Krishna Murari)
NEW DELHI;
November 13, 2019.
109
CONCLUSION
152. In light of the discussion above, summary of law as held herein
is as follows:
a. The Speaker, while adjudicating a disqualification petition, acts as a quasijudicial authority and the validity of the orders thus passed can be questioned before this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. However, ordinarily, the party challenging the disqualification is required to first
approach the High Court as the same would be appropriate, effective and expeditious.
b. The Speaker’s scope of inquiry with respect to acceptance or rejection of a resignation tendered by a member of the legislature is limited to examine whether such a resignation was tendered voluntarily or genuinely. Once it is demonstrated that a member is willing to resign out of his
free will, the speaker has no option but to accept the resignation. It is constitutionally impermissible for the Speaker to take into account any extraneous factors while considering the resignation. The satisfaction of the Speaker is subject to judicial review.
c. Resignation and disqualification on account of defection under the Tenth Schedule, both result in vacancy of the seat held by the member in the legislature, but further consequences envisaged are different.
d. Object and purpose of the Tenth Schedule is to curb the evil of political defection motivated by lure of office or rather similar considerations which endanger the foundation of our democracy. By the 91st Constitutional Amendment, Articles 71 (1B), 164(1B) and 361B were enacted to ensure that a member disqualified by the Speaker on account of defection is not appointed as a Minister or holds any remunerative political post from the
date of disqualification or till the date on which his term of office would expire or he/she is reelected to the legislature, whichever is earlier.
e. Disqualification relates back to the date when the act of defection takes place. Factum and taint of disqualification does not vaporise by tendering a resignation letter to the
Speaker. A pending or impending disqualification action does not become infructuous by submission of the resignation letter, when act(s) of disqualification have arisen prior to the member’s resignation letter.
f. In the earlier Constitution Bench judgment of Kihoto
Hollohan (supra), the order of the Speaker under Tenth
Schedule can be subject to judicial review on four grounds:
mala fide, perversity, violation of the constitutional
mandate and order passed in violation of natural justice.
g. Our findings on allegations of not granting specific time in
all the above cases are based on the unique facts and
circumstances of the case. It should not be understood to
mean that the Speaker could cut short the hearing period.
The Speaker should give sufficient opportunity to a
member before deciding a disqualification proceeding and
ordinarily follow the time limit prescribed in the Rules of
the Legislature.
h. In light of the existing Constitutional mandate, the Speaker
is not empowered to disqualify any member till the end of
the term. However, a member disqualified under the Tenth
Schedule shall be subjected to sanctions provided under
Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B of Constitution, which
provides for a bar from being appointed as a Minister or
from holding any remunerative political post from the date
of disqualification till the date on which the term of his
office would expire or if he is reelected to the legislature,
whichever is earlier.
i. There is a growing trend of the Speaker acting against the
constitutional duty of being neutral. Further horse trading
and corrupt practices associated with defection and change
of loyalty for lure of office or wrong reasons have not
abated. Thereby the citizens are denied stable
governments. In these circumstances, there is need to
consider strengthening certain aspects, so that such
undemocratic practices are discouraged and checked.
j. The existence of a substantial question of law does not
weigh on the stakes involved in the case, rather, it depends
on the impact the “question of law” will have on the final
determination. If the questions having a determining effect
on the final outcome have already been decided by a
conclusive authority, then such questions cannot be called
as “substantial questions of law”. In any case, no
108
substantial question of law exists in the present matter,
which needs reference to a larger bench.
153. In view of the discussion above, we pass the following order:
1. Orders dated 25.07.2019 and 28.07.2019 passed by the
Speaker in Disqualification Petition Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8
of 2019, are upheld to the extent of the disqualification of
the Petitioners therein.
2. However, the part of Speaker’s orders detailing the
duration of disqualification, viz., from the date of the
respective order till the expiry of the term of the 15th
Legislative Assembly of Karnataka, is accordingly set aside.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 992 OF 2019
SHRIMANTH BALASAHEB PATIL …PETITIONER
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
WITH
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 997 OF 2019
RAMESH L. JARKHIHOLI AND ANOTHER …PETITIONERS
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 998 OF 2019
PRATAP GOUDA PATIL AND OTHERS …PETITIONERS
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
REPORTABLE
1
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1000 OF 2019
DR. K. SUDHAKAR …PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY …RESPONDENT
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1001 OF 2019
ANAND SINGH …PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY …RESPONDENT
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1003 OF 2019
R. SHANKAR …PETITIONER
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1005 OF 2019
A. H. VISHWANATH AND OTHERS …PETITIONERS
2
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1006 OF 2019
ROSHAN BAIG …PETITIONER
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1007 OF 2019
N. NAGARAJU MTB …PETITIONER
VERSUS
HON’BLE SPEAKER, KARNATAKA
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction A
Contentions B
3
Issues C
Maintainability of Writ Petition D
Rejection of Resignations E
Disqualification Proceedings After Resignation F
Validity of Disqualification order G
Power of the Speaker to direct disqualification
till the expiry of the term
H
Reference to Constitution Bench I
Individual Cases J
Conclusions K
N . V . RA M A N A , J .
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Reflecting on Indian parliamentary democracy, the words of
André Béteille, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, need to be
observed:
“In a parliamentary democracy, the
obligations of constitutional morality are
expected to be equally binding on the
government and the opposition. In India, the
same political party treats these obligations
very differently when it is in office, and
when it is out of it. This has contributed
greatly to the popular perception of our
political system as being amoral…”1
Although the framers of the Constitution entrusted ‘we the
people’ with the responsibility to uphold the constitutional
1 André Béteille, ‘Constitutional Morality’, Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 43 (40)
(4th October 2008).
4
values having attained freedom, the question which begs herein
to be answered is to what extent we have discharged our duty
and sustained our democratic and constitutional obligations.
2. In this context, the questions arising in this batch of Writ
Petitions concern the importance of party politics in a democracy
and the requirement to have stability within the government to
facilitate good governance, as mandated under the Constitution.
We need to keep in mind that the separating line between
dissent and defection requires to be made apparent, so that
democratic values are upheld in balance with other
constitutional considerations. In an endeavor to maintain such
balance, the role of the Speaker is critical in maintaining the
balance between democratic values and constitutional
considerations. In this regard, this Court’s role is only to
ascertain whether the Speaker, as a neutral member, upheld the
tradition of his office to uphold the Constitution.
3. These Writ Petitions are filed against five different orders passed
by the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly: two
orders dated 25.07.2019 in Disqualification Petition No. 01 of
2019 and Disqualification Petition No. 07 of 2019 respectively;
two orders dated 28.07.2019 in Disqualification Petition No. 05
5
of 2019 and Disqualification Petition No. 08 of 2019 respectively;
and a common order dated 28.07.2019 in Disqualification
Petition Nos. 3 and 4 of 2019.
4. Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the present
petitions are that the results of the 15th Karnataka Legislative
Assembly were declared on 15.05.2018. The contesting political
parties secured the following seats:
Party Seats Won
Bahujan Samaj Party 1
Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] 104
Indian National Congress [INC] 78
Janata Dal (Secular) [JD(S)] 37
Karnataka Pragnyavantha
Janatha Party [KPJP]
1
Independent 1
Total 222
5. The Petitioners herein were elected as members of 15th
Karnataka Legislative Assembly, as per the details given below:
W.P. (C)
NO.
PETITIONER(S) PARTY CONSTITUENCY
992/
2019
Shrimanth Balasaheb
Patil
INC Kagawad
997/
2019
1. Ramesh Jarkhiholi
2. Mahesh Kumathalli
INC 1. Gokak
2. Athani
998/ 1. Pratap Gouda Patil
2. B.C. Patil
INC 1. Maski
2. Hirekerur
6
2019 3. Arbail Shivaram
Hebbar
4. S.T. Somashekhar
5. B.A. Basvaraja
6. Munirathna
3. Yellapur
4. Yeshvanthapura
5. KR Pura
6. RR Nagar
1000/
2019
Dr. K. Sudhakar INC Chikkaballapur
1001/
2019
Anand Singh INC Vijayanagara
1003/
2019
R. Shankar KPJP
Independent
Ranebennur
1005/
2019
1. A.H. Vishwanath
2. K. Gopalaiah
3. K.C. Narayanagowda
JD(S) 1.Hunsur
2.Mahalakshmi
Layout
3.Krishanarajapet
1006/
2019
Roshan Baig INC Shivajinagar
1007/
2019
N. Nagaraju MTB INC Hosakote
6. Though the BJP was the single largest party, its attempt to form
the Government was not successful. A coalition government of
INC and JD(S) was formed under the leadership of Mr.
Kumaraswamy (one of the Respondents herein). This
Government had a short life of about 14 months. The events
leading up to the resignation of the Chief Minister, on losing the
trust vote on 23.07.2019, after several days delay, form the
backdrop to the case of the present Petitioners.
7
7. On 11.02.2019 Disqualification Petition No. 1 of 2019 was
instituted against Ramesh L. Jarkhiholi, Mahesh Iranagaud
Kumathalli, Umesh G. Jadhav and B. Nagendra. The main
allegations against the aforesaid persons were that they did not
participate in the meetings of the party and the proceedings of
the Assembly session held from 06.02.2019 onwards, and the
conduct of all the aforesaid members’ was in violation of the
whip issued by the INC in this regard. Thereafter, Petitioners in
Writ Petition (C) No. 997 of 2019, Ramesh L. Jarkhiholi and
Mahesh Iranagaud Kumathalli, are said to have submitted their
resignations to the Speaker on 06.07.2019.
8. Other Petitioners, including, Dr. K. Sudhakar, Pratap Gouda
Patil, B. C. Patil, Arbail Shivaram Hebbar, S. T. Somashekar,
B.A. Basvaraja, Munirathna, A.H. Vishwanath, K. Gopalaiah,
K.C. Narayanagowda, Anand Singh, N. Nagaraju MTB and
Roshan Baig submitted their resignations from the membership
of the House between 01.07.2019 to 11.07.2019.
9. However, the Speaker did not take any call on the resignation of
the above persons. Aggrieved by the fact that their resignations
were not accepted, and with the impending trust vote being
inevitable, most of the above persons approached this Court by
8
way of a Writ Petition, being Writ Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019.
This Court, on 11.07.2019, in the aforesaid Writ Petition
directed the Speaker to take a decision qua the resignations
forthwith, and further directed the same to be laid before this
Court. The relevant extract of the said order is as under:
“....Having regard to the facts of the case, we
permit the petitioners, ten in number, to
appear before the Hon’ble Speaker of the
Karnataka Legislative Assembly at 6.00 p.m.
today. We request the Hon’ble Speaker to
grant an audience to the ten petitioners at
the said time. The petitioners, if they so
wish and are so inclined, shall intimate the
Hon’ble Speaker of the Assembly their
decision to resign, in which event, the
Hon’ble Speaker shall take a decision
forthwith and, in any case, in the course of
the remaining part of the day. Such decision
of the Hon’ble Speaker as may be taken in
terms of the present order, be laid before the
Court tomorrow (12.07.2019)...”
10. Meanwhile, on 11.07.2019, members of the INC withdrew their
disqualification complaint against B. Nagendra in
Disqualification Petition No.1 of 2019. The Speaker, it appears,
did not take any decision on the resignation in spite of the order
of this Court. Simultaneously, a whip was issued by the INC and
the JD(S) on 12.07.2019 calling upon their members to attend
proceedings, and cautioning the members of disqualification if
9
they failed to attend the same. Further, Disqualification Petition
Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were filed against Dr. K. Sudhakar, Pratap
Gouda Patil, B. C. Patil, Arbail Shivaram Hebbar, S. T.
Somashekhar, B.A. Basvaraja, Munirathna, A.H. Vishwanath, K.
Gopalaiah, K.C. Narayanagowda, Anand Singh, N. Nagaraju
MTB and Roshan Baig between 10.07.2019 to 12.07.2019.
11. Subsequently, when the aforesaid Writ Petition came up for
hearing on 12.07.2019, this Court passed the order as under:
“Having regard to the weighty issues
that have arisen and the incomplete state of
facts, as indicated above, we are of the view
that the matter should be considered by the
Court further on 16th July, 2019.
In the meantime, the status quo as
on today, with regard to the ten
petitioners, be maintained, namely, that
neither the issue of resignation nor the
issue of disqualification will be decided
by the Hon’ble Speaker.
This order has been passed by this
Court only to enable the Court to decide the
larger constitutional questions arising as
indicated above.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Further, this Court on 17.07.2019, passed the following order:
“The issue arising in the case is
whether resignations submitted by Members
of the Legislative Assembly at a point of time
10
earlier than petitions for their
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule of
the Constitution should have priority in the
decision making process or whether both
sets of proceedings should be taken up
simultaneously or the disqualification
proceedings should have precedence over
the request(s) for resignation.
Arguments have been advanced by the
learned counsels for the parties on the
touchstone of Articles 164, 190, 191, 212
and 361B and the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution. We have considered the same.
Constitutional principles should not receive
an exhaustive enumeration by the Court
unless such an exercise is inevitable and
unavoidable to resolve the issues that may
have arisen in any judicial proceeding.
In the present case, having regard to
the stage at which the above issues are
poised in the light of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the same, we
are of the view that the aforesaid questions
should receive an answer only at a later
stage of the proceedings. The imperative
necessity, at this stage, is to maintain
the constitutional balance and the
conflicting and competing rights that
have been canvassed before us. Such an
interim exercise has become prudent in
view of certain time frame exercise(s)
that is in the offing in the Karnataka
Legislative Assembly, particularly, the no
trust motion against the present
Government, which we are told is due for
being taken up on 18th July, 2019. In
these circumstances, the competing
claims have to be balanced by an
11
appropriate interim order, which
according to us, should be to permit the
Hon’ble Speaker of the House to decide
on the request for resignations by the 15
Members of the House within such time
frame as the Hon’ble Speaker may
consider appropriate. We also take the
view that in the present case the discretion
of the Hon’ble Speaker while deciding the
above issue should not be fettered by any
direction or observation of this Court and
the Hon’ble Speaker should be left free to
decide the issue in accordance with
Article 190 read with Rule 202 of the
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of
Business in Karnataka Legislative
Assembly framed in exercise of the
powers under Article 208 of the
Constitution.
The order of the Hon’ble Speaker on
the resignation issue, as and when passed,
be placed before the Court.
We also make it clear that until further
orders the 15 Members of the Assembly,
ought not to be compelled to participate in
the proceedings of the ongoing session of the
House and an option should be given to
them that they can take part in the said
proceedings or to opt to remain out of the
same. We order accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. Disqualification Petition No. 7 of 2019 was filed against R.
Shankar on 16.07.2019 and Disqualification Petition No. 8 of
2019 was filed against Shrimanth Balasaheb Patel on
12
20.07.2019. The Speaker thereupon issued emergent notices
between 18.07.2019 to 20.07.2019 to all the Petitioners
regarding the pending disqualification petitions to appear before
him on the date of hearing fixed for 23.07.2019 and 24.07.2019.
The notices did not refer to the resignation letters which had
been submitted by 15 Petitioners, who are parties to the Writ
Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019 filed before this Court. The
Petitioners have alleged that the period given in the aforesaid
notices was too short and in fact some of them had not even
received notices within time to respond.
14. While the aforesaid disqualification petitions/resignation letters
were pending, the INC on 20.07.2019 had again issued a whip
requiring their members of the Legislative Assembly to attend
the proceedings of the House on 22.07.2019.
15. The trust vote was finally taken up for consideration on
23.07.2019. The 17 Petitioners did not attend the House. As a
result, the INC and JD(S) coalition Government, under the
leadership of Mr. Kumaraswamy was in a minority, resulting in
the resignation of Mr. Kumaraswamy as Chief Minister.
13
16. Further, as detailed above, on 25.07.2019 and 28.07.2019, the
Speaker passed the five impugned orders in Disqualification
Petition Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of 2019. In these orders, the
Speaker:
a. Rejected the resignation of the members asserting that they
were not voluntary or genuine
b. Disqualified all the Petitioners, and
c. Disqualified the Petitioners till the end of the 15th
Legislative Assembly term
17. Aggrieved, by the aforesaid disqualifications, all the Petitioners
herein have approached this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution.
B. CONTENTIONS
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL MR. MUKUL ROHATGI ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONERS IN W.P. (C) NOS.997, 998, 1006 AND 1007 OF 2019
Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, argued that the
members of the house have an indefeasible right to resign but
the speaker went beyond his constitutionally mandated duty
and gave an opinion on the motive of the members and
wrongfully rejected the resignations tendered by them. On the
contrary, the speaker has to accept the resignation once it has
been tendered in the correct format.
Explaining the connection between resignation and
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution,
14
Mr. Rohatgi stressed that once resignation was validly tendered,
there was no question of the Speaker exercising his jurisdiction
to disqualify a member. Disqualification under the Tenth
Schedule was only with respect to a person who was a member,
and not otherwise.
The learned Senior Counsel challenging the legality of the
disqualification order submitted that the same can be interfered
with, if the Court finds that the order is perverse, results from
nonapplication of mind, or is in violation of principles of natural
justice. It was contended that in the present case, all three of
the above infirmities are made out in the disqualification order
of the Speaker.
The Speaker, in issuing “emergent” notice returnable in 34 days
is in contravention of the requirement for 7 days’ notice under
the Karnataka Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Members
on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986. This makes the order of
the Speaker bad for noncompliance of the principles of natural
justice, particularly when the Petitioners had only sought time of
4 weeks to produce documents.
Lastly, learned Senior Counsel vehemently submitted that even
if disqualification is held to be valid in law, the same cannot take
away the right of the Petitioners to contest in the upcoming
elections, as there exists no bar on the right to contest elections
under Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL CA SUNDARAM ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER IN W.P. (C) NO. 1000 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the resignation
tendered in the present case was resignation from the House
and not from the party.
15
If resignation is tendered under Article 190, the Speaker’s role is
limited to the extent of determining voluntariness and
genuineness of the same. The inquiry of the Speaker as to the
“voluntariness” is limited in its scope to the question of whether
the member was coerced to resign or not. The enquiry as to
“genuineness” only related to whether the resignation letter was
forged, or not actually made by the member. Additionally, when
a member hands over the letter of resignation to the Speaker
personally and informs the Speaker that the same is voluntary
and genuine, then the Speaker has to accept the resignation
immediately.
The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the motive
behind the resignation is immaterial, as the proviso to Article
190(3) of the Constitution restricts the scope of inquiry by the
Speaker only to voluntariness and genuineness.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL V. GIRI ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER IN
W.P.(C) NO. 1003 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel distinguished the case of the
Petitioner on the basis that he had never tendered his
resignation. In spite of that, a separate disqualification order
was passed against him.
In the present case, the Petitioner belonged to KPJP. Although
the party had decided to merge with the INC and had intimated
the Speaker about the same, there was no formal order of
merger. When the whip was issued by the INC, the Petitioner
herein requested the Speaker to provide him with a separate
seat with the opposition members. But the Speaker refused the
same, recognizing the Petitioner to be affiliated with the INC.
16
The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner brought to the
notice of the Court the letter of intimation issued by the
Executive Committee of his party directing him to stay on the
side of the opposition. Therefore, without any formal order of
merger, the Petitioner was not bound by the whip issued by the
INC.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL V. GIRI ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER IN
W.P. (C) NO. 992 OF 2019
The case of the Petitioner can be distinguished factually from the
case of most of the other Petitioners as he had not tendered his
resignation. When the whip was issued, due to prevailing
medical conditions, the Petitioner had to urgently travel to
Mumbai, pursuant to which he failed to participate in the
proceedings of the House.
Although these facts were intimated to the Speaker with
supporting medical records, the Speaker passed the order of
disqualification in haste without giving due notice to the
Petitioner. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that such an
ex parte order of disqualification, without considering relevant
material on record and placing reliance upon extraneous
circumstances, is untenable.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL A.K GANGULY ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONERS IN W.P.(C) NO. 1005 OF 2019
This Court, vide its order dated 17.07.2019 in Writ Petition (C)
No. 872 of 2019, granted liberty to the Petitioners herein to
either participate or opt out of the proceedings of the ongoing
session of the House. But the aforesaid order was ignored by the
political party of the Petitioners herein by issuing the whip, and
17
by the Speaker in relying upon the same to disqualify the
Petitioners.
The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the sanctity of
the Petitioners’ resignation should be protected. The order of
disqualification rendered by the Speaker is mala fide and is not
supported by any cogent reasons.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL K.V. VISHWANATHAN ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONERS IN W.P. (C) NO. 997 OF 2019
The learned senior counsel submitted that on 11.02.2019, a
disqualification petition was filed against 4 MLAs including Dr.
Umesh Yadav and the Petitioners herein. Subsequently, during
the pendency of the said disqualification petition, Dr. Umesh
Yadav submitted his resignation which was accepted by the
Speaker. However, the Speaker, acting in a mala fide manner,
kept the resignation letter submitted by the Petitioners herein
pending until the disqualification petition was decided.
Despite the orders of this Court directing the Speaker to decide
the resignation, the Speaker kept the matter pending till the
decision on the disqualification petition. The learned Senior
Counsel further contended that the Speaker wrongly took into
consideration actions pursuant to the orders of this Court dated
17.07.2019, wherein the Petitioners were granted the liberty not
to participate in the ongoing proceedings of the house.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL SAJAN POOVAYYA ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER IN W.P. (C) NO. 1001 OF 2019
The Petitioner was a member of the INC who had resigned on
01.07.2019 in protest against certain land dealing in his
Constituency. However, he was put in the same group as the
other disqualified Petitioners by the Speaker. The learned Senior
18
Counsel contends that omnibus statements and allegations have
been rendered in the disqualification order and the same was
passed without taking into consideration the documents
submitted by the Petitioner herein.
The learned Senior Counsel reiterated the earlier contention that
the actions of the Petitioner stood protected by virtue of the
interim order dated 17.07.2019 passed by a Coordinate Bench
of this Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019.
LEARNED SOLICITOR GENERAL TUSHAR MEHTA ON BEHALF OF THE
SPEAKER:
The learned Solicitor General submitted that members of the
House have the right to resign.
The learned Solicitor General submitted that this was a fit case
for the matter to be remanded to the Speaker for fresh hearing.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL KAPIL SIBAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
NOS. 2 AND 3 IN W.P. (C) NOS. 992, 997, 998, 1000, 1001,
1003, 1006 AND 1007 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel firstly stated that the impugned
orders of disqualification can only be challenged under Article
226 and not under Article 32 of the Constitution, as these are
matters involving merely statutory rights. There is no alleged
violation of fundamental rights which mandates the invocation
of jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. Further, the
Speaker is a quasijudicial authority, the remedy against whose
order lies only under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The learned Senior Counsel emphasized upon the conduct of the
Petitioners to prove that their resignations were motivated. The
counsel urged this Court to take a note of the conduct of the
members both prior and subsequent to the act of resignation to
19
comprehend the motive behind such resignation. He stated that
motive has to be decided to determine the “genuineness” and
“voluntariness” of the resignation, as it is the motive which acts
as an umbilical cord between the issues of genuineness and
voluntariness. In light of the same, learned Senior Counsel
pointed out that the Petitioners, after tendering their
resignation, never went to the Speaker; rather they approached
the Governor and the Supreme Court. It ought to be noted that
the letters of resignation were tendered collectively.
The power vested in the Speaker is a judicial exercise of power.
The Court’s discretion in this arena is quite limited. Moreover,
the Speaker, being the master of the House, can impose any
restriction pursuant to the act of disqualification. It ought to be
noted that the acts of disqualification took place within the
House and therefore it is well within the inherent powers of the
Speaker to impose any sanction consequent to the act of
defection. Without such power of sanction, the position of the
Speaker is equivalent to that of a toothless tiger.
Additionally, it was submitted that although the Petitioners have
repeatedly contended that the rules of natural justice have been
violated, it ought to be noted that rules of natural justice cannot
be put in a straitjacket. Although, these principles are
immutable, yet they are flexible, and are not confined to
technical limits. The Petitioners herein have to show some real
injury or patent perversity in the order of the Speaker.
Moreover, when the whip was issued with respect to a motion of
confidence, the members are duty bound to accept the same.
The Petitioners, by violating the whip, have voluntarily given up
20
membership of the party. Even assuming that the liberty
granted by this Court in the earlier writ proceedings was correct,
with respect to noncompulsion of the members for attending
the Assembly, there was legal necessity to attend the Assembly
at such a determinative point. The learned Senior Counsel made
a distinction between ordinary whips and those which are more
essential, which were necessary for the survival of the
Government such as those pertaining to a trust vote, a noconfidence motion, or even a whip relating to the budget. He
submitted that such a whip must be followed per se, and that a
member could not refuse to appear/vote with respect to the
same.
The learned Senior Counsel proceeded to distinguish between
consequences of resignation with that of disqualification. He
stated that sole purpose of the Tenth Schedule is to check bulk
defections. In light of the same, the Petitioners cannot be
allowed to contest the byelections, as allowing them to contest
dilutes the effect of disqualification. There is a clear bar for
acceptance of the nomination of disqualified candidates under
Section 36 of The Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Therefore, the disqualified members should not be allowed to
contest fresh elections.
The learned Senior Counsel also contended that the Speaker has
the power to disqualify under the Tenth Schedule, which also
includes the power of the Speaker to command that the member
disqualified would not be eligible to stand for reelection, on the
seat falling vacant, till the end of the term of the House.
21
However, since the matter involves important questions in
relation to the power of the Speaker to decide the parallel
proceedings of resignation and disqualification, the power of the
Speaker to conduct inquiry as to the “voluntariness” and
“genuineness”, the interpretation of the terms “voluntary” and
“genuine”, the relevant material to be considered during an
inquiry under Article 190(3) of the Constitution, the relevant
period of inquiry, etc., the same is required to be considered by a
Constitution Bench.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL DR. RAJEEV DHAVAN ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NO. 2 IN W.P (C) NO. 1005 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel defended the order of
disqualification by stating that the Speaker exercises wide range
of power while acting in an adjudicatory capacity and the same
should not be reduced to a mechanical exercise. Therefore, while
deciding the issues regarding “genuineness” and “voluntariness”
behind the act of resignation, the Speaker can look to the series
of events leading to the resignation so as to decide the motive.
Pursuant to the above submission, the counsel stated that
taking into totality of facts into consideration there exist no
ground to claim that the order of the Speaker suffers from
perversity or that the same was passed mala fide.
The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that there exists no
indefeasible right of resignation as these Petitioners are acting in
their constitutional capacity as members of the Legislative
Assembly. Moreover, the resignations rendered in the present
case cannot be qualified as resignation simpliciter, rather they
indicate resignation for the cause of defection and in such a
22
situation, the Speaker could not have turned a blind eye to the
activities of the Petitioners.
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL DEVADUTT KAMAT ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NOS. 2 AND 3 IN W.P. (C) NOS. 992, 997, 998,
1000, 1001, 1003, 1006 AND 1007 OF 2019
The learned Senior Counsel reiterated the views expressed above
by the other learned Senior Counsel and defended the orders of
the Speaker stating that he had duly complied with the orders of
this Court by deciding the resignations submitted by the
Petitioners under Article 190 of the Constitution. The learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the orders dated 11.07.2019 and
17.07.2019 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ
Petition (C) No.872 of 2019 only requested the Speaker to take a
decision on the resignations as per his discretion and within
such time frame as he may consider appropriate. Acceptance or
rejection of the resignations is dependent on the condition that
the same are voluntary and genuine.
Further, the disqualification orders passed by the Speaker were
based on a totality of circumstances prevailing in which the
conduct of the Petitioners was questionable. The absence of the
Petitioners from the proceedings of the House, when the trust
motion of their Government was being discussed, clearly shows
their intention to act against the party interest. The
disqualification orders were based on cumulative facts including
the absence of the Petitioners despite repeated notices to remain
present, and their actions and conduct in colluding with the BJP
to engineer the fall of the coalition government.
23
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL K. SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NOS. 2 AND 3 IN W.P. (C) NOS. 992, 997, 998,
1000, 1001, 1003, 1006 AND 1007 OF 2019
Learned senior advocate supported the arguments advanced by
the learned senior advocate, Mr. Kapil Sibal, and stated that the
disqualification order could not be reviewed by this Court.
Further, the Tenth Schedule is clear on the aspect of merger,
wherein he pointed out that there is no need to communicate
the factum of merger to R. Shankar [Petitioner in Writ Petition
(C) No. 1003 of 2019].
LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL RAKESH DWIVEDI ON BEHALF OF
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
The learned Senior Counsel submitted that it has been a matter
of consistent practice that members disqualified under the Tenth
Schedule can participate in the next elections. Any bar for a
particular period is not anticipated by law with respect to
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule.
He further stated that the power of the Speaker is only limited to
the adjudication of the disqualification petition. Any
consequential action which flows from such disqualification is
beyond his jurisdiction. The Speaker cannot, at will, provide any
particular term of disqualification. Disqualification, and the
consequences thereof, being punitive, have to be sanctioned by
law.
When a member gets disqualified under the Tenth Schedule, a
consequential vacancy arises thereby. However, it is
impermissible for the Speaker to decide as to who can contest
for the said vacancy.
24
C. ISSUES
18. In view of the arguments contended, following questions arise for
our consideration herein:
1. Whether the Writ Petition challenging the order of the
Speaker under Article 32 is maintainable?
2. Whether the order of the Speaker rejecting the resignation
and disqualifying the Petitioners is in accordance with the
Constitution?
3. Even if the Speaker’s order of disqualification is valid, does
the Speaker have the power to disqualify the members for
the rest of the term?
4. Whether the issues raised require a reference to the larger
Bench?
D. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE WRIT PETITION
19. At the outset, it must be noted that learned Senior Counsel, Mr.
Kapil Sibal has contended that this Court does not have the
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India to deal
with this matter. Further, learned Senior Counsel, Dr. Rajeev
Dhavan, has supported the aforesaid argument by stating that
no fundamental right is violated, more so when the members of
25
Parliament or Legislative Assembly cannot invoke the ‘right to
freedom of trade and profession’ under Article 19 (1)(g) of the
Constitution of India.
20. The contours of this Court’s writ jurisdiction has been long
established in several decisions of this Court. Where the law
provides for a hierarchy of appeals, the parties must exhaust the
available remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction of this
Court [See U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey, (2005)
8 SCC 264]. At the same time, this Court in a catena of
decisions has held that this doctrine is not a rule of law, but
essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and thus
not a compulsion and where there is failure of principles of
natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction warrants, this Court may exercise its writ
jurisdiction even if the parties had other adequate legal
remedies. [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR
1958 SC 86; Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107]
21. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the Respondents have
challenged the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the
26
Constitution by placing reliance on the Kihoto
Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651, wherein this
Court, while dealing with the scope of judicial review stated as
under:
“109. In the light of the decisions
referred to above and the nature of
function that is exercised by the
Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6,
the scope of judicial review under
Articles 136, and 226 and 227 of the
Constitution in respect of an order
passed by the Speaker/Chairman
under Paragraph 6 would be confined to
jurisdictional errors only viz., infirmities
based on violation of constitutional
mandate, mala fides, noncompliance
with rules of natural justice and
perversity.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. We may note that writ jurisdiction is one of the valuable rights
provided under Article 32 of the Constitution, which in itself
forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. After the
decision in the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra), the Speaker,
while exercising the power to disqualify, is a Tribunal and the
validity of the orders are amenable to judicial review. On a
perusal of the judgment in the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra),
we do not find any explicit or implicit bar to adjudicate the issue
under the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
27
23. The Petitioners are alleging violation of principles of natural
justice and their right to a fair hearing. Principles of natural
justice and right to fair hearing can be traceable to right to
equality and rule of law enshrined under Article 14 of the
Constitution, read with other fundamental rights [refer to
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,(1978) 1 SCC 248].
24. A seven Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Ujjam Bai v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621, held that writ
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution is available
when principles of natural justice are violated. This view was
affirmed by a nine Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1967 SC 1, in the following terms:
“54. The scope of the jurisdiction of this Court
in dealing with writ petitions under Article 32
was examined by a Special Bench of this Court
in Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1963) 1
SCR 778]. This decision would show that it
was common ground before the court that in
three classes of cases a question of the
enforcement of the fundamental rights may
arise; and if it does arise, an application under
Article 32 will lie. These cases are: (1) where
action is taken under a statute which is ultra
vires the Constitution; (2) where the statute is
intra vires but the action taken is without
jurisdiction; and (3) where the action taken
28
is procedurally ultra vires as where a quasijudicial authority under an obligation to act
judicially passes an order in violation of the
principles of natural justice.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. In the context of disqualification orders, this Court has exercised
its writ jurisdiction under Article 32. A three Judge Bench of
this Court in Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC
1, has explicitly held that a challenge to an order of
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is available under the
writ jurisdiction of this Court. This Court held as under:
“11. The Speaker, while exercising power to
disqualify Members, acts as a Tribunal and
though validity of the orders thus passed
can be questioned in the writ jurisdiction
of this Court or High Courts, the scope of
judicial review is limited as laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Kihoto
Hollohan v. Zachillhu [1992 Supp (2) SCC
651]. The orders can be challenged on the
ground of ultra vires or mala fides or having
been made in colourable exercise of power
based on extraneous and irrelevant
considerations. The order would be a nullity
if rules of natural justice are violated.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. Reliance can be placed on the constitutional provisions and
debates thereupon which show that this Court can inquire into
the legitimacy of the exercise of the power. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
29
has described Article 32 as the very soul of the Constitution
very heart of it most important Article. Moreover, the
jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 32 is an important
and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution of
India and no act of Parliament can abrogate it or take it away
except by way of impermissible erosion of fundamental
principles of the constitutional scheme are settled propositions
of Indian jurisprudence.
27. This Court, as the highest Constitutional Court, has to, and has
always, functioned in accordance with the applicable judicially
determined parameters while performing its constitutional duty
to judicially review the acts of constitutional functionaries. It has
examined questions of both fact and law, so long as it has been
vested with the power to do so. The scrupulous discharge of
duties by all guardians of the Constitution include the duty not
to transgress the limitations of their own constitutionally
circumscribed powers by trespassing into what is properly the
domain of other constitutional organs.
28. In any case, we note that by challenging the order directly under
Article 32, the Petitioners have leapfrogged the judicial hierarchy
as envisaged under the Constitution [refer to Tamil Nadu
30
Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries (I) Ltd., 2019
SCC Online SC 221].
29. We do not appreciate the manner in which the petitioners have
knocked on the doors of this Court. Among other reasons, we
proceeded to hear the present matter due to the peculiar facts
presented before us, wherein certain interim orders were passed
herein by another Coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ
Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019 filed by some of the present
petitioners. We had heard the matter at some length on
25.09.2019 and 26.09.2019, when with the consent of the
counsel of all the parties, the matter was fixed for final hearing.
Since a substantial amount of time has passed in the
meanwhile, and to ensure that the same exercise need not be
repeated before the High Court, we are left with no option but to
hear these cases on merits.
30. Despite the fact that this Court has sufficient jurisdiction to deal
with disqualification cases under the writ jurisdiction, a party
challenging a disqualification order is required to first approach
the High Court as it would be appropriate, effective and
expeditious remedy to deal with such issues. This Court would
have the benefit of a considered judicial verdict from the High
31
Court. If the parties are still aggrieved, then they may approach
this Court.
31. Having ascertained that this Court has the jurisdiction to deal
with the subject matter of the present petitions, the question
concerning the extent of judicial review can be taken up later,
when we analyze and discuss the aspects concerning the validity
of the orders passed by the Speaker, disqualifying the Petitioners
and rejecting their resignations.
E. REJECTION OF RESIGNATIONS
32. In the present case, 15 of the 17 Petitioners had tendered their
resignation from the House before the disqualification petitions
were adjudicated. The Speaker vide orders dated 28.07.2019 in
Disqualification Petition Nos. 3 and 4 of 2019 and
Disqualification Petition No. 5 of 2019, and order dated
25.07.2019 in Disqualification Petition No. 1 of 2019, rejected
the resignation of the Petitioners therein, holding that they were
not voluntary and genuine.
33. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel, has contended that
rejection of the resignation by the Speaker was appropriate as
the same was given only to frustrate the object of
32
disqualification. He has submitted that the consideration before
the Court is limited considering the fact that the bonafides and
motive of the Petitioners to resign was appropriately dealt under
Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution. On the other hand, the
Petitioners have strenuously contended that the inquiry required
under Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution is limited to
“voluntariness” and “genuineness”, and not the motive or the
reason for resignation.
34. The first question we need to consider concerns the scope of
judicial review with respect to acceptance/rejection of the
resignation by the Speaker. The Respondents have contended on
this count that the Court cannot go into this aspect as the
acceptance/rejection of resignation is based on the subjective
satisfaction of the Speaker, which is immune from judicial
review.
35. We are unable to agree with this contention. It is true that 33rd
Constitutional Amendment changed the constitutional position
by conferring discretion on the Speaker to reject the resignation.
However, such discretion is not unqualified, as the resignation
33
can only be rejected if the Speaker is “satisfied that such
resignation is not voluntary or genuine”. Determination of
whether the resignations were “voluntary” or “genuine” cannot
be based on the ipse dixit of the Speaker, instead it has to be
based on his “satisfaction”. Even though the satisfaction is
subjective, it has to be based on objective material showing that
resignation is not voluntary or genuine. When a member tenders
his resignation in writing, the Speaker must immediately
conduct an inquiry to ascertain if the member intends to
relinquish his membership. The inquiry must be in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution and the applicable rules
of the House. This satisfaction of the Speaker is subject to
judicial review.
36. The next logical question which arises for consideration
concerns the ambit of the terms “voluntary” and “genuine” in
Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution. Prior to the 33rd
Constitutional Amendment, Article 190(3)(b) read as follows:
“(3) If a member of a House of the
Legislature of a State—
(a) …..
34
(b) resigns his seat by writing under his
hand addressed to the Speaker or the
Chairman, as the case may be.”
37. The 33rd Constitutional Amendment amended Article 190(3)(b) of
the Constitution and added a proviso. The revised clause reads
as follows:
“(3) If a member of a House of the
Legislature of a State—
(a) …..
(b) resigns his seat by writing under his
hand addressed to the Speaker or the
Chairman, as the case may be, and his
resignation is accepted by the Speaker or
the Chairman, as the case may be,
his seat shall thereupon become vacant:
Provided that in the case of any resignation
referred to in sub clause (b), if from
information received or otherwise and after
making such inquiry as he thinks fit, the
Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may
be, is satisfied that such resignation is not
voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept
such resignation.”
38. Thus, prior to the 33rd Constitutional Amendment, there was no
provision in the Article which required the resignation to be
accepted by the Speaker to become effective. Originally, the
position was that a member of a Legislative Assembly could
35
resign from office by a unilateral act, and the acceptance of
resignation was not required. [refer to Union of India v. Gopal
Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301; Moti Ram v. Param Dev,
(1993) 2 SCC 725]
39. First, as a starting principle, it has to be accepted that a member
of the Legislature has a right to resign. Nothing in the
Constitution, or any statute, prevents him from resigning. A
member may choose to resign for a variety of reasons and his
reasons may be good or bad, but it is his sole prerogative to
resign. An elected member cannot be compelled to continue his
office if he chooses to resign. The 33rd Constitutional
Amendment does not change this position. On the contrary, it
ensures that his resignation is on account of his free will.
40. Second, the 33rd Constitutional Amendment requires acceptance
of resignation by the Speaker. Thus, merely addressing a
resignation letter to the Speaker would not lead to the seat
automatically falling vacant. The Speaker has to accept such
resignation for the seat to become vacant. However, as discussed
above, the Speaker has limited discretion for rejecting the
resignation. If the resignation is voluntary or genuine, the
36
Speaker has to accept the resignation and communicate the
same.
41. Third, the Speaker can reject the resignation, if the Speaker is
satisfied that resignation was “not voluntary or genuine”. Herein,
our attention is drawn to the Chapter 22, Rule 202 (2) of the
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karnataka
Legislative Assembly, which is extracted as under:
“(2) If a member hands over the letter of
resignation to the Speaker personally and
informs him that the resignation is
voluntary and genuine and the Speaker has
no information or knowledge to the contrary,
and if he is satisfied, the Speaker may
accept resignation immediately.”
(emphasis supplied)
The rule states that the Speaker has to take a call on the
resignation letter addressed to him immediately, having been
satisfied of the voluntariness and genuineness. Reading the rule
in consonance with Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution and its
proviso, it is clear that the Speaker’s satisfaction should be
based on the information received and after making such inquiry
as he thinks fit. The aforesaid aspects do not require roving
inquiry and with the experience of a Speaker, who is the head of
the House, he is expected to conduct such inquiry as is
37
necessary and pass an order. If a member appears before him
and gives a letter in writing, an inquiry may be a limited inquiry.
But if he receives information that a member tendered his
resignation under coercion, he may choose to commence a
formal inquiry to ascertain if the resignation was voluntary and
genuine.
42. Fourth, although the word “genuine” has not been defined, in
this context, it would simply mean that a writing by which a
member chooses to resign is by the member himself and is not
forged by any third party. The word “genuine” only relates to the
authenticity of the letter of resignation.
43. Similarly, the word “voluntary” has not been defined. In this
context, it would mean the resignation should not be based on
threat, force or coercion. This is evident from the Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the 33rd Constitutional Amendment
which is extracted below:
1. Articles 101 (3) (b), and 190 (3) (b) of the
Constitution permit a member of either
House of Parliament or a member of a
House of the Legislature of a State to resign
his seat by writing under his hand
addressed to the Speaker or the Chairman,
as the case may be. In the recent past,
there have been instances where coercive
38
measures have been resorted to for
compelling members of' a Legislative
Assembly to resign their membership, if
this is not checked, it might become
difficult for Legislatures to function in
accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution. It is therefore, proposed to
amend the above two articles to impose a
requirement as to acceptance of the
resignation by the Speaker or the Chairman
and to provide that the resignation shall not
be accepted by the Speaker or the Chairman
if he is satisfied after making such inquiry
as he thinks fit that the resignation is not
voluntary or genuine.
(emphasis supplied)
The Speaker therefore has a duty to reject the resignation if
such resignation is based on coercion, threat or force.
44. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, has contended that a
Speaker, as a part of his inquiry, can also go into the motive of
the member and reject his resignation if it was done under
political pressure. We are unable to accept this contention. The
language of Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution does not permit
the Speaker to inquire into the motive of the resignation. When a
member is resigning on political pressure, he is still voluntarily
doing so. Once the member tenders his resignation it would be
“voluntary” and if the writing can be attributed to him, it would
39
be “genuine”. Our view is also supported by the debates on the
33rd Constitutional Amendment. It may be necessary to quote
the debate dated 03.05.1974 on the 33rd Constitutional
Amendment, which is extracted below:
H.R. Gokhale: I do not want to reply
elaborately to all the points because I know I
will have to deal with these points when the
Bill comes up for consideration. In a way, I
am thankful to the Hon. Members. They
have given me notice of what they are going
to say. I will deal with some points raised.
Sir, the idea that the Bill prevents any
member from resigning is absolutely wrong.
On the contrary, the basis on which the Bill
proceeds is, the right of resignation is
protected and the idea of acceptance of a
resignation is also subject to a proviso that
the acceptance is in the normal course and
the resignation can take place only in the
event of a conclusion being reached that
either it is not genuine or it is not voluntary.
Therefore, to proceed on the basis that the
right of a Member to resign is taken away, is
entirely wrong. This can be seen if the bill is
properly studied. The other thing they said
was, in the name of democracy, how do you
prevent people from resigning. Nobody is
prevented from resigning. On the contrary,
the basic idea is, the ordinary right of a
person to say ‘I do not want to continue to
be a Member of the House’ is maintained.
But, is it a democratic way, when a
Member does not want to resign, people
pressurise him to resign not political
pressure but by threats of violence as
had occurred in the recent past. The
40
person has no option but to resign. The
Speaker has no option but to accept the
resignation in the present setup. This is
a matter which was true in Gujarat. It may
be true elsewhere. It was true in Gujarat. It
had happened. A large number of people,
about 200300 people, went and indulged in
acts of violence, held out threats and under
duress, signatures were obtained. In some
cases, Members were carried physically from
their constituencies to the Speaker for giving
resignations.
(emphasis supplied)
In this regard, there is no doubt that the Petitioners have
categorically stated and have reaffirmed before the Speaker and
this Court, in unequivocal terms, that they have voluntarily and
genuinely resigned their membership of the House. This Court,
in the earlier Writ Petition, being Writ Petition (C) No. 872 of
2019, had also directed the Speaker to look into the resignation
of the members, but the same was kept pending.
45. In view of our above discussion we hold that the Speaker can
reject a resignation only if the inquiry demonstrates that it is not
“voluntary” or “genuine”. The inquiry should be limited to
ascertaining if the member intends to relinquish his
membership out of his free will. Once it is demonstrated that a
member is willing to resign out of his free will, the Speaker has
41
no option but to accept the resignation. It is constitutionally
impermissible for the Speaker to take into account any other
extraneous factors while considering the resignation. The
satisfaction of the Speaker is subject to judicial review.
46. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid observations clarify the
scope of the Speaker’s duty under Article 190(3)(b) of the
Constitution, and answer the contention raised by the learned
senior counsel regarding the same. However, since we are
deciding the question of disqualification, it might not be
necessary to make any observations on the merits of the
petitioners’ plea regarding the nonacceptance of their
resignation letters, in view of our subsequent findings on
disqualification.
F. DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS AFTER
RESIGNATION
47. It was also contended by the Petitioners that the Speaker did not
have the jurisdiction to deal with disqualification petitions, as
the Petitioners having resigned were no longer members who
could have been disqualified. This issue does not apply to the
42
Petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 992 of 2019 and Writ Petition
(C) No. 1003 of 2019 as they did not tender their resignation.
48. Before we proceed to record our reasons, it is pertinent to reflect
upon the statement of objects and reasons to the Constitution
(Fiftysecond Amendment) Act, 1985 which states that the issue
of defection has preoccupied the national conscience from the
1960s. The importance of the same stems from the fact that it
has the potential to cause extensive damage to the democracy.
In this regard, having experienced earlier Governments falling
due to such practice, the legislature introduced the bill inserting
the Tenth Schedule for discouraging such practice.
“The evil of political defections has been a
matter of national concern. If it is not
combated, it is likely to undermine the very
foundations of our democracy and the
principles which sustain it. With this object,
an assurance was given in the Address by the
President to Parliament that the government
intended to introduce in the current session of
Parliament an antidefection Bill. This Bill is
meant for outlawing defection and fulfilling the
above assurance.”
(emphasis supplied)
49. This court in the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) has clearly
enunciated the purpose behind the introduction of the Tenth
43
Schedule, wherein it is stated that “the main purpose underlying
the constitutional amendment and introduction of the Tenth
Schedule is to curb the evil of defection which was causing
immense mischief in our body politic.” The relevant extracts are
presented below:
“9. This brings to the fore the object
underlying the provisions in the Tenth
Schedule. The object is to curb the evil of
political defections motivated by lure of
office or other similar considerations
which endanger the foundations of our
democracy. The remedy proposed is to
disqualify the Member of either House of
Parliament or of the State Legislature
who is found to have defected from
continuing as a Member of the House. The
grounds of disqualification are specified in
Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule.”
(emphasis supplied)
50. Therefore, it can be clearly concluded that the Tenth Schedule
was brought in to cure the evil of defection recognising the
significant impact it has on the health of our democracy. The
91st Constitutional Amendment also strengthens the aforesaid
view that the law needed further strengthening in order to curb
the evil of defection. The aforesaid amendment introduced
44
Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B in the Constitution. These
provisions bar any person who is disqualified under the Tenth
Schedule from being appointed as a Minister or from holding
any remunerative political post from the date of disqualification
till the date on which the term of his office would expire or if he
is reelected to the legislature, whichever is earlier.
51. The intent of the amendment is crystal clear. The constitutional
amendment sought to create additional consequences resultant
from the determination that a person was disqualified under the
Tenth Schedule. If we hold that the disqualification proceedings
would become infructuous upon tendering resignation, any
member who is on the verge of being disqualified would
immediately resign and would escape from the sanctions
provided under Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B. Such an
interpretation would therefore not only be against the intent
behind the introduction of the Tenth Schedule, but also defeat
the spirit of the 91st Constitutional Amendment.
52. A five Judge Bench of this Court, in the case of Delhi
Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, 1991
Supp (1) SCC 600 ruled that an inhibition under the
Constitution must be interpreted so as to give a wider
45
interpretation to cure the existing evils. The relevant extract has
been provided below:
118. Legislation, both statutory and
constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
experience of evils. But its general
language should not, therefore,
necessarily be confined to the form that
that evil had taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and
purposes and new awareness of
limitations. Therefore, a principle to be
valid must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is particularly true of the
constitutional constructions. Constitutions
are not ephemeral enactments designed to
meet passing occasions. These are, to use
the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
“designed to approach immortality as nearly
as human institutions can approach it ….”.
In the application of a constitutional
limitation or inhibition, our interpretation
cannot be only of ‘what has been’ but of
‘what may be’. See the observations of this
Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration
[(1978) 4 SCC 494: 1979 SCC (Cri) 155].
(emphasis supplied)
53. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8
SCC 501, a five Judge Bench of this Court articulated the
principles of constitutional interpretation, stating that Courts
are obligated to take an interpretation which glorifies the
democratic sprit of the Constitution:
46
284.1. While interpreting the provisions of
the Constitution, the safe and most sound
approach for the constitutional courts to
adopt is to read the words of the
Constitution in the light of the spirit of
the Constitution so that the
quintessential democratic nature of our
Constitution and the paradigm of
representative participation by way of
citizenry engagement are not
annihilated. The courts must adopt such
an interpretation which glorifies the
democratic spirit of the Constitution.
284.5. The Constitution being the supreme
instrument envisages the concept of
constitutional governance which has, as its
twin limbs, the principles of fiduciary nature
of public power and the system of checks
and balances. Constitutional governance,
in turn, gives birth to the requisite
constitutional trust which must be
exhibited by all constitutional
functionaries while performing their
official duties.
(emphasis supplied)
54. In addition to the above, the decision of the Speaker that a
member is disqualified, relates back to the date of the
disqualifying action complained of. The power of the Speaker to
decide upon a disqualification petition was dealt by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Rajendra Singh Rana v.
Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270. This Court, reading
47
the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 6 of the Tenth Schedule, has
clearly held that the Speaker has to decide the question of
disqualification with reference to the date it was incurred. The
Court held that:
“34. As we see it, the act of disqualification
occurs on a member voluntarily giving up
his membership of a political party or at the
point of defiance of the whip issued to him.
Therefore, the act that constitutes
disqualification in terms of para 2 of the
Tenth Schedule is the act of giving up or
defiance of the whip. The fact that a
decision in that regard may be taken in
the case of voluntary giving up, by the
Speaker at a subsequent point of time
cannot and does not postpone the
incurring of disqualification by the act of
the legislator. Similarly, the fact that the
party could condone the defiance of a whip
within 15 days or that the Speaker takes the
decision only thereafter in those cases,
cannot also pitch the time of disqualification
as anything other than the point at which
the whip is defied. Therefore in the
background of the object sought to be
achieved by the Fiftysecond Amendment of
the Constitution and on a true
understanding of para 2 of the Tenth
Schedule, with reference to the other
paragraphs of the Tenth Schedule, the
position that emerges is that the Speaker
has to decide the question of
disqualification with reference to the
date on which the member voluntarily
gives up his membership or defies the
48
whip. It is really a decision ex post
facto...”
(emphasis supplied)
55. As such, there is no doubt that the disqualification relates to the
date when such act of defection takes place. The tendering of
resignation does not have a bearing on the jurisdiction of the
Speaker in this regard. At this point we may allude to the case of
D. Sanjeevayya v. Election Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1967 SC 1211, wherein this Court has held that:
“5.It is, therefore, not permissible, in the
present case, to interpret Section 150 of the
Act in isolation without reference to Part III
of the Act which prescribes the machinery
for calling in question the election of a
returned candidate. When an election
petition has been referred to a Tribunal by
the Election Commission and the former is
seized of the matter, the petition has to be
disposed of according to law. The Tribunal
has to adjudge at the conclusion of the
proceeding whether the returned candidate
has or has not committed any corrupt
practice at the election and secondly, it has
to decide whether the second respondent
should or should not be declared to have
been duly elected. A returned candidate
cannot get rid of an election petition filed
against him by resigning his seat in the
Legislature, whatever the reason for his
resignation may be…”
Therefore, the aforesaid principle may be adopted accordingly,
wherein the taint of disqualification does not vaporise, on
49
resignation, provided the defection has happened prior to the
date of resignation.
56. In light of the above, resignation and disqualification are distinct
mechanisms provided under the law which result in vacancy.
Further, the factum/manner of resignation may be a relevant
consideration while deciding the disqualification petition. We do
not agree with the submission of the Petitioners that the
disqualification proceedings cannot be continued if the
resignations are tendered. Even if the resignation is tendered,
the act resulting in disqualification arising prior to the
resignation does not come to an end. The pending or impending
disqualification action in the present case would not have been
impacted by the submission of the resignation letter, considering
the fact that the act of disqualification in this case have arisen
prior to the members resigning from the Assembly.
G. VALIDITY OF DISQUALIFICATION ORDER
57. The Petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the
Speaker disqualifying them. The Speaker has, after a detailed
analysis, categorically concluded that the present Petitioners
50
have voluntarily given up membership of the party, through
their undisputed conduct.
58. To examine the above contention, we need to refer to the scheme
of Tenth Schedule and other provisions of the Constitution.
There is no dispute that in India, since the framing of the
Constitution, there was a constant demand for formulating a law
on defection. It may be noted that India was one of the first
countries to legislate on an AntiDefection Law. Following the
example of India, many other countries including Israel, Canada
etc. have followed suit.
59. Relevant provisions of Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule
provide that:
“2.Disqualification on ground of
defection.—
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4
and 5, a member of a House belonging to
any political party shall be disqualified for
being a member of the House—
(a) if he has voluntarily given up his
membership of such political party; or
(b) if he votes or abstains from voting in
such House contrary to any direction issued
by the political party to which he belongs or
by any person or authority authorised by it
in this behalf, without obtaining, in either
51
case, the prior permission of such political
party, person or authority and such voting
or abstention has not been condoned by
such political party, person or authority
within fifteen days from the date of such
voting or abstention.”
That the Speaker can disqualify a member belonging to any
political party if he has voluntarily given up his membership of
such political party or if he votes against the wishes of his party.
It is in this regard that an appropriate meaning needs to be
given to the term disqualification.
60. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘disqualification’ is ‘to
officially stop someone from being in a competition or doing
something because they are not suitable, or they have done
something wrong’. However, under the Tenth Schedule this term
occupies a specific meaning wherein, a member is stopped from
continuing to be a member of a legislative body, if his actions fall
in one of the conditions provided under paragraph 2.
61. In order to analyze the case at hand, we need to briefly refer to
and understand the scheme of the Constitution with respect to
State Legislatures. Article 168 of the Constitution provides that
for every State there shall be a Governor and two Houses of
Legislature namely Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly
52
or where only one such Legislative House is there, then a
Legislative Assembly. Under Article 172 of the Constitution every
Legislative Assembly unless sooner dissolved shall continue for
five years from the date appointed for its first meeting. In order
to secure the membership of the State Legislature, such
members must comply and conform to three distinct
qualifications enlisted under Article 173.
62. Article 190(3) of the Constitution provides that the seat
belonging to a member of the Legislative Assembly becomes
vacant if such a member becomes subject to any disqualification
as mentioned in clause (1) or (2) of Article 191 of the
Constitution, or he resigns his seat by writing under his hand
addressed to the Speaker, and his resignation is accepted by the
Speaker in terms of the proviso to Article 190(3) of the
Constitution.
63. Article 191 provides for disqualification of a membership which
may be reduced as under:
“191. Disqualifications for membership.—
(1) A person shall be disqualified for being
chosen as, and for being, a member of the
Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council
of a State—
53
(a) if he holds any office of profit under the
Government of India or the Government of
any State specified in the First Schedule,
other than an office declared by the
Legislature of the State by law not to
disqualify its holder;
(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so
declared by a competent court;
(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent;
(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has
voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a
foreign State, or is under any
acknowledgment of allegiance or adherence
to a foreign State;
(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any
law made by Parliament.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this
clause, a person shall not be deemed to hold
an office of profit under the Government of
India or the Government of any State
specified in the First Schedule by reason
only that he is a Minister either for the
Union or for such State.
(2) A person shall be disqualified for being a
member of the Legislative Assembly or
Legislative Council of a State if he is so
disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.”
64. It is interesting to note that Article 191(1) of the Constitution
provides for disqualification of a person (a) for being chosen as
and (b) for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or the
Legislative Council if his actions or candidature attract the
grounds therein. We can therefore easily infer from the usage of
54
language under Article 191(1) that for disqualification such as
holding an office of profit, unsoundness of mind, insolvency,
etc., bars a person from continuing as a member as well as from
contesting elections. Article 191(2), on the other hand, bars a
person only “for being a member” of the Legislative Assembly or
the Legislative Council. This difference in phraseology would be
explained later when we consider the part of the order of the
Speaker which disqualified the present Petitioners for the rest of
the legislative term.
65. Article 192 of the Constitution provides that the Governor will be
the authority for determination of disqualification on the
grounds as contained under Article 191(1) of the Constitution.
In contrast, the decision as to disqualification on the ground as
contained in Article 191(2) of the Constitution vests exclusively
in the Speaker in terms of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule.
There is no dispute that provisions under Tenth Schedule are
relatable to disqualification as provided under Articles 102(2)
and 191(2) of the Constitution.
66. At this point we need to observe Article 164 (1B) and 361B of the
Constitution. Article 164(1B) of the Constitution reads as under:
55
“164. Other provisions as to Members
...
(1B). A member of the Legislative Assembly
of a State or either House of the Legislature
of a State having Legislative Council
belonging to any political party who is
disqualified for being a member of that
House under paragraph 2 of the Tenth
Schedule shall also be disqualified to be
appointed as a Minister under clause (1) for
duration of the period commencing from the
date of his disqualification till the date on
which the term of his office as such
member would expire or where he
contests any election to the Legislative
Assembly of a State or either House of
the Legislature of a State having
Legislative Council, as the case may be,
before the expiry of such period, till the
date on which he is declared elected,
whichever is earlier.”
Article 361B of the Constitution reads as under:
“361B. Disqualification for appointment
on remunerative political post.
A member of a house belonging to any
political party who is disqualified for being a
member of the House under paragraph 2 of
the Tenth Schedule shall also be disqualified
to hold any remunerative political post for
duration of the period commencing from
the date of his disqualification till the
date on which the term of his office as
such member would expire or till the date
on which he contests an election to a
56
House and is declared elected, whichever
is earlier.”
(emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provisions, it is clear that the
disqualification of a member, apart from the political taint,
results in two further restrictions as a means of punitive actions
against the members disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.
67. Having understood the meaning and ambit of disqualification,
we now need to concern ourselves with the extent of judicial
review of the order of the Speaker passed under the Tenth
Schedule.
68. Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule has an important bearing
upon extent of the judicial review in case of disqualification, and
the same is reproduced as under:
“6. Decision on questions as to
disqualification on ground of defection.—
(1) If any question arises as to whether a
member of a House has become subject to
disqualification under this Schedule, the
question shall be referred for the decision of
the Chairman or, as the case may be, the
Speaker of such House and his decision
shall be final:
Provided that where the question
which has arisen is as to whether the
Chairman or the Speaker of a House has
57
become subject to such disqualification, the
question shall be referred for the decision of
such member of the House as the House
may elect in this behalf and his decision
shall be final.
(2) All proceedings under subparagraph (1)
of this paragraph in relation to any question
as to disqualification of a member of a
House under this Schedule shall be deemed
to be proceedings in Parliament within the
meaning of Article 122 or, as the case may
be, proceedings in the Legislature of a State
within the meaning of Article 212.”
Disqualification is with respect to the status of being a member
of the House and can only be considered by the Speaker if such
question, through a petition, is addressed/ referred to the
Speaker. It is apparent from the reading of paragraph 6 of the
Tenth Schedule that the decision of the Speaker on
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is final.
69. However, the finality which is attached to the order of Speaker
cannot be meant to take away the power of this Court to review
the same. In the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) this Court
recognized the Speaker’s role as a tribunal and allowed judicial
review of the orders of the same on the grounds provided
therein. The Speaker, being a constitutional functionary, is
generally presumed to have adjudicated with highest traditions
58
of constitutionalism. In view of the same, a limited review was
allowed for the courts to adjudicate upon the orders passed by
the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule. Here, we need to
appreciate the difference in the meaning of the terms ‘final’ and
‘conclusive’, in the context that the order of the Speaker is final
but not conclusive and the same is amenable to judicial review.
70. Now we come to the principles that have been evolved by Courts
in deciding a challenge to the order passed by Speaker in
exercise of his powers under the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution. In the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) this Court,
while upholding the constitutionality of the Tenth Schedule of
the Constitution, held that the finality clause under paragraph
6(2) of the Tenth Schedule limits the scope of judicial review
available to an aggrieved person to certain limited grounds. This
Court, in this context, held that:
“109. In the light of the decisions referred
to above and the nature of function that is
exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under
Paragraph 6, the scope of judicial review
under Articles 136, and 226 and 227 of the
Constitution in respect of an order passed
by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph
6 would be confined to jurisdictional errors
only viz., infirmities based on violation
of constitutional mandate, mala fides,
59
noncompliance with rules of natural
justice and perversity.”
(emphasis supplied)
71. The Petitioners contend that the principles of natural justice
were breached when the Speaker provided for a threedays’
notice, in derogation of Rule 7(3)(b) of the Karnataka Legislative
Assembly (Disqualification of Members on Ground of Defection)
Rules, 1986, wherein a sevenday period is prescribed. On the
contrary, the Respondents have emphatically stressed on the
fact that there was adequate opportunity given to the
disqualified members to make out their case before the Speaker.
72. Principles of natural justice cannot be reduced into a
straitjacket formula. The yardstick of judging the compliance of
natural justice, depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case. In the case of R.S. Dass v. Union of India, (1986) Supp
SCC 617, this Court made following observations:
“25. It is well established that rules of
natural justice are not rigid rules, they
are flexible and their application depends
upon the setting and the background of
statutory provision, nature of the right
which may be affected and the
consequences which may entail, its
application depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case....”
60
(emphasis supplied)
73. This Court in the case of Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) held
that the Speaker decides the question as to the disqualification
in an adjudicatory disposition. This view received further
elaboration by this court in the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union
of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641 at page 653:
“20...An order of an authority exercising
judicial or quasijudicial functions passed
in violation of the principles of natural
justice is procedurally ultra vires and,
therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional
error. That is the reason why in spite of the
finality imparted to the decision of the
Speakers/Chairmen by paragraph 6(1) of
the Tenth Schedule such a decision is
subject to judicial review on the ground of
noncompliance with rules of natural
justice. But while applying the principles
of natural justice, it must be borne in
mind that “they are not immutable but
flexible” and they are not cast in a rigid
mould and they cannot be put in a legal
straitjacket. Whether the requirements of
natural justice have been complied with
or not has to be considered in the
context of the facts and circumstances of
a particular case.”
(emphasis supplied)
61
74. At this point, the Petitioners have placed reliance on the case of
Balachandra L. Jarkhiholi v. B. S. Yeddyurappa, (2011) 7
SCC 1 and argued that in that case, this Court had struck down
the disqualification order solely on the basis of the fact that only
three days’ notice was given to the members. However, it is
relevant to point out here, that in the Ravi S. Naik case (supra),
a disqualification order wherein the Speaker had granted two
days’ notice to the members was upheld. The question,
therefore, is not the number of days that were given by the
Speaker for answering the showcause notice, rather to see
whether an effective opportunity of hearing was provided. This
brings us back to the point already reiterated that the principle
of natural justice is not a straitjacket formula.
75. In this context, this aspect needs to be adjudicated in the
individual facts and circumstances having regard to the fact as
to whether the members received notice of hearing, the reason
for their absence and their representation before the Speaker.
Therefore, we will deal with the individual cases later, having
regard to the law laid down. [Refer to Chapter J]
62
76. The second contention raised by some of the Petitioners is that
the order of the Speaker was passed in violation of the
constitutional mandate. We are of the considered view that such
contention cannot be sustained.
77. The phrase “violation of constitutional mandate” speaks for itself
and does not need much elaboration. A “constitutional mandate”
can be understood as what is required under, or by, the
Constitution. For instance, in the Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble
Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184, the phrase
“constitutional mandate” is used in this sense:
“360...On a plain reading, Article 122(1)
prohibits "the validity of any proceedings in
Parliament" from being "called in question"
in a court merely on the ground of
"irregularity of procedure". In other words,
the procedural irregularities cannot be used
by the court to undo or vitiate what
happens within the four walls of the
legislature. But then, 'procedural
irregularity' stands in stark contrast to
'substantive illegality' which cannot be
found included in the former. We are of the
considered view that this specific provision
with regard to check on the role of the
judicial organ visàvis proceedings in
Parliament uses language which is neither
vague nor ambiguous and, therefore, must
be treated as the constitutional mandate
on the subject, rendering unnecessary
search for an answer elsewhere or
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invocation of principles of harmonious
construction.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the context of the Tenth Schedule, and an order of
disqualification passed by the Speaker thereunder, the
“constitutional mandate” is therefore nothing but what is
constitutionally required of the Speaker. A “violation of
constitutional mandate” is merely an unconstitutional act of the
Speaker, one that cannot be defended on the touchstone of the
Tenth Schedule and the powers or duties of the Speaker therein
and is in contravention or violation of the same.
78. On the point of violation of constitutional mandate, although we
are of the opinion that there was an error committed by the
Speaker in deciding the disqualification petitions, the same does
not rise to a level which requires us to quash the disqualification
orders in their entirety. The specific error which we have
identified relates to the period of disqualification imposed by the
Speaker in the impugned orders. However, this error is
severable, and does not go to the root of the disqualification, and
thus does not require us to quash the disqualification orders in
toto. Our findings on this issue highlighted above are dealt with
in separate section of this judgment, for the sake of clarity.
64
79. The third contention of the Petitioners is that the orders of the
Speaker were passed with malafides, and therefore, the same
needs to be quashed. While there is no gainsaying that the
ground of malafides is available to an individual challenging the
order of the Speaker, the onus of proof regarding the same is on
the one who challenges the said action and has a very heavy
burden to discharge. [See E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3; Raja Ram Pal case (supra); SubCommittee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India,
(1991) 4 SCC 699]. In the present case, although the Petitioners
claimed that the Speaker acted malafide, they have neither
made any specific allegation, nor can it be said that they have
discharged the heavy burden that is required to prove that the
ground of malafide is made out.
80. The Petitioners have contended that the order of the Speaker is
perverse; however, they are not able to specifically point out any
such instance. “Perversity” has been understood by this Court in
a catena of judgments as relating to a situation where the
findings assailed before it have been arrived at on the basis of no
65
evidence, or thoroughly unreliable evidence, and no reasonable
person would act upon it.
81. Although, the learned Senior Counsel Dr. Rajeev Dhavan
contended that the “some material” test needs to be applied to
determine perversity. However, we are not expressing any
opinion on this issue as in the earlier case of Mayawati v.
Markandeya Chand, (1998) 7 SCC 517, a threeJudge Bench of
this Court expressed different views on the same. In our opinion,
the impugned orders of the Speaker can be sustained from the
challenge made on the ground of perversity as the Respondents
have been able to show that there was sufficient material
available before the Speaker to pass the impugned orders.
Further, on a consideration of the totality of the facts brought on
record before us, it cannot be held that the findings of the
Speaker are so unreasonable or unconscionable that no tribunal
could have arrived at the same findings. Additionally, it may be
noticed that the counsel for the Petitioners did not even
controvert before us, the material relied upon by the Speaker. In
view of the above, the Petitioners failed to show any illegality in
the orders of the Speaker.
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82. Before we conclude we need to refer to Griffith and Ryle
on Parliament Functions, Practice and Procedure (1989
edn., p. 119) say:
“Loyalty to party is the norm, being
based on shared beliefs. A divided party
is looked on with suspicion by the
electorate. It is natural for Members to
accept the opinion of their Leaders and
Spokesmen on the wide variety of
matters on which those Members have no
specialist knowledge. Generally Members
will accept majority decisions in the party
even when they disagree. It is
understandable therefore that a Member
who rejects the party whip even on a single
occasion will attract attention and more
criticism than sympathy. To abstain from
voting when required by party to vote is
to suggest a degree of unreliability. To
vote against party is disloyalty. To join
with others in abstention or voting with
the other side of conspiracy.”
(emphasis supplied)
83. There is no gainsaying that the scope of judicial review is limited
to only grounds elaborated under the Kihoto Hollohan case
(supra). In this regard, the Petitioners have not been able to
establish any illegality in the orders passed by the Speaker. The
Speaker, in our view, had concluded based on material and
evidence that the members have voluntarily given up their
67
membership of the party, thereby accruing disqualification in
terms of the Tenth Schedule, which facts cannot be reviewed
and evaluated by this Court in these writ petitions. So, we have
to accept the orders of the Speaker to the extent of
disqualification.
H.POWER OF THE SPEAKER TO DIRECT
DISQUALIFICATION TILL THE EXPIRY OF THE TERM
84. The Petitioners have submitted that the Speaker, through the
disqualification orders, has prohibited them from contesting
elections and becoming members of the House for the remaining
duration of the 15th Legislative Assembly of Karnataka.
85. The impugned disqualification orders not only disqualify the
Petitioners, but also indicated the time period for which they
would be disqualified, viz., from the date of the order till the
expiry of the term of the 15th Legislative Assembly of Karnataka.
86. Learned counsel for the Petitioners have specifically challenged
this finding by asserting that the Speaker did not have the
jurisdiction. They contended that the Speaker’s orders have the
effect of disqualifying them from contesting elections and “being
68
chosen” as members. Learned Senior Counsel asserted that the
Constitutional provisions, particularly Articles 361B and
164(1B) of the Constitution, clarify that the disqualification of a
member under the Tenth Schedule does not bar him from
contesting elections, and on a member being reelected the bar
under the two Articles comes to an end.
87. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, defended the orders of
the Speaker barring the disqualified members till the end of the
term of the Legislative Assembly. He contended that the Speaker
was within his jurisdiction, as the master of the House, to
punish the members for having indulged in antiparty activities.
While the learned Senior Counsel was unable to point to any
specific provision in the Constitution allowing the same, he
submitted that the Speaker has the inherent power to maintain
the integrity and decorum of the House. The learned Senior
Counsel gave the example of the power of the Speaker to take
action against a member who commits a crime in the well of the
House, despite the absence of any specific provision allowing
him to do the same. The learned Senior Counsel lastly submitted
that unless the Speaker had such a power, the antidefection
69
law would be a toothless law and that constitutional morality
requires such interpretation.
88. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Election Commission of India submitted that as a matter of
practice, the Election Commission has always allowed a person
disqualified under the Tenth Schedule to participate in the next
election. The learned Senior Counsel substantiated his position
by indicating from the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution that the Speaker has only been given a limited
jurisdiction therein, that is, to decide on the question of
disqualification. The consequences of the same, however, are
separately provided for under the Constitution, and the Speaker
does not have the power to decide the same. The learned Senior
Counsel also took us through the phrasing of Article 191 of the
Constitution, which provides for disqualification, and Section 36
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to indicate that
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is not included in the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 as a ground for rejecting
the nomination of a candidate. Finally, the learned Senior
Counsel submitted that barring someone from contesting
elections is a very serious penal power which cannot be resorted
70
to by the Speaker in absence of an express and specific
provision of law.
89. The crucial question which arises is whether the power of the
Speaker extends to specifically disqualifying the members till the
end of the term?
90. The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution while dealing with
disqualification on account of defection, does not specify the
consequences or period of such disqualification. In fact, the
vacancy which results from the disqualification is provided
under Article 190(3) of the Constitution. The scope of the
Speaker’s powers on disqualification requires us to examine the
other provisions of the Constitution and relevant statutory
provisions.
91. Article 191 of the Constitution provides for disqualification from
the membership of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative
Council of a State generally. Article 191(1) of the Constitution is
a general provision providing for the disqualification from the
membership of the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative
Council of a State on the grounds mentioned therein. Article
191(2) of the Constitution specifically provides that a person
disqualified under the Tenth Schedule is disqualified for being a
71
member. It is relevant to note that Article 191(2) of the
Constitution, like the Tenth Schedule, does not provide that the
“disqualification” is to operate for a particular period or
duration.
92. The contrast in phraseology between Article 191(1) and Article
191(2) of the Constitution is crucial for deciding the present
controversy. Article 191(1) of the Constitution provides that a
person disqualified under any one of the clauses of Article 191(1)
is disqualified both “for being chosen as” and “for being” a
member of the house. In contrast, Article 191(2) only uses the
phrase “for being a member”, which is the language used in
paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule. The exclusion of the phrase
“for being chosen as” a member in Article 191(2) of the
Constitution suggests that the disqualification under the Tenth
Schedule is qualitatively and constitutionally different from the
other types of disqualification that are provided for under Article
191(1) of the Constitution. The phrase “for being chosen as” has
a specific connotation, meaning that a person cannot become a
member of the House, if suffering from a disqualification under
Article 191(1) of the Constitution. At the same time, the absence
of these words in Article 191(2) of the Constitution suggests that
72
a person who is no longer a member due to disqualification
under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution does not suffer
from the additional infirmity of not being allowed to become a
member subsequently. Therefore, such a person is not barred
from contesting elections.
93. This interpretation is further supported by the language
employed in Section 36(2) of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951, which provides for when a returning officer may reject
the nomination of a candidate. Section 36(2)(a), of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 states that the
nomination may be rejected if a candidate is disqualified “for
being chosen” to fill the seat under Article 191 of the
Constitution, echoing the language employed in Article 191(1),
and not Article 191(2) of the Constitution.
94. Apart from the above, Articles 164(1B) and 361B of the
Constitution, which were inserted by the 91st Constitutional
Amendment, also show that disqualification under the Tenth
Schedule does not bar a person from contesting elections. Both
the above constitutional provisions specifically indicate the outer
period for which the consequences indicated therein would
extend, which is, either till the end of the term or till the
73
disqualified member is elected, whichever is earlier. The fact that
the phrase “whichever is earlier” is used in both these
provisions, indicates that the Constitution contemplates a
situation where an election takes place prior to the end of the
term of the House. Further, the term “election” as used in the
above provisions has not been constrained by any other word,
which strengthens the view that a member who has been
disqualified under the Tenth Schedule is not barred from
contesting elections.
95. Parliament by way of an enactment under Article 191(1)(e) read
with Entry 72 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule can
make a law providing for disqualifications of persons from
contesting elections. It is in exercise of this power that the
Parliament enacted The Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The Preamble to the aforementioned Act makes it evident that it
was enacted for the purpose of “providing qualifications and
disqualifications for membership” to the Houses of Legislature.
“An Act to provide for the conduct of
elections to the Houses of Parliament and to
the House or Houses of the Legislature of
each State, the qualifications and
disqualifications for membership of
those Houses, the corrupt practices and
other offences at or in connection with such
74
elections and the decision of doubts and
disputes arising out of or in connection with
such elections.”
(emphasis supplied)
96. Chapter II of Part II of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 provides for the qualification for membership of the State
Legislature while Chapter III vide Sections 7 to 11 provides for
disqualification for membership of the Legislature. These
sections not only provide for the event of disqualification, but
also provide for the specific periods for which such
disqualification shall operate. For instance, under Section 8 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, different periods of
disqualification are provided depending on the specific offence
an individual is convicted under.
97. However, the provisions do not provide for and deal with
disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. Clearly, Section 36 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 also does not
contemplate such disqualification. Therefore, neither under the
Constitution nor under the statutory scheme is it contemplated
that disqualification under the Tenth Schedule would operate as
a bar for contesting reelections. The language of clauses (1) and
75
(2) of Article 191, Articles 164(1B) and 361B are contrary to the
contention of the Respondents.
98. Given this position, we conclude that the Speaker does not have
any explicit power to specify the period of disqualification under
the Tenth Schedule or bar a member from contesting elections
after disqualification until the end of the term of the Legislative
Assembly.
99. It is necessary for us to look at the submission of the learned
Senior Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, that the Speaker can still be
said to have inherent powers which allows him to pass
restrictions like the one impugned herein. On this point, the
counsel for the Petitioners argued that such a broad inherent
power does not exist with the Speaker. He contended that even
for granting leave of absence, the Speaker is required to present
the same before the Legislative Assembly, which needs to accept
the leave application before leave of absence is actually granted.
100. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, that the power of the Speaker to bar a
disqualified member from contesting reelection is inherent to
his role and is required to be read into the Constitution to
prevent the Speaker from becoming toothless. When the express
76
provisions of the Constitution provide for a specific eventuality,
it is not appropriate to read an “inherent” power to confer
additional penal consequences. To do so, and accept the
contention of the respondents, would be against the express
provisions of the Constitution.
101. This Court has repeatedly held that a person cannot be barred
from contesting elections if he is otherwise qualified to contest
the same. This legal position is vividly illustrated by the
Constitution Bench ruling in G. Narayanaswami v. G.
Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717. In dealing with the question
as to whether a nongraduate was qualified to be a candidate for
the graduate constituency for the Legislative Council, when such
a requirement was not prescribed either by the Constitution or
the Parliament, this Court reversed the judgment of the Madras
High Court which required the candidate to be a graduate. This
Court held that when the law does not require such a
qualification, it cannot be imposed by the Courts, and observed
that:
“20. We think that the language as well as
the legislative history of Articles 171 and
173 of the Constitution and Section 6 of the
Representation of People Act, 1951, enable
77
us to presume a deliberate omission of the
qualification that the representative of the
graduates should also be a graduate. In our
opinion, no absurdity results if we presume
such an intention. We cannot infer as the
learned Judge of the Madras High Court
had done, from the mere fact of such an
omission and opinions about a supposed
scheme of “functional representation”
underlying Article 171 of our Constitution,
that the omission was either unintentional
or that it led to absurd results. We think
that, by adding a condition to be
necessary or implied qualifications of a
representative of the graduates which the
Constitutionmakers, or, in any event the
Parliament, could have easily imposed,
the learned Judge had really invaded the
legislative sphere. The defect, if any, in
the law could be removed only by law
made by Parliament.
(emphasis supplied)
102. Similarly in the case of N.S. Vardachari v. G. Vasantha Pai,
(1972) 2 SCC 594, a threejudge bench of this Court reiterated
the above position, and held that once a candidate possesses the
qualifications and is not subject to any of the disqualifications
specified in the law, he is qualified to be a candidate and any
other consideration becomes irrelevant. The Court held that:
“18. The Representation of the People Act,
1950 prescribes qualifications for being
enrolled as an elector. Sections 8 to 10A of
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the Act set out the grounds which disqualify a
person from being a candidate. If a person
possesses all the qualifications prescribed in
the Constitution as well as in the Act and has
not incurred any of the disqualifications
mentioned therein then he is qualified to be a
candidate. It may look anomalous that a nongraduate should be a candidate in a
Graduates' constituency. But if a candidate
possesses the qualifications prescribed and
has not incurred any of the
disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution or in the Act other
consideration becomes irrelevant. That is
the ratio of the decision of this Court
in Narayanaswamy case.”
(emphasis supplied)
103. It is clear that nothing can be added to the grounds of
disqualification based on convenience, equity, logic or perceived
political intentions.
104. It is the contention of the Respondents that the Court should
consider desirability of having a stricter model of disqualification
wherein a person who has jumped the party lines should not be
encouraged and should be punished with severe penal
consequences for attempting to do so. Further, learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, has termed the actions of the
Petitioners as a constitutional sin.
79
105. We do not subscribe to such an extreme stand taken by the
learned Senior Counsel, considering the fact that such extreme
stand could have a chilling effect on legitimate dissent. In any
case, such a change in the policy cannot be looked into by this
Court, as the same squarely falls within the legislative forte. Any
attempt to interfere is better termed as reconstruction, which
falls beyond the scope of legal interpretation by the Courts. [refer
to G. Narayanaswami case (supra)]
106. It is clear that the power to prescribe qualifications and
disqualifications for membership to the State Legislature must
be specifically provided for under the Constitution or by the
Parliament by enacting a law. Since neither the Constitution nor
any Act provides for defection to another party as a bar from
contesting further elections, reading such a bar into the
nebulous concept of the inherent powers of the Speaker is
impermissible and invalid. Without commenting on whether the
Speaker has inherent powers or not, a Constitution Bench of
this Court in the Raja Ram Pal case (supra), while holding that
certain unwritten powers inure with the Parliament under
Article 105(3) of the Constitution, went on to observe even in
80
case of expulsion, the expelled candidate is not barred from
contesting reelection.
107. Viewed from a different angle, although the Constitution may
not say everything, this Court is mandated to expound the
unsaid. However, such elaboration cannot be done in derogation
of separation of powers and in a drastic or radical fashion. In
this context, Benjamin Constant, a prominent SwissFrench
political writer, wrote in 1814 that:
“Constitutions are seldom made by the will
of men. Time makes them. They are
introduced gradually and in an almost
imperceptible way. Yet there are
circumstances in which it is
indispensable to make a constitution.
But then do only what is indispensable.
Leave room for time and experience, so
that these two reforming powers may
direct your already constituted powers in
the improvement of what is done and the
completion of what is still to be done.”
(emphasis supplied)
108. The contention of the Respondents that the political exigencies
required such measures to be taken needs to be rejected. The
Constitutional silences cannot be used to introduce changes of
such nature.
109. In Kihoto Hollohan (supra), this Court observed:
81
48. The learned author, referring to cases in
which an elected Member is seriously
unrepresentative of the general constituency
opinion, or whose personal behaviour falls
below standards acceptable to his constituents
commends that what is needed is some
additional device to ensure that a Member
pays heed to constituents' views. Brazier
speaks of the efficacy of the device where the
constituency can recall its representative.
Brazier says: [Ibid. at 52, 53]
“What sort of conduct might attract the
operation of the recall power? First, a
Member might have misused his
Membership of the House, for example
to further his personal financial
interests in a manner offensive to his
constituents. They might consider
that the action taken against him by
the House (or, indeed, lack of action)
was inadequate …. Thirdly, the use
of a recall power might be
particularly apt when a Member
changed his party but declined to
resign his seat and fight an
immediate byelection. It is not
unreasonable to expect a Member
who crosses the floor of the House,
or who joins a new party, to
resubmit himself quickly to the
electors who had returned him in
different colours. Of course, in all
those three areas of controversial
conduct the ordinary process of
reselection might well result in the
Member being dropped as his party's
candidate (and obviously would
definitely have that result in the third
case). But that could only occur when
82
the time for reselection came; and in
any event the constituency would still
have the Member representing them
until the next general election. A
cleaner and more timely parting of
the ways would be preferable.
Sometimes a suspended sentence
does not meet the case.”
49. Indeed, in a sense an antidefection law
is a statutory variant of its moral principle
and justification underlying the power of
recall. What might justify a provision for
recall would justify a provision for
disqualification for defection. Unprincipled
defection is a political and social evil...
(emphasis supplied)
110. From the above, it is clear that the Speaker, in exercise of his
powers under the Tenth Schedule, does not have the power to
either indicate the period for which a person is disqualified, nor
to bar someone from contesting elections. We must be careful to
remember that the desirability of a particular rule or law, should
not in any event be confused with the question of existence of
the same, and constitutional morality should never be replaced
by political morality, in deciding what the Constitution
mandates. [refer to Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992
Supp (3) SCC 217]
83
111. We, therefore, hold that part of the impugned orders passed by
the Speaker which specifies that the disqualification will last
from the date of the order to the expiry of the term of the 15th
Legislative Assembly of Karnataka to be ultra vires the
constitutional mandate, and strike down this portion of the
disqualification orders. However, this does not go to the root of
the order, and as such, does not affect the aspect of legality of
the disqualification orders.
112. Before parting, having ascertained the ambit of the Speaker’s
power, the only regret this bench has, is with respect to the
conduct and the manner in which all the constitutional
functionaries have acted in the current scenario. Being a
constitutional functionary, the Constitution requires them and
their actions to uphold constitutionalism and constitutional
morality. In this regard, a functionary is expected to not be
vacillated by the prevailing political morality and pressures. In
order to uphold the Constitution, we need to have men and
women who will make a good Constitution such as ours, better.
In this regard, Dr. Ambedkar on 25.11.1949 stated that:
… ‘As much defence as could be offered to
the Constitution has been offered by my
friends Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and
84
Mr T.T. Krishnamachari. I shall not
therefore enter into the merits of the
Constitution. Because I feel, however good
a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn
out bad because those who are called to
work it, happen to be a bad lot. However
bad a Constitution may be, it may turn
out to be good if those who are called to
work it, happen to be a good lot. The
working of a Constitution does not depend
wholly upon the nature of the Constitution.
The Constitution can provide only the
organs of State such as the Legislature, the
Executive and the Judiciary. The factors
on which the working of those organs of
the State depend are the people and the
political parties they will set up as their
instruments to carry out their wishes and
their politics. Who can say how the people
of India and their parties will behave? Will
they uphold constitutional methods of
achieving their purposes or will they prefer
revolutionary methods of achieving them? If
they adopt the revolutionary methods,
however good the Constitution may be, it
requires no prophet to say that it will fail. It
is, therefore, futile to pass any judgment
upon the Constitution without reference to
the part which the people and their parties
are likely to play.’
(emphasis supplied)
113. Dr. Rajendra Prasad reiterated the same on 26.11.1949, in the
following words:
… ‘Whatever the Constitution may or
may not provide, the welfare of the
country will depend upon the way in
85
which the country is administered. That
will depend upon the men who
administer it. It is a trite saying that a
country can have only the Government it
deserves. Our Constitution has provisions
in it which appear to some to be
objectionable from one point or another. We
must admit that the defects are inherent in
the situation in the country and the people
at large. If the people who are elected are
capable and men of character and
integrity, they would be able to make the
best even of a defective Constitution. If
they are lacking in these, the
Constitution cannot help the country.
After all, a Constitution like a machine is a
lifeless thing. It acquires life because of the
men who control it and operate it, and India
needs today nothing more than a set of
honest men who will have the interest of the
country before them.’
(emphasis supplied)
114. In view of the same, we can only point out that merely taking the
oath to protect and uphold the Constitution may not be
sufficient, rather imbibing the Constitutional values in everyday
functioning is required and expected by the glorious document
that is our Constitution. Having come to conclusion that the
Speaker has no power under the Constitution to disqualify the
members till the end of the term, we are constrained to make
certain observations.
86
115. In the end we need to note that the Speaker, being a neutral
person, is expected to act independently while conducting the
proceedings of the house or adjudication of any petitions. The
constitutional responsibility endowed upon him has to be
scrupulously followed. His political affiliations cannot come in
the way of adjudication. If Speaker is not able to disassociate
from his political party and behaves contrary to the spirit of the
neutrality and independence, such person does not deserve to
be reposed with public trust and confidence.
116. In any case, there is a growing trend of Speakers acting against
the constitutional duty of being neutral. Additionally, political
parties are indulging in horse trading and corrupt practices, due
to which the citizens are denied of stable governments. In these
circumstances, the Parliament is required to reconsider
strengthening certain aspects of the Tenth Schedule, so that
such undemocratic practices are discouraged.
I. REFERENCE TO CONSTITUTION BENCH
117. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel, has contended that the
matters herein involve substantial questions of law, which
require a reference to a larger bench. To support his argument,
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he has referred to Article 145 (3) of the Constitution to state that
this Court is mandated under law to refer the matters to a larger
bench since a substantial question of law concerning the
interpretation of the Constitution has arisen in the instant case.
118. At this juncture, it may be beneficial to quote Article 145(3) of
the Constitution:
“145. Rules of Court, etc.
...
(3)The minimum number of Judges who are
to sit for the purpose of deciding any case
involving a substantial question of law as to
the interpretation of this Constitution or for
the purpose of hearing any reference under
Article 143 shall be five:
Provided that, where the Court hearing an
appeal under any of the provisions of this
Chapter other than Article 132 consists of
less than five Judges and in the course of
the hearing of the appeal the Court is
satisfied that the appeal involves a
substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of this Constitution the
determination of which is necessary for the
disposal of the appeal, such Court shall
refer the question for opinion to a Court
constituted as required by this clause for
the purpose of deciding any case involving
such a question and shall on receipt of the
opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity
with such opinion.”
88
119. There is no doubt that the requirements under Article 145(3) of
the Constitution have never been dealt with extensively and,
more often than not, have received mere lip service, wherein this
Court has found existence of case laws which have already dealt
with the proposition involved, and have rejected such references.
Normatively, this trend requires consideration in appropriate
cases, to ensure that unmeritorious references do not
unnecessarily consume precious judicial time in the Supreme
Court.
120. In any case, we feel that there is a requirement to provide a
preliminary analysis with respect to the interpretation of this
provision. In this context, we need to keep in mind two
important phrases occurring in Article 145(3) of the
Constitution, which are, ‘substantial question of law’ and
‘interpretation of the Constitution’. By reading the aforesaid
provision, two conditions can be culled out before a reference is
made:
i. The Court is satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of
this Constitution;
ii. The determination of which is necessary for the disposal
of the case.
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121. We may state that we are not persuaded for referring the present
case to a larger bench as the mandate of the aforesaid Article is
that this Court needs to be satisfied as to the existence of a
substantial question of law on the Constitutional interpretation.
However, this does not mean that every case of constitutional
interpretation should be compulsorily referred to a
Constitutional Bench.
122. Any question of law of general importance arising incidentally, or
any ancillary question of law having no significance to the final
outcome, cannot be considered as a substantial question of law.
The existence of substantial question of law does not weigh on
the stakes involved in the case, rather, it depends on the impact
the question of law will have on the final determination. If the
questions having a determining effect on the final outcome have
already been decided by a conclusive authority, then such
questions cannot be called as “substantial questions of law”. In
any case, no substantial question of law exists in the present
matter, which needs reference to a larger bench. The cardinal
need is to achieve a judicial balance between the crucial
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obligation to render justice and the compelling necessity of
avoiding prolongation of any lis.
123. Similar questions for reference to a larger bench had arisen in
the case of Abdul Rahim Ismail C. Rahimtoola v. State of
Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 1315, wherein this Court rejected the
reference as the questions sought to be referred were already
settled by an earlier five judge bench. Likewise, this Court in the
case of Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682, held that a substantial
question of interpretation of a provision of the Constitution
cannot arise when the law on the subject has been finally and
effectively decided by this Court. The same is provided
hereunder:
“11... Learned counsel suggests that the
question raised involves the interpretation
of a provision of the Constitution and
therefore the appeal of this accused will
have to be referred to a Bench consisting of
not less than 5 Judges. Under Article 145(3)
of the Constitution only a case involving a
substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution shall be
heard by a bench comprising not less than
5 Judges. This Court held in State of
Jammu and Kashmir v. Thakur Ganga
Singh, AIR 1960 SC 356 that a substantial
question of interpretation of a provision
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of the Constitution cannot arise when
the law on the subject has been finally
and effectively decided by this
Court…..As the question raised has already
been decided by this Court, what remains is
only the application of the principle laid
down to the facts of the present case. We
cannot, therefore, hold that the question
raised involves a substantial question of law
as to the interpretation of the Constitution
within the meaning Article 145(3) of the
Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
This Court sitting in a three Judge Bench in People's Union for
Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399, has
reiterated the above principle.
124. In light of the above pronouncements, we observe that question
of constitutional interpretation would arise only if two or more
possible constructions are sought to be placed on a provision. In
spite of the assertive arguments made by the learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, we are guided by the decisions
rendered by two Constitutional Bench decisions of this Court in
the Kihoto Hollohan case (supra) and Rajendra Singh Rana
case (supra). These decisions form the authoritative framework
for understanding the Tenth Schedule and have been followed in
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a number of subsequent judgments and do not require
reconsideration.
125. At the cost of repetition, we may note that the ambit of this
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution is well
settled, which does not merit any further reference in this
regard. The Respondents have contended that the
disqualification issue cannot be dealt under the writ jurisdiction,
however, we have already pointed out that there is no bar for
this Court to deal with the same as portrayed by various
precedents cited above.
126. The case mostly turns on the fact that there is ample evidence to
portray that the defection of these Petitioners had occurred even
before they resigned. In the impugned orders, the Speaker has
made out a case that the acts of the Petitioners indicated
“voluntary giving up of membership”. Therefore, the question as
to the jurisdiction of the Speaker to deal with disqualification
after the members have tendered the resignation does not arise,
stricto sensu. In view of the aforesaid factual scenario, there is
no requirement to deal with the questions of law raised by the
Respondents.
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127. Further, the power of the Speaker to disqualify has been
interpreted in a number of cases, and the present case does not
require any broadbased reference which would only prolong the
inevitable. Such casual and cavalier references should not be
undertaken by this Court in view of conditions prescribed under
Article 145(3) of the Constitution, which mandates a
responsibility upon this Court not to indulge in excessive
academic endeavors and preserve precious judicial time, and
effectively dispense justice in a timely fashion.
128. The last aspect, which relates to the power of the Speaker to
disqualify the members till the end of the term, has already been
dealt with extensively. At the cost of repetition, we may only
point out that the Respondents’ contention that a bar exists on
the members till the end of the term, falls within the domain of
the legislature. Therefore, we do not see any merit in referring
the aforesaid case to a larger bench. [Refer to Public Interest
Foundation v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 224]
129. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we decline to refer the case
to a larger bench considering that there is no substantial
question of constitutional interpretation that arises in this case.
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J. INDIVIDUAL CASES
W.P. (C) NO. 992 OF 2019
130. The Petitioner (Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil) accepts that he was
elected on the ticket of INC and claims that he proceeded to
Chennai for personal reasons without abstaining from his
presence in the ongoing Assembly Session. Admittedly, the
Petitioner had abstained from attending the proceedings in the
Assembly on 18.07.2019 and 19.07.2019. Pursuant to the same,
the disqualification petition was filed against him on 20.07.2019
and he was further directed to appear for hearing on
24.07.2019. Subsequently, the Petitioner had written a letter
dated 23.07.2019 addressing the Speaker and seeking four
weeks’ time to file appropriate reply to the contents of the
petition. Nevertheless, the Hon’ble Speaker proceeded and
passed the disqualification order on 28.07.2019 which has been
impugned in the instant petition.
131. It ought to be noted that the impugned order passed by the
Hon’ble Speaker, refers to the communication/letters addressed
by the petitioner of having gone to Chennai, but due to
discomfort and health reasons had contacted his doctor friend
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and accordingly proceeded to Mumbai where he was admitted. It
also records that the petitioner had attended the Assembly
sessions on 12.07.2019 and 15.07.2019 but thereafter had
abstained from attending the session on 22.07.2019 for which
whip had been issued on 20.07.2019. It was also admitted that
no formal leave was granted to the Petitioner. The Speaker had
earlier rejected the leave of absence tendered by the Petitioner as
the documents issued by the private hospital did not inspire
confidence. Pertinently, the petitioner’s letter dated 19.07.2019
written to the Speaker was not countersigned by any doctors of
the Hospital.
132. It is further recorded that the petitioner had not attended the
Assembly sessions on 18.07.2019, 19.07.2019, 22.07.2019 and
23.07.2019. So, the petitioner was aware that the motion
seeking the vote of confidence was on the floor of the Karnataka
Legislative Assembly. The petitioner accepts that he had sent
letter dated 23.07.2019, which refers to the disqualification
petition. The petitioner herein was clearly aware of the
disqualification proceedings.
133. The objections filed to the writ petition also refer to the fact that
the INC, to test the loyalty of its Members, in view of the pending
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trust vote, had categorically informed the party members not to
absent themselves from the proceedings of the Assembly, failing
which action under the Tenth Schedule would be taken.
134. We do not think that the order of the Speaker suffers from
perversity. Even the petitioner has not submitted material to
controvert the findings recorded by the Speaker in the impugned
order. With regard to the assertion that there was violation of
principles of natural justice would not also stand in view of the
fact that the Speaker has taken a holistic view and gave sound
reasons to disqualify the petitioner after providing him sufficient
opportunity to defend himself. Alleged violation of principles of
natural justice also do not carry any weight in view of the factual
background of the case read in light of the fact that trust vote
had to be voted upon.
W. P. (C) NO. 997 OF 2019
135. The Petitioners were elected to the 15th Karnataka Legislative
Assembly on the INC ticket. On 19.01.2019, showcause notices
were issued to the Petitioners by INC for having failed to attend
the party meeting on 18.01.2019, to which explanation was
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submitted by the Petitioners claiming that due to personal
exigencies and medical reasons they could not attend the
meeting. However, the Petitioners again failed to attend the
meeting held on 08.02.2019. The Petitioners also did not attend
the Budget session. On 08.02.2019, the Petitioner No.1 (Ramesh
Jarkhiholi) sought leave of absence in a letter addressed to the
Speaker, due to his daughter’s wedding fixed for 24.02.2019.
Similarly, the Petitioner No. 2 (Mahesh Kumathalli) had also
addressed a letter seeking leave of absence due to illhealth.
disqualification petition was filed against the two Petitioners on
11.02.2019 on the ground that the Petitioners had voluntarily
given up membership of the political party, i.e. INC and incurred
disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule.
Thereupon, notices were issued to the Petitioners on
14.02.2019, who duly filed their response disputing the contents
of the disqualification petition on 20.02.2019. While the
disqualification petition was pending, the two Petitioners
submitted their resignation to the Speaker along with ten other
MLAs belonging to INC/JD(S) on 06.07.2019. The Petitioners
were thereupon given notice to appear before the Speaker on
11.07.2019 in connection with the disqualification petition.
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136. The Speaker in the impugned order has taken note of the
surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the
Petitioners from February 2019 onwards. It ought to be noted
that sufficient opportunity of hearing was accorded to the
Petitioners herein who had also filed their responses. It ought to
be noted that, vide notice dated 16.01.2019, a meeting of the
INC legislative party was called for 18.01.2019. The notice stated
that the members must compulsorily attend the meeting
otherwise action would be taken against them under the Tenth
Schedule. The Petitioners did not attend the party meeting on
18.01.2019. Admittedly, the Petitioners also refrained from
attending the subsequent general body meeting dated
06.02.2019 as well as Assembly Sessions from 06.02.2019. The
resignations were submitted by the Petitioners nearly four
months after the Disqualification Petition had already been filed.
137. One of the contentions raised by the Petitioners is predicated on
the order of the Speaker in the case of Dr. Umesh Yadav who
was also named and served with the disqualification petition
filed on 11.02.2019. Dr. Umesh Yadav had tendered his
resignation on 04.03.2019, which was accepted by the Speaker
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on 01.04.2019. Therefore, the Petitioners claim parity and equal
treatment. The contention deserves to be rejected as the Speaker
has given detailed reasons to why he was not bound by the case
of Dr. Umesh Yadav’s resignation.
138. As observed earlier, the Speaker had sufficient material before
him to pass the order of disqualification. There exist no
infirmities in the order, which calls for our indulgence and
interference.
W.P. (C) NOS. 998, 1000, 1001, 1005, 1006 AND 1007 OF
2019
139. The three Petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 1005 of 2019 were
members of the JD(S), against whom a separate Disqualification
Petition No. 5 of 2019 was moved. The Speaker passed a
separate impugned order dated 28.07.2019 against these
Petitioners.
140. Petitioners in Writ Petition (C) Nos. 998, 1000, 1001, 1006 and
1007 of 2019 were all members of the INC, against whom
Disqualification Petition Nos. 3 and 4 of 2019 were moved. A
common order dated 28.07.2019, disqualifying the 10
Petitioners, was passed by the Speaker.
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141. Both the above orders are being dealt with together as there are
certain commonalities in the facts and circumstances which
need to be noted and highlighted, which led to the decision of
the Speaker. Between 01.07.2019 and 11.07.2019, the
Petitioners resigned from their posts as members of the
Legislative Assembly. However, the Speaker did not adjudicate
upon their resignation. Aggrieved by the fact that the Speaker
was not taking a decision, ten Petitioners approached this Court
in WP (C) No. 872 of 2019, wherein this Court on 11.07.2019,
passed an order directing the Speaker to take the decision
forthwith. The Speaker, on the other hand, did not take the
decision. The other five Petitioners impleaded themselves in the
pending Writ Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019 and again, on
17.07.2019, this Court granted protection to the Petitioners with
respect to being compelled to participate in the proceedings of
the House. As the Speaker, did not conduct the floor test, R.
Shankar [Petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No. 1003 of 2019]
approached this Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 929 of 2019,
wherein this Court passed following order on 23.07.2019:
“It has been stated that the Speaker expects
and is optimistic that the Trust Vote would
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be taken up by the House in the Course of
the day, perhaps later in the evening. We,
therefore, adjourn the matter till tomorrow.
142. In this regard, it was imperative for the Speaker to pass orders
in view of the urgency indicated by this Court. In these facts and
circumstances, the reasonable opportunity of hearing needs to
be assessed.
143. A notice of three days with an opportunity for hearing would
have been sufficient in the facts and circumstances of this case,
when viewed in light of the decision in the Ravi S Naik case
(supra). In this regard, our attention was drawn to the fact that
notices were sent to their emails, and their permanent addresses
within their constituency. In view of the unique facts, it cannot
be said that an opportunity was not provided to the Petitioners
to appear before the Speaker.
144. It is altogether a different matter that the aforesaid Petitioners
were in Mumbai even though they were aware of the notice, and
some of them did not even bother to be represented before the
Speaker. In this light, we cannot say that effective opportunity
was not granted to the Petitioners. Consequently, it cannot be
102
said as well that there has been a violation of principles of
natural justice as against the aforesaid Petitioners.
W.P. (C) NO. 1003 OF 2019
145. The Petitioner (R. Shankar) claims that he is the sole elected
member of the House belonging to KPJP. As per the Petitioner,
KPJP had not merged with INC and consequently whip issued by
the INC on 11.07.2019 was not binding on the Petitioner. As a
result, the Petitioner had not incurred any disqualification under
the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
146. The Petitioner, however, accepts that he had addressed a letter
dated 14.06.2019 to the Speaker that he was the only legislator
elected under the KPJP ticket and he had agreed to merge his
party with the INC. The Petitioner had relied upon paragraph
4(2) of the Tenth Schedule stating that since he is the sole
elected member of his party there is a deemed merger under the
Tenth Schedule.
147. The Petitioner, however, claims that the said letter dated
14.06.2019 was not accepted by the Speaker and, therefore,
would be inconsequential. He relied upon the letter dated
17.06.2019 written by the Speaker requiring him to file on
record resolution of merger passed by KPJP, and to furnish
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documents as per legal requirements. It was further stated that
is stated that no such document was filed.
148. The impugned order passed by the Speaker, on the other hand,
refers to the letter of the Speaker dated 25.06.2019 stating that
in terms of paragraph 4(2) of the Tenth Schedule, if two thirds of
the members of the party decides to merge with another party,
that decision would not attract provisions of the Tenth Schedule.
As the Petitioner had represented that he was the lone elected
member of the KPJP and had decided to merge with INC,
appropriate steps had been initiated. In this background, with
effect from 25.06.2019, the Petitioner would be considered as a
member of the INC legislative party. The Petitioner has disputed
this letter and has stated that this letter was not addressed to
him but was addressed to the Leader of the Congress Legislature
Party and the President of the Karnataka Pradesh Congress
Party. The letter dated 25.06.2019 is available on the file of the
Speaker.
149. The contention of the Petitioner may have carried weight in other
circumstances, but we find that it is an accepted and admitted
position that the Petitioner, after giving letter dated 14.06.2019,
had even become a Minister in the Government then in power.
104
Pertinently, the Petitioner does not deny the letter dated
14.06.2019 and the fact that he had become a Minister. The
impugned order passed by the Speaker further records that on
25.06.2019 a direction had been issued by the Speaker to the
Secretary, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, to treat the
Petitioner as a member of the INC and allot him a seat in the
forthcoming session. Further, on 08.07.2019, the Petitioner had
addressed a letter to the then Chief Minister tendering his
resignation from the Council of Ministers of which he was a part,
with a request that his resignation be accepted. This resignation
was also personally given to the Governor. On 12.07.2019, the
Petitioner had addressed a letter to the Speaker about
withdrawing support to the Government and had requested that
he be allotted a seat on the floor in the opposite benches. These
aspects have been highlighted in the impugned order, which
show that the contention of the Petitioner that the Speaker did
not apply his mind on the aspect of merger, is wrong and
incorrect.
150. We do not find any reason and good ground to hold that the
findings in the impugned order are perverse and based on no
evidence. Rather the stand and plea taken by the Petitioner is
105
devoid of merit. Similarly, the plea predicated on the violation of
principles of natural justice must fail in the light of the above
facts.
151. Our findings on allegations of not granting specific time in all
the above cases are based on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case. It should not be understood to
mean that the Speaker could cut short the hearing period. The
Speaker should give sufficient opportunity to a member before
deciding a disqualification proceeding and ordinarily follow the
time limit prescribed in the Rules of the Legislature.
K.CONCLUSION
152. In light of the discussion above, summary of law as held herein
is as follows:
a. The Speaker, while adjudicating a disqualification petition,
acts as a quasijudicial authority and the validity of the
orders thus passed can be questioned before this Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution. However, ordinarily,
the party challenging the disqualification is required to first
approach the High Court as the same would be
appropriate, effective and expeditious.
b. The Speaker’s scope of inquiry with respect to acceptance
or rejection of a resignation tendered by a member of the
legislature is limited to examine whether such a resignation
was tendered voluntarily or genuinely. Once it is
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demonstrated that a member is willing to resign out of his
free will, the speaker has no option but to accept the
resignation. It is constitutionally impermissible for the
Speaker to take into account any extraneous factors while
considering the resignation. The satisfaction of the Speaker
is subject to judicial review.
c. Resignation and disqualification on account of defection
under the Tenth Schedule, both result in vacancy of the
seat held by the member in the legislature, but further
consequences envisaged are different.
d. Object and purpose of the Tenth Schedule is to curb the
evil of political defection motivated by lure of office or
rather similar considerations which endanger the
foundation of our democracy. By the 91st Constitutional
Amendment, Articles 71 (1B), 164(1B) and 361B were
enacted to ensure that a member disqualified by the
Speaker on account of defection is not appointed as a
Minister or holds any remunerative political post from the
date of disqualification or till the date on which his term of
office would expire or he/she is reelected to the
legislature, whichever is earlier.
e. Disqualification relates back to the date when the act of
defection takes place. Factum and taint of disqualification
does not vaporise by tendering a resignation letter to the
Speaker. A pending or impending disqualification action
does not become infructuous by submission of the
resignation letter, when act(s) of disqualification have
arisen prior to the member’s resignation letter.
f. In the earlier Constitution Bench judgment of Kihoto
Hollohan (supra), the order of the Speaker under Tenth
Schedule can be subject to judicial review on four grounds:
mala fide, perversity, violation of the constitutional
mandate and order passed in violation of natural justice.
107
g. Our findings on allegations of not granting specific time in
all the above cases are based on the unique facts and
circumstances of the case. It should not be understood to
mean that the Speaker could cut short the hearing period.
The Speaker should give sufficient opportunity to a
member before deciding a disqualification proceeding and
ordinarily follow the time limit prescribed in the Rules of
the Legislature.
h. In light of the existing Constitutional mandate, the Speaker
is not empowered to disqualify any member till the end of
the term. However, a member disqualified under the Tenth
Schedule shall be subjected to sanctions provided under
Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B of Constitution, which
provides for a bar from being appointed as a Minister or
from holding any remunerative political post from the date
of disqualification till the date on which the term of his
office would expire or if he is reelected to the legislature,
whichever is earlier.
i. There is a growing trend of the Speaker acting against the
constitutional duty of being neutral. Further horse trading
and corrupt practices associated with defection and change
of loyalty for lure of office or wrong reasons have not
abated. Thereby the citizens are denied stable
governments. In these circumstances, there is need to
consider strengthening certain aspects, so that such
undemocratic practices are discouraged and checked.
j. The existence of a substantial question of law does not
weigh on the stakes involved in the case, rather, it depends
on the impact the “question of law” will have on the final
determination. If the questions having a determining effect
on the final outcome have already been decided by a
conclusive authority, then such questions cannot be called
as “substantial questions of law”. In any case, no
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substantial question of law exists in the present matter,
which needs reference to a larger bench.
153. In view of the discussion above, we pass the following order:
1. Orders dated 25.07.2019 and 28.07.2019 passed by the
Speaker in Disqualification Petition Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8
of 2019, are upheld to the extent of the disqualification of
the Petitioners therein.
2. However, the part of Speaker’s orders detailing the
duration of disqualification, viz., from the date of the
respective order till the expiry of the term of the 15th
Legislative Assembly of Karnataka, is accordingly set aside.
154. The Writ Petitions are disposed of in the aforestated terms. All
pending applications are also accordingly disposed of.
..........................J.
(N.V. Ramana)
...........................J.
(Sanjiv Khanna)
...........................J.
(Krishna Murari)
NEW DELHI;
November 13, 2019.
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