Sc.482 - Quashing of criminal case = When there is not even a whisper in the complaint that the present appellant, i.e., accused No. 4 was fully aware that accused No. 1 was not the sole beneficiary by inheritance and that the property had devolved upon the complainant and her sisters. Also there is nothing to show that knowing this he has collusively entered into the lease agreement with accused No. 1, by creating a false and fabricated will. Though, there is a mention with regard to conspiracy, but there is not even a suggestion with regard to manner of such conspiracy. - No criminal complaint is maintainable and is liable to be quashed.
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1586 OF 2019
(arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 9156 of 2017)
M. SRIKANTH .... APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. .... RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.15871588 OF 2019
(arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos. 91609161 of 2017)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.
2. Both these appeals arise out of the common Judgment
and Order passed by the single Judge of High Court of
Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the
State of Andhra Pradesh dated 01.06.2017.
2
3. The criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.
9156 of 2017 filed by M. Srikanth, the original accused No. 4,
challenges that part of the order by which the single Judge of
the High Court has rejected his application under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings in Crime No.
311/2010 of P.S., Central Crime Station, Hyderabad. The
criminal appeals arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 91609161 of
2017 at the instance of the original complainant challenge that
part of the order vide which the single Judge of the High Court
has quashed the complaint qua accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
4. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals
are as under:
The parties are referred to herein as they are arrayed
in the original complaint. The Respondent No. 2, Fatima Hasna,
in the criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9156 of
2017 (hereinafter referred to as “the complainant”), is the sister
of accused No. 1, Akramuddin Hasan. The complainant had
filed a private complaint against nine persons including accused
No. 1. The allegations in the said complaint in a nutshell is that
the house bearing No. 351102 at Narayanaguda, Hyderabad,
originally belonged to Afzaluddin Hassan, the father of the
3
complainant, who died on 28.05.1996. Afzaluddin Hassan,
possessed the same upon death of his mother, Khairunnisa
Begum Saheba as per the oral gift dated 12.12.1966 and deed of
confirmation of the said oral gift. It was the case of the
complainant, that upon death of her father, Afzaluddin Hassan,
the said property was inherited by her as well as her three
sisters and accused No. 1, her brother. It is further averred in
the complaint, that her father had entered into a development
agreement on 25.05.1989 with M/s Banjara Construction
Company Pvt. Ltd. However, the same was cancelled during his
lifetime. It is further averred by her that after the death of her
father, accused No. 3, Abid Rassol Khan, tried to trespass into
the property and for that on her complaint, Crime No. 159/1996
came to be registered for the offence punishable under Sections
448 and 380 of the IPC on 14.06.1996.
5. It is further averred by her that, thereafter, she came
to know about the existence of a document thereby assigning
the rights by M/s Banjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. in
favour of M/s NRI Housing Company Pvt. Ltd., represented
through accused No. 3, Abid Rasool Khan. For the said incident
another complaint vide Crime No. 177/1996, came to be
4
registered for the offence punishable under Sections 418 and
420 read with Section 120B of the IPC against seven persons
including M/s Banjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and
accused No. 3 in the present case. With regard to the said cause
of action, the complainant had also filed Original Suit No.
1989/1996 against accused No. 3 and others for permanent
injunction. The complainant’s sisters had filed O.S. No.
1403/1999 against M/s Banjara Construction Company Pvt.
Ltd. of which accused No. 3, Abid Rasool Khan, was the
Managing Director. According to the complainant, certain
interim orders were also passed in the said original suits.
6. It is further the case of the complainant in the
complaint, that her brother accused No. 1, Akramuddin Hasan,
who had falsely created a will in Urdu purported to be executed
by their paternal grandmother, Khairunnisa Begum Saheba, in
favour of their parents Afzaluddin Hassan and Liaquathunnisa
Begum for their lifetime and vested remainder to accused No. 1.
It is the case of the complainant, that the said will is registered
and said to have been executed on 02.04.1950. Further, it is the
case, that accused No. 1 had also created another forged and
fabricated document styled as deed of confirmation (Hiba Bil
5
Musha) dated 08.03.1990 vide which the property is orally
gifted to accused No. 1 on 29.08.1989 and also handed over
physical possession thereof.
7. It is further the case of the complainant, that accused
No. 1, posing himself to be the owner of the premises, on the
basis of the alleged oral will and deed of confirmation, created a
registered lease on 01.12.2008, bearing document No.
3107/2008 permitting accused No. 4 to sublease the said land
in favour of accused No. 5, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. (“HPCL”). Accused No. 6 and accused No. 9 are the
employees/officers of accused No. 5 HPCL whereas, accused
Nos. 7 and 8 are the attesting witnesses. On the basis of the
said complaint, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate directed the
registration of an FIR on 24.11.2010.
8. It appears, that various criminal petitions came to be
filed before the High Court. Criminal Petition No. 6047/2013
was filed by accused No. 7, Khaja Mohiuddin and accused No.
8, G. V. Prasad. Criminal Petition No. 6064/2013 came to be
filed by accused No. 3, Abid Rasool Khan. Criminal Petition No.
6609/2013 came to be filed by accused No. 4, M. Srikanth, who
is the appellant in the criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.)
6
No. 9156/2017. Criminal Petition No. 8743/2013 was filed by
accused No. 5 HPCL and its officers, accused No. 6, S.K. Srui
and accused No. 9, R. Umapathi. By the impugned Order, the
High Court allowed the Criminal Petitions of all the applicants
except accused Nos. 3 and 4.
9. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of his petition,
accused No. 4, so also the original complainant, being aggrieved
by the impugned Order by which the petitions of accused Nos.
5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 have been allowed, have approached this Court.
10. We have heard Mr. D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, M. Srikanth, and
Mr. Shakil Ahmed Syed, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the complainant. We have also heard Mr. K. M. Nataraj, learned
Additional Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the original
accused No. 5 HPCL and its officers/employees, accused Nos.
6 and 9.
11. The learned counsel for the original accused No. 4
submitted, that the only role attributed to the said accused in
the complaint is that a lease deed was executed in his favour by
7
accused No. 1, showing himself to be the absolute owner of the
property in question; whereas, the property was owned by the
complainant and her three sisters along with accused No. 1. It
is further submitted, that the entire allegations of fabrication so
as to show that the property belongs to accused No. 1 are
against accused no. 1. It is submitted that accused No. 4, on
the basis of the advertisement issued by accused No. 5 – HPCL
for installation of a petrol pump, had applied and after being
successful in the competition had obtained the land in question
on lease from accused No. 1. He submitted, that as per the
terms and conditions for grant of the said outlet, he was
required to get the land on long term lease and sublease the
same to accused No. 5 – HPCL. It is submitted, that even taking
the complaint at its face value, there are no averments which
would show that accused No. 4 had any role to play in
fabrication of the document which bestowed the title on accused
No. 1. It is further submitted, that there are various civil
proceedings pending amongst the complainant, accused No. 1
and their sisters so also the other parties. Accused No. 4 is not
at all concerned with the same.
8
12. It is further submitted, that as a matter of fact, the
case of accused No. 4 could not have been distinguished from
the case as against accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. It is
submitted, that applying the same logic, which the learned
Judge of the High Court had applied while quashing the case
against the said accused, the case against the present accused
No. 4 also ought to have been quashed. It is submitted that the
continuation of criminal proceedings against accused No. 4, the
appellant herein, would be nothing else but an abuse of the
process of law.
13. Per contra, Mr. Shakil Ahmed Syed, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the private complainant, submitted that
the High Court has rightly dismissed the petition of accused
No. 4. It is submitted, that accused No. 4 in order to deprive
the benefits of the property to the complainant had got the lease
deed executed in his favour from accused No. 1 knowing very
well that the claim of accused No. 1 was based on fabricated
document(s). He further submitted, that the High Court had
also erred in allowing the petitions of accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8
and 9 and, therefore, the order to the extent that it quashes the
criminal proceedings qua them also needs to be set aside.
9
14. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General,
submitted that accused Nos. 5, 6 and 9 have been
unnecessarily dragged in the said criminal litigation. It is
submitted that accused No. 5 HPCL is a public undertaking
and accused Nos. 6 and 9 are its officers. It is submitted that
the High Court has rightly arrived at a finding that there was no
material against them and quashed the criminal proceedings
qua them.
15. This Court, in the case of State of Haryana and Ors.
vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.1
after considering all its earlier
judgments, has laid down principles which are required to be
taken into consideration by the High Court while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the
proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to the following
observations of this Court in Bhajan Lal (supra):
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482
of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above,
we give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
10
secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to
lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and
to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated
under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
11
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge.”
16. It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that
where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute a case against the accused, the
High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings.
Further, it has been held that where the uncontroverted
allegations in the FIR and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose any offence and make out a case
against the accused, the court would be justified in quashing
the proceedings.
17. Let us consider the case of the complainant on its face
value without going into the truthfulness or otherwise thereof.
It is the case of the complainant, that the property originally
belonged to her grandmother. After her death, it devolved upon
her father, Afzaluddin Hassan and after his death on
28.05.1996, it devolved upon accused No. 1 and his three
sisters, namely, Karima Siddiqua, Saleha Asmatunnisa and
Sadika Khairunnisa. Their father had entered into a
12
development agreement with M/s Banjara Construction
Company Pvt. Ltd., however, the same was cancelled during his
lifetime. After the death of their father on 28.05.1996, accused
No. 3 tried to trespass into the property for which, on the basis
of her complaint a crime was registered. That the said M/s
Banjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. had executed some
document alleging assignment of its rights in favour of M/s NRI
Housing Company Pvt. Ltd. of which accused No. 3, Abid Rasool
Khan was the Managing Director. In respect of the same action,
Crime No. 177/1996 had been registered at the instance of the
complainant. With respect to the said transaction, two original
suits were already filed, one by the complainant and another by
her sisters.
18. It is further the case of the complainant, that accused
No.1 created a will in Urdu purported to be executed by her
grandmother bequeathing the property in favour of her parents,
namely, Afzaluddin Hassan and Liaquathunnisa Begum for
their lifetime and vesting the remainder to accused No. 1. The
said will is created on a nonjudicial stamp paper of Nizamat
Jung and has been allegedly executed on 02.04.1950.
According to the complainant, accused No. 1, her brother, had
13
created another forged and fabricated document styled as deed
of confirmation (Hiba Bil Musha) dated 08.03.1990 confirming
the oral gift to accused No. 1 and also recording handing over
of physical possession. It is her case, that on the basis of these
fabricated documents, accused No. 1, posing himself to be an
absolute owner of the property, executed a lease deed in favour
of accused No. 4 (the appellant herein in one of the appeals) on
01.12.2008. It is further the case of the complainant, that
thereafter accused No. 4 executed a sublease in favour of
accused No. 5 HPCL represented by accused Nos. 6 and 9
within a period of two months i.e. on 30.01.2009 and that
accused Nos. 7 and 8 are the attesting witnesses. That is all the
case of the complainant.
19. The complaint filed by respondent No. 2 runs into 26
pages and 26 paragraphs. As already discussed hereinabove, it
reveals a disputed property claim based on inheritance between
the complainant, her sisters and her brother, accused No. 1. A
perusal of the complaint would further reveal, that the
complainant also disputes with regard to the area of the
property including the manner of its devolution upon the
parents of the complainant and her competing interest with that
14
of her siblings. There is not even a whisper in the complaint
that the present appellant, i.e., accused No. 4 was fully aware
that accused No. 1 was not the sole beneficiary by inheritance
and that the property had devolved upon the complainant and
her sisters. Also there is nothing to show that knowing this he
has collusively entered into the lease agreement with accused
No. 1, by creating a false and fabricated will. Though, there is a
mention with regard to conspiracy, but there is not even a
suggestion with regard to manner of such conspiracy.
20. Upon perusal of the complaint itself, it would reveal
that the father of the complainant and accused No. 3 had
himself entered into a development agreement which
subsequently came to be cancelled during his lifetime. It would
also reveal, that only after the lease in question was executed in
favour of the appellant, the complainant has raised all these
issues. We are of the considered view, that the issues raised
reflect a civil dispute with regard to inheritance amongst the
legal heirs. We fail to understand as to how a dispute with
regard to the inheritance under a will and deed of confirmation
can be decided in a criminal proceeding. We find, that the same
can be done only in an appropriate civil proceeding. Not only
15
that, the civil proceedings with that regard are already
instituted by various parties including the complainant. These
proceedings are as follows:
(i) O.S. No. 239 of 2004 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(ii) O.S. No. 337 of 2002 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(iii) O.S. No. 58 of 2001 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(iv) O.S. No. 277 of 2000 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(v) O.S. No. 506 of 2001 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(vi) Writ Petition (C) No. 685 of 2010.
21. It will be relevant to refer that though in the complaint,
the complainant had mentioned about pendency of O.S. No.
1989 of 1996 against accused No. 3 and O.S. No. 1403 of 1999
against M/s Banjara Construction Pvt. Ltd., there is no
reference with regard to the other proceedings. Accused No. 4
has been impleaded as a partydefendant in O.S. No. 506 of
2001 only on 30.10.2009.
16
22. O.S. No. 239 of 2004 has already been filed by the
complainant against her brother, accused No. 1 and her three
sisters inter alia for partition and separate possession which is
stated to be pending. As such, the documents alleged to be
fraudulent in the complaint will fall for consideration in the
said suit. A possibility of contradictory finding in civil
proceeding as against criminal proceedings cannot be ruled
out. Though, the complainant had filed Writ Petition Nos.
23017/2009 and 23672/2009 to restrain construction on the
plot in question, the same was dismissed on 28.10.2009.
However, there is no mention with regard to the same in the
complaint. This Court in Sardool Singh vs. Nasib Kaur2
observed as follows:
“2. A civil suit between the parties is pending
wherein the contention of the respondent is that no
will was executed whereas the contention of the
appellants is that a will has been executed by the
testator. A case for grant of probate is also pending
in the court of learned District Judge, Rampur. The
civil court is therefore seized of the question as
regards the validity of the will. The matter is sub
judice in the aforesaid two cases in civil courts. At
this juncture the respondent cannot therefore be
permitted to institute a criminal prosecution on the
allegation that the will is a forged one. That question
will have to be decided by the civil court after
recording the evidence and hearing the parties in
accordance with law. It would not be proper to
permit the respondent to prosecute the appellants
on this allegation when the validity of the will is
2 (1987) Supp. SCC 146
17
being tested before a civil court. We, therefore, allow
the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court,
and quash the criminal proceedings pending in the
Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Chandigarh in the case entitled Smt Nasib
Kaur v. Sardool Singh. This will not come in the way
of instituting appropriate proceedings in future in
case the civil court comes to the conclusion that the
will is a forged one. We of course refrain from
expressing any opinion as regards genuineness or
otherwise of the Will in question as there is no
occasion to do so and the question is wide open
before the lower courts.”
23. It is further to be noted, that the complainant and her
sisters executed an agreement of salecumirrevocable specific
power of attorney on 20.03.2015 in favour of one Mohd. Khalid
Shareef. Various litigations have also been filed with regard to
the installation of the petrol pump and grant of N.O.C. etc. The
complaint was sent to the police for registration of an FIR and
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. on
24.11.2010. In its final report dated 30.08.2017, the police has
opined that no material had surfaced to show any conspiracy
during investigation.
24. The learned Judge himself in Paragraph 8, after
observing that it is nobodies case that the signatures on the
documents in question are forged or anybody has impersonated
for the purpose of cheating, goes on to observe thus:
18
“8…..The allegation in nutshell in this regard is that
accused No. 1 is not the absolute owner of the properties,
but for one of the coowner or cosharer along with the de
facto complainant and other sisters of them and he
falsely claimed as if he is the owner for purpose of
cheating by using as if genuine forged and fabricated
documents of so called will and so called deed of
confirmation. The so called will is of the year 1950 and
the so called deed of confirmation is of year 19891990
and the alleged oral gift prior to that is of 1966….”
25. We fail to understand, as to how after observing the
aforesaid, the learned Judge could have refused to quash the
proceedings against accused No. 4. Not only that, but on the
basis of the said observations, the learned Judge himself has
observed that it will not be in the interest of justice to permit
the Police authorities to arrest the accused for the purposes of
investigation. We are of the considered view, that the learned
Judge, having found that the entire allegations with regard to
forgery and fabrication and accused No. 1 executing the lease
deed on the basis of the said forged and fabricated documents
were only against accused No. 1, ought to have exercised his
jurisdiction to quash the proceedings qua accused No. 4 also.
We find that the learned Judge ought to have applied the same
parameters to the present accused No. 4, which had been
applied to the other accused whose applications were allowed.
19
26. Insofar as the criminal appeals arising out of the
special leave petitions filed by the original complainant is
concerned, we absolutely find no merit in the appeals. The
learned single Judge has rightly found that there was no
material to proceed against accused No. 5 – HPCL and its
officers accused Nos. 6 and 9 as also accused Nos. 7 and 8, who
have been roped in, only because they were the attesting
witnesses. The learned single Judge has rightly exercised his
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
27. Insofar as original accused No. 4 is concerned, we have
no hesitation to hold, that his case is covered by categories (1)
and (3) carved out by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal
(supra). As already discussed hereinabove, even if the
allegations in the complaint are taken on its face value, there is
no material to proceed further against accused No. 4. We are of
the considered view, that continuation of criminal proceedings
against accused No. 4, M. Srikanth, would amount to nothing
else but an abuse of process of law. As such, his appeal
deserves to be allowed.
20
28. In the result, the criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P.
(Crl.) No. 9156/2017 filed by accused No. 4 is allowed. The
criminal proceedings in Crime No. 311/2010 of P.S., Central
Crime Station, Hyderabad, against accused No. 4 are quashed
and set aside. The criminal appeals arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.)
Nos. 916061/2017 filed by the original complainant are
dismissed.
…....................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
......................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 21, 2019.
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1586 OF 2019
(arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 9156 of 2017)
M. SRIKANTH .... APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. .... RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.15871588 OF 2019
(arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos. 91609161 of 2017)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.
2. Both these appeals arise out of the common Judgment
and Order passed by the single Judge of High Court of
Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the
State of Andhra Pradesh dated 01.06.2017.
2
3. The criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.
9156 of 2017 filed by M. Srikanth, the original accused No. 4,
challenges that part of the order by which the single Judge of
the High Court has rejected his application under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings in Crime No.
311/2010 of P.S., Central Crime Station, Hyderabad. The
criminal appeals arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 91609161 of
2017 at the instance of the original complainant challenge that
part of the order vide which the single Judge of the High Court
has quashed the complaint qua accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
4. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals
are as under:
The parties are referred to herein as they are arrayed
in the original complaint. The Respondent No. 2, Fatima Hasna,
in the criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9156 of
2017 (hereinafter referred to as “the complainant”), is the sister
of accused No. 1, Akramuddin Hasan. The complainant had
filed a private complaint against nine persons including accused
No. 1. The allegations in the said complaint in a nutshell is that
the house bearing No. 351102 at Narayanaguda, Hyderabad,
originally belonged to Afzaluddin Hassan, the father of the
3
complainant, who died on 28.05.1996. Afzaluddin Hassan,
possessed the same upon death of his mother, Khairunnisa
Begum Saheba as per the oral gift dated 12.12.1966 and deed of
confirmation of the said oral gift. It was the case of the
complainant, that upon death of her father, Afzaluddin Hassan,
the said property was inherited by her as well as her three
sisters and accused No. 1, her brother. It is further averred in
the complaint, that her father had entered into a development
agreement on 25.05.1989 with M/s Banjara Construction
Company Pvt. Ltd. However, the same was cancelled during his
lifetime. It is further averred by her that after the death of her
father, accused No. 3, Abid Rassol Khan, tried to trespass into
the property and for that on her complaint, Crime No. 159/1996
came to be registered for the offence punishable under Sections
448 and 380 of the IPC on 14.06.1996.
5. It is further averred by her that, thereafter, she came
to know about the existence of a document thereby assigning
the rights by M/s Banjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. in
favour of M/s NRI Housing Company Pvt. Ltd., represented
through accused No. 3, Abid Rasool Khan. For the said incident
another complaint vide Crime No. 177/1996, came to be
4
registered for the offence punishable under Sections 418 and
420 read with Section 120B of the IPC against seven persons
including M/s Banjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and
accused No. 3 in the present case. With regard to the said cause
of action, the complainant had also filed Original Suit No.
1989/1996 against accused No. 3 and others for permanent
injunction. The complainant’s sisters had filed O.S. No.
1403/1999 against M/s Banjara Construction Company Pvt.
Ltd. of which accused No. 3, Abid Rasool Khan, was the
Managing Director. According to the complainant, certain
interim orders were also passed in the said original suits.
6. It is further the case of the complainant in the
complaint, that her brother accused No. 1, Akramuddin Hasan,
who had falsely created a will in Urdu purported to be executed
by their paternal grandmother, Khairunnisa Begum Saheba, in
favour of their parents Afzaluddin Hassan and Liaquathunnisa
Begum for their lifetime and vested remainder to accused No. 1.
It is the case of the complainant, that the said will is registered
and said to have been executed on 02.04.1950. Further, it is the
case, that accused No. 1 had also created another forged and
fabricated document styled as deed of confirmation (Hiba Bil
5
Musha) dated 08.03.1990 vide which the property is orally
gifted to accused No. 1 on 29.08.1989 and also handed over
physical possession thereof.
7. It is further the case of the complainant, that accused
No. 1, posing himself to be the owner of the premises, on the
basis of the alleged oral will and deed of confirmation, created a
registered lease on 01.12.2008, bearing document No.
3107/2008 permitting accused No. 4 to sublease the said land
in favour of accused No. 5, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. (“HPCL”). Accused No. 6 and accused No. 9 are the
employees/officers of accused No. 5 HPCL whereas, accused
Nos. 7 and 8 are the attesting witnesses. On the basis of the
said complaint, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate directed the
registration of an FIR on 24.11.2010.
8. It appears, that various criminal petitions came to be
filed before the High Court. Criminal Petition No. 6047/2013
was filed by accused No. 7, Khaja Mohiuddin and accused No.
8, G. V. Prasad. Criminal Petition No. 6064/2013 came to be
filed by accused No. 3, Abid Rasool Khan. Criminal Petition No.
6609/2013 came to be filed by accused No. 4, M. Srikanth, who
is the appellant in the criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.)
6
No. 9156/2017. Criminal Petition No. 8743/2013 was filed by
accused No. 5 HPCL and its officers, accused No. 6, S.K. Srui
and accused No. 9, R. Umapathi. By the impugned Order, the
High Court allowed the Criminal Petitions of all the applicants
except accused Nos. 3 and 4.
9. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of his petition,
accused No. 4, so also the original complainant, being aggrieved
by the impugned Order by which the petitions of accused Nos.
5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 have been allowed, have approached this Court.
10. We have heard Mr. D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, M. Srikanth, and
Mr. Shakil Ahmed Syed, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the complainant. We have also heard Mr. K. M. Nataraj, learned
Additional Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the original
accused No. 5 HPCL and its officers/employees, accused Nos.
6 and 9.
11. The learned counsel for the original accused No. 4
submitted, that the only role attributed to the said accused in
the complaint is that a lease deed was executed in his favour by
7
accused No. 1, showing himself to be the absolute owner of the
property in question; whereas, the property was owned by the
complainant and her three sisters along with accused No. 1. It
is further submitted, that the entire allegations of fabrication so
as to show that the property belongs to accused No. 1 are
against accused no. 1. It is submitted that accused No. 4, on
the basis of the advertisement issued by accused No. 5 – HPCL
for installation of a petrol pump, had applied and after being
successful in the competition had obtained the land in question
on lease from accused No. 1. He submitted, that as per the
terms and conditions for grant of the said outlet, he was
required to get the land on long term lease and sublease the
same to accused No. 5 – HPCL. It is submitted, that even taking
the complaint at its face value, there are no averments which
would show that accused No. 4 had any role to play in
fabrication of the document which bestowed the title on accused
No. 1. It is further submitted, that there are various civil
proceedings pending amongst the complainant, accused No. 1
and their sisters so also the other parties. Accused No. 4 is not
at all concerned with the same.
8
12. It is further submitted, that as a matter of fact, the
case of accused No. 4 could not have been distinguished from
the case as against accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. It is
submitted, that applying the same logic, which the learned
Judge of the High Court had applied while quashing the case
against the said accused, the case against the present accused
No. 4 also ought to have been quashed. It is submitted that the
continuation of criminal proceedings against accused No. 4, the
appellant herein, would be nothing else but an abuse of the
process of law.
13. Per contra, Mr. Shakil Ahmed Syed, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the private complainant, submitted that
the High Court has rightly dismissed the petition of accused
No. 4. It is submitted, that accused No. 4 in order to deprive
the benefits of the property to the complainant had got the lease
deed executed in his favour from accused No. 1 knowing very
well that the claim of accused No. 1 was based on fabricated
document(s). He further submitted, that the High Court had
also erred in allowing the petitions of accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8
and 9 and, therefore, the order to the extent that it quashes the
criminal proceedings qua them also needs to be set aside.
9
14. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General,
submitted that accused Nos. 5, 6 and 9 have been
unnecessarily dragged in the said criminal litigation. It is
submitted that accused No. 5 HPCL is a public undertaking
and accused Nos. 6 and 9 are its officers. It is submitted that
the High Court has rightly arrived at a finding that there was no
material against them and quashed the criminal proceedings
qua them.
15. This Court, in the case of State of Haryana and Ors.
vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.1
after considering all its earlier
judgments, has laid down principles which are required to be
taken into consideration by the High Court while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the
proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to the following
observations of this Court in Bhajan Lal (supra):
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482
of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above,
we give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
10
secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to
lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and
to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated
under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
11
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge.”
16. It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that
where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute a case against the accused, the
High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings.
Further, it has been held that where the uncontroverted
allegations in the FIR and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose any offence and make out a case
against the accused, the court would be justified in quashing
the proceedings.
17. Let us consider the case of the complainant on its face
value without going into the truthfulness or otherwise thereof.
It is the case of the complainant, that the property originally
belonged to her grandmother. After her death, it devolved upon
her father, Afzaluddin Hassan and after his death on
28.05.1996, it devolved upon accused No. 1 and his three
sisters, namely, Karima Siddiqua, Saleha Asmatunnisa and
Sadika Khairunnisa. Their father had entered into a
12
development agreement with M/s Banjara Construction
Company Pvt. Ltd., however, the same was cancelled during his
lifetime. After the death of their father on 28.05.1996, accused
No. 3 tried to trespass into the property for which, on the basis
of her complaint a crime was registered. That the said M/s
Banjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. had executed some
document alleging assignment of its rights in favour of M/s NRI
Housing Company Pvt. Ltd. of which accused No. 3, Abid Rasool
Khan was the Managing Director. In respect of the same action,
Crime No. 177/1996 had been registered at the instance of the
complainant. With respect to the said transaction, two original
suits were already filed, one by the complainant and another by
her sisters.
18. It is further the case of the complainant, that accused
No.1 created a will in Urdu purported to be executed by her
grandmother bequeathing the property in favour of her parents,
namely, Afzaluddin Hassan and Liaquathunnisa Begum for
their lifetime and vesting the remainder to accused No. 1. The
said will is created on a nonjudicial stamp paper of Nizamat
Jung and has been allegedly executed on 02.04.1950.
According to the complainant, accused No. 1, her brother, had
13
created another forged and fabricated document styled as deed
of confirmation (Hiba Bil Musha) dated 08.03.1990 confirming
the oral gift to accused No. 1 and also recording handing over
of physical possession. It is her case, that on the basis of these
fabricated documents, accused No. 1, posing himself to be an
absolute owner of the property, executed a lease deed in favour
of accused No. 4 (the appellant herein in one of the appeals) on
01.12.2008. It is further the case of the complainant, that
thereafter accused No. 4 executed a sublease in favour of
accused No. 5 HPCL represented by accused Nos. 6 and 9
within a period of two months i.e. on 30.01.2009 and that
accused Nos. 7 and 8 are the attesting witnesses. That is all the
case of the complainant.
19. The complaint filed by respondent No. 2 runs into 26
pages and 26 paragraphs. As already discussed hereinabove, it
reveals a disputed property claim based on inheritance between
the complainant, her sisters and her brother, accused No. 1. A
perusal of the complaint would further reveal, that the
complainant also disputes with regard to the area of the
property including the manner of its devolution upon the
parents of the complainant and her competing interest with that
14
of her siblings. There is not even a whisper in the complaint
that the present appellant, i.e., accused No. 4 was fully aware
that accused No. 1 was not the sole beneficiary by inheritance
and that the property had devolved upon the complainant and
her sisters. Also there is nothing to show that knowing this he
has collusively entered into the lease agreement with accused
No. 1, by creating a false and fabricated will. Though, there is a
mention with regard to conspiracy, but there is not even a
suggestion with regard to manner of such conspiracy.
20. Upon perusal of the complaint itself, it would reveal
that the father of the complainant and accused No. 3 had
himself entered into a development agreement which
subsequently came to be cancelled during his lifetime. It would
also reveal, that only after the lease in question was executed in
favour of the appellant, the complainant has raised all these
issues. We are of the considered view, that the issues raised
reflect a civil dispute with regard to inheritance amongst the
legal heirs. We fail to understand as to how a dispute with
regard to the inheritance under a will and deed of confirmation
can be decided in a criminal proceeding. We find, that the same
can be done only in an appropriate civil proceeding. Not only
15
that, the civil proceedings with that regard are already
instituted by various parties including the complainant. These
proceedings are as follows:
(i) O.S. No. 239 of 2004 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(ii) O.S. No. 337 of 2002 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(iii) O.S. No. 58 of 2001 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(iv) O.S. No. 277 of 2000 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(v) O.S. No. 506 of 2001 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,
CCC, Hyderabad.
(vi) Writ Petition (C) No. 685 of 2010.
21. It will be relevant to refer that though in the complaint,
the complainant had mentioned about pendency of O.S. No.
1989 of 1996 against accused No. 3 and O.S. No. 1403 of 1999
against M/s Banjara Construction Pvt. Ltd., there is no
reference with regard to the other proceedings. Accused No. 4
has been impleaded as a partydefendant in O.S. No. 506 of
2001 only on 30.10.2009.
16
22. O.S. No. 239 of 2004 has already been filed by the
complainant against her brother, accused No. 1 and her three
sisters inter alia for partition and separate possession which is
stated to be pending. As such, the documents alleged to be
fraudulent in the complaint will fall for consideration in the
said suit. A possibility of contradictory finding in civil
proceeding as against criminal proceedings cannot be ruled
out. Though, the complainant had filed Writ Petition Nos.
23017/2009 and 23672/2009 to restrain construction on the
plot in question, the same was dismissed on 28.10.2009.
However, there is no mention with regard to the same in the
complaint. This Court in Sardool Singh vs. Nasib Kaur2
observed as follows:
“2. A civil suit between the parties is pending
wherein the contention of the respondent is that no
will was executed whereas the contention of the
appellants is that a will has been executed by the
testator. A case for grant of probate is also pending
in the court of learned District Judge, Rampur. The
civil court is therefore seized of the question as
regards the validity of the will. The matter is sub
judice in the aforesaid two cases in civil courts. At
this juncture the respondent cannot therefore be
permitted to institute a criminal prosecution on the
allegation that the will is a forged one. That question
will have to be decided by the civil court after
recording the evidence and hearing the parties in
accordance with law. It would not be proper to
permit the respondent to prosecute the appellants
on this allegation when the validity of the will is
2 (1987) Supp. SCC 146
17
being tested before a civil court. We, therefore, allow
the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court,
and quash the criminal proceedings pending in the
Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Chandigarh in the case entitled Smt Nasib
Kaur v. Sardool Singh. This will not come in the way
of instituting appropriate proceedings in future in
case the civil court comes to the conclusion that the
will is a forged one. We of course refrain from
expressing any opinion as regards genuineness or
otherwise of the Will in question as there is no
occasion to do so and the question is wide open
before the lower courts.”
23. It is further to be noted, that the complainant and her
sisters executed an agreement of salecumirrevocable specific
power of attorney on 20.03.2015 in favour of one Mohd. Khalid
Shareef. Various litigations have also been filed with regard to
the installation of the petrol pump and grant of N.O.C. etc. The
complaint was sent to the police for registration of an FIR and
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. on
24.11.2010. In its final report dated 30.08.2017, the police has
opined that no material had surfaced to show any conspiracy
during investigation.
24. The learned Judge himself in Paragraph 8, after
observing that it is nobodies case that the signatures on the
documents in question are forged or anybody has impersonated
for the purpose of cheating, goes on to observe thus:
18
“8…..The allegation in nutshell in this regard is that
accused No. 1 is not the absolute owner of the properties,
but for one of the coowner or cosharer along with the de
facto complainant and other sisters of them and he
falsely claimed as if he is the owner for purpose of
cheating by using as if genuine forged and fabricated
documents of so called will and so called deed of
confirmation. The so called will is of the year 1950 and
the so called deed of confirmation is of year 19891990
and the alleged oral gift prior to that is of 1966….”
25. We fail to understand, as to how after observing the
aforesaid, the learned Judge could have refused to quash the
proceedings against accused No. 4. Not only that, but on the
basis of the said observations, the learned Judge himself has
observed that it will not be in the interest of justice to permit
the Police authorities to arrest the accused for the purposes of
investigation. We are of the considered view, that the learned
Judge, having found that the entire allegations with regard to
forgery and fabrication and accused No. 1 executing the lease
deed on the basis of the said forged and fabricated documents
were only against accused No. 1, ought to have exercised his
jurisdiction to quash the proceedings qua accused No. 4 also.
We find that the learned Judge ought to have applied the same
parameters to the present accused No. 4, which had been
applied to the other accused whose applications were allowed.
19
26. Insofar as the criminal appeals arising out of the
special leave petitions filed by the original complainant is
concerned, we absolutely find no merit in the appeals. The
learned single Judge has rightly found that there was no
material to proceed against accused No. 5 – HPCL and its
officers accused Nos. 6 and 9 as also accused Nos. 7 and 8, who
have been roped in, only because they were the attesting
witnesses. The learned single Judge has rightly exercised his
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
27. Insofar as original accused No. 4 is concerned, we have
no hesitation to hold, that his case is covered by categories (1)
and (3) carved out by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal
(supra). As already discussed hereinabove, even if the
allegations in the complaint are taken on its face value, there is
no material to proceed further against accused No. 4. We are of
the considered view, that continuation of criminal proceedings
against accused No. 4, M. Srikanth, would amount to nothing
else but an abuse of process of law. As such, his appeal
deserves to be allowed.
20
28. In the result, the criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P.
(Crl.) No. 9156/2017 filed by accused No. 4 is allowed. The
criminal proceedings in Crime No. 311/2010 of P.S., Central
Crime Station, Hyderabad, against accused No. 4 are quashed
and set aside. The criminal appeals arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.)
Nos. 916061/2017 filed by the original complainant are
dismissed.
…....................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
......................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 21, 2019.
