LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Monday, September 16, 2019

It is settled law that the acquittal by a Criminal Court does not preclude a Departmental Inquiry against the delinquent officer. The Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the judgment of the Criminal Court if the evidence that is produced in the Departmental Inquiry is different from that produced during the criminal trial. The object of a Departmental Inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a Departmental Inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence.

Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 7279 of 2019
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 25909 of 2013)
Karnataka Power Transmission
Corporation Limited, Represented
by Managing Director (Admin. and HR) ... Appellant(s)
Versus
Sri C. Nagaraju & Anr. ….Respondent (s)
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
Leave granted.
1. The judgment of the High Court by which the order
of dismissal of Respondent No.1 from the service was set
aside is the subject matter of this Appeal. Respondent
No.1 was appointed as a Meter Reader-cum-Clerk in the
Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited
(KPTCL) in the year 1974. He was promoted as a Junior
Engineer in the year 1997. On 21.06.2003, Additional
Registrar of Enquiries-I, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore
[1]
framed a charge against the Respondent which is as
follows:
“Charge:
That you DBE Sri. C. Nagaraju, while working
as Junior Engineer (Elecl.,) at KEB, VV-1 (O&M)
South Zone, Vidyaranyapuram Circle, Mysore
during the year 1998, one Sri. K. Chandrasekhar,
Class II Electrical Contractor, Resident of
Vidyaranyapuram, Mysore, (hereinafter called as
‘Complainant’) had approached you for obtaining
electrical power supply to the house and shop of
his customer Smt. Savithramma, on 14-5-
1998, and you demanded a sum of Rs.1,250/- as
illegal gratification, and on 16-5-1998 you once
again demanded and accepted illegal gratification
of Rs.750/- as advance amount, from the
complainant for doing the said work of giving
electrical power supply, and thereby you being a
public servant failed to maintain absolute integrity
and devotion to duty and did an act which was
unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby
[2]
you have committed an act of misconduct as
enumerated under Rule 3(1)(i) & (iii) of K.E.B.
Employees Service (Conduct) Regulation Rules,
1988.”
2. The Respondent submitted his explanation to the
charge. After conducting an inquiry, Additional Registrar
of Enquiries-I, Karnataka Lokayukta, who was nominated
as the Inquiry Officer, held that the charge against
Respondent No.1 was proved. The Lokayukta examined
the inquiry report and approved the findings of the
Inquiry Officer. Having regard to the serious misconduct
committed by Respondent No.1, the Lokayukta imposed
the penalty of dismissal from service under Clause VIII of
Regulation No.9 of Karnataka Electricity Board Employees
(Classification, Discipline, Control and Appeal)
Regulations, 1987.
3. The final notice was issued by the Appellant seeking
an explanation from Respondent No.1 as to why the
report of the Inquiry Officer should not be accepted. The
reply submitted by Respondent No.1 was considered, and
[3]
by an order dated 23.03.2007, Respondent No.1 was
dismissed from service. The said order was affirmed by
the Appellant Authority on 24.06.2008. Aggrieved by the
order of dismissal from service, Respondent No.1 filed a
writ petition in the High Court of Karnataka which was
allowed by a learned single Judge by a judgment dated
08.09.2011. The Writ Appeal filed by the Appellant was
dismissed by the Division Bench. Dissatisfied with the
judgment of the High Court, the Appellant is before this
Court.
4. It is relevant to note that Respondent No.1 was tried
by the Court of Special Judge, Mysore (hereinafter
referred to as “the Criminal Court”) for committing
offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“the PC
Act”). He was acquitted by the Criminal Court as the
prosecution witnesses turned hostile and did not support
the case of the prosecution.
5. The learned single Judge of the High Court allowed
the Writ Petition relying upon the judgments of this Court
[4]
in Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold
Mines Ltd.
1
 and G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat.
2
 It
was held that the charges in the departmental inquiry
and the criminal case are the same and Respondent No.1
ought not to have been dismissed from service after he
was found not guilty by the Criminal Court. The Division
Bench upheld the judgment of the learned single Judge
by observing that an order of dismissal from service
could not have been passed once the Respondent was
honourably acquitted by the Criminal Court.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the Appellant
submitted that the charges framed against Respondent
No.1 in the Criminal Court and the Departmental
Inquiries were different. He submitted that the
complainant resiled from his statement and turned
hostile before the Criminal Court. He further submitted
that the evidence which was the basis of the order of
dismissal was different from the evidence before the
Criminal Court. By relying upon the judgments of this
Court, the learned counsel emphasized that an acquittal
1 (1999) 3 SCC 679
2 (2006) 5 SCC 446
[5]
by a Criminal Court does not bar a departmental
proceeding. According to him, the standard of proof in a
criminal trial is different from what is required for a
departmental proceeding. Strict rules of evidence are
followed in criminal proceedings whereas preponderance
of probabilities is what is taken into consideration in a
departmental inquiry. Reliance was placed by the learned
counsel for the Appellant on the judgments of this Court
in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport
Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya
3
 and Ajit Kumar
Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,
Haldia.
4

7. The learned counsel for Respondent No.1 justified
the judgments of the High Court by arguing that an order
of dismissal cannot be passed by the Appellant after he
was honourably acquitted by the Criminal Court. He
stated that the essence of the charge in the criminal trial
and the departmental inquiry is the same. He supported
the judgment of the High Court by submitting that
the Departmental Authorities were bound by the
3 (1997) 2 SCC 699
4 (2005) 7 SCC 764
[6]
judgment of the Criminal Court. He urged that there is
no truth in the allegation of demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification against Respondent No.1. He further
submitted that the evidence adduced in the
departmental inquiry is not sufficient for warranting the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service.
8. Mr. Chandrasekhar who was an electrical contractor
submitted a complaint in which it was stated that he
made an application for an electrical connection in favour
of his client, Mrs. Savithri. He alleged in the complaint
that Respondent No.1 demanded a bribe of Rs.1250/- for
giving the electricity connection. After negotiation, the
amount of bribe was reduced to Rs.750/-. Unwilling to
pay the illegal gratification, Mr. Chandrasekhar lodged a
complaint before the Lokayukta Police on 15.05.1998. A
case was registered under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the PC Act. A trap was laid and
Respondent No.1 was caught accepting the amount of
Rs.750/- from Mr. Chandrasekhar. The right hand of
Respondent No.1 was washed in Sodium Carbonate
solution and it turned into pink colour. The complainant
[7]
appeared before the Inquiry Officer and deposed against
Respondent No.1 about demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification. That apart, the complainant Mr.
Chandrasekhar also gave details about the trap laid down
by the Lokayukta Police. Mr. Santhosh Kumar, Deputy
Superintendent of Police who conducted the trap was
examined as PW3. After taking into account the
evidence, the Inquiry Officer held Respondent No.1
guilty of the charge. Considering the gravity of
misconduct in demanding and accepting illegal
gratification, the Disciplinary Authority found Respondent
No.1 not fit to continue in service.
9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an
employer from exercising the power to conduct
departmental proceedings in accordance with the rules
and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and
departmental, are entirely different. They operate in
different fields and have different objectives.5
 In the
disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the
Respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his
5 Ajit Kumar Nag (supra)
[8]
removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case
may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the
question is whether the offences registered against him
under the PC Act are established, and if established, what
sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of
proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing
inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly
distinct and different.6

10. As the High Court set aside the order of dismissal on
the basis of the judgments of this Court in Captain M.
Paul Anthony (supra) and G.M. Tank (supra), it is
necessary to examine whether the said judgments are
applicable to the facts of this case. Simultaneous
continuance of departmental proceedings and
proceedings in a criminal case on the same set of facts
was the point considered by this Court in Captain M.
Paul Anthony’s case (supra). This Court was of the
opinion that departmental proceedings and proceedings
in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is
no bar. However, it is desirable to stay departmental
6 State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena (1996) 6 SCC 417
[9]
inquiry till conclusion of the criminal case if the
departmental proceedings and criminal case are based
on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the
criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a
grave nature which involves complicated questions of
law and fact. On the facts of the said case, it was found
that the criminal case and the departmental proceedings
were based on identical set of facts and the evidence
before the Criminal Court and the departmental inquiry
was the same. Further, in the said case the
departmental inquiry was conducted ex parte.
In such circumstances, this Court held that the ex parte
departmental proceedings cannot be permitted to stand
in view of the acquittal of the delinquent by the Criminal
Court on the same set of facts and evidence. The said
judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. In
the present case, the prosecution witnesses turned
hostile in the criminal trial against Respondent No.1. He
was acquitted by the Criminal Court on the ground that
the prosecution could not produce any credible evidence
to prove the charge. On the other hand, the complainant
[10]
and the other witnesses appeared before the Inquiry
Officer and deposed against Respondent No.1. The
evidence available in the Departmental Inquiry is
completely different from that led by the prosecution in
criminal trial.
11. Reliance was placed by the High Court on a
judgment of this Court in G.M. Tank (supra) whereby the
Writ Petition filed by Respondent No.1 was allowed. In
the said case, the delinquent officer was charged for an
offence punishable under Section 5(1)(e) read with
Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988. He was honourably
acquitted by the criminal court as the prosecution failed
to prove the charge. Thereafter, a Departmental
Inquiry was conducted and he was dismissed from
service. The order of dismissal was upheld by the High
Court. In the Appeal filed by the delinquent officer, this
Court was of the opinion that the departmental
proceedings and criminal case were based on identical
and similar set of facts. The evidence before the
Criminal Court and the departmental proceedings being
exactly the same, this Court held that the acquittal of the
[11]
employee by a Criminal Court has to be given due weight
by the Disciplinary Authority. On the basis that the
evidence in both the criminal trial and Departmental
Inquiry are the same, the order of dismissal of the
Appellant therein was set aside. As stated earlier, the
facts of this case are entirely different. The acquittal of
Respondent No.1 was due to non-availability of any
evidence before the Criminal Court. The order of
dismissal was on the basis of a report of the Inquiry
Officer before whom there was ample evidence against
Respondent No.1.
12. In Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bhartiya
Chah Mazdoor Sangh
7
 this Court was concerned with
the validity of the termination of the services of workmen
after acquittal by the Criminal Court. Dealing with a
situation similar to the one in this case, where the
acquittal was due to lack of evidence before criminal
court and sufficient evidence was available before the
Labour Court, this Court was of the opinion that the
7 (2004) 8 SCC 200
[12]
judgment in Captain M. Paul Anthony’s case (supra)
cannot come to the rescue of the workmen.
13. Having considered the submissions made on behalf
of the Appellant and the Respondent No.1, we are of the
view that interference with the order of dismissal by the
High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law that the
acquittal by a Criminal Court does not preclude a
Departmental Inquiry against the delinquent officer. The
Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the judgment of
the Criminal Court if the evidence that is produced in the
Departmental Inquiry is different from that produced
during the criminal trial. The object of a Departmental
Inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of
misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose of
determining whether he should be continued in service.
The standard of proof in a Departmental Inquiry is not
strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of
dismissal which is based on the evidence before the
Inquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is
different from the evidence available to the Criminal
[13]
Court, is justified and needed no interference by the High
Court.
14. For the aforementioned reasons, the Appeal is
allowed.

…................................J.
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]


 ..…….............................J.
 [HEMANT GUPTA]
New Delhi,
September 16, 2019
[14]