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Friday, May 26, 2017

Sec.319 to summon any person as an accused and face the trial in the ongoing case when to be exercised - Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the Court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. = the trial court acted in a casual and cavalier manner in passing the summoning order against the appellants. = the IO found that these appellants were in Jaipur city when the incident took place in Kanaur, at a distance of 175 kms. The complainant and others who supported the version in the FIR regarding alleged presence of the appellants at the place of incident had also made statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to the same effect. Notwithstanding the same, the police investigation revealed that the statements of these persons regarding the presence of the appellants at the place of occurrence was doubtful and did not inspire confidence, in view of the documentary and other evidence collected during the investigation, which depicted another story and clinchingly showed that appellants plea of alibi was correct. Notwithstanding the same, the trial court went by the deposition of complainant and some other persons in their examination-in-chief, with no other material to support their so- called verbal/ocular version. Thus, the ‘evidence’ recorded during trial was nothing more than the statements which was already there under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded at the time of investigation of the case. No doubt, the trial court would be competent to exercise its power even on the basis of such statements recorded before it in examination-in-chief. However, in a case like the present where plethora of evidence was collected by the IO during investigation which suggested otherwise, the trial court was at least duty bound to look into the same while forming prima facie opinion and to see as to whether ‘much stronger evidence than mere possibility of their (i.e. appellants) complicity has come on record. There is no satisfaction of this nature. Even if we presume that the trial court was not apprised of the same at the time when it passed the order (as the appellants were not on the scene at that time), what is more troubling is that even when this material on record was specifically brought to the notice of the High Court in the Revision Petition filed by the appellants, the High Court too blissfully ignored the said material. Except reproducing the discussion contained in the order of the trial court and expressing agreement therewith, nothing more has been done. Such orders cannot stand judicial scrutiny. As a consequence, this appeal is allowed setting aside the order of summoning the appellants under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 763 OF 2017


|BRIJENDRA SINGH & ORS.                     |.....APPELLANT(S)            |
|VERSUS                                     |                             |
|STATE OF RAJASTHAN                         |.....RESPONDENT(S)           |



                               J U D G M E N T


A.K. SIKRI, J.
            The appellants herein, three in number, have  been  summoned  by
the Court of Special Judge, SC/ST Act, which is in seisin of  the  trial  in
respect of FIR No. 53 of 2000, wherein charges for offences  under  Sections
147, 148, 149, 323, 448, 302/149 of Indian  Penal  Code  (IPC)  as  well  as
under Sections 3 and 3(2)(V) of  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  the  Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act)  have  been  framed.
The appellants were not  arraigned  as  accused  in  the  chargesheet.   The
charges were framed against those who were accused in  the  chargesheet  and
prosecution evidence is being recorded.   The  appellants  are  summoned  as
additional accused persons under Section 319 of Code of Criminal  Procedure,
1973 (Cr.P.C.) to face the trial along  with  other  accused  persons.   The
trial court has passed the Order dated 06.10.2015 on  an  application  filed
by the complainant Harkesh Meena under Section 319 of  Cr.P.C.   This  order
was challenged by the appellants before the High Court.  However,  the  High
Court has dismissed the revision petition preferred  by  the  appellants  on
11.01.2016.

Factual details pertaining to the  FIR  and  registration  of  case  against
other persons as well as filing of the application by the complainant  under
Section 319 of Cr.P.C. and the orders therein are as under:
      On the  basis  of  a  written  complaint,  FIR  No.  53  of  2000  was
registered at 10:30 pm on 29.04.2000 under  Sections  147,  148,  149,  323,
448, 302/149 IPC as well as under Sections 3 and 3(2)(V) of SC/ST  Act.   In
this complaint, the  complainant  had  stated  that  at  about  3:00  pm  on
29.04.2000 when he was at his Khejra well, making his  cattle  drink  water,
certain persons including appellants who belong to his  village  came  there
armed with axe, lathi sabbal (iron rod) and  knives  in  their  hands,  with
intention to kill the complainant.  On  seeing  them,  the  complainant  ran
from that place and came to his uncle’s  (Nathu)  house  and  cried  loudly.
His uncle was sleeping in front of the house and Lakhpat was sleeping  under
Neem tree.  As soon as he came  into  the  thatch,  Pratap  Singh  inflicted
lathi blow on him from behind which hit on his back.   The  complainant  ran
into the house of Bharatlal.  Brijendra Singh inflicted sabbal at  the  head
of his uncle Nathu who was sleeping at that time and Pratap  hit  his  uncle
with axe above the ear.   Thereafter,  all  these  accused  persons  started
inflicting lathi sticks.  Lakhpat tried to run in order to  rescue  himself.
These persons gave beating to him as well,  with  lathi  sticks.   When  the
complainant’s elder brother went to rescue them, these accused persons  gave
lathi sticks blow to him as well.  In the meantime, their  wives,  wives  of
their sons had also come.  Rishi, son of Ramu Brahmin of Talabka and  Bhanu,
nephew of Jagdish Singh of Jaipur were also along  with  them.   Because  of
the beating by the accused persons, complainant’s uncle Nathu  died  on  the
spot.  Thereafter, accused persons fled away.  The  incident  was  witnessed
by a number of villagers.  In the FIR, the appellants  were  also  named  as
accused persons.


FIR was registered and the matter  was  investigated  by  the  Investigating
Officer  (IO).   During  the  investigation,  the   appellants   were   also
interrogated.  They had stated that they are residing at Jaipur and  at  the
time of incident, they were in Jaipur.  Thus, plea of  alibi  was  taken  by
these persons.  Appellant No.1 and 2 are in police service and  at  relevant
time they were posted at Jaipur.  Appellant No.2 Jagdish has  lost  his  leg
while on traffic police duty.   Appellant  No.3  Bhanu  is  the  appellant’s
sister’s son and claimed that he was  also  at  Jaipur.   The  police  after
investigation and considering the evidence with regard to the alibi  of  the
appellants Brijendra, Jagdish (who lost his leg  while  discharging  traffic
police duty) and Bhanu, did not find any sufficient  and  reliable  evidence
against the appellants and, therefore, did  not  file  any  challan  against
them and kept the investigation pending under Section 178(3)  Cr.P.C.   When
the trial court by its Order dated 06.09.2000,  without  any  challan  being
submitted by the police, directed cognizance of the matter,  the  appellants
filed the S.B. Criminal Revision No. 505/2000 before the High Court and  the
High Court vide its Order dated 16.04.2009  allowed  the  Revision  and  set
aside the Order dated 06.09.2000  of  the  trial  court.   The  High  Court,
however, made it clear  that  the  said  Order  dated  16.04.2009  shall  be
without prejudice to the powers of the Sessions Court to add any  person  in
the array of accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

During the period when S.B. Criminal Revision No. 505 of  2000  was  pending
before  the  High  Court,  the  police  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the
appellants  were  not  involved  in  the   incident.    The   police   after
investigation, prepared the Final Report of closure of the case against  the
appellants which was approved by the SP.  In this manner,  after  completing
the investigation, the police filed the Challan only against  other  accused
persons, namely, Bhanwar Singh, Pratap Singh and Shambhu Singh.

Though, at the time of filing of the Challan, the police kept  investigation
pending, subsequently it came to the conclusion  that  the  appellants  were
not involved and the final  report  of  closure  of  the  case  against  the
appellants was filed.  The trial court framed charges against the  aforesaid
three accused persons and the trial proceeded, though it  has  been  delayed
abnormally as more than 15 years have been passed.  Be that as it  may,  the
prosecution examined 23 witnesses including PW-1 Bharat Lal, PW-2 Kamla, PW-
3 Lakhpat, PW-4 Harkesh and PW-5 Amritlal sometime in  the  year  2009.   On
26.03.2014 i.e. after five years of examination of the aforesaid  witnesses,
complainant filed application under Section  319  of  Cr.P.C.   It  is  this
application which has been allowed by the Special Judge and the  said  order
has been affirmed by the High Court.

Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for  the  appellant,
submitted that the appellant had obtained information from  the  authorities
under the Right to Information Act about the  status  of  the  investigation
that was carried out by the Investigating Officer  culminating  into  filing
of the final report.  He drew our attention to the letter  dated  19.02.2016
that was received by the appellant in response to his query under the  Right
to Information Act wherein the information was  supplied  to  the  appellant
along  with   requisite   documents   that   were   collected   during   the
investigation.  The details of these documents are as under:

Duty  Certificate  No.  2407  dated  04.05.2000  signed  by  the   Assistant
Inspector General of Police (Training), Jaipur, Rajasthan,  certifying  that
Brijendra Singh, Junior Driver, was present on duty on 29.04.2000.

Medical Certificate  No.  13365  dated  28.04.2000  issued  by  the  Medical
Officer,  Primary  Medical  Centre,  Moti  Kotla,  Jaipur,  certifying  that
Jagdish Singh was suffering from .....  (illegible)  disease  on  24.04.2000
and was advised five days rest.

Letter dated  17.02.2002  signed  by  the  Police  Superintendent,  District
Karauli, addressed to the Circle Officer, Circle  –  Kailadevi,  giving  the
sanction under Section 173(9) of the Cr.P.C. to end investigation in  Cr.No.
53/2K, Police Station, Sapotra, and submit the report in the Court.

Statement of Rajendra Prasad, Deputy Inspector  General  of  Police,  Police
Head Office, Jaipur, recorded  under  Section  161  Cr.P.C.  on  07.12.2000,
wherein he stated that  on  29.04.2000,  he  was  working  on  the  post  of
Assistant Inspector General of  Police  (Training),  Jaipur,  Rajasthan  and
Brijendra Singh, Constable, was his driver who was present on duty  on  that
day.  Log book of the vehicle was also produced  to  show  the  presence  of
Brijendra Singh.

Statement recorded  under  Section  161  Cr.P.C.  of  Smt.  Shashi  Rajawat,
Medical Officer In-charge, Government Ayurvedic Hospital,  Nahati  Ka  Naka,
wherein she had stated that as per the record one  Bhanu  Pratap  Singh  had
come to the hospital on 26.4.2000, suffering from sickness as he was  having
loose motions and was vomiting as well.  He was treated by the said  Medical
Officer and was also prescribed medicines on a slip  written  by  her.   She
verified the prescription.

Statement of Mr. Naveel Kasliwal of Jain Medical Store, Opposite  Government
Hospital, Moti Katla, Jaipur, recorded under Section  161  Cr.P.C.,  wherein
stated that the said Medical Store was owned by him.  He verified  that  the
medical slip of the Government Hospital had been written  by  Sudhir  Sharma
on 29.04.2000 and based thereupon he had given the medicines.

Statement of Sudhir  Sharma,  Medical  Officer,  Government  Hospital,  Moti
Katla, Jaipur, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., wherein  he  stated  that
from 22.02.2000 to 04.05.2000, his duty was at Vidhan Sabha from  3.00  p.m.
to 7.00 p.m. and in the morning from  8.00  a.m.  till  12.00  noon  at  the
Government Hospital.  He further stated that on 29.04.2000, a patient  named
Jagdish Singh, who was suffering  from  malaria  fever,  had  come  and  was
prescribed medicines by  him  on  the  slip,  which  are  medicines  of  the
Government Hospital.   He  verified  that  the  slip  was  written  by  him,
containing the  prescription.   Three  days  medicines  were  given  to  the
patient.  On 02.05.2000, again two  days  medicines  for  the  patient  were
prescribed on the said slip.

Statement of Shri Mahendra Singh Tanwar, who was working as a driver at  the
Government District Mahila Hospital, Sanganeri Gate, Jaipur, recorded  under
Section 161 Cr.P.C.  He stated that son of his elder brother,  Bhanu  Pratap
Singh, who was a student, was unwell for 15 to  20  days  in  the  month  of
April, 2000.  For this purpose, he was given treatment in  private  hospital
but no improvement was found and,  therefore,  he  was  taken  to  Ayurvedic
Hospital on 26.04.2000 for treatment.  He was suffering from  loose  motions
and cough  for  which  he  was  prescribed  three  days  medicines  and  the
medicines were repeated again on 29.04.2000 for further three days.

Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel, submitted that it is on the basis  of  the
aforesaid documents and  statements  of  various  persons,  recorded  during
investigation, the Investigating Officer  was  convinced  that  these  three
appellants were in Jaipur at the time of the incident and, therefore,  could
not have been present at the place of incident, i.e. Karauli, which is at  a
distance of 176 kms. approximately, from Jaipur.   Submission  of  Mr.  Jain
was that merely on the basis of the statement of the complainant, which  was
there  before  the  Investigating  Officer  as   well   at   the   time   of
investigation, the Special Judge could  not  have  allowed  the  application
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. as no further or new material was produced  before
the Court which could indicate the involvement of the  appellants.   Learned
counsel submitted that for exercising the powers under Section 319  Cr.P.C.,
which was discretionary and extraordinary in nature, the trial court  should
have convinced itself that there is strong and  cogent  evidence  indicating
that  the  appellants  may  be  guilty  of  committing  the  offence.   This
condition, according to him, was not satisfied.  He further  submitted  that
the  High  Court  also  did  not  examine  the  matter  from  the  aforesaid
perspective and merely went by the fact  that  the  witnesses  have  deposed
about the involvement of the  appellants  in  their  deposition  before  the
Court.

Learned counsel for the respondents, on the  other  hand,  argued  that  the
trial court has rightly exercised its power on the basis of  depositions  of
the witnesses before it, which were in the form of ‘evidence’ to the  effect
that the appellants may have committed the  offence  in  question.   It  was
argued that provisions of Section  319  Cr.P.C.  were  not  meant  for  this
purpose only and the exercise of power by the trial court cannot be  treated
as unwarranted.  It was so observed by the High Court also while  dismissing
the revision petition and observing that no  illegality  or  perversity  was
found in the orders of the trial court.

Powers of the Court to proceed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. even against  those
persons who  are  not  arraigned  as  accused,  cannot  be  disputed.   This
provision is meant to achieve the objective that  real  culprit  should  not
get away unpunished.  A Constitution Bench of this Court  in  Hardeep  Singh
v. State of Punjab & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 92, explained the aforesaid  purpose
behind this provision in the following manner:
“8. The constitutional mandate under Articles 20 and 21 of the  Constitution
of India provides a protective umbrella for  the  smooth  administration  of
justice making adequate provisions to ensure a fair  and  efficacious  trial
so that the accused does not get prejudiced after the law has been put  into
motion to try him for the offence but at the  same  time  also  gives  equal
protection to victims and to society at large  to  ensure  that  the  guilty
does not get away from the clutches of  law.  For  the  empowerment  of  the
courts  to  ensure  that  the  criminal  administration  of  justice   works
properly,  the  law  was  appropriately  codified  and   modified   by   the
legislature under CrPC indicating as to how the  courts  should  proceed  in
order to ultimately find out the truth so that  an  innocent  does  not  get
punished but at the same time, the guilty are  brought  to  book  under  the
law. It is these ideals as enshrined under the  Constitution  and  our  laws
that  have  led  to  several  decisions,  whereby  innovating  methods   and
progressive tools have been forged to find out the real truth and to  ensure
that the guilty does not go unpunished.

                       xx               xx         xx

12. Section 319 CrPC springs out of the doctrine judex damnatur  cum  nocens
absolvitur  (Judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted) and this  doctrine
must be used as a beacon light while explaining the  ambit  and  the  spirit
underlying the enactment of Section 319 CrPC.

13. It is the duty of  the  court  to  do  justice  by  punishing  the  real
culprit. Where the investigating agency for any reason does  not  array  one
of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not  powerless  in  calling
the  said  accused  to  face  trial.  The  question   remains   under   what
circumstances and at what stage should  the  court  exercise  its  power  as
contemplated in Section 319 CrPC?

                       xx               xx         xx

19. The court is the sole repository of justice and a duty is cast  upon  it
to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it will be inappropriate  to  deny
the existence of such powers with the courts in our criminal justice  system
where it is not uncommon that the  real  accused,  at  times,  get  away  by
manipulating the investigating and/or the prosecuting agency. The desire  to
avoid trial is so strong that an accused  makes  efforts  at  times  to  get
himself absolved even at the stage of investigation or inquiry  even  though
he may be connected with the commission of the offence.”

It also goes without saying that Section 319 Cr.P.C., which is  an  enabling
provision empowering the Court to  take  appropriate  steps  for  proceeding
against any person, not being an accused,  can  be  exercised  at  any  time
after the  charge-sheet  is  filed  and  before  the  pronouncement  of  the
judgment, except during the stage of Section 207/208 Cr.P.C., the  committal
etc., which is only a pre-trial stage  intended  to  put  the  process  into
motion.

In Hardeep Singh’s  case,  the  Constitution  Bench  has  also  settled  the
controversy on the issue as to whether the word ‘evidence’ used  in  Section
319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a  comprehensive  sense  and  indicates  the
evidence collected during investigation or the word  ‘evidence’  is  limited
to the evidence  recorded  during  trial.   It  is  held  that  it  is  that
material, after cognizance is taken by the Court, that is  available  to  it
while making an inquiry into or trying  an  offence,  which  the  court  can
utilise or take into consideration for  supporting  reasons  to  summon  any
person on the  basis  of  evidence  adduced  before  the  Court.   The  word
‘evidence’ has to be understood in its wider sense, both  at  the  stage  of
trial and even at the stage of inquiry.  It means that the power to  proceed
against any person after summoning him can be exercised on the basis of  any
such material as brought forth before it.  At  the  same  time,  this  Court
cautioned that the duty and obligation of the Court becomes more onerous  to
invoke such powers consciously on such material after evidence has been  led
during trial.  The Court also clarified that ‘evidence’  under  Section  319
Cr.P.C. could even be examination-in-chief and the Court is not required  to
wait till such evidence  is  tested  on  cross-examination,  as  it  is  the
satisfaction of the Court which can be gathered from  the  reasons  recorded
by the Court in respect of complicity of some  other  person(s)  not  facing
trial in the offence.

The moot question, however, is the degree of satisfaction that  is  required
for invoking the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and the  related  question
is as to in what situations this power should be exercised in respect  of  a
person named in the FIR but not  charge-sheeted.   These  two  aspects  were
also specifically dealt with by the Constitution Bench  in  Hardeep  Singh’s
case and answered in the following manner:
“95.  At the time of taking cognizance, the  court  has  to  see  whether  a
prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused.  Under  Section
319 CrPC, though the test of prima facie case is the  same,  the  degree  of
satisfaction that is required is much stricter. A two-Judge  Bench  of  this
Court in Vikas v. State of Rajasthan [(2014) 3  SCC  321]  ,  held  that  on
the objective satisfaction of the  court  a  person  may  be  “arrested”  or
“summoned”, as the circumstances of the case  may  require,  if  it  appears
from the evidence that any such person not being the accused  has  committed
an offence for which such person could be tried together  with  the  already
arraigned accused persons.

                       xx               xx         xx

105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary  and  an  extraordinary
power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in  those  cases  where  the
circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because  the
Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that  some  other  person
may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and  cogent
evidence occurs against a person from the  evidence  led  before  the  court
that such power should be  exercised  and  not  in  a  casual  and  cavalier
manner.

106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be  established
from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the  anvil
of  cross-examination,  it  requires  much  stronger  evidence   than   mere
probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one  which
is more than prima facie case  as  exercised  at  the  time  of  framing  of
charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the  evidence,  if  goes
unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of  such  satisfaction,
the court should refrain from exercising power under Section  319  CrPC.  In
Section 319 CrPC the purpose of providing if “it appears from  the  evidence
that any person not being the accused has committed any  offence”  is  clear
from the words “for which such person  could  be  tried  together  with  the
accused”.  The  words  used  are  not  “for  which  such  person  could   be
convicted”. There is,  therefore,  no  scope  for  the  court  acting  under
Section 319 CrPC to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused.
                                                        (emphasis supplied)”

In order to answer the  question,  some  of  the  principles  enunciated  in
Hardeep Singh’s case may be recapitulated:
      Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by  the  trial  court
at any stage during the trial, i.e., before  the  conclusion  of  trial,  to
summon any person as an accused and face the  trial  in  the  ongoing  case,
once the trial court finds that there is  some  ‘evidence’  against  such  a
person on the basis of which evidence it can be gathered that he appears  to
be guilty of offence.  The ‘evidence’ herein  means  the  material  that  is
brought before the Court during trial.   Insofar  as  the  material/evidence
collected by the IO at  the  stage  of  inquiry  is  concerned,  it  can  be
utilised for corroboration and to  support  the  evidence  recorded  by  the
Court to invoke  the  power  under  Section  319  Cr.P.C.   No  doubt,  such
evidence  that  has  surfaced  in   examination-in-chief,   without   cross-
examination of witnesses, can also be taken  into  consideration.   However,
since it is a discretionary power given  to  the  Court  under  Section  319
Cr.P.C. and  is  also  an  extraordinary  one,  same  has  to  be  exercised
sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances  of  the  case  so
warrants.  The degree of satisfaction is  more  than  the  degree  which  is
warranted at the time of framing of the charges against  others  in  respect
of whom chargesheet was  filed.   Only  where  strong  and  cogent  evidence
occurs against a person from the evidence led before  the  Court  that  such
power should be exercised.  It is not to be  exercised  in  a  casual  or  a
cavalier manner.  The prima facie opinion which is  to  be  formed  requires
stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity.

When we translate the aforesaid principles with  their  application  to  the
facts of this case, we gather an impression that the trial court acted in  a
casual and cavalier manner  in  passing  the  summoning  order  against  the
appellants.  The appellants  were  named  in  the  FIR.   Investigation  was
carried out by the police.   On  the  basis  of  material  collected  during
investigation, which has been referred to by us above,  the  IO  found  that
these appellants were in  Jaipur  city  when  the  incident  took  place  in
Kanaur, at a distance of 175 kms.  The complainant and others who  supported
the version in the FIR regarding alleged presence of the appellants  at  the
place of incident had also made statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to  the
same effect.  Notwithstanding the same, the  police  investigation  revealed
that  the  statements  of  these  persons  regarding  the  presence  of  the
appellants at the place of occurrence  was  doubtful  and  did  not  inspire
confidence, in view of the documentary and other evidence  collected  during
the investigation, which depicted another story and clinchingly showed  that
appellants plea of alibi was correct.

This record was before the  trial  court.   Notwithstanding  the  same,  the
trial court went by the deposition of complainant and some other persons  in
their examination-in-chief, with no other  material  to  support  their  so-
called verbal/ocular version.  Thus, the ‘evidence’  recorded  during  trial
was nothing more than the statements which was already there  under  Section
161 Cr.P.C. recorded at the time of investigation of the  case.   No  doubt,
the trial court would be competent to exercise its power even on  the  basis
of such statements recorded before it in examination-in-chief.  However,  in
a case like the present where plethora of evidence was collected by  the  IO
during investigation which suggested  otherwise,  the  trial  court  was  at
least duty bound to look into the same while  forming  prima  facie  opinion
and to see as to whether ‘much stronger evidence than  mere  possibility  of
their (i.e.  appellants)  complicity  has  come  on  record.   There  is  no
satisfaction of this nature.  Even if we presume that the  trial  court  was
not apprised of the same at the time  when  it  passed  the  order  (as  the
appellants were not on the scene at that time), what is  more  troubling  is
that even when this material on  record  was  specifically  brought  to  the
notice of the High Court in the Revision Petition filed by  the  appellants,
the  High  Court  too  blissfully  ignored  the   said   material.    Except
reproducing the discussion contained in the order of  the  trial  court  and
expressing agreement therewith, nothing more has  been  done.   Such  orders
cannot stand judicial scrutiny.

As a consequence,  this  appeal  is  allowed  setting  aside  the  order  of
summoning the appellants under Section 319 Cr.P.C.


                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)



                             .............................................J.
                                                             (ASHOK BHUSHAN)

NEW DELHI;
APRIL 27, 2017

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