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Friday, May 26, 2017

the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short, the 'Act of 1986').= the detention order in this case is vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the past as would have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a trial. The satisfaction of the authority is not in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Incidents which are stale, cease to have relevance to the subject matter of the enquiry and must be treated as extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute.- The influence of the stale incidents in the detention order is too pernicious to be ignored, and the order must therefore go; both on account of being vitiated due to malice in law and for taking into account matters which ought not to have been taken into account There is another reason why the detention order is unjustified. It was passed when the accused was in jail in Crime No. 221 of 2016. His custody in jail for the said offence was converted into custody under the impugned detention order. The incident involved in this offence is sometime in the year 2002-2003. The detenu could not have been detained preventively by taking this stale incident into account, more so when he was in jail.- In Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Ors.[9], this Court observed as follows:- “6. On a reading of the grounds, particularly the paragraph which we have extracted above, it is clear that the order of detention was passed as the detaining authority was apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial prisoner was likely to get bail an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed.” - Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we allow this appeal, and set aside the aforesaid detention order dated 23.11.2016 passed by the Respondent No.2 – Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda Commissionerate, Rangareddy District, Telangana, as also the impugned judgment and order dated 22.03.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No.43671 of 2016.

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 885 OF 2017


SAMA ARUNA                             ....APPELLANT(S)
                                   VERSUS
STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR             ...RESPONDENT(S)


                               J U D G M E N T

S.A.BOBDE, J.
            The appellant - the wife  of  the  detenu,  has  preferred  this
appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated  22.03.2017  passed  by
the High Court of Hyderabad in Writ Petition No.43671 of 2016,  whereby  the
High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the  order  of  detention
dated 23.11.2016, issued against the detenu by Respondent  No.2–Commissioner
of Police, Rachakonda Commissionerate, Rangareddy District, Telangana.
2.          The detenu has been charged for various offences  which  he  had
allegedly committed during the years 2002-2007.  Four FIR’s were  registered
for the said offences.  He was admitted to  bail  in  three  FIR’s.  In  the
fourth FIR Crime No. 221 of 2016, he was arrested on 05.09.2016. To  prevent
him from seeking bail, while in judicial custody he was detained  under  the
Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,  Dacoits,  Drug
Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land  Grabbers  Act,  1986
(for short, the 'Act of 1986').
3.           The  Respondent  No.2  -  Commissioner  of  Police,  Rachakonda
Commissionerate,  Rangareddy  District,  Telangana,  passed  an   order   of
detention against the detenu on 23.11.2016 under section 3(2) of the Act  of
1986, for a unspecified period, from the date of service  of  the  order  on
the detenu, and further directed  that  the  detenu  be  lodged  in  Central
Prison, Chenchalguda, Hyderabad.
4.          The aforesaid detention order was  accompanied  by  grounds  for
detention of the same date. The grounds in the  detention  order  carried  a
statement informing the detenu of his right to represent against  the  order
of detention to (i) the detaining authority  i.e.  Commissioner  of  Police,
Rachakonda, (ii) the Chief  Secretary  to  Government  of  Telangana  State,
Hyderabad, (iii) the Advisory Board.
5.          The Respondent No.1 – State  approved  the  aforesaid  detention
order on 01.12.2016 under section 3(3) of the  Act  of  1986.  The  Advisory
Board reviewed the case on 02.01.2017 and opined that “there  is  sufficient
cause for the detention of Sama Sanjeeva Reddy”. After  the  report  of  the
Advisory Board,  the  respondent-State  confirmed  the  detention  order  on
15.02.2017. Being aggrieved, the appellant- the  wife  approached  the  High
Court by filing a writ petition which was dismissed. Hence, this appeal.
6.          The main contention of Mr. Vikas Singh, learned  Senior  Counsel
appearing for the appellant, is that the grounds  of  detention  are  stale.
They are based on the incidents which are said to have occurred between  the
period from 2002 to 2007 and are relied on by the detaining authority  while
forming its opinion and recording its satisfaction that the detenu needs  to
be detained on 23.11.2016.
7.          The aforesaid contention of Mr. Singh,  learned  Senior  Counsel
for the appellant, may be examined with reference to  the  detention  order.
The detention order mentions six cases as follows:
|Sl. |Case No.          |Date of     |Date of      |Offences under IPC |
|No. |                  |Incident    |Reporting the|                   |
|    |                  |            |incident     |                   |
|1.  |Crime No.554/2013 |26.9.2013   |21.11.2013   |447, 427, 506      |
|2.  |Crime No.8/2014   |21.11.2014  |23.11.2015   |447, 427           |
|3.  |Crime No.361/2016 |2007        |13.08.2016   |363, 384, 420,120B,|
|    |                  |            |             |Section 4 of AP LG |
|    |                  |            |             |Act and 25 1(B) of |
|    |                  |            |             |the Arms Act.      |
|4.  |Crime No.362/2016 |2007        |13.08.2016   |363, 384, 420,120B,|
|    |                  |            |             |Section 4 of AP LG |
|    |                  |            |             |Act and 25 1(B) of |
|    |                  |            |             |the Arms Act.      |
|5.  |Crime No.367/2016 |2005        |17.08.2016   |363, 384, 420,120B,|
|    |                  |            |             |Section 4 of AP LG |
|    |                  |            |             |Act and 25 1(B) of |
|    |                  |            |             |the Arms Act.      |
|6.  |Crime No.221/2016 |2002-03     |05.09.2016   |419, 420, 468, 363,|
|    |                  |            |             |452, 323, 342, 386,|
|    |                  |            |             |505 r/w 120B,      |
|    |                  |            |             |Section 4 of AP LG |
|    |                  |            |             |Act and 25 1(B) of |
|    |                  |            |             |the Arms Act.      |

8.          The first two incidents are about three to two years before  the
detention order dated 23.11.2016. The other incidents  are  about  9  to  14
years  before  the  detention  order.  Peculiarly,  though  the  first   two
incidents are mentioned, the detaining authority has not relied on  them  as
grounds of detention. The detaining authority has relied on the  four  other
cases which are item nos.3 to 6 as  grounds  of  detention.  The  report  in
these cases was apparently lodged in the year  2016  for  some  reason  best
known to the police. However, that is not of much consequence since the  FIR
is in respect of incidents which are old, 9 to 14 years  old.  It  is  their
relevance to  a  grossly  belated  order  of  detention  which  we  have  to
consider.
9.          The detaining authority has  pointedly  referred  to  only  four
offences of criminal conspiracy, cheating, kidnapping and extortion, in  the
limits of Pahadishareef  Police  Station  and  Adibatla  Police  Station  of
Rachakonda Commissionerate. In three out of these four  cases  he  has  been
granted bail.  The State accepted these orders.
10.         Each of them are beyond 9 years, up  to  14  years,  before  the
detention orders. They have been considered under a sub-heading which is  as
follows:
“THE FOLLOWING FACTS OF THE (4) CASES CONSIDERED AS  GROUNDS  FOR  DETENTION
WHICH WERE COMMITTED BY YOU IN THE RECENT PAST, WOULD  PROVE  YOUR  ACTIVITY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER.”

11.          The  detaining  authority  has  then  gone  to  consider  those
grounds, to arrive at the satisfaction that the detenu needs to be  detained
in 2016. These grounds are so stale and mildewed that the  exercise  of  the
power of detention based on them appears mala fide in law.
12.         The four cases which are old and therefore,  stale,  pertain  to
the period from 2002 to 2007. They pertain to land grabbing  and  hence,  we
are not inclined to consider the impact of those cases on public order  etc.
 We are satisfied that they ought to have been excluded  from  consideration
on the ground that they are stale and could not have  been  used  to  detain
the detenu in the year 2016  under  the  Act  of  1986  which  empowers  the
detaining authority to do so with a view to prevent a person from acting  in
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
13.         We are not inclined to accept the justification offered  by  Mr.
Harin  P.  Raval,  learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of   the
respondents, that the mere reference to two other cases which are 2-3  years
old should be considered as relevant and  proximate  grounds  of  detention,
though the detaining authority itself has not done so.  Every  statement  in
the detention order must be taken to have been made responsibly.  Where  the
detaining authority has detailed 4 cases and stated  that  these  have  been
considered as the grounds of  detention  it  must  be  considered  as  true-
speaking. Moreover,  those  incidents  appeared  to  be  cases  of  ordinary
criminal trespass which would not, in  any  way,  be  of  much  significance
since they do not deal with the disruption of  any  public  order  which  is
relevant under the law dealing with preventive detention.

14.         Section 3(1) confers the power of  detention  in  the  following
terms:-
      “3(1). The Government may, if satisfied  with  respect  to  any  boot-
legger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral  traffic  offender  or  land-
grabber that with a view  to  preventing  him  from  acting  in  any  manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary  so  to  do,
make an order directing that such person be detained.”

The purpose for which a  detention  order  may  be  passed  is  confined  to
‘preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance  of
public order’.
The term “acting in any manner prejudicial  to  the  maintenance  of  public
order” is further defined as follows:-
“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
 (a) “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of  public  order”
means when a bootlegger, a dacoit, a drug-offender,  a  goonda,  an  immoral
traffic offender or a land-grabber is engaged or is making preparations  for
engaging, in any of his activities as such, which affect adversely,  or  are
likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order:

Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause public order  shall  be  deemed
to have been  affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to  be  affected
adversely inter alia, if any  of  the  activities  of  any  of  the  persons
referred  to  in  this  clause  directly,  or  indirectly,  is  causing   or
calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or  a  feeling  of  insecurity
among the general public or any section  thereof  or  a  grave  wide  spread
danger to life or public health:”


A person may be detained under the Act of 1986 with a view  to  prevent  him
from  engaging  in,  or  making  preparations  for  engaging,  in  any  such
activities.
15.         Obviously, therefore, the power to  detain,  under  the  Act  of
1986 can be exercised only for preventing a  person  from  engaging  in,  or
pursuing or taking some action which  adversely  affects  or  is  likely  to
affect adversely the maintenance of public  order;  or  for  preventing  him
from making preparations for engaging in  such activities. There  is  little
doubt that the conduct or activities of the  detenu  in  the  past  must  be
taken into account for coming to the conclusion that he is going  to  engage
in or make preparations for engaging  in  such  activities,  for  many  such
persons follow a pattern of criminal activities.  But the  question  is  how
far back?  There is no doubt  that  only  activities  so  far  back  can  be
considered as furnish a cause  for  preventive  detention  in  the  present.
That is, only those activities so far back in the past  which  lead  to  the
conclusion that he is likely to engage in  or  prepare  to  engage  in  such
activities in the immediate future can be  taken  into  account.   In  Golam
Hussain alias Gama v. Commissioner of Police,  Calcutta  and  Ors.[1],  this
Court observed as follows:-
             “No   authority,   acting   rationally,   can   be   satisfied,
subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because  long  ago  the
detenu had done  something  evil.   To  rule  otherwise  is  to  sanction  a
simulacrum of a statutory requirement.  But no mechanical test  by  counting
the months of the interval is sound.  It all depends on the  nature  of  the
acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on  the
length of the gap, short or long, on the reason  for  the  delay  in  taking
preventive action, like information of participation  being  available  only
in the course of an  investigation.  We  have  to  investigate  whether  the
causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

Suffice it to say that in any case, incidents which are said to  have  taken
place nine to fourteen years  earlier,  cannot  form  the  basis  for  being
satisfied in the present that the detenu is going  to  engage  in,  or  make
preparation for engaging in such activities.
16.         We are, therefore, satisfied that the aforesaid detention  order
was passed on grounds  which  are  stale  and  which  could  not  have  been
considered as relevant for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that  the
detenu must be detained. The detention order must be based on  a  reasonable
prognosis of the future behavior of a person based on his  past  conduct  in
light of the surrounding circumstances.  The live and  proximate  link  that
must exist between the past conduct of a person and the imperative  need  to
detain him must be taken to have been snapped in  this  case.   A  detention
order which is founded on stale incidents, must be regarded as an  order  of
punishment for a crime, passed without a trial, though purporting to  be  an
order  of  preventive  detention.  The  essential  concept   of   preventive
detention is that the detention of  a  person  is  not  to  punish  him  for
something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. See G.  Reddeiah  v.
Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.[2]     , and P.U. Iqbal  v.  Union  of
India and Ors.[3]

THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
17.         While reviewing a detention order, a court does  not  substitute
its judgment for the decision of the executive.  Nonetheless, the Court  has
a duty to enquire that the decision of the executive is  made  upon  matters
laid down by the statute as relevant for  reaching  such  a  decision.   For
what is at stake, is the personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed to him  by
the Constitution and of which he cannot  be  deprived,  except  for  reasons
laid down by the law and for a purpose sanctioned by law.  As  early  as  in
Machinder Shivaji v. The King[4], this Court observed:-
      “…… and it would be a serious derogation from that  responsibility  if
the Court were to substitute  its  judgment  for  the  satisfaction  of  the
executive authority and, to that end,  undertake  an  investigation  of  the
sufficiency of the materials on which such satisfaction was grounded.
       The  Court  can,  however,  examine  the  grounds  disclosed  by  the
Government to see if they are relevant to the object which  the  legislation
has in view, namely, the prevention of acts  prejudicial  to  public  safety
and tranquility, for “satisfaction” in this connection must be  grounded  on
material which is of rationally probative value.”

      Later, in the case of Khudiram Das vs. The State of  West  Bengal  and
Others[5], while considering the judicial reviewability  of  the  subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority, the Court surveyed the area  within
which the validity of  the  subjective  satisfaction  can  be  subjected  to
judicial scrutiny in the following paragraphs:-
“9.   …… There are several grounds evolved by judicial decisions for  saying
that no subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the authority  as  required
under the statute. The simplest  case  is  whether  the  authority  has  not
applied its mind at all; in such a case the authority could not possibly  be
satisfied as regards the fact in respect of  which  it  is  required  to  be
satisfied. Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji is a case in point.  Then  there  may
be a case where the power  is  exercised  dishonestly  or  for  an  improper
purpose: such a case would also negative the existence  of  satisfaction  on
the part of the authority. The existence of 'Improper purpose', that  is,  a
purpose  not  contemplated  by  the  statute,  has  been  recognised  as  an
independent ground of control in several decided  cases.  The  satisfaction,
moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority itself, and therefore,  if
in exercising the power, the authority has  acted  under  the  dictation  of
another body as the Commissioner of Police did in Commissioner of Police  v.
Gordhandas Bhanji and the officer of the Ministry  of  Labour  and  National
Service did in Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister  of  Labour  and  National
Service, the exercise of the power would  be  bad  and  so  also  would  the
exercise of the power be vitiated where the authority  has  disabled  itself
from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case by  self-created
rules of policy or in any other manner. The satisfaction said to  have  been
arrived at by the authority would also be bad  where  it  is  based  on  the
application of a wrong test or the misconstruction of a statute. Where  this
happens, the satisfaction of the authority would not be in  respect  of  the
thing in regard to which it is required to  be  satisfied.  Then  again  the
satisfaction  must  be  grounded  'on  materials  which  are  of  rationally
probative value'. Machinder v. King. The grounds on which  the  satisfaction
is based must be such as a rational human being can consider connected  with
the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be  reached.  They  must
be relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and must not be  extraneous
to the scope and purpose of the statute. If the  authority  has  taken  into
account, it may even be with the best of intention,  as  a  relevant  factor
something which it could not properly take into account in deciding  whether
or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it  should  be
exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad.”



18.          This  Court  then  dealt  with  the  review  of  administrative
findings which are not supported with substantial evidence in the  following
paragraphs of Khudiram Das (supra):-

“10.   …… But in England and in  India,  the  courts  stop-short  at  merely
inquiring whether the  grounds  on  which  the  authority  has  reached  its
subjective satisfaction are such that any reasonable person  could  possibly
arrive at such satisfaction. "If", to use the words of Lord Greene,  M.  R.,
in Associated Provincial  Picture  Houses  Ltd.  v.  Wednesbury  Corporation
words which have found approval of the House  of  Lords  in  Smith  v.  Rest
Eller Rural District Council  and  Fawcett  Properties  Ltd.  v.  Buckingham
County Council – ‘the authority has come to  a  conclusion  so  unreasonable
that no reasonable authority could ever have come to  it,  then  the  courts
can interfere". In such a case, a legitimate inference may fairly  be  drawn
either that the authority "did not  honestly  form  that  view  or  that  in
forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts’…….

11.   This discussion is sufficient to  show  that  there  is  nothing  like
unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability. The truth is  that
in a Government under law, there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  unreviewable
discretion. "Law has reached its  finest  moments",  said  Justice  Douglas,
"when it has  freed  man  from  the  unlimited  discretion  of  some  ruler,
some...official, some  bureaucrat....  Absolute  discretion  is  a  ruthless
master.  It  is  more  destructive  of  freedom  then  any  of  man's  other
inventions". United States v. Wunderlich and this is much more so in a  case
where personal liberty is involved. That is  why  the  courts  have  devised
various methods of judicial control  so  that  power  in  the  hands  of  an
individual officer or authority  is  not  misused  or  abused  or  exercised
arbitrarily or without any justifiable grounds.”


19.         Incidents which are old and stale and in which  the  detenu  has
been granted bail, cannot be said to have  any  relevance  for  detaining  a
citizen and depriving him  of  his  liberty  without  a  trial.  This  Court
observed the following in the case of Khudiram Das (Supra):
            “The grounds on which the satisfaction is based must be such  as
a rational human being can consider connected with the fact  in  respect  of
which the satisfaction is to be  reached.  They  must  be  relevant  to  the
subject-matter of the inquiry and must not be extraneous to  the  scope  and
purpose of the statute. If the authority has  taken  into  account,  it  may
even be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor something which  it
could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to  exercise
the power or the manner or extent to  which  it  should  be  exercised,  the
exercise of the power would be bad. Partap Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab.  If
there are to be found in the statute expressly  or  by  implication  matters
which the authority ought to have regard to them, in exercising  the  power,
the authority must have regard to those matters.  The  authority  must  call
its attention to the matters which it is bound to consider.”

20.         We are of the view, that the detention order  in  this  case  is
vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the past  as  would
have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without  a  trial.   The
satisfaction of the authority is not in respect of the thing  in  regard  to
which it is required to be satisfied.  Incidents which are stale,  cease  to
have relevance to the subject matter of the enquiry and must be  treated  as
extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute.
21.         In this case, we find the authority has come to a conclusion  so
unreasonable that no reasonable authority  could  ever  reach.  A  detaining
authority must be taken to know both, the purpose and the procedure of  law.
 It is no answer to say that the authority was  satisfied.   In  T.A.  Abdul
Rahman v. State of Kerela  and  Ors.[6],  this  Court  observed,  where  the
authority takes into account stale incidents which have gone by to  seed  it
would be safe to infer that the satisfaction  of  the  authority  is  not  a
genuine one.
      The extent of staleness of grounds in this case compel us  to  examine
the aspect of malice in law.  It is not necessary to say that there  was  an
actual malicious intent in making a wrong  detention  order.  In  Smt.  S.R.
Venkataraman v. Union of India and Anr.[7],  this  Court  cited  Shearer  v.
Shields[8], where Viscount Haldane observed as follows:-
            “A  person  who  inflicts  an  injury  upon  another  person  in
contravention of law is not allowed to say that he did so with  an  innocent
mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law.  He  may,
therefore, be guilty of malice in law, although, so far  the  state  of  his
mind is concerned, he acts ignorantly and in that sense innocently.”

22.         This Court then went on to observe  in  Smt.  S.R.  Venkataraman
(supra) as follows:-
“6. It is however not necessary to examine the question of malice in law  in
this case, for it is trite law  that  if  a  discretionary  power  has  been
exercised for an unauthorised purpose, it is  generally  immaterial  whether
its repository was acting in good faith or in bad faith. As  was  stated  by
Lord Goddard. C.J. in Pilling v. Abergele Urban  District  Council  where  a
duty to determine a question is conferred on an authority which state  their
reasons for the decision,
and the reasons which they state show that  they  have  taken  into  account
matters which they ought not to have taken into account, or that  they  have
failed to take matters into account which they  ought  to  have  taken  into
account, the court to which an appeal lies can and ought  to  adjudicate  on
the matter.

7. The principle which is applicable in such cases has thus been  stated  by
Lord Esher, M.R. in The Queen on the Prosecution  of  Richard  Westbrook  v.
The Vestry of St. Pancras:
“If  people  who  have  to  exercise  a  public  duty  by  exercising  their
discretion take into account matters which the Courts  consider  not  to  be
proper for the guidance of their discretion, then in  the  eye  of  the  law
they have not exercised their discretion.”
This view has been followed in Sadler v. Sheffield Corporation.”

23.         The influence of the stale incidents in the detention  order  is
too pernicious to be ignored, and the  order  must  therefore  go;  both  on
account of being vitiated due to malice in law and for taking  into  account
matters which ought not to have been taken into account.
24.         There is another reason why the detention order is  unjustified.
 It was passed when the accused was in jail in Crime No. 221 of  2016.   His
custody in jail for the said offence was converted into  custody  under  the
impugned  detention  order.   The  incident  involved  in  this  offence  is
sometime in the year 2002-2003.  The detenu could  not  have  been  detained
preventively by taking this stale incident into account,  more  so  when  he
was in jail. In Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Ors.[9],  this
Court observed as follows:-
      “6. On a reading of the grounds, particularly the paragraph  which  we
have extracted above, it is clear that the order of detention was passed  as
the detaining authority  was  apprehensive  that  in  case  the  detenu  was
released on bail he would again carry on  his  criminal  activities  in  the
area. If the apprehension of the detaining  authority  was  true,  the  bail
application had to be opposed  and  in  case  bail  was  granted,  challenge
against that order in the higher forum had  to  be  raised.  Merely  on  the
ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial  prisoner  was  likely
to get bail an order of detention under the  National  Security  Act  should
not ordinarily be passed.”

25.          Therefore, in the facts and  circumstances  of  this  case,  we
allow this appeal,  and  set  aside  the  aforesaid  detention  order  dated
23.11.2016  passed  by  the   Respondent  No.2  –  Commissioner  of  Police,
Rachakonda Commissionerate, Rangareddy  District,  Telangana,  as  also  the
impugned judgment and order dated 22.03.2017 passed by  the  High  Court  of
Judicature at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No.43671 of 2016.


                                                       ....................J
                                                               [S. A. BOBDE]



                                                       ....................J
                                                          [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
NEW DELHI
MAY 03, 2017
-----------------------
[1]
      [2]     (1974) 4 SCC 530
[3]
      [4]     (2012) 2 SCC 389
[5]
      [6]     (1992) 1 SCC 434
[7]
      [8]     AIR 1950 FC 129
[9]
      [10]   (1975) 2 SCC 81
[11]
      [12]    (1989) 4 SCC 741
[13]
      [14]    (1979) 2 SCC 491
[15]
      [16]    (1914) AC 808
[17]
      [18]    (1985) 4 SCC 232

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