Whether in exercise of its powers under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Code’), the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to ignore any one of the reports, where there are two reports by the same or different investigating agencies in furtherance of the orders of a Court? If so, to what effect? Question No.2 : Whether the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short ‘the CBI’) is empowered to conduct ‘fresh’/’re- investigation’ when the cognizance has already been taken by the Court of competent jurisdiction on the basis of a police report under Section 173 of the Code? Facts :-In our considered view, the trial court has to consider the entire record, including both the Delhi Police Report filed under Section 173(2) of the Code as well as the Closure Report filed by the CBI and the documents filed along with these reports. It appears, the trial court may have three options, firstly, it may accept the application of accused for discharge. Secondly, it may direct that the trial may proceed further in accordance with law and thirdly, if it is dissatisfied on any important aspect of investigation already conducted and in its considered opinion, it is just, proper and necessary in the interest of justice to direct ‘further investigation’, it may do so. 53. Ergo, for the reasons recorded above, we modify the order of the High Court impugned in the present appeal to the above extent and direct the trial court to proceed with the case further in accordance with law.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

           CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.          2040-2041        OF 2012
              (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.9185-9186 of 2009)


Vinay Tyagi                                         … Appellant
                                   Versus
Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors.                    … Respondents

                                    WITH

           CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.      2042-2043            OF 2012
              (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos. 9040-9041 of 2009)

               CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.      2044           OF 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 6210 of 2010)

               CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.      2045          OF 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 6212 of 2010)




                               J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1.    Leave Granted

2.    The following two important questions  of  law  which  are  likely  to
arise more often than not before the courts of competent  jurisdiction  fall
for consideration of this Court in the present appeal :

Question No.1 :        Whether in exercise of its powers under  Section  173
                   of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,  ‘the
                   Code’), the Trial Court has the  jurisdiction  to  ignore
                   any one of the reports, where there are  two  reports  by
                   the  same  or   different   investigating   agencies   in
                   furtherance of the orders of a Court?   If  so,  to  what
                   effect?

Question No.2 :  Whether the Central  Bureau  of  Investigation  (for  short
                   ‘the  CBI’)  is   empowered   to   conduct   ‘fresh’/’re-
                   investigation’  when  the  cognizance  has  already  been
                   taken by the Court of competent jurisdiction on the basis
                   of a police report under Section 173 of the Code?

Facts :-

3.    Irshad Ali @ Deepak,  Respondent  No.1,  in  the  present  appeal  was
working as an informer of the Special Cell  of  Delhi  Police  in  the  year
2000.  He was also working in a similar capacity  for  Intelligence  Bureau.
Primarily, his profession and means of earning his  livelihood  was  working
as a rickshaw puller.  On 11th December, 2005, it is stated that  he  had  a
heated conversation with the Intelligence Bureau officials for whom  he  was
working.  It was demanded of him that he should  join  a  militant  camp  in
Jammu & Kashmir in order to give information with respect  their  activities
to the Intelligence Bureau.  However, the said respondent refused to do  the
job and consequently claims that he  has  been  falsely  implicated  in  the
present case.   In fact,  on  12th  December,  2005,  a  report  was  lodged
regarding disappearance of respondent no.2 by his family members  at  Police
Station, Bhajanpura, Delhi.  Not only this, the brother  of  the  respondent
no.2 also sent a telegram to the Prime Minister, Home  Minister  and  Police
Commissioner on 7th and 10th  January,  2006,  but  to  no  avail.   On  9th
February, 2006, a report was published in  the  Hindustan  Times  newspaper,
Delhi Edition, through SHO,  Police  Station,  Bhajanpura,  Delhi  with  the
photograph of respondent no.2 seeking help of the general public in  tracing
him.  On that very evening, it is stated that the Special Cell of the  Delhi
Police falsely implicated both the respondents in a case, FIR  No.  10/2006,
under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances  Act  and  under  Section
120B, 121 and 122 of the Indian Penal Code,  1860  (for  short  ‘IPC’)  read
with Section 25 of the Arms Act.  Both the  respondents  were  described  as
terrorists.  In the entire record, it was not stated  that  the  respondents
were working as informers of these agencies.  At  this  stage,  it  will  be
pertinent to refer to the  FIR  that  was  registered  against  the  accused
persons, relevant part of which can usefully be extracted herein: -

           “To, the Duty Officer, PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi.
            During the 3rd week of January, 2006 information  was  received
           through Central Intelligence Agency  that  militant  of  Kashmir
           based Organisation has set up a base in Delhi.  One Irshad Ali @
           Deepak is frequently visiting Kashmir to get  arms,  ammuniation
           and explosives or the  instructions  from  their  Kashmir  based
           Commanders.  He is also visiting different parts of the  country
           to spread the network of the militant organizations.  As per the
           directions of senior officers, a team under the  supervision  of
           Sh. Sanjeev Kumar, ACP Special Cell led by Inspector Mohan Chand
           Sharma was formed  to  develop  this  information  and  identify
           Irshad and ‘his whereabouts in Sultanpuri area,  Secret  sources
           were  deployed.   During   the   course   of   developments   of
           information, it came to knowledge that above noted Irshad Ali  @
           Deepak is  resident  of  Inder  Enclave,  Phase-II,  Sultanpuri,
           Delhi.  It also came to notice that one  Mohd.  Muarif  Qamar  @
           Nawab r/o Bhajanpura, Delhi is also associated with the militant
           organization.  During the development of  this  information,  it
           was revealed that both Irshad Ali and nawab had gone to  J&K  on
           the directions of their handlers to  receive  a  consignment  of
           arms and explosives.  Today on February 09, 2006 at about 4  PM,
           one of these sources telephonically informed SI Vinay  Tyagi  in
           the office of Special Cell, Lodhi Colony that Irshad A.li(sic) @
           Deepak along with his associate Mohd. Muarif Qamar @  Nawab  R/o
           Bajanpura, Delhi is coming from Jammu in JK SRTC Bus No. JK-02 Y-
           0299 with a consignment of explosives,  arms  &  ammunition  and
           will alight at Mukarba Chowk, near Karnal Bypass in the evening.
             This  information  was  recorded  in  Daily  Dairy  (sic)  and
           discussed with senior officers.   A  team  consisting  of  Insp.
           Sanjay Dutt, myself, SI Subhash  Vats,  SI  Rahul,  SI  Ravinder
           Kumar Tyagi, S.I Dalip Kumar, SI Pawan Kumar,  ASI  Anil  Tyagi,
           ASI Shahjahan, HC Krishna Ram, HC Nagender, HC Rustam, Ct. Rajiv
           and Ct. Rajender was constituted to act upon  this  information.
           Thereafter the team members in 3  private  vehicles  and  2  two
           wheelers armed with official weapons as per  Malkhana  register,
           departed from the office of Special Cell, Lodhi Colony at  about
           4.30 PM and reached G.T. Karnal Depot at  5.30  PM  where  Insp.
           Sanjay Dutt met the  informer.   Insp.  Sanjay  Dutt  asked  6/7
           persons to join the police party after disclosing them about the
           information.  All of them went away citing genuine excuses.  The
           police party was briefed by Insp. Sanjay Dutt and  was  deployed
           around Mukarba Chowk, Interstate Bus Stand.  At about  7.35  PM,
           above  mentioned  Irshad  and  Nawab  were  identified   by  the
           informer when they had alighted from  the  bus  No.JK-02  Y-0299
           coming from Jammu.  Both were  scene  (sic)  carrying  blue  and
           green-red check coloured airbags each on their right  shoulders.
           In the meantime, team posted near by was alerted and  when  they
           were about to cross the outer Ring Road  to  go  towards  Rohini
           side, were overpowered.  Cursory search of  the  above-mentioned
           persons was conducted and from the right dhub of the  pant  worn
           by Mohd Muarif Qamar @ Nawab mentioned above, apprehended by  me
           with the help of Dalip Kumar, one Chinese  pistol  star  Mark.30
           calibre along  with  8  live  cartridges  in  its  magazine  was
           recovered.  On measuring the length of the barrel and body  19.4
           cms, magazine 10.8 cms, butt 8.9  cms  and  diagonal  length  of
           pistol is 21.5 cms Number 19396 is engraved on the butt  of  the
           pistol.  On checking the blue coloured bag  recovered  from  the
           possession  of  Nawab,  one  white  envelope   containing   non-
           electronic detonators, one ABCD green  coloured  Timer,  one  AB
           cream coloured Timer was  also  recovered  which  was  concealed
           beneath the layers of clothes including one light blue  coloured
           shirt and dark gray coloured pant in the bag, and from  the  red
           green coloured bag recovered from the possession of  Irshad  Ali
           mentioned above, apprehended by SI Ravinder Tyagi with the  help
           of Ct. Rajender Kumar, one Chinese pistol star Mark .30  calibre
           along with 8 live cartridges in its magazine was recovered.   On
           measuring the length of the barrel and body 19.4  cms,  magazine
           10.8 cms, butt 8.9 cms and diagonal length  of  pistol  is  21.5
           cms, Number 33030545 is engraved on the barrel and body  of  the
           pistol.  One white polythene containing a mixture of  black  and
           white oil based explosive material kept in a black polythene and
           was also concealed beneath the layers of clothes.   On  weighing
           the explosive was found to be 2 kg.  Out of this two samples  of
           10 gms each were taken out in white  plastic  small  jars.   The
           remaining recovered explosive  kept  back  in  black  polythene,
           pulinda  prepared and sealed with the  seal  of  ‘VKT’.   Sample
           explosive were marked as S1 and S2 and sealed with the  seal  of
           ‘VKT’.  The ABCD timer and AB Timer were kept in a  plastic  jar
           and sealed with the seal of  ‘VKT’  marked  as  ‘T’  and  3  non
           electric  detonators  along  with  envelope  were  kept   in   a
           transparent plastic jar with the help of cotton and sealed  with
           the seal of “VKT’ marked as ‘D’.  The recovered Star Mark pistol
           from the possession of accused Mohd. Muarif @ Nawab  and  Irshad
           ali  were  kept  in  separate  pulindas  and   marked   as   M&I
           respectively and sealed  with  the  seal  of  “VKT’.   The  blue
           coloured airbag and clothes recovered  from  the  possession  of
           accused Mohd. Muarif @ Nawab and kept in  a  cloth  pulinda  and
           sealed with the seal of ‘T’ and the green-red colour  check  bag
           recovered from the possession of accused Irshad  Ali  containing
           clothes was kept in a pulinda sealed with the seal of ‘VKT’  and
           CFSL forms were filled-up and sealed with  the  seal  of  “VKT”.
           Seal after use was handed  over  to  SI  Ravinder  Kumar  Tyagi.
           During their interrogation, both the accused Irshad Ali @ Deepak
           S/o Mohd.  Yunus  Ali  R/o  F-247-A,  Inder  Enclave,  Phase-II,
           Sultnpuri, Delhi aged 30 years and Mohd. Muarif  Qamar  @  Nawab
           R/o  Vill.  Deora  Bandhoh,   P.O.-Jogiara,   PS-Jale,   Distt.-
           Darbhanga,  Bihar,  stated  that  they  brought  the   recovered
           consignment of arms, ammunitions and explosives  from  J&K  from
           their Commanders in J&K and was to be kept in safe  custody  and
           was to be used for terrorist activity in Delhi on the directions
           of their handlers in J&K.  Militant Irshad Ali and  Nawab  above
           mentioned have kept in their possession explosives, ABCD  Timer,
           AB Timer, Non Electronic  detonators  and  arms  and  ammunition
           which were to be used for the purpose of terrorist activities in
           order to overawe the sovereignty, integrity and unity  of  India
           in order to commit terrorist and disruptive activities and there
           by committing offences punishable u/s 121/121A/122/123/120B  IPC
           r/w 4/5 Explosive Substance Act and 25 Arms Act.  Rukka is being
           sent to you for registration of the  case  through  SI  Ravinder
           Kumar Tyagi.  Case be registered and  further  investigation  be
           handed over to SI Rajpal Dabas, D-882, PIS No. 28860555 who  has
           already reached at the spot  as  per  the  direction  of  senior
           Officers who had already been informed  about  the  apprehension
           and recovery of  explosives,  arms  and  ammunition  from  their
           possession.  Date and time of offence.   February  09,  2006  at
           7.35 PM, place of occurrence; Outer ring  road,  Mukarba  Chowk,
           near Inter State bus stand, Delhi.  Date and time of sending the
           rukka: 09.02.2006 at 10.15 PM.  Sd English SI Vinay Tyagi No. D-
           1334, PIS No. 28862091, Special Cell/NDR/OC, Lodhi  Colony,  New
           Delhi dated 09.02.2006.”



4.    Aggrieved by the action of the Delhi police, brother of  the  accused
filed a petition in the High Court of Delhi stating  the  harrowing  facts,
the factum that both the accused were working as ‘informers’, and that they
have been falsely implicated in the case and, inter alia, praying that  the
investigation in relation to FIR No.10 of 2006 be transferred to  the  CBI.
This writ petition was filed on 25th February, 2006 upon  which  the  Delhi
High Court had issued notice to the respondents  therein.   Upon  receiving
the notice, Delhi Police filed its status  report  before  the  High  Court
reiterating the contents stated in the above FIR but conceding to the  fact
that the accused persons were working as ‘informers’ of the police.   While
issuing the  notice,  the  High  Court  did  not  grant  any  stay  of  the
investigation  and/or  the  proceedings  before  the  court  of   competent
jurisdiction, despite the fact that a prayer to that effect had been  made.
The Special Cell of the Delhi Police, filed a chargesheet before the  trial
court on 6th May, 2006 when the matter was pending before the  High  Court.
In the writ petition, it was stated to be a mala fide  exercise  of  power.
The High Court on 9th May, 2006 passed the following order :

           “The Petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the
           Constitution of India read with  the  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  for
           issuance of Writ, Order or Direction in the nature  of  Mandamus
           to the Respondents to transfer the  investigation  of  case  FIR
           No.10/2006 dated 09.02.2006 of the Police Station Special  Cell,
           under Section 121/121-A/122/123/120-B IPC read with the  Section
           4/5 of Explosive Substance Act and Section 25 of Arms Act to  an
           independent agency like CBI on the allegation that  his  brother
           Moarif Qamar @ Nawab was falsely implicated in  a  serious  case
           like the present one on the basis of a totally cooked up  story.
           The above named brother of the Petitioner  was  reported  to  be
           missing ever since 22.12.2005 and a complaint to that effect was
           lodged at PS Bhajanpura, Delhi.  It appears that usual  notices,
           as provided, were issued on order to search the brother  of  the
           Petitioner.   Lastly,  a  notice  was  got  published  by   SHO,
           Bhajanpura, Delhi in Delhi Hindustan Times in its edition  dated
           09.05.2006 which is precisely the date on which  it  is  alleged
           that the brother of  the  Petitioner  and  another  person  were
           apprehended by the police when they were returning from Jammu  &
           Kashmir by Jammu & Kashmir State  Transport  Roadways  bus  near
           Kingsway Camp, Mukraba Chowk and a Chinese made pistol,  certain
           detonators and 2 Kg of RDX were recovered from the  Petitioner’s
           brother and 2 Kg of RDX were  recovered  from  co-accused  Mohd.
           Irshad Ali.  The investigation leads the police to pinpoint  the
           Petitioner being a member of terrorist organization, namely  Al-
           Badar and consequently,  after  usual  investigation,  a  charge
           sheet has been filed against both the accused persons.


                 On notice being issued to the Respondent/State.  A  status
           report stands filed by the  Assistant  Commissioner  of  Police,
           NDR/OC, Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, Delhi which  has  reiterated
           the allegations about the arrest of the Petitioner’s brother and
           Mohd. Irshad Ali in the above  circumstances,  the  report  has,
           however sustained the allegation about a report in regard to the
           missing of the brother of the Petitioners  having  being  lodged
           with the police as far as on 28.12.2005.  The allegations  about
           the false implication of the Petitioner’s brother are,  however,
           controverted and denied.


                 I have heard learned counsel  for  the  parties.   Learned
           counsel for the Petitioner has  invited  the  attention  of  the
           Court to various attendant circumstances around the time of  the
           alleged arrest  of  the  accused  persons  on  09.02.2006.   The
           circumstances disclosed do cast a suspicion on the case  of  the
           prosecution in regard to the manner in which Mohd. Moarif  Qamar
           @ Nawab and the other accused Mohd. Irshad Ali were  apprehended
           by the officials of Special Cell and about the recovery  of  the
           contraband articles like explosive and detonators.  The offences
           under Sections 121/121-A/122/123/120-B IPC read with the Section
           4/5 of Explosive Substance Act and Section of 25  Arms  Act  are
           very grave offences and may lead to a very severe punishment, if
           the charges are established.  Therefore, without commenting  any
           further on the merits of  the  matter,  this  Court  is  of  the
           considered opinion that it is a fit case  where  an  inquiry  by
           some independent agency is called for the  allegations  made  in
           the present  petition.   Accordingly,  the  CBI,  in  the  first
           instance, is called upon to undertake an inquiry into the matter
           and submit a report to this Court within four weeks.

           List on 17th July, 2006.

           Copy of the Order be forwarded to the Director, CBI  for  taking
           necessary action in the matter.”




5.    The CBI also filed  its  report  before  the  High  Court  indicating
therein that the alleged recoveries effected from the accused  persons  did
not  inspire  confidence  and  further  investigation  was  needed.   After
perusing the records, the High Court again on 4th August, 2008  passed  the
following order: -

           “However, this relief cannot be claimed  at  this  stage  as  if
           there was any error or misconduct or false  implication  of  the
           accused on the part of any police official or the  investigating
           officer while registering the case and while  the  investigation
           of the case is yet to be ascertained by the trial  court  during
           the trial of the case.  Therefore, this relief  being  premature
           cannot be granted.”



6.    After detailed investigation, the CBI filed  the  closure  report  on
11th November, 2008 stating  that  the  accused  persons  were  working  as
‘informers’ of  Special  Cell  of  Delhi  Police  and  Intelligence  Bureau
Officials and that it was a false case.  After filing of the report by  the
CBI, the accused-respondent no.2, namely, Mohd. Muarif Qamar Ali, filed  an
application before the Trial Court in terms of Section 227 of the Code with
a prayer that in view of the ‘closure report’  submitted  by  the  CBI,  he
should be discharged.  This application was opposed by  the  Special  Cell,
Delhi Police, who filed a detailed reply.  The CBI, of course, stood by its
report and submitted that it had no  objection  if  the  said  accused  was
discharged.  The learned Trial Court, in its  order  dated  13th  February,
2009, opined that the CBI had concluded in its report that  the  manner  of
recovery and arrest of the accused  persons  from  Mukarba  Chowk  did  not
inspire any confidence but the CBI had not discovered any  fact  pertaining
to the recovery of the arms and ammunition, explosive  substances  and  bus
tickets etc. from the two accused persons.

7.    Observing that the CBI had not investigated all the  aspects  of  the
allegations, the Court also noticed that in the  order  dated  4th  August,
2008, the High Court noted that transfer of investigation from Special Cell
to CBI had  been  directed,  and  further,  filing  of  charge-sheet  after
completion  of  investigation,  which  was  pending  before  the  Court  of
competent jurisdiction had been directed.  Upon noticing  all  these  facts
and pleas, the Court concluded, ‘therefore, the prayer  for  acceptance  of
the closure report and discharge of the accused  is  premature.   The  same
cannot be granted at this stage.  With these observations, the  contentions
of the CBI, Special Cell and the accused persons stand disposed of.’

8.    Vide the same order, the Court also observed, ‘no definite conclusion
can be drawn at this stage to ascertain the truthfulness of the version  of
two different agencies’ and fixed the case for arguments on charge for 28th
February, 2009.

9.    The respondent no.2 herein, Maurif  Qamar,  filed  a  petition  under
Section 482 of the Code praying that the  proceedings  pending  before  the
Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, pertaining to FIR No.10 of 2006,
be quashed.  This was registered as Criminal Miscellaneous Petition  No.781
of 2009  and  the  application  for  stay  was  registered  as  Crl.  Misc.
Application No.286/2009.   As already noticed, the Court  had  not  granted
any stay but had finally disposed of the petition vide its order dated 28th
August, 2009.  The High Court observed that once the report  was  filed  by
the CBI, that agency has to be treated as the investigating agency  in  the
case and the closure report ought to have  been  considered  by  the  trial
court.  It remanded the case to the trial court while passing the following
order:

           “12.   In  these  circumstances,  the   impugned   order   dated
           13.02.2009 dismissing the applications moved by the  petitioners
           for discharging them is set aside.  The case is remanded back to
           the Additional Sessions Judge to proceed further in  the  matter
           after hearing the parties on the basis  of  the  closure  report
           filed by the CBI dated 11.11.2008 and  in  accordance  with  the
           provisions contained under Section 173 and Section  190  of  the
           Code of Criminal Procedure.  In case he accepts the report, then
           the matter may come to an end, subject to his  orders,  if  any,
           against the erring officers.  However, if he feels that  despite
           the closure report filed by the  CBI,  it  is  a  case  fit  for
           proceeding  further  against  the  petitioners,  he   may   pass
           appropriate orders uninfluenced dby (sic) what  this  Court  has
           stated while disposing of this case.  The only  rider  would  be
           that while passing the  orders  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge
           would not be influenced by the report of the Sepcial (sic)  Cell
           in this matter.  Parties to appear before  the  Trial  Judge  on
           14th September, 2009.”




10.   It is this order of the High Court which is the subject matter of the
present appeals by special leave.

11.   It would  be  appropriate  for  the  Court  to  examine  the  relevant
provisions and scheme of the Code in relation to filing of a  report  before
the court of competent jurisdiction and the extent of its power  to  examine
that  report  and  pass  appropriate  orders.   The  criminal  investigative
machinery is set into motion by lodging of a  First  Information  Report  in
relation to commission of a cognizable offence.  Such  report  may  be  made
orally, in writing or through any means by an officer in charge of a  police
station.  Such officer is required to reduce the  same  into  writing,  read
the same to the informant and wherever the person reporting is present,  the
same  shall  be  signed  by  such  person  or  the  person  receiving   such
information in accordance with the provisions of Section 154  of  the  Code.
A police officer can conduct investigation in any congnizable  case  without
the orders of the  Magistrate.   He  shall  conduct  such  investigation  in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter XIII,  i.e.,  in  accordance  with
Sections 177 to 189 of the Code.  Where information as contemplated  in  law
is received by an investigating officer and he has reasons to  believe  that
an offence has been committed, which he is empowered  to  investigate,  then
he shall forthwith send a report of the same to the Magistrate  and  proceed
to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and  take
appropriate measures for discovery  and  arrest  of  the  offender.    Every
report under Section 157 shall be submitted to the Magistrate  in  terms  of
Section  158  of  the  Code  upon  which  the  Magistrate  may   direct   an
investigation or may straight away proceed  himself  or  depute  some  other
magistrate subordinate to him to hold an inquiry and to dispose of the  case
in accordance with the provisions of the Code.   It  needs  to  be  recorded
here that the proceedings recorded by a  police  officer  cannot  be  called
into question at any stage on the  ground  that  he  was  not  empowered  to
conduct such investigation.  The provisions of Section  156(3)  empower  the
Magistrate, who is competent to take cognizance in terms of Section 190,  to
order  investigation  as  prescribed  under  Section  156(1)  of  the  Code.
Section 190 provides that subject to the provisions of Chapter  XIV  of  the
Code, any Magistrate of the first class and any  magistrate  of  the  second
class specifically empowered in this  behalf  may  take  cognizance  of  any
offence upon  receipt  of  a  complaint,  facts  of  which  constitute  such
offence, upon a police report of such facts  or  upon  information  received
from any person other than a police officer,  or  upon  his  own  knowledge,
that such offence has been committed.   The  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  is
competent to empower any Magistrate of the second class to  take  cognizance
in terms of Section 190.  The competence  to  take  cognizance,  in  a  way,
discloses  the  sources  upon  which  the  empowered  Magistrate  can   take
cognizance.   After  the   investigation   has   been   completed   by   the
Investigating Officer and he  has  prepared  a  report  without  unnecessary
delay in terms of Section 173 of the Code, he shall forward his report to  a
Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance on  a  police  report.    The
report so completed should satisfy the  requirements  stated  under  clauses
(a) to (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code.  Upon  receipt  of
the report, the empowered Magistrate shall  proceed  further  in  accordance
with law.  The Investigating Officer has  been  vested  with  some  definite
powers in relation to the manner in which the  report  should  be  completed
and it is required that all the documents on which the prosecution  proposes
to rely and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section  161  of  the
code accompany the report submitted before the Magistrate, unless some  part
thereof is excluded by the Investigating Officer in exercise of  the  powers
vested in him under Section 173(6) of  the  Code.   A  very  wide  power  is
vested in the investigating agency to conduct  further  investigation  after
it has filed the report in terms of Section  173(2).   The  legislature  has
specifically used the expression ‘nothing in this section  shall  be  deemed
to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence  after  a  report
under  Section  173(2)  has  been  forwarded  to  the   Magistrate’,   which
unambiguously indicates the legislative intent that even after filing  of  a
report  before  the  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  the  Investigating
Officer can  still  conduct  further  investigation  and  where,  upon  such
investigation, the officer in  charge  of  a  police  station  gets  further
evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a  further
report or reports regarding such evidence in the prescribed form.  In  other
words, the investigating agency is competent to file a supplementary  report
to its primary report in terms of Section 173(8).  The supplementary  report
has to be treated by the Court in continuation of  the  primary  report  and
the same provisions of law, i.e., sub-section  (2)  to  sub-section  (6)  of
Section 173 shall apply when the Court deals with  such  report.   Once  the
Court examines the  records,  applies  its  mind,  duly  complies  with  the
requisite formalities of summoning the accused and,  if  present  in  court,
upon ensuring that the copies of the requisite  documents,  as  contemplated
under Section 173(7), have been furnished to the accused, it  would  proceed
to hear the case.  After  taking  cognizance,  the  next  step  of  definite
significance is the duty of the Court to frame charge in  terms  of  Section
228 of the Code unless the Court finds, upon consideration of the record  of
the case and  the  documents  submitted  therewith,  that  there  exists  no
sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, in  which  case  it  shall
discharge him for reasons to be recorded in terms  of  Section  227  of  the
Code.  It may be noticed that the language of Section  228  opens  with  the
words, ‘if after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the  Judge  is
of the opinion that there is ground  for  presuming  that  the  accused  has
committed an offence’, he may frame  a  charge  and  try  him  in  terms  of
Section 228(1)(a) and if exclusively  triable  by  the  Court  of  Sessions,
commit the same to the Court of Sessions  in  terms  of  Section  228(1)(b).
Why the legislature  has  used  the  word  ‘presuming’  is  a  matter  which
requires serious deliberation.  It is a settled rule of interpretation  that
the legislature does not use any expression purposelessly  and  without  any
object.  Furthermore, in terms of doctrine of  plain  interpretation,  every
word should be given its ordinary meaning unless context to the contrary  is
specifically stipulated in the relevant provision.   Framing  of  charge  is
certainly a matter of earnestness.  It is not merely a formal  step  in  the
process of criminal inquiry and trial.  On the contrary,  it  is  a  serious
step as it is determinative to some extent, in the  sense  that  either  the
accused is acquitted giving right to challenge to the complainant party,  or
the State itself, and if the charge is framed, the accused  is  called  upon
to face the complete trial which may prove prejudicial to  him,  if  finally
acquitted.  These are the courses open to the Court at  that  stage.   Thus,
the word ‘presuming’ must be read ejusdem generis to the opinion that  there
is a ground.  The ground  must  exist  for  forming  the  opinion  that  the
accused had committed an offence.  Such opinion has  to  be  formed  on  the
basis of the record of the case and the documents submitted  therewith.   To
a limited extent, the plea of defence also  has  to  be  considered  by  the
Court at this stage.  For instance, if a plea of  proceedings  being  barred
under any other law is raised, upon such consideration,  the  Court  has  to
form its opinion which in a way is tentative.   The  expression  ‘presuming’
cannot be said to be superfluous in the language and ambit  of  Section  228
of the Code.  This is to emphasize that  the  Court  may  believe  that  the
accused had committed an offence, if  its  ingredients  are  satisfied  with
reference to the record before the Court.  At this stage, we  may  refer  to
the judgment of this Court in the case of Amit Kapur  v.  Ramesh  Chander  &
Anr. [JT 2012 (9) SC 329] wherein, the Court held as under :

           “The above-stated principles clearly show that inherent as  well
           as revisional jurisdiction should be exercised  cautiously.   If
           the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code  in  relation  to
           quashing of an FIR is circumscribed by the  factum  and  caution
           afore-noticed,  in  that  event,  the  revisional  jurisdiction,
           particularly while dealing with framing of a charge, has  to  be
           even more limited.  Framing  of  a  charge  is  an  exercise  of
           jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228  of  the
           Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of  the
           Code.  Under both these provisions, the  court  is  required  to
           consider the  ‘record  of  the  case’  and  documents  submitted
           therewith and, after hearing the parties, may  either  discharge
           the accused or where it appears to the court and in its  opinion
           there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed  an
           offence,  it  shall  frame  the  charge.   Once  the  facts  and
           ingredients of the Section exists, then the Court would be right
           in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused
           and frame the charge accordingly.  This  presumption  is  not  a
           presumption of law as such.  The satisfaction of  the  court  in
           relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and  the
           facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise  of
           such jurisdiction.  It may even be weaker  than  a  prima  facie
           case.  There is a  fine  distinction  between  the  language  of
           Sections 227 and 228 of the Code.  Section 227 is expression  of
           a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while  Section  228
           is tentative.  Thus, to say that at  the  stage  of  framing  of
           charge, the Court should form an opinion  that  the  accused  is
           certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach  which
           is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the  Code.   It  may
           also be noticed that the revisional  jurisdiction  exercised  by
           the High Court is in a way final and no inter  court  remedy  is
           available in such cases.   Of  course,  it  may  be  subject  to
           jurisdiction of this court under Article 136 of the Constitution
           of  India.   Normally,  a  revisional  jurisdiction  should   be
           exercised  on  a  question  of  law.   However,   when   factual
           appreciation is involved, then it must find place in  the  class
           of cases resulting in a perverse finding.  Basically, the  power
           is required to be exercised so that justice is done and there is
           no abuse of power by  the  court.   Merely  an  apprehension  or
           suspicion of the same would  not  be  a  sufficient  ground  for
           interference in such cases.”





12.   On analysis of the above discussion, it can safely be  concluded  that
‘presuming’ is an expression of relevancy and places some weightage  on  the
consideration of the record before the Court.  The prosecution’s record,  at
this stage, has to be examined on the plea of demur.  Presumption  is  of  a
very weak and mild nature.  It would cover the cases where some  lacuna  has
been left out and is capable of being supplied and proved during the  course
of the trial.  For instance, it is not necessary that  at  that  stage  each
ingredient of an offence should be linguistically reproduced in  the  report
and backed with meticulous facts.  Suffice would be  substantial  compliance
to the requirements of the provisions.

13.   Having noticed the provisions and relevant part of the scheme  of  the
Code, now we must examine the powers of the Court to  direct  investigation.
Investigation can be ordered  in  varied  forms  and  at  different  stages.
Right at the initial stage of receiving the FIR or a  complaint,  the  Court
can direct investigation  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Section
156(1) in  exercise  of  its  powers  under  Section  156(3)  of  the  Code.
Investigation can be of the following kinds :

(i)   Initial Investigation.

(ii)  Further Investigation.

(iii) Fresh or de novo or re-investigation.

14.   The initial investigation  is  the  one  which  the  empowered  police
officer shall conduct in  furtherance  to  registration  of  an  FIR.   Such
investigation itself can lead to filing of  a  final  report  under  Section
173(2) of the Code and shall take within its ambit the  investigation  which
the  empowered  officer  shall  conduct  in  furtherance  of  an  order  for
investigation passed by the court of  competent  jurisdiction  in  terms  of
Section 156(3) of the Code.


15.   ‘Further investigation’ is where  the  Investigating  Officer  obtains
further oral or documentary evidence after the final report has  been  filed
before the Court in terms of Section 173(8).  This power is vested with  the
Executive.   It  is  the  continuation  of  a  previous  investigation  and,
therefore, is understood and described as a ‘further investigation’.   Scope
of such investigation is restricted to the discovery  of  further  oral  and
documentary evidence.  Its purpose is to bring the  true  facts  before  the
Court even if they are discovered at  a  subsequent  stage  to  the  primary
investigation.   It  is  commonly  described  as   ‘supplementary   report’.
‘Supplementary report’ would be the correct  expression  as  the  subsequent
investigation is meant and intended to supplement the primary  investigation
conducted by the empowered police officer.  Another significant  feature  of
further investigation is that it does not have  the  effect  of  wiping  out
directly  or  impliedly  the  initial   investigation   conducted   by   the
investigating agency.  This is  a  kind  of  continuation  of  the  previous
investigation.   The  basis  is  discovery  of   fresh   evidence   and   in
continuation of the same offence and chain of events relating  to  the  same
occurrence incidental thereto.  In other words, it has to be  understood  in
complete contradistinction to a  ‘reinvestigation’,  ‘fresh’  or  ‘de  novo’
investigation.


16.   However, in the case of a ‘fresh investigation’, ‘reinvestigation’  or
‘de novo investigation’ there has to be a definite order of the court.   The
order of the Court unambiguously should state as  to  whether  the  previous
investigation, for reasons to be  recorded,  is  incapable  of  being  acted
upon. Neither the Investigating agency nor the Magistrate has any  power  to
order or conduct ‘fresh investigation’. This is  primarily  for  the  reason
that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code.  It  is  essential  that
even an order of  ‘fresh’/’de  novo’  investigation  passed  by  the  higher
judiciary should always be coupled with a specific direction as to the  fate
of the investigation already conducted.  The cases where such direction  can
be issued are few and  far  between.   This  is  based  upon  a  fundamental
principle of our criminal jurisprudence which is that it is the right  of  a
suspect or an accused to have a  just  and  fair  investigation  and  trial.
This principle flows from the constitutional mandate contained  in  Articles
21 and 22 of the Constitution of India.  Where the  investigation  ex  facie
is unfair, tainted, mala fide and smacks of foul play, the courts would  set
aside such an investigation and direct fresh or de novo  investigation  and,
if necessary, even by another independent investigating agency.  As  already
noticed, this is a power  of  wide  plenitude  and,  therefore,  has  to  be
exercised sparingly.  The principle of rarest of rare cases  would  squarely
apply to such cases.  Unless the unfairness of  the  investigation  is  such
that it pricks the judicial conscience of the Court,  the  Court  should  be
reluctant to interfere  in  such  matters  to  the  extent  of  quashing  an
investigation and  directing  a  ‘fresh  investigation’.   In  the  case  of
Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi)  [(2010)  6  SCC  1],  the  Court
stated that it is not only the responsibility of the  investigating  agency,
but also that of the courts to ensure that investigation is  fair  and  does
not in any way hamper the freedom of  an  individual  except  in  accordance
with law.  An equally enforceable canon of the criminal  law  is  that  high
responsibility  lies  upon  the  investigating  agency  not  to  conduct  an
investigation in a tainted or unfair manner.  The investigation  should  not
prima facie be indicative of a biased mind and every effort should  be  made
to bring the guilty to law as nobody stands above law de hors  his  position
and influence in the  society.   The  maxim  contra  veritatem  lex  nunquam
aliquid permittit  applies  to  exercise  of  powers  by  the  courts  while
granting approval or declining  to  accept  the  report.   In  the  case  of
Gudalure M.J. Cherian & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1992)  1  SCC  397],
this Court stated the principle that in cases where charge-sheets have  been
filed after completion of investigation and request  is  made  belatedly  to
reopen  the  investigation,  such  investigation  being   entrusted   to   a
specialized agency would normally be declined  by  the  court  of  competent
jurisdiction but nevertheless in a given situation  to  do  justice  between
the parties  and  to  instil  confidence  in  public  mind,  it  may  become
necessary to pass  such  orders.   Further,  in  the  case  of  R.S.  Sodhi,
Advocate v. State of U.P. [1994 SCC Supp. (1) 142], where  allegations  were
made against a police officer, the Court ordered  the  investigation  to  be
transferred to CBI with an intent to maintain credibility of  investigation,
public confidence and in the interest of justice.   Ordinarily,  the  courts
would not exercise such jurisdiction but the expression  ‘ordinarily’  means
normally and it is used where there can be an exception.  It  means  in  the
large majority of cases but not invariably.   ‘Ordinarily’  excludes  extra-
ordinary  or  special   circumstances.    In   other   words,   if   special
circumstances exist, the court  may  exercise  its  jurisdiction  to  direct
‘fresh  investigation’  and  even  transfer  cases  to  courts   of   higher
jurisdiction which may pass such directions.

17.   Here, we will also have to examine the kind of  reports  that  can  be
filed by an investigating agency under the scheme  of  the  Code.   Firstly,
the FIR which the investigating  agency  is  required  to  file  before  the
Magistrate right at the threshold and within the time specified.   Secondly,
it may file a report in furtherance to  a  direction  issued  under  Section
156(3) of the Code.  Thirdly, it  can  also  file  a  ‘further  report’,  as
contemplated under Section 173(8).  Finally,  the  investigating  agency  is
required to file a ‘final report’ on the basis  of  which  the  Court  shall
proceed further to frame  the  charge  and  put  the  accused  to  trial  or
discharge him as envisaged by Section 227 of the Code.

18.   Next question that  comes  up  for  consideration  of  this  Court  is
whether the empowered Magistrate has the  jurisdiction  to  direct  ‘further
investigation’  or  ‘fresh  investigation’.   As  far  as  the   latter   is
concerned, the law declared by this Court consistently is that  the  learned
Magistrate  has  no  jurisdiction   to   direct   ‘fresh’   or   ‘de   novo’
investigation.  However, once  the  report  is  filed,  the  Magistrate  has
jurisdiction  to  accept  the  report  or  reject  the  same  right  at  the
threshold.  Even after accepting the report,  it  has  the  jurisdiction  to
discharge the accused or frame the charge and put him to trial.   But  there
are no provisions in the Code which empower the Magistrate  to  disturb  the
status of an accused pending investigation or when report is, filed to  wipe
out the report and its effects in law.  Reference  in  this  regard  can  be
made  to  K.  Chandrasekhar  v.  State  of  Kerala  [(1998)  5   SCC   223];
Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar [(2008) 5 SCC 413], Nirmal  Singh  Kahlon   v
State of Punjab & Ors. [(2009) 1 SCC 441]; Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel &  Ors.
v. State of Gujarat [(2009) 6 SCC 332]; and Babubhai  v.  State  of  Gujarat
[(2010) 12 SCC 254].

19.   Now, we come to the former question, i.e., whether the Magistrate  has
jurisdiction under Section 173(8) to direct further investigation.

20.   The power of the Court to pass an order for further investigation  has
been a matter of judicial concern for some time now.  The courts have  taken
somewhat divergent but not diametrically  opposite  views  in  this  regard.
Such views can be reconciled and harmoniously applied without  violation  of
the rule of precedence.  In the case of State of Punjab  v.  Central  Bureau
of Investigation [(2011) 9 SCC 182], the Court noticed the distinction  that
exists between ‘reinvestigation’ and  ‘further  investigation’.   The  Court
also noticed the settled principle that the courts subordinate to  the  High
Court do not have the statutory inherent  powers  as  the  High  Court  does
under  Section  482  of  the  Code  and  therefore,  must   exercise   their
jurisdiction within the four corners of the Code.


21.   Referring to the provisions of Section 173  of  the  Code,  the  Court
observed that the police has the power to conduct further  investigation  in
terms of Section 173(8) of the Code but also  opined  that  even  the  Trial
Court  can  direct  further  investigation  in  contradistinction  to  fresh
investigation, even where the report has been filed.  It will be  useful  to
refer to the following paragraphs of the judgment wherein  the  Court  while
referring to the case of Mithabhai  Pashabhai  Patel  v.  State  of  Gujarat
(supra) held as under:


           “13.  It  is,  however,   beyond   any   cavil   that   ‘further
           investigation’ and ‘reinvestigation’ stand on different footing.
           It may be that in a given situation a superior court in exercise
           of its constitutional power, namely, under Articles 226  and  32
           of the Constitution of India could direct a ‘State’  to  get  an
           offence investigated and/or further investigated by a  different
           agency. Direction of a reinvestigation, however, being forbidden
           in  law,  no  superior  court  would  ordinarily  issue  such  a
           direction. Pasayat, J. in Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar  (2008)
           5 SCC 513 opined as under: (SCC p. 415, para 7)


                    ‘7. At this juncture it would be necessary to take  note
                 of Section 173 of the Code. From a  plain  reading  of  the
                 above section it is evident that even after  completion  of
                 investigation under sub-section (2) of Section 173  of  the
                 Code, the police has right to further investigate under sub-
                 section   (8),   but    not    fresh    investigation    or
                 reinvestigation.’

           A distinction, therefore, exists between a  reinvestigation  and
           further investigation.

                    XXX              XXX              XXX

           15. The investigating  agency  and/or  a  court  exercise  their
           jurisdiction conferred on them only in terms of  the  provisions
           of the Code. The courts subordinate to the High  Court  even  do
           not have any inherent power under Section 482  of  the  Code  of
           Criminal Procedure or otherwise. The precognizance  jurisdiction
           to remand vested in the subordinate courts, therefore,  must  be
           exercised within the four corners of the Code.”



22.   In the case of Minu Kumari & Anr. v.  State of Bihar  &  Ors.  [(2006)
4 SCC 359], this Court explained the powers that are vested in a  Magistrate
upon filing of a report in terms of Section 173(2)(i) and the kind of  order
that the Court can pass.  The Court held that when a report is filed  before
a Magistrate, he may either (i) accept the report  and  take  cognizance  of
the offences and issue process; or (ii)  may disagree with  the  report  and
drop the proceedings;  or  (iii)  may  direct  further  investigation  under
Section 156(3) and require the police to make a further report.


23.   This judgment, thus, clearly shows that the Court of Magistrate has  a
clear power to direct further investigation when a  report  is  filed  under
Section 173(2) and may also exercise such powers with  the  aid  of  Section
156(3) of the Code.  The lurking doubt, if  any,  that  remained  in  giving
wider interpretation to Section 173(8) was removed and  controversy  put  to
an end by the judgment of this Court in the  case  of  Hemant  Dhasmana   v.
CBI, [(2001) 7 SCC 536] where the Court held that although  the  said  order
does not, in specific terms,  mention  the  power  of  the  court  to  order
further  investigation,  the  power  of  the  police  to   conduct   further
investigation  envisaged  therein  can  be  triggered  into  motion  at  the
instance of the court.  When any such order is passed by  the  court,  which
has the  jurisdiction  to  do  so,  then  such  order  should  not  even  be
interfered with in exercise of a  higher  court’s  revisional  jurisdiction.
Such orders would normally be  of  an  advantage  to  achieve  the  ends  of
justice.  It was clarified,  without  ambiguity,  that  the  magistrate,  in
exercise of powers under Section 173(8) of the Code can direct  the  CBI  to
further investigate the case and collect further evidence  keeping  in  view
the objections raised by the appellant to  the  investigation  and  the  new
report to be submitted by the Investigating Officer, would  be  governed  by
sub-Section (2) to sub-Section (6) of Section 173 of the Code.  There is  no
occasion  for  the  court  to  interpret  Section   173(8)   of   the   Code
restrictively.  After filing of the final  report,  the  learned  Magistrate
can also take cognizance on the basis of the material placed  on  record  by
the investigating agency and it is permissible for  him  to  direct  further
investigation. Conduct of proper and fair investigation is the  hallmark  of
any criminal investigation.

24.   In support of these principles reference can be made to the  judgments
of this Court in the cases of Union Public Service Commission v. S.  Papaiah
& Ors [(1997) 7 SCC 614], State of Orissa v.  Mahima [(2003) 5  SCALE  566],
Kishan Lal  v.  Dharmendra Bhanna &  Anr.  [(2009)  7  SCC  685],  State  of
Maharashtra  v.  Sharat Chandra Vinayak Dongre [(1995) 1 SCC 42].

25.   We may also notice here that in the case of S.  Papaiah  (supra),  the
Magistrate had rejected an application  for  reinvestigation  filed  by  the
applicant primarily on the ground that it had no power to review  the  order
passed earlier.  This Court held that it was not a  case  of  review  of  an
order, but was  a  case  of  further  investigation  as  contemplated  under
Section 173 of the Code.  It permitted further  investigation  and  directed
the report to be filed.

26.   Interestingly and more particularly  for  answering  the  question  of
legal academia that we are dealing with, it may be noticed that this  Court,
while pronouncing its judgment in  the  case  of  Hemant  Dhasmana  v.  CBI,
(supra) has specifically referred to the judgment of S. Papaiah (supra)  and
Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Anr. [(1985) 2 SCC 537].    While
relying upon the three Judge  Bench  judgment  of  Bhagwant  Singh  (supra),
which appears to be a foundational view for development of law  in  relation
to Section 173 of the Code, the Court held that the  Magistrate  could  pass
an order for further investigation.   The principal question  in  that  case
was whether the Magistrate could drop the  proceedings  after  filing  of  a
report under Section 173(2), without  notice  to  the  complainant,  but  in
paragraph 4 of the judgment, the three Judge Bench dealt with the powers  of
the Magistrate as enshrined in Section 173 of the Code.   Usefully,  para  4
can be reproduced for ready reference:-


           “4. Now, when the report forwarded by the officer-in-charge of a
           police station to the Magistrate  under  sub-section  (2)(i)  of
           Section 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one of
           two different situations may arise. The report may conclude that
           an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person
           or persons and in such a case, the  Magistrate  may  do  one  of
           three things: (1) he may accept the report and  take  cognizance
           of the offence and issue process or (2) he may disagree with the
           report and drop the proceeding or  (3)  he  may  direct  further
           investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156  and  require
           the police to make a further report. The report may on the other
           hand state that, in  the  opinion  of  the  police,  no  offence
           appears to have been committed and where such a report has  been
           made, the Magistrate again has an option to adopt one  of  three
           courses: (1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or
           (2) he may disagree with the report and  taking  the  view  that
           there  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding   further,   take
           cognizance of the offence and issue process or (3) he may direct
           further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section
           (3) of Section 156. Where, in either of  these  two  situations,
           the Magistrate decides to take cognizance of the offence and  to
           issue process, the informant is not prejudicially  affected  nor
           is the injured or in case of death, any relative of the deceased
           aggrieved, because cognizance of the offence  is  taken  by  the
           Magistrate and it is decided by the  Magistrate  that  the  case
           shall proceed. But if the Magistrate decides that  there  is  no
           sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  further   and   drops   the
           proceeding or takes the view that  though  there  is  sufficient
           ground for proceeding  against  some,  there  is  no  sufficient
           ground for proceeding against  others  mentioned  in  the  first
           information report, the informant would certainly be  prejudiced
           because the first information report lodged by  him  would  have
           failed of its purpose, wholly or in  part.  Moreover,  when  the
           interest of the informant in prompt and effective  action  being
           taken on the first information report lodged by him  is  clearly
           recognised by the provisions contained  in  sub-section  (2)  of
           Section 154, sub-section (2)  of  Section  157  and  sub-section
           (2)(ii) of Section 173, it must be presumed that  the  informant
           would equally be interested in seeing that the Magistrate  takes
           cognizance of the offence and issues process, because that would
           be culmination of the first information report  lodged  by  him.
           There can. therefore, be no doubt that when, on a  consideration
           of the report made by the officer-in-charge of a police  station
           under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173, the Magistrate  is  not
           inclined to take cognizance of the offence  and  issue  process,
           the informant must be given an opportunity  of  being  heard  so
           that he can make his submissions to persuade the  Magistrate  to
           take cognizance  of  the  offence  and  issue  process.  We  are
           accordingly of the view that in a case where the  Magistrate  to
           whom a report is forwarded under sub-section (2)(i)  of  Section
           173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence  and  to  drop
           the proceeding or takes the view that  there  is  no  sufficient
           ground for proceeding against some of the persons  mentioned  in
           the first information report, the Magistrate must give notice to
           the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at  the
           time of consideration of the report. It was urged before  us  on
           behalf of the respondents that if  in  such  a  case  notice  is
           required to be given  to  the  informant,  it  might  result  in
           unnecessary delay on account  of  the  difficulty  of  effecting
           service of the notice on the informant. But we do not think this
           can be regarded as a valid objection against  the  view  we  are
           taking, because in any case the action taken by  the  police  on
           the first information report  has  to  be  communicated  to  the
           informant and a copy of the report has to  be  supplied  to  him
           under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 and if that be so, we do
           not see any reason why it should be difficult to serve notice of
           the consideration of the report on the informant.  Moreover,  in
           any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the  informant
           cannot possibly provide  any  justification  for  depriving  the
           informant of the opportunity of being heard at the time when the
           report is considered by the Magistrate.”




27.   In some judgments of this Court, a view has  been  advanced,  (amongst
others in the case of Reeta Nag v State of West Bengal & Ors. [(2009) 9  SCC
129] Ram Naresh Prasad v. State of Jharkhand and Others [(2009) 11 SCC  299]
and Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1997) 1 SCC  361]),
that a  Magistrate  cannot  suo  moto  direct  further  investigation  under
Section 173(8) of the  Code  or  direct  re-investigation  into  a  case  on
account of the bar contained in Section 167(2)  of  the  Code,  and  that  a
Magistrate could direct filing of a charge sheet where the police submits  a
report that no case had been made out for sending up an accused  for  trial.
The gist of the view taken in  these  cases  is  that  a  Magistrate  cannot
direct reinvestigation and cannot suo moto direct further investigation.

28.   However, having given our considered thought to the principles  stated
in these judgments, we are of the view that the  Magistrate  before  whom  a
report under Section 173(2) of the Code is filed, is  empowered  in  law  to
direct ‘further investigation’ and require the police to  submit  a  further
or a supplementary report.   A three Judge Bench of this Court in  the  case
of  Bhagwant  Singh  (supra)  has,  in  no  uncertain  terms,  stated   that
principle, as afore-noticed.

29.   The contrary view taken by  the  Court  in  the  cases  of  Reeta  Nag
(supra) and Randhir Singh (supra) do not consider the  view  of  this  Court
expressed in Bhagwant Singh (supra).  The decision of the Court in  Bhagwant
Singh (supra) in regard to the issue in hand cannot be termed as an  obiter.
 The ambit and scope of the power of a magistrate in terms  of  Section  173
of the Code was squarely debated before  that  Court  and  the  three  Judge
Bench concluded as afore-noticed.    Similar  views  having  been  taken  by
different Benches of this Court while following Bhagwant Singh (supra),  are
thus squarely in line with the doctrine of precedence.      To some  extent,
the view expressed in Reeta Nag (supra),  Ram  Naresh  (supra)  and  Randhir
Singh (supra), besides being different on facts, would have to  be  examined
in light of the principle of stare decisis.

30.   Having analysed the provisions of the Code and the  various  judgments
as afore-indicated, we would state the following conclusions  in  regard  to
the powers of a magistrate in terms of  Section  173(2)  read  with  Section
173(8) and Section 156(3) of the Code :


     1. The Magistrate has no power to direct ‘reinvestigation’  or  ‘fresh
        investigation’ (de novo) in the case initiated on the  basis  of  a
        police report.

     2. A Magistrate has the power to direct ‘further investigation’  after
        filing of a police report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code.

     3. The view expressed in (2) above is in conformity with the principle
        of law stated in Bhagwant Singh’s case (supra)  by  a  three  Judge
        Bench and thus in conformity with the doctrine of precedence.

     4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific  provision  therein
        bars  exercise  of  such  jurisdiction  by  the  Magistrate.    The
        language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively  as
        to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly  in  face  of
        the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8)
        itself.  In fact, such  power  would  have  to  be  read  into  the
        language of Section 173(8).

     5. The Code  is  a  procedural  document,  thus,  it  must  receive  a
        construction  which  would  advance  the  cause  of   justice   and
        legislative object sought to be achieved.   It does  not  stand  to
        reason that the legislature provided power of further investigation
        to the police even after filing a report, but intended  to  curtail
        the power of the Court to the extent that even where the  facts  of
        the case and the ends of justice demand, the Court  can  still  not
        direct the investigating agency to  conduct  further  investigation
        which it could do on its own.

     6. It has been a procedure of proprietary that the police has to  seek
        permission of the Court to  continue  ‘further  investigation’  and
        file supplementary chargesheet.   This approach has  been  approved
        by this Court in a  number  of  judgments.    This  as  such  would
        support the view that we are taking in the present case.



31.   Having discussed the scope of power of the  Magistrate  under  Section
173 of the Code, now we have  to  examine  the  kind  of  reports  that  are
contemplated under the provisions of the Code and/or as  per  the  judgments
of this Court.   The first  and  the  foremost  document  that  reaches  the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate is  the  First  Information  Report.    Then,
upon completion of the investigation, the police  are  required  to  file  a
report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code.   It will be  appropriate  to
term this report as a primary report, as it is the very  foundation  of  the
case of the prosecution before the Court.   It is the  record  of  the  case
and the documents annexed thereto, which are considered  by  the  Court  and
then the Court of the Magistrate is expected to exercise any  of  the  three
options afore-noticed.   Out of the  stated  options  with  the  Court,  the
jurisdiction it would exercise has to  be  in  strict  consonance  with  the
settled principles of law.  The power of the magistrate to  direct  ‘further
investigation’ is a significant power which has to be  exercised  sparingly,
in exceptional cases and to achieve the ends of justice.   To provide  fair,
proper  and  unquestionable  investigation  is   the   obligation   of   the
investigating agency and the Court in its supervisory capacity  is  required
to ensure the same.   Further investigation conducted under  the  orders  of
the Court, including that of the Magistrate or by  the  police  of  its  own
accord and, for valid reasons, would lead to the filing of  a  supplementary
report.  Such supplementary report shall  be  dealt  with  as  part  of  the
primary report.   This is  clear  from  the  fact  that  the  provisions  of
Sections 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports  in  terms  of
Section 173(8) of the Code.

32.   Both  these  reports  have  to  be  read  conjointly  and  it  is  the
cumulative effect of the reports and the documents annexed thereto to  which
the Court would be expected to apply its mind  to  determine  whether  there
exist grounds to presume that the accused has committed  the  offence.    If
the answer is in the negative, on the basis  of  these  reports,  the  Court
shall discharge an accused in compliance with the provisions of Section  227
of the Code.

33.   At this stage,  we  may  also  state  another  well-settled  canon  of
criminal jurisprudence that the superior courts have the jurisdiction  under
Section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of the Constitution of India  to
direct  ‘further   investigation’,   ‘fresh’   or   ‘de   novo’   and   even
‘reinvestigation’.    ‘Fresh’,  ‘de   novo’,   and   ‘reinvestigation’   are
synonymous expressions and their result in law  would  be  the  same.    The
superior  courts  are  even  vested   with   the   power   of   transferring
investigation from one agency to another, provided the ends  of  justice  so
demand such action.    Of course, it is also a settled principle  that  this
power has to be exercised by the superior courts  very  sparingly  and  with
great circumspection.

34.   We have deliberated at some length on the issue  that  the  powers  of
the High Court under Section 482 of  the  Code  do  not  control  or  limit,
directly or impliedly, the width of the power of  Magistrate  under  Section
228 of the Code.   Wherever a charge sheet has been submitted to the  Court,
even this Court ordinarily would not reopen  the  investigation,  especially
by entrusting the same to a specialised agency.   It can  safely  be  stated
and concluded that in an appropriate case, when the  court  feels  that  the
investigation by the police authorities is not in the proper  direction  and
that in order to do complete  justice  and  where  the  facts  of  the  case
demand, it is always open to the Court to hand over the investigation  to  a
specialised agency.   These principles have been  reiterated  with  approval
in the judgments of this Court in the case of Disha v. State  of  Gujarat  &
Ors. [(2011) 13 SCC  337].  Vineet  Narain  &  Ors.  v.  Union  of  India  &
Anr.[(1998) 1 SCC 226], Union of India & Ors. v. Sushil Kumar  Modi  &  Ors.
[1996 (6) SCC 500] and  Rubabbuddin  Sheikh  v.  State  of  Gujarat  &  Ors.
[(2010) 2 SCC 200].

35.    The  power   to   order/direct   ‘reinvestigation’   or   ‘de   novo’
investigation falls in the domain of higher courts, that too in  exceptional
cases.   If one examines the provisions of the Code, there  is  no  specific
provision for cancellation of the reports,  except  that  the  investigating
agency can file a closure  report  (where  according  to  the  investigating
agency, no offence is  made  out).    Even  such  a  report  is  subject  to
acceptance by the learned Magistrate who, in his  wisdom,  may  or  may  not
accept such a report.   For valid reasons, the Court may,  by  declining  to
accept such a report, direct ‘further investigation’, or even on  the  basis
of the record of the case and the  documents  annexed  thereto,  summon  the
accused.

36.   The Code does not contain any provision which  deals  with  the  court
competent to direct ‘fresh  investigation’,  the  situation  in  which  such
investigation can be conducted, if at all, and finally the manner  in  which
the report so obtained shall be dealt with.  The superior courts can  direct
conduct of a ‘fresh’/‘de novo’ investigation,  but  unless  it  specifically
directs that the  report  already  prepared  or  the  investigation  so  far
conducted will not form part of the record of the case,  such  report  would
be deemed to be part of the record.   Once it is part  of  the  record,  the
learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to exclude the same from  the  record
of the case.   In other words, but for a  specific  order  by  the  superior
court, the reports, whether a primary  report  or  a  report  upon  ‘further
investigation’ or a report upon ‘fresh  investigation’,  shall  have  to  be
construed and read conjointly.  Where there is a specific order made by  the
court for reasons like the investigation  being  entirely  unfair,  tainted,
undesirable  or  being  based  upon  no  truth,  the  court  would  have  to
specifically direct that  the  investigation  or  proceedings  so  conducted
shall  stand  cancelled  and  will  not  form  part  of   the   record   for
consideration by the Court of competent jurisdiction.

37.   The scheme of Section 173 of the Code even deals with  the  scheme  of
exclusion of documents or statements  submitted  to  the  Court.    In  this
regard, one can make a reference to the provisions of Section 173(6) of  the
Code, which empowers the investigating agency  to  make  a  request  to  the
Court to exclude that part of the statement or  record  and  from  providing
the copies thereof to the accused, which are not essential in  the  interest
of justice, and where it will be  inexpedient  in  the  public  interest  to
furnish such statement.  The framers of  the  law,  in  their  wisdom,  have
specifically provided a limited mode of exclusion,  the  criteria  being  no
injustice to be caused to the accused  and  greater  public  interest  being
served.   This itself is indicative of  the  need  for  a  fair  and  proper
investigation by the concerned  agency.   What  ultimately  is  the  aim  or
significance of the expression ‘fair and proper investigation’  in  criminal
jurisprudence?  It has a twin purpose.   Firstly, the investigation must  be
unbiased, honest, just and in accordance with law.    Secondly,  the  entire
emphasis on a fair investigation has to be to bring out  the  truth  of  the
case  before  the  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.     Once  these  twin
paradigms  of fair investigation are satisfied,  there  will  be  the  least
requirement for the court of law to interfere with the  investigation,  much
less quash the same, or transfer it to another agency.    Bringing  out  the
truth  by  fair  and  investigative  means  in  accordance  with  law  would
essentially repel the very basis of  an  unfair,  tainted  investigation  or
cases of false implication.   Thus, it is inevitable for a court of  law  to
pass a specific order as to the fate of  the  investigation,  which  in  its
opinion is unfair, tainted and in violation of  the  settled  principles  of
investigative canons.

38.   Now, we may examine  another  significant  aspect  which  is  how  the
provisions of Section 173(8) have been understood and applied by the  courts
and investigating agencies.  It is true that though  there  is  no  specific
requirement in the provisions of Section  173(8)  of  the  Code  to  conduct
‘further investigation’ or file supplementary report with the leave  of  the
Court, the investigating agencies have not only understood but also  adopted
it as a legal practice to seek permission of the courts to conduct  ‘further
investigation’ and file ‘supplementary report’ with the leave of the  court.
 The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a similar view.   The
requirement of  seeking  prior  leave  of  the  Court  to  conduct  ‘further
investigation’ and/or to file a ‘supplementary report’ will have to be  read
into, and is a necessary implication of the provisions of Section 173(8)  of
the Code.  The doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully  come  to  the
aid  of  such  interpretation  as  the  matters  which  are  understood  and
implemented for a long time, and such practice  that  is  supported  by  law
should be accepted as part of the interpretative process.

39.   Such a view can be  supported  from  two  different  points  of  view.
Firstly, through the doctrine of precedence, as afore-noticed,  since  quite
often the courts have taken such a view, and,  secondly,  the  investigating
agencies which have also so understood  and  applied  the  principle.    The
matters which are understood and implemented as a  legal  practice  and  are
not opposed to the basic rule  of  law  would  be  good  practice  and  such
interpretation  would  be  permissible  with  the   aid   of   doctrine   of
contemporanea expositio.    Even otherwise, to seek such leave of the  court
would meet the ends of justice and also provide adequate  safeguard  against
a suspect/accused.

40.   We have already noticed that there is no  specific  embargo  upon  the
power of  the  learned  Magistrate  to  direct  ‘further  investigation’  on
presentation of a report in terms of  Section  173(2)  of  the  Code.    Any
other approach or interpretation would  be  in  contradiction  to  the  very
language of Section 173(8) and the scheme of the Code for giving  precedence
to proper administration of criminal justice.   The  settled  principles  of
criminal jurisprudence would support such  approach,  particularly  when  in
terms of Section 190 of the Code, the Magistrate is the competent  authority
to take cognizance of an offence.   It is the Magistrate who has  to  decide
whether on the basis of the record and documents  produced,  an  offence  is
made out or not, and if made out, what course of law should  be  adopted  in
relation to committal of the case to the court of competent jurisdiction  or
to proceed with the trial himself.  In  other  words,  it  is  the  judicial
conscience of the Magistrate which has to be  satisfied  with  reference  to
the record and the documents placed before him by the investigating  agency,
in coming to the appropriate conclusion in consonance  with  the  principles
of law.   It will  be  a  travesty  of  justice,  if  the  court  cannot  be
permitted to direct ‘further investigation’ to clear its doubt and to  order
the investigating agency to further  substantiate  its  charge  sheet.   The
satisfaction  of  the  learned  Magistrate  is  a  condition  precedent   to
commencement  of  further  proceedings  before  the   court   of   competent
jurisdiction.  Whether the Magistrate should direct ‘further  investigation’
or not is again a matter which will depend upon the facts of a  given  case.
  The learned Magistrate or  the  higher  court  of  competent  jurisdiction
would direct ‘further investigation’ or ‘reinvestigation’ as  the  case  may
be, on the facts of a given case.   Where the  Magistrate  can  only  direct
further  investigation,  the  courts  of  higher  jurisdiction  can   direct
further, re-investigation or even investigation de  novo  depending  on  the
facts of a given case. It will be the  specific  order  of  the  court  that
would determine the nature of investigation.   In this regard, we may  refer
to the observations made by this court  in  the  case  of  Sivanmoorthy  and
Others v. State represented by Inspector of Police [(2010) 12 SCC  29].   In
light of the above discussion, we answer the  questions  formulated  at  the
opening of this judgment as follows:

Answer to Question No. 1

      The court of competent jurisdiction is  duty  bound  to  consider  all
reports,  entire  records  and  documents   submitted   therewith   by   the
Investigating Agency as its report in terms of Section 173(2) of  the  Code.
 This Rule is subject to only the following exceptions;


a) Where a specific order has been passed by the learned Magistrate  at  the
   request of the prosecution limited to exclude any document  or  statement
   or any part thereof;

b) Where an order is passed by the higher courts in exercise of  its  extra-
   ordinary or inherent jurisdiction directing that any of the reports  i.e.
   primary report, supplementary report or the report  submitted  on  ‘fresh
   investigation’ or ‘re-investigation’ or  any  part  of  it  be  excluded,
   struck off the court record and be treated as non est.

Answer to Question No. 2

      No investigating agency is empowered to conduct a ‘fresh’,  ‘de  novo’
or ‘re-investigation’ in relation to the offence for which  it  has  already
filed a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code.    It  is  only  upon
the orders  of  the  higher  courts  empowered  to  pass  such  orders  that
aforesaid investigation can be conducted, in which event the  higher  courts
will have to  pass  a  specific  order  with  regard  to  the  fate  of  the
investigation already conducted and the report so filed before the court  of
the learned magistrate.

41.   Having answered the questions of law as  afore-stated,  we  revert  to
the facts of the case in hand.   As  already  noticed,  the  petitioner  had
filed the writ petition before the High Court that the investigation of  FIR
No. 10/2006 dated 9th February, 2006 be transferred  to  CBI  or  any  other
independent investigating agency providing protection  to  the  petitioners,
directing  initiation  of  appropriate  action  against  the  erring  police
officers who have registered the case against the petitioner and such  other
orders  that  the  court  may  deem  fit  and  proper  in  the   facts   and
circumstances of the case.   This petition was filed under  Article  226  of
the Constitution read with Section 482 of the Code on 25th  February,  2006.
The High Court granted no order either staying the further investigation  by
the agency, or the proceedings before the court of  competent  jurisdiction.
 The Delhi Police itself filed a status report before the High Court on  4th
April, 2006 and the Special Cell of Delhi  Police  filed  the  charge  sheet
before the trial court on 6th May, 2006.   After perusing the status  report
submitted to the High Court, the High Court vide its Order  dated  9th  May,
2006 had noticed that the circumstances of the case had cast a suspicion  on
the case of the prosecution, in regard to the manner in  which  the  accused
were apprehended and recoveries alleged to  have  been  made  from  them  of
articles like explosives and detonators.   After noticing  this,  the  Court
directed that without commenting on the merits of the matter, it was of  the
opinion that this was a case where inquiry by  some  independent  agency  is
called for, and directed the CBI to undertake an  inquiry  into  the  matter
and submit its report within four weeks.   Obviously,  it  would  have  been
brought to the notice of the High Court that the Delhi Police  had  filed  a
report before the trial court.  The  status  report  had  also  been  placed
before the High Court itself.    Still, the High Court, in its  wisdom,  did
not consider it appropriate  to  pass  any  directions  staying  proceedings
before the court of competent jurisdiction.   Despite  pendency  before  the
High Court for a substantial period of time, the CBI took considerable  time
to conduct its preliminary inquiry and it is only on  4th  July,  2007  that
the CBI submitted its preliminary inquiry report before the  court.    After
perusing the report, the Court directed, as per the request of the  CBI,  to
conduct in depth investigation of the case.

42.   In the order dated 24th October, 2007, the  High  Court  noticed  that
despite the fact that the CBI had taken  considerable  time  for  completing
its  investigation,  it  had  still  not  done  so.    Noticing   that   the
investigation was handed over to the  CBI  on  9th  May,  2006  and  despite
extensions it had not submitted its report   the Court granted  to  the  CBI
four weeks’ time from the date of  the  order  to  submit  its  findings  in
respect of the  allegations  made  by  the  accused  in  the  complaint  and
directed the matter to come up on 28th  November,  2007.    The  significant
aspect which needs to be noticed is that the Court specifically  noticed  in
this order that ‘the trial of the case is  not  proceeding,  further  hoping
that CBI shall file supplementary report or  supplementary  material  before
the trial court and the accused gets an opportunity of case  being  formally
investigated.   However, the pace at which the investigation is done by  the
CBI shows that CBI may take years together for getting the records….’

43.   This order clearly shows that the High Court  contemplated  submission
of a supplementary report, which means report in continuation to the  report
already submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code by the Delhi Police.

44.   On 28th November, 2007, the case came up for hearing before  the  High
Court.  Then CBI filed its closure report making a  request  that  both  the
accused be discharged.   The case came up for hearing before the High  Court
on 4th August, 2008, when the Court noticed that CBI had filed a  report  in
the sealed cover and the Court had perused it.  Herein,  the  Court  noticed
the entire facts in great detail.   The High  Court  disposed  of  the  writ
petition and while noticing the earlier order dated 4th July,  2007  wherein
the accused persons had assured the court that  they  would  not  move  bail
application before the trial court, till CBI  investigation  was  completed,
permitted the applicants to move bail applications as well.

45.   The application for discharge filed by  the  accused  persons  on  the
strength of the closure report filed by the CBI was rejected  by  the  trial
court vide its order dated 13th February, 2009 on the ground that it had  to
examine the entire record including the report filed  by  the  Delhi  Police
under Section 173(2) of the  Code.    
The  High  Court,  however,  took  the
contrary view and stated that it was only the closure report  filed  by  the
CBI which could be taken into  consideration,  and  then  the  matter  shall
proceed in accordance with law.   
In this  manner,  the  writ  petition  was
finally disposed of, directing the parties to appear before the trial  court
on 14th September, 2009.   
The High Court had relied upon  the  judgment  of
this Court in the case of K. Chandrasekhar v. State  of  Kerala  and  Others
(supra) to say that once investigation stands  transferred  to  CBI,  it  is
that agency only which has to proceed with the  investigation  and  not  the
Special Cell of the Delhi Police.

46.   We are unable to accord approval to the view taken by the High  Court.
The judgment in the case of  K.  Chandrasekhar  (supra),  
firstly  does  not
state any proposition of law.   
It is a judgment on peculiar facts  of  that
case.  Secondly, it has no application to the present case.  
In  that  case,
the investigation by the police  was  pending  when  the  investigation  was
ordered to be transferred to the CBI.   
There the Court  had  directed  that
further investigation had to be continued by the CBI  and  not  the  Special
Cell of the Delhi Police.

47.   In the present case, 
report in terms of  Section  173(2)  had  already
been filed by  the  Special  Cell  of  the  Delhi  Police  even  before  the
investigation was  handed  over  to  CBI  to  conduct  preliminary  inquiry.
Furthermore, the final investigation on the basis of the preliminary  report
submitted by the CBI had also not been handed over to CBI at that stage.

48.   Once a Report under Section 173(2) of the Code has been filed, it  can
only be cancelled,  proceeded  further  or  case  closed  by  the  court  of
competent jurisdiction and that too in accordance with  law.    
Neither  the
Police nor a specialised investigating agency has any right  to  cancel  the
said Report.   
Furthermore, in the present case, the High Court  had  passed
no order or direction staying further investigation by the Delhi  Police  or
proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction.

49.   On the contrary, the court had noticed explicitly in  its  order  that
it was a case of supplementary or further  investigation  and  filing  of  a
‘supplementary report’.


50.   Once the Court has taken this view, 
there is no question  of  treating
the first report as being withdrawn, cancelled or capable of being  excluded
from the records by the implication.  
In fact, except by a  specific  order
of a higher court competent to make said orders, the  previous  as  well  as
supplementary report shall form part of the record which the trial court  is
expected  to  consider  for  arriving  at  any  appropriate  conclusion,  in
accordance with law.  
 It is also interesting to note that  the  CBI  itself
understood  the  order  of   the   court   and   conducted   only   ‘further
investigation’ as is evident from the status report filed by the CBI  before
the High Court on 28th November, 2007.

51.   In our considered view, the trial court has  to  consider  the  entire
record, including both the Delhi Police Report filed  under  Section  173(2)
of the Code as well  as  the  Closure  Report  filed  by  the  CBI  and  the
documents filed along with these reports.

52.   It appears, the trial court may have three options, 
 firstly,  it  may
accept the application of accused for discharge.   
Secondly, it  may  direct
that the trial may proceed further in accordance with law  and  thirdly,  if
it  is  dissatisfied  on  any  important  aspect  of  investigation  already
conducted and in its considered opinion, it is just,  proper  and  necessary
in the interest of justice to direct ‘further investigation’, it may do so.

53.   Ergo, for the reasons recorded above, we modify the order of the  High
Court impugned in the present appeal to the  above  extent  and  direct  the
trial court to proceed with the case further in accordance with law.




                                             …….…………......................J.
                                                              (A.K. Patnaik)




                                           ...….…………......................J.
                                                           (Swatanter Kumar)

New Delhi;
December 13, 2012.