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Monday, December 3, 2012

Order 21 Rules 94 and 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’)-When the auction is for such a large amount, running in crores of rupees, nobody can expect the auction purchaser to pay the amount in cash on the fall of the hammer. So far as the instant case is concerned, facts would reveal that the auction purchaser had paid Rs.2.40 crores, may not be in cash, but by way of drafts on 8.10.2010 and the balance amount i.e. 75 % of the bid maount was also paid on 23.10.2010, consequently, in our view, the auction purchaser had complied with the provisions of Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 CPC.=“immediately” which occurs in Order 21 Rule 84 CPC, as follows: “30. The term “immediately”, therefore, must be construed having regard to the aforementioned principles. The term has two meanings. One, indicating the relation of cause and effect and the other, the absence of time between two events. In the former sense, it means proximately, without intervention of anything, as opposed to “immediately.” In the latter sense, it means instantaneously. 31. The term “immediately”, is thus, required to be construed as meaning with all reasonable speed, considering the circumstances of the case. (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 23, para 1618, p. 1178).”- A Constitution Bench of this Court in Jammulu Ramulu (supra) had occasion to consider the scope of Order 21 Rule 92(2) and Rule 89 CPC. Overruling P. K. Unni (supra), this Court held as follows: “15. A plain reading of Order 21 Rule 92 CPC shows that the court could either dismiss an application or allow an application. Order 21 Rule 89 CPC prescribes no period either for making the application or for making the deposit. The Limitation Act also prescribes no period for making a deposit. However, Article 127 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period within which an application to set aside a sale should be made. Earlier, this was 30 days, now it has been enhanced to 60 days. Unless there was a period prescribed for making a deposit, the time to make the deposit would be the same as that for making the application. This is so because if an application is made beyond the period of limitation, then a deposit made at that time or after that period would be of no use. 16. Normally, when the legislature wishes to prescribe a period for making a deposit, it does so by using words to the effect “no deposit shall be made after … days” or “a deposit shall be made within … days” or “no application will be entertained unless a deposit is made within … days”. Order 21 Rule 92(2) CPC does not use any such expressions. The relevant portion of Order 21 Rule 92(2) CPC reads as follows: “92. (2) Where such application is made and allowed, and where, in the case of an application under Rule 89, the deposit required by that rule is made within thirty days from the date of sale, … the court shall make an order setting aside the sale:” Thus Order 21 Rule 92(2) CPC is only taking away discretion of the court to refuse to set aside the sale where an application is made and allowed and the [pic]deposit has been made within 30 days from the date of sale. It is thus clear that Order 21 Rule 92(2) CPC is not prescribing any period of limitation within which a deposit has to be made. 17. Viewed in this context the intention of the legislature in extending the period under Article 127 of the Limitation Act may be seen. It is very clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which have been set out hereinabove, that the period under Article 127 of the Limitation Act was extended from 30 days to 60 days in order to give more time to persons to make deposits. The legislature has noted that the period of 30 days from the date of sale was too short and often caused hardships because judgment-debtors usually failed to arrange for money within that period. The question then would be whether by merely amending Article 127 of the Limitation Act the legislature has achieved the object for which it increased the period of limitation to file an application to set aside sale.”


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8652  OF 2012
               [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 34402 of 2011]

Ram Karan Gupta                                    .. Appellant
                                   Versus
J. S. Exim Ltd. and Ors.                                 .. Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T

K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    This matter arises in execution and
this appeal has been preferred  by
one of the judgment debtors challenging the common final judgment and  order
dated 11.11.2011 passed by the High Court of Delhi in C. M. (M) No. 1093  of
2011 and E.F.A. No. 15 of 2011.

3.    Decree holders and judgment  debtors  are  co-sharers  of  a  property
bearing No. 1-87, Ashok Vihar, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as  the  ‘suit
property’).  
Late Rameshwar Dass Gupta filed a suit  for  partition  of  the
suit property and 
after passing a preliminary decree,  a  final  decree  was
passed and 
the suit property was ordered to be sold in  public  auction  and
sale proceeds were directed to be distributed among the shareholders.

4.     Decree  holders  filed  execution  petition  and  vide  order   dated
20.11.2009,  the  auction  sale  was  scheduled  to  be  held  on  9.1.2010.
However,
objector/J.D.2 Shri Ram Karan Gupta  (appellant  herein)  moved  an
application seeking stay of auction sale scheduled to be  held  on  9.1.2010
and a joint application  was  moved  by  the  decree  holders  and  judgment
debtors, wherein it was disclosed that J.D.2  had  agreed  to  purchase  the
suit property, as such, the auction sale be  adjourned.
  Later  on,  J.D.2
failed to comply with the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  Compromise  and,
therefore, a fresh process for auction sale was issued and the auction  sale
was scheduled to be held on 4.7.2010.
Due to various reasons,  it  did  not
materialize.   Later, auction sale was scheduled to  be  held  on  8.10.2010
and the auction was completed and
the auction purchaser M/s J.S.  Exim  Ltd.
(1st respondent herein) was found to be the highest bidder for a bid  amount
of Rs.9.60 crores.   
The auction purchaser deposited Rs.2.40 crores  by  way
of 27 demand drafts of even date towards 25% of the bid amount.   
The  Court
Auctioneer placed on record the record of the auction  proceedings  held  on
8.10.2010.

5.    Later, the auction purchaser moved an application for  depositing  the
remaining 75% of the sale price/bid amount of  the  suit  property  and  the
application was allowed and 75% of the sale  amount  was  deposited  by  the
auction purchaser on 23.10.2010 in the State  Bank  of  India,  Tees  Hazari
Court, Delhi.

6.    The auction purchaser, later, moved  an  application  under  Order  21
Rules 94 and 95 of the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  (for  short  ‘CPC’)  for
confirmation  of  sale.  

J.D.2,  the  appellant  herein,  then  sought  for
cancellation of the auction held  on  8.10.2010  stating  that  the  auction
purchaser had failed to deposit 25% of the bid amount on completion  of  the
auction sale proceedings.   Further,  it  was  also  pointed  out  that  the
auction purchaser had enclosed the drafts  dated  7.10.2010  issued  by  the
Indian Overseas Bank, Chennai,  but  the  said  bank  drafts  had  not  been
enclosed by the Court Auctioneer with her report.   It  was  also  contended
that the auction  was  vitiated  due  to  the  violation  of  the  mandatory
provisions of Order 21 Rule 84 and 85 CPC.

7.    The auction purchaser refuted  all  those  contentions  and  submitted
that 25% of the bid amount was  deposited  on  the  date  of  auction  after
conclusion of the auction sale proceeding and the remaining 75% of  the  bid
amount was deposited on 23.10.2010.  Further, it was pointed  out  that  the
auction purchaser had got prepared the demand drafts of  Rs.2.50  crores  in
the name of the Court Auctioneer. But, later on, it  was  disclosed  by  the
Court Auctioneer that the demand drafts should be issued in the name of  the
competent authority, consequently, the auction purchaser  got  prepared  the
said demand drafts on 8.10.2010 and  handed  over  the  same  to  the  Court
Auctioneer.  
Further, it was also pointed  out  that  the  words  occurring
“shall pay” and “immediately” do not mean that the 25%  of  the  bid  amount
should be paid at the fall of the hammer. 
 Further, it was also pointed  out
that the auction sale could be set aside only  on  the  ground  of  material
irregularity or fraud  that  had  resulted  in  substantial  injury  to  the
applicant.

8.    The Executing Court elaborately  considered  the  various  contentions
raised by the parties and perused the documents and took the view 
 that  the
auction purchaser had deposited 25% of the bid amount as mandated  by  Order
21 Rule 84 CPC.   Further, it was also held
 that the remaining  75%  of  the
bid amount was also deposited by the  auction  purchaser  on  23.10.2010  in
terms of Order  21  Rule  85  CPC.    
The  Court,  therefore,  rejected  the
objection  raised  by  the  appellant/judgment  debtor  and  confirmed   the
auction, vide its order dated 24.3.2011.

9.    The appellant/judgment debtor, aggrieved by the said order,  preferred
an appeal being E.F.A. No. 15 of 2011 and C.M. (M) No. 1093 of  2011  before
the High Court of Delhi.
 Before the  High  Court,  contention  was  raised
that the auction purchaser had not complied with the mandatory  requirements
of Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 CPC and that 25%  of  the  bid  amount  was  not
deposited on the fall of the  hammer  and,  consequently,  the  entire  sale
transaction was void and liable to be  set  aside.  
Further,  it  was  also
stated that since the appellant was one of the  family  members,  he  should
have been permitted to get the sale executed in his favour, since he  had  a
pre-emptive right and he was ready and willing  to  deposit  the  amount  of
Rs.9.60 crores, so as to avoid the sale.

10.   The High Court  considered  the  various  contentions  raised  by  the
parties and concurred with the views expressed by the Executing  Court  that
the auction purchaser had complied with Order 21 Rules 84 and 85  CPC.
The
High Court noticed that the auction purchaser had deposited 25% of  the  bid
amount as mandated by Order 21 Rule 84 CPC and that he  had  also  paid  the
remaining 75% of the bid amount within the statutory  period,  in  terms  of
Order 21 Rule 85 CPC.
The High Court, therefore, upheld the  order  of  the
trial Court  confirming  the  sale  and  directed  the  parties  to  execute
documents of title in favour of the auction  purchaser.   Aggrieved  by  the
same, this appeal has been preferred.

11.    Shri  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing   for   the
appellant, submitted
 that the auction purchaser had not  complied  with  the
mandatory provisions of Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 CPC,  inasmuch  as  he  did
not deposit 25% of the bid amount immediately on the  fall  of  the  hammer.
It was pointed out that  25%  of  the  bid  amount  was  deposited  only  on
11.10.2010 and non-compliance of the above  mentioned  statutory  provisions
has vitiated the auction sale.
In support of his contentions, reliance  was
placed on the judgments of this Court in Manilal Mohanlal  Shah  and  Others
v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and another AIR 1954 SC  349  and  Balram
son of Bhasa Ram v. Ilam Singh and others AIR 1996 SC 2781.
Learned  senior
counsel submitted  that  the  appellant  had  preferred  an  application  on
1.12.2010 before the Executing Court to allow the appellant to  deposit  the
entire amount of the sale, after deduction of his  one-forth  share  in  the
property, and  handover  the  possession  to  him.
 Learned  senior  counsel
submitted that the application was filed before the  confirmation  of  sale,
but was not considered by  the  Executing  Court.  
Learned  senior  counsel
submitted that only if the application is allowed under Order 21 Rule  92(2)
CPC, the appellant could deposit the amount within the  time  stipulated  in
the said provision.
Learned senior counsel  submitted  that  the  Executing
Court has committed an error in confirming the sale before entertaining  the
application and  allowing  the  same,  so  that  the  appellant  could  have
deposited the entire amount.
 Learned senior counsel  submitted  that  even
now the appellant is willing to pay  the  entire  amount  deposited  by  the
auction purchaser including interest.
 Further, it was also  submitted  that
the appellant is willing even to pay Rs.1 crore more so  that  he  can  save
the property where he is  residing.
 Learned  senior  counsel  also  placed
reliance on a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Dadi  Jagannadham
v. Jammlu Ramulu and Others (2001) 7 SCC 71 and
pointed out  that  there  is
no strict time limit in depositing the amount and the  question  of  deposit
arises only after  the  application  is  allowed.
 Learned  senior  counsel
pointed out that rationale in P. K. Unni v. Nirmala  Industries  and  others
(1990) 2 SCC 378 and the views expressed in  that  judgment
that  Order  21
Rule 92(2) CPC prescribed a period of limitation, was found to be  incorrect
in Jammlu Ramulu (supra).
 Learned senior counsel also placed  reliance  on
M. Noohukan v. Bank  of  Travancore  and  another  (2008)  11  SCC  161  and
submitted that this Court, in the similar circumstances,  had  extended  the
time for depositing the amount.  
Learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that,
under such circumstances, the prayer for depositing the  amount,  as  stated
above, be allowed.

12.    Shri  C.  A.  Sundram,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
respondent,  submitted  that  this  Court  shall  not  interfere  with   the
concurrent findings rendered by the Courts below.
 Learned  senior  counsel
submitted that the auction purchaser deposited 25%  of  the  bid  amount  on
8.10.2010 and further deposited the remaining amount i.e.  75%  of  the  bid
amount on 23.10.2010.
 Learned senior counsel pointed out that  the  mandate
of Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 CPC was complied with in letter and  spirit  and
the Court Auctioneer was satisfied that the entire  amount  had  been  paid.
Learned senior counsel submitted
 that the word  “immediately”  occurring  in
Order 21 Rule 84 CPC was expanded by this Court in Rosali V. v.  Talco  Bank
and others AIR 2007 SC 998.  
It was pointed out that, in the present  case,
27 drafts of Rs.2.40 corores had  been  paid  to  the  Court  Auctioneer  on
8.10.2010, which is reflected in the report of the  Court  Auctioneer  dated
8.10.2010.
The balance amount was also deposited in accordance  with  Order
21 Rule 85 CPC.
 Learned senior counsel submitted  that  there  is  no  bona
fide in the offer made by the appellant and, if, had  any  genuine  interest
for avoiding the sale, the amount offered should have been deposited  before
the confirmation of sale and within the time stipulated  in  Order  21  Rule
92(2) CPC.

13.   We are in full agreement with the order passed by the Executing  Court
as well as the High Court that the auction purchaser had  deposited  25%  of
the amount on 8.10.2010.  
 When the auction is  for  such  a  large  amount,
running in crores of rupees, nobody can expect the auction purchaser to  pay
the amount in cash on the fall of the hammer. 
So far as the instant case  is
concerned, facts would reveal that the auction purchaser  had  paid  Rs.2.40
crores, may not be in cash, but by  way  of  drafts  on  8.10.2010  and  the
balance amount i.e. 75 % of the bid maount  was  also  paid  on  23.10.2010,
consequently, in our view, the  auction  purchaser  had  complied  with  the
provisions of Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 CPC.

14.   We may, in this connection, refer to the judgment  of  this  Court  in
Talco Bank (supra), wherein this Court has extended the meaning of the  term
“immediately” which occurs in Order 21 Rule 84 CPC, as follows:
           “30.  The  term  “immediately”,  therefore,  must  be  construed
      having regard to the aforementioned  principles.   The  term  has  two
      meanings. One, indicating the relation of cause  and  effect  and  the
      other, the absence of time between two events. In the former sense, it
      means proximately, without intervention of  anything,  as  opposed  to
      “immediately.”  In the latter sense, it means instantaneously.


           31.   The term “immediately”, is thus, required to be  construed
      as meaning with all reasonable speed, considering the circumstances of
      the case.  (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 23, para
      1618, p. 1178).”


Learned senior counsel appearing for  the  appellant,  as  we  have  already
indicated, submitted
that  the  Executing  Court  should  have  allowed  his
application dated 1.12.2010 since he preferred that  application  within  60
days of the date of sale,  but  could  not  deposit  the  amount  since  the
application filed in terms of Order 21 Rule  92(2)  CPC  was  neither  dealt
with nor allowed.
Order 21 Rule 89 CPC, it may  be  noted,  gives  a  final
opportunity to the judgment debtor to save his property by setting the  sale
aside before the confirmation upon the  terms  of  satisfying  the  decretal
debt and of paying compensation to the auction purchaser.  
 Rules 89  to  92
of Order 21 deal with setting aside of sale.  When a  property  is  sold  in
execution of a decree and an application for setting aside the sale  can  be
made  under  those  provisions  by  the  persons  affected  on  the  grounds
mentioned  therein.  
 Such  an  application  has  to  be  made  within   the
prescribed period of limitation, the provisions  mentioned  therein  are  in
the nature of concession and those  provisions  must  be  strictly  complied
with before a sale is set aside before confirmation. 
On  setting  aside  the
sale under Order 21 Rule 89 CPC the property continues to  be  the  property
of the judgment debtor.
15.   This Court in Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar  v.  Ratilal  Motilal
Patel and others AIR 1968 SC 372 
held that the rule is intended to confer  a
right upon the judgment debtor, even after the property is sold, to  satisfy
the claim of the decree holder and to compensate the  auction  purchaser  by
paying him 5 per cent of the purchase-money.  
In Challamane  Huchha  Gowda
v. M. R. Tirumala and another (2004) 1 SCC 453,
this  Court  held  that  it
gives a final opportunity to put an end to the dispute, at the  instance  of
the judgment debtor before the sale is confirmed by the Executing Court  and
enables him to save his property.
Order  21  Rule  89  CPC  is,  therefore,
intended to (i) to save the judgment debtor from the threatened  deprivation
of his property, (ii) to satisfy the claim of the decree  holder  and  (iii)
to compensate the auction purchaser.
 Rule 89 of Order 21  CPC  also  applies
to a sale in execution of a decree for payment of  money  and  an  order  of
sale of property under the Partition Act, 1893 is a deemed decree under  the
Code and, therefore, an application for setting aside sale in  execution  of
such decree is maintainable.
 It also applies to a decree passed  in  terms
of an award in a Partition suit, so also to a sale in execution of  mortgage
decree.  
Order 21 Rule 92 CPC provides for confirmation of  sale,  as  also
setting aside the sale, which reads as follows:

           “92. Sale when to become absolute or be set aside.- (1) Where no
      application is made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91, or  where  such
      application is made and disallowed, the  court  shall  make  an  Order
      confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute:


           Provided that, where any property is  sold  in  execution  of  a
      decree pending the final disposal of any claim to, or any objection to
      the attachment of, such property, the court  shall  not  confirm  such
      sale until the final disposal of such claim or objection.


           (2) Where such application is made and allowed,  and  where,  in
      the case of an application under Rule 89, the deposit required by that
      rule is made within sixty days from the date  of  sale,  or  in  cases
      where the amount deposited under Rule 89  is  found  to  be  deficient
      owing to any clerical or arithmetical  mistake  on  the  part  of  the
      depositor and such deficiency has been made good within such  time  as
      may be fixed by the court, the court shall make an Order setting aside
      the sale:


           Provided that no order  shall  be  made  unless  notice  of  the
      application has been given to all persons affected thereby:


           Provided further that the deposit under  this  sub-rule  may  be
      made within sixty days in all such cases where the  period  of  thirty
      days, within which the deposit had to be made, has not expired  before
      the commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002.



               (3) No suit to set aside an Order made under this rule  shall
      be brought by any person against whom such Order is made.


           (4) Where a third party challenges the  judgment-debtor’s  title
      by filing a suit against the auction-purchaser, the decree-holder  and
      the judgment-debtor shall be necessary parties to the suit.


           (5) If the suit referred to in  sub-rule  (4)  is  decreed,  the
      Court shall direct the  decree-holder  to  refund  the  money  to  the
      auction-purchaser, and where such an order  is  passed  the  execution
      proceeding in which the sale had been held  shall,  unless  the  Court
      otherwise directs, be revived at the  stage  at  which  the  sale  was
      ordered.

Sub-rule (1) of Rule 92 deals with cases where no application to  set  aside
the sale is made or such an application is  made  and  disallowed.   In  all
these cases, the Court shall make an order confirming  the  sale.   Sub-rule
(2) of Rule 92 covers those cases where an application for setting aside  is
made and allowed or in an application under Rule 89  requisite  deposit  has
been made, in all such cases, the Court is bound to set aside the sale.

16.   A Constitution Bench of this  Court  in  Jammulu  Ramulu  (supra)  had
occasion to consider the scope of Order 21  Rule  92(2)  and  Rule  89  CPC.
Overruling P. K. Unni (supra), this Court held as follows:

           “15. A plain reading of Order 21 Rule  92  CPC  shows  that  the
      court could either dismiss an application  or  allow  an  application.
      Order 21 Rule 89 CPC  prescribes  no  period  either  for  making  the
      application or  for  making  the  deposit.  The  Limitation  Act  also
      prescribes no period for making a deposit. However, Article 127 of the
      Limitation Act prescribes a period within which an application to  set
      aside a sale should be made. Earlier, this was 30  days,  now  it  has
      been enhanced to 60 days. Unless there was  a  period  prescribed  for
      making a deposit, the time to make the deposit would be  the  same  as
      that for making the application. This is so because if an  application
      is made beyond the period of limitation, then a deposit made  at  that
      time or after that period would be of no use.


           16. Normally, when the legislature wishes to prescribe a  period
      for making a deposit, it does so by using  words  to  the  effect  “no
      deposit shall be made after … days” or “a deposit shall be made within
      … days” or “no application will be entertained  unless  a  deposit  is
      made within … days”. Order 21 Rule 92(2) CPC does  not  use  any  such
      expressions. The relevant portion of Order 21 Rule 92(2) CPC reads  as
      follows:
                 “92. (2) Where such application is made  and  allowed,  and
           where, in the case of an application under Rule 89, the  deposit
           required by that rule is made within thirty days from  the  date
           of sale, … the court shall  make  an  order  setting  aside  the
           sale:”
      Thus Order 21 Rule 92(2) CPC is only taking  away  discretion  of  the
      court to refuse to set aside the sale where an application is made and
      allowed and the [pic]deposit has been made within  30  days  from  the
      date of sale. It is thus clear that Order 21 Rule  92(2)  CPC  is  not
      prescribing any period of limitation within which a deposit has to  be
      made.


           17. Viewed in this context the intention of the  legislature  in
      extending the period under Article 127 of the Limitation  Act  may  be
      seen. It is very clear from the  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons,
      which have been set out hereinabove, that the period under Article 127
      of the Limitation Act was extended from 30 days to 60 days in order to
      give more time to persons to make deposits. The legislature has  noted
      that the period of 30 days from the date of sale  was  too  short  and
      often caused hardships  because  judgment-debtors  usually  failed  to
      arrange for money within that  period.  The  question  then  would  be
      whether by merely amending Article  127  of  the  Limitation  Act  the
      legislature has achieved the object for which it increased the  period
      of limitation to file an application to set aside sale.”


The Constitution Bench held that all that Order 21 Rule 92(2)  CPC  provides
is that if the deposit is made within 30 days from the date of sale  and  an
application is filed then the court would have  no  discretion  but  to  set
aside the sale.  The Court held that that does not mean that if the  deposit
is made after 30 days the court could not  entertain  the  application.   If
the deposit is made beyond the period of 30 days, but within the  period  of
60 days, then it will be within the discretion of the court whether  or  not
to grant the application.

17.   Law  Commission  in  its  89th  report,  para  42.35,  page  219,  Law
Commission report 139th report paras 3.1 to 3.6 and 4.1  to  4.5  considered
the period of limitation of thirty days for depositing  the  amount  to  set
aside  sale  as  specified  in  sub-rule  (2)  of  Rule  92  and   suggested
enlargement of period of sixty days so as to be consistent with Section  127
of the Limitation Act.  Following that the second proviso  to  sub-rule  (2)
of Rule 92, as inserted by the Code  of  Civil  Procedure  (Amendment)  Act,
2002, clarified that the amendment would  also  apply  to  all  those  cases
where the period of thirty days within which the deposit was required to  be
made had not expired before the commencement of  the  Amendment  Act,  2002.
The amendment which came into force w.e.f. 01.07.2002 extends the period  of
deposit up to sixty days, which is in conformity with  Section  127  of  the
Limitation Act, as amended by the Code of Civil  Procedure  (Amendment)  Act
1976.

18.   In Challamane Huchha Gowda (supra), the Court  was  primarily  dealing
with the question as to whether a mode of application  has  been  prescribed
for making an application for setting aside the sale.  The Court noted  that
Order 21 Rule 89 CPC requires an application to be made  for  setting  aside
the sale, nothing is stated in the rule regarding the  mode  of  application
and then held that purshis contains an implicit  prayer  for  setting  aside
the sale and the absence of a formal application does  not  amount  to  non-
compliance with the provision.  The above view  expressed  by  certain  High
Courts was found favour by this Court in Tribhovandas Purshottamdas  Thakkar
(supra) and this Court held that Order 21 Rule 89 CPC does not provide  that
the application in a particular form shall be filed to set aside the sale.

19.   We notice, in this  case,
 there  was  no  reference  at  all  to  the
provisions of Order 21  Rule 89 in the application filed  by  the  appellant
on 1.12.2010, be that it may, even then the appellant had not complied  with
the mandatory requirements of depositing the amount.   
Clause  (a)  of  Sub-
rule (1) of Rule 89 of Order 21 requires the applicant to deposit  in  Court
5 per cent of the purchase money  for  payment  to  the  auction  purchaser.
Deposit of the requisite amount in the Court is a condition precedent  or  a
sine qua non to an application for setting aside the execution of  sale  and
such a amount must be paid within a period specified in the rule and if  the
deposit is made after the time limit, the  application  must  be  dismissed.
The deposit made under Rule 89 of Order 21 CPC should be  unconditional  and
unqualified and the decree holder or the auction purchaser  should  be  able
to get the amount at once.

20.   We have already indicated  that  the  rule  is  in  the  nature  of  a
concession shown to the judgment debtor, so he has to strictly  comply  with
the requirements thereof and a sale will not be set aside unless the  entire
amount specified in rub-rule (1) is deposited within 60 days from  the  date
of the sale and, if it is  beyond  60  days,  the  Court  cannot  allow  the
application.  
We have already found that the appellant-judgment  debtor  did
not pay  the  amount  within  the  stipulated  time  and  he  only  made  an
application on 1.12.2010 without depositing the amount and hence  the  Court
cannot entertain such an application and bound to confirm  the  sale  which,
in this case, the Court did on 23.10.2010.

21.   We, therefore, find no  error  in  the  judgment  and  orders  of  the
Executing Court as well as the High Court and the belated offer made by  the
appellant for depositing the amount now cannot be entertained and  the  same
is rejected.

22.   The appeal, therefore, lacks in merits  and  the  same  is  dismissed,
with no order as to costs.



                                                            ………………………………..J.
                                          (K.S. Radhakrishnan)







                                                           …………………………………..J.
                                             (Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
December 3, 2012