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inter se seniority in the promotional cadre = In the said provisional gradation list, the recruits of the special batch were shown as senior to the recruits of the regular batch. the officers belonging to the regular batch were shown below the officers belonging to the special batch. Because of the aforesaid situation, the direct recruits invoked the jurisdiction of the tribunal for the apposite determination of seniority claiming to be senior to the respondent Nos. 6 to 24.- whether the appointments have been made in violation of the rules; whether the selection of the special batch recruits if accepted to be in violation of the rules, can be treated to be de hors the rules; and whether the concept of relaxation has been extended to them or is extendable to them and further whether they can avail the benefit under the second proviso to Rule 18 of the Rules and whether the tribunal as well as the High Court is justified in refixing the seniority without quashing the appointment of the special batch recruits.= before the tribunal, the challenge was not for the quashment of the appointments on the foundation that they were made in violation of the rules and the propriety in the matter of appointment of the special recruits was not maintained and that apart, the appeal was filed after a span of nine years after the selection and appointment and hence, the principle stated therein is squarely applicable to the case at hand.-Be it noted, the tribunal as well as the High Court has placed reliance on Rafiquddin and others (supra) to refix the seniority and justify the direction for refixation of seniority by putting the direct recruits over and above the special recruits on the foundation that it was necessitous to strike the balance. - there can be no scintilla of doubt that the selection of the special batch recruits was totally de hors the Rules; that there was a maladroit effort to go for a special drive when there was no need for the same by the State which is supposed to be a model employer; that neither the concept of relaxation nor the conception of benefit of Rule 18 would be attracted for grant on conferring any privilege to the special batch recruits; that their seniority has to be pushed down and, hence, the directions given by the tribunal and the High Court in that regard are absolutely flawless; and that regard being had to the delayed challenge and long rendering of service in the posts and further promotions having been effected, it would be inapposite to quash their appointments. 48. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to reiterate the oft-stated principle that the State is a model employer and it is required to act fairly giving due regard and respect to the rules framed by it. But in the present case, the State has atrophied the rules. Hence, the need for hammering the concept. 49. Almost a quarter century back, this Court in Balram Gupta vs Union of India & Anr. [1987 (Supp) SCC 228] had observed thus: “As a model employer the Government must conduct itself with high probity and candour with its employees.” 50. In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh and Ors.[(1992)4SCC118], the Court had clearly stated: “The main concern of the court in such matters is to ensure the rule of law and to see that the Executive acts fairly and gives a fair deal to its employees consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16”. 51. In Secretary, State Of Karnataka And vs. Umadevi And Others [(2006)4SCC1], the Constitution Bench, while discussing the role of state in recruitment procedure, stated that if rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accordance with the rules, for the State is meant to be a model employer. 52. In Mehar Chand Polytechnic & Anr. vs. Anu Lamba & Ors. [(2006) 7 SCC 161] the Court observed that public employment is a facet of right to equality envisaged under Article 16 of the Constitution of India and that the recruitment rules are framed with a view to give equal opportunity to all the citizens of India entitled for being considered for recruitment in the vacant posts. 53. We have stated the role of the State as a model employer with the fond hope that in future a deliberate disregard is not taken recourse to and deviancy of such magnitude is not adopted to frustrate the claims of the employees. It should always be borne in mind that legitimate aspirations of the employees are not guillotined and a situation is not created where hopes end in despair. Hope for everyone is gloriously precious and a model employer should not convert it to be deceitful and treacherous by playing a game of chess with their seniority. A sense of calm sensibility and concerned sincerity should be reflected in every step. An atmosphere of trust has to prevail and when the employees are absolutely sure that their trust shall not be betrayed and they shall be treated with dignified fairness then only the concept of good governance can be concretized. We say no more. 54. Consequently, all the appeals are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8514-8515   OF 2012
          (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 19707-19708 of 2009)


Bhupendra Nath Hazarika and another          ... Appellants

                                   Versus
State of Assam and others                        ... Respondents
                                    WITH
                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.8516             OF 2012
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 963 of 2010)


Bibekananda Das                                    ... Appellant

                                   Versus
State of Assam and others                        ... Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

      Leave granted.

2.    In these appeals, the challenge is to the common  judgment  and  order
dated 9.9.2008 passed by the Division Bench of the High  Court  of  Gauhati,
Assam in WA Nos. 448 of 2004, 459 of 2004 and 465 of 2004 whereby  stamp  of
approval has been given to the judgment and order  dated  19.11.2004  passed
by the learned single Judge in WP(C) Nos. 7482 of 2002, 7843 of  2002,  7564
of 2002, 8081 of 2002 and 298 of 2003 whereunder the  learned  single  Judge
had  maintained  the  order   dated   11.10.2002   passed   by   the   Assam
Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati (for short “the tribunal”) in Appeal  Case
No. 79ATA of 1999, and dismissed WP(C) Nos. 4028 of 2003, 4129 of  2003  and
1031 of  2003  which  were  preferred  directly
for  issuance  of  mandamus
commanding the respondent authorities  to  consider 
 the  previous  services
rendered by the petitioners therein  prior  to  their  appointments  in  the
Assam Police Service (Junior Grade) in the year 1993 and
 to determine  their
inter  se  seniority  in  the  promotional  cadre  accordingly  and 
 further
disposed of WP(C) 69 of 2003 preferred by an  Additional  Superintendent  of
Police, Guwahati for quashing of the appointment to the promotional post  of
the private respondents  therein  on  the  foundation  that  they  had  been
promoted in violation of the provisions of the Assam Police  Service  Rules,
1966 (for brevity “the 1966 Rules”).

3.    Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts  which  are  requisite  to  be
stated are  that
 the  Assam  Public  Service  Commission  (for  short  “the
Commission”) issued an  advertisement  No.  9/92  dated  23.6.1992  inviting
applications  for  preliminary  examination  for  the  Combined  Competitive
Examination,  1992-93  for  selecting  candidates  for  various  posts   and
services including thirty vacancies in  the  Assam  Police  Service  (Junior
Grade) (for short “the  APS”)  as  requisitioned  by  the  Commissioner-cum-
Secretary to the Government of Assam  in  the  Department  of  Personnel  on
5.9.1992.
On 29.8.1992, the Commission published another advertisement  No.
12/92 inviting applications for filling up of 20  posts  in  the  APS  under
Rule 5(1)(c) of the 1966 Rules.
There is no dispute  that  the  initial  30
vacancies were  put  in  the  compartment  of  “regular  batch”  or  “direct
recruitment” and 
the other 20 vacancies, which were sought to be  filled  up
by way of special drive, were kept in the category  of  “special  batch”  or
“promotional recruits”.  
 The main examination for  the  regular  batch  was
held on 15.11.1992 for  total  marks  of  1400.  
The  examination  for  the
special batch  was  held  on  22.11.1992  for  650  marks.
 The  Commission
declared the result in respect of  regular  batch  on  23.4.1993  and,  vide
letter dated 24.4.1993, recommended 30 candidates for appointment  in  order
of merit.
Despite the recommendation by the Commission, no appointment  was
made till 13.8.1993.
 At this juncture,
 the  Commissioner-cum-Secretary  to
the Government of Assam in the Department of Home requested  the  Commission
to furnish the select list of the special recruits at the earliest.
 On  the
basis  of  the  aforesaid  letter  of  request,  the  Commission  sent   its
recommendations in respect of the candidates belonging to the special  batch
and  on  the  basis  of  the  said  recommendation,  vide  notification  No.
HMA.478/86/Pt-I/17 dated 3.7.1993,
 the respondent Nos. 6 to  24  before  the
tribunal were appointed.
The respondent No. 25 was appointed  on  31.81994.

Thereafter, the Competent Authority,  vide  notification  No.  HMA.110/93/43
dated 13.8.1993, appointed 28  persons  from  the  regular  batch.  
As  the
recruits of the special batch were  appointed  earlier,  they  were  treated
senior to the recruits belonging to the regular batch.

4.    The facts, as further  uncurtained,  are
 that  the  determination  of
seniority came to the notice of the recruits of the  regular  batch  at  the
time of their confirmation of service in the year 1999.  
Being  dissatisfied
with  the  action  of  the  authorities,  they   immediately   submitted   a
representation.  
When  the  representation  was  pending  consideration, 
 a
provisional gradation list showing the inter se seniority as  on  31.12.1992
was published on 12.3.1999. 
 In the said  provisional  gradation  list,  
the
recruits of the special batch were shown as senior to the  recruits  of  the
regular batch.
As warranted,
the recruits belonging to  the  regular  batch
filed their objections to  the  fixation  of  seniority  on  24.9.1999,
but
without publishing the final gradation list,
the respondent No.  3,  namely,
the Secretary in the Department of Home,
promoted 
14 officers  belonging  to
the special batch and 
16 officers belonging to  the  regular  batch  to  the
Senior Scale of APS (Grade-II). 
 In  the  promotional  order,
the  officers
belonging to the regular batch were shown below the  officers  belonging  to
the special batch. 
 Because of the aforesaid situation,
the direct  recruits
invoked the jurisdiction of the tribunal for the apposite  determination  of
seniority claiming to be senior to the respondent Nos. 6 to 24.

5.    The claim of the appellants before the tribunal was  resisted  by  the
respondent-State and the  private  respondents  therein  on  many  a  ground
including the one that the appeal was barred by limitation.
 It  is  worthy
to note that in an affidavit, the Secretary to  the  Commission  asseverated
that
 the Government had not consulted the Commission before  publishing  the
provisional gradation list;
 that when the selection process for the  regular
batch was already underway, there was no justification whatsoever to go  for
special recruitment;
that the recourse taken to fill up the posts by way  of
special recruitment was in  gross  violation  of  the  rules  and  procedure
inasmuch as all vacancies could have been filled  up  by  resorting  to  the
usual and regular procedure of recruitment;
 that the Competent Authority  of
the State Government should have acted on the list sent  by  the  Commission
relating to the regular candidates in quite promptitude but delayed  it  for
no apparent reason and called for the recommendation for the  special  batch
and  issued  letters  of  appointment  in  their  favour   which   exhibited
unwarranted interest; and
 that  the  inter  se  seniority  deserved  to  be
refixed and the regular batch should be treated to be senior to the  special
batch.

6.    The tribunal dealt with the issue of limitation and observed that  the
appeal did not  concern  itself  with  the  validity  or  propriety  of  the
appointments of the respondent Nos.  6  to  25  but  fixation  of  inter  se
seniority and hence, the appeal was not barred under the provisions  of  the
Assam Administrative Tribunals Act, 1977.
  It further  opined  that  it  was
curious that despite the fact that the  recommendation  in  respect  of  the
regular  batch  had  already  been  forwarded  to  the  Government  by   the
Commission, no steps were  taken.  
The  aforesaid  act  of  the  authority,
observed the tribunal, on one  hand,  exposited  lackadaisical  attitude  in
dealing with the case of the regular batch and,
on the  other,  unreasonable
alacrity in the appointment of the special batch.
 The  tribunal  attributed
motive to  such  an  action  and  proceeded  to  opine  that  there  was  no
administrative decision by the appropriate authority for making  appointment
to the service by  resorting  to  the  process  of  special  recruitment  in
preference to general recruitment.

7.    It is apt to note that the tribunal referred to  various  departmental
communications including the letter dated 17.8.1991 which emanated from  the
Office of the DGP proposing to enlist 20  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police
from other departments under Rule 5(1)(c) of the 1966 Rules.  
The  tribunal
referred to Rules 5, 7 and 8 of the 1966 Rules  and  came  to  hold  that  a
close perusal of the provisions of  the  service  Rules  clearly  show  that
recruitment by resorting to clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5  should  be
made only in special cases and at all time such recruitment must be  limited
only to 5 per cent of the total number  of  posts  in  the  cadre  and  such
special recruitment must be limited only to one post in a  particular  year.
It further stated
 that the 1966 Rules are  quite  silent  as  regards  carry
forward  of  such  posts  and,  therefore,  there  could   not   have   been
accumulation of vacancies to be filled up  by  resorting  to  the  provision
contained in clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 and
as such, the  question
of selecting and appointing as many as 20 persons in a year did  not  arise.
The tribunal further held
that as per Rule 8(1), the  Governor  is  required
to call for  recommendations  from  the  recommending  authorities  for  the
purpose of recruitment to the service under clause (c) of  sub-rule  (1)  of
Rule 5  and  the  recommending  authorities  are  also  required  to  submit
recommendations in respect of the persons having regard  to  the  laid  down
criteria but in the instant case, the said procedure was given  a  total  go
by which is not permissible.
The tribunal further noticed that  Rule  8(2),
which is mandatory, provides that all the recommendations  are  required  to
be submitted before the selection committee constituted under Rule 7(1)  and
the selection committee is required to interview the recommended  candidates
and  prepare  the  select  list  and,  therefore,  the  Commission,  in   no
circumstance,  could  have  been  entrusted  with  the   responsibility   of
interviewing, testing, selecting and recommending any candidate for  special
recruitment under clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5.
 In  this  backdrop,
the tribunal observed that, admittedly, all the processes undertaken by  the
Commission  and  the  third  respondent  were  in  gross  violation  of  the
mandatory provisions of the Rules and hence, the selection was not valid.

8.    After  so  stating,  the  tribunal  proceeded  to  hold
 that  as  the
respondent Nos. 6 to 25 had been appointed in violation of the  rules,  they
could not be treated as regular recruits within the meaning of Rule  5(1)(a)
of the 1966 Rules. 
 It also stated that had the appeal  been  filed  earlier
in a different form, the selection and  appointment  of  the  special  batch
recruits could have possibly  been  set  aside.  
Eventually,  the  tribunal
placing reliance on State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin and  others[1]  and  Dalilah
Sojah  v.  State  of  Kerala  and  others[2],  came  to  hold
that  due  to
unreasonable delay and inaction on the part of the Government  in  notifying
the  appointments,  the  regular  batch   candidates,   who   were   earlier
recommended by the Commission, could not be put in jeopardy and  lose  their
seniority and accordingly directed for refixation  of  the  seniority  list.

It further directed that 
the regular batch shall  be  allowed  consequential
benefits with effect from the date on which the senior most  member  of  the
special batch availed of any benefit even  by  creating  supernumerary  duty
post in the cadre.

9.    Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the tribunal, as has  been
stated  earlier,
 certain  writ  petitions  were  preferred  and  some  writ
petitions were directly filed before the High  Court  seeking  quashment  of
the appointment of the  private  respondents  as  Deputy  Superintendent  of
Police.  
The prayer in the other batch of writ petitions was to  treat  the
direct recruits as  per  the  rules  regard  being  had  to  their  date  of
appointment and to extend the benefit  of  earlier  services  as  stipulated
under Rule 18 of the 1966 Rules.

10.   The learned  single  Judge  adverted  to  the  facts  in  detail,
 the
proposal before the Cabinet for appointment of 20 officers in  the  post  of
Deputy Superintendent of Police by taking resort  to  Rule  5(1)(c)  of  the
1966 Rules and basically posed three  questions,  namely,
  (i)  whether  the
appeal preferred before the tribunal was barred by limitation;
(ii)  whether
the members of the regular batch could  be  treated  as  senior  when  their
appointments were violative of the recruitment process  as  envisaged  under
the  relevant  recruitment  rules;  and
 (iii)  whether  the  tribunal   was
justified in directing rectification in the gradation list  when  there  was
no appeal seeking removal of the special batch recruits being  in  violation
of the rules.  Be it noted, as far as question No.
(iii) is  concerned,  the
learned single Judge framed five ancillary questions.

11.   While dealing with the facet of limitation, the learned  single  Judge
referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and expressed the  view  that
the appellants before the tribunal having the remedy which was available  to
them in terms of the directions contained in  the  circular  dated  1.4.1999
were entitled to prefer the appeal in terms of the  proviso  to  sub-section
(2) of Section 4 of the AAT Act, 1977 and hence, the appeal was  not  barred
by limitation.

12.   Adverting to the  facet  of  appointment,  the  learned  single  Judge
scanned the anatomy of the 1966 Rules and came to hold that  the  number  of
persons who got selected as members of the special batch were  not  eligible
for consideration for appointment in terms of Rule 5(1)(c) and  further  the
procedure engrafted under the said sub-rule was not followed and,  in  fact,
was mutilated and flouted in every conceivable manner  leading,  eventually,
to the appointment of the members of the special batch.  Dwelling  upon  the
issue that the appointments were arbitrary, malafide and discriminatory vis-
à-vis the  appointment  of  the  direct  batch,  the  learned  single  Judge
referred to the factual matrix pertaining to the  recommendations  sent  for
recruitment by  special  drive,  the  Cabinet  Memorandum  and  the  Cabinet
decision  and  eventually  held  that  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the
proposal for recruitment of twenty  Dy.  Superintendents  of  Police,  as  a
special case, was submitted by the Home Department and  the  Government  did
not agree to the proposal, yet the decision to make the recruitment and  the
manner and modalities for holding of the interview  and  the  test  for  the
purpose of recruitment of the Special Batch was taken in the chamber of  the
Chairman of the Commission, on the basis of a discussion  held  between  the
then DGP, Assam, and the Chairman of  the  Commission  and,  therefore,  the
decision, so reached, could not be termed as a decision of  the  Government.
He also observed that  the  members  of  the  Special  Batch  were  selected
throwing over-board, in entirety, the relevant  recruitment  rules.   Regard
being had to chronology of events leading to the appointment of the  members
of the Special Batch, the  learned  single  Judge  opined  that  the  entire
exercise for selecting the Special Batch was wholly  de  hors  the  relevant
recruitment rules.  The urgency  shown  by  the  Government  to  obtain  the
result of the examination held in  respect  of  the  Special  Batch  was  an
indication that the Government was  waiting,  for  no  justified  and  valid
reason, to, first, make appointment of the members  of  the  Special  Batch,
though selected in  complete  disregard  of  the  Rules,  and,  then,  issue
appointment in respect of the members of the Direct Batch, whose process  of
selection was never questioned.  After so stating, the learned single  Judge
held that contrary to the  provisions  of  Rule  5(1)(c),  which  prescribes
upper age limit for selection to be 35 years and throwing to  the  wind  the
very purpose for which special recruitment was sought to be  made,  the  age
was relaxed to 45 years and persons, who were  born  in  1942,  came  to  be
selected in the year 1992, and thereby many of the officers recruited  under
the special drive were as old as 50 years, whereas proposal for the  special
drive was made on the pretext of recruiting young officers.  He also  opined
that the whole process of selection  of  the  special  batch  recruited  was
malafide and arbitrary.

13.   After so stating, the learned single Judge dealt with  issues
 whether
the  appointments  were  ab-initio  void,
whether  the  relevant  rules  of
recruitment were relaxed in respect of the special  batch  at  the  time  of
making their recruitment and what was the permissible  limit  of  relaxation
and whether there can be deemed relaxation.
Delving into the said  aspects,
the learned single Judge ruled that while appointing the special batch,  the
rules of recruitment were completely shelved, no  order  of  relaxation  was
passed under Rule 23 relaxing the provisions contained in  Rule  5(1)(c)  of
the 1966 Rules; and that there could not have been  any  deemed  relaxation.
The learned single Judge referred to various pronouncements  of  this  Court
with regard to relaxation and deemed relaxation and expressed the view  that
the Special  Batch  was  recruited,  ostensibly,  on  the  ground  that  the
department  was  in  need  of  young  officers  in  the  grade   of   Deputy
Superintendent of Police, but the officers  recruited  were  as  old  as  50
years, and, thus, the very purpose for which the proposal was  mooted  stood
defeated.
The writ court discussed the ratio laid down in Bachan  Singh  v.
Union of India[3], Narender Chadha v. Union of India[4] and  J.C.  Yadav  v.
State of Haryana[5] and
 held that contrary to the facts of the case of  J.C.
Yadav (supra),
wherein the relaxation of the rules  could  be  justified  by
the Government, the State-respondent had, in the obtaining  factual  matrix,
miserably failed to show any justification to relax the  rules  and  in  any
case could not have  relaxed  the  rules  to  such  an  extent  to  make  it
nugatory.   It was also  observed  that  when  the  Cabinet  Memorandum  had
failed to receive the approval of the  Cabinet,  the  then  DGP,  Assam,  in
consultation with the Chairman of the Commission, could  not  have,  through
the back-door and with  the  help  of  an  authority  like  the  Commission,
flouted the relevant rules and made the appointments.


14.    The  learned  single  Judge  ruled  that  the  appointment  in   the
promotional cadre was de hors the rules and, therefore,  the  court  cannot
direct that the period of service  rendered  in  the  promotional  post  by
virtue of illegal promotional appointment should be counted for the purpose
of seniority.
Relying on the pronouncement  in  Raffiquddin  (supra),  the
learned single Judge
held that
the case in hand is more akin to  the  facts
of Raffiquddin (supra) and ruled that it is possible that  without  setting
aside and quashing the appointment of an irregular appointee,
 the Court  or
tribunal may direct the appointing authority to treat a  regular  appointee
in service, though appointed later in point  of  time  than  the  irregular
appointee, as senior to the irregular appointee.


15.   It is worthy to note that
 the learned single Judge referred  to  Rule
18 of the 1966 Rules which clearly states that the seniority of the members
of the service shall be determined on the basis of their  respective  dates
of appointment to the service.
 He distinguished the applicability of  Rule
18 and ultimately maintained the order passed by the tribunal and dismissed
the writ petitions challenging the order of the tribunal.
  It  is  apt  to
note that  in  WP(C)  69  of  2003  wherein  the  petitioner  had  directly
approached the High Court for quashment of the appointments of the  special
batch recruits, the learned single Judge observed that the appointments  of
the special batch deserved to be set aside and quashed,  but  he  refrained
from doing so considering the period of service which they had rendered.


16.   Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid  order,  the  special  recruits
preferred WA Nos. 448 of 2004 and 465 of 2004.  WA 459 of 2004 was filed by
the recruits under Rule 5(1)(a) of the  1966  Rules.
 The  Division  Bench
noted the facts, adverted to the orders passed  by  the  tribunal  and  the
learned single Judge, dealt  at length with the  submissions  canvassed  by
the learned counsel for the parties and came to hold that the tribunal  had
jurisdiction to deal with the appeals  and  thereafter,  dealing  with  the
stand that the appointments having  not  been  challenged  the  delineation
thereof by the tribunal and the learned single  Judge  was  barred  by  the
doctrine of res judicata, repelled them on the base that the memorandum  of
appeal before the tribunal had graphically challenged the  appointments  to
be non est being in violation of the rules though that there was no  prayer
for cancellation of the appointments.
 The  Division  Bench  analysed  the
scheme of the rules and stated that Rule 5(1)(c) envisages a  selection  in
special cases from amongst the limited categories of  persons  referred  to
and the number of vacancies to be filled up by that procedure has also been
restricted.
 The Division Bench referred to  Rule  8  and  regarded  it  as
unequivocal on the conditions of eligibility, commencement of  the  process
contemplated and the culmination thereof, and observed that the  assessment
of eligibility by the Recommending Authority of the person is  a  sine  qua
non for consideration of his candidature to be recruited.  
The  candidate,
as per the mandate of Rule 8, has to be of outstanding merit  and  ability,
possessing the academic qualification as prescribed by Rule 10, should  not
be above 35 years of age on  the  first  day  of  the  year  in  which  the
recommendations are called for and should have not less than two  years  of
experience in duties comparable in status and responsibility to that of the
Deputy Superintendent  of  Police  or  8  years  of  experience  in  duties
comparable in status and responsibility to that of the Inspector of Police.


17.   After so stating, the Division Bench referred to various  authorities
and, eventually, came to hold that though the appointments of  the  special
recruits had been made in deviation of the Rules, yet the  same  cannot  by
any means be branded as de hors any procedure whatsoever  known  to  public
employment.  
 Their induction of the special recruits  cannot  be  equated
with ad hoc, casual or temporary  recruitments  or  an  entry  through  the
backdoor and hence, their appointment cannot be regarded  as  de  hors  the
rules.
 Dealing  with  the  aspect  of  seniority  it  ruled  that   their
appointments not being in observance of  the  statutory  provision  stricto
sensu, the fixation of their batch wise seniority over the direct  recruits
of the same year is impermissible and the benefit as stipulated  under  the
proviso to Rule 18(1) was not extendable.


18. The Division Bench further opined that at  such  a  belated  time  their
appointments could not be annulled.  In the ultimate analysis, the  Division
Bench concurred with the view expressed by the learned single Judge  on  the
issue of fixation of seniority.


19.   It is worthy to note that
 in compliance of  the  judgment  and  order
passed   by   the   learned    single    Judge,    a    notification    No.
HMA.154/2004/Pt.1/176 was issued on 6.12.2004 wherein the  direct  recruits
of the 1993 batch were placed above the special recruits of the  same  year
in the APS Senior Grade-II.  
The Bench also perused file No.  H.M.A.  10/99
of the Home Department from which it  transpired  that  the  names  of  the
candidates to the promotional posts were recommended in order of preference
following  the  same  seniority  in  which  their  names  appeared  in  the
provisional gradation list dated 12.3.1999 as the Selection  Committee  did
not find any reason justifying supersession of a senior by a  junior.
 The
Division Bench noticed that as the inter se seniority of  promotees  was  a
replication of that in  the  provisional  gradation  list  which  has  been
unsettled,  the  challenge  to  the  notification   dated   6.12.2004   was
unsustainable.  Being of this view, the Division Bench  dismissed  all  the
appeals.


20.   We have heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel representing  the
special  batch  recruits,  and  Mr.  V.  Shekhar,  learned  senior  counsel
appearing for the direct recruits in all the appeals.


21.   The fundamental questions that emanate for consideration before  this
Court are, namely,
whether the appointments have been made in violation  of
the rules;
 whether the selection of the special batch recruits if  accepted
to be in violation of the rules, can be treated to be de  hors  the  rules;
and whether the concept of relaxation has  been  extended  to  them  or  is
extendable to them and further 
whether they can avail the benefit under the
second proviso to Rule 18 of the Rules and 
whether the tribunal as well  as
the High Court is justified in refixing the seniority without quashing  the
appointment of the special batch recruits.


22.   Regard being had to the aforesaid issues, we think it seemly to refer
to certain  authorities  in  the  field.   In  Roshan  Lal  and  others  v.
International Airport Authority of India and others[6], a two-Judge  Bench,
while entertaining a petition under Article 32 of  the  Constitution,  held
that
  when the appointments were made in 1975  and  the  writ  petition  was
filed in 1978, it would not be  justified  in  reopening  the  question  of
legality of the appointments of the respondents therein.   The  Bench  also
noticed that the prayer in the writ petition was also confined primarily to
the seniority list and the consequences flowing from the seniority list.


23.   We have referred to the said pronouncement only for the purpose
 that
before the tribunal, the  challenge  was  not  for  the  quashment  of  the
appointments on the foundation that they were  made  in  violation  of  the
rules and the propriety  in  the  matter  of  appointment  of  the  special
recruits was not maintained and that apart, the appeal was  filed  after  a
span of nine years after the  selection  and  appointment  and  hence,  the
principle stated therein is squarely applicable to the case at hand.


24.   Be it noted, the tribunal as  well  as  the  High  Court  has  placed
reliance on Rafiquddin and  others  (supra)  to  refix  the  seniority  and
justify the direction for refixation of seniority  by  putting  the  direct
recruits over and above the special recruits on the foundation that it  was
necessitous to strike the balance.
In Rafiquddin case  (supra),  the  U.P.
Public Service Commission published a notification  on  September  3,  1970
inviting  applications  for  recruitment  to  85  posts  of  Munsifs.  
 It
recommended names of 46 candidates for appointment  on  October  25,  1971.
The State Government  requested  the  Commission  to  recommend  some  more
candidates by suggesting that minimum of 40% marks may be reduced  to  35%.
Considering the said request, the Commission forwarded another list  of  33
candidates on April 25, 1972.
All the 79 candidates were appointed between
May 1972 to June 12, 1973.
Thereafter, on July 17,  1973,  a  notification
was issued determining the inter se seniority  of  all  the  79  candidates
under Rule 19 of the U.P. Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951.   In
the meantime, the UP Public Service  Commission  held  another  competitive
examination for appointment to the posts of 150  Munsifs  and,  eventually,
they were appointed on different  dates  between  1975  to  1977.
 As  the
factual narration would show, a proposal was sent by the  State  Government
to  the  Commission  requesting  it  to  reconsider  the  result   of   the
examinations of 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 for appointment to the service of
persons/candidates who might have obtained 40% of  marks  or  more  in  the
aggregate even if they had failed to secure the minimum marks in  the  viva
voce test.
The Commission declined to  accede  to  the  said  request.   A
meeting was held by the High Level Committee and, eventually, a third  list
of 37 candidates was sent by the Commission for the aforementioned years in
which list the name of Rafiquddin featured.  As out of  37  candidates,  16
had already appeared in the 1972 examination and  had  been  selected,  the
Government requested the Commission to select 16 more candidates  from  the
1972 examination.  In pursuance of the Government’s request, the Commission
forwarded the list of 16  candidates  for  appointment.   In  this  factual
matrix, in March, 1977, the State Government published a seniority list  of
successful  candidates  of  the  competitive  examination  of  1970.    The
candidates belonging to the third list made a representation  to  the  High
Court for determining their seniority in accordance with  Rule  22  of  the
Rules on the footing that they were recruited to service  in  pursuance  of
the 1970 examination and, therefore, they were entitled to the seniority as
candidates belonging to that examination irrespective of their  appointment
made in 1975.  They claimed  seniority  above  the  recruits  of  the  1972
examination.  As the representation was rejected, a writ petition was filed
and the High Court allowed the  same  on  the  ground  that  as  the  third
category candidates were appointed on the basis of the result of  the  1970
examination, they were to be treated  as  senior  in  accordance  with  the
stipulates engrafted under Rule 22 of the Rules.  While dealing with such a
situation, this Court scanned the anatomy of the Rules and its purport, the
role of the Commission and held that the selection and  appointment  of  21
Munsifs at the later stage was invalid.  However,  it  declined  to  strike
down their appointments in view of the fact that they had already  rendered
12 years of service.


25.   After so holding, the Bench proceeded to deal with the  issue  as  to
what seniority should be assigned  to  the  unplaced  candidates  who  were
appointed.  In that context, the Bench came  to  hold  that  as  they  were
appointed not in accordance with the rules, they could not  be  treated  as
selectees under the 1970 examination for the purpose of  determining  their
seniority under Rule 22 of the Rules and, accordingly, the  Bench  directed
that the said candidates have been placed below the candidates of  recruits
of the 1972 examination.  In  the  1972  examination,  16  candidates  were
appointed to the service on the basis of the result of the 1972 examination
and their appointment did not suffer from any legal infirmity and they were
entitled to seniority of the recruits of the 1972 examination on the  basis
of their position in the merit list  but  they  were  not  entitled  to  be
treated as senior on the basis of the 1970 examination.


26.   We have referred to the facts in  detail  and  what  this  Court  had
ultimately held only for the purpose that where recruitment of  service  is
regulated  by  the  statutory  rules,  the  recruitment  must  be  made  in
accordance with those rules and if any appointment is made in breach of the
rules, the same would be illegal and the persons so appointed  have  to  be
put in a different class and they cannot claim seniority.


27.   In The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers’ Association  and
others v. State of Maharashtra and others[7], the  Constitution  Bench  was
dealing with the  issue  of  seniority  between  direct  recruits  and  the
promotees  under  the  Maharashtra  Service  of  Engineers  (Regulation  of
Seniority and Preparation and Revision of  Seniority  Lists  for  Specified
Period) Rules, 1982.  The Constitution Bench referred to  the  decision  in
A.K. Subraman v. Union of India[8] and ruled that  if  a  rule  fixing  the
ratio for recruitment from different sources is framed, it is meant  to  be
respected and not violated at the whims of the authority.  It ought  to  be
strictly  followed  and  not  arbitrarily  ignored.   A  deviation  may  be
permissible to meet the  exigencies.   The  Constitution  Bench  posed  the
question as to what would be the consideration if the  quota  rule  is  not
followed at  all  continuously  for  a  number  of  years  and  it  becomes
impossible to adhere to the same.  The Constitution Bench  opined  that  if
the rule fixes the quota and it becomes impracticable to act upon, it is of
no use insisting that the authorities must continue to give effect  to  it.
But the Government, before departing from the rule, must make every  effort
to respect it and only when it ceases to be feasible to enforce it, then it
has to be ignored.  In such a situation, if appointments  from  one  source
are made in excess of the quota but in a regular manner and after following
the prescribed procedure, there is no reason to push  down  the  appointees
below the recruits from other sources  who  are  inducted  in  the  service
subsequently.  A reference  was  made  to  the  rules  that  permitted  the
Government to relax the provisions fixing the ratio.  In the said case, the
Court observed that there was no justification to urge lack of bona fide on
the part of the State.  Eventually, the Bench summed up its conclusions and
we proceed to reproduce some of them which are relevant for our purpose: -

           “(A)  Once an incumbent is appointed  to  a  post  according  to
           rule, his seniority has to be  counted  from  the  date  of  his
           appointment and not according to the date of  his  confirmation.
           The corollary of the  above  rule  is  that  where  the  initial
           appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules  and  made
           as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such  post  cannot
           be taken into account for considering the seniority.

           (B)   If the initial appointment is not made  by  following  the
           procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues  in
           the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his  service
           in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating  service
           will be counted.

                       xxx        xxx        xxx

            (D)  If it becomes impossible to adhere to the  existing  quota
           rule, it should be substituted by an appropriate  rule  to  meet
           the needs of the situation. In case, however, the quota rule  is
           not followed continuously for a number of years because  it  was
           impossible to do so the inference is irresistible that the quota
           rule had broken down.

           (E)   Where the quota rule has broken down and the  appointments
           are made from one source in excess of the quota,  but  are  made
           after following the procedure prescribed by the  rules  for  the
           appointment, the appointees should not be pushed down below  the
           appointees from the other source inducted in the  service  at  a
           later date.”


28.   In Madan Gopal Garg v. State of Punjab and others[9], the controversy
related to inter se seniority of promotees and direct recruits  in  respect
of the posts, namely, District Food  and  Supplies  Controller  and  Deputy
Director, Food and Supplies in the State of Punjab governed by  the  Punjab
Food and Supplies Department (State Service Class II) Rules,  1966.   After
analyzing the facts and the appointments in  excess  of  quota,  the  Court
observed that the appointment of the controller was in excess of the  quota
and it continued to be so till the respondent No. 2 therein  was  appointed
by direct recruitment.  In that context, the Bench opined: -


           “Once it is held that the appointment of the  appellant  was  in
           excess of the quota fixed for promotees and  officers  appointed
           by transfer, the said  appointment  has  to  be  treated  as  an
           invalid  appointment  and  it  can  be  treated  as  a   regular
           appointment  only  when  a  vacancy  is  available  against  the
           promotion quota  against  which  the  said  appointment  can  be
           regularized.  In other words, any such appointment in excess  of
           the quota has to be pushed down to a later year when it  can  be
           regularized as per the quota and such an  appointment  prior  to
           regularization cannot confer any right as against a  person  who
           is directly appointed within the  quota  prescribed  for  direct
           recruits.”


29.   In Maharashtra Vikrikar Karamchari Sangathan v. State of  Maharashtra
and another[10], a  two-Judge  Bench  took  note  of  the  fact  that  when
promotions are made in excess of the prescribed quota  and  the  Government
had not taken any conscious decision in accordance with law  to  treat  the
promotions of excess promotees on regular  basis,  it  would  be  wrong  to
assert that such promotions were on regular basis.  In  that  context,  the
Bench further proceeded to state thus: -


           “Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that  some
           of the appellants have put in more than 17 years of service when
           a few of the direct recruits were either  schooling  and/or  not
           born in the cadre.  If the appellants were to be pushed down, it
           would cause great hardship to them.  We are unable to  subscribe
           to this contention because if there is patent violation  of  the
           quota rule, the  result  must  follow  and  the  appellants  who
           remained in the office for  all  these  years  cannot  take  the
           advantage of this situation.   This  submission  is,  therefore,
           devoid of any substance.”


30.   In D. Ganesh Rao  Patnaik  and  others  v.  State  of  Jharkhand  and
others[11], a three-Judge Bench was dealing with inter se seniority between
the direct recruits and the promotees under  the  Bihar  Superior  Judicial
Service Rules, 1946.  The Bench also dealt with the  concept  of  temporary
posts and the computation of posts under Rule 6 therein, the definition  of
cadre and posed a  question  whether  the  temporary  posts  of  Additional
District and Sessions Judges are  to  be  included  in  the  cadre.   After
referring to various decisions, the Court opined that for  determining  the
quota of direct recruits, both the temporary and permanent posts have to be
counted and taken into consideration and their quota cannot be confined  to
permanent posts alone.  In the said case, the promotees had exceeded  their
quota and entrenched into  the  quota  of  direct  recruits  and,  in  that
context, the Court held that the promotion given to the promotees  was  not
in accordance with law.  The Court further proceeded to state that  it  did
not lie in the mouth of the respondent therein to contend  that  the  quota
rule had broken down or that though their promotions were made  beyond  the
quota fixed for  promotees,  yet  the  same  should  be  treated  not  only
perfectly valid but also in a manner so as to  give  them  the  benefit  of
seniority over the direct recruits.  Eventually, the Bench ruled  that  the
inevitable conclusion was that the contesting respondent  could  not  claim
seniority over the appellant.


31.   We have referred to the aforesaid pronouncements to restate the legal
principle that if the quota rule has been broken down, the appointee should
not be pushed down  below  the  appointees  from  other  source;  but,  the
Government before departing from the rule must make every effort to respect
it and then only it may proceed to appoint from other source.

32.   At this juncture, it is necessary to state that the decision  in  The
Direct Recruit Class  II  Engineering  Officers’  Association  (supra)  was
clarified by a three-Judge Bench in State of W.B. and others v. Aghore Nath
Dey and others[12] as the later Bench perceived an  apparent  contradiction
in conclusions (A) and (B).  While clarifying, the Bench has stated thus: -

           “19.  The  constitution  bench  in  Maharashtra  Engineers  case
           (supra), while dealing with Narender Chadha  (supra)  emphasised
           the unusual fact that  the  promotees  in  question  had  worked
           continuously for long periods of nearly fifteen to twenty  years
           on the posts without being reverted, and then proceeded to state
           the principle thus: (SCC p. 726, para 13)

                 “We, therefore, confirm the principle of  counting  towards
                 seniority the period of continuous officiation following an
                 appointment made in accordance with  the  rules  prescribed
                 for regular substantive appointments in the service.”

           20.   The constitution bench having dealt with  Narender  Chadha
           (supra) in this manner, to indicate the  above  principle,  that
           decision cannot be construed to apply to cases where the initial
           appointment was not according to rules.

                       xxx        xxx        xxx

           22. There can be no doubt that these two conclusions have to  be
           read harmoniously, and conclusion (B) cannot cover  cases  which
           are expressly excluded by conclusion  (A).  We  may,  therefore,
           first refer to conclusion (A). It is clear from  conclusion  (A)
           that to enable seniority to be counted from the date of  initial
           appointment and not according to the date of  confirmation,  the
           incumbent of the post has to be initially  appointed  ‘according
           to rules’.  The corollary set out in conclusion  (A),  then  is,
           that ‘where the initial appointment  is  only  ad  hoc  and  not
           according to rules  and  made  as  a  stopgap  arrangement,  the
           officiation in such posts  cannot  be  taken  into  account  for
           considering the seniority’. Thus, the  corollary  in  conclusion
           (A) expressly excludes the category of cases where  the  initial
           appointment is only ad hoc and not  according  to  rules,  being
           made only as  a  stopgap  arrangement.  The  case  of  the  writ
           petitioners squarely falls within this corollary  in  conclusion
           (A), which says that the officiation in  such  posts  cannot  be
           taken into account for counting the seniority.”


      Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state as follows: -

           “Admittedly,  this  express  requirement  in  Rule  11  was  not
           followed or fulfilled subsequently, and, therefore, the  initial
           ad  hoc  appointments  cannot  be  treated  to  have  been  made
           according to the applicable rules.  These  ad  hoc  appointments
           were clearly not in accordance with the  rules,  and  were  made
           only as a stopgap arrangement for  fixed  period,  as  expressly
           stated in the appointment order itself.”


                                                         [Emphasis supplied]




33.   Recently,  in  State  of  Haryana  and  others  v.  Vijay  Singh  and
others[13], the question arose with regard to the fixation of seniority  in
the backdrop of ad hoc initial appointment made de hors the statutory rules
but later on services were regularized by the State Government.  The  Court
took note of the fact that the respondents therein were  neither  appointed
by the competent authority on the recommendations made by the  Board  which
was constituted by  the  Governor  of  Haryana  nor  were  they  placed  on
probation as required under the rules and, therefore, their ad  hoc  period
could not be counted for the  purpose  of  fixation  of  seniority.   Thus,
emphasis was laid that when  appointment  is  made  without  following  the
procedure prescribed under the rules, the appointees are  not  entitled  to
have the seniority fixed on the basis of the total length of  service.   In
essence, it has been ruled that when the appointment is made  de  hors  the
rules, the appointee cannot claim seniority  even  if  his  appointment  is
later on regularized.


34.   Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of  law  pertaining  to
fixation of seniority when the initial appointment is  made  in  breach  of
rules and further departure from provision pertaining  to  quota  in  their
essential nature,  it is apposite to refer to the  relevant  rules  of  the
1966 Rules.  Rule 4 defines the  ‘Cadre’.   Rule  4(1)(a)  deals  with  the
categories of posts in the junior grade and Rule  4(1)(b)  deals  with  the
senior grade posts.  Rule 5 provides for the recruitment and  procedure  of
selection, etc.  Rule 5(1), being pertinent, is reproduced below: -


           “5.   Methods of recruitment to the service. (1) Recruitment  to
           the service, after the commencement of these rules, shall be  by
           the following methods, namely:


           (a)   by a competitive examination conducted by the Commission;


           (b)   by promotion of confirmed Inspectors of Police; and


           (c)   by selection, in special case, from amongst –


                 (i)   persons other than Inspectors of  Police  serving  in
                       connection with the affairs of the Government; and


                 (ii)  other persons having qualifications  and  experiences
                       eminently  suitable  for  service   in   the   Police
                       Department in the rank of  Deputy  Superintendent  of
                       Police :


                 Provided that fifty per cent of the total number of  posts
           in the cadre shall be filled up by recruitment  under  Cls.  (a)
           and (c) and the other fifty per cent exclusively under Cl.  (b),
           and that the number of posts filled up under Cl. (c) above shall
           not at any time exceed five per cent  of  the  total  number  of
           posts in the cadre and one post in any particular year.”


35.   On scanning of Rule 5(1), it is evident  that  various  methods  have
been stipulated for recruitment.  In the case at hand, the direct  recruits
have been recruited by way of  competitive  examination  conducted  by  the
Commission.  The special batch has been selected under Rule 5(1)(c).     In
that context, the proviso to Rule 5(1) of the 1966  Rules  is  significant.
It clearly lays a postulate that the number of posts filled up under clause
(c) shall not, at any time, exceed five per cent of  the  total  number  of
posts in the cadre and one post in any particular year.  As has been stated
hereinabove, there was a requisition for  20  posts  to  be  filled  up  by
special drive.  On a  query  being  made  during  hearing,  it  was  fairly
conceded before us that five per cent in the cadre could not have  exceeded
four posts.  Thus, there has been selection in excess of the quota provided
in the Rule and nothing had been  shown  to  justify  the  departure  since
nothing really could have been demonstrated as the commission  had  already
recommended the names of the candidates meant for direct recruits.


36.   Rule 8  deals  with  recruitment  by  selection.   It  is  reproduced
hereunder: -


           “8.   Recruitment by selection. (1) The Governor may, from  time
           to time, for the purpose of recruitment to the service under Cl.
           (c)  of  sub-R.  (1)  of  R.  5,  call  upon  the   recommending
           authorities to submit recommendations in respect of persons who-


              a) are of outstanding merit and ability;


              b) have to their credit not less than 2 years of experience in
                 duties comparable in status and responsibility to  that  of
                 Deputy Superintendent of Police or 8 years of experience in
                 duties comparable in status and responsibility to  that  of
                 Inspectors of Police;


              c) possess the academic qualification prescribed under R.10;


              d) are not above the age of 35 years on the  1st  day  of  the
                 year in which the recommendations are called for; and


              e) are otherwise eligible,  in  the  opinion  of  recommending
                 authorities to be appointed to the service.


           (2)   On receipt of  the  recommendations,  the  Governor  shall
           refer them and also simultaneously  send  the  character  rolls/
           testimonials of character  and  service  records/other  relevant
           records of the persons recommended to the committee which  will,
           after  examination  of  the  records   forwarded   to   it   and
           interviewing, such of the persons recommended  as  it  considers
           necessary, draw up a list of persons in order of the  preference
           who are considered suitable for appointment to the service.  The
           procedure details in  sub-Rr.  (4)  to  (7)  of  R.  7,  mutatis
           mutandis be followed in regard to the list of  persons  prepared
           under this sub-rule.


           (3)   For every recruitment a separate list shall  be  drawn  up
           and the  list  once  approved  by  the  Commission  shall  lapse
           immediately on the year’s quota of posts for persons  under  Cl.
           (c) of sub-R. (1) of R. 5 having been filled up from the list.”


37.   On a perusal of the aforesaid Rule, it is graphically clear that  the
recommending authority has to submit the recommendations  to  the  Governor
regard being had to certain aspects which have been prescribed  under  Rule
8(1).  Rule 8(1)(d) prescribes the age limit on the first date of the  year
in which the recommendations are  called  for.   Sub-rule  (2)  of  Rule  8
stipulates that the procedure detailed in sub-rules (4) to (7)  of  Rule  7
mutatis mutandis be followed in regard to the list of persons prepared.  In
this context, it is necessary to reproduce sub-rules (4) to (7) of  Rule  7
which are as follows: -


           “(4)  The list prepared by the Committee shall give the names in
           order of preference and the total number of such names shall not
           be more than double the number of vacancies that  may  arise  in
           the promotion quota of the  cadre  and  the  ex-cadre  temporary
           posts of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of  Police  during  a
           period of approximately one year  thereafter.   In  every  case,
           where in drawing up the list the committee changes the order  of
           seniority of any person in the rank of Inspector  of  Police  or
           supersedes any one in that rank by omission  of  his  name,  the
           Committee shall record in writing the reason for such change  or
           supersession.


           (5)   The Committee shall forward the list to the  Governor  and
           on receipt of the list the Governor shall forward  the  same  to
           the Commission together  with  the  character  rolls  and  other
           relevant papers.


           (6)   The Commission shall consider the  list  prepared  by  the
           Committee along with other documents received from the  Governor
           or on receipt of other documents as may be  called  for  by  the
           Commission unless it considers any change necessary, approve the
           list.  If the Commission  considers  any  change  necessary,  it
           shall inform the Governor of  the  changes  proposed  and  after
           taking into account the comments, if any, by the  Governor,  may
           approve the list finally with such modification, if any, as  may
           in its opinion be just and proper.


           (7)   The list, as finally approved by the Commission, shall  be
           forwarded to the Governor along with  all  the  papers  received
           under sub-Rr. (5) and (6).”


38.   It needs to be noted that under Rule 8(2), the Governor  is  required
to send the character  rolls/testimonials  of  the  character  and  service
records/other relevant records of the persons recommended to the  Committee
which  would,  after  examination  of  the  records  forwarded  to  it  and
interviewing such of the persons recommended  as  it  considers  necessary,
draw up a list of persons in order of the  preference  who  are  considered
suitable for appointment to the service.  “Committee” has been  defined  in
Rule 2(c) and it reads as follows: -


           “(c)  “Committee” means a committee  constituted  in  accordance
           with sub-R. (1) of R. 7.”


The aforesaid definition makes sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 important.  The  said
sub-rule reads as follows: -


           “7.   Recruitment by promotion. (1) There shall be  a  Selection
           Committee consisting of the following, namely :


           (a)   Chairman, Assam Public Service Commission, or,  where  the
                 Chairman is  unable  to  attend,  a  Member,  Assam  Public
                 Service Commission nominated by him;


           (b)   Chief Secretary to the Government;


           (c)   Inspector-General of Police;


           (d)    A  Senior  Deputy  Inspector  General  of  Police  to  be
                 nominated by Chief Secretary;


           (e)    Secretary  to  the  Government  of  Assam  in  the   Home
                 Department or any other  officer  of  the  Home  Department
                 nominated in this  behalf  by  the  Chief  Secretary.   The
                 Chairman, Assam Public  Commission  or  the  Member,  Assam
                 Public Service  Commission,  as  the  case  may  be,  shall
                 preside at the meeting of the Selection Committee at  which
                 he is present.”

      In the obtaining factual matrix,  the  Selection  Committee  had  not
recommended the case of the special batch recruits to the  Commission.   As
the affidavit filed by the Secretary to the Commission before the  tribunal
clearly stated that the procedure was not followed and the  same  has  been
accepted by the tribunal and concurred with by the High Court, there is  no
reason to differ with the same.  Therefore, we give the seal of  imprimatur
to the said conclusion.  At the risk  of  repetition,  we  state  that  the
selection has been made in excess of the quota and  in  the  absence  of  a
recommendation of the Selection Committee as prescribed  under  the  rules.
Plainly speaking, a maladroit effort was made to appoint the special  batch
recruits first despite the recommendation of the  direct  recruits  pending
before the State Government.  It is also disturbing that though the Cabinet
had not approved the proposal for  special  drive  to  appoint  from  other
source yet the Director General of Police impressed upon the Commission  to
recommend 20 names.  It is also equally perplexing that the concept of  the
special drive was  meant  to  have  young  officers  but  in  the  ultimate
eventuate, officers were nearing fifty got the appointment.  It is  obvious
that it was totally arbitrary and exhibits indecent  enthusiasm  to  confer
benefits on the special batch by making the rules comatosed.

39.   At this stage, it is requisite to clarify one  aspect.   The  learned
single Judge has treated  the  selection  of  the  special  batch  recruits
totally de hors the rules and the Division Bench has opined that it is  not
de hors the rules on the foundation that they were  not  casual  appointees
and their recommendation had been made by the Commission and  further  they
had not played any overt act in getting their selection done.


40.    In  University  of  Kashmir  and  others  v.  Dr.  Mohd.  Yasin  and
others[14], this Court expressed the view that an equitable ground does not
clothe an appointment with a legal status.  Similar view was also expressed
in Swapan Kumar Pal and others v. Samitabhar Chakraborty and others[15].


41.   In State of Haryana v. Haryana Veterninary and AHTS  Association  and
another[16], a three-Judge Bench, after x-ray of the relevant  rules,  came
to hold that when appointments are made in  violation  of  the  recruitment
rules, the said appointments cannot be treated to be regular.


42.   The aforesaid authorities clearly lay down the  principle  that  when
there  is  violation  of  the  recruitment  rules,   the   recruitment   is
unsustainable.  Whether any active part is played by a selectee or not  has
nothing to do with the appointment made in contravention of the rules.   In
the case at hand, the special batch recruits have encroached into the quota
of the direct recruits.  The whole selection process is in violation of the
rules and, therefore, we are inclined to concur with the opinion  expressed
by the learned single Judge that the selection was made de hors the  rules.
The Division Bench was not justified in stating that  the  selection  could
not be said to be de hors the rules.  However, we accept the conclusion  of
the tribunal as well as the High Court that as there had been long delay in
challenging the selection of the special batch recruits and  some  of  them
have already retired, it would not be apposite to annul their appointments.



43.   Presently, we shall refer to Rule 18 which deals with seniority.  Mr.
Prashant Bhushan, during the course of hearing, has laid  immense  emphasis
on the said Rule to buttress the stance that if the service rendered in the
previous posts by the special batch recruits are taken  into  consideration
on the anvil of Rule 18, they should be treated as  senior  to  the  direct
recruits.  Regard being had to the said submission, it becomes  necessitous
to refer to the said Rule in entirety.  It reads as follows: -


           “18.  Seniority. (1) The seniority of a member  of  the  service
           shall be determined on the basis of his date of  appointment  to
           the service :


                 Provided that inter se seniority of the persons  recruited
           under Rr. 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b) and 5(2) on the same  date  shall  be
           according to the following order :


           (i)   Persons recruited under R. 5(2);


           (ii)  Persons recruited under R. 5(1)(b);


           (iii) Persons recruited under R. 5(1)(a);


                 Provided further that in the case of  a  person  recruited
           under R.5(1)(c)  the  Governor  may,  in  consideration  of  his
           previous  service  and/or  experience,  fix  a  deemed  date  of
           appointment for the  purpose  of  seniority  after  taking  into
           consideration half the period of continuous service in completed
           years subject to a maximum  of  4  years  rendered  in  previous
           service.


           (2)   Inter se seniority of persons appointed under any  of  the
           three clauses of R. 5(1), shall be in the order in  which  their
           names appear in the list from which the appointment is made.


           (3)   The date of appointment for  the  purposes  of  this  rule
           shall be,  if  a  date  is  specified  in  the  notification  of
           appointment, such date, or if no such  date  is  specified,  the
           date on which such notification is issued.


           (4)   Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Rr. (1)  to  (3)
           the seniority of a person who does not join the  service  within
           three months of the date of appointment as defined in sub-R.(3),
           shall be determined on the basis  of  the  actual  date  of  his
           joining the service.


           (5)   If the confirmation of a member of the service is  delayed
           on account of his failure to qualify for such  confirmation,  he
           shall lose his post in the order of seniority vis-à-vis such  of
           his juniors as may be confirmed earlier than  he.  His  original
           position  shall,  however,  be  restored  on  his   confirmation
           subsequently but any benefits  of  promotion,  etc.,  shall  not
           accrue to him with retrospective effect on such confirmation.


           (6)   Inter se seniority of persons promoted to the senior grade
           of the service shall be in the order in which their names appear
           in the list from which the promotion is made.”






44.   The two facets which emerge from the scanning of the  aforesaid  Rule
are that the seniority of a member of the service is to  be  determined  on
the basis of the date of appointment to the service and the  seniority  has
to follow a particular order as has been  stipulated  therein.   The  other
significant aspect is that power has been  conferred  on  the  Governor  to
consider the previous service of an incumbent and  fix  a  deemed  date  of
appointment for the purpose of seniority by adopting a specific method.  As
far as the first part is concerned, the tribunal as well as the High  Court
has not accepted the stipulation that in the  present  case  the  seniority
should be determined on the basis of the date of appointment  as  the  same
has been made in flagrant violation  of  the  rules  and  we  have  already
concurred with the same.   As  far  as  the  computation  of  the  previous
service is concerned, the learned single Judge  as  well  as  the  Division
Bench, after adequate  ratiocination,  has  expressed  the  view  that  the
appointments had been made in contravention of the rules, the  question  of
conferment of the benefit under the second proviso to Rule  18(1)  did  not
arise.   In  our  considered  view,  the  said  conclusion  is   absolutely
defensible for the simon pure reason when the infrastructure is founded  on
total illegal edifice, the endeavour to put forth a claim for counting  the
previous service to build a pyramid is bound to founder.


45.   Another specious contention has been urged that
power is vested  with
the Governor to dispense with or relax any rule and in the case at hand, it
should be treated that the authority by its conduct has relaxed the  rules.
In this context, it is appropriate to refer  to
 Rule  23  which  reads  as
follows: -


        “Power of the Governor to dispense with or relax any  rule.   Where
        the Governor is satisfied that the operation of any of these  rules
        may cause undue hardship in any particular case, he  may  order  to
        dispense with or relax the requirements of that  rule  to  such  an
        extent and subject to such conditions as he may consider  necessary
        for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner :


           Provided that the case of any person shall not be dealt with  in
        any manner less favourable to him than  that  provided  by  any  of
        these rules.”


46.   As has been observed by the  learned  single  Judge  which  has  been
accepted by the Division Bench,
there was no decision to relax the rules in
favour of the special batch recruits.  
That apart, whenever there has to be
relaxation about the operation of any of the rules, regard has to be  given
to the test of causation of undue hardship in any  particular  case.  
 That
apart, the authority is required to record satisfaction while dispensing or
relaxing the requirements of any rule to such an extent and subject to such
conditions as he may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just
and equitable manner.  
The language of the Rule really casts  a  number  of
conditions.
 It provides guidance.  It cannot be exercised in an  arbitrary
manner so as to dispense with the procedure of  selection  in  entirety  in
respect of a particular class, for it has  to  be  strictly  construed  and
there has to be apposite foundation for exercise of such power.  
It  is  to
be borne in mind that if a particular rule empowers the authority to  throw
all the rules overboard in all possibility,  it  may  not  withstand  close
scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution.
 Be that it  may,  no  decision
was taken to relax the rules and, the concept of deemed relaxation  is  not
attracted and, therefore, the relief claimed by the special batch  recruits
has no legs to stand upon.


47.   From the aforesaid analysis,
there can be no scintilla of doubt  that
the selection of the special batch recruits was totally de hors the  Rules;
that
 there was a maladroit effort to go for a special drive when there  was
no need for the same by the State which is supposed to be a model employer;
that
neither the concept of relaxation nor the  conception  of  benefit  of
Rule 18 would be attracted for grant on conferring  any  privilege  to  the
special batch recruits; 
that
their seniority has to  be  pushed  down  and,
hence, the directions given by the tribunal and  the  High  Court  in  that
regard are absolutely flawless; and that regard being had  to  the  delayed
challenge and long rendering of service in the posts and further promotions
having been effected, it would be inapposite to quash their appointments.

48.   Before parting with the case, we are compelled to reiterate  the                                                     oft-stated principle that 
the State is a model employer and it  is  required  to
act fairly giving due regard and respect to the rules framed by it.  But  in
the present case, the State has atrophied the rules.  Hence,  the  need  for
hammering the concept.

49.   Almost a quarter century back, this Court in Balram Gupta vs Union  of
India & Anr. [1987 (Supp) SCC 228] had observed thus:

           “As a model employer the Government  must  conduct  itself  with
           high probity and candour with its employees.”

50.   In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh and Ors.[(1992)4SCC118], the  Court
had clearly stated:

           “The main concern of the court in such matters is to ensure  the
           rule of law and to see that the Executive acts fairly and  gives
           a fair deal to its employees consistent with the requirements of
           Articles 14 and 16”.


51.    In  Secretary,  State  Of  Karnataka  And  vs.  Umadevi  And   Others
[(2006)4SCC1], the Constitution Bench, while discussing the  role  of  state
in recruitment procedure,
stated that if rules have been made under  Article
309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments  only  in
accordance with the rules, for the State is meant to be a model employer.

52.   In Mehar Chand Polytechnic & Anr. vs. Anu Lamba & Ors. [(2006)  7  SCC
161] the Court observed that
 public  employment  is  a  facet  of  right  to
equality envisaged under Article 16 of the Constitution of  India  and  that
the recruitment rules are framed with a view to give  equal  opportunity  to
all the citizens of India entitled for being considered for  recruitment  in
the vacant posts.

53.   We have stated
the role of the State as  a  model  employer
with  the
fond hope that in future a deliberate disregard is  not  taken  recourse  to
and deviancy of such magnitude is not adopted to  frustrate  the  claims  of
the  employees.  
It  should  always  be  borne  in  mind  that   legitimate
aspirations of the employees are not guillotined  and  a  situation  is  not
created where hopes  end  in  despair.  
Hope  for  everyone  is  gloriously
precious and a model employer should not convert  it  to  be  deceitful  and
treacherous by playing a game of chess with their  seniority.  
A  sense  of
calm sensibility and concerned sincerity should be reflected in every  step.
An atmosphere of trust has to prevail and when the employees are  absolutely
sure that their trust shall not be betrayed and they shall be  treated  with
dignified  fairness  then  only  the  concept  of  good  governance  can  be
concretized.
We say no more.

54.   Consequently, all the appeals are dismissed  leaving  the  parties  to
bear their respective costs.




                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]



                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                            [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
November 30, 2012.
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[1]    AIR 1988 SC 162
[2]    (1998) 9 SCC 641

[3]    (1972) 3 SCC 489
[4]    (1986) 6 SCC 157
[5]    (1990) 2 SCC 189
[6]    1980 (Supp) SCC 449

[7]    AIR 1990 SC 1607
[8]    AIR 1975 SC 483
[9]    1995 Supp. (3) SCC 366
[10]  (2000) 2 SCC 552
[11]   (2005) 8 SCC 454
[12]   (1993) 3 SCC 371
[13]   (2012) 8 SCC 633
[14]   (1974) 3 SCC 546
[15]   (2001) 5 SCC 581
[16]   (2000) 8 SCC 4


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