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Thursday, October 18, 2012

“In view of all the aforesaid and particularly for the reasons that the writ petition No.111 (H/C) of 2011 was filed on the instructions of Kishor Samrite (who has also sworn the affidavit in support of the writ petition) which contained wild allegations/insinuation against Shri Rahul Gandhi and questions the virtue and modesty of a young girl of 22 years Km. Kirti Singh, we dismiss this writ petition with a cost of Rs.50,00,000/- (Fifty lacs). Out of the cost amount, Rs.25,00,000/- (Twenty five lacs) shall be paid to Km. Kirti Singh and Rs.20,00,000/- (Twenty lacs) to Shri Rahul Gandhi, opposite part no.6. The cost amount shall be deposited within a period of one month with the Registrar of this Court, failing which the Registrar shall take necessary action for recovery of the amount as land revenue. We also record our special note of appreciation for Shri Karamveer Singh, Director General of police, U.P. (a highly decorated police officer), for producing the alleged detenues within the time frame as directed in the order. Thus, for all the promptness and sincerity shown, in themidst of serious law and order problems all over the State on account of some agitation in obeying and complying with the directions, we direct payment of Rs.5,00,000/- (five lacs) towards a reward to the DGP. We also record our appreciation for Shri Jyotindra Misra, learned Advocate General and the State Government for showing concern in this matter. We also direct the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, to register case against Kishor Samrite, the websites referred to in Writ Petition No.111 (H/C) of 2011 and all other persons who are found involved in the plot, if any, hatched in order to frame up Shri Rahul Gandhi, Member of Parliament from Amethi. We also appreciate Shri Gajendra Pal singh, author of Writ Petition No.125(H/C) of 2011 for approaching this Court in order to save the reputation of Shri Rahul Gandhi and the family of alleged detenues at the hands of vested interests responsible for filing Writ Petition No.111 (H/C) of 2011. Till the investigation continues and the websites in question are not cleared by the CBI, their display in India shall remain banned. The Director, CBI, shall ensure compliance of this order forthwith. He shall also prepare a list of such other websites which are involved in display of scandalous informations about the functionaries holding high public offices and submit a report in respect thereof on the next date of hearing. - The CBI shall continue the investigation in furtherance to the direction of the High Court against petitioner in Writ Petition No. 111/2011 and all other persons responsible for the abuse of the process of Court, making false statement in pleadings, filing false affidavits and committing such other offences as the Investigating Agency may find during investigation. The CBI shall submit its report to the court of competent jurisdiction as expeditiously as possible and not later than six months from the date of passing of this order. These directions are without prejudice to the rights of the respective parties to take such legal remedy as may be available to them in accordance with law. We also make it clear that the Court of competent jurisdiction or the CBI would not in any way be influenced by the observations made in this judgment or even the judgment of the High Court. All the pleas and contentions which may be raised by the parties are left open.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1406 OF 2012

Kishore Samrite                              ... Appellant
                                   Versus
State of U.P. & Ors.                               ... Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1.    Challenge in the present appeal is to the order dated 7th March,  2011
passed by a Division Bench of the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad
(Lucknow Bench).  The operative part of the order reads as under :

           “In view of all the aforesaid and particularly for  the  reasons
           that the writ petition No.111 (H/C) of 2011  was  filed  on  the
           instructions of Kishor Samrite (who has also sworn the affidavit
           in  support  of  the  writ  petition)   which   contained   wild
           allegations/insinuation against Shri Rahul Gandhi and  questions
           the virtue and modesty of a young girl of  22  years  Km.  Kirti
           Singh,  we  dismiss  this  writ  petition   with   a   cost   of
           Rs.50,00,000/-  (Fifty  lacs).   Out   of   the   cost   amount,
           Rs.25,00,000/- (Twenty five lacs) shall be  paid  to  Km.  Kirti
           Singh and Rs.20,00,000/- (Twenty lacs)  to  Shri  Rahul  Gandhi,
           opposite part no.6.  The cost amount shall be deposited within a
           period of one month with the Registrar of  this  Court,  failing
           which the Registrar shall take necessary action for recovery  of
           the amount as land revenue.

                 We also record our special note of appreciation  for  Shri
           Karamveer Singh, Director General  of  police,  U.P.  (a  highly
           decorated police officer), for producing  the  alleged  detenues
           within the time frame as directed in the order.  Thus,  for  all
           the promptness and sincerity shown, in themidst of  serious  law
           and order problems  all  over  the  State  on  account  of  some
           agitation in obeying  and  complying  with  the  directions,  we
           direct payment of Rs.5,00,000/- (five lacs) towards a reward  to
           the DGP.  We also record our  appreciation  for  Shri  Jyotindra
           Misra, learned Advocate General and  the  State  Government  for
           showing concern in this matter.

                  We  also  direct  the   Director,   Central   Bureau   of
           Investigation, to register  case  against  Kishor  Samrite,  the
           websites referred to in Writ Petition No.111 (H/C) of  2011  and
           all other persons who are found involved in the  plot,  if  any,
           hatched in order to  frame  up  Shri  Rahul  Gandhi,  Member  of
           Parliament from Amethi.  We also appreciate  Shri  Gajendra  Pal
           singh,  author  of  Writ  Petition  No.125(H/C)  of   2011   for
           approaching this Court in order to save the reputation  of  Shri
           Rahul Gandhi and the family of alleged detenues at the hands  of
           vested interests responsible for  filing  Writ  Petition  No.111
           (H/C) of 2011.

                 Till the  investigation  continues  and  the  websites  in
           question are not cleared by the  CBI,  their  display  in  India
           shall remain banned.  The Director, CBI, shall ensure compliance
           of this order forthwith.  He shall also prepare a list  of  such
           other websites which  are  involved  in  display  of  scandalous
           informations about the functionaries holding high public offices
           and submit a report in respect  thereof  on  the  next  date  of
           hearing.

                 Thus,  writ  petition  No.125  (H/C)  of  2011  is  partly
           disposed of to the extent insofar as it relates to production of
           the alleged detenues.   However,  it  shall  remain  pending  in
           respect of notice issued to the Registrar General Allahabad High
           Court and for the submission of report by the  CBI  as  directed
           hereinabove.  The matter shall remain part heard.

                 List the matter on 11.04.2011 for further hearing.

                 The Registrar of this Court shall issue copy of this order
           to all the concerned parties  including  the  Director,  Central
           Bureau of Investigation, for immediate compliance.”

2.    Challenge to the above impugned order, inter alia,  but  primarily  is
on the following grounds :

(i)   The Court could not have called  for  the  records  of  Writ  Petition
      No.111 of 2011.  Consequently it lacked inherent jurisdiction to  deal
      with and decide the said writ petition.   Furthermore,  no  order  was
      passed by the competent authority, i.e., the Chief Justice of the High
      Court transferring that writ petition to the Bench dealing  with  Writ
      Petition No.125 of 2011.

(ii)  The Bench showed undue haste and has  not  dealt  with  Writ  Petition
      No.125 of 2011 in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

(iii) The order was passed without notice and grant of  appropriate  hearing
      to the present appellant.

(iv)  The orders for imposition of cost and registration of a  case  against
      the appellant by the CBI are uncalled for and in any case  are  unjust
      and disproportionate as per the known canons of law.

3.    Stands on merits is that Writ Petition No.125 of  2011  was,  in  fact
and in law, not a petition for habeas corpus and, thus, could not have  been
entertained and dealt with by a Division Bench  of  that  Court.   The  said
petition primarily related to transfer of a petition though in the  garb  of
a prayer for production  of  the  corpus.   It  did  not  satisfy  the  pre-
requisites of a petition of habeas corpus.

4.    Writ Petition No.111 of 2011, even if not complete in  its  form,  was
maintainable and the same could not have been dismissed by the Court as  the
prayer by the  appellant  in  that  writ  petition  for  habeas  corpus  was
maintainable in view of the right to life and  liberty  of  the  petitioners
stated therein, as enshrined in Article 21 of  the  Constitution  of  India,
was violated.  The petition had been filed by the appellant as  next  friend
and had not seen the alleged detenues since  4th  January,  2007  when  they
were last seen in Amethi. According to  the  appellant  the  representations
made to various authorities had failed to yield  any  results.   Thus,  that
petition was not liable to be dismissed.

5.    To the contra, it is  contended  on  behalf  of  the  State  of  Uttar
Pradesh that :

(i)   The Writ Petition No.111 of 2011  was  an  abuse  of  the  process  of
       Court.  The appellant had not approached the Court with  clean  hands
       as the facts as were pleaded by him were not correct to the knowledge
       of the appellant.

(ii)  The petition was mala fide and even the  affidavit  of  the  appellant
       was not in conformity with the prescribed procedure.

(iii) The averments made in the affidavit and in the  other  documents  were
       contradictory in terms.

(iv)  The appellant was neither the next friend of  the  stated  petitioners
       (in Writ Petition No.111 of 2011) nor was he competent  to  institute
       such a petition. Moreover, the petition itself did  not  satisfy  the
       basic ingredients of a petition for habeas corpus.

(v)   In view of the dismissal of the Writ Petition No.3719 of 2009  by  the
       same High Court and its non-mentioning  by  the  petitioner  in  Writ
       Petition No.111 of 2011, besides being suppression of material  facts
       was hit by the principles of res judicata.

(vi)  Writ Petition No.111 of 2011  had  been  rightly  transferred  by  the
       Division Bench and its dismissal  and  imposition  of  costs  was  in
       proper exercise of jurisdiction.

(vii) Lastly, it is contended that the  next  friend  had  given  fictitious
       addresses of the petitioners which are different than the ones  given
       in the present appeal.

6.    On behalf of Respondent No.6, Shri  Rahul  Gandhi,  it  was  contended
that Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 is an abuse of the process of  Court  and,
in  fact,  is  a  motivated   petition   primarily   based   on   ‘political
mudslinging’.  While supporting the stand of Respondent No. 1, the State  of
Uttar Pradesh, it  is  also  contended  that  the  appellant,  Shri  Kishore
Samrite,  was  a  total  stranger,  had  no  knowledge  of  the  facts  and,
therefore, had no right to file the petition as next friend.  It was  not  a
case of private detention and the petition filed by the  appellant  was  not
in conformity with the rules.  The petition was primarily aimed  at  hurting
the reputation and image of respondent No.6  out  of  ulterior  motives  and
political vendetta.

7.    According to Respondent No. 7, the  Central  Bureau  of  Investigation
(for short “CBI”), it had investigated the matter and found that it was  not
a case of detention and, therefore,  petition  for  habeas  corpus  was  not
maintainable.  It had, in furtherance to the order of the Court,  registered
a case on 11th March,  2011  being  RC  No.219-2011-(E)2002  under  Sections
120B, 181, 191, 211, 469, 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  (IPC).
 The CBI could not complete the investigation because of the order  of  stay
passed by this Court on 6th April, 2011.   From  the  limited  investigation
which was conducted during that  period  and  from  the  statement  of  Shri
Balram Singh and  other  witnesses,  it  came  to  light  that  nothing  had
happened on 3rd December, 2006 as alleged by the appellant.   In  fact,  the
persons and the addresses given in the petition were found to be  fictitious
and non-existent.  Shri Balram Singh had not supported the version  advanced
by the appellant. On the contrary, he had  belied  the  entire  version  and
categorically denied the allegations and informed that the name of his  wife
and daughter were incorrectly mentioned as Smt. Sushila  and  Sukanya  Devi.
In regard to the website, CBI stated that the three suspected websites  were
posted outside the geographical limits of our country  and  the  originating
IP address could not be traced and further investigation had to be  stopped.
It was specifically contended on behalf of the CBI that  the  appellant  had
made no enquiry, had no personal knowledge and that the litigation had  been
funded from sources other than appellant’s own sources.

8.    Lastly, Respondent No.8 in this appeal, Shri Gajendra Pal  Singh,  who
was the petitioner in Writ Petition No.125 of 2011, has stated that  he  had
filed that petition bona fidely while  Writ  Petition  No.111  of  2011  was
based upon a false affidavit, public justice system has been abused  by  the
petitioner in  that  case  and  he  has  committed  perjury.   According  to
Respondent No.8, Writ Petition No.125 of 2011 was necessitated  and  he  had
the right to  file  the  habeas  corpus  petition  as  next  friend  of  the
petitioners stated therein.

9.    As is evident from the varied stand taken by the  respective  parties,
they are not ad idem in regard to the  factual  matrix  of  the  case.   The
facts as they emerge from the record  before  this  Court  can  usefully  be
noticed as follows: -

10.   The appellant, Shri  Kishore  Samrite,  an  ex-member  of  legislative
assembly of Madhya Pradesh, elected on the ticket of  Samajwadi  Party  from
the legislative constituency of Tehsil Langi in  District  Balaghat,  Madhya
Pradesh, instituted a Writ Petition in  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at
Allahabad being Writ Petition No. 111/2011 acting  as  next  friend  of  one
Sukanya Devi, Balram Singh and Sumrita Devi.  Address  of  all  these  three
persons was given as 23-12, Medical Chowk, Sanjay Gandhi  Marg,  Chhatrapati
Shahu Ji Mahraj Nagar, Uttar Pradesh.  According  to  the  appellant,  these
three persons were kept in illegal detention  by  the  respondent  no.6  and
were incapacitated to file  the  writ  petition.   It  was  averred  in  the
petition filed by him before the High  Court  that  he  came  to  know  from
certain  websites  viz.,  www.indybay.org,   www.arizona.indymedia.org   and
www.intellibriefs.blogspot.com, which contained news items stating  that  on
the night of 3rd December, 2006,  while  on  a  tour  of  his  parliamentary
constituency in Amethi, respondent no.6, along with six of his friends  (two
from Italy and four from Britain) committed rape on Sukanya  Devi,  daughter
of Balram Singh.  The appellant placed  the  said  news  reports  on  record
along with the writ petition.

11.   The writ petition also contained the averment that Balram Singh  is  a
congress worker in Amethi constituency and Sukanya Devi along  with  Sumitra
Devi wanted to report the said incident but the  concerned  authorities  did
not lodge the complaint.  They approached various other authorities  but  to
no avail.  The appellant specifically averred that he had not seen  all  the
three persons in public for a long time,  particularly  since  4th  January,
2007, when they were last seen in Amethi.  He claims to have visited  Amethi
to verify these facts and also a couple  of  times  thereafter.  Lastly,  on
12th  December, 2010, he visited the  place  where  all  the  three  persons
lived, but found the same locked.  The  incident  was  reported  to  various
authorities,  including  the  Chief  Minister,  the  Home  Minister,   Chief
Secretary of the State, Governor and the other  authorities  of  the  State.
The only communication he received was  from  the  office  of  the  Governor
wherein it was said  that  his  application  had  been  sent  to  the  State
Government for proper action.  Invoking the right to  life  and  liberty  as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India  on  behalf  of  the
three named petitioners in the writ petition and  alleging  that  respondent
No.6 would influence any fruitful investigation, the  appellant  prayed  for
issuance  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  commanding  the  opposite   party
particularly respondent No.6 to produce the  petitioners  before  the  Court
and for passing any other appropriate order or direction.

12.   Before we refer to the events subsequent to the  filing  of  the  Writ
Petition no.111/2011, it must be noticed that a  person  named  Ram  Prakash
Shukla, a practising advocate at Lucknow, who claimed himself to be a  human
rights activist and a public spirited person had earlier instituted  a  writ
petition on the same facts being Writ Petition No. 3719/2009 tilted  as  Ram
Prakash Shukla  v.  Union of India and Ors.  He also stated that he had  got
information from the internet website about the rape of Ms. Sukanya Devi  in
the evening of 3rd December, 2006 and no  action  was  being  taken  on  the
basis  of  the  said  report.  He  further  stated  that  congress  men  had
threatened to kill both, Smt. Sumitra Devi and Sukanya Devi, if they  raised
the issue.  According to him they had stayed at Delhi for over  a  fortnight
to meet the authorities which they ultimately  could  not.   It  was  stated
that they are missing since then and were not traceable.  On  the  basis  of
the news report, though an offence under Section 376 of  the  IPC  was  made
out, yet no FIR was being registered  by  the  authorities.   In  that  writ
petition, Ram Prakash Shukla had made the following prayers: -

           “(i)  Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus
           commanding the opposite parties  nos.  1  to  4  to  ensure  the
           lodging of the F.I.R. and  to  refer  it  for  investigation  to
           independent agency like S.I.T or C.B.I.

           (ii)  Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature  of  Habeas
           Corpus commanding the respondents nos. 1  to  4  to  search  and
           produce the Ms. Sukanya Devi, her mother Smt. Sumitra Devi,  her
           father Balram Singh as well as Videographer Mr. Drupadh and  the
           CNN-IBN Cameramen before this Hon’ble Court.

           (iii)  Issue a  writ,  order  or  direction  in  the  nature  of
           Mandamus directing the respondents nos. 5 & 6 (the  Human  Right
           Commission) and the National Commission for Women) to submit the
           report of  the  investigation  if  any,  done  by  them  on  the
           complaint lodged by Ms. Sukanya Devi.

           (iv)  Issue any other order or  directions  which  this  Hon’ble
           Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and  circumstances
           of the case in favour of  the  petitioner  in  the  interest  of
           justice.

           (v)  Allow the cost of  the  writ  petition  in  favour  of  the
           petitioner.”




13.   This writ petition was heard by a  Division  Bench  of  the  Allahabad
High Court at Lucknow and was dismissed by a detailed judgement dated  April
17th, 2009.  The Court specifically noticed that before passing a  direction
for lodging of an FIR, the Court is required to see that the  pleadings  are
absolutely clear, specific and precise and that they make out  a  charge  or
criminal offence,, which prima facie is supported  by  cogent  and  reliable
evidence and that the State machinery has failed to take appropriate  action
in accordance with law for no valid reason.  In absence thereof,  the  Court
cannot  issue  such  a  direction.   The   Court   recorded   its   complete
dissatisfaction about the correctness of the allegations made  in  the  writ
petition as they were not supported by  any  reliable  or  cogent  evidence.
The Court, while declining to grant the reliefs prayed  for,  dismissed  the
writ petition.  The operative part of the judgment reads as under :

           “So far the  petitioner’s  plea  that  the  respondents  may  be
           required to inform the court,  whether  any  such  incident  had
           taken place or not, suffice would be  to  mention  that  in  the
           absence of  clear  and  precise  pleadings  with  no  supporting
           evidence, the  Court  will  not  make  any  roving  and  fishing
           enquiry.

                 The writ petition does not make any case for grant of  the
           reliefs claimed.

                  The  writ  Petition  has  not  force,  which   is   being
           dismissed.”



14.   It may be noticed that  Writ Petition No.  3719  of  2009  itself  was
instituted in the year 2009 nearly three years after the  alleged  news  and
was dismissed vide order dated 17th April, 2009.  It was  in  the  beginning
of the year 2011 that the present appellant instituted Writ Petition  No.111
of 2011 in the Allahabad High Court. The latter writ petition was  filed  by
the appellant herein as  next  friend  of  the  three  petitioners,  namely,
Sukanya Devi, Balram  Singh  and  Sumitra  Devi,  all  residents  of  23/12,
Medical Chowk, Sanjay Gandhi  Marg,  Chhatrapati  Shahu  Ji  Maharaj  Nagar,
Uttar Pradesh  relying  upon  the  website  news  relating  to  the  alleged
occurrence of 2006  and  making  the  same  allegations,  including  illegal
detention of the petitioners by respondent No.6, and praying as follows :

           “WHEREFOR, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court  may
           be pleased to

           1.    Issue a writ of or writ, order or direction in the  nature
                of  habeas   corpus   commanding   the   opposite   parties,
                particularly opposite party No.6, to produce the petitioners
                before this Hon’ble Court and set them at liberty.

           2.    Issue any other order or direction which it deems fit  and
                proper in  the  present  circumstances,  in  favour  of  the
                petitioners, in the interest of justice.

           3.    Award the cost of Petition to the petitioners.”




15.   This Writ petition was listed before a Single Judge of  the  Allahabad
High Court who, vide order  dated  1st  March,  2011  directed  issuance  of
notice to respondent No.6 to submit his reply.  The matter was to be  listed
before the Court after service of notice.  During the pendency of this  writ
petition, respondent No. 8, Shri Gajendra Pal Singh, again  acting  as  next
friend of Sukanya Devi, Shri Balram Singh and Smt.  Sumitra  Devi  @  Mohini
Devi,  all  residents  of  Ward  No.5,  near  Gurudwara,  Town  Area  Amethi
District, Chhatrapati Shahu Ji  Maharaj  Nagar,  Uttar  Pradesh  filed  Writ
Petition No.125 of 2011 on  4th  March,  2011  stating  that  a  false  writ
petition No.111 of 2011 was filed by Shri Kishore  Samrite  as  next  friend
and that it  was  politically  motivated  to  harm  the  reputation  of  the
opposite party.  Further that Shri Kishore  Samrite  was  neither  the  next
friend of the petitioners in that petition  nor  had  any  interest  in  the
liberty of those petitioners.  Respondent No. 8,  Shri  Gajendra  Pal  Singh
claimed to be a neighbour of  Shri  Balram  Singh,  father  of  Sukanya  and
husband of Smt. Sumitra @ Mohini Devi.  According to  him,  when  the  three
petitioners in Writ Petition No.125 of 2011 were not  seen  in  their  house
for some time,  he  approached  the  Police  Station,  Amethi,  to  lodge  a
complaint but the police authorities refused to file/register the  complaint
on the ground that the petitioners were in custody of  police  as  they  had
committed some wrong.   Seeing  that  right  to  life  and  liberty  of  the
petitioners was involved, he prayed for the following refliefs :

                 “Wherefor it is most respectfully prayed that this  Hon’ble
           Court may kindly be pleased to :

           a.    Issue a writ or writ order or direction in the  nature  of
                habeas corpus commanding the opposite parties to produce the
                petitioner  before  this  Hon’ble  Court  and  set  them  at
                Liberty.

           b.    To call the record of Writ Petition No.111  H.C.  of  2011
                and connect with this  present  Writ  Petition.   The  order
                passed in Writ Petition.  The order passed in Writ  Petition
                No.111 H.C. of 2011 be reviewed and recalled.

           c.    To order the investigation by the appropriate agency.

           d.    Issue any other order or direction which is deemed fit and
                proper  in  the  present  circumstances  in  favour  of  the
                petitioners, in the interest of justice.

           e.    Award the cost of the petition to the petitioner.




16.   This petition was taken up by a Division Bench of the  Allahabad  High
Court and the Court passed the following order on 4th March, 2011 :

           “In view of all the aforesaid, we direct  that  the  records  of
           Writ Petition No.111 (H/C) of 2011, said to be pending before  a
           learned  Single  Judge,  shall  be  connected  with  this   writ
           petition.  Besides, we also direct that the Director General  of
           Police, U.P., shall  produce  the  petitioners,  in  particular,
           Sukanya Devi,  on  the  next  date  of  hearing  i.e.  7.3.2011.
           However, we make it clear that this direction  to  the  Director
           General of Police, U.P., shall not be construed to mean that the
           detenu is in  illegal  custody  of  State  authorities  and  the
           Director General of Police, U.P., in this  case  shall  function
           only as an officer of the Court for the purpose of production of
           detenu.”



17.   The Court directed transfer  of  Writ  Petition  No.111  of  2011  and
directed tagging of the same with Writ  Petition  No.125  of  2011,  besides
issuing notice to the Director  General  of  Police,  U.P.  to  produce  the
petitioners on 7th March, 2011.   In  Writ  Petition  No.125  of  2011,  the
Director General of Police filed a personal affidavit.   According  to  him,
the Superintendent of Police, Chhatrapati  Shahu  Ji  Maharaj  Nagar,  while
noticing the allegations made in both the writ petitions reported  that  the
address mentioned in Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 was wrong  and  there  was
no such place in the town of Amethi with the name of Medical  Chowk,  Sanjay
Gandhi Marg and the address mentioned in Writ Petition no.125  of  2011  was
the correct address of Shri Balram Singh who lived there in the  past.    On
3rd December, 2007, Balram Singh had sold the plot, which was  in  the  name
of his wife, Smt. Sushila Singh,  to  one  Smt.  Rekha  and,  thereafter  he
himself shifted to village Hardoia,  Police  Station  Kumar  Ganj,  District
Faizabad.  Even the house adjacent to the plot was sold off by Balram  Singh
to Dr. Vikas Shukla who was residing at the said  village  with  his  entire
family.  It was stated that Balram Singh was living in Village Hardoia  with
his wife and four children, three daughters and  one  son.   Name  of  their
eldest daughter is Kumari Kirti Singh, aged about 21 years.  She had  passed
her B.Sc. examination in the year 2009-2010.  Balram  Singh  had  stated  to
the police that he  knew  Gajendra  Pal  Singh  but  did  not  know  Kishore
Samrite.  According to  this  affidavit,  Balram  Singh  also  informed  the
police that in the year 2006 some men claiming to be media persons had  come
to his house in Amethi and  asked  his  wife  after  showing  photograph  of
Sukanya Devi, if she was her daughter.  Upon this, his wife  produced  their
daughter before them and told them that  the  girl  in  the  photograph  was
different than their daughter.  Further, Balram Singh  also  stated  to  the
police that they had never  authorised  any  advocate  or  anybody  else  to
institute any writ petition in  the  court.   In  this  very  affidavit,  in
regard to the incident of 3rd December, 2006, the DGP has  referred  to  the
following statement of Balram Singh :

           “It has also been stated by Sri Balram Singh that neither he nor
           his wife Sushila Singh nor daughter Kirti Singh  has  ever  made
           any allegation either on 03.12.2006  or  before  or  after  that
           against Shri Rahul Gandhi or anybody else; nor any writ petition
           has been preferred in the Hon’ble High Court making any kind  of
           allegations.  He has never authorised any  Advocate  or  anybody
           else to institute any writ petition.”



18.   The Ration Card and Pan Card  of  Balram  Singh  was  produced  during
investigation.  It  is  also  noticed  that  Sukanya  and  Kirti,  the  name
mentioned in Writ Petition No.125 of 2011 partially matches the  particulars
of daughter of Balram Singh and they have no relation whatsoever to  any  of
the next friend in either of the writ petition.  Shri Balram  Singh,  Kumari
Kirti Singh and Smt. Sushila Singh, all three were produced by the  Director
General of Police in Court.

19.   When the Writ Petition No.125 of 2011 came up for hearing  before  the
Court on 7th March, 2011, the  Division  Bench  passed  the  detailed  order
impugned in the present appeal.  Vide this order, Writ  Petition  No.111  of
2011 was disposed of while Writ Petition No.125 of 2011 was partly  disposed
of and, as afore-noticed, Director of CBI was directed to  register  a  case
against Shri Kishore Samrite and all other persons  involved  in  the  plot.
The Court also imposed cost of Rs.50,00,000/- which was  to  be  distributed
as per the order.  The contention raised was that the counsel appearing  for
the  petitioner  in  Writ  Petition  No.111  of  2011  was  not  given   the
opportunity of hearing by the Bench before passing the impugned  order  and,
in fact, the counsel was standing in the Court  when  the  order  was  being
dictated.

20.   At this stage, we may also notice that according to the appellant,  he
was not aware of Writ Petition No.3719 of 2009  having  been  filed  or  the
orders passed by the Bench thereupon.  The appellant has  also  stated  that
there was no urgency for taking up the matter on that very day and,  in  any
case, Writ Petition No.111/11  could  not  have  been  transferred  by  that
Bench.  The appellant in the present appeal has even gone to the  extent  of
saying that the girl Kumari Kirti Singh  has  been  implanted  in  place  of
Sukanya Devi and even the name of the mother  has  been  wrongly  described.
No notice is stated to have been given to the petitioner  in  Writ  Petition
No.111 of 2011.   It is contended that the Writ Petition No.111  of  11  had
been filed in consonance with the proviso to Rule 1(2)  of  Chapter  XXI  of
the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 under which  habeas  corpus  against  a
private person was maintainable and could be listed before a  Single  Judge.
Allegations have been made  in  Writ  Petition  No.125  of  11  calling  the
present appellant, petitioner in Writ Petition No.111 of 2011,  as  mentally
challenged.  The Division Bench dealing with Writ Petition No. 125  of  2011
could not have dealt with Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 and  could  not  have
exercised its appellate jurisdiction.  The cost imposed upon  the  appellant
is exorbitant and without any basis.

21.   In the background of the above factual matrix and the stand taken  by
the respective parties, we shall now proceed  to  examine  the  contentions
raised before the Court by the learned counsel appearing for  the  parties.
For this purpose, we would deal with various  aspects  of  the  case  under
different heads.

1) Whether  there was violation of  Principles  of    Natural  Justice  and
   whether transfer of Writ Petition No. 111/2011 was  in  accordance  with
   law ?



22.   It is contended that the impugned order dated  7th  March,  2011  has
been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.  No adequate
opportunity was granted to the present appellant to put forward  his  case.
The Writ Petition No. 111/2011 had been transferred to the  Division  Bench
without even issuing notice to the appellant.  The order dated  4th  March,
2011 had not directed issuance of notice.  It is only vide order dated  7th
March, 2011 that the Registrar of the High Court was directed to issue copy
of the order  to  all  the  concerned  parties  for  immediate  compliance.
Absence of notice and non-grant of  adequate  hearing  has  caused  serious
prejudice to the appellant and the order is liable to be set aside on  this
sole ground.  It is also contended that the appellant’s counsel was present
only when the order was being dictated and had no notice  of  the  hearing.
On the contrary, the contention on behalf of Respondent  No.  1,  State  of
Uttar Pradesh, and other parties is that the counsel for the appellant  was
present and had due notice of hearing of the Writ  Petitions  No.  125/2011
and 111/2011 and as such there was neither any violation of the  principles
of natural justice nor has any prejudice been caused to the appellant.

23.   Compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem and other allied
principles of natural justice is the basic requirement of rule of law.   In
fact, it is the essence of judicial  and  quasi-judicial  functioning,  and
particularly the Courts would not  finally  dispose  of  a  matter  without
granting notice and adequate hearing to the parties to the lis.   From  the
record, i.e. in the orders dated 4th March, 2011 as well as 7th March, 2011
it has not been specifically recorded nor is it  implicitly  clear  that  a
notice was directed to the petitioners in  Writ  Petition  No.111/2011  and
they were given opportunity to address the Court.  Lack of clarity in  this
behalf does raise a doubt in the mind of the Court that the  appellant  did
not get a fair opportunity to put forward  his  case  before  the  Division
Bench.  The fact that we have issued notice to all the concerned parties in
both the Writ Petitions bearing nos.125/2011 and 111/2011, have heard  them
at great length and propose to deal with and dispose  of  both  these  writ
petitions in accordance with law, renders it unnecessary for this Court  to
examine this aspect of the matter in any further  detail.   Suffice  it  to
note that we have heard the  counsel  appearing  for  the  parties  on  all
aspects including maintainability, jurisdiction as well as merits  of  both
the  petitions,  which  issues  we  shall  shortly  proceed  to  deal  with
hereinafter.  Thus, this submission of the appellant need not detain us any
further.

24.   From the above narrated facts it is clear that a petition for  habeas
corpus (Writ Petition No. 111/2011) had been filed by the present appellant
while referring to the news on the website  in  relation  to  the  incident
dated 3rd December, 2006 (in paragraphs 3 and 4) to the effect  that  since
the petitioners, because of their illegal  detention  by  private  opposite
party no.6 are incapacitated  to file the instant writ  petition  and  also
that those petitioners were in illegal detention of  the  private  opposite
party no.6 and they have not been seen since 4th January, 2007.  This  writ
petition was treated as private habeas  corpus  and  was  listed  before  a
Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court.  Rule 1 of  Chapter  XXI  of  the
Allahabad High Court Rules provided that an application under  Article  226
of the Constitution for a writ in  the  nature  of  habeas  corpus,  except
against private custody, if not sent by post or telegram, shall be made  to
the Division Bench appointed to receive applications or on any day on which
no such Bench is sitting, to the Judge appointed to receive applications in
civil matters.  In the  latter  case,  the  Judge  shall  direct  that  the
application be laid before a  Division  Bench  for  orders.   In  terms  of
proviso to this Rule, it is provided that an application under Article  226
of the Constitution in the nature of habeas corpus directed against private
custody shall be made to the Single Judge appointed by the Chief Justice to
receive such an application.  The clear analysis of the  above  Rule  shows
that habeas corpus against a private custody has  to  be  placed  before  a
Single Judge while in the case of custody other than private  custody,  the
matter has to be placed before a Division Bench.  It appears  that  on  the
strength of this Rule, Writ Petition No. 111/2011  was  listed  before  the
Single Judge of Allahabad High Court.  The  roster  and  placing  of  cases
before  different  Benches  of  the  High  Court  is   unquestionably   the
prerogative of the Chief Justice of that Court.  In the High Courts,  which
have Principal and other Benches, there is a practice and as per rules,  if
framed, that the senior-most Judge at the Benches, other than the Principal
Bench, is normally permitted to exercise powers of the  Chief  Justice,  as
may be delegated to the  senior  most  Judge.   In  absence  of  the  Chief
Justice, the senior most Judge would  pass  directions  in  regard  to  the
roster of Judges and listing of cases.   Primarily,  it  is  the  exclusive
prerogative of the Chief Justice and does not admit any ambiguity or  doubt
in this regard.  Usefully we can refer to  some  judgments  of  this  Court
where such position has been clearly stated by this Court.    In  the  case
of State of Rajasthan  v.  Prakash Chand & Ors., (1998) 1 SCC 1,  a  three-
Judge Bench of this Court was dealing with the requirement of  constitution
of Benches, issuance of daily cause  list  and  the  powers  of  the  Chief
Justice in terms of the Rajasthan High  Court  Ordinance,  1949  read  with
Article 225 of the Constitution of India.  The Court held as under: -


           “10. A careful  reading  of  the  aforesaid  provisions  of  the
           Ordinance and Rule 54  (supra)  shows  that  the  administrative
           control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice of the High
           Court alone  and  that  it  is  his  prerogative  to  distribute
           business of the High Court both judicial and administrative.  He
           alone, has the right and power to decide how the Benches of  the
           High Court are to be constituted: which Judge is  to  sit  alone
           and which cases he can and is required to hear  as  also  as  to
           which Judges shall constitute a Division  Bench  and  what  work
           those Benches shall do. In other words the Judges  of  the  High
           Court can sit alone or in Division Benches and do such work only
           as may be allotted to them by an order of or in accordance  with
           the directions of the Chief Justice. That necessarily means that
           it is not within the competence  or  domain  of  any  Single  or
           Division Bench of  the  Court  to  give  any  direction  to  the
           Registry  in  that  behalf  which  will  run  contrary  to   the
           directions of the Chief Justice.  Therefore  in  the  scheme  of
           things judicial discipline demands that in the  event  a  Single
           Judge or a Division  Bench  considers  that  a  particular  case
           requires to be listed before it for  valid  reasons,  it  should
           direct the Registry to obtain appropriate orders from the  Chief
           Justice. The puisne Judges are not  expected  to  entertain  any
           request from the advocates of the parties for  listing  of  case
           which does not strictly fall within the  determined  roster.  In
           such cases, it is appropriate to direct the counsel  to  make  a
           mention before the Chief Justice and obtain appropriate  orders.
           This is essential for smooth functioning of the  Court.  Though,
           on the judicial side  the  Chief  Justice  is  only  the  “first
           amongst the equals”, on the administrative side in the matter of
           constitution of Benches and making of roster, he alone is vested
           with the  necessary  powers.  That  the  power  to  make  roster
           exclusively vests in the Chief Justice and that  a  daily  cause
           list is to be prepared under the directions of the Chief Justice
           as is borne out from Rule 73, which reads thus:

                 “73. Daily Cause List.—The Registrar shall subject to  such
              directions as the Chief Justice may give from  time  to  time
              cause to be prepared for each day on which the Court sits,  a
              list of cases which may be heard by the different Benches  of
              the Court. The list shall also state the hour  at  which  and
              the room in which each Bench shall sit. Such  list  shall  be
              known as the Day's List.”


              XXXX           XXXX       XXXX  XXXX


              24................The correctness of the order of  the  Chief
              Justice could only be tested in  judicial  proceedings  in  a
              manner known to law.  No Single Judge was competent  to  find
              fault with it.”



25.   In view of the above discussion, the Court amongst others, stated the
following conclusions: -

           “59. ......(1) That the administrative control of the High Court
           vests in the Chief Justice alone. On the judicial side, however,
           he is only the first amongst the equals.


           (2) That the Chief Justice is the master of the roster. He alone
           has the prerogative to  constitute  benches  of  the  court  and
           allocate cases to the benches so constituted.


           (3) That the puisne Judges can only do that work as is  allotted
           to them by the Chief Justice or under his directions.


           (4) That till any determination made by the Chief Justice lasts,
           no Judge who is to sit singly can sit in a Division Bench and no
           Division Bench can be split up by the  Judges  constituting  the
           bench themselves and one or both the  Judges  constituting  such
           bench sit singly and take up any other kind of judicial business
           not otherwise assigned to them by or under the directions of the
           Chief Justice.”



26.   Similarly, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.   v.   Neeraj
Choubey and Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 320, the Court had  directed  appearance  of
certain persons in the  matter  of  selection  to  the  post  of  Assistant
Professor and treated the matter as a writ petition in the nature of Public
Interest Litigation.   The  Court,  while  passing  widespread  orders,  in
paragraph 10 of the judgment held as under: -

           “10. In case an application is filed and the Bench comes to  the
           conclusion that it  involves  some  issues  relating  to  public
           interest, the Bench may not entertain it as  a  public  interest
           litigation but the court has its option to  convert  it  into  a
           public interest litigation and ask  the  Registry  to  place  it
           before a Bench which has jurisdiction to entertain  the  PIL  as
           per the Rules, guidelines or by the roster fixed  by  the  Chief
           Justice but the Bench cannot  convert  itself  into  a  PIL  and
           proceed with the matter itself.”



27.   Judicial discipline and propriety are the two significant  facets  of
administration of justice.  Every court  is  obliged  to  adhere  to  these
principles to ensure hierarchical discipline on the  one  hand  and  proper
dispensation of justice on the other.   Settled  canons  of  law  prescribe
adherence to the rule of law with due regard to the prescribed  procedures.
Violation thereof may not always result in  invalidation  of  the  judicial
action but normally it may cast a shadow of improper exercise  of  judicial
discretion.  Where extraordinary jurisdiction, like the writ  jurisdiction,
is very vast in its  scope  and  magnitude,  there  it  imposes  a  greater
obligation upon the courts to observe due  caution  while  exercising  such
powers.  This is to ensure that the principles of natural justice  are  not
violated and there is no  occasion  of  impertinent  exercise  of  judicial
discretion.

28.   In the present case there is no dispute to the fact that no order was
passed by the Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court or even the senior-most
Judge, administratively Incharge of the Lucknow  Bench,  transferring  Writ
Petition No. 111/2011 for hearing from a Single Judge before which  it  was
pending, to the Division Bench of that Court.  On basis of the  allegations
made in the Writ Petition No. 111/2011, that matter had been listed  before
the Single Judge.  If this writ petition was improperly  instituted  before
the Single Judge of the High Court then it was for  the  Registry  of  that
Court or any of the contesting  parties  to  that  petition,  to  raise  an
objection  in  that  behalf.    The   objection   could   relate   to   the
maintainability and/or jurisdiction on the  facts  pleaded.   If  the  Writ
Petition No. 125 of 2011 was filed with  a  prayer  for  transfer  of  Writ
Petition No. 111/2011 on the ground stated in the petition, this power fell
within the exclusive domain of  the  Chief  Justice  or  the  Senior  Judge
Incharge for that purpose.  It does  not  appear  to  be  apt  exercise  of
jurisdiction by the Division Bench to suo  moto  direct  transfer  of  Writ
Petition No. 111/2011 without leave of the Chief Justice of that  Court  as
such action would ex facie amount  to  dealing  with  matters  relating  to
constitution and  roster  of  Benches.    We  have  already  cited  various
judgments  of  this  Court  where  matters  relating  to  the  roster   and
constitution of the Benches fall within the exclusive domain of  the  Chief
Justice of the concerned High Courts.   Transfer  of  a  petition  may  not
necessarily result  in  lack  of  inherent  jurisdiction.   It  may  be  an
administrative lapse but normally would not render the  Division  Bench  or
Court of competent jurisdiction as lacking inherent  jurisdiction  and  its
orders being invalid ab initio.  Such  an  order  may  necessarily  not  be
vitiated  in  law,  particularly  when  the  parties  participate  in   the
proceedings without any objection and protest.  This, however, always  will
depend on the facts and circumstances of a  given  case.   In  the  present
case, suffices it to note that transfer of Writ Petition  No.  111/2011  by
the Division Bench to its own Board was  an  order  lacking  administrative
judicial propriety and from  the  record  it  also  appears  that  adequate
hearing had not been provided to the writ petitioners before  dismissal  of
the Writ Petition No. 111 of 2011 by the Division Bench.

Abuse of the process of Court :

29.   Now, we shall deal with the question  whether  both  or  any  of  the
petitioners in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 111/2011 and 125/2011 are guilty of
suppression of material facts, not approaching the Court with clean  hands,
and thereby abusing the process of the Court.  Before  we  dwell  upon  the
facts and circumstances of the case in hand, let us refer to some case laws
which would help us in dealing with  the  present  situation  with  greater
precision.  The cases of abuse of the process  of  court  and  such  allied
matters have been arising before the Courts consistently.  This  Court  has
had many occasions where it dealt with the cases of this kind  and  it  has
clearly stated the principles  that  would  govern  the  obligations  of  a
litigant while approaching the court for redressal of any grievance and the
consequences of abuse of the process of court.   We  may  recapitulate  and
state some of the principles.  It is difficult  to  state  such  principles
exhaustively and with such accuracy that would uniformly apply to a variety
of cases.  These are:

(i)   Courts have, over the centuries, frowned  upon  litigants  who,  with
       intent to deceive and  mislead  the  Courts,  initiated  proceedings
       without full disclosure  of  facts  and  came  to  the  courts  with
       ‘unclean hands’.  Courts have held that such litigants  are  neither
       entitled to be heard on the merits of the case nor entitled  to  any
       relief.

(ii)        The people, who approach the Court for relief on  an  ex  parte
       statement, are under a contract with the court that they would state
       the whole case fully and fairly to the court and where the  litigant
       has broken such  faith,  the  discretion  of  the  court  cannot  be
       exercised in favour of such a litigant.

(iii) The obligation to approach the Court with clean hands is an  absolute
       obligation and has repeatedly been reiterated by this Court.

(iv)        Quests for personal gains have become  so  intense  that  those
       involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of  falsehood
       and misrepresent  and  suppress  facts  in  the  court  proceedings.
       Materialism, opportunism and malicious intent have over-shadowed the
       old ethos of litigative values for small gains.

(v)   A litigant who attempts to pollute  the  stream  of  justice  or  who
       touches the pure fountain of  justice  with  tainted  hands  is  not
       entitled to any relief, interim or final.

(vi)        The Court must ensure that its process is  not  abused  and  in
       order to prevent abuse  of  the  process  the  court,  it  would  be
       justified even in insisting on furnishing of security and  in  cases
       of serious abuse, the Court would be  duty  bound  to  impose  heavy
       costs.

(vii)       Wherever a public interest is invoked, the Court  must  examine
       the petition carefully  to  ensure  that  there  is  genuine  public
       interest involved.  The stream of justice should not be  allowed  to
       be polluted by unscrupulous litigants.

(vii)       The Court,  especially  the  Supreme  Court,  has  to  maintain
       strictest vigilance over the abuse  of  the  process  of  court  and
       ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should not be granted “visa”.  Many
       societal pollutants create new problems  of  unredressed  grievances
       and the Court should endure to take cases where the justice  of  the
       lis well-justifies it.

       [Refer : Dalip Singh  v.  State of U.P. & Ors.  (2010)  2  SCC  114;
       Amar Singh  v.  Union of India & Ors. (2011) 7 SCC 69 and  State  of
       Uttaranchal  v  Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 402].



30.   Access jurisprudence requires Courts  to  deal  with  the  legitimate
litigation whatever be its form but decline to  exercise  jurisdiction,  if
such litigation is an abuse  of  the  process  of  the  Court.   In  P.S.R.
Sadhanantham  v. Arunachalam & Anr. (1980) 3 SCC 141, the Court  held:

           “15. The crucial significance of access jurisprudence  has  been
           best expressed by Cappelletti:

                 “The right of effective access to justice has emerged  with
                 the  new  social  rights.   Indeed,  it  is  of   paramount
                 importance among  these  new  rights  since,  clearly,  the
                 enjoyment of traditional  as  well  as  new  social  rights
                 presupposes  mechanisms  for  their  effective  protection.
                 Such protection, moreover, is best assured  be  a  workable
                 remedy  within  the  framework  of  the  judicial   system.
                 Effective access to justice can thus be seen  as  the  most
                 basic requirement the most basic ‘human-right’ of a  system
                 which purports to guarantee legal rights.”

           16.   We  are  thus  satisfied  that  the  bogey  of  busybodies
           blackmailing adversaries through frivolous invocation of Article
           136 is chimerical.  Access to justice to every bona fide  seeker
           is a democratic dimension  of  remedial  jurisprudence  even  as
           public interest litigation, class action, pro bono  proceedings,
           are.  We cannot dwell in the  home  of  processual  obsolescence
           when our Constitution highlights social justice as a  goal.   We
           hold that there is no merit  in  the  contentions  of  the  writ
           petitioner and dismiss the petition.”




31.   It has been consistently stated by this Court that the entire journey
of a Judge is to discern  the  truth  from  the  pleadings,  documents  and
arguments of the parties, as truth is the basis  of  the  Justice  Delivery
System.

32.   With the passage of time, it has been realised that  people  used  to
feel  proud  to  tell  the  truth  in  the  Courts,  irrespective  of   the
consequences but that practice no longer proves true, in  all  cases.   The
Court does not sit simply as an umpire in a contest between two parties and
declare at the end of the combat as to who has won and who has lost but  it
has a legal duty of its own, independent of parties, to take active role in
the proceedings and  reach  at  the  truth,  which  is  the  foundation  of
administration of justice.  Therefore, the truth should become the ideal to
inspire the  courts  to  pursue.   This  can  be  achieved  by  statutorily
mandating the Courts to become active seekers  of  truth.   To  enable  the
courts to ward off unjustified interference in  their  working,  those  who
indulge  in  immoral  acts  like  perjury,  prevarication   and   motivated
falsehood, must be  appropriately  dealt  with.   The  parties  must  state
forthwith sufficient factual details to the  extent  that  it  reduces  the
ability to put forward false and exaggerated claims  and  a  litigant  must
approach the Court with clean hands.  It is the bounden duty of  the  Court
to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to surpass the legal process must
be effectively curbed and the Court must ensure that there is no  wrongful,
unauthorised or unjust gain to anyone as a result of abuse of  the  process
of the Court.  One way to curb this tendency  is  to  impose  realistic  or
punitive costs.

33.   The party not approaching the Court with clean hands would be  liable
to be non-suited and such party, who has also succeeded  in  polluting  the
stream of justice by making patently false statements, cannot claim relief,
especially under Article 136 of the Constitution.   While  approaching  the
court, a litigant must state correct  facts  and  come  with  clean  hands.
Where such statement of facts is based on some information, the  source  of
such information must also  be  disclosed.  Totally  misconceived  petition
amounts to abuse of the process of the court and such  a  litigant  is  not
required to be dealt with lightly, as a petition containing misleading  and
inaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose  amounts  to
abuse of the process of the court.  A litigant is bound to make  “full  and
true disclosure of facts”. (Refer : Tilokchand H.B. Motichand  &  Ors.   v.
Munshi & Anr. [1969  (1)  SCC  110];  A.  Shanmugam   v.   Ariya  Kshatriya
Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam & Anr.  [(2012)  6
SCC 430]; Chandra Shashi  v.  Anil Kumar Verma [(1995) SCC 1 421]; Abhyudya
Sanstha  v.  Union of India & Ors. [(2011) 6  SCC  145];  State  of  Madhya
Pradesh   v.   Narmada  Bachao  Andolan  &  Anr.  [(2011)   7   SCC   639];
Kalyaneshwari  v.  Union of India & Anr. [(2011) 3 SCC 287)].

34.   The person seeking equity must do equity.  It is not just  the  clean
hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean objective  that  are  the
equi-fundamentals of judicious litigation.  The legal  maxim  jure  naturae
aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri  locupletiorem,
which means that it is a law of nature that one should not be  enriched  by
the  loss  or  injury  to  another,  is  the  percept  for  Courts.    Wide
jurisdiction of the court should not  become  a  source  of  abuse  of  the
process of law by the  disgruntled  litigant.   Careful  exercise  is  also
necessary to ensure that  the  litigation  is  genuine,  not  motivated  by
extraneous considerations and imposes an obligation upon  the  litigant  to
disclose the true facts and approach the court with clean hands.

35.   No litigant can play ‘hide and seek’ with the courts or  adopt  ‘pick
and choose’.  True facts ought to be disclosed as the Court knows law,  but
not facts.  One, who does not come  with  candid  facts  and  clean  breast
cannot hold a  writ  of  the  court  with  soiled  hands.   Suppression  or
concealment of material facts is impermissible to a litigant or even  as  a
technique of advocacy.  In such cases, the Court is duty bound to discharge
rule nisi and such applicant is required to be dealt with for  contempt  of
court for abusing the  process  of  the  court.  {K.D.  Sharma   v.   Steel
Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. [(2008) 12 SCC 481].

36.   Another settled  canon  of  administration  of  justice  is  that  no
litigant should be permitted to  misuse  the  judicial  process  by  filing
frivolous petitions.  No litigant has a right to unlimited drought upon the
court time and public money in order to get  his  affairs  settled  in  the
manner as he wishes.  Easy access to  justice  should  not  be  used  as  a
licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (Buddhi Kota Subbarao
(Dr.)  v.  K. Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530).

37.   In light of these settled principles, if we examine the facts of  the
present case, next friends in both the petitions are guilty of  suppressing
material facts, approaching the court with unclean hands, filing  petitions
with ulterior motive and finally for abusing the process of the court.

38.   In this regard, first of all  we  may  deal  with  the  case  of  the
appellant, Kishore Samrite:

39.   Firstly, he filed Writ Petition No. 111/2011 on vague, uncertain  and
incomplete averments.  In fact, he withheld the fact that the earlier  Writ
Petition No. 3719/2009 had been  dismissed  by  a  Division  Bench  of  the
Allahabad High Court as back as on 17th April, 2009,  while  he  instituted
Writ Petition No. 111/2011 in the year 2011.  The excuse put forward by the
appellant was that he did not know about the dismissal of that case.   This
flimsy excuse is hardly available to the appellant as he  claims  to  be  a
public person (ex-MLA), had allegedly  verified  the  facts  and  incidents
before instituting the petition and made the desired prayers therein.    It
is obvious that subject matter of Writ Petition  No.  3719/2009  must  have
received great publicity before and at the time of  the  dismissal  of  the
writ petition.

40.   Secondly, without verification of any facts, the  appellant  made  an
irresponsible statement that the petitioners Sukanya Devi, Sh. Balram Singh
and Smt. Sumitra Devi were in the illegal  detention  of  Respondent  no.6.
The averments made in the writ petition  were  supported  by  an  affidavit
filed in the High Court stating that contents of paragraphs 1 and 3  to  15
were true, partly true to  knowledge  and  partly  based  on  record  while
paragraphs 2 and 16 were  believed  to  be  correct  as  per  legal  advice
received.  This stood falsified from the fact that the  appellant  did  not
even know the three petitioners, their correct addresses and identity.

41.   Thirdly, in the Writ Petition in paragraph 10, it is stated that  the
petitioners were last seen on 4th January, 2007 in Amethi and the appellant
had not seen them thereafter.   The  appellant  also  claims  in  the  same
paragraph that the facts came  to  his  knowledge  when  he,  in  order  to
personally verify the facts, visited Amethi a couple of times and  also  as
late as in December, 2010. From this, the inference is  that  the  petition
was based upon the facts which the petitioner learnt  and  believed  during
these visits.  On the contrary, when he filed an affidavit in this Court on
25th July, 2012, in paragraph 6 of the affidavit, he stated as under:

             “....The Petitioner has been the Member of Ruling Party in the
             State of M.P. and because of his standing in the  Society,  in
             2007 he was called for by the Samajwadi Party  Leadership,  to
             contest Legislative Assembly Election from Constituency Lanji,
             Dist. Balaghat, Madhya Pradesh, he won  the  Bye-election  and
             remained MLA, during 03.11.2007 to 08.12.2008.  True  Copy  of
             the Identity Card is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE P-
             8.

                 That the Petitioner, from a young age  since  1986  he  has
             been involved in Social Activities, in State of Madhya Pradesh
             being a Social Activist, he has filed several  Writ  Petitions
             before Various High Courts, raising serious public and  Social
             issues, and the issues  concerning  Corruption  and  Crime  in
             Politics, and the courts have been pleased  to  entertain  his
             writ petitions and grant reliefs  in  the  several  such  writ
             Petitions filed by him.  This List of Writ Petitions filed  by
             the Petitioner is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE P-9.

                       That taking into account his standing and  antecedent
                   at behest of  the  leader  of  his  political  party  the
                   Petitioner was called to C-1/135, Pandara Park, New Delhi
                   in 2010 to meet the other Senior  Leaders,  who  were  in
                   Delhi as the Parliament was  in  Session,  where  he  was
                   appraised about the facts of the  serious  incident  that
                   had been reported from a village in U.P. and in  view  of
                   the fact that he had taken up several  public  causes  in
                   the past he was requested to file a Writ Petition in  the
                   nature of a public interest litigation in the High  Court
                   of Judicature at Allahabad Lucknow Bench at  Lucknow  and
                   thus the Writ Petition came  to  be  filed.   Notice  was
                   issued in the said Writ Petition.”



42.   Thus, there is definite contradiction  and  falsehood  in  the  stand
taken by the petitioner in the writ petition and  in  the  affidavit  filed
before this court, as afore-noticed.  This clearly indicates the  falsehood
in the averments made and the intention of the appellant  to  misguide  the
courts by filing such frivolous petitions.  No  details,  whatsoever,  have
been furnished to state as to how he verified the alleged website  news  of
the incident of 3rd December, 2006 and from whom.  Strangely,  he  did  not
even know the petitioners and could not even identify them.  The prayer  in
the writ petition was for issuance of a direction in the nature  of  habeas
corpus to respondent no.6 to produce the petitioners.  And lastly, the writ
petition is full of irresponsible allegations which, as now  appears,  were
not true to the knowledge of the petitioner, as he claimed to have acted as
next friend of the petitioners while he was no relation, friend or  even  a
person known to the petitioners.  His acting as  the  next  friend  of  the
petitioners smacks of  malice,  ulterior  motive  and  misuse  of  judicial
process.

43.   The alleged website provides that the girl was missing.  It  was  not
reported there that she and her parents were in illegal  detention  of  the
respondent no.6.  So by no means, it could not be a case of habeas corpus.

44.   Now, we would deal with Writ Petition No.125 of  2011  instituted  by
Sh. Gajender Pal Singh, respondent No.8 in this appeal, being  next  friend
of petitioners Sukanya Devi, Sh. Balram Singh and Sh.  Sumitra  Devi.   The
glaring factors showing abuse of process of Court and attempt to circumvent
the prescribed procedure can be highlighted, inter alia, but primarily from
the following :

     a)     Sh. Gajender Pal Singh also had no relationship, friendship  or
        had not even known the three petitioners.

     b)    In face of the statements made by the three  petitioners  before
        the Police and the CBI, stating that  they  had  never  approached,
        asked or even expected respondent No.8 to act as  next  friend,  he
        had no authority to act as their next friend before the  Court  and
        pray for such relief.

     c)    In the garb of petition for habeas corpus, he filed  a  petition
        asking for transfer of Writ Petition No.111 of 2011,  to  which  he
        was neither a party nor had any interest.

      d) Respondent No.8 intentionally did  not  appear  in  writ  petition
         No.111 of 2011 raising the question of jurisdiction or  any  other
         question but circumvented the process  of  Court  by  filing  Writ
         Petition No.125 of 2011 with the prayers  including  investigation
         by an authority against the petitioner in writ petition No.111  of
         2011.  Respondent No.8, despite being a resident of that very area
         and town, Amethi, did not even care to mention about the dismissal
         of Writ Petition No.3719 of 2009.

      e) In the writ petition, he claimed to be a neighbour  of  the  three
         petitioners but did not even know this much that  the  petitioners
         had, quite some time back, shifted to Village Hardoia in  district
         Faizabad.  He also stated in paragrah 5 of the writ petition  that
         he was neighbour of the petitioners and having not seen them,  had
         sought to lodge a police report, which the authorities refused  to
         take on the ground that the petitioners were  in  custody  of  the
         police as they had committed some wrong.  This  averment,  to  the
         knowledge of the petitioner, was false inasmuch  as  the  Director
         General of Police, U.P. had stated in his affidavit that they were
         never detained or called to the police station.  In fact, they had
         shifted their house to the aforestated Village.   Respondent  No.8
         has, thus, for obvious and with ulterior motive abused the process
         of the court and filed a petition based on falsehood, came to  the
         Court with unclean hands and  even  attempted  to  circumvent  the
         process of law by making motivated and  untenable  prayers.   This
         petitioner (respondent No.8) also made  irresponsible  allegations
         stating that Kishore Samrite, petitioner in Writ  Petition  No.111
         of 2011, was a mentally challenged person.

45.   From the above specific averments made in the writ petitions,  it  is
clear that both these petitioners have approached the Court with falsehood,
unclean hands and have misled the courts by showing urgency and  exigencies
in relation to an incident of 3rd December, 2006 which, in fact,  according
to the three petitioners and the police was false,  have  thus  abused  the
process of the court and misused the judicial  process.   They  maliciously
and with ulterior motives encroached upon the valuable time  of  the  Court
and wasted public money.  It is a settled canon  that  no  litigant  has  a
right to unlimited drought upon the court time and public money in order to
get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes.  The privilege of  easy
access to justice has been abused by these petitioners by filing  frivolous
and misconceived petitions.  On  the  basis  of  incorrect  and  incomplete
allegations, they had  created  urgency  for  expeditious  hearing  of  the
petitions, which never existed.  Even this Court had to spend days to reach
at the truth.  Prima facie it is clear that both these petitioners have mis-
stated facts, withheld true  facts  and  even  given  false  and  incorrect
affidavits.  They well knew that  Courts  are  going  to  rely  upon  their
pleadings and affidavits while passing appropriate  orders.   The  Director
General of Police, U.P., was required to file an affidavit and CBI directed
to conduct investigation.   Truth  being  the  basis  of  justice  delivery
system, it was important for this Court to reach at  the  truth,  which  we
were able to reach at with the able assistance of all the counsel and  have
no hesitation in holding that the case of  both  the  petitioners  suffered
from falsehood, was misconceived  and  was  a  patent  misuse  of  judicial
process.  Abuse of the process of the Court and not approaching  the  Court
with complete facts and clean hands, has compelled  this  Court  to  impose
heavy and penal costs on the persons acting as next  friends  in  the  writ
petitions before the High Court.  This Court  cannot  permit  the  judicial
process to become an instrument  of  oppression  or  abuse  or  to  subvert
justice by unscrupulous litigants like the petitioners in the present case.

Locus Standi

46.   Having discussed the abuse of process of Court and misuse of judicial
process by both the petitioners, the issue of locus standi would  obviously
fall within a very narrow compass.  The  question  of  locus  standi  would
normally be a question of fact and law both.  The issue  could  be  decided
with reference to the given facts and not in isolation.  We have stated the
facts and the stand of the respective parties in some  detail.   Both,  the
appellant and respondent No.8, had filed their  respective  writ  petitions
before the Allahabad High Court as next friends of  the  three  petitioners
whose names have not been stated with complete correctness in both the writ
petitions.  There has been complete contradiction in the  allegations  made
in the two writ petitions by the respective petitioners.  According to  the
appellant, the three stated petitioners  were  illegally  detained  by  the
respondent no.6 while according to the respondent no.8 they  were  detained
by the authorities.  These contradictory and  untrue  allegations  are  the
very foundation of these writ petitions.  It may also be  noticed  that  in
both the writ petitions, baseless allegations  in  regard  to  the  alleged
incident of 3rd December, 2006, involving the  respondent  no.6,  had  also
been raised.

47.   Ordinarily, the party aggrieved by any order has the  right  to  seek
relief by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of that  order.
There could be cases where a person is not directly affected but  has  some
personal stake in the outcome of a petition.  In such cases,  he  may  move
the Court as a guardian or next friend for and on behalf  of  the  disabled
aggrieved party.  Normally, a total stranger would not act as next  friend.
In the case of Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India [(1992) 4  SCC  653],
this Court held that a total stranger to the trial  commenced  against  the
convicts, cannot be permitted to question the correctness of the conviction
recorded against some convicts unless an  aggrieved  party  is  under  some
disability recognised by law, othewise it would be unsafe or  hazardous  to
allow a third party to question the decision against him.  In the  case  of
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [AIR (1982) SC 149], the Court stated, “but we
must be careful to see that the member of the public,  who  approaches  the
court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal  gain
or private profit or political motivation or other  oblique  consideration.
The court must not allow its  process  to  be  abused  by  politicians  and
others.”  Dealing with the question of the next friend bringing a  petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court in the case  of  Karamjeet
Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 4 SCC 666], held as under :

           “We are afraid these observations do not permit  a  mere  friend
           like the petitioner to initiate the proceedings of  the  present
           nature under Article 32 of the  Constitution.  The  observations
           relied upon relate to a  minor  or  an  insane  or  one  who  is
           suffering from any other disability which the law recognises  as
           sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next friend,  to  move
           the Court on his behalf; for example see :  Sections  320(4)(a),
           330(2) read with Section  335(1)(b)  and  339  of  the  Code  of
           Criminal Procedure. Admittedly,  it  is  not  the  case  of  the
           petitioner that the two convicts are minors  or  insane  persons
           but the learned counsel argued that since  they  were  suffering
           from an acute  obsession  such  obsession  amounts  to  a  legal
           disability which permits the next friend to initiate proceedings
           under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think that  such
           a contention is tenable. The disability must be  one  which  the
           law recognises.”



48.   Dealing with public interest litigation and the cases  instituted  by
strangers or busybodies, this Court in the following  cases  cautioned  the
courts and even required that they be dismissed at the threshold:

I)    Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305, at page 347  :

           “Sarkaria,  J.  in  Jasbhai  Motibhai  Desai  v.  Roshan   Kumar
           expressed his view that the application of the  busybody  should
           be rejected at the threshold in the following terms:

                 ‘It will be seen that in the context  of  locus  standi  to
                 apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily
                 fall in any of these categories:  (i)  ‘person  aggrieved’;
                 (ii) ‘stranger’; (iii) busybody or  meddlesome  interloper.
                 Persons in the last  category  are  easily  distinguishable
                 from those coming under  the  first  two  categories.  Such
                 persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They
                 masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in
                 the name of pro bono publico, though they have no  interest
                 of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge
                 in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either
                 by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are
                 actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap  popularity;
                 while the  ulterior  intent  of  some  applicants  in  this
                 category, may  be  no  more  than  spoking  the  wheels  of
                 administration. The High Court should do well to reject the
                 applications of such busybodies at the threshold’.”



II)   R & M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group (2005) 3 SCC  91]



           “25. In this connection  reference  may  be  made  to  a  recent
           decision given by this Court in the  case  of  Dattaraj  Nathuji
           Thaware v. State of Maharashtra in which Hon'ble Pasayat, J. has
           also observed as follows:

                 ‘12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be
                 used with great care and circumspection and  the  judiciary
                 has  to  be  extremely  careful  to  see  that  behind  the
                 beautiful veil of public interest, an ugly private  malice,
                 vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It
                 is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of  law
                 for delivering social justice to citizens.  The  attractive
                 brand name of public interest litigation should not be used
                 for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed  at
                 redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and  not
                 be publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta’.”



49.   On the analysis of the above principles, it is clear  that  a  person
who brings a petition even for invocation of a fundamental right must be  a
person having some direct or  indirect  interest  in  the  outcome  of  the
petition on his behalf or on behalf  of  some  person  under  a  disability
and/or unable to have access to the  justice  system  for  patent  reasons.
Still, such a person must act bonafidely and without abusing the process of
law.  Where a person is a  stranger/unknown  to  the  parties  and  has  no
interest in the outcome of the litigation, he can hardly claim locus standi
to file such petition.  There could be cases where a public spirited person
bonafidely brings petition in relation to violation of fundamental  rights,
particularly in habeas corpus petitions, but even in such cases, the person
should have some demonstrable interest  or  relationship  to  the  involved
persons, personally or for the benefit of the public at large,  in  a  PIL.
But in all such cases, it is essential that  the  petitioner  must  exhibit
bonafides, by truthful and cautious exercise  of  such  right.  The  Courts
would be expected to examine such  requirement  at  the  threshold  of  the
litigation in order to prevent abuse of  the  process  of  court.   In  the
present case, both the appellant and respondent No.8 are total strangers to
the three mentioned petitioners.  Appellant, in  fact,  is  a  resident  of
Madhya  Pradesh,  belonging  to  a  political  party  and  was  elected  in
constituency Tehsil Lanji in District Balaghat at Madhya Pradesh.   He  has
no roots in Amethi and, in fact, he was a  stranger  to  that  place.   The
appellant as well as respondent No.8 did not even know that the persons  on
whose behalf they have acted as next friend had shifted their residence  in
the year 2010 to Hardoia  in  District  Faizabad.   They  have  made  false
averments in the petition and have withheld true facts from the Court.

50.   This Court, in the case of Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v.  The  Union  of
India & Ors. [AIR 1951 SC 41], while discussing the distinction between the
rights and possibility of invocation of legal remedy of  a  company  and  a
shareholder, expressed the view that this follows logically from  the  rule
of law that a corporation has a distinct legal personality of its own  with
rights and capacities, duties and obligations separate from  those  of  its
individual members.  As the rights are different and  inhere  in  different
legal entities, it is not competent to one person to seek  to  enforce  the
right of another except where the law permits him to do so.  A  well  known
illustration of such exception  is  furnished  by  the  procedure  that  is
sanctioned in an application for a writ of habeas corpus.  Not only the man
who is imprisoned or detained in confinement but any person, provided he is
not an absolute stranger, can institute proceedings to  obtain  a  writ  of
habeas corpus for  the  purpose  of  liberating  another  from  an  illegal
imprisonment.  It is not a case of a mere third  person  moving  the  court
simpliciter on behalf of persons under alleged detention.  It is a case  of
definite improprietory  abuse  of  process  of  court,  justice  and  is  a
motivated attempt based on falsehood to misguide the  Court  and  primarily
for publicity or political vendetta.  More so, when the petitioners in  the
writ petitions have categorically stated that they made no complaint of the
alleged incident of 3rd December, 2006 and never authorised,  requested  or
approached either of the petitioners to move the court for redressal of any
grievance.  The question of filing habeas corpus petitions on their  behalf
would not arise because they were living at their own  house  and  enjoying
all freedoms.  According to them, they were detained by none at  any  point
of time either by respondent No.6 or the Police authorities.   In  face  of
this definite stand taken by these persons, the question  of  locus  standi
has to be answered against both the petitioners.  In fact, it is  not  only
abuse of the process of the Court but also is a case of access  to  justice
unauthorisedly  and  illegally.   Their  whole  modus  operandi  would   be
unacceptable in law.  Thus, we have no hesitation in holding on  the  facts
of the present case that both  the  petitioners  had  no  locus  standi  to
approach the High Court of Allahabad in the manner and method in which they
did.  It was contended on behalf of the appellant  as  well  as  respondent
No.8 that a petition for habeas corpus is not struck by  the  rule  of  res
judicata or constructive res judicata.  According to them, the decision  of
the Writ Petition  No.3719  of  2009  was  in  no  way  an  impediment  for
institution of the writ petition as in the case of habeas corpus every  day
would be a fresh and a continuing  cause  of  action.   For  this  purpose,
reliance has been placed upon the judgment of this Court  in  the  case  of
Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India [AIR 1967 SC 1335] and Kirti  Kumar  Chaman
Lal Kundaliya v. Union of India [AIR 1981 SC 1621].  We do not consider  it
necessary to decide this question as a question of law  in  the  facts  and
circumstances of the present case particularly  in  view  of  the  findings
recorded by us on other issues.  Suffice it to note that  the  judgment  of
the Allahabad High Court dated 17th April, 2009 in Civil Writ Petition 3719
of 2009 had attained finality as the legality or  correctness  thereof  was
not challenged by any person.  There can hardly  be  any  doubt  that  upon
pronouncement of this judgment this case squarely fell in the public domain
and was obviously known to both the  petitioners  but  they  did  not  even
consider it  necessary  to  mention  the  same  in  their  respective  writ
petitions.  Another contention that  has  been  raised  on  behalf  of  the
appellant is that a petition of habeas corpus lies  not  only  against  the
Executive Authority but  also  against  private  individual.   Reliance  is
placed on the case of In Re: Shri Sham  Lal  [(1978)  2  SCC  479].   As  a
proposition  of  law,  there  is  no  dispute  raised  before  us  to  this
proposition.  Thus, there is no occasion for this Court  to  deliberate  on
this issue in any further elaboration.

51.   Having dealt with various aspects of this case, now we must revert to
the essence of the present appeal on facts.  The  petitions  instituted  by
the appellant and respondent No.8 were certainly an abuse of the process of
Court.  They have encroached upon the valuable time  of  the  courts.   The
contradictory stands taken before the courts and their  entire  case  being
denied by the petitioners themselves clearly show that  they  have  misused
the judicial process and  have  stated  facts  that  are  untrue  to  their
knowledge.  The alleged  incident  which,  according  to  the  petitioners,
police and the CBI, never happened and illegal detention of the petitioners
has been falsified by the petitioners themselves in the writ petitions.  It
is a matter of regret that the process of the  court  has  been  abused  by
unscrupulous litigants just to attain publicity and  adversely  affect  the
reputation of another politician, respondent  No.6.   One  of  the  obvious
reasons which can reasonably  be  inferred  from  the  peculiar  facts  and
circumstances of the case is  the  political  rivalry.   According  to  the
counsel  appearing  for  respondent  No.6,  it  is  a  case  of   political
mudslinging.  He has rightly contended that the  websites  information  was
nothing but secondary evidence, as  stated  by  this  Court  in  Samant  N.
Balkrishna & Anr. v. V. George Fernandez and Ors. [(1969) 3  SCC  238]  but
not even an iota of  evidence  has  been  placed  on  record  of  the  writ
petitions before the High Court or even in the appeal  before  this  Court,
which could even show the remote possibility of happening  of  the  alleged
rape incident on 3rd December, 2006.  There is an affidavit by  the  police
and report by the CBI to show that this incident  never  occurred  and  the
three petitioners have specifically disputed and denied any  such  incident
or making of any report in relation  thereto  or  even  in  regard  to  the
alleged illegal detention.  Political rivalry can lead to such  ill-founded
litigation.  In the case of Gosu Jayarami Reddy & Anr. v. State  of  Andhra
Pradesh [(2011) 11 SCC 766], this Court observed that political rivalry  at
times degenerates into personal vendetta where principles and policies take
a back seat and personal ambition and longing for power drive men to commit
the foulest of  deeds  to  avenge  defeat  and  to  settle  scores.   These
observations aptly apply to the facts of the present case particularly  the
writ petition preferred by the appellant.  At one place, he claims to  have
acted as a public figure with good conscience but has stated  false  facts.
On the other hand, he takes a somersault and claims that he  acted  on  the
directives of the political figures.  It is unworthy of a public figure  to
act in such a manner and demonstrate a behaviour which is impermissible  in
law.  Appellant as well as respondent No.8 filed  Habeas  corpus  petitions
claiming it to be a petition for attainment of public confidence and  right
to life.  In the garb of doctrines like the Right to Liberty and access  to
justice, these petitioners not only intended but  actually  filed  improper
and untenable petitions, primarily with the object of  attaining  publicity
and causing injury to the reputation of others.  The term ‘person’ includes
not only the physical body and members but  also  every  bodily  sense  and
personal attribute among which  is  the  reputation  a  man  has  acquired.
Reputation can also be defined to be  good  name,  the  credit,  honour  or
character which is derived from a favourable public opinion or esteem,  and
character by report.  The right to enjoyment of  a  good  reputation  is  a
valuable privilege of  ancient  origin  and  necessary  to  human  society.
‘Reputation’ is an  element  of  personal  security  and  is  protected  by
Constitution equally with the right  to  enjoyment  of  life,  liberty  and
property.   Although  ‘character’   and   ‘reputation’   are   often   used
synonymously, but these terms are distinguishable.  ‘Character’ is  what  a
man is and ‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what people say  he
is.  ‘Character’  depends  on  attributes  possessed  and  ‘reputation’  on
attributes which others believe  one  to  possess.   The  former  signifies
reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be  reality  at  present.
{Ref. Smt. Kiran Bedi v. The Committee of Inquiry & Anr. [(1989) 1 SCC 494]
and Nilgiris Bar Association v. T.K. Mahalingam & Anr. [AIR 1998 SC  398]}.
The methodology adopted by the next friends in the  writ  petitions  before
the High Court was  opposed  to  political  values  and  administration  of
justice.  In the case of Kusum Lata v. Union of India [(2006) 6  SCC  180],
this Court observed that when there is material to  show  that  a  petition
styled as a public interest litigation  is  nothing  but  a  camouflage  to
foster personal disputes,  the said petition should  be  dismissed  by  the
Court.  If such petitions are not properly regulated and abuse averted,  it
becomes a  tool  in  unscrupulous  hands  to  release  vendetta  and  wreak
vengeance as well.

52.   In light of these legal principles, appellant  and,  in  fact,  to  a
great extent even  respondent  No.8  have  made  an  attempt  to  hurt  the
reputation and image of respondent no.6 by stating  incorrect  facts,  that
too, by abusing the process of court.

53.   Coming to the judgment of the High Court under appeal it  has  to  be
noticed that the appellant was deprived of adequate  hearing  by  the  High
Court, but that defect stands cured  inasmuch  as  we  have  heard  of  the
concerned parties in both the writ petitions at length.   The  transfer  of
Writ Petition No. 111/2011 was not in consonance with the  accepted  canons
of judicial administrative propriety.  The imposition of such  heavy  costs
upon the petitioner was not called for in the facts  and  circumstances  of
the case as the Court was not dealing with a suit for damages  but  with  a
petition for habeas corpus,  even  if  the  petition  was  not  bona  fide.
Furthermore, we are unable to endorse our approval to the manner  in  which
the costs imposed were ordered to be disbursed to  the  different  parties.
Moreover, the question of paying rewards to the Director General of  Police
does not arise as the police and the Director General of Police  were  only
performing their duties by producing the petitioners in the  Court.   They,
in any case, were living in their own house without restriction or any kind
of  detention  by  anyone.   In  fact,  the  three  petitioners  have  been
compulsorily dragged to the court by the petitioner in  Writ  Petition  No.
125/2011.  They had made no complaint to any person and thus, the  question
of their illegal detention  and  consequential  release  would  not  arise.
These three persons have been used by both the petitioners and  it  is,  in
fact, they are the ones whose reputation has suffered a serious setback and
were exposed to inconvenience of being dragged to courts for  no  fault  of
their own.  We hardly see any attributes of the Police  except  performance
of their duties in the normal course so as to entitled them to  exceptional
rewards.  Certainly, the  reputation  of  respondent  no.6  has  also  been
damaged,  factually  and  in  law.   Both  these  petitions  are  based  on
falsehood.  The reputation of respondent no.6 is  damaged  and  his  public
image  diminished  due  to  the  undesirable  acts  of  the  appellant  and
respondent no.8.

54.   For these reasons, we are unable to sustain the order under appeal in
its entirety and while modifying the judgments under appeal,  we  pass  the
following order: -

     1.  Writ petition No. 111/2011 was based upon falsehood, was abuse  of
        the process of  court  and  was  driven  by  malice  and  political
        vendetta.    Thus,  while  dismissing  this  petition,  we   impose
        exemplary costs of Rs. 5 lacs upon the  next  friend,  costs  being
        payable to respondent no.6.

     2. The next friend in Writ Petition No. 125/2011  had  approached  the
        court with unclean hands, without  disclosing  complete  facts  and
        misusing the judicial process.  In  fact,  he  filed  the  petition
        without any proper authority, in  fact  and  in  law.   Thus,  this
        petition is also dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 5 lakhs  for
        abuse of the process of the court and/or for  such  other  offences
        that they are found to have committed, which shall  be  payable  to
        the three petitioners produced before  the  High  Court,  i.e.  Ms.
        Kirti Singh, Dr. Balram Singh and Ms. Sushila @ Mohini Devi.

     3. On the basis of the affidavit filed  by  the  Director  General  of
        Police, U.P., statement  of  the  three  petitioners  in  the  Writ
        Petition,  CBI’s  stand  before  the  Court,  its  report  and  the
        contradictory stand taken by  the  next  friend  in  Writ  Petition
        No.111/2011, we, prima facie, are of the view that the  allegations
        against the respondent no.6 in regard to the  alleged  incident  of
        rape on 3rd  December,  2006  and  the  alleged  detention  of  the
        petitioners, are without substance and there is not even an iota of
        evidence before the  Court  to  validly  form  an  opinion  to  the
        contrary.  In fact, as  per  the  petitioners  (allegedly  detained
        persons), they were never detained by any person at  any  point  of
        time.

     4. The CBI shall continue the  investigation  in  furtherance  to  the
        direction of the High Court against petitioner in Writ Petition No.
        111/2011 and all other persons responsible for  the  abuse  of  the
        process of Court, making false statement in pleadings, filing false
        affidavits and committing such other offences as the  Investigating
        Agency may find during investigation.  The  CBI  shall  submit  its
        report to the court of competent jurisdiction as  expeditiously  as
        possible and not later than six months from the date of passing  of
        this order.

     5. These directions  are  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  the
        respective parties to take such legal remedy as may be available to
        them in accordance with law.  We also make it clear that the  Court
        of competent jurisdiction or the  CBI  would  not  in  any  way  be
        influenced by the observations made in this judgment  or  even  the
        judgment of the High Court.  All the pleas  and  contentions  which
        may be raised by the parties are left open.

55.   The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.



                                                              ..…………………………J.
                                                              (B.S. Chauhan)




                                                              ..…………………………J.
                                                           (Swatanter Kumar)
New Delhi,
October 18, 2012






























ITEM NO.1A           COURT NO.12         SECTION II        (For Judgment)

            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A

                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1406 OF 2012

KISHORE SAMRITE                                  Appellant(s)

                 VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                             Respondent(s)



Date: 18/10/2012 This Appeal was called on for pronouncement

                   of Judgment today.



For Petitioner(s)      Ms. Kamini Jaiswal,Adv.



For Respondent(s)

Respondent No. 6 Mr. P.P. Rao, Sr. Adv.

                 Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, Adv.

                 Mr. G. Balaji, Adv.




CBI              Mr. Harin P.Raval, ASG

                 Mr. Rajiv Nanda, Adv.

                 Mr. P.K. Dey, Adv.

                 Mr. B.V. Balram Das,Adv.

                 Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma ,Adv




State of U.P.

                 Mr. Rakesh Diwedi,Sr.Adv.

                 Mr. Gaurav Bhatia,AAG, U.P.

                 Mr. Gaurav Dhingra,Adv.

                 Mr. Avnish Pandey,Adv.

                 Mr. Gautam Talukdar,Adv.




Respondent Nos. 4 & 5

                 Mr. S.P. Singh, Sr. Adv.

                 Mr. V.K. Biju, Adv.

                 Ms. Sadhana Sandhu,Adv.

                 Ms. Sunita Sharma,Adv.

                 Mr. B.V. Balramdas, Adv.

                 Mrs. Anil Katiyar,Adv.



Respondent No.8  Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi,Sr.Adv.

                 Mr. Subramonium Prasad,Adv.

                 Mr. Raj Kamal,Adv.

                 Mr. Kuber Boddh,Adv.






                   Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Swatanter  Kumar  pronounced   the
      judgment of the Bench comprising of Hon'ble  Dr.Justice  B.S.  Chauhan
      and His Lordship.

                  The impugned  judgment  is  modified  and  the  appeal  is
      disposed of in terms of the signed Judgment.




     (A.S. BISHT)                            (INDU BALA KAPUR)

     COURT MASTER                          COURT MASTER
             (Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file)