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Tuesday, October 30, 2012

Mortgage - deposit of title deeds - default - sale underthe State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 - in meanwhile private sale - not valid - High court cannot set aside the corporation sale as it was done underthe State Financial Corporation Act, 1951= the property in question was duly advertised for sale pursuant whereto the fifth respondent had offered the highest amount. On acceptance of the said offer by the UPFC, the entire amount was paid and the sale was confirmed by the Corporation. No sale deed was however executed by the Corporation in favour of the fifth respondent. It also appears that before the property was put up for sale by the Corporation, the original owner, Smt. Nisha Devi Jaiswal had sold the same to the third and fourth respondents, who, in turn, had sold the same to the writ petitioner by sale deed dated 29.08.2001. The aforesaid sale by the original owners to the vendors of the writ petitioner and, thereafter, by said vendors to the petitioner himself was made when the property stood mortgaged in favour of the UPFC. It is in the above circumstances, that the writ petitioner had approached the High court seeking interference with the sale of the property made in favour of the fifth respondent pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 issued by the UPFC and further for transfer of the property in favour of the writ petitioner besides restoration of possession thereof which was taken over by the Corporation. 13. The sale made by the UPFC in favour of the fifth respondent was in exercise of the statutory powers vested in the Corporation by Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Under the aforesaid provisions of the Act default in re-payment of any loan by an industrial undertaking vests in the Financial Corporation the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern along with the right to transfer the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation. By virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act such transfer of property by the Corporation will vest in the transferee all rights in the property as if the transfer had been made by the owner thereof. 14. No serious issue either with regard to the validity of the exercise of the power under the Act or the manner of sale of the property by the Corporation pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 had been raised in the Writ Petition. What was contended before the High Court is that the Writ Petitioner, Vishnu Dutt Sharma, had purchased the property by sale deed dated 29.08.2001 without any knowledge or information of the mortgage created by the original owner, Smt. Nisha Devi Jaiswal in favour of the Corporation and that the sale pursuant to the advertisement was also without notice to him. A right to the property based on certain equitable principles was also claimed to strengthen which, the offer covered by the interim order of the High Court dated 28.05.2003 was made by the writ petitioner. 15. The issues raised by the writ petitioner before the High court really pertained to the claim of better title of the writ petitioner to the property in question on the basis of the sale deed dated 29.08.2001. The validity of the sale deed dated 29.08.2001 executed in favour of the writ petitioner by his vendors during the subsistence of the mortgage in favour of the Corporation and the rights of the fifth respondent to the said property on the basis of the sale made in his favour by the Corporation pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 are the issues that arose in the Writ Petition. Broad and expansive though the powers of the High Court under Article 226 may be, adjudication of the aforesaid questions, some of which also required proof of certain basic facts, in our view, was not appropriate in the domain of public law. Though the High Court in its order dated 05.12.2006 did not expressly say so, the affect of the several directions issued by it, in fact, amounts to an adjudication of the issues outlined above. 16. The essence of the dispute between the parties denuded the lis a public law character. Nor was any issue arising out of public law functions of the State or its authorities involved. In such a situation resort to the public law remedy should not have entertained by the High Court. (Vide Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra[1]). Even if the vindication of the writ petitioner’s rights under the sale deed dated 29.08.2001 is ignored and we are to proceed on the basis that the writ petitioner questioned the sale made by the Corporation, the writ petitioner would not be entitled to an adjudication of the rights of the parties inter se but at best to a judicial review of the administrative action of the Corporation with regard to the sale made (Vide Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. and ors. vs. Vardan Linkers and others[2] ) But as already noticed neither the exercise of the statutory power under the Act by the Corporation in the matter of the sale of the property nor the process of the sale transaction was questioned in the Writ Petition either on account of lack of jurisdiction or abuse of authority. In the above facts, the High Court should have refused an adjudication of the Writ Petition and, instead, ought to have required the aggrieved parties to seek their remedies in an appropriate manner and before the competent civil forum. 17. In view of the above discussions, we allow both the appeals and set aside the order dated 05.12.2006 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital.



|REPORTABLE                   |


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL No. 7597   of 2012
                   (Arising out of SLP (Civil) 6521/2007)


PRADEEP KUMAR SHARMA                                 … Appellant

                                   Versus


U.P.F.C. RAJPUR ROAD, DEHRADUN & ORS                 … Respondents

                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL No. 7598  of 2012
                   (Arising out of SLP (Civil) 11835/2007)


                            J  U  D  G M  E  N T


RANJAN GOGOI, J


      Leave granted.




2.    Both the appeals are directed against the judgment and  final  order
dated 05.12.2006 passed by the High Court of  Uttaranchal  in  Crl.  Misc.
Writ Petition No. 196 of 2003 (M/B).
3.    A recital of the facts stated by the appellant Uttar Pradesh Finance
Corporation (UPFC) in the appeal filed by it would suffice for the purpose
of the adjudication that is required to be made in the present appeals.
4.    A term loan of Rs. 4.55 lacs was sanctioned by the UPFC to one  M/s.
Sangam Ice Cream (hereinafter shall be referred to  as  the  borrower),  a
proprietorship concern owned by one, Smt. Nisha Devi Jaiswal.   To  secure
the repayment of  the  aforesaid  loan  together  with  the  interest  due
thereon, the borrower had created an equitable  mortgage,  by  deposit  of
title deeds, of land measuring 192.34 sq. meter  or  0.048  acres  bearing
Khasra No. 496 along with the constructions standing  thereon  located  at
Mauza Niranjanpur, Pargana Kendriya Doon Tehsil and District Dehradun.
5.    After sanction of the aforesaid loan, the borrower  availed  a  part
thereof but defaulted in payment of the installments due. As such  default
became chronic and persistent, the UPFC invoking its power  under  Section
29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, issued notice dated 20.12.1994,
calling upon the borrower to clear all the dues failing which recovery  of
proceedings including sale of mortgaged property was  contemplated.     As
despite the said Notice the dues of the  Corporation  remained  unpaid  an
advertisement was issued in the newspaper “Doon Darpan” on 22.09.1996  for
sale of the mortgaged property.  The Corporation, however, did not receive
any suitable offer pursuant to the advertisement issued.  The fresh second
advertisement, nevertheless, came to be issued  only  in  the  edition  of
“Amar Ujala” on 20.10.2002.   It appears that, in the meantime,  the  sole
proprietor of the borrower firm, Smt. Nisha Devi Jaiswal, executed a  sale
deed in respect of the land in favour of two other  persons,  i.e.  Deepak
Kumar Bishnoi and Smt. Sarita Rani, who, in turn, sold the  said  property
to one Vishnu Dutt Sharma by sale deed dated 29.08.2001.
6.    Pursuant to the second advertisement dated 20.10.2002  published  in
the edition of Amal Ujala, one Pradeep Kumar Sharma submitted his offer of
Rs. 4.50 lacs along with a bank draft of Rs. 50,000/-  as  earnest  money.
The UPFC issued another advertisement in the edition of  “Dainik  Jagaran”
dated 01.11.2002 indicating a price offered by Pradeep  Kumar  Sharma  for
the property in question and calling upon the borrower /  members  of  the
public to submit their better offer, if any.    Evidently,  there  was  no
response to the aforesaid advertisement dated 01.11.2002 published in  the
“Dainik Jagaran”.  Therefore on 31.12.2002, the Corporation  accorded  its
approval for the sale of the land in favour of Shri Pradeep  Kumar  Sharma
and on 14.01.2003, a deposit of another sum of Rs. 1.75 lacs was  made  by
the aforesaid Pradeep Kumar Sharma. On 27.02.2003, the balance  amount  of
the offered price i.e. Rs.2.25  lacs  was  tendered  to  the  Corporation.

7.    While the matter  was  so  situated,  Vishnu  Dutt  Sharma  who  had
purchased the property by the sale  deed  dated  29.08.2001  instituted  a
suit, i.e. O.S. 75/2003 contending that on 06.02.2003, while  he  and  his
family members were away, possession of the property in question was taken
over by the Corporation.   Restoration of  possession  was  the  principal
relief prayed for in the aforesaid suit. Thereafter, stating that from the
written statement filed in the suit by the Corporation it transpired  that
the property purchased by him (Vishnu  Dutt  Sharma)  stood  mortgaged  in
favour of the Corporation on account of a loan taken by the original owner
thereof and that pursuant to the said Notice published  in  the  newspaper
“Dainik Jagaran” dated 20.10.2002, the property had been purchased by  one
Pradeep Kumar Sharma, a Writ Petition was filed impleading  the  UPFC  and
its Managing Director as the first and second  respondents,  Deepak  Kumar
Bisnoi and Sarita Rani  as  the  third  and  fourth  respondents  and  the
purchaser Pradeep Kumar Sharma as the fifth respondent.
8.    In the said Writ Petition, the prayer made was for quashing  of  the
sale made in favour of the  fifth  respondent  and  for  transfer  of  the
property to the writ petitioner and further for restoration of  possession
of the same.  The High Court while entertaining the Writ  Petition  passed
an interim order dated 28.05.2003 permitting the  writ  petitioner  Vishnu
Dutt sharma to make a deposit of Rs. 5 lacs in which event it was directed
that the “accommodation in question shall be handed over to the petitioner
subject to further orders of this court.”  By the  said  order,  the  High
Court also directed that the sale deed will not be executed in  favour  of
the fifth respondent Pradeep Kumar Sharma.
9.  The writ proceeding before the High Court of Uttaranchal was contested
by the UPFC as well as by the purchaser i.e. the fifth respondent, Pradeep
Kumar Sharma.   The Corporation had taken a specific stand before the High
Court that the sale in favour of fifth respondent  was  finalized  by  the
Corporation and the  entire  offered  price  was  tendered  by  the  fifth
respondent.   The Corporation had also contended that the  property  being
subject to an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds could not  have
been validly transferred by the mortgager/ original owner i.e. Nisha  Devi
Jaiswal to the third and fourth respondents in the Writ  Petition  and  in
turn the said respondents could  not  have  transferred  the  property  in
favour of the fifth respondent so long as the mortgage subsisted.
10.   Thereafter, by the impugned final order  of  the  High  Court  dated
05.12.2006, the Writ Petition was disposed of by  directing  the  UPFC  to
withdraw the amount of Rs. 5 lacs deposited in the High Court by the  writ
petitioner, Vishnu Dutt Sharma, and out of the said amount  to  repay  the
fifth respondent, Pradeep Kumar Sharma, the amount of Rs.4.50 paid by  him
to the Corporation along with 9%  interest  thereon.    Specifically,  the
High Court  in its order dated 05.12.2006 had ordered that the  sale  made
in favour of  fifth  respondent,  which  had  not  been  confirmed,  stood
cancelled.   Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, two separate  appeals  have
been filed by the UPFC and the fifth respondent in the Writ Petition  i.e.
Pradeep Kumar Sharma.  The writ petitioner, Vishnu  Dutt  Sharma,  is  the
principal respondent in both the appeals.
11.   We have heard Ms. Madhu Tewatia, learned counsel for the appellant –
fifth respondent and Mr. Shrish  Kumar  Misra,  learned  counsel  for  the
appellant Corporation. We have also heard Shri  Naresh  Kaushik  and  Shri
Akshay Verma, learned counsel for the respondents.
12.   The detailed recital made hereinabove  clearly  indicates  that  the
property in question was duly advertised for  sale  pursuant  whereto  the
fifth respondent had offered the highest amount.   On  acceptance  of  the
said offer by the UPFC, the entire  amount  was  paid  and  the  sale  was
confirmed by the Corporation.   No sale deed was however executed  by  the
Corporation in favour of the  fifth  respondent.   It  also  appears  that
before the property was put up for sale by the Corporation,  the  original
owner, Smt. Nisha Devi Jaiswal had sold the same to the third  and  fourth
respondents, who, in turn, had sold the same to  the  writ  petitioner  by
sale deed dated 29.08.2001.  The aforesaid sale by the original owners  to
the vendors of the writ petitioner and, thereafter, by said vendors to the
petitioner himself was made when the property stood mortgaged in favour of
the UPFC.   It is in the above circumstances, that the writ petitioner had
approached the High court  seeking  interference  with  the  sale  of  the
property  made  in  favour  of  the  fifth  respondent  pursuant  to   the
advertisement dated 20.10.2002 issued by the UPFC and further for transfer
of the property in favour of the writ petitioner  besides  restoration  of
possession thereof which was taken over by the Corporation.
13.   The sale made by the UPFC in favour of the fifth respondent  was  in
exercise of the statutory powers vested in the Corporation by  Section  29
of the  State  Financial  Corporation  Act,  1951.   Under  the  aforesaid
provisions of the Act default in re-payment of any loan by  an  industrial
undertaking vests in the Financial Corporation the right to take over  the
management or possession or both of the industrial concern along with  the
right  to  transfer  the  property  pledged,  mortgaged,  hypothecated  or
assigned to the Financial Corporation.  By virtue of  sub-section  (2)  of
Section 29 of the Act such transfer of property by  the  Corporation  will
vest in the transferee all rights in the property as if the  transfer  had
been made by the owner thereof.


   14. No serious issue either with regard to the validity of the exercise
       of the power under the Act or the manner of sale of the property by
       the Corporation pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002  had
       been raised in the Writ Petition.  What was  contended  before  the
       High Court is that the Writ Petitioner,  Vishnu  Dutt  Sharma,  had
       purchased the property by sale deed dated  29.08.2001  without  any
       knowledge or information of the mortgage created  by  the  original
       owner, Smt. Nisha Devi Jaiswal in favour  of  the  Corporation  and
       that the sale pursuant to the advertisement was also without notice
       to him.     A right to the  property  based  on  certain  equitable
       principles was also claimed to strengthen which, the offer  covered
       by the interim order of the High Court dated 28.05.2003 was made by
       the writ petitioner.
15.  The issues raised by the writ petitioner before the High court really
pertained to the claim of better title  of  the  writ  petitioner  to  the
property in question on the basis of the sale deed dated 29.08.2001.   The
validity of the sale deed dated 29.08.2001 executed in favour of the  writ
petitioner by his vendors during the subsistence of the mortgage in favour
of the Corporation and the rights of the  fifth  respondent  to  the  said
property on the basis of the sale made in his favour  by  the  Corporation
pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 are the issues  that  arose
in the Writ Petition.   Broad and expansive though the powers of the  High
Court under Article 226 may be, adjudication of the  aforesaid  questions,
some of which also required proof of certain basic facts, in our view, was
not appropriate in the domain of public law.  Though the High Court in its
order dated 05.12.2006 did not expressly say so, the affect of the several
directions issued by it, in fact, amounts to an adjudication of the issues
outlined above.
16.    The essence of the dispute between the parties denuded  the  lis  a
public law character.  Nor  was  any  issue  arising  out  of  public  law
functions of the State or its authorities involved.  In such  a  situation
resort to the public law remedy should not have entertained  by  the  High
Court. (Vide Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra[1]).  Even
if the vindication of the  writ petitioner’s rights under  the  sale  deed
dated 29.08.2001 is ignored and we are to proceed on the  basis  that  the
writ petitioner questioned the sale made  by  the  Corporation,  the  writ
petitioner would not be entitled to an adjudication of the rights  of  the
parties inter se but at best to a judicial review  of  the  administrative
action  of the Corporation with regard to  the  sale  made    (Vide  Kisan
Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. and ors. vs. Vardan Linkers and others[2] )   But
as already noticed neither the exercise of the statutory power  under  the
Act by the Corporation in the matter of the sale of the property  nor  the
process of the sale transaction was questioned in the Writ Petition either
on account of lack of jurisdiction or abuse of  authority.  In  the  above
facts, the High Court should have refused  an  adjudication  of  the  Writ
Petition and, instead, ought to have required  the  aggrieved  parties  to
seek their remedies in an appropriate  manner  and  before  the  competent
civil forum.
17.   In view of the above discussions, we allow both the appeals and  set
aside the order dated 05.12.2006 passed by the High Court  of  Uttarakhand
at Nainital.


       ...……………………J.
                                                         [P SATHASIVAM]



                                                         ………………………J.
                                                         [RANJAN GOGOI]

New Delhi,
October 19, 2012.




























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[1]      (2011) 2 SCC 439 [para 8 (vi) ]
[2]    2008) 12 SCC 500 - para 23

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