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Saturday, October 20, 2012

whether the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was competent to remand the accused beyond 15 days for offences under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.the provisions of Section 167(2) of the Code were modified by virtue of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The modification of the provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. by virtue of Section 43D of the aforesaid Act is extracted hereinbelow :- “43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and "cognizable case" as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly. (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that in sub-section (2),- (a) the references to "fifteen days", "ninety days" and "sixty days", wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to "thirty days", "ninety days" and "ninety days" respectively; and (b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:- Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty days: Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.". By virtue of the aforesaid modification to the provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., the period of 90 days stipulated for completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet, was modified by virtue of the amended proviso, which indicated that if the investigation could not be completed within 90 days and if the Court was satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond the period of 90 days, extend the said period upto 180 days. In other words, the custody of an accused could be directed initially for a period of 90 days and, thereafter, for a further period of 90 days, in all a total of 180 days, for the purpose of filing charge-sheet. In the event the charge-sheet was not filed even within the extended period of 180 days, the conditions directing that the accused persons shall be released on bail if he is prepared to do and does furnish bail, would become operative. It is well-established that if an accused does not exercise his right to grant of statutory bail before charge-sheet is filed, he loses his right to such benefit once such charge-sheet is filed and can, thereafter, only apply for regular bail.- the Appellant acquired the right for grant of statutory bail on 17th July, 2012, when his custody was held to be illegal by the Additional Sessions Judge since his application for statutory bail was pending at the time when the application for extension of time for continuing the investigation was filed by the prosecution. We therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order dated 20th July, 2012, passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate extending the time of investigation and custody of the accused for 90 days, with retrospective effect from 2nd June, 2012, and the orders of the High Court dated 2nd July, 2012, 6th July, 2012 and 6th August, 2012, impugned in the appeal and direct that the Appellant be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, upon such conditions as may be deemed fit and proper, including surrender of passport, reporting to the local police station, and not leaving the city limits where the Appellant would be residing without the leave of the Court, so as to ensure the presence of the accused-Appellant at the time of the trial.


|REPORTABLE              |

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1695-1697  OF 2012
                    (@ S.L.P.(CRL) NOS.6965-6967 OF 2012)



1 SAYED MOHD. AHMED KAZMI               …    APPELLANT


           Vs.



           2 STATE, GNCTD & ORS.                   …    RESPONDENTS





                                  O R D E R



ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    These appeals arise out the judgment and orders dated 2nd July,  2012,
6th July, 2012 and 6th August, 2012, passed by the Delhi High Court in  Crl.
M.C. No.2180 of 2012.
3.    By virtue of the first order dated 2nd  July,  2012,  the  High  Court
issued notice on the question whether the Court of  the  Chief  Metropolitan
Magistrate was competent to remand the accused beyond 15 days  for  offences
under the provisions of the  Unlawful  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1967.
Notice was also issued to the learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  since
the  case  involved  interpretation  of  the  provisions  of  the   National
Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  and
the abovementioned Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.   Proceedings
pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Central-II, Delhi,  in
CR No.86 of 2012, were also stayed till the next date  of  hearing  and  the
matter was directed to be listed on  9th  October,  2012.  By  a  subsequent
order dated 6th July, 2012, the High Court modified its  earlier  order  and
directed the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate  to  extend  the  remand  of  the
accused and to take cognizance of offences  under  the  Unlawful  Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967.  By yet another order dated 6th  August,  2012,  the
High Court rejected the Appellant’s prayer for early hearing of  the  matter
indicating that in view of the heavy board of the Court it was not  possible
to accommodate the Appellant’s request for early hearing.

4.    Although, the Special Leave Petition was  directed  against  the  said
three orders, during the hearing thereof, another  question  of  substantial
importance surfaced when on behalf of the Appellant  an  application,  being
Crl. M.A. No.19883-85 of 2012 for grant  of  statutory  bail  under  Section
167(2) Cr.P.C. was filed, and was  taken  up  for  hearing  along  with  the
appeal.

5.    Appearing in support of  the  Appeals,  Mr.  Mehmood  Pracha,  learned
Advocate, urged that on 13th February, 2012, the police registered FIR  No.4
of 2012 in  respect  of  offences  alleged  to  have  been  committed  under
Sections 307, 427 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code in connection  with  an
explosion involving an Israeli Embassy  vehicle  carrying  the  wife  of  an
Israeli Diplomat which had occurred at about  3.15  p.m.  at  the  Aurangzeb
Road/Safdarjung Road crossing.  The alleged offences were later  amended  to
cover Sections 16 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,  1967.


6.    On 6th March, 2012,  the  Appellant,  Sayed  Mohd.  Ahmed  Kazmi,  was
apprehended by some unidentified men  in  plain  clothes  from  outside  the
Indian Islamic Culture Centre at Lodhi Road at  about  11.30  p.m.   He  was
produced before the learned Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  on  7th  March,
2012, who remanded  him  to  20  day  police  custody,  subject  to  certain
conditions.  On 25th March, 2012, the  Investigating  Agency  completed  its
investigation, two days prior to the expiry of the  20  day  remand  period,
and  the  learned  Magistrate  was  informed  that  no   further   custodial
interrogation of the Appellant was  required.  Consequently,  the  Appellant
was sent to judicial custody for a further period of 14 days.

7.    On 28th March, 2012, a prayer for bail  was  made  on  behalf  of  the
Appellant under Section 437 Cr.P.C.  The said  application  was  heard,  but
the Appellant’s prayer for  bail  was  rejected  on  3rd  April,  2012.   In
between various other proceedings were taken with regard to  the  inspection
of the damaged car.

8.    On 2nd June,  2012,  the  Appellant  was  produced  before  the  Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, since his 90 days’ period of custody was to  expire
on 3rd June, 2012, and further custody of 90 days’ was  sought  for  by  the
prosecution.  The learned Magistrate by his  order  dated  2nd  June,  2012,
extended the period of investigation and the custody  of  the  Appellant  by
another 90 days.   The said order dated 2nd June, 2012,  was  challenged  by
the Appellant by way of CR No.86 of 2012 which  came  up  for  consideration
before the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 8th June, 2012. The  learned
Additional Sessions Judge, inter alia, held that it was  only  the  Sessions
Court and not the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate which had the competence  to
even extend the judicial custody of the accused and to  entertain  cases  of
such nature.

9.    On 22nd June, 2012, the Appellant  was  produced  before  the  learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate for extension of his custody. However,  on  behalf
of the Appellant, an application had been made under Section 167(2)  Cr.P.C.
on 17th July, 2012, seeking default bail as no charge-sheet had  been  filed
within the 90 day period of the Appellant’s custody.  The  said  application
was dismissed by the learned Magistrate despite  the  observations  made  by
the Additional Sessions Judge in his order of 8th June, 2012.

10.    The  matter  was,  thereafter,  referred   by   the   learned   Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate to the District  and  Sessions  Judge  who  directed
that the judicial custody of the Appellant be extended till 3rd July,  2012.
 On 30th June, 2012, without serving any notice to the Appellant, the  State
filed Crl. M.C. No.2180 of 2012 under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  before  the  High
Court  questioning  the  validity  of  the  order  passed  by  the   learned
Additional Sessions Judge on 8th June, 2012. By its order  dated  2nd  July,
2012, the High Court stayed the  observations  of  the  Additional  Sessions
Judge, Central II, Delhi, in CR No.86 of 2012.  The Appellant’s  application
for grant of statutory bail  could  not,  therefore,  be  taken  up  by  the
Additional Sessions Judge till the High Court on 13th  July,  2012,  vacated
the stay in respect of the proceedings in CR No.86 of 2012,  subject  to  an
undertaking to be given that the question  of  law  involved  would  not  be
agitated and the revision would be restricted only to  the  factual  aspects
of the case.  In that context,  on  the  same  date,  the  counsel  for  the
Appellant moved another application before the  learned  Chief  Metropolitan
Magistrate under  Section  167(4)  Cr.P.C.  and  the  same  was  listed  for
consideration on 17th July, 2012.  In the meantime, on 16th July,  2012,  CR
No.86 of 2012 which had been filed  by  the  Appellant  came  up  for  final
arguments and on 17th July, 2012, the Additional Sessions Judge allowed  the
application and held that the custody of the Appellant was illegal.

11.   In  view  of  the  order  passed  by  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge
declaring the Appellant’s custody to be illegal, on the  same  day,  counsel
for the Appellant appeared before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and  the
application under Section  167(2)  Cr.P.C.  was  listed  for  hearing,  but,
instead of hearing the application on the said date, the Chief  Metropolitan
Magistrate renotified the hearing for 18th July, 2012.

12.   On 18th July, 2012, the State filed a  fresh  application  before  the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate seeking further extension of  the  Appellant’s
custody and the investigation period.  On receiving  the  said  application,
the learned Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate  directed  a  copy  of  the  said
application to be served on the counsel for  the  Appellant  and  renotified
the matter for hearing on 20th July, 2012.

13.   On 20th July, 2012, the Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  took  up  the
application for extension of custody filed  on  behalf  of  the  prosecution
instead of considering the  Appellant’s  application  under  Section  167(2)
Cr.P.C. and by his order  of  even  date,  the  learned  Chief  Metropolitan
Magistrate extended the time of interrogation and custody of  the  Appellant
for 90 days with retrospective effect from 2nd June, 2012.

14.   The aforesaid order of the learned Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate  was
challenged by the Appellant by way of CR  No.86  of  2012  in  the  Sessions
Court.  The Additional Sessions Judge in  his  order  of  30th  July,  2012,
observed that the said revisional application involved  mixed  questions  of
law and fact and adjourned the matter  till  12th  October,  2012.   In  the
meantime, on 31st July, 2012, the prosecution filed charge-sheet.  This  was
followed by the Appellant’s application before the High Court in  Crl.  M.A.
No.13484 of 2012 for early  hearing,  on  which  the  High  Court  made  the
observation that on account of the heavy board  of  the  Court  it  was  not
possible to accommodate the request for early hearing  and  the  matter  was
renotified to 9th October, 2012,  which  is  the  impugned  order  in  these
appeals.

15.   Appearing for the Appellant, Mr.  Mehmood  Pracha,  learned  Advocate,
contended that once the period  of  90  days,  as  stipulated  under  clause
(a)(i) of the proviso to Subsection (2) of Section 167 Cr.P.C., came  to  an
end, the right of a person arrested in connection with the commission of  an
offence to be  released  on  statutory  bail  commenced  and  could  not  be
extinguished by a subsequent application for  extension  of  the  period  of
custody.  Mr. Pracha submitted that on  17th  July,  2012,  the  Appellant’s
custody was held to be illegal by the Additional Sessions Judge in CR  No.86
of 2012 and on the same  day,  the  Appellant’s  application  under  Section
167(2) Cr.P.C. was pending hearing before  the  learned  Chief  Metropolitan
Magistrate, who, however, did not hear the application  and  renotified  the
hearing  for  18th  July,  2012.   The  fact  that  the  application   stood
renotified  for  the  next  day,  did  not  take  away  the  fact  that  the
application was pending on 17th July, 2012, when the period  of  custody  of
the Appellant had not only ended, but had been declared to be illegal.   Mr.
Pracha submitted that the application of 18th July, 2012,  filed  on  behalf
of the prosecution for  extension  of  the  period  of  custody,  which  was
allowed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate  on  20th  July,  2012,
without  considering  the  Appellant’s  application  under  Section   167(2)
Cr.P.C. and the subsequent extension of time of  investigation  and  custody
of the Appellant with retrospective effect from  2nd  June,  2012,  did  not
improve the matter to any extent, as far as the  prosecution  is  concerned,
since on the expiry of the first period of custody  beyond  90  days,  there
was no application pending for  extension  of  the  period  of  custody,  as
contemplated under the amended provisions of  Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.

16.   At this juncture, it may be useful to indicate that the provisions  of
Section 167(2) of the Code were modified by virtue of  Section  43D  of  the
Unlawful  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1967.   The  modification  of  the
provisions of Section 167(2)  Cr.P.C.  by  virtue  of  Section  43D  of  the
aforesaid Act is extracted hereinbelow :-


           “43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.  -
           (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any  other
           law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed  to
           be a cognizable offence within the  meaning  of  clause  (c)  of
           section 2 of the Code, and "cognizable case" as defined in  that
           clause shall be construed accordingly.

           (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation  to  a  case
           involving an offence punishable under this Act  subject  to  the
           modification that in sub-section (2),-


           (a) the references to "fifteen days", "ninety days"  and  "sixty
           days", wherever they occur, shall be construed as references  to
           "thirty days", "ninety days" and "ninety days" respectively; and




           (b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted,
           namely:-


           Provided further that if it is  not  possible  to  complete  the
           investigation within the said period of ninety days,  the  Court
           may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public  Prosecutor
           indicating the progress of the investigation  and  the  specific
           reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said  period
           of ninety days, extend the said period up  to  one  hundred  and
           eighty days:


           Provided  also  that  if   the   police   officer   making   the
           investigation under this Act,  requests,  for  the  purposes  of
           investigation, for police custody from judicial custody  of  any
           person in judicial custody, he shall file an  affidavit  stating
           the reasons for doing so and shall also explain  the  delay,  if
           any, for requesting such police custody.".

17.   By virtue of the aforesaid modification to the provisions  of  Section
167(2)  Cr.P.C.,  the  period  of  90  days  stipulated  for  completion  of
investigation and filing of charge-sheet, was  modified  by  virtue  of  the
amended proviso, which indicated that if  the  investigation  could  not  be
completed within 90 days and if the Court was satisfied with the  report  of
the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation  and  the
specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond the period of 90  days,
extend the said period upto 180 days.  In other words,  the  custody  of  an
accused  could  be  directed  initially  for  a  period  of  90  days   and,
thereafter, for a further period of 90 days, in all a  total  of  180  days,
for the purpose of filing charge-sheet. In the event  the  charge-sheet  was
not filed even within the  extended  period  of  180  days,  the  conditions
directing that the accused persons shall  be  released  on  bail  if  he  is
prepared to do and does furnish bail, would become operative.

18.   Mr. Pracha submitted that in the instant  case  on  17th  July,  2012,
when the Appellant’s initial custody was held to be illegal,  the  right  of
the Appellant to grant of  statutory  bail  under  clause  (a)(ii)  of  Sub-
section (2) of  Section  167  became  operative  and  the  Appellant  became
entitled to grant of statutory bail and the mere fact that on  a  subsequent
application for extension  of  the  period  of  custody,  such  custody  was
extended, was immaterial and was of no consequence, as  had  been  contended
in the High Court on behalf of the prosecution.

19.   In support of his submissions, Mr. Pracha referred to and relied  upon
a Three-Judge Bench decision of this Court  in  Uday  Mohanlal  Acharya  Vs.
State of Maharashtra [(2001) 5 SCC 453],  wherein  while  referring  to  the
earlier decision of this Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt Vs. State  through
CBI [(1994) 5 SCC 410],  this  Court  interpreted  the  expression  “if  not
already availed of” to mean  that  the  Magistrate  has  to  dispose  of  an
application under Section 167(2) forthwith and on being satisfied  that  the
accused had been in custody for the specified period, that  no  charge-sheet
had been filed and that the  accused  was  prepared  to  furnish  bail,  the
Magistrate is obliged to grant  bail,  even  if  after  the  filing  of  the
application by the accused  a  charge-sheet  had  been  filed.   Mr.  Pracha
submitted that so long as an application was pending before  a  charge-sheet
had been filed after the expiry of  the  stipulated  period  for  filing  of
charge-sheet, the accused had  an  indefeasible  right  to  be  released  on
statutory bail, as contemplated under the proviso to Section 167(2)  Cr.P.C.
Mr. Pracha submitted that the aforesaid decision was ad idem with the  facts
of the instant case,  wherein  the  Appellant’s  application  for  grant  of
statutory bail was pending on the  day  when  the  Appellant’s  custody  was
declared to be illegal by the Additional Sessions Judge.

20.    Mr. Pracha submitted that the  order  passed  by  the  learned  Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate as  also  the  High  Court,  were  not  sustainable,
having been made in  contravention  of  the  provisions  of  Section  167(2)
Cr.P.C. and were, therefore, liable to be set aside and  the  Appellant  was
entitled to be released on statutory bail.

21.   On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Harin  P.
Raval, contended that there had been no breach of the provisions of  Section
167(2) Cr.P.C. as the right of the Appellant for  grant  of  statutory  bail
stood extinguished once the  application  for  extension  of  the  time  for
completing investigation had been filed by the  prosecution  on  18th  July,
2012.  Mr. Raval contended that it was settled law that if  an  accused  did
not avail of the remedy contemplated under  Section  167(2)  Cr.P.C.  before
the charge-sheet was filed, such right was no longer  indefeasible  and  was
rendered nugatory upon filing of the charge-sheet.

22.   In support  of  his  submissions,  the  learned  Additional  Solicitor
General referred to the Constitution Bench decision of  this  Court  in  the
case of Sanjay Dutt (supra), wherein the aforesaid proposition  of  law  was
considered. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that  it  had
been held by  the  Constitution  Bench  that  in  matters  relating  to  the
Terrorist and Disruptive  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1987,  default  in
completion  of  investigation  within  180  days   gave   the   accused   an
indefeasible right to bail, but the  time  of  default  continues  till  the
filing of the challan, but does not survive thereafter.  It  was  held  that
after filing of the challan, grant of bail  would  have  to  be  decided  on
merit.  Reference was also made to the decision of this Court in  Dr.  Bipin
Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat [(1996)1 SCC 718], in which  the  same
legal position was reiterated.

23.   The   learned Additional Solicitor General  submitted  that  once  the
period for completing  investigation  was  extended  on  18.7.2012  and  the
Appellant’s application, if any, for statutory bail remained  undecided,  by
virtue of the ratio of the decisions in the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra)  and
the subsequent case of Dr. Bipin Shantilal Panchal (supra),  the  right,  if
any, of the Appellant for grant of statutory  bail  was  rendered  null  and
void. The learned Additional Solicitor General,  therefore,  submitted  that
no  interference  was  called  for  in  the  order  passed  by  the  learned
Additional Sessions Judge and also of the High  Court  and  the  appeal  was
liable to be dismissed.

24.   Having carefully considered the submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the
respective parties, the relevant provisions of law and the  decision  cited,
we are unable to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of the  State  by
the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Raval.  There  is  no  denying
the fact that on 17th July, 2012, when CR No.86 of 2012 was allowed  by  the
Additional Sessions Judge and the custody of the Appellant was  held  to  be
illegal and an application under Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C. was made on  behalf
of the Appellant for grant of statutory bail which was listed  for  hearing.
Instead of  hearing  the  application,  the  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate
adjourned the same till the next day when the  Public  Prosecutor  filed  an
application for extension of the period of custody and investigation and  on
20th July, 2012 extended the time of investigation and the  custody  of  the
Appellant for a further period of 90 days  with  retrospective  effect  from
2nd June, 2012.  Not only is the retrospectivity of the order of  the  Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate untenable, it could not also  defeat  the  statutory
right which had accrued to the Appellant on the expiry of 90 days  from  the
date when the Appellant was taken into custody.  Such  right,  as  has  been
commented upon by this Court in the case of  Sanjay  Dutt  (supra)  and  the
other cases cited by the learned Additional Solicitor  General,  could  only
be distinguished  once the charge-sheet had been filed in the  case  and  no
application has been made prior thereto for grant of statutory bail.  It  is
well-established that if an accused does not exercise his right to grant  of
statutory bail before charge-sheet is filed, he  loses  his  right  to  such
benefit once such charge-sheet is filed and can, thereafter, only apply  for
regular bail.

25.   The circumstances, in this case, however, are different  in  that  the
Appellant had exercised his right to statutory bail on the very same day  on
which his custody was held to be illegal and such an  application  was  left
undecided by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate till  after  the  application
filed by the prosecution for extension of  time  to  complete  investigation
was taken up and orders were passed thereupon.

26.   We are unable  to  appreciate  the  procedure  adopted  by  the  Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, which has been endorsed by the High  Court  and  we
are of the  view  that  the  Appellant  acquired  the  right  for  grant  of
statutory bail on 17th July, 2012, when his custody was held to  be  illegal
by the Additional Sessions Judge since his application  for  statutory  bail
was pending at the time when the  application  for  extension  of  time  for
continuing the investigation was filed by the  prosecution.   In  our  view,
the right of the Appellant to grant of statutory  bail  remained  unaffected
by the subsequent application and both  the  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate
and the High Court erred in holding otherwise.

27.   We therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order dated  20th  July,
2012, passed by the Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate  extending  the  time  of
investigation and custody of the accused for  90  days,  with  retrospective
effect from 2nd June, 2012, and the orders  of  the  High  Court  dated  2nd
July, 2012, 6th July, 2012 and 6th August, 2012, impugned in the appeal  and
direct that the Appellant be released on bail to  the  satisfaction  of  the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, upon such conditions as  may  be  deemed  fit
and proper, including surrender of passport, reporting to the  local  police
station,  and not leaving the city  limits  where  the  Appellant  would  be
residing without the leave of the Court, so as to  ensure  the  presence  of
the accused-Appellant at the time of the trial.




                                                     …………………………………………………CJI.

                                         (ALTAMAS KABIR)



                                                    …………………………………………………………J.

                                         (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)



                                                    …………………………………………………………J.
                                        (J.CHELAMESWAR)

New Delhi,
Dated: 19.10.2012.
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