REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7593 OF 2012
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.3571 of 2012)
Ratnagiri Gas & Power Pvt. Ltd. …Appellant
Versus
RDS Projects Ltd. & Ors. …Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7594 OF 2012
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.5554 of 2012)
And
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7595 OF 2012
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.6180 of 2012)
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise out of a common judgment and order dated 17th
October, 2011 passed by the High Court of Delhi whereby Writ Petition (C)
No.534 of 2011 filed by the respondent has been allowed and the rejection
of the tender submitted by it quashed with a mandamus to the appellant-
company to take a fresh decision on the subject in the light of the
observations made by the High Court.
3. The factual matrix leading to the filing of the writ petition by
RDS Project Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘RDS’ for short) has been set
out at considerable length in the order passed by the High Court. We do
not, therefore, consider it necessary to re-count the same all over again
except to the extent the same is absolutely necessary for the disposal of
these appeals. Suffice it to say that Government of India has entrusted
the task of reviving and restructuring of the Dabhol Project to Gas
Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) and National Thermal Power Corporation
(‘NTPC’ for short) both Government of India undertakings who have in turn
formed a joint venture company in the name and style of Ratnagiri Gas &
Power Pvt. Ltd., the appellant in this appeal, for short referred to as
‘RGPPL’. The appellant-RGPPL is charged with the duty of completing the
balance work at LNG Terminal of the Dabhol Power project and of
commissioning and operating the same. The appellant has, for that purpose,
engaged GAIL as its Engineer who has in turn appointed Engineers India
Limited (EIL) as their Primary Project Management Consultant. Scott Wilson
a U.K. based entity was also kept in the loop as a backup consultant for
marine works.
4. In terms of an international competitive bidding notice, issued by
it on 26th June, 2009, EIL invited tenders from eligible parties for
completion of, what is called “Breakwater” at LNG Terminal at RGPPL site,
Dabhol, Maharashtra. The construction of the breakwater was left incomplete
by a previously employed contractor appointed for the purpose on account of
the stoppage of the work by the Dabhol Power Company. The earlier
contractor had, according to the appellant, constructed only 500 meters of
breakwater length leaving the balance of nearly 1800 meters incomplete and
a certain length thereof untouched.
5. Apart from stipulating other terms and conditions, Clause 8.1.1.1
of the tender required that Single Bidders responding to the invitation
should have experience of successfully completing as a single bidder or “as
a lead of a Consortium/Joint Venture”, at least one project of a breakwater
in an offshore location with a minimum length of 400 meters. Clause
8.1.1.1 of the Tender document was in the following words:
“The bidder shall have experience of having successfully completed,
as a single bidder or as a lead of a Consortium/Joint Venture, at
least one project of a breakwater in an offshore location (as
defined at Clause No.8.1.2.5 below) of minimum length of 400m
during the last 20 (twenty) years to be reckoned from the last date
of submission of bids. The scope of work of the proposed qualifying
project work should comprise of the design, engineering, project
management and construction of the breakwater.”
6. In response to the notice inviting tenders, EIL received five
tenders from five different entities viz. RDS the respondent in this
appeal, M/s ESSAR Construction Ltd., M/s Afcons Infrastructure Ltd., joint
venture of M/s Higgard Punj Lloyd Ltd. and joint venture of M/s Hung-
Hua/Ranjit Buildcon Ltd.
7. With the tender submitted by it RDS enclosed the requisite
documents such as Form-B in which details of specific work experience, on
the basis whereof it claimed to be satisfying the Bid Qualification
Criteria (‘BQC’ for short), were also given. It also enclosed along with
its tender, completion certificate dated 5th April, 2008 issued by Deputy
Chief Engineer-IV, Andaman Harbour Works under the Ministry of Shipping,
Road Transport and Highway, Government of India certifying that RDS had
completed breakwater of 500 meters against a tender dated 26th May, 1999.
Completion certificate dated 30th June, 2003 issued by the Senior Executive
Manager of Ellen Hinengo Ltd. a Tribal Society (EHL) and letter dated 10th
November, 2000 addressed by the said Ellen Hinengo Ltd. to RDS asking it to
commence work for construction of breakwater at Mus in Car Nicobar Island
pursuant to tender dated 3rd November, 2000 were also produced by RDS apart
from a certificate issued by EHL about the offshore location of the
breakwater.
8. Tenders received from different parties were techno commercially
evaluated by EIL all of whom were found to be technically qualified except
Hung-Hua & Ranjit Buildcon Ltd. who went out of the reckoning at that stage
itself. Names of only four bidders found techno commercially eligible were
recommended by EIL for the approval of GAIL the owner’s engineer. The price
bids of the four bidders were pursuant to the said recommendation opened on
11th February, 2010 in which RDS was found to be the lowest bidder having
quoted a price of Rs.390 crores only, which was less than the estimated
cost of the project by Rs.160 crores. GAIL accordingly recommended RDS to
the appellant-company for award of the contract. Recommendation received
from GAIL notwithstanding the appellant-company appears to have expressed
apprehensions about the capability of RDS to complete the project in time
having regard to the fact that RDS had taken three years to complete a
breakwater with a length of mere 500 meters whereas the appellant-company’s
breakwater project stretched over a length of 1800 meters and had to be
completed within a period of 33 months only. Reservations about the
viability of the rates quoted by RDS which were found to be abnormally low
were also expressed.
9. While a final decision regarding award of the contract had yet to
be taken, Hung-Hua/Ranjit Buildcon Ltd. who was one of the bidders
and whose bid was not found to be techno-commercially qualified, filed a
writ petition in the Delhi High Court, inter alia, alleging that while they
had been wrongly disqualified, RDS who did not satisfy the qualifying
criteria had been wrongly held to be qualified. Questions regarding
validity of certificates submitted by RDS were also raised in the writ
petition.
10. In response to the above writ petition filed by Hung-Hua, the
appellant company filed a short affidavit in which it disputed the
averments made in the writ petition and took the stand that the documents
filed by RDS along with its bid showed that breakwater at Mus in Car
Nicobar Island was built at an offshore location and that RDS had completed
the entire work as a single entity on behalf of M/s Ellen Hinengo Ltd.
11. While the writ petition filed by Hung-Hua was pending before the
High Court, the appellant sought from GAIL the work order issued to RDS in
respect of the qualifying project at Car Nicobar to verify the credentials
of the RDS. RDS was accordingly asked by EIL to produce the documents in
support of its qualification such as the work order for the Andaman Harbour
works. The appellant-company also sought the details about the contracts to
verify the correctness of the certificates submitted by RDS along with its
bid in response to the tender notice.
12. A further development in the meantime took place in the form of the
CAG forwarding a report in which certain adverse observations regarding the
completion of the breakwater at chainage 22M to chainage 200 M in the
Andaman and Nicobar Project were made. The report revealed that in January,
1998 the contractor had completed only 15 to 47 percent of the work and
that in April, 1998 the Executive Engineer had taken out a part of the
unexecuted work for awarding it to another contractor. The CAG found that
due to delay in the construction of a portion of the breakwater coupled
with non-compliance of contractual terms, the department had suffered a
loss of Rs.2.61 crores, apart from increase in cost of the work by Rs.3.55
crores.
13. The report of the CAG was forwarded by the appellant to GAIL with
the request to arrange copies of work order, and satisfactory evidence of
the credentials of RDS. GAIL was also informed that in the absence of
satisfactory evidence furnished by RDS, the appellant was not in a position
to place the matter for award of contract before the Board of Directors.
14. While correspondence between RGPPL, GAIL and EIL was being
exchanged on the subject the appellant received certain documents under RTI
Act including the work order placed by Andaman Harbour Works on EHL and
those placed on M/s Recon International for a part of the Andaman Project
for chainage 22-200 meters. These documents were quickly sent to EIL for
review who examined the matter again and submitted its observations in
terms of letter dated 18th September, 2010 stating that RDS did not meet
the basic qualifying conditions of offshore breakwater of a minimum length
of 400 meters. GAIL then forwarded that opinion to the appellant to take
appropriate action on the subject.
15. On receipt of the letters aforementioned, the appellant requested
GAIL to forward its own recommendations. GAIL, however, reiterated that
since all the relevant information on the subject was available with the
appellant, it could take an appropriate decision in the matter in its
capacity as the owner of the project.
16. A resolution was accordingly passed by the Board of Directors of
the appellant company on 4th October, 2010, whereby it decided to annul the
Breakwater tender in exercise of its power under Clause 28.1 of the Bidding
Document on the ground that RDS did not qualify the BQC criteria which fact
had, according to the appellant, come to light only after the opening of
the price bids. From the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors
it is further evident that the Board had taken note of the CVC guidelines
and declined to award the contract to the next lowest tenderer in view of
the huge price difference between L1 & L2 and opted to go for fresh
tenders. By a separate communication dated 6th October, 2010 the appellant-
company conveyed to RDS the reasons for rejection of its tender.
17. With the annulment of the entire tender process Writ Petition
No.2142 of 2010 filed by Hung-Hua/Ranjit Buildcon Ltd. inter alia
challenging the acceptance of the technical bid submitted by RDS was
dismissed as withdrawn by the High Court in terms of order dated 30th
November, 2010. That order came to be passed on an application filed by
the appellant-RGPPL stating that the entire tender process having been
scrapped with a decision to invite fresh tenders Writ Petition No.2142 of
2010 did not survive for consideration. The High Court took note of the
subsequent events and dismissed the writ petition as not pressed in view of
the fact that the tender process had been scrapped and a decision to invite
fresh tenders had been taken.
18. In Writ Petition (C) No.8252 of 2010 which was filed by RDS to
challenge the annulment of the tender process and the rejection of its
techno commercial bid as non-responsive a similar order was made by which
the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn reserving liberty to the
respondent-RDS to take recourse to seek redress in accordance with law if
it was excluded from consideration in the fresh tender which RGPPL had
decided to issue. We shall presently refer to the writ petition and the
effect of its withdrawal in greater detail. Suffice it to say that the
maintainability of Writ Petition No.534 of 2011 filed by RDS out of which
the appeal arises was assailed by the appellant herein on the ground that
the earlier petition filed by it having been withdrawn the second petition
filed by RDS was not according to the appellant maintainable insofar as the
same sought to question the validity of the decision taken by the Board of
Directors on 4th October, 2010 cancelling the tender process and the
communication of the said decision with reasons for rejection of the bid
submitted by RDS on 6th October, 2010. The High Court has in the judgment
under appeal rejected that contention and not only held that the writ
petition filed by RDS was maintainable but also that the decision to reject
the tender submitted by it was not legally valid nor was the annulment of
the entire tender process. The High Court found that the action taken by
the appellant on both counts was vitiated by mala fides especially when the
fresh tender notice issued by the appellant made an attempt to exclude RDS
from competing for the works in question.
19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length. The following questions, in our opinion, fall for our
determination:
(1) Whether Writ Petition No.534 of 2011 filed by RDS challenging the
rejection of its tender and annulment of the entire tender process was
maintainable in the light of the withdrawal of writ petition No.8252 of
2010 previously filed by it?
(2) Whether the rejection of the tender submitted by RDS and the
decision to annul the entire tender process was vitiated by mala fides?
(3) Whether the condition of eligibility stipulated in the second
tender notice issued by the appellant-RGPPL unfairly excluded the
appellant from bidding for the allotment of the work in question? and;
4) Whether respondent-RDS was eligible in terms of the first tender
notice to compete for the works in question having executed a
minimum breakwater length of 400 meters in a single project required
vide Clause 8.1.1.1.
We propose to deal with the questions ad-seriatim.
In Re: Question No.1
20. Writ Petition (C) No.8252 of 2010 questioned the validity of the
appellant-Board’s decision dated 4th October, 2010 regarding rejection of
the bid submitted by RDS in terms of the former’s letter dated 6th October,
2010 as also the annulment of the entire tender process for the completion
of the “Breakwater” at LNG Terminal at RGPPL site, Dabhol, Maharashtra. It
also prayed for a mandamus directing the appellant to formalise the award
of contract for the Dabhol project to RDS. For the sake of clarity it is
useful to extract the prayer made by RDS in the said writ petition:
“In the premises mentioned above it is most respectfully prayed
that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to:-
(A) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing the
action of the Respondents, and in particular the decision
dated 4.10.2010 of the Respondent No.1, as communicated to the
Petitioner vide letter dated 6.10.2010 whereby bid of the
Petitioner has been rejected and the entire bidding process
for the completion of the breakwater of LNG Terminal of Dabhol
Power Project, Maharashtra, has been annulled; and
(B) Issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction, directing the Respondent No.1 to formalise
the awarding of the contract for the DABHOL PROJECT to the
Petitioner; and
(C) Issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction, as
this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
21. When the above petition came up before the High Court on the 14th
December, 2010 learned counsel for RDS withdrew the writ petition and the
accompanying application reserving liberty to seek redress in case the
tender which is floated sought to exclude RDS in any manner from competing
for the allotment of the work in question. Since the answer to question
No.1 above depends on the interpretation of the said order we may extract
the same in extenso:
“Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that though
the tender process has been scrapped on 4.10.2010, the same was
followed up by a letter dated 6.10.2010 of the respondents setting
out the reasons why the petitioner was held not to meet the BQC
requirements of having completed at least one project of breakwater
in an offshore location of a minimum length of 400 mtrs; which was
a stipulation in the contract. Learned senior counsel for the
petitioner has serious objection to the contents of this letter and
thus submits that the objection was only to somehow ensure that the
petitioner does not get the contract because the petitioner had
made the technical qualifications and thereafter the price bid was
opened in which the petitioner was L-1.
The learned counsel for respondents No.1, on the other hand,
disputes the aforesaid and submits that on analysis of the matter
it was deemed proper to scrap the tender process itself exercising
the rights of an owner under article 28.1 of the terms & conditions
of the tender.
In view of the aforesaid, taking into consideration the fact
that the tender process now stands scrapped, learned counsel for
the petitioner fairly states that he would like to withdraw the
writ petition and the application at this stage but that in case
the tender which is floated seeks to exclude the petitioner, in any
manner, so as to prevent the participation in the tender, the
petitioner should have leave and liberty to take recourse to legal
remedy in accordance with law. Liberty granted.
Dismissed as withdrawn.”
22. Two distinct features of the above order may be noticed
immediately. These are (a) The writ petition specially questioned the
validity of the Board resolution dated 4th October, 2010 and the rejection
of the bid offered by RDS, by letter dated 6th October, 2010 meaning
thereby that the same squarely related to the issues that were sought to be
agitated in the subsequently filed writ petition No.534 of 2011 in which
too RDS had prayed for quashing of the resolution dated 4th October, 2010
and communication dated 6th October, 2010 rejecting the bid offered by RDS.
There is thus almost complete identity of the subject matter and the issues
raised in the two writ petitions and the grounds urged in support of the
same, and (b) The challenge to the Board resolution dated 4th October, 2010
and communication dated 6th October, 2010 was withdrawn in toto, with
liberty reserved to RDS to file a fresh petition for redress only in case
the fresh tender to be floated by the appellant for allotment of the works
in any manner sought to exclude RDS from participation in the same. This
necessarily implies that if RDS was allowed to participate in the fresh
tender process it would have had no quarrel with the annulment of the
entire tender process based on the first tender notice. Conversely if the
fresh tender notice sought to disqualify RDS from bidding for the works it
could seek redress against such exclusion. Liberty granted by the High
Court to file a fresh petition was in our considered opinion limited to any
such fresh challenge being laid by RDS to its exclusion in terms of any
fresh tender notice. The order passed by the High Court did not permit RDS
to re-open and re-agitate issues regarding rejection of its bid pursuant to
the earlier tender notice and the annulment of the entire tender process,
even if the second tender notice sought to disqualify it from competition
by altering the conditions of eligibility to its disadvantage. In fresh
Writ Petition No.534 of 2011 filed by RDS not only were the amended
conditions of the tender notice assailed but the validity of the resolution
dated 4th October, 2010 and letter dated 6th October, 2010 was also
sought to be re-opened no matter the same was already concluded with the
withdrawal of Writ Petition No.8252 of 2010. RDS sought to use the liberty
to challenge the amended terms of eligibility to re-open what it could and
indeed ought to have taken to a logical conclusion in Writ Petition No.8252
of 2010. If the intention behind withdrawal of the Writ Petition No.8252 of
2010 was to come back on the issues raised therein there was no need for
any such withdrawal, which could if taken to their logical conclusion have
given to RDS the relief prayed for in the latter writ petition without even
going into the question whether exclusion of RDS in the second tender
notice was legally valid. Besides, the withdrawal of the earlier writ
petition was a clear acknowledgment of the fact that the grievance made by
RDS regarding the rejection of its bid had been rendered infructuous as the
works in question remained available for allotment in a fresh tender
process with everyone otherwise eligible to compete for the same being at
liberty to do so. Inasmuch as and to the extent writ petition No.534 of
2011 filed by RDS challenged the rejection of the tender and the annulment
process in a second round despite withdrawal of the earlier writ petition
filed for the same relief, it was not maintainable. The scope of writ
petition no.534 of 2011 was and had to be limited to the validity of the
amendment in the conditions of eligibility introduced by RGPPL in the
second tender notice issued by it. Question no.1 is answered accordingly.
In Re: Question No.2
23. This question no longer survives for consideration in view of what
has been observed by us while answering question no.1 above. If writ
petition no. 534 of 2011 could not have re-agitated issues touching the
validity of annulment of the tender process, there was no occasion for the
High Court to go into the question whether or not the decision to refer to
the bid and annul the process was vitiated by malice in law or fact. The
findings recorded by the High Court on the question of mala fides are,
therefore, liable to be set aside on that ground alone.
24. Even otherwise the findings recorded by the High Court on the
question of mala fides do not appear to us to be factually or legally
sustainable. While we do not consider it necessary to delve deep into this
aspect of the controversy, we may point out that allegations of mala fides
are more easily made than proved. The law casts a heavy burden on the
person alleging mala fides to prove the same on the basis of facts that are
either admitted or satisfactorily established and/or logical inferences
deducible from the same. This is particularly so when the petitioner
alleges malice in fact in which event it is obligatory for the person
making any such allegation to furnish particulars that would prove mala
fides on the part of the decision maker. Vague and general allegations
unsupported by the requisite particulars do not provide a sound basis for
the court to conduct an inquiry into their veracity. The legal position in
this regard is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions of this
Court. We may briefly refer to only some of them. In State of Bihar v.
P.P. Sharma 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222, this Court summed up the law on the
subject in the following words:
“50. Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge,
oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative
action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done
honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done
honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An
administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner
and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or
contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the
circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised
discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a
plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there
is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the
administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and
conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power.
51. The action taken must, therefore, be proved to have been made
mala fide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or
bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by
admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given
case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide
for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable
exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag
v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia and Ors. (2005) 7
SCC 764 where the Court declared that allegations of mala fides need proof
of high degree and that an administrative action is presumed to be bona
fide unless the contrary is satisfactorily established. The Court observed:
56. … … … It is well settled that the burden of proving mala fide is
on the person making the allegations and the burden is “very heavy”.
(vide E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. (1974) 4 SCC 3) There is every
presumption in favour of the administration that the power has been
exercised bona fide and in good faith. It is to be remembered that
the allegations of mala fide are often more easily made than made out
and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high
degree of credibility. As Krishna Iyer, J. stated in Gulam Mustafa v.
State of Maharashtra (1976) 1 SCC 800 (SCC p. 802, para 2): “It (mala
fide) is the last refuge of a losing litigant.”
26. There is yet another aspect which cannot be ignored. As and when
allegations of mala fides are made, the persons against whom the same are
levelled need to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings to enable them
to answer the charge. In the absence of the person concerned as a party in
his/her individual capacity it will neither be fair nor proper to record a
finding that malice in fact had vitiated the action taken by the authority
concerned. It is important to remember that a judicial pronouncement
declaring an action to be mala fide is a serious indictment of the person
concerned that can lead to adverse civil consequences against him. Courts
have, therefore, to be slow in drawing conclusions when it comes to holding
allegations of mala fides to be proved and only in cases where based on the
material placed before the Court or facts that are admitted leading to
inevitable inferences supporting the charge of mala fides that the Court
should record a finding in the process ensuring that while it does so, it
also hears the person who was likely to be affected by such a finding.
Decisions of this Court have repeatedly emphasised this aspect, which is of
considerable importance. In State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and
Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 566, speaking for the Court, P.N. Bhagwati, J., as His
Lordship then was, disapproved the observations made by the High Court
attributing mala fides and corruption to the State Government without
there being any foundation in the pleadings for such observations. The
Court declared that wherever allegations of mala fides are made, it is
necessary to give full particulars of such allegations and to set out
material facts specifying the particular person against whom such
allegations are made so that he may have an opportunity to controvert such
allegations. The following observations of the Court are apposite:
“39. Before we part with this case we must express our strong
disapproval of the observations made by B.M. Lal, J. in para 1, 9,
17, 18, 19 and 34 of his concurring opinion. The learned Judge made
sweeping observations attributing mala fides, corruption and
underhand dealing to the State Government. These observations are
in our opinion not at all justified by the record. In the first
place it is difficult to appreciate how any such observation could
be made by the learned Judge without any foundation for the same
being laid in the pleadings. It is true that in the writ petitions
the petitioners used words such as “mala fide”, “corruption” and
“corrupt practice” but the use of such words is not enough. What is
necessary is to give full particulars of such allegations and to
set out the material facts specifying the particular person against
whom such allegations are made so that he may have an opportunity
of controverting such allegations. The requirement of law is not
satisfied insofar as the pleadings in the present case are
concerned and in the absence of necessary particulars and material
facts, we fail to see how the learned Judge could come to a finding
that the State Government was guilty of factual mala fides,
corruption and underhand dealing.”
27. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Smt. Swaran
Lata v. Union of India & Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 165, where the Court emphasized
the need for particulars supporting the allegations of mala fides, in order
that the Court may hold an inquiry with the same. Absence of such
particulars was held to be sufficient for the Court to refuse to go into
the allegations. The Court said:
“57. ……….. The Court would be justified in refusing to carry on
investigation into allegations of mala fides, if necessary
particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not
given in the writ petition. The burden of establishing mala fides
lies very heavily on the person who alleges.”
28. The above was reiterated in a recent decision of this Court in
Nirmal Jeet Singh Hoon v. Irtiza Hussain & Ors. (2010) 14 SCC 564 and All
India State Bank Officers’ Federation v. Union of India (1997) 9 SCC 151.
In the latter case this Court observed:
“22. There is yet another reason why this contention of the
petitioners must fail. It is now settled law that the person
against whom mala fides are alleged must be made a party to the
proceeding. The allegation that the policy was amended with a view
to benefit Respondents 4 and 5 would amount to the petitioners
contending that the Board of Directors of the Bank sought to favour
Respondents 4 and 5 and, therefore, agreed to the proposal put
before it. Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who were present
in the said meeting, have been impleaded as respondents. This being
so the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of
mala fides, which allegations, in fact, are without merit.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. In the case at hand there was no allegation of “malice in fact”
against any individual nor was any individual accused of bias, spite or
ulterior motive impleaded as a party to the writ petition. Even Mr. Sudhir
Chandra and Jagdeep Dhankar, learned Senior Counsels appearing for RDS
fairly conceded that RDS had not alleged malice in fact against any
individual who had played any role in the decision making process. What
according to them was alleged and proved by RDS was malice in law, which
did not require impleading of individual officers associated with the
decision making process. We will presently examine whether a case of malice
in law had been made out by the respondent-RDS. But before we do so we
wish to point out that the High Court had in the absence of any assertion
in the writ petition and in the absence of the officers concerned recorded
a finding suggesting that the officers had acted mala fide. The High Court
named the officers concerned and concluded that the integrity of the entire
process was suspect. We shall subsequently extract the passage from the
impugned judgment where the High Court has even without an assertion of any
malice against the officers named in the judgment, recorded a finding which
was wholly unjustified in the circumstances of the case especially when the
High Court was making out a case for RDS which it had not pleaded when nor
were the officers concerned arrayed as parties to the writ petition, in
their individual capacities.
30. Coming then to the question whether the action taken by the
appellant-RGPPL was vitiated by malice in law, we need hardly mention that
in cases involving malice in law the administrative action is unsupportable
on the touchstone of an acknowledged or acceptable principle and can be
avoided even when the decision maker may have had no real or actual malice
at work in his mind. The conceptual difference between the two has been
succinctly stated in the following paragragh by Lord Haldane in Shearer v.
Shields (1914) A.C. 808 quoted with approval by this Court Additional
District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521 :
“410.
Between 'malice in fact' and 'malice in law' there is a broad
distinction which is not peculiar to any system of jurisprudence.
The person who inflicts a wrong or an injury upon any person in
contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with
an innocent mind. He is taken to know the flaw and can only act
within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of 'malice in law',
although., so far as the state of ins mind was concerned he acted
ignorantly, and in that sense innocently. 'Malice in fact' is a
different thing. It means an actual malicious intention on the part
of the person who has done the wrongful act.”
31. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in State
of AP & Ors. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti (2003) 4 SCC 739 where the difference
between malice in fact and malice in law was summed up in the following
words:
“11. The legal meaning of malice is “ill-will or spite towards a
party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action”.
This is sometimes described as “malice in fact”. “Legal malice” or
“malice in law” means 'something done without lawful excuse'. In
other words, 'it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without
reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from
ill feeling and spite'. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the
rights of others'. [See Words and Phrases legally defined in Third
Edition, London Butterworths 1989].
. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a
case of personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State.
If at all, it is malice in legal sense, it can be described
as an act which is taken with a oblique or indirect
object...”
(emphasis supplied)
32. To the same effect is the recent decision of this Court in Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad and Ors (2012) 2 SCC 407 where
this Court observed:
“MALICE IN LAW:
37. This Court has consistently held that the State is under an
obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice- in fact or in
law. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a
case of personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State. “Legal
malice” or “malice in law” means something done without lawful
excuse. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of
others. It is an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect
object. It is an act done wrongfully and willfully without
reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from
ill feeling and spite. Mala fide exercise of power does not imply
any moral turpitude. It means exercise of statutory power for
“purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended.” It
means conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another, a
depraved inclination on the part of the authority to disregard the
rights of others, where intent is manifested by its injurious acts.
Passing an order for unauthorized purpose constitutes malice in
law. (See: Addl. Distt. Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla,
AIR 1976 SC 1207; Union of India thr. Govt. of Pondicherry and Anr.
v. V. Ramakrishnan and Ors.,2005) 8 SCC 394; and Kalabharati
Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and Ors., AIR 2010 SC
3745).”
33. In the case at hand the final decision to reject the tender
submitted by RDS was taken by the appellant-RGPPL in its capacity as the
owner of the project. GAIL and EIL performed only an advisory role whose
opinions were recommendatory and meant to assist the owner to take a final
call. The appellant-RGPPL had from the date of receipt of the
recommendations made to it by EIL and GAIL till the end maintained a
consistent stand and expressed reservations about the capacity of RDS to
undertake the work. Correspondence exchanged between RGPPL and GAIL and EIL
bears testimony to that fact. In the challenge mounted before the High
Court by Hung Hua/Ranjit Buildcon Ltd. to the decision holding RDS techno
commercially responsive, RGPPL had no doubt filed a short affidavit
supporting its decision holding RDS eligible but discovery of material in
proceedings under the RTI Act and an adverse CAG report instead of clearing
the mist had created further confusion in the process, supporting what may
have been a mere hunch or apprehension in the beginning about the capacity
of RDS to handle a major project having regard to the fact that it had
overshot the time schedule for completion of a much lesser project in Car
Nicobar. In that backdrop and as owner of a project being executed at a
colossal cost running into hundreds of crores of rupees, RGPPL was
perfectly justified in adopting a careful approach to ensure that those
found eligible by its technical experts and consultants were indeed so
qualified and possessed the necessary wherewithal, experience and expertise
to execute the project at Dabhol. It was also well within its right to
demand documentary proof from RDS to support its claim that it had indeed
executed the project at Mus in Car Nicobar area so as to make it eligible
for claiming award of the works in question. In the course of the hearing
we had on several occasions asked learned counsel for RDS to furnish
documentary evidence to probabilize if not conclusively establish that RDS
had indeed undertaken the execution of the work involving construction of
400 meters of breakwater which it claimed to have executed. Besides, we had
directed the Central Government Counsel to produce before us the relevant
record relating to the project at Car Nicobar in response to which Mr.
Gulati had produced a few files. These files, according to Mr. Gulati, did
not show that RDS had indeed executed the breakwater Project of 400 meters
length in Car Nicobar. More importantly Mr. Gulati was unable to disclose
the basis on which the certificates, which RDS had produced to prove its
eligibility, were issued by the engineers concerned. The files that were
produced did not bear any testimony to the issue of any such certificates
or the basis on which the same were issued. Our effort to resolve the
issue regarding the eligibility of RDS in these proceedings, therefore,
remained fruitless, no matter we were keen to give a quietus to the
controversy which is delaying indefinitely a project of national
importance. The task of finding an answer to the question of eligibility
was rendered all the more difficult by the fact that the High Court has not
adverted to and resolved that issue on merits and by reference to the
available material. We will advert to this aspect in some detail a little
later. Suffice it to say for the present that RGPPL as the owner acting as
a prudent and responsible public authority discharging public trust
obligations was well within its rights to raise questions and seek answers
on an important matter like the eligibility of RDS to participate, no
matter EIL and GAIL had on the basis of the certificates produced before
them recommended RDS as an eligible bidder. There was in that view no
justification for either RDS or the High Court to raise an accusing finger
against RGPPL simply because it had demanded proof regarding the claim of
eligibility from RDS or collected relevant information under RTI Act and
referred the material so collected to GAIL and EIL for evaluation and
opinion. The final decision to scrap the project being within its powers
under the terms of the tender notice RGPPL’s invocation of that power was
not in the facts and circumstances vulnerable to challenge on the ground of
malice in fact or law, on the grounds set out by the High Court even
assuming that writ petition No.534/2012 was maintainable notwithstanding
the withdrawal of the earlier petition filed by RDS.
34. Independent of what has been said above we may point out that the
High Court has rested its finding on malafides entirely on the conflict
between recommendations made by EIL in its letter dated 8th March, 2010
holding RDS to be techno commercially responsive and letter dated 1st
December, 2010 by which the said recommendation has been reversed. The High
Court has while dealing with the change in the view taken by the EIL,
inspired as it was by the legal opinion tendered to it on the subject,
observed:
“It was submitted before us that this opinion became the edifice
for the change of view that the EIL took on 1.9.2010. We may note
at the outset that the opinion is completely converse to the stand
taken by the EIL up to 11.8.2010. It is pertinent to note (a fact
we were told in the hearing) that the said legal opinion bears the
endorsement of Mr. Grover, Director (Projects) calling upon Mr.
R.K. Bhandari, General Manager (Project), EIL to simply comply with
the view taken by the legal department. As noticed here in above by
us, Mr. R.K. Bhandari was the same gentleman, who on 10.6.2010 had
opined that no revision in the award recommendation in favour of
RDS was called for. The crucial question which arises, is that,
was Mr. R.K. Bhandari given a chance to express his view on the
opinion rendered by the legal department. This is a pertinent
aspect of matter to our minds since Mr. R.K. Bhandari, followed by
Mr. Ravi Saxena, in EIL and Mr. M.B. Gohil in GAIL were people who
would have dealt with such like contact on a number of occasions.
Being experts in their respective fields, they would know what was
intended when terms like “single project” and “single bidder” were
put in Clause 8.1.1.1 Therefore, for the legal department of EIL to
take contrary, though “absurd” and “harsh” view, required at least
a modicum of response from the expert, which was none other than
Mr. R.K. Bhandari dealing with the issue till 10.6.2010. Mr. Grover
Director (Projects) did not deem it fit to even ask for his
comments. Therefore, the integrity of entire process is suspect to
say the least. In any event, in our view, the opinion is completely
contrary to the plain language of clause 8.1.1.1.”
35. The above clearly shows that the High Court has recorded its
finding on mala fides on the sole basis that EIL had reviewed its earlier
opinion regarding eligibility of RDS. The High Court, in our opinion, was
wrong in doing so. While the High Court could find fault with the
interpretation which EIL placed on the provisions of clause 8.1.1.1 on the
basis of the legal opinion tendered to it, it went too far in dubbing the
entire process as mala fide. The High Court appears to have taken the view
as though Mr. R.K. Bhandari, Mr. Ravi Saxena and Mr. M.B. Gohil were
experts, even in the matter of interpretation of the terms and conditions
of the tender document, who could sit in judgment over the legal opinion
tendered to them. If on an interpretation of a clause in the tender notice
by the legal department concerned the officers review their decision or
reverse the recommendations made earlier, the same does not tantamount to
malice in law so as to affect the purity of the entire process or render it
suspect even assuming that the opinion is on a more thorough and seasoned
consideration found to be wrong. In the absence of any other circumstances
suggesting that the process was indeed vitiated by consideration of any
inadmissible material or non-consideration of material that was admissible
or misdirection on issues of vital importance, fresh recommendations made
in tune with the legal opinion could not be held to have been vitiated by
malice in law. The High Court, it appears, felt that since the officers
referred to above were senior officers they ought to have known what was
meant by terms like ‘single project’ and ‘single bidder’ appearing in
clause 8.1.1.1. We need hardly point out that in cases where the decision
making process is multi-layered, officers associated with the process are
free and indeed expected to take views on various issues according to their
individual perceptions. They may in doing so at time strike discordant
notes, but that is but natural and indeed welcome for it is only by
independent deliberation, that all possible facets of an issue are unfolded
and addressed and a decision that is most appropriate under the
circumstances shaped. If every step in the decision making process is
viewed with suspicion the integrity of the entire process shall be
jeopardized. Officers taking views in the decision making process will feel
handicapped in expressing their opinions freely and frankly for fear of
being seen to be doing so for mala fides reasons which would in turn
affect public interest. Nothing in the instant case was done without a
reasonable or probable cause which is the very essence of the doctrine of
malice in law vitiating administrative actions. We have, therefore, no
hesitation in holding that the findings recorded by the High Court to the
effect that the process of annulment of the tender process or the rejection
of the tender submitted by RDS was vitiated by mala fides is unsustainable
and is hereby set aside. Question no. 2 is accordingly answered in the
negative.
In Re: Question No.3
36. The withdrawal of Writ Petition No.8252 of 2010 with permission to
petitioner-RDS to file a fresh Writ Petition No.534 of 2011 was followed by
the issue of a fresh tender notice in which Clause 8.1.1.1 of the first
tender document was modified. Clause 8.1.1.1 as it appeared in the second
tender notice was as under:
“The bidder must have completed in a single contract, as a single
bidder or as a leader of a consortium, at least one breakwater
(using marine spread-refer Note 1) of minimum length of 400 m
located in sea during the last 20 (twenty) years to be reckoned
from the last date of submission of bids. The scope of work of the
above referred qualifying job should comprise of design,
engineering, construction and project management of the breakwater.
Land connected breakwater having a minimum length of 400m located
in sea is also acceptable provided construction has been carried
out using marine spread as mentioned above.”
37. Even when RDS claimed to have completed the project of 400 meters
length in Mus-Car Nicobar, it was ineligible to compete for the works at
Dabhol under the above clause as the work in Car Nicobar was executed under
two contracts and not a ‘single contract’ which was added to the conditions
of eligibility under the above clause. The said modification in the BQC
was, according to the RDS, meant to unfairly exclude RDS from competing.
The modified clause was, therefore, assailed on the ground that it was
tailor made to suit the requirement of other tenderers who had lost out on
the “financial bid” front in relation to the first tender. The High Court
accepted that contention and declared that the modification in the BQC by
which RDS was rendered ineligible was not justified and unfairly eliminated
it from competing for the allotment of the works.
38. Assailing the above finding of the High Court Mr. Nariman, learned
Solicitor General, argued that if the annulment of the tender process
pursuant to the first tender notice was held to be valid and beyond
challenge at the instance of RDS, the conditions on which fresh tenders are
invited including the conditions of eligibility stipulated in the tender
notice was not open to challenge by a prospective tenderer. Relying upon
the decision of this Court in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International
Airport Ltd. and Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 617, Mr. Nariman argued that the High
Court went wrong in declaring the provisions of Clause 8.1.1.1 of the
second tender notice to be legally bad. The following passage from the
above decision is apposite:
“7. ….. The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party
or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial
transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations
which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can
choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own
terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial
scrutiny….”
39. Having said that we must say to the credit of Mr. Nariman that he
made a statement on instructions that in order to show its bona fides and
to prove that it had no intention to deliberately target or exclude RDS,
RGPPL would not apply the modified Clause 8.1.1.1 of the second tender
notice to fresh tenders while evaluating them for techno commercial
purposes. RGPPL would, according to Mr. Nariman, treat Clause 8.1.1.1. in
the first tender notice as the applicable clause and the second tender
process shall be carried forward on the Clause 8.1.1.1 as it stood in the
first tender document. The statement of Mr. Nariman makes it unnecessary
for us to examine whether or not RGPPL was justified in amending the BQC
and whether such amendment was meant to exclude RDS or any other similarly
situated tenderers from competing for the works. In the light of the
statement made by Mr. Nariman we do not consider it necessary to go into
the juristic aspect relevant to the validity of the clause extracted above.
All that we need say is that Clause 8.1.1.1 of the second tender notice
shall not be enforced by RGPPL and that the corresponding clause as it
appeared in the first tender notice shall govern matters stipulated
therein. Question No.3 is answered accordingly.
In Re: Question No.4
40. We have while answering Question No.1 held that W.P. No.534 of
2011, out of which this appeal arises, was maintainable only in so far as
the same questioned the exclusion of RDS from competing for the work in
question. That exclusion could be on account of a change in the conditions
of eligibility as was sought to be introduced by Clause 8.1.1.1 of the
second tender notice or by reason of RDS being found ineligible even under
the unamended/original Clause 8.1.1.1 of the first tender notice. In so
far as the amended Clause 8.1.1.1 of the second tender notice is concerned
Mr. Nariman’s statement which we have noticed while answering question no.3
above, has put an end to the controversy. RDS cannot, therefore, be
excluded from competition based on Clause 8.1.1.1 in the second tender
notice. But that does not automatically make RDS eligible for allotment of
the works even under the first tender notice. The appellant’s case is that
RDS was techno commercially ineligible for allotment, and in its
communication dated 6th October, 2010 it had given the reasons for that
view. We shall presently examine the said reasons but before we do so we
need to point out that the High Court had quashed the communication and
held RDS to be eligible. That finding has not yet attained finality, as the
appellant has questioned the judgment of the High Court in the present
appeal. Whether or not RDS is eligible, therefore, remains relevant not for
the purpose of taking the tender process initiated with the issue of the
first tender notice forward but for purposes of finally determining whether
RDS will be eligible to participate in any fresh tender notice issued in
future, in which Clause 8.1.1.1 remains, the touch stone for determining
the eligibility of the tenderers. It is in the above background that we
need to examine whether RDS was eligible to compete for the works based on
the first tender notice.
41. In its communication dated 6th October, 2010 the appellant had
summed up the reasons for declaring RDS to be techno commercially non-
responsive in the following words:
“From perusal of the various documents, it can be concluded that
the qualifying project claimed by you to have been awarded in
November 2000 had the maximum length of 290 m and not 400 m
required under BQC. The breakwater(s) at Mus (chainage 22 m to 200
m and chainage 200m to 330m/490m) was awarded as two separate
projects by the project authority and also executed accordingly by
the respective agencies.
Further, award for different phases of the project was made
on EHL or M/s Reacon International and you were also not
responsible for the execution of total scope of work in any of the
two projects.
In the light of the above, it is concluded that RDS does not
meet the BQC requirement of having completed at least one project
of a breakwater in an offshore location of minimum length of 400,
during the last 20 (twenty) years to be reckoned from the last date
of submission of bids.”
42. A careful reading of the above would show that the rejection of the
bid offered by RDS was based on three distinct grounds. These are:
(i) RDS had claimed the qualifying project to have been awarded in its
favour in November, 2000. The length of the project so allotted was
290 meters only as against 400 meters required under the BQC.
(ii) The breakwater at Mus (chainage 22m to 200m and 200 meters to
330/490 meters) were awarded and executed as two separate Projects,
whereas Clause 8.1.1.1 required that the single bidder should have
executed the required length of Breakwater in a Single Project.
(iii) The award of the above project was made on EHL or M/s Reacon
International, for different phases and RDS was not responsible for
the execution of the total scope of the work in any one of the two
projects.
43. RDS has before the High Court and even before us, claimed that the
Breakwater at Mus in Car Nichobar was a single project and not two projects
as contended by the appellant-RGPPL. It has further claimed that the entire
project has been executed by it on behalf of EHL, no matter a part of the
work like quarrying of stones/boulders and shipping the same from the
quarry site to the place of construction was handled by EHL. These works
were performed by the above two agencies for monetary consideration on
behalf of RDS who was entitled to associate them with the execution of the
project work in terms of the conditions of contract; under which EHL had
engaged RDS.
44. The case of the appellant on the other hand is that the only
purpose behind stipulating that the tenderer should have executed a
breakwater project as a single tenderer with a minimum length of 400 meters
was to ensure that only such tenderers are held eligible as have executed a
“single project” of that length ‘single handedly’ without associating any
other agency with the execution of the work. It was important for the
appellant to do so because the breakwater length in the present case is
more than four times the length stipulated as a condition of eligibility.
It is the further case of the appellant that apart from Recon International
one Surya Rao was also associated with the execution of the project, which
fact is according to the appellant evident from the government files
produced by Mr. Gulati appearing for the Central Government.
45. On the question whether the Breakwater constructed at Mus in Car
Nicobar comprised one or two projects, also there was some debate which was
rendered academic, by Mr. Nariman, making a fair and unqualified concession
that for purposes of determining the eligibility of RDS the breakwater at
Mus Car Nicobar could be treated as a single project. With that concession,
what remains to be determined is whether RDS had limited its claim to
eligibility only on the award made in its favour in November, 2000. If so,
whether it is debarred or stopped from claiming that it had executed the
project from chainage 22 meters to 200 meters also. More importantly,
whether RDS had actually executed the Breakwater Project at Mus Car Nicobar
with a length of 400 meters.
46. We looked in vain for a finding on the above questions in the
impugned judgment leave alone one that satisfactorily dealt with the
material placed by the parties on record in support of their respective
cases. What we found was a concession attributed to Ms. Indra Jai Singh,
learned Additional Solicitor General to which the High Court referred in
Para 30.2 of its order, and which by far is the only reason given by the
High Court for holding that RDS had executed the Breakwater Project at Mus
in Car Nicobar. The High Court observed:
“30.2
We may note at this stage that we had had pointedly put to the ASG
Ms. Indra Jai Singh during the course of hearing, as to whether
there was any doubt or dispute that RDS had not executed the
qualifying work at Mus Car Nicobar Island equivalent to the
contracted length of 500 meters. Ms. Indra Jai Singh, on
instructions, categorically informed us that this aspect of the
matter was not in issue. She, however, submitted that what was in
issue, was the fact, that since it had not emerged that RDS had
completed the project in two (2) phases; according to EIL, it was
not eligible. With EIL having taken this stand, which was not
contradicted by GAIL at the hearing; it quite surprised us when Mr.
Chandiok appearing on behalf of RGPPL took the stand that RDS had
not even constructed the required minimum 400 meters length of
qualifying work.”
47. Ms. Indra Jai Singh appearing for the Central Government argued
that the High Court had misconstrued her statement, in as much as no
concession as attributed to her was made or could be made when the relevant
record did not bear any evidence of RDS having been associated with the
project in question. Mr. Nariman contended that the concession even if made
did not bind the appellant RGPPL, who as a separate legal entity was
entitled to argue, as it indeed argued, before the High Court that RDS had
not been associated with or executed the entire project, at Mus Car
Nicobar, hence was not eligible to compete.
48. There is considerable merit in the submission made by the learned
counsel for the appellants and Ms. Jai Singh. A concession even if made by
one of the parties could not prevent the other parties from arguing that it
did not bind them or that the same was contrary to the facts. The High
Court ought to have examined the issue on merits, rather than taking a
short cut. The High Court has incidentally taken support from the
certificate dated 5th April, 2008 and clarification issued on 5th June,
2010 to hold that the RDS had indeed executed the qualifying project at Car
Nicobar. We had in the course of the hearing asked Mr. Gulati, learned
counsel for the Central Government, to disclose to us the basis on which
the certificate and the clarification had been issued by the officers
concerned. We got no satisfactory answer to the query. We even asked the
parties to produce the relevant record including the government files, so
that we could ourselves answer the question regarding eligibility of RDS
but in the absence of any conclusive evidence, and in the absence of a
specific finding from the High Court, on the question, we remained
handicapped. A remand to the High Court, therefore, became inevitable which
part we must say in fairness to learned counsel for both sides, was
conceded even by them.
49. In the result we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and
order passed by the High Court and remand the matter back to the High Court
with the following directions:
(1) The High Court shall examine and decide afresh the limited issue
whether RDS was eligible to compete for the works in question in terms of
the first tender notice based on the works which it claims to have executed
at Mus in Car Nicobar.
(2) If the High Court comes to the conclusion that RDS is not eligible
in terms of Clause 8.1.1.1 of the first tender notice as it had not
executed a breakwater of the requisite length, Writ Petition No. 534 of
2011 filed by the respondent-RDS shall stand dismissed in toto.
Resultantly, the appellant-RGPPL shall be free to carry forward and
finalize the process of allotment of works started by it in terms of the
second tender notice.
(3) In case, however, the High Court comes to the conclusion that RDS
was eligible to compete for the works in question on the basis of the first
tender notice, subject to that finding attaining finality in any further
appeal filed by the aggrieved party, the appellant-RGPPL shall be free to
issue a fresh tender notice without altering the conditions of eligibility
as stipulated in Clause 8.1.1.1 and finalise the said process on such other
terms and conditions as it may deem fit and proper to incorporate in the
tender notice.
(4) Keeping in view that the tender process relates to a project of
national importance, the High Court is requested to dispose of the matter
at an early date and as far as possible within a period of four months from
the date a copy of this order is received by it.
50. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
……… ……………….…..…J.
(T.S. Thakur)
……………………………..…J.
(Gyan Sudha Misra)
New Delhi
October 18, 2012
ITEM NO.1B COURT NO.10 SECTION XIV
[FOR JUDGMENT]
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
C.A. No.........../2012 @
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).3571/2012
(From the judgement and order dated 17/10/2011 in WPC No.534/2011 of The
HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT N. DELHI)
RATNAGIRI GAS & POWER PVT.LTD. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
RDS PROJECTS LTD.& ORS. Respondent(s)
(With prayer for interim relief)
WITH
C.A. No.........../2012 @
SLP(C) NO. 5554 of 2012
C.A. No.........../2012 @
SLP(C) NO. 6180 of 2012
Date: 18/10/2012 These Petitions were called on for JUDGMENT today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.S. THAKUR
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE GYAN SUDHA MISRA
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Shailendra Swarup,Adv.
Mr. Ashok Mathur, Adv.
Mr. Ajit Pudussery,Adv.
Mr. K. Vijayan,Adv.
For Respondent(s) Ms. Asha Jain Madan,Adv.
Mr. D.S. Mahra ,Adv
Ms. Asha Jain Madan, Adv.
The Court made the following
O R D E R
Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur pronounced the judgment of the
Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Gyan Sudha Misra.
Leave granted.
The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed judgment.
|(N.K. Goel) | |(Veena Khera) |
|Court Master | |Court Master |
(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
