Cancellation of bail is a serious matter. Bail once granted can be cancelled only in the circumstances and for the reasons which have been clearly stated by this court in a catena of judgments. It would be appropriate to refer to a few of them before dealing with the rival contentions. Thus, Section 439 of the Code confers very wide powers on the High Court and the Court of Sessions regarding bail. But, while granting bail, the High Court and the Sessions Court are guided by the same considerations as other courts. That is to say, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds are required to be taken into consideration. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual scenario and, therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. The court has to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police and comment on the same. Such assessment of evidence and premature comments are likely to deprive the accused of a fair trial. While cancelling bail under Section 439(2) of the Code, the primary considerations which weigh with the court are whether the accused is likely to tamper with the evidence or interfere or attempt to interfere with the due course of justice or evade the due course of justice. But, that is not all. The High Court or the Sessions Court can cancel bail even in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the court granting bail ignores relevant materials indicating prima facie involvement of the accused or takes into account irrelevant material, which has no relevance to the question of grant of bail to the accused, the High Court or the Sessions Court would be justified in cancelling the bail. Such orders are against the well recognized principles underlying the power to grant bail. Such orders are legally infirm and vulnerable leading to miscarriage of justice and absence of supervening circumstances such as the propensity of the accused to tamper with the evidence, to flee from justice, etc. would not deter the court from cancelling the bail. The High Court or the Sessions Court is bound to cancel such bail orders particularly when they are passed releasing accused involved in heinous crimes because they ultimately result in weakening the prosecution case and have adverse impact on the society. Needless to say that though the powers of this court are much wider, this court is equally guided by the above principles in the matter of grant or cancellation of bail. -Taking an overall view of the matter, we are of the opinion that in the interest of justice, the impugned order granting bail to the accused deserves to be quashed and a direction needs to be given to the police to take the accused in custody. We enquired with learned counsel for respondent 1-State of Rajasthan as to what is the stage of the case. We were shocked to know that till date, even the charges are not framed. We feel that the matter brooks no further delay. A direction needs to be given to the trail court to frame the charges and conclude the trial at the earliest. In the circumstances, the impugned order dated 19/8/2012 granting bail to accused – Khushi Ram Meena is quashed. The police are directed to take accused - Khushi Ram Meena in custody. The trial court is directed to frame charges within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order. The trial court is further directed to proceed with the case and conclude it at the earliest independently and in accordance with law without being influenced by any observations made by us which may touch merits of the case as they are merely prima facie observations.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1662  OF 2012
        [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.155 of 2012]


KANWAR SINGH MEENA                …            APPELLANT

           Vs.

STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.    …           RESPONDENTS



                                  JUDGMENT

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.      The  appellant  is  the  brother  of  one  Purna  Singh  Meena.   On
20/5/2009, he lodged a complaint in respect of murder of Purna  Singh  Meena
(“the deceased”) against Khushi Ram Meena, who is respondent  2  herein  and
five others at Gandhi Nagar Police Station,  District  Jaipur  City  (East),
which was registered under Sections 147,  148,  149,  364  and  302  of  the
Indian Penal Code (for short,  “the  IPC”).   By  the  impugned  order,  the
Rajasthan High Court released Khushi Ram  Meena  (“the  accused”)  on  bail.
The appellant has challenged the said order in this appeal.


3.    The grievance of the appellant as stated by his counsel Mr.  Lekh  Raj
Rehalia is that the High Court committed a  grave  error  in  releasing  the
accused on  bail.   According  to  him  the  High  Court  ignored  the  well
established  principles  which  guide  the  courts  in  exercise  of   their
discretion to grant bail.  It is inter alia contended that  the  High  Court
overlooked extremely vital evidence collected by  the  investigating  agency
and, without assigning any reasons, it released the accused  on  bail.   The
High Court failed to notice  that  there  is  more  than  prima  facie  case
against the accused and that the brother  of  the  accused  who  is  an  IPS
Officer is trying to exert pressure on the investigating  officers.   It  is
submitted that the High Court’s order being perverse must be set  aside  and
the accused must be directed to be taken in custody.

4.    Mr. Ajay Vir Singh, learned counsel for respondent  1-State  supported
the  appellant.   He  relied  on  the  affidavit  of  Mr.  Yogesh   Dadhich,
Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police,  Jaipur  City  (East),  Jaipur  in
support of his submissions.  He also drew our attention to an  extract  from
the relevant station diary which indicates that the brother of  the  accused
tried to pressurize the investigating agency.


5.    Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  accused
submitted that though the High  Court  has  not  assigned  any  reasons  for
releasing the accused on bail, it has made a reference to various  important
features of the matter.  The High Court has observed  that  the  information
was received by the police at 6.10 a.m. on 20/5/2009 on mobile; however,  no
FIR was registered immediately; that the FIR came to be filed at  3.15  p.m.
on 20/5/2009; that though the investigation was transferred to CID  (CB)  on
5/6/2009,  the  same  officer  continued  the  investigation  and  got   the
statements  of  witnesses  recorded  under  Section  164  of  the   Criminal
Procedure Code (for short, “the Code”) on 10/6/2009;   that when the  matter
was investigated by CID  (CB),  the  factual  report  of  investigation  was
submitted by Sandeep Singh and Rajesh Sharma which reveals that the  accused
was not involved in this case;   that the location  of  the  mobile  of  the
accused as per the investigation was at Sikar and that the trial  court  had
rejected the application filed by the investigating agency  to  declare  the
accused as absconder.   The High Court also considered  the  fact  that  the
other co-accused have been enlarged on bail  by  the  High  Court.   Counsel
submitted that the impugned order was passed  after  taking  all  the  above
vital features into account and, therefore, it cannot be said that there  is
any non application of mind.  Counsel  submitted  that  each  of  the  above
circumstances is very relevant and makes out a case of false implication  of
the accused.  Counsel pointed  out  that  there  is  nothing  on  record  to
indicate that after  release  on  bail,  the  accused  had  tried  to  bring
pressure on the police.  The diary entry produced in this court pertains  to
an earlier period.  Counsel submitted that the accused  is  on  bail  for  a
considerable period.  There is nothing on record to show that he  has  tried
to  tamper  with  the  evidence  or  he  has  obstructed   the   course   of
administration of justice.  It would be, therefore, improper to  cancel  his
bail.


6.    Cancellation of bail is a serious matter.  Bail once  granted  can  be
cancelled only in the circumstances and for  the  reasons  which  have  been
clearly stated by this  court  in  a  catena  of  judgments.   It  would  be
appropriate to refer to  a  few  of  them  before  dealing  with  the  rival
contentions.

7.      In   Gurcharan   Singh   and   others   etc.    v.    State   (Delhi
Administration)[1], the  appellant  Gurcharan,  who  was  Superintendent  of
Police, was charged along with other police personnel  under  Section  120-B
read with Section 302 of  the  IPC.   During  the  preliminary  enquiry  six
alleged eye-witnesses, who  were  police  personnel,  did  not  support  the
prosecution case.  However, after the FIR was lodged during  the  course  of
investigation, seven witnesses including the said six police personnel  gave
statements implicating appellant Gurcharan Singh.   One  eye-witness  A.S.I.
Gopal Das made a statement under Section 164 of the Code in  favour  of  the
prosecution.  Learned Sessions Judge released appellant Gurcharan  Singh  on
bail after observing that there was little to gain by him by tampering  with
the witnesses who had, themselves, already tampered with their  evidence  by
making contradictory statements.  Learned Sessions  Judge  further  observed
that after reviewing the entire material he was of the  opinion  that  there
was little probability of appellant Gurcharan Singh fleeing from justice  or
tampering with the witnesses.  He noted that having regard to the  character
of evidence he was inclined to grant bail.  The prosecution moved  the  High
Court under Section 439 (2) of the Code for cancellation of the said  order.
 The High Court inter alia observed  that  considering  the  nature  of  the
offence and the character of the evidence, the  reasonable  apprehension  of
witnesses being tampered with and all other  relevant  factors,  it  had  no
option but to cancel  the  bail.   The  High  Court  observed  that  learned
Sessions Judge did not exercise his judicial discretion  on  relevant  well-
recognized principles.  An appeal was carried from the said  order  to  this
court.  This court observed that the  powers  of  the  High  Court  and  the
Sessions Court under Section 439 (1) of the Code are much wider  than  those
conferred on a court other  than  the  High  Court  and  Sessions  Court  in
respect of bail. However, certain considerations  which  have  to  be  taken
into account are common to all courts. This court  noted  that   gravity  of
the circumstances in  which the offence is committed; the position  and  the
status of the accused with reference to the victim and  the  witnesses;  the
likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; of  repeating  the  offence;
of jeopardizing his own life being faced with a grim prospect of a  possible
conviction in the case; of tampering witnesses; the history of the  case  as
well as its investigation and  such other relevant grounds will have  to  be
taken into account.  To ascertain whether there is prima facie case  against
the accused, character of the evidence will have to  be  considered.   While
confirming the High Court’s interference with the  discretion  exercised  by
the  Sessions  Court,  this  court  expressed  its  displeasure  about   the
unwarranted premature comments made by the Sessions Court on the  merits  of
the case when at that stage it was only  called  upon  to  consider  whether
prima facie case was made out  against  the  accused  or  not.   This  court
particularly referred to statement of ASI Gopal Das, recorded under  Section
164 of the  Code  and  observed  that  this  witness  had  made  no  earlier
contradictory  statement  and  the  taint  of  unreliability  could  not  be
attached to his statement at that stage as was done by the  Sessions  Court.
This court found that the Sessions Court was not  alive  to  legal  position
that there was no substantive evidence recorded against  the  accused  until
the eye-witnesses were examined in the trial.  Serious  note  was  taken  of
the fact that the Sessions Court had not focused its attention  on  relevant
considerations.  The approach of the Sessions Judge was viewed as  suffering
from serious infirmity and cancellation of bail was endorsed.


8.    In Puran  v.  Rambilas & Anr.[2], the appellant  therein  was  charged
under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the IPC.  The Additional  Sessions  Judge,
Nagpur released the appellant therein, on bail.  The  High  Court  cancelled
the bail granted to the appellant.   The  said  order  was  under  challenge
before this court.  It was argued that rejection of bail in  a  non-bailable
case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail already granted  have
to be considered and  dealt  with  on  different  basis.   Very  cogent  and
overwhelming  circumstances  are  necessary  for  an  order  directing   the
cancellation  of  bail  already  granted.   It  was  argued  that  generally
speaking the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly  are  interference  or
attempt to interfere with the due course of justice or  evasion  or  attempt
to evade the due course of justice or abuse of  the  concession  granted  to
the accused in any manner.  Reliance was placed on Dolat Ram  v.   State  of
Haryana[3] in support of this  submission.   This  court  observed  that  in
Dolat  Ram,  it  was  clarified  that  the  above   instances   are   merely
illustrative and not exhaustive and one  such  ground  for  cancellation  of
bail would be where ignoring material and  evidence  on  record  a  perverse
order granting bail is passed in  a  heinous  crime  and  that  too  without
giving any reasons.  This  court  observed  that  such  an  order  would  be
against the principles of law and, interest of justice  would  require  that
such a perverse order be set aside and bail be cancelled.  This court  found
that inasmuch as the  Sessions  Court  had  ignored  vital  materials  while
granting bail, the High Court  had  rightly  cancelled  the  bail.   It  was
further observed that such  orders  passed  in  heinous  crimes  would  have
serious impact on the  society  and  an  arbitrary  and  wrong  exercise  of
discretion by the trial court has to be corrected.

9.    In Dinesh  M.N.   (S.P.)   v.   State  of  Gujarat[4],  the  appellant
therein - a police officer  was  involved  in  a  case  of  fake  encounter.
Learned Sessions Judge released him on bail.  It was evident from  the  bail
order that learned Sessions Judge  was  influenced  by  the  fact  that  the
deceased was a dreaded criminal, against  whom  as  many  as  25  FIRs  were
lodged.  An application for cancellation of bail was moved before  the  High
Court under Section 439(2) of the Code.  The High Court cancelled  the  bail
holding that learned Sessions Judge had not kept in view the seriousness  of
the offence in which the high ranking police officer was involved.   It  was
observed that past conduct or antecedents of the  deceased  could  not  have
been a ground for grant of bail to the accused.  This  court  while  dealing
with the challenge to the said order  held  that  though  it  is  true  that
parameters for grant of bail and cancellation of bail are different, if  the
trial court while granting bail acts on irrelevant materials,  bail  can  be
cancelled.  It was observed that perversity of a bail order  can  flow  from
the fact that  irrelevant  materials  have  been  taken  into  consideration
adding vulnerability to the order granting bail.  On the facts of the  case,
this court held that that the deceased had a shady reputation  and  criminal
antecedents, was certainly not a factor which should have  been  taken  into
consideration while granting bail to the accused.  It was the nature of  the
act  committed  by  the  accused  which  ought  to  have  been  taken   into
consideration.  The order of the High Court  was  confirmed  on  the  ground
that  the  bail  was  granted  on  untenable  grounds.   The  argument  that
supervening circumstances such as attempt to tamper with  the  evidence  and
interference with the investigation were absent and, therefore,  bail  could
not have been cancelled by reappreciating evidence,  was  rejected  by  this
court.

10.   Thus, Section 439 of the Code confers very wide  powers  on  the  High
Court and the Court of Sessions regarding bail.  But, while  granting  bail,
the High Court and the Sessions Court are guided by the same  considerations
as other courts. That is to say, the gravity of the crime, the character  of
the evidence, position and status of  the  accused  with  reference  to  the
victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the  accused  fleeing  from  justice
and repeating the  offence,  the  possibility  of  his  tampering  with  the
witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other  grounds  are
required to be taken into consideration.  Each criminal  case  presents  its
own peculiar factual scenario and, therefore, certain grounds peculiar to  a
particular case may have to be taken into account by the court.   The  court
has to only opine as to whether  there  is  prima  facie  case  against  the
accused.  The  court  must  not  undertake  meticulous  examination  of  the
evidence collected by the police and comment on the same.   Such  assessment
of evidence and premature comments are likely to deprive the  accused  of  a
fair trial.  While cancelling bail under Section 439(2)  of  the  Code,  the
primary considerations which weigh with the court are  whether  the  accused
is likely to tamper with the evidence or interfere or attempt  to  interfere
with the due course of justice or evade the due  course  of  justice.   But,
that is not all.  The High Court or the Sessions Court can cancel bail  even
in cases where the order granting  bail  suffers  from  serious  infirmities
resulting in miscarriage of justice.  If the  court  granting  bail  ignores
relevant materials indicating prima facie  involvement  of  the  accused  or
takes into account irrelevant  material,  which  has  no  relevance  to  the
question of grant of bail to the accused, the High  Court  or  the  Sessions
Court would be justified in cancelling the bail.  Such  orders  are  against
the well recognized principles underlying the power  to  grant  bail.   Such
orders are legally infirm and vulnerable leading to miscarriage  of  justice
and absence of supervening circumstances  such  as  the  propensity  of  the
accused to tamper with the evidence, to flee from justice,  etc.  would  not
deter the court from cancelling the bail.  The High Court  or  the  Sessions
Court is bound to cancel such bail orders particularly when they are  passed
releasing accused involved in heinous crimes because they ultimately  result
in weakening the prosecution case and have adverse impact  on  the  society.
Needless to say that though the powers of this court are  much  wider,  this
court is equally guided by the above principles in the matter  of  grant  or
cancellation of bail.

11.   It is necessary now to briefly  note  the  facts  of  the  case.   The
complaint lodged by the appellant stated that  on  19/5/2009,  the  deceased
came to his house at about 7.00 p.m.  After the deceased  received  a  phone
call, he told the appellant that he had  to  take  money  from  someone  and
asked him to drop him by his bike at Gandhi Nagar.  Accordingly, he  dropped
the deceased near Janta Store, Opp. Shyam Hawans Paradise Apartment,  Gandhi
Nagar at 12.00 in the night. The deceased told him that he  will  come  back
next morning.  Since the deceased did not return as promised, the  appellant
reached Padawa near Shyam Hawans Paradise Apartment at about 11.00 a.m.  and
inquired about the deceased.  Chowkidar Kuldip Prajapati told him  that  the
deceased was with Rita madam in Flat No.603 and  in  the  morning  at  about
6.00 a.m., the accused, who used to meet Rita madam came with his  four/five
men in a jeep bearing Registration No.RJ-14-UB-294.  All of them  went  into
Flat no.603; beat up the deceased; dragged him out of the flat,  dumped  him
in the jeep and left the place in the jeep.  After  that,  he  searched  for
the deceased.  He ultimately  went  to  the  police  station  and  gave  the
information to the police.   Thereafter, he went  to  the  mortuary  in  SMS
Hospital.  At the mortuary  he  saw  the  dead  body  of  the  deceased  and
identified it.  The appellant stated that he was sure that the deceased  was
murdered by the accused and his associates.   On  the  basis  of  this  FIR,
investigation was started.

12.   During investigation, on 10/6/2009, statements  of  Kuldip  Prajapati,
the Chowkidar of Shyam Hawans Paradise  Apartment  and  Rita  were  recorded
under Section 164 of the Code by Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class  No.15,
Jaipur City, Jaipur.  Copies of these statements have been  perused  by  us.
Kuldip Prajapati inter alia stated  in  his  statement  that  Rita  came  to
reside in Flat No.603 situate in Shyam Hawans Paradise  Apartment  belonging
to R.P. Singh on 7/5/2009.  The accused was a  usual  visitor  at  the  said
flat. On 19/5/2009 at about 8.30 p.m., he received a  phone  call  from  the
accused.  The accused asked him whether Rita was in the  flat  to  which  he
answered in the affirmative.  He further stated that on 20/5/2009  at  about
6.00 a.m., the accused came there in a jeep along with three  to  four  men.
He went to Rita’s flat.  After sometime, Rita came to him and told him  that
there was a dispute going on in her house.  He went upstairs with Rita.   He
saw the accused along with three to four persons dragging  a  man.   On  his
enquiry, the accused told him that a wicked man had entered his  flat.   The
accused did not tell him where he was  taking  the  man.   He  put  the  man
inside the jeep and took him away.

13.   In her statement, recorded under Section 164 of the Code, Rita,  inter
alia, stated that she was married to one  Ramgopal  Meena.   Ramgopal  Meena
became insane and, therefore, she deserted him.  She was  staying  with  her
parents.  Since her elder brother was  dealing  in  wine,  the  accused,  an
Excise Officer used to visit their house frequently.  On  his  request,  she
began residing with him.  Later on,  physical  relations  developed  between
both of them.  The accused made  arrangement  for  her  in  a  rented  house
wherever he was posted.  When she was residing in Deepak  Colony,  she  came
in contact with the deceased,  who  was  also  residing  in  Deepak  Colony.
Intimate friendship developed between her and the  deceased.   Rita  further
stated that disputes arose between her and the  accused.   She  stated  that
the accused knew that she was staying with the deceased.  In the absence  of
the deceased, the accused came to her and threatened her.  He told  her  not
to reside with the deceased and vacate the house.  He made  her  vacate  the
house and put her  up  in  a  rented  accommodation  in  Gandhi  Nagar.   On
19/5/2009, the accused was  continuously  making  telephone  calls  to  her.
Last call was received at 11.30 p.m.  He was threatening her and asking  her
as to why she was in touch with the deceased.   The  deceased  came  to  her
flat at about 5.30 a.m.   When they were taking tea at about 6.00 a.m.,  the
accused came there.  He was accompanied by Rai Singh and two others.   Those
two other persons caught her.  They  pushed  her  outside  the  flat.   They
closed the door.  She went downstairs to call the  guard  Kuldip  Prajapati.
She told him that some dispute was going on in her flat.  When both of  them
were going upstairs, she saw all the  four  persons  dragging  the  deceased
down.  She did not know where the deceased  was  taken.   She  informed  the
brother of the deceased that the accused had taken away the  deceased.   She
concluded that the accused, Rai Singh, Vijay and Subhash  jointly  committed
the murder of the deceased.


14.   From the complaint and  the  aforementioned  two  statements  recorded
under Section 164 of the  Code,  it  prima  facie  appears  that  there  was
illicit relationship between the accused and Rita.  However,  Rita  came  in
contact with the deceased and intimate relationship  developed  between  the
two, which was not liked by the accused.  It appears to be the case  of  the
investigating agency that, therefore, the accused  eliminated  the  deceased
with the help of his companions.


15.   At this stage, we do  not  want  to  comment  on  the  credibility  or
otherwise of  the  evidence  collected  by  the  prosecution.   Whether  the
statements  of  Kuldip  Prajapati  and  Rita  would  ultimately   help   the
prosecution to establish its case can be ascertained only when the trial  is
concluded.   That  is  the  function  of  the  trial  court.   It  would  be
inappropriate to discuss the evidence in depth at this stage because  it  is
likely to influence the trial court.  We, therefore, refrain from doing  so.
 But, we must make it clear that the  statements  of  Kuldip  Prajapati  and
Rita, recorded under Section 164 of the Code, appear to be relevant as  they
prima facie indicate involvement of the accused in the  crime  in  question.
The High Court ought not to have ignored those statements.  It is true  that
the High Court has referred to certain features  of  the  prosecution  case,
but that reference is in the form of submissions made  by  counsel  for  the
accused.   The  High  Court  has  not  discussed  those  features.   It  has
expressed no opinion as to why it was releasing the  accused  on  bail.   It
was imperative for the High Court to do so.  We have been shown  an  extract
from a relevant diary entry which does indicate that brother of the  accused
tried to bring pressure on  the  investigating  agency.   In  his  affidavit
filed in this court, Mr. Yogesh Dadhich, Additional Deputy  Commissioner  of
Police, Jaipur City (East), has confirmed  that  the  accused  had  made  an
effort to influence  the  investigation.   The  fact  that  brother  of  the
accused is an IPS officer is not denied by his counsel.  This  fact  is  not
noticed by the High Court.  If it was not brought to the notice of the  High
Court by the investigating agency, then, it will have to be  said  that  the
investigating agency adopted a very casual approach before the  High  Court.
In any case, the order passed  by  the  High  Court  releasing  the  accused
involved in a heinous crime on bail,  ignoring  the  relevant  material,  is
legally not tenable.  It suffers from serious infirmities.  The  High  Court
has exercised its discretionary power in an  arbitrary  and  casual  manner.
We have also noticed that the incident  took  place  on  19/5/2009  and  the
accused could be  arrested  only  on  1/6/2011.  His  two  attempts  to  get
anticipatory bail, one from the Sessions Court and the other from  the  High
Court, did not succeed.  Assuming that the accused is  not  likely  to  flee
from justice or after release on bail he has not tried to  tamper  with  the
evidence, that is no reason why a legally infirm and untenable order  passed
in arbitrary exercise of discretion releasing  the  accused  involved  in  a
gruesome crime on bail should be allowed to stand.  This order needs  to  be
corrected because it will set  a  bad  precedent.   Besides,  it  will  have
adverse effect on the trial.


16.   Taking an overall view of the matter, we are of the  opinion  that  in
the interest of justice, the impugned order granting  bail  to  the  accused
deserves to be quashed and a direction needs to be given to  the  police  to
take  the  accused  in  custody.   We  enquired  with  learned  counsel  for
respondent 1-State of Rajasthan as to what is the stage  of  the  case.   We
were shocked to know that till date, even the charges are  not  framed.   We
feel that the matter brooks no further delay.    A  direction  needs  to  be
given to the trail court to frame the charges and conclude the trial at  the
earliest.   In  the  circumstances,  the  impugned  order  dated   19/8/2012
granting bail to accused – Khushi Ram Meena  is  quashed.   The  police  are
directed to take accused - Khushi Ram Meena in custody.  The trial court  is
directed to frame charges within a period of one  month  from  the  date  of
receipt of this order.  The trial court is further directed to proceed  with
the case and conclude it at the earliest  independently  and  in  accordance
with law without being influenced by any observations made by us  which  may
touch merits of the case as they are merely prima facie observations.

17.   The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.



                                                       ……………………………………………..J.
                                         (AFTAB ALAM)



                                                       ……………………………………………..J.
                             (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)


NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 16, 2012.

-----------------------
[1]    (1978) 1 SCC 118
[2]    (2001) 6 SCC 338
[3]    (1995) 1 SCC 349
[4]    (2008) 5 SCC 66

-----------------------
16

Grieved by the order of rejection of prayer for bail for offences punishable under Sections 302, 201 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the IPC’) and under Sections 25(1)(b) and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 9576 of 2011 dated 26.7.2011 by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, the appellant, accused No. 4, has preferred the present appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.= with regard to the investigation conducted by the investigating agency. It has called it perfunctory. After ascribing reasons, it has directed the C.B.I. to expeditiously undertake further investigation. We may hasten to add that the legal propriety of the said order is not the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. It has only been brought to our notice that C.B.I. has been directed to conduct a comprehensive investigation. Needless to state, it is open to the appellant to challenge the legal substantiality of the said order. But for the present, suffice it to say, as there is a direction for fresh investigation, it should be inapposite to enlarge the appellant on bail. We may add that in case the order for reinvestigation is annulled by this Court, it would be open for the appellant to file a fresh application for bail before the competent Court. If the order of the High Court withstands scrutiny, after the C.B.I. submits its report, liberty is granted to the appellant to move the appropriate court for grant of bail. We may clarify that though we have narrated the facts, adverted to parameters for grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code, dwelled upon the view of this Court relating to criminal conspiracy and noted the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, we have not expressed our final opinion on entitlement of the appellant to be released on bail or not because of the subsequent development i.e. direction by the High Court for comprehensive investigation by the C.B.I. 27. The appeal, is accordingly, disposed of.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1649  OF 2012
             (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 2450 of 2012


Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki                    ... Appellant
                                   Versus
State of Gujarat and another                     ...Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.


      Leave granted.

2.    Grieved by the order of rejection of  prayer  for  bail  for  offences
punishable under Sections 302, 201 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code,  1860
(for short ‘the IPC’) and under Sections 25(1)(b) and 27 of  the  Arms  Act,
1959 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 9576 of 2011 dated 26.7.2011  by  the
High Court of Gujarat at  Ahmedabad,  the  appellant,  accused  No.  4,  has
preferred the present appeal by special  leave  under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution.

3.    The  appellant  was  arraigned  as  an  accused  in  crime/F.I.R.  No.
163/2010 for the aforesaid offences and the investigation was  conducted  by
the CID (Crime), Ahmedabad.  The prosecution case, in brief, is that an  FIR
was registered against two persons on 20th of  July,  2010  about  8.40  pm.
They came on a Bajaj motorcycle having registration  No.  GJ-1-DQ-2482.   At
the corner of “Satyamev Complex-I”, Opposite  Gujarat  High  Court  at  S.G.
Highway, they fired at one Amitbhai Bhikhabhai  Jethwa  from  their  country
made revolver on the left part of his back and caused injuries to  which  he
succumbed and they immediately disappeared from  the  scene  of  occurrence.
After  the  criminal  law  was  set  in  motion,  the  investigating  agency
commenced  investigation  and  after  completion,  placed  the  charge-sheet
before the competent court.

4.    During pendency of investigation, an application was filed before  the
learned Session Judge for grant of bail contending,  inter  alia,  that  the
name of the appellant was not found in the FIR; that he had  no  nexus  with
the commission of crime; that the  case  of  the  prosecution  that  he  had
conspired for murder of the deceased who was an RTI activist was  absolutely
incredulous inasmuch as the allegations against the appellant  were  totally
vague and, in fact, had been deliberately made to  destroy  his  unblemished
public image, for he had been in public life for so  many  years;  that  the
material brought on record in no way implicated the appellant in  the  crime
in question and, therefore, he was entitled  to  bail.   The  learned  trial
Judge, analysing the material on record, declined to enlarge  the  appellant
on bail.  Be it noted, after the charge-sheet was filed  the  doors  of  the
learned trial Judge were again knocked at but the same  did  not  meet  with
success.

5.    As the factual narration would exposit,  the  accused-appellant  filed
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 2847 on 30th March, 2011  before  the
High Court for grant of bail, but the same was withdrawn.   Thereafter,  the
appellant  filed  Criminal  Misc.  Application  No.  7505  of  2011  seeking
temporary bail on the ground that his wife had suffered  from  acute  gynaec
problem and she needed to undergo surgery for  Fibroid  in  the  Uterus  and
regard being had to the said assertion  the  High  Court  granted  temporary
bail for a period of 21 days.

6.    As is manifest from the material brought  on  record,  the  informant,
after completing his duty about 8.00 p.m., was returning to his house  on  a
motorcycle.  He went to “Satyamev Complex”  with  his  friend,  Bhupatisinh,
for the purpose of having tea and then they heard a gun shot sound and  they
rushed to the place where the firing took place.  They found that one  Bajaj
motorcycle No. GJ-1-DQ-2482, one country made pistol and a plastic bag  were
lying on the road.   They  also  saw  a  white  colour  Maruti  Gypsy.   The
informant, who was a constable,  informed  his  superior  inspector  on  his
mobile phone and gathered information from the  public  around.   They  were
informed that two persons after firing drove towards Viswas City Road.   The
emergency ambulance was  called  for  and  the  staff  after  examining  the
injured person declared him dead.  The  advocate  present  there  identified
the deceased to  be  Amitkumar  Jethwa,  an  RTI  activist.   In  course  of
investigation, the appellant was arrested on 7.9.2010.

7.    Thereafter, as  the  factual  matrix  is  uncurtained,  the  appellant
preferred bail application  under  Section  439  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure, 1973 forming the subject-matter of Crl. Application No.  9576  of
2011.  It was urged before  the  High  Court  that  the  appellant,  for  no
justifiable reasons, had remained in custody since 7.9.2010 and the  charge-
sheet had been filed under Sections 302, 201 and 120-B of the IPC solely  on
the basis of the statement of Abhesinh Kesarsinh Zala,  a  Peon  serving  in
the office of the appellant.  It was also canvassed that there was  no  iota
of material to rope him in the crime and a maladroit effort  had  been  made
to demolish his political career and demolish his social image.

8.    It was further urged that the first application for bail  having  been
withdrawn, there was  no  bar  to  entertain  and  dispose  of  second  bail
application  on  merits  in  favour  of  the  accused-appellant;  that   the
appellant is a childhood friend of accused,  Bahadursinh  Vadher,  a  police
constable, having business of mines and he is engaged  in  the  business  of
mobile towers and had held the post of the  ex-President  of  Kodinar  Nagar
Palika and Vice-President at the time of incident  and  had  been  roped  in
such a crime solely on the base that the accused-Bahadursinh had met him  at
his office in Kodinar where allegedly a conspiracy was hatched to  eliminate
the deceased, which was sans substance; that as far as theory of  conspiracy
is concerned, nothing had been remotely brought on  record  to  justify  the
allegations; and that the charge-sheet had been filed;  and,  therefore,  he
was entitled to be enlarged on bail.  It  was  propounded  that  a  singular
telephonic call from the mobile the voice of which was not  recorded,  could
not form the fulcrum of the prosecution to book the appellant in  the  crime
and further the  case  has  been  fabricated  with  the  sole  intention  to
systematically smother the liberty of a law abiding individual.

9.    The application for bail was resisted by the learned counsel  for  the
prosecution on the ground that the deceased was the President of Gir  Nature
Youth Club, an NGO and also Editor of a magazine “Around the Nature” and  an
active RTI activist.  He had found the appellant to be  involved  in  number
of  illegal  activities  and  had  exposed  him  in  number  of  ways  as  a
consequence of which he had hatched the conspiracy with the  accused  No.  1
which ultimately resulted in hiring of accused No. 2 as  a  contract  killer
on payment of Rs.11 lakhs  to  eliminate  him.   The  learned  counsel  also
contended that there were various call details  and  contacts  made  by  the
accused, particularly, with accused No. 2 who had absconded; that  fake  SIM
cards were provided by the  appellant  to  hide  their  identity;  that  the
appellant had  criminal  antecedents;  that  no  leniency  should  be  shown
despite the plea advanced as regards the social reputation; that the  factum
of conspiracy is quite complex and the prosecution had been able  to  gather
the connecting materials which would go a long way to  show  involvement  of
the appellant and hence, it was not a fit case where  discretion  for  grant
of bail should be exercised.

10.   The learned single Judge, considering the rival  submissions  advanced
at the Bar came to hold that the conspiracy between the accused  No.  4  and
the accused No. 1 was obvious from the number of visits of accused No. 1  to
the office of accused  No.  4;  that  there  was  conversation  between  the
accused No. 4, the appellant herein, and the  sharp-shooter,  a  person  who
had absconded and that itself prima facie  showed  the  involvement  of  the
accused-appellant.  The High Court taking note of all the aspects  including
the gravity of the offence declined to admit the appellant to bail.

11.   We have heard Mr.  Mukul  Rohatgi,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, learned counsel for the State of Gujarat  and
Ms. Kamini Jaiswal and Mr. Mohit D. Ram, learned counsel for respondent  No.
2.

12.   Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the appellant, accused No.  4,
has submitted that the reliance on the statement of the peon  who  had  only
mentioned that accused No. 1 Bahadursinh, was  a  frequent  visitor  to  the
office of the appellant, but he had not been able to hear  any  conversation
because of glass doors, makes the impugned orders sensitively  unsustainable
as such kind of statement does not render any assistance to the  prosecution
case.  He would further  submit  that  the  allegation  that  the  appellant
provided the finance in hiring the  contract  killer  has  no  semblance  of
truth inasmuch as it  is  manifest  from  the  statement  of  Amarsinh,  the
brother of Bahadursinh, that he had given rupees nine lakhs in cash  to  his
brother for purchase of land in Kodinar area and thus, the appellant had  no
involvement with the alleged financing.   It  is  his  submission  that  the
voice in the mobile phone was not recorded and  only  a  singular  call  was
made by the accused No. 2 and such a stray incident cannot even  suggest  in
the remotest manner any kind of conspiracy and, therefore, regard being  had
to the period of incarceration, he should be enlarged on bail.

13.   Ms.  Hemantika  Wahi,  learned  counsel  for  the  State  of  Gujarat,
resisting the application for grant of bail, submitted that  the  conspiracy
is always hatched in secrecy and there  are  series  of  circumstances  from
which the involvement  of  the  accused-appellant  is  evincible  and,  that
apart, the material on  record  would  reveal  that  the  appellant  was  in
constant connection with the  accused  No.  1,  who  was  facing  a  lot  of
disadvantage because  of  the  pro-active  crusade  undertaken  against  his
illegal activities by the deceased, an RTI activist, by filing PILs.  It  is
also urged by her that the deceased had been able to expose the  involvement
of the appellant in many an illegal  operations  and,  therefore,  the  High
Court has correctly declined to entertain the prayer for bail.

14.    Ms. Kamini Jaiswal and Mr. Mohit D.  Ram,  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent No. 2, the father of the deceased, have supported  the  stand  of
the State.

15.   At this juncture, we may refer  with  profit  to  certain  authorities
which lay down the considerations  that  should  weigh  with  the  Court  in
granting bail in non-bailable  offences.   This  Court  in  State  v.  Capt.
Jagjit Singh[1] and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)[2] has held  that
the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character  of  the  evidence;
circumstances which are peculiar to the accused;  a  reasonable  possibility
of the presence of the accused not being secured at  the  trial;  reasonable
apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger  interest  of  the
public or the State and other similar factors which may be relevant  in  the
facts and circumstances  of  the  case  are  to  be  considered.   The  said
principles have been reiterated in Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State  of
T.N.[3]

16.   In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi and Another[4],  this  Court  has
culled out the principles to be kept in  mind  while  granting  or  refusing
bail.  In that context, the two-Judge Bench has stated that  while  granting
the bail, the court has to keep in  mind  the  nature  of  accusations,  the
nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment  which
conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of  the
accused,  circumstances  which  are  peculiar  to  the  accused,  reasonable
possibility  of  securing  the  presence  of  the  accused  at  the   trial,
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being  tampered  with,  the  larger
interests of the public or State and similar other  considerations.  It  has
also to be kept in mind that for the  purposes  of  granting  the  bail  the
legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds  for  believing”  instead
of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of  bail  can
only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case  against  the  accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce  prima  facie  evidence  in
support of the charge. It is not  expected,  at  this  stage,  to  have  the
evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

17.   In State  of  U.P.  through  C.B.I.  v.  Amarmani  Tripathi[5],  while
emphasizing  on  the  relevant  factors  which  are   to   be   taken   into
consideration, this Court has expressed thus: -

        “While a vague allegation that  the  accused  may  tamper  with  the
        evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to  refuse  bail,  if  the
        accused is of such character that his mere presence at  large  would
        intimidate the witnesses or if there is material  to  show  that  he
        will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence,
        then bail will be refused.”

In the said case, the Bench has also observed as follows: -

        “Therefore, the general rule that this Court  will  not  ordinarily
        interfere in matters relating to bail,  is  subject  to  exceptions
        where  there  are  special  circumstances  and   when   the   basic
        requirements for grant of bail are completely ignored by  the  High
        Court.”


18.   Recently, in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla  Babu  &  Anr.[6],
this Court while dealing with individual liberty and cry of the society  for
justice has opined as under: -
         “It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty  cannot  be
         accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high  pedestal
         which would bring in anarchy or  disorder  in  the  society.   The
         prospect of greater justice requires that  law  and  order  should
         prevail in a civilized milieu.   True  it  is,  there  can  be  no
         arithmetical  formula  for  fixing  the  parameters   in   precise
         exactitude  but  the  adjudication   should   express   not   only
         application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction on  accepted
         and established norms.  Law and order in  a  society  protect  the
         established precepts and see to it that contagious crimes  do  not
         become epidemic.  In an organized society the concept  of  liberty
         basically requires citizens to be responsible and not  to  disturb
         the  tranquility  and  safety  which  every  well-meaning   person
         desires.”


19.   We are absolutely conscious that liberty is a greatly cherished  value
in the life of an individual, and no one would like to  barter  it  for  all
the tea in China, but it is obligatory on the part  of  court  to  scan  and
scrutinize,  though  briefly,  as  regards  the  prima   facie   case,   the
seriousness and gravity of the crime and the potentiality of the accused  to
tamper with the evidence apart from other aspects before the restriction  on
liberty is lifted on imposition of certain conditions.

20.   The submission of Mr. Rohtagi  is  that  there  is  total  absence  of
material to connect the appellant with the crime  in  question  but  due  to
maladroit endeavour of the prosecution he has been falsely implicated.   The
learned senior counsel would emphatically urge  that  certain  visits  by  a
friend of accused No. 1, a singular telephone call and filing  of  a  public
interest litigation where the appellant is  not  involved  cannot  form  the
foundation of a prima facie case relating to conspiracy.

21.   At this stage, it is useful to recapitulate the view  this  Court  has
expressed  pertaining  to  criminal  conspiracy.  In  Damodar  v.  State  of
Rajasthan[7], a two-Judge Bench after referring to  the  decision  in  Kehar
Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)[8], State of Maharashtra v.  Somnath  Thapa[9],
has stated thus: -

        “The most important ingredient of the offence being  the  agreement
        between two or more persons to do an illegal act. In a  case  where
        criminal conspiracy is alleged, the court must inquire whether  the
        two persons are independently pursuing the same end  or  they  have
        come together to pursue the unlawful object. The  former  does  not
        render them conspirators but the latter does. For  the  offence  of
        conspiracy some kind of  physical  manifestation  of  agreement  is
        required to be established.  The  express  agreement  need  not  be
        proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the
        unlawful act is  not  sufficient.  A  conspiracy  is  a  continuing
        offence which continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded
        or frustrated  by  choice  of  necessity.  During  its  subsistence
        whenever any one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts,
        he would be held guilty under Section 120-B  of  the  Indian  Penal
        Code.”

22.   In Ram Narayan Popli v. Central  Bureau  of  Investigation[10],  while
dealing with  the  conspiracy  the  majority  opinion  laid  down  that  the
elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be: (a) an  object  to
be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying  means  to  accomplish  that
object, (c) an agreement  or  understanding  between  two  or  more  of  the
accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to  cooperate  for
the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement,  or
by any effectual means, and  (d)  in  the  jurisdiction  where  the  statute
required an overt act. It has been further opined  that  the  essence  of  a
criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily  the  offence
is complete when the combination is framed. No overt act  need  be  done  in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object of the  combination  need
not be accomplished, in order  to  constitute  an  indictable  offence.  Law
making conspiracy a crime  is  designed  to  curb  immoderate  power  to  do
mischief which is gained by a combination of the means.   The  encouragement
and support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering  enterprises
possible which, if left to individual effort, would  have  been  impossible,
furnish the ground for  visiting  conspirators  and  abettors  with  condign
punishment. The conspiracy is held to be continued and  renewed  as  to  all
its members wherever and whenever any  member  of  the  conspiracy  acts  in
furtherance of the common design. The two-Judge  Bench  proceeded  to  state
that for an offence punishable under Section  120-B,  the  prosecution  need
not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agree to do  or  cause
to  be  done  illegal  act;  the  agreement  may  be  proved  by   necessary
implication. Offence  of  criminal  conspiracy  has  its  foundation  in  an
agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy  consists  not  merely  in  the
intention of two or more, but in the agreement of  two  or  more  to  do  an
unlawful act by unlawful means.

23.   In the said  case  it  has  been  highlighted  that  in  the  case  of
conspiracy there cannot be any direct evidence. The ingredients  of  offence
are that there should be an agreement between persons  who  are  alleged  to
conspire and the said agreement should be for doing an illegal  act  or  for
doing by illegal means an act which itself may not  be  illegal.  Therefore,
the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act  and
such  an  agreement  can  be  proved  either  by  direct  evidence   or   by
circumstantial evidence or by both, and it is a matter of common  experience
that direct evidence to prove conspiracy  is  rarely  available.  Therefore,
the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to  be
considered to decide about the complicity of the accused.

24.   The present factual matrix is required to be tested on  the  aforesaid
touchstone of law.  There is no denial of the fact that the deceased was  an
RTI activist and extremely keen in exposing certain  matters  which  pertain
to illegal mining and many other such arenas.  It is  not  in  dispute  that
the deceased was murdered about 8.30 p.m. on the Public Road  just  opposite
the High Court and near the corner of “Satyamev  Complex-I”  where  situates
the office of Bar Council of Gujarat.  The appellant is a dealer  in  mobile
phones and there is some material on record that he had handed  over  mobile
phones to his friend who is a police constable and owns mines;  and  that  a
call has been  traced  from  the  mobile  of  the  contract  killer  to  the
appellant.  Mr. Rohtagi  would  argue  with  vehemence  that  the  aforesaid
circumstances are  sketchy  and  the  prosecution  has  tried  to  rope  the
appellant in conspiracy basically on the ground that  he  had  provided  the
finance but the said story does collapse like a pack of  cards  inasmuch  as
the accused No. 1 had taken a substantial sum from his brother  towards  his
share in the profit from the family property.   It  is  also  borne  out  on
record that the appellant is an  influential  man  in  the  society  and  he
claims to be a friend of a constable and has urged that as a friend  he  was
visiting his office and nothing has been stated to have been  heard  by  the
office  peon.   It  is  argued  with  immense  emphasis  that  the   sketchy
connection does not make out a prima facie case against  the  appellant  and
further there is no material to infer that he would tamper with evidence  or
would not make himself available for trial.

25.   Ordinarily, we would have proceeded to  express  our  opinion  on  the
basis of analysis of the material available on record but, a  pregnant  one,
after  order  was  reserved,  Ms.  Arora,  learned  counsel  appearing   for
respondent No. 2 filed an order  dated  25.9.2002  passed  by  the  Division
Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Special Criminal Application No.  1925
of 2010.  On a perusal of the said order,  it  is  luculent  that  the  High
Court after referring to its number of  earlier  orders  and  surveying  the
scenario in entirety has passed the following order:-

           “13.  As discussed in detail in paragraphs 6, 7  and  9  herein,
           investigation into the murder of the petitioner’s son  does  not
           appear to have been carried out in  conformity  with  the  legal
           provisions discussed in paragraph 11 and the  control  exercised
           by one police officer of a very high rank,  all  throughout  and
           even after the orders for further investigation by  this  Court,
           provides sufficient ground to conclude  that  the  investigation
           was controlled and the line of investigation was determined  and
           supervised so as to put to naught the allegations made  and  the
           suspicion raised by the acquaintances and family members of  the
           deceased.  As discussed in detail earlier in  paragraph  9,  the
           investigation would hardly inspire confidence not  only  in  the
           minds of the bereaved and aggrieved  family  members,  but  even
           general public on taking an objective view of  the  matter.   On
           the other hand, the deceased having been an active RTI activist,
           so-many people whose vested interests may have been affected  by
           his applications under the RTI  Act,  could  have  a  motive  to
           contribute  into  his   killing.    Therefore,   a   perfunctory
           investigation on the basis of statements of the accused  persons
           themselves may not unearth the whole truth and meet the ends  of
           justice.   Therefore,  it  is   imperative   that   proper   and
           comprehensive investigation is undertaken by an agency which  is
           not under the control of the State Government.

           14. The Right to Information Act, 2005 declared in its  Preamble
           that,  whereas  the  Constitution  of  India   has   established
           democratic Republic and democracy requires an informed citizenry
           and  transparency  of  information  which  are  vital   to   its
           functioning  and  also  to  contain  corruption  and   to   hold
           Governments  and  their  instrumentalities  accountable  to  the
           governed; and to preserve  the  paramountcy  of  the  democratic
           ideal, that it was enacted.  The Constitutional powers conferred
           upon the highest judicial institution in the State to  entertain
           public interest litigation and  issue  necessary  direction  was
           also a step forward in enforcing the fundamental rights  of  the
           citizens and ensuring the rule of law.  These progressive  steps
           cannot be allowed to be nullified  and  no  one  should  face  a
           threat to his life when he approaches a court of law to exercise
           his right of access to justice.  In such  milieu,  murder  of  a
           petitioner in a PIL and an RTI activist, in front  of  the  High
           Court, could be  read  as  a  clear  message  to  the  concerned
           citizens that they may have to  pay  by  their  lives,  if  they
           insist upon using the tools placed in their  hands  by  law  and
           approach the Court for redressal  of  public  grievance  against
           some individuals.  The commission of murder, in the facts of the
           present case, amounted to an affront to the judicial system  and
           a challenge to implementation of  an  Act  of  Parliament,  with
           national  repercussions  and  has  to   be   viewed   seriously.
           Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the case on  hand  is
           thoroughly investigated and properly prosecuted  by  independent
           and competent officers, so as to inspire confidence and reaffirm
           faith of the people in rule of law.

           15.   In the facts and for the  reasons  discussed  hereinabove,
           while concluding that the investigation into murder of  the  son
           of the petitioner was far from fair, independent, bona  fide  or
           prompt, this Court refrain from even  remotely  suggesting  that
           the investigating agency should  or  should  not  have  taken  a
           particular line of  investigation  or  apprehended  any  person,
           except in  accordance  with  law.   It  is  clarified  that  the
           observations made herein are only for  the  limited  purpose  of
           deciding whether further investigation was required to be handed
           over to CBI, and they shall not be construed as expression of an
           opinion on any particular aspect of  the  investigation  carried
           out so  far.   However,  in  view  of  the  peculiar  facts  and
           circumstances, following the ratio of several judgments  of  the
           Apex Court discussed hereinabove and in the interest of  justice
           and to instill confidence in the investigation  into  a  serious
           case having far reaching implications that we order that further
           investigation into I-C.R.No. 163 of 2010 shall be transferred to
           the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI),  with  the  direction
           that the CBI shall immediately undertake an independent  further
           investigation, and all the officers and  authorities  under  the
           State Government shall co-operate in such investigation so as to
           facilitate submission of report of investigation by the  CBI  as
           early as practicable and  preferably  within  a  period  of  six
           months.  The police authorities of the  State  are  directed  to
           hand over the records of the present case to the CBI authorities
           within  ten  days  and  thereafter  the  CBI   shall   take   up
           comprehensive  investigation  in  all  matters  related  to  the
           offence and report thereof shall be submitted to  the  Court  of
           competent jurisdiction and, in the meantime, further  proceeding
           pursuant to the charge-sheets  submitted  by  respondent  No.  5
           shall remain stayed.”

26.   On a perusal of the aforesaid order, it is demonstrable that the  High
Court has expressed its dissatisfaction with  regard  to  the  investigation
conducted by the  investigating  agency.   It  has  called  it  perfunctory.
After ascribing  reasons,  it  has  directed  the  C.B.I.  to  expeditiously
undertake further investigation.  We  may  hasten  to  add  that  the  legal
propriety of the said order is not the subject matter of  challenge  in  the
present appeal.  It has only been brought to  our  notice  that  C.B.I.  has
been directed to conduct a comprehensive investigation.  Needless to  state,
it is open to the appellant to challenge the  legal  substantiality  of  the
said order.  But for  the  present,  suffice  it  to  say,  as  there  is  a
direction for fresh investigation, it should be inapposite  to  enlarge  the
appellant on bail.  We may add that in case the  order  for  reinvestigation
is annulled by this Court, it would be open for  the  appellant  to  file  a
fresh application for bail before the competent Court.  If the order of  the
High Court  withstands  scrutiny,  after  the  C.B.I.  submits  its  report,
liberty is granted to the appellant to move the appropriate court for  grant
of bail.  We may clarify that though we have narrated  the  facts,  adverted
to parameters for grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code, dwelled  upon
the view of this  Court  relating  to  criminal  conspiracy  and  noted  the
submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, we  have  not  expressed
our final opinion on entitlement of the appellant to be released on bail  or
not because of the subsequent development i.e. direction by the  High  Court
for comprehensive investigation by the C.B.I.

27.   The appeal, is accordingly, disposed of.




                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                      [K. S. Radhakrishnan]



                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
October 12, 2012.


-----------------------
[1]    (1962) 3 SCR 622
[2]    (1978) 1 SCC 118
[3]    (2005) 2 SCC 13
[4]    (2001) 4 SCC 280
[5]    (2005) 8 SCC 21
[6]    JT 2012 (9) SC 155
[7]    (2004) 12 SCC 336
[8]    (1988) 3 SCC 609
[9]    (1996) 4 SCC 659
[10]   (2003) 3 SCC 641


-----------------------
21

bail- Therefore, as of now, prima facie, the participation of these accused in the occurrence of 30.4.2011 cannot be seriously doubted, unless of course, during the course of evidence, the video clipping is shown to be doctored.The MLA is alleged to have received gun shot injuries as well. The allegations constitute an open challenge to civil society. Persons involved in the alleged incident can not be accepted to remain disciplined if enlarged on bail. It is likely that they would threaten witnesses, which would severely prejudice the outcome of the trial - Insofar as the other cases filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh are concerned, a video clipping clearly demonstrates the presence of accused nos. 2 to 5, 7 and 14 at the place of occurrence. As such, bail granted to accused nos. 2, 3, 5, 7 and 14 (since accused no. 4 whose presence was shown in the video clipping, has already died) by the High Court, is hereby set aside. Taking into consideration the fact that the complainant, in the First Information Report, has involved a large number of members in one family, wherein the accused nos. 1, 2 and 6 are real brothers, and the other accused are their children, it would be just and appropriate to affirm the order passed by the High Court qua all the accused other than the main accused and the accused depicted in the video clipping. Accordingly, the order of the High Court extending the benefit of bail to accused nos. 2, 3, 5, 7 and 14 is hereby set aside. The bail granted to the rest of the accused, by the High Court, is affirmed.

                                                            “NON-REPORTABLE”

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1595-1596  OF 2012
           (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) Nos. 4409-4410 of 2012)

Younus Bin Omer Yafai @
Younus Bhai & Ors.                                 …. Appellants

                                   Versus

State of A.P.                                      …. Respondent
                                    WITH
                       CRLMP Nos. 18203-18204 of 2012
                                     IN
                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1597-1598 OF 2012
              (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.7919-7920 of 2012)

State of Andhra Pradesh                                  …. Appellant

                                   Versus

Awad Bin Younus Yafai etc.                         …. Respondents
                                    WITH

                           CRLMP No. 19162 of 2012
                                     IN
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1599 OF 2012
                (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.7921  of 2012)

State of Andhra Pradesh                                  …. Appellant

                                   Versus

Mohammed Bin Saleh Wahlan & Ors.             …. Respondents

                                    WITH

                           CRLMP No. 19175 of 2012
                                     IN
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1600 OF 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.7922 of 2012)
State of Andhra Pradesh                                  …. Appellant

                                   Versus

Abdulla Bin Younus Yafai                           …. Respondent

                                  O R D E R

1.    Delay in filing the Special Leave  Petition  is  condoned  in  Special
Leave Petition (R)…. CRLMP nos. 18203-18204 of 2012, Special Leave  Petition
(R)….CRLMP no. 19162 of 2012 and Special  Leave  Petition  (R)….  CRLMP  no.
19175 of 2012.

2.    Leave granted in all the Special Leave Petitions.

3.    On  13.4.2011,  Shri  Akberuddin  Owaisi,  a  sitting  Member  of  the
Legislative Assembly  from  the  Chandrayangutta  Constituency  (hereinafter
referred to as, the MLA), alongwith  Government  officials,  is  alleged  to
have visited Gurram Cheruvu  area  on  Balapur  road  for  inspection.   The
purpose of the inspection was to identify government lands which were  under
encroachment of  private  individuals.   In  the  course  of  the  aforesaid
inspection, while on his way back, it is alleged that  he  halted  near  the
patta lands of the family of  the  accused.   Accused  nos.  6  and  7  were
present at the spot, at that time.  Accused no. 6 allegedly objected to  the
MLA pointing out their  lands  to  Government  officials.   This,  in  turn,
resulted in a heated exchange of words between them,  during  which  accused
No. 6 allegedly warned the MLA of dire consequences.

4.    On 14.4.2011, accused nos. 1 to 10 and  12  to  14  allegedly  held  a
meeting at Omer Function Hall,  Chandrayangutta,  wherein  they  decided  to
eliminate the MLA.  Accused no. 11 is alleged to have  business  investments
in the lands  in  question.   It  is  also  alleged,  that  accused  no.  11
supported the decision of the other accused, to eliminate the MLA.

5.    On 30.4.2011, the MLA alongwith another MLA Shri Ahmed  Bala  and  his
supporters, after having concluded a meeting  at  the  Corporator’s  Office,
were in the process of  getting  into  their  respective  vehicles.   It  is
alleged, that accused nos. 2 to 5,  7  to  10  and  13  to  15  had  already
gathered outside the Corporator’s office.  As the  MLA  sat  in  his  Maruti
Gypsy, in order to stop the MLA from proceeding further, accused  no.  2  is
alleged to have driven his motorcycle and thrown it in front of the  vehicle
of the MLA.  Thereafter, the  accused  are  alleged  to  have  attacked  and
beaten up the MLA with knives  etc.,  causing  him  serious  injuries.   The
accused are also alleged to have fired at the  MLA  from  a  revolver  which
resulted in injuries to him in the abdominal area.   The  remaining  accused
are alleged to have stopped those who tried to intervene to  save  the  MLA.
These remaining accused are also alleged to  have  caused  injuries  to  the
persons who tried to save the MLA and his supporters.

6.    A police constable who had been deputed for the personal  security  of
the MLA, is alleged to have fired at the  assailants,  resulting  in  bullet
injuries to accused nos. 3 to 5.

7.    The MLA was taken to Owaisi Hospital immediately after  the  incident.
On the same day, at about 9 P.M., he was shifted to Care  Hospital,  Banjara
Hills, Hyderabad.  Accused nos. 3 to 5 who suffered  bullet  injuries,  were
taken to Yashoda Hospital, where accused nos. 3  and  5  were  admitted  for
treatment.  Accused no. 4 died due to bullet injuries suffered by him.

8.    On 30.4.2011 itself, at  about  2  P.M.,  Shri  Mansoor  Bin  Mohammad
Awalgi, Corporator of Barkas Division filed a complaint  at  Police  Station
Chandrayangutta, which led  to  registration  of  First  Information  Report
(FIR) no. 135 of 2011 against 16 accused (actually 15, since accused  No.  4
had died of bullet  injuries).   The  aforesaid  FIR  was  registered  under
Sections 147, 148, 324, 307 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections  149
and 120 of the Indian Penal Code, as also, Section 27(1) of the Indian  Arms
Act.

9.    It is also necessary to notice, that accused nos. 1, 2 and 6 are  real
brothers.  They lived together at Barkas, Hyderabad.  Accused nos. 3, 4,  5,
7, 8 and 13 are sons of accused No.  6.   Accused  no.  11  is  allegedly  a
family friend and business partner of accused nos. 1 and 6.  There  is  also
a contrary version.  It is the case of the accused, that  the  MLA  and  his
supporters went to the house of accused  no.  1  and  tried  to  molest  the
womenfolk.  The fight between the rival parties  is  stated  to  have  taken
place on account of the said incident.  Based on the aforesaid version,  the
case of the accused has been, that the accused  are  actually  the  victims.
This factual position stands duly noticed in paragraph  9  of  the  impugned
order.

10.   Accused nos. 6 and 11 were arrested  on  3.5.2011.   The  trial  Court
rejected the bail application of accused nos. 6 and  11  on  8.7.2011.   The
order passed by the trial Court  was  assailed  before  the  High  Court  of
Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to  as,  the
High Court).  On 21.7.2011, the High Court granted bail to  accused  nos.  6
and 11.  In a separate petition  filed  before  the  High  Court,  bail  was
granted to accused no. 5 on 24.8.2011.  In yet another  petition,  the  High
Court granted bail to accused nos. 1, 2  and  7  to  10  on  8.9.2011.   The
aforesaid orders passed by the High Court  dated  21.7.2011,  24.8.2011  and
8.9.2011 were assailed before this Court.  On 16.3.2012, this  Court  passed
the following order:-

      “Leave granted.

      We have heard Mr. Harin Rawal, learned  Additional  Solicitor  General
      and Mr. Altaf Ahmad, learned senior counsel for the  respondents.   We
      have gone through the impugned judgment and order dated 21.7.2011, and
      perused the record of the case.  Learned counsel for the appellant has
      contended that without assigning any reason the High Court has  passed
      the order granting bail to the respondents.

      Considering the facts and  circumstances  of  the  case,  we  are  not
      satisfied with the manner in  which  the  bail  application  has  been
      disposed of by the High  Court  as  no  reason  whatsoever,  has  been
      assigned for grant of bail.

      In view of the above, impugned order dated 21.7.2011 is set aside  and
      we request the High Court to decide the bail application afresh within
      a period of six  weeks  from  today.   The  respondents  shall  remain
      protected in the meantime.

      However, we make it clear that we have not expressed any view one  way
      or the other on the merits of the case.

      In case the application is not disposed of within the stipulated time,
      the respondents shall be at liberty to renew their prayer for  interim
      bail before the High Court.

      Needless to say that the parties will co-operate  and  will  not  take
      unwarranted adjournments before the High Court.

      The appeal is disposed of.”

On the same day, in a connected matter, this Court set aside  the  order  of
the High Court, wherein the  High  Court  had  directed  the  Station  House
Officer, Central Crime Station, Hyderabad to register a  case/crime  at  the
behest of the accused herein.  The relevant extract of the  aforesaid  order
is being reproduced hereunder:-

      “It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the  parties  that
      the High Court while dealing with the bail application has passed  the
      following order:-

           (2)    The  Station  House  Officer,  Central   Crime   Station,
                 Hyderabad, is  directed  to  register  a  case/crime  under
                 appropriate sections of law and  against  all  the  persons
                 concerned on the incident of  police  gunmen  opening  fire
                 against the accused party  in  this  case  after  recording
                 statement of the petitioner/A5 or after  receiving  written
                 report given by him and to investigate into the same as per
                 law; and

           (3)   Directing the Government of  Andhra  Pradesh  to  initiate
                 Magisterial enquiry into the incident relating  to  opening
                 of fire by  the  police  gunmen  attached  to  the  MLA  of
                 Malakpet constituency causing  death  of  A-4  and  causing
                 bullet injuries to A-3 and A-5, and after receiving  report
                 of the Magistrate to take steps according to law.

      In the facts and circumstances of the case and after hearing Mr. Harin
      Rawal, learned Additional  Solicitor  General  and  Mr.  Altaf  Ahmad,
      learned senior counsel for the respondents and having gone through the
      impugned judgment and order dated 21.7.2011, we are of the  view  that
      it was not permissible for the  High  Court  to  issue  the  aforesaid
      directions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 while dealing with the bail
      application.  This kind  of  direction  could  be  issued  only  while
      dealing  with  the  petition  filed  under  Articles  226/227  of  the
      Constitution of India or under Section 482 of  the  Code  of  Criminal
      Procedure.

      In view of the above, with  the  aforesaid  directions,  the  impugned
      judgment and order of the High Court are set aside.  Needless  to  say
      that any consequential order passed/FIR lodged, if  any,  shall  stand
      washed off and would remain inconsequential.

      However,  it  shall  be  open  to  the  applicants  to  approach   the
      appropriate  forum  for  seeking  appropriate   directions/remedy   in
      accordance with law.

      With these observations, the appeal stands disposed of.”

11.   Consequent upon the orders passed by  this  Court  on  16.3.2012,  the
bail applications filed by the accused before the High Court, were taken  up
for reconsideration.  It was contended before the High  Court  that  inspite
of the fact that accused nos. 3 and 12 were alleged to have been armed  with
fire arms and had fired at the MLA, they were  released  on  bail,  and  the
order  by  which  they  were  released,  had  not  been  assailed.   It  was
submitted, that the accused praying for bail before  the  High  Court,  were
not alleged to have caused any injury to the MLA or his supporters nor  they
were alleged to be in possession of fire arms.  It was further stated,  that
consequent upon release of some of the accused on bail  by  the  High  Court
(vide orders dated 21.7.2011,  24.8.2011  and  8.9.2011),  the  accused  had
remained on bail till this Court set aside the  order  passed  by  the  High
Court, on 16.3.2012.  It was pointed out that none of the  accused  released
on bail, had misused their freedom in any manner whatsoever.   It  was  also
submitted on behalf of the accused, that  three  of  the  accused  had  also
suffered bullet injuries i.e., accused nos. 3 to 5.  All the  three  accused
who had suffered bullet injuries  were  taken  to  Yashoda  Hospital,  where
acused nos. 3 and 5 were admitted for treatment, whereas accused no. 4  died
of the bullet injuries suffered by him.  It was, therefore,  contended  that
the injuries to  the  accused  side  were  far  serious  than  the  injuries
suffered by the complainant side.  It was also contended, that  the  accused
side is seriously prejudiced on account of the influence of the MLA,  in  as
much as, all efforts made by the  accused  party  to  register  a  complaint
expressing their side of the  story,  had  remained  futile.   It  was  also
contended on behalf of accused,  that  most  of  the  accused  comprised  of
members of one family alone who  had  been  victimized  on  account  of  the
influence of the MLA.

12.   Having considered the submissions advanced at the hands of  the  rival
parties before the High Court, on 25.4.2012, the High  Court  ordered,  that
accused nos. 2, 5 and 7 to 10 shall continue to  remain  on  bail.   Accused
nos. 1, 6 and 11 were declined bail.

13.   The aforesaid order of  the  High  Court  dated  25.4.2012,  has  been
assailed through several special leave petitions.   Special  Leave  Petition
(Crl.) Nos. 4409-4410 of 2012 were filed on behalf of accused nos. 1, 6  and
11 who had been declined bail.  Special Leave  Petitions  (R)….  CRLMP  Nos.
18203-18204 of 2012 were filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh assailing  the
order of the High Court for granting bail to accused nos. 2, 5 and 7 to  10.
 Special Leave Petition  (R)….  CRLMP  No.  19162  of  2012  was  filed  for
assailing the order of the High Court in granting bail to  accused  nos.  12
to 15, and Special Leave Petition (R)…. CRLMP No. 19175 of  2012  was  filed
by the State of Andhra Pradesh assailing the action of  the  High  Court  in
granting bail to accused no. 3.

14.   Leave  has  already  been  granted  in  all  the  said  special  leave
petitions.  Since all the matters have been  filed  as  against  the  common
order passed by the High  Court  dated  25.4.2012,  and  since  the  factual
controversy is also the same; all the matters shall be disposed  of  by  the
instant common order.  In passing the instant order,  pleadings  in  Special
Leave (Crl.) Nos. 4409-4410 of 2012 have been relied upon.

15.   It is not necessary for us to delineate the factual position all  over
again.  All relevant facts  have  already  been  noticed  in  the  foregoing
paragraphs.  From the sequence  of  facts  narrated,  it  is  apparent  that
accused nos. 1, 6 and 11 are the main accused, as they are alleged  to  have
determined the course of events of the incident dated  30.4.2011,  which  is
subject matter of the complaint in First Information Report no. 135 of  2011
registered at Police Station Chandrayangutta.  The other accused  had  their
own individual roles.  Prima facie, the roles attributed to  the  respective
accused, as have been depicted in the video clipping recorded by the  listed
witness no. 22 Shri Shaik Salem,  cannot  be  overlooked.   Insofar  as  the
aforesaid video  clipping  is  concerned,  reference  may  be  made  to  the
following observations recorded in the  chargesheet  dated  30.6.2011  filed
with reference to the allegations contained in First Information Report  no.
135 of 2011 registered at Police Station Chandrayangutta:-

      “The video clipping recorded by LW-22 Shaik Salem shows  the  presence
      of the accused at the scene i.e.  A-2  with  a  butcher’s  knife,  A-4
      Ibrahim stabbing Akbar with dagger, A-3 Abdullah struggling to release
      his weapon from the hands of LW-12 MLA  Balala  with  the  support  of
      accused A-7 and A-14.  A-5 Awad  Bin  Awad  Younus  Yafai  carrying  a
      cricket bat and racing to give a  blow.   The  video  also  shows  the
      severely injured Akbaruddin being shifted into Gypsy by  LW-1  Mansoor
      Awalgi, LW-2 Mohamood Awalgi, LW-11 Al Kaseri, LW-28 Bawazeer and  LW-
      13 Habeeb Osman, LW-14 Mustafa Baig, LW-13 Samad Bin Abided, LW-19  MD
      Shareed, LW-8 Fayyaz Khan are also found at the scene  of  offence  in
      the videograph.”

It is therefore apparent, that the  aforesaid  video  clipping  notices  the
presence  and  participation  of  accused  nos.  2,  3,  4,  5,  7  and  14.
Therefore, as of now, prima facie, the participation  of  these  accused  in
the occurrence of 30.4.2011 cannot be seriously doubted, unless  of  course,
during the course of evidence, the video clipping is shown to  be  doctored.


16.   The allegations, as they appear in the  chargesheet  dated  30.6.2011,
leave no room for doubt, that the accusations are of a very serious  nature.
 In broad day light, at 11.10 AM, an elected representative of  the  people,
was attacked, without any fear of the repercussions.  The  attacks  resulted
in serious injuries to him.  In the aforesaid attack, at least  two  of  the
accused were in possession of guns.  The MLA is  alleged  to  have  received
gun shot injuries as well.  The allegations constitute an open challenge  to
civil society.   Persons  involved  in  the  alleged  incident  can  not  be
accepted to remain disciplined if enlarged on bail.  It is likely that  they
would threaten witnesses, which would severely prejudice the outcome of  the
trial.  In fact, it has been noticed in the impugned  order  passed  by  the
High Court that accused no. 8, after his release on bail, had  picked  up  a
quarrel with the MLA on 1.3.2012, and an entry of  the  aforesaid  fact  was
recorded in the Station General Diary.  The aforesaid factual  position  has
been  noticed  in  paragraph  10  of  the  impugned  order.   The  same  was
emphatically highlighted by the learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  who
represented the State of Andhra Pradesh.  It is also apparent, that  if  the
trial concludes by returning a finding against the accused,  they  would  be
liable to be subjected to extremely severe punishment(s).  As  of  now,  the
period  of  their  custody  is  trivial  in  comparison  to  the  punishment
prescribed for the offences for which they are charged.

17.   In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are satisfied  that  the  main
accused i.e., accused nos. 1, 6  and  11  are  clearly  disentitled  to  the
benefit of bail.  Accordingly,  Criminal  Appeals  arising  out  of  Special
Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 4409-4410 of 2012 are hereby dismissed.

18.   Insofar as the other cases filed by the State of  Andhra  Pradesh  are
concerned, a video clipping clearly demonstrates  the  presence  of  accused
nos. 2 to 5, 7 and 14 at the place of occurrence.  As such, bail granted  to
accused nos. 2, 3, 5, 7 and 14 (since  accused  no.  4  whose  presence  was
shown in the video clipping, has already died) by the High Court, is  hereby
set aside.  Taking into consideration the fact that the complainant, in  the
First Information Report, has involved a large  number  of  members  in  one
family, wherein the accused nos. 1, 2 and  6  are  real  brothers,  and  the
other accused are their children,  it  would  be  just  and  appropriate  to
affirm the order passed by the High Court qua all  the  accused  other  than
the  main  accused  and  the  accused  depicted  in  the   video   clipping.
Accordingly, the order of the High Court extending the benefit  of  bail  to
accused nos. 2, 3, 5, 7 and 14 is hereby set aside.   The  bail  granted  to
the rest of the accused, by the High Court, is affirmed.

19.   Accordingly, Criminal Appeals arising out of  Special  Leave  Petition
(Crl.) Nos. 4409-4410 of 2012 are dismissed.  And, Criminal Appeals  arising
out of Special Leave Petition (R)…… CRLMP Nos. 18203-18204 of 2012,  Special
Leave Petition (R)…… CRLMP No. 19162 of 2012,  and  Special  Leave  Petition
(R)….. CRLMP No. 19175 of 2012, are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

20.   Any observations or inferences drawn in the instant  order  shall  not
prejudice the rival parties in the ongoing criminal prosecution.


                                       …………………………….J.
                                        (B.S. CHAUHAN)


                                        …………………………….J.
                                        (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
New Delhi;
October 5, 2012
                                      .
.
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