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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

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Friday, December 12, 2025

Workplace sexual harassment — Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) — Under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act), an ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman may entertain a complaint against a “respondent” who is employed in a different department or workplace; the phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11(1) is a procedural trigger (directing application of the service rules applicable to that respondent) and does not operate as a jurisdictional bar requiring co-employment of the parties.

  1. Workplace sexual harassment — Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) — Under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act), an ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman may entertain a complaint against a “respondent” who is employed in a different department or workplace; the phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11(1) is a procedural trigger (directing application of the service rules applicable to that respondent) and does not operate as a jurisdictional bar requiring co-employment of the parties.

  2. Statutory interpretation — Text, context and purpose — The POSH Act must be interpreted purposively as social-welfare legislation enacted to secure women’s right to a safe workplace (Articles 14, 15, 21); definitions of “workplace”, “employee” and “employer” are wide (notably Section 2(o)(v) covering places visited in course of employment) and a narrow, place-bound reading of Section 11 would frustrate the Act’s object and create practical and psychological barriers to access to remedies.

  3. Procedure versus punitive authority — Two-stage scheme — The Act contemplates a two-stage process for government employees (investigation/fact-finding by the ICC and, if warranted, formal disciplinary action by the employer/disciplinary authority). An ICC’s fact-finding inquiry at the aggrieved woman’s workplace may form the basis for disciplinary action by the respondent’s employer under service rules; the ICC need not itself be the disciplining authority.

  4. Interplay with CCS rules and administrative instructions — The statutory scheme accords with prior judicial directions (Vishaka; Medha Kotwal Lele) and administrative instruments (CCS (CCA) Rules, Rule 14(2) proviso and DoPT Office Memorandum dated 16.07.2015), which envisage that Complaints Committees can act as fact-finding/inquiring authorities and the disciplinary authority must act on ICC recommendations; cooperation by the respondent’s employer (Section 19(f)) is mandatory.

  5. Prejudice and relief at interim stage — Where an aggrieved woman’s ICC has conducted only a preliminary/fact-finding inquiry, and no prejudice to the respondent is shown, courts should avoid interfering with ICC jurisdictional validity; disciplinary and other defenses remain available to the respondent in subsequent service/disciplinary proceedings and appeals.

RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. Non-jurisdictional reading of “where the respondent is an employee” (Section 11(1))
    The expression “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11(1) functions as a conditional/procedural clause — it prescribes the procedure to be followed (i.e., apply service rules applicable to the respondent or the prescribed manner where no service rules exist) and does not restrict the competence of the ICC to entertain complaints merely because the respondent is employed in a different workplace. The section must be read as a whole; isolated reading of the word “where” to infer a territorial or workplace-based jurisdictional limitation would be contrary to the statutory scheme.

  2. Purposive construction required by the POSH Act
    The POSH Act is social-welfare legislation aimed at removing barriers to remedy for women subjected to sexual harassment. Its definitions of “workplace”, “employee” and “employer” are deliberately expansive (including places visited during course of employment) and require a purposive construction that allows the aggrieved woman to bring complaints before the ICC of her workplace where the incident occurred or is connected to, even if the respondent is employed elsewhere. A restrictive construction would defeat the legislative purpose and produce absurd and impracticable results.

  3. Two-stage investigatory and disciplinary architecture; role of employer
    Section 11 and Section 13 together envisage a two-stage process: (i) ICC performs preliminary/fact-finding inquiry and issues a report/recommendation, and (ii) the respondent’s employer/disciplinary authority acts on those recommendations (including initiating formal disciplinary proceedings under applicable service rules). The ICC’s inquiry is thus investigatory; final disciplinary sanctions are the responsibility of the employer — an ICC at the aggrieved woman’s workplace can validly perform the first stage even when the respondent is from another department.

  4. Statutory duty of cooperation and safeguards against prejudice
    The Act imposes on employers duties (Section 19) to cooperate with ICC inquiries and to act upon ICC reports (Section 13). Where the respondent alleges lack of access to material or procedural prejudice because the inquiry is being conducted outside his department, the proper remedy lies in raising those contentions during disciplinary proceedings or by invoking appellate remedies under the Act; absence of demonstrable prejudice at the interim stage is a reason to uphold the ICC’s proceedings.

  5. Complementarity with CCS/administrative framework
    The statutory scheme aligns with prior judicial directions and administrative rules (e.g., Medha Kotwal Lele, amendment to CCS (CCA) Rules, and DoPT OM of 16.07.2015) that treat Complaints Committees as appropriate fact-finding/inquiring authorities and prescribe mechanisms to ensure fairness in transition from fact-finding to formal disciplinary inquiry. These integrated instruments support the validity of ICC inquiries conducted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace against respondents from other departments.