Constitutional / Statutory Interpretation — Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (“PP Act”) vis-à-vis State Rent Control enactments — Whether PP Act (a central statute) overrides State rent control laws in respect of premises which fall within definition of “public premises” under s.2(e) — Whether two-Judge decision in Suhas H. Pophale (2014) drawing a prospective-only application and exempting tenants in occupation prior to 16-9-1958 (or prior to date premises became ‘public premises’) was correct — Held: Ashoka Marketing (Constitution Bench, 1990) and subsequent three-Judge authority(s) correctly decide law; PP Act is a special enactment whose object and policy demonstrate overriding operation over State Rent Control Acts to the extent premises fall within s.2(e); Suhas H. Pophale is overruled to the extent inconsistent. The PP Act applies to tenancies created either before or after coming into force of PP Act provided (i) the premises fall within s.2(e) and (ii) occupation is unauthorised (including where tenancy is terminated under s.106 T.P. Act). “Occupation” (continuous concept) and not merely “possession” is the relevant test.
RATIO / KEY POINTS
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Primary holding: Where premises fall within the definition of “public premises” under Section 2(e) of the PP Act, and occupation of such premises is “unauthorised” within the meaning of Section 2(g) (for example, after termination of tenancy under Section 106, T.P. Act), the statutory machinery of the PP Act applies and will, by reason of its object, policy and later legislative will, override inconsistent provisions of State Rent Control legislation.
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Status of Suhas H. Pophale (2014): The two-Judge Bench decision in Suhas H. Pophale, insofar as it held that PP Act applies only prospectively (i.e., excluding occupants in possession prior to 16-9-1958 or prior to date premises became public premises), stands in conflict with the Constitution-Bench decision in Ashoka Marketing (1990) and the three-Judge precedent in M/s. Jain Ink. The court holds Suhas H. Pophale incorrect and overrules it to the extent inconsistent.
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Precedential hierarchy & stare decisis: A Bench of lesser strength cannot override or depart from law laid down by a larger Bench. Where the two-Judge view conflicts with earlier Constitution-Bench / three-Judge authorities on materially similar facts, the larger-Bench jurisprudence prevails.
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Principles of statutory interpretation applied: Both PP Act and State Rent Control Acts are “special” enactments. When two special statutes overlap, conflict must be resolved by reference to (i) legislative purpose, (ii) policy and object, and (iii) clear intendment of the statutory language. The PP Act — designed to provide a special, speedy regime for eviction from public premises — must be given overriding effect to carry out its purpose.
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Occupation vs. possession; continuity of occupation: The material inquiry for applicability of PP Act is whether the person was in “occupation” of the public premises when the PP Act was enacted and, later, whether occupation became “unauthorised.” The term “occupation” is continuous in nature and not limited to a discrete moment of entry or “possession.”
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Two conditions for PP Act to apply: (i) the tenanted premises must fall within the scope of s.2(e) (i.e., belong to or be taken on lease by a Central Government entity or specified companies/corporations), and (ii) the occupation must have become unauthorised (e.g., upon expiry/termination of tenancy, including after issuance of a s.106 T.P. Act notice).
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Termination of tenancy as a mode of rendering occupation “unauthorised”: Determination of tenancy (e.g., by notice under Section 106 T.P. Act) is one statutory mode which can render continued occupation “unauthorised” and thus attract PP Act eviction procedure.
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Non-dependence on mere physical possession: Invocation of PP Act does not depend exclusively on the moment of taking physical possession; rather, the test is whether occupation is unauthorised within the statutory definition and the premises are public premises as defined.
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Practical consequence: Where both statutes arguably cover the same premises, occupants in unauthorised occupation of public premises cannot successfully invoke protections of State Rent Control Acts against eviction under the PP Act; the Estate Officer’s summary machinery under PP Act is available to central/public entities for recovery of possession.
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Scope preserved: The judgment preserves that the PP Act operates only when both statutory conditions are met and leaves open other remedies where PP Act is inapplicable (e.g., proceedings under Rent Control Act or Small Causes Court where appropriate).
