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Whether the appellants have been able to satisfy the twin conditions laid down in s. 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the persons accused of the offence under the PMLA is not guilty of such offence; and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 778 : 2024 INSC 217

Satyendar Kumar Jain

v.

Directorate of Enforcement

(Criminal Appeal No. 1638 of 2024)

18 March 2024

[Bela M. Trivedi* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the appellants have been able to satisfy the twin conditions

laid down in s. 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002,

that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the persons

accused of the offence under the PMLA is not guilty of such offence;

and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

Headnotes

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s. 45 – Offence

of money laundering – Conditions to be satified for grant of

bail – Appellant-Minister in the Govt. of NCT of Delhi was the

conceptualizer, initiator, fund provider and supervisor for the

entire operation of the accommodation entries against cash

totalling to around Rs. 4.81 crores received through entry

operators in the bank accounts of the four companies, by

paying cash and the said companies controlled and owned

by him and his family – Other two appellants assisted the

Minister by making false declarations under the IDS each of

them declaring alleged undisclosed income of Rs.8.26 crores

in order to protect the Minister – Prosecution complaint filed

by the Enforcement Directorate against the appellants for the

commission of the offence of Money laundering – Prosecution

complaint fixed for framing of charge against the appellants –

Bail applications – Denial of, by the High Court – Correctness:

Held: Though a company is a separate legal entity from its

shareholders and directors, the lifting of corporate veil is permissible

when such corporate structures have been used for committing

fraud or economic offences or have been used as a facade or a

sham for carrying out illegal activities – Declarations made by the

other two appellants under the IDS though were held to be void, the

observations and proceedings recorded in the said orders passed 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 779

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

by the Authorities and by the High Court cannot be brushed aside

merely because of the said declarations – Said proceedings clearly

substantiates the case of the ED as alleged in the prosecution

complaint – Appellants could not be permitted to take advantage of

their own wrongdoing of filing the false declarations to mislead the

Income Tax authorities, and now to submit that the said declarations

under the IDS were void – Having regard to the totality of the facts

and circumstances of the case, the appellants miserably failed to

satisfy that there are reasonable grounds for believing that they

are not guilty of the alleged offences – On the contrary, there is

sufficient material collected by the ED to show that they are prima

facie guilty of the alleged offences – Thus, it is not possible to hold

that appellants complied with the twin mandatory conditions laid

down in s. 45 – High Court also prima facie found the appellants

guilty of the alleged offences under the PMLA, and the judgment

does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity – Appellants were

released on bail for temporary period after their arrest and the

appellant-Minister was released on bail on medical ground which

continued till date – Appellant to surrender forthwith before the

Special Court. [Paras 28-33]

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – ss. 3 and 2(1)

(u) – Offence of money laundering u/s. 3 – Words “proceeds

of Crime” in s. 2(1)(u) – Definition:

Held: Offence of money laundering captures every process and

activity in dealing with the proceeds of crime, directly or indirectly,

and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration

of tainted property in the formal economy to constitute an act of

money laundering – Authority of the Authorised Officer under the

Act to prosecute any person for the offence of money laundering

gets triggered only if there exists proceeds of crime within the

meaning of s. 2(1)(u) and further it is involved in any process

or activity – Property must qualify the definition of “proceeds of

crime” u/s. 2(1)(u) – In all or whole of the crime property linked to

scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but

all properties qualifying the definition of “proceeds of crime” u/s.

2(1)(u) will necessarily be the crime properties. [Para 21]

Case Law Cited

Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Others v. Union of India

and Others [2022] 6 SCR 382 : (2022) SCC OnLine

SC 929; Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana and Another 

780 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(1995) Supp (3) SCC 376; Neelu Chopra and Another

v. Bharti [2009] 14 SCR 1074 : (2009) 10 SCC 184;

Myakala Dharmarajam & Ors. v. State of Telangana &

Anr. (2020) 2 SCC 743; Gautam Kundu v. Directorate

of Enforcement (Prevention of Money-Laundering Act),

Government of India [2015] 15 SCR 499 : (2015) 16

SCC 1; Rohit Tandon v. Directorate of Enforcement

[2017] 13 SCR 156 : (2018) 11 SCC 46 – referred to.

List of Acts

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Prohibition of Benami

Property Transactions Act, 1988; Finance Act, 2016.

List of Keywords

Prevention of Money Laundering; Bail; Money laundering;

Accommodation entries; Undisclosed income; Company, separate

legal entity from its shareholders and directors; Lifting of corporate

veil; False declarations; Surrender; Proceeds of Crime; Property;

Beneficial owner.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1638

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.04.2023 of the High Court

of Delhi at New Delhi in BA No.3590 of 2022

With

Criminal Appeal Nos.1639 and 1640 of 2024

Appearances for Parties

Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, N. Hari Haran, Mrs. Meenakshi Arora, Sr.

Advs., Vivek Jain, Abhinav Jain, Amit Bhandari, Rajat Jain, Sharian

Mukherji, Mueed Shah, Siddhant Sahay, Dr. Sushil Kumar Gupta,

Mrs. Sunita Gupta, Dr. Sushil Satrawala, Chandratanay Chaube,

Ankit Shah, Manan Verma, Advs. for the Appellant.

S.V. Raju, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Zoheb Hussain, Rajat

Nair, Annam Venkatesh, Padmesh Mishra, Ms. Sairica S Raju,

Vinayak Sharma, Kshitiz Agarwal, Vivek Gurnani, Vivek Gaurav,

Kartik Sabharwal, Ms. Abhipriya, Advs. for the Respondent.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 781

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Bela M. Trivedi, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. All the three appeals arise out of the common impugned judgment

and order dated 06.04.2023 passed by the High Court of Delhi at

New Delhi, in the Bail Application Nos. 3590 of 2022, 3705 of 2022

and 3710 of 2022, whereby the High Court has rejected all the bail

applications of the appellants.

3. Earlier the Special Judge (PC Act) (CBI) -23 (MPs/MLAs cases) vide

the separate detailed orders dated 17.11.2022 had rejected the bail

applications of all the appellants – accused.

FACTUAL MATRIX

4. An FIR being case No.RC-AC-1-2017-A-0005 dated 24th August,

2017 came to be registered at the CBI AC-1, New Delhi against

Shri Satyendar Kumar Jain, Minister in the Government of National

Capital Territory of Delhi & Others, for the offences under Section

109 IPC and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988

at the instance of the Dy. Superintendent of Police, CBI who had

conducted a Preliminary Enquiry, being PE AC-1-2017-A0003

dated 10.04.2017 registered at the said office of the CBI. After the

investigation, a Charge-sheet came to be filed by the CBI in respect

of the said FIR on 03.12.2018 in the Court of Special Judge, CBI,

Patiala House Courts, New Delhi against the six accused viz. Sh.

Satyendar Kumar Jain, Smt. Poonam Jain, Sh. Ajit Prasad Jain, Sh.

Sunil Kumar Jain, Sh. Vaibhav Jain and Sh. Ankush Jain.

5. Since Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act in the

said FIR dated 24th August, 2017 were scheduled offences under the

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to

as the “PMLA”) and since it was alleged inter alia that Sh. Satyendar

Jain with the help of his family members and other persons had

acquired disproportionate assets during the period from 14.02.2015

to 31.05.2017, while he was functioning as Minister of Govt. NCT of

Delhi, and had laundered tainted cash amounts through Kolkata based

shell companies, the Directorate of Enforcement had registered an

ECIR bearing No. ECIR/HQ/14/2017 dated 30th August, 2017 against 

782 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Satyendar Jain, Vaibhav Jain, Ankush Jain and others for investigation

into the commission of the offence of Money laundering as defined

under Section 3 and punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA. On

the completion of the said investigation, the Prosecution Complaint

came to be filed on 27.07.2022 by the Directorate of Enforcement

in the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Rouse Avenue District

Court, New Delhi, against the accused Sh. Satyendar Jain and

others with a prayer to take cognizance of the offences of money

laundering under Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of PMLA. The

said Prosecution Complaint being CC No.23/2022 is now pending

at the stage of framing of charge against the appellants – accused.

6. During the course of investigation, the appellant- Satyendar Kumar

Jain was arrested on 30th May, 2022 and the appellants-Vaibhav

Jain and Ankush Jain were arrested on 30th June, 2022. The gist of

the allegations made against the appellants-accused as mentioned

in the said Prosecution Complaint is as under: -

S.No. Name of the

Accused

Role in the case (in brief)

1. Satyendar

Kumar Jain

Based on the discussion and material herein

above, it is clear that Satyendar Kumar

Jain hatched the criminal conspiracy and

conceptualized the idea of accommodation

entries against cash. To get his idea

implemented, he recommended appointing his

old friend Sh. Jagdish Prasad Mohta, Chartered

Accountant as the auditor of Akinchan

Developers Pvt. Ltd., Paryas Infosolution

Pvt. Ltd., Indo Metalimpex Pvt. Ltd. and

Mangalayatan Projects Pvt. Ltd. He (Satyendar

Kumar Jain) first approached Sh. Jagdish

Prasad Mohta for taking accommodation

entries in lieu of cash in his aforesaid four

companies. Shri Mohta arranged a meeting

between Satyendar Kumar Jain and Rajendra

Bansal, Kolkata based accommodation entry

provider. In this meeting all the nitty gritties

of these entries was finalized like percentage

of commission, process of cash transfer,

documents to be maintained etc.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 783

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

In this way Satyendar Kumar Jain was the

conceptualizer, initiator, and supervisor for

the entire operation of these accommodation

entries. By taking the accommodation entries in

various companies, Satyendar Kumar Jain was

hiding behind the Corporate Veil. Investigation

into the transactions and facts prove that

Satyendar Kumar Jain initiated, managed

and controlled the companies in which these

accommodations entries were received.

Accordingly, the accommodation entries

totalling to Rs.4.81 Crore (Rs.4.75 crores

as entries + Rs.5.32 lakhs as commission)

were received during the period 2015-16 from

Kolkata based entry operators in the bank

accounts of the aforesaid companies and

cash totalling to Rs.4,65,99,635/- i.e. (sum of

Rs.4,60,83,500/- + Rs.5,16,135/- commission

paid to entry operators), for this purpose, was

paid to them. He also received accommodation

entry of Rs.15,00,000/- in his company J.J.

Ideal Estate Pvt. Ltd. during the year 2015-16

from Kolkata based entry operators by paying

cash amounts of Rs. 15,00,000 + commission

of Rs.16,800/-. By this criminal activity, he while

holding the public office of and functioning as

a Minister of Government of National Capital

Territory of Delhi, during the period 14.02.2015

to 31.05.2017, acquired assets to the tune of

Rs.4,81,16,435/- i.e. (sum of Rs.4,60,83,500/-

+ Rs.15,00,000/- received in J.J. Ideal Estate

Pvt. Ltd. + Rs.5,16,135/- & Rs.16,800/-

commission paid to entry operators) - , as

discussed in above paragraphs, in his name

and in the name of his family member/ friends,

with the help of his business associates, which

are disproportionate to his known sources

of income for which he has not satisfactorily

accounted for and laundered the proceeds of

crime through a complex web of companies

controlled by him. 

784 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Satyendar Kumar Jain has thus committed

the offence of money laundering as defined

under Section 3 of PMLA by actually

acquiring, possessing, concealing and

using the proceeds of crime to the tune

of Rs.4,81,16,435/- and projecting and

claiming the same as untainted in the mode

and manner as provided in the preceding

paragraphs in the present complaint.

2. Ankush Jain Ankush Jain has knowingly assisted Satyendar

Kumar Jain by making declaration under IDS,

2016 for declaring undisclosed income of

Rs.8.6 crore (including Rs.1,53,61,166/-

during check period) for the period from

2010-11 to 2015-16 in order to save and

shield Sh. Satyendar Kumar Jain. He also

prepared back dated documents with the

help of Vaibhav Jain, Sunil Kumar Jain and

Jagdish Prasad Mohta with regard to his

directorship in Akinchan Developers Pvt.

Ltd., Paryas Infosolution Pvt. Ltd. and Indo

Metalimpex Pvt. Ltd. by becoming directors

of aforesaid companies from back date for

showing his IDS declaration as genuine.

Ankush Jain has thus committed the offence

of money laundering as defined under Section

3 of PMLA by being actually involved in and

knowingly assisting Satyendar Kumar Jain in

projecting his proceeds of crime to the tune

of Rs.4,81,16,435/- as untainted in the mode

and manner as described in the preceding

paragraphs in the present complaint and is

therefore, liable for punishment under Section

4 of PMLA.

3. Vaibhav Jain Vaibhav Jain is involved in knowingly

assisting Satyendar Kumar Jain by making

declaration under IDS, 2016 for declaring

undisclosed income of Rs.8.6 crore (including

Rs.1,53,61,166/- during check period) for

the period from 2010-11 to 2015-16 in

order to save Sh. Satyendar Kumar Jain.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 785

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

He also prepared back dated documents with

the help of Sunil Kumar Jain, Ankush Jain and

Sh. Jagdish Prasad Mohta with regard to his

directorship in Akinchan Developers Pvt. Ltd.,

Indo Metalimpex Pvt. Ltd. and Mangalayatan

Projects Pvt. Ltd. by becoming directors of

aforesaid companies from back date for

showing his IDS declaration as genuine.

Vaibhav Jain has thus committed the offence

of money laundering as defined under Section

3 of PMLA by being actually involved in and

knowingly assisting Satyendar Kumar Jain in

projecting his proceeds of crime to the tune

of Rs.4,81,16,435/- as untainted in the mode

and manner as aforesaid in the complaint

and is therefore, liable for punishment under

Section 4 of PMLA.

SUBMISSIONS

7. The learned counsels for the parties made their respective

submissions at length. The learned senior advocate Mr. Abhishek

Manu Singhvi broadly made following submissions on behalf of the

appellant Satyendar Kumar Jain:

(i) The appellant was already granted bail in the predicate offence

registered by the CBI, and the arrest of the appellant was made

by the ED almost five years after the registration of the ECIR,

though the appellant was cooperating the ED by remaining

present in response to the summons issued under Section 50

of the PMLA. The appellant was in custody from 30.05.2022

to 26.05.2023 and since then has been granted interim bail on

the medical ground.

(ii) No shares of companies as alleged by the ED were acquired

by the appellant within the check period and even otherwise

the assets held by the company could not be attributed to its

shareholders.

(iii) Even if the accommodation entries amounting to Rs. 4.61 crores

are attributed to the appellant through his wife’s shareholdings,

it would come only to Rs. 59,32,122/- which is less than 1 crore, 

786 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

and therefore the appellant is entitled to bail under the proviso

to Section 45 of the PMLA.

(iv) There is gross discrepancy in the amount of proceeds of

crime calculated by the ED and the amount mentioned

in the Chargesheet of the CBI in as much as the alleged

disproportionate amount is Rs.1,62,50,294/- as per the FIR

whereas as per the ED the amount is Rs. 4,81,16,435/-.

(v) The appellant had neither served as a Director nor had signed

any financial document during the check period, and the

appellant had already resigned from the directorship of the

allegedly involved Companies two years before the commission

of the alleged offence. It was Vaibhav Jain and Ankush Jain

and their family members who had a significant influence and

control over the said companies.

(vi) The appellant’s role in the companies has been delineated in the

MOU seized from Vaibhav Jain’s locker, which underscores the

business relations and shows that the appellant’s architectural

expertise was to be employed for the investment to be financed

by the families of Vaibhav Jain and Ankush Jain. Through the

quashing of the provisional attachment order by the Delhi High

Court, the allegation against the appellant being the beneficial

owner had stood refuted.

(vii) The alleged proceeds of crime through accommodation entries

were directed to the families of Vaibhav Jain and Ankush

Jain, and the fresh shares issued to the Kolkata based Shell

Companies were promptly transferred to Vaibhav Jain and

Ankush Jain during the check period. The appellant therefore

was not in possession of any proceeds of crime.

(viii) The appellant could not be held to be in constructive possession

of the property, if there was no dominion or control of the

appellant over the said property. As per the ED’s complaint

also the appellant was not in possession of the proceeds of

crime and therefore also the appellant could not be said to be

in constructive possession of the same.

(ix) There was no shred of evidence collected by the ED to show

that the appellant had provided cash to Kolkata companies

during the check period. It was Vaibhav Jain and Ankush Jain 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 787

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

who had explained on their Fragrance business as the legitimate

source of the cash during their recording of statements under

Section 50 of the PMLA.

(x) The Kolkata companies and the persons allegedly providing

accommodation entries were not made the accused by the ED.

(xi) The allegation of the ED in its complaint that the appellant had

committed a predicate offence of hatching a criminal conspiracy

and by committing criminal activity had acquired assets to the

tune of Rs. 4.81 crore in his name and in the name of his family

members while holding the public office, was not the allegation

made by the CBI in the FIR registered against the appellant

and others with regard to the disproportionate assets charged

under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

(xii) The assumptions of proceeds of crime on the sole basis of

accommodation entries is completely contrary to the concept

of proceeds of crime as explained in the judgment of Vijay

Madanlal Choudhary and Others vs. Union of India and

Others1

. Such allegation could be a tax violation but could not

be considered as proceeds of crime.

(xiii) The Prosecution Complaint is silent as to when the scheduled

offence was committed and as to how and in what manner the

proceeds of crime was laundered within the meaning of Section

3 of the PMLA.

(xiv) As regards the Income Disclosure Scheme (IDS) declaration

made by Vaibhav Jain and Ankush Jain for about Rs.16 crores

for the period 2010-2016, it has been submitted that the said

IDS declarations were rejected by the PCIT vide the order dated

09.06.2017, on the ground of misrepresentation/suppression of

facts. The said order of PCIT was challenged by Vaibhav Jain

and Ankush Jain before the Delhi High Court, however the

High Court had also rejected that petition vide the order dated

01.08.2019. Neither the PCIT nor the High Court had given

any finding that the said amount of Rs. 16 crores belonged to

the appellant.

1 [2022] 6 SCR 382 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929

788 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(xv) The reliance placed by the ED on the appellant’s letter dated

27.06.2018 was misleading and incorrect, in as much as the

appellant vide the said letter had explicitly denied the appellant

being the beneficial owner. Since Vaibhav Jain and Ankush

Jain had already deposited the tax on the said income, the

appellant in the said letter had only requested the authorities

to adjust the said tax and not to make a demand again for the

same amount from the appellant, however from the said letter

it could not be assumed that the appellant had accepted the

additions made in the assessment order.

(xvi) As held in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the courts ought

not to conduct mini trial and should consider only the broad

probability of the matter. The appellant is not a flight risk, there is

no risk of tampering of documents or witnesses. The jail violation

as alleged by the ED has not been accepted by the concerned

Jail visiting Judge and the Jail authorities. The appellant being

sick and infirm, having undergone a spine surgery, is entitled

to bail as per the proviso to Section 45 of PMLA.

8. The learned ASG Mr. SV Raju made the following submissions in

the appeal preferred by the appellant Shri Satyendar Kumar Jain:

(i) It was revealed during the course of investigation that the

appellant Satyendar Kumar Jain while posted and functioning

as the Minister in the Government of National Capital Territory

of Delhi, during the period from 2015 to 2017 had acquired

assets in the form of movable and immovable properties in

his name and in the name of his family members, which were

disproportionate to his known source of income.

(ii) During the check period, the accommodation entries against

cash of about 4.81 crores was received in the companies – M/s

Akinchan Developers Pvt. Ltd., M/s Paryas Infosolutions Pvt.

Ltd., M/s. Manglayatan Projects Pvt. Ltd., and M/s JJ Ideal

Estate Pvt. Ltd., beneficially owned/ controlled by the appellant

from Kolkata based entry operators through Shell Companies.

(iii) From the statements of Rajendra Bansal, Jivendra Mishra, both

residents of Kolkata, and from Shri J.P. Mohta, the Chartered

Accountant, it was revealed that Shri Rajendra Bansal had

arranged accommodation entries in the companies of the 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 789

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

appellant. Shri Vaibhav Jain in his statement under Section 50

had also stated that the cash was provided by the appellant

himself and had also explained about the modus operandi of

transferring the cash from Delhi to Kolkata through Hawala

operators and as to how in lieu of cash, accommodation entries

were layered and received from Kolkata based shell companies

into the companies owned by the appellant, and agricultural

lands were purchased from the said funds.

(iv) From the documents obtained from the Income Tax Department

it was revealed that the appellant had submitted the application

before the income tax authorities requesting that the income

tax paid by Vaibhav Jain and Ankush Jain under IDS, 2016

be adjusted against the demands raised in his individual

assessments by the IT authorities, which established that the

IDS declaration made by Vaibhav Jain and Ankush Jain were

made for the appellant and that the amount paid in IDS as well

as the tax paid thereon belonged to the appellant Satyendar

Kumar Jain.

(v) The Special Court having taken the cognizance of the PMLA

case vide the order dated 29.07.2022 and having held that there

was prima facie evidence incriminating about the involvement

of the appellant Satyendar Kumar Jain was sufficient to show

the existence of the scheduled offence and also the existence

of proceeds of crime.

(vi) The appellant Satyendar Kumar Jain was the main person

behind the bogus shell companies based in Kolkata, which

never did any real business. He had either incorporated them

or was having majority shareholdings alongwith his wife. The

accommodation entries of Rs. 16.50 crores (approx.) were

received in the said companies during the financial years 2010-

11, 2011-12 and 2015-16 with the modus operandi as revealed

from the statements of the Auditor/Chartered Accountant Shri

J.P. Mohta as well as the accommodation entry provider Shri

Rajendra Bansal and also from the statement of Vaibhav Jain.

(vii) Though the principle of company being a separate legal entity

from its shareholders is an established principle of Company

law, the lifting of corporate veil has been upheld in the cases

where the corporate structures have been used for committing 

790 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

fraud, economic offences or have been used as a facade or a

sham for carrying out illegal activities.

(viii) The bogus nature of IDS declarations was substantiated by

the fact that the entire amount of Rs.16.50 Crores received

as accommodation entry was split between Vaibhav Jain and

Ankush Jain. The said declarations showed their modus operandi

to shield Satyendar Jain and his family members, and assume

the entire liability upon themselves to give it a colour of a tax

evasion simplicitor, rather than a criminal activity relating to

disproportionate assets. This modus operandi also showed

that the appellants themselves had disregarded the corporate

entities of these companies.

(ix) The disproportionate pecuniary resources earned by the

appellant by the commission of scheduled offence, were used

as accommodation entries for concealing and layering the

tainted origins of the money, and therefore would qualify to

be the proceeds of crime as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of

the PMLA.

(x) The two entry operators namely Rajendra Bansal and Jivendra

Mishra had expressed a fear that Shri Satyendar Kumar Jain

being an influential politician will create danger to them.

(xi) The mandatory twin conditions of Section 45 of PMLA having

not been satisfied, the appellant should not be released on bail.

9. So far as the appellants Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain are concerned,

the Learned Senior Advocate Ms. Menakshi Arora with Learned

Advocate Mr. Sushil Kumar Gupta made the following submissions: -

(i) The Scheduled offence in the present case i.e. the disproportionate

assets case under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act is a period

specific offence and gets accomplished only at the end of

the check period (14.02.2015 to 31.05.2017). As stated in

Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the proceeds of crime

is indicative of criminal activity related to a scheduled offence

already accomplished, and therefore the offence of money

laundering can be initiated only after the Scheduled Offence

is accomplished. However, in the instant case, the appellants

have been roped in for benami transactions from 2015-2016

which was well before the end of check period i.e 31.05.2017.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 791

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

(ii) The offence of money laundering against the appellants is

attributed to their act of filing IDS on 27.09.2016 much before

the end of check period i.e. 31.05.2017. Hence, the same cannot

be considered as an act of assisting someone in the offence of

money laundering as the proceeds of crime could have been

generated after the end of the check period and not before that.

(iii) The act of declaring IDS by the appellants in respect of

undisclosed income for the period from 2010-2011 to 2015-2016

cannot be considered as an act of assisting Satyendar Jain in

committing the offence of money laundering, in as much as the

possession of unaccounted property acquired by legal means

may be actionable for tax violation, but cannot be regarded

as the proceeds of crime unless the concerned tax legislation

prescribes such violations as an offence and such an offence

is included in the Schedule of the PML Act. In the instant case,

the total amount of 16 crores has not been considered as the

proceeds of crime as the ED is relying on the accommodation

entries received during the check period.

(iv) The IDS filed u/s 183 of the Finance Act, 2013 was declared

void u/s 193 of the said Act by the Income Tax authorities.

Hence, the said act of the appellants filing the IDS cannot

be construed as basis for levelling charges under Section 3

of PMLA. Reliance is placed on Karnail Singh vs. State of

Haryana and Another2 for understanding the meaning of “void.”

(v) It is not made clear by the ED as to the declaration of which IDS,

whether the one filed by Vaibhav Jain or that filed by Ankush

Jain has led to the assistance of Satyendar Jain for making out

the offence under PMLA. Since the allegations are vague, the

benefit of the same should go to the accused. In this regard,

reliance is placed on Neelu Chopra and Another vs. Bharti3

 and

Myakala Dharmarajam & Ors. Vs. State of Telangana & Anr.4

(vi) Since, the generation of proceeds of crime is not an offence

under Section 3 of PMLA and the said offence could be

2 (1995) Supp (3) SCC 376

3 [2009] 14 SCR 1074 : (2009) 10 SCC 184

4 (2020) 2 SCC 743

792 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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committed only after the accomplishment of the Scheduled

Offence, the alleged act could not be said to be an offence

under Section 3 of PMLA. The act of the appellants assisting

Satyendar Jain for accumulating assets as alleged by the CBI,

cannot be said to be an offence under the PMLA.

(vii) The control of the entire records of the companies was with

the appellants, including the bank accounts. They were the

main decision- makers being the Directors, in respect of the

acts performed on behalf of the Companies, and Mr. Satyendar

Jain had nothing to do with the said Companies after 2013.

The prosecution has unnecessarily tried to link the appellants

with Satyendar Jain from the statements of witnesses recorded

under Section 50 of the PMLA.

(viii) The Scheduled Offence does not allege conspiracy. The day

Mr. Satyendar Jain decided to enter into politics, all the relations

with him whether in respect of the Companies or any business

transactions were severed, and since July 2013 he was neither

a Director nor a shareholder nor had any relation with the

Companies which were the Companies of the appellants.

(ix) The appellants are in custody since 30.06.2022 except for the

period when they were released on the interim bail (Vaibhav Jain

on 18.08.2023 to 27.12.2023 and Ankush Jain on 12.09.2023

to 27.12.2023).

(x) The appellants have not violated any conditions imposed by

the Court when on interim bail, and have also not tried to delay

the proceedings before the trial court in any manner.

10. The learned ASG Mr. S.V. Raju appearing on behalf of the respondentDirectorate of Enforcement made his submissions in the appeals

preferred by the appellants- Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain as under: -

(i) The appellants-Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain were actively

involved in the commission of the offence of money laundering

by assisting the accused-Satyendar Kumar Jain. The appellant

Ankush Jain was the Director of M/s. Mangalayatan Projects Pvt.

Ltd. during the check period. The said company is one of the

accused in the Prosecution Complaint filed on 27.07.2022. The

said company had received the proceeds of crime amounting

to Rs.1,90,00,000/- during the check period in the form of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 793

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

accommodation entries from Kolkata based shell companies.

The said appellant-Ankush Jain transferred the land possessed

by M/s. Mangalayatan Projects Pvt. Ltd. in the name of his

mother Indu Jain to frustrate the proceeds of crime.

(ii) Similarly, the appellant-Vaibhav Jain was the Director of M/s.

Paryas Infosolution Pvt. Ltd. during the check period. The

said company is also one of the accused in the Prosecution

Complaint filed on 27.07.2022. The said company had received

proceeds of crime amounting to Rs.69,00,300/- during the

check period in the form of accommodation entries from the

Kolkata based shell companies. The said appellant-Vaibhav

Jain had transferred the land possessed by M/s. Mangalayatan

Projects Pvt. Ltd. in the name of his mother Sushila Jain and

wife-Swati Jain to frustrate the proceeds of crime. He also took

back the shares without consideration from shell companies

and thus both the appellants helped Satyendar Kumar Jain in

projecting the tainted money as untainted in the process of

money laundering.

(iii) Both the appellants had made declarations in their individual

capacity under the IDS, 2016 for declaring undisclosed income

of Rs.8.6 Crores during check period i.e. from 2010-11 to 2015-

16, in order to shield Satyendar Kumar Jain for concealing the

true nature of proceeds of crime.

(iv) Both the appellants prepared back dated documents with the

help of each other and with the help of Sunil Kumar Jain and

Jagdish Prasad Mohta for becoming directors in their respective

companies i.e. Mr. Ankush Jain in M/s. Akinchan Developers

Pvt. Ltd., and M/s. Indo Metalimpex Pvt. Ltd., and Mr. Vaibhav

Jain in M/s. Akinchan Developers Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Mangalayatan

Projects Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Indo Metalimpex Pvt. Ltd. for showing

the IDS declarations as genuine.

(v) The income sought to be disclosed by the appellants under

the IDS declarations belonged to the appellant- Satyendar

Jain, and the said IDS declarations were rejected by the

Income Tax authorities under Section 193 of the Finance Act,

2016 on the ground of misrepresentation and suppression of

facts. The said order was upheld by the High Court and the

Supreme Court.

794 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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(vi) The declarations of the appellants were held void under Section

193 of the Finance Act, 2016, which applied only for the purpose

of the said scheme, however, if the making of such declarations

was an offence under a separate Act, namely, PMLA, then such

an act would not be effaced merely because of Section 193.

(vii) The very fact that such declarations were made by the said

appellants, was the relevant fact for the purposes of the

alleged offence under the PMLA, as both the appellants are

being prosecuted in their individual capacities for allegedly

actively assisting the appellant- Satyendar Jain in concealing

the proceeds of crime and projecting the proceeds of crime

as untainted.

(viii) Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) are both scheduled offences

under the PMLA, and Section 3 of PMLA ropes in any person

who may or may not have any role to play in the scheduled

offence but has directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or

knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party involved in any

process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.

(ix) The money laundering need not commence only after the check

period, inasmuch as the offence under Section 13(1) (e) of the

PC Act contemplates that at any time the assets of the public

servant could be disproportionate to his income, which could

have been acquired by the public servant either at the beginning

or in the middle of the check period also.

(x) From the statements of bank accounts of the four companies

and various other Kolkata based shell companies controlled

by Kolkata based entry operators revealed that the amount

totalling to Rs. 4,60,83,500/- was received in M/s. Akinchan

Developers Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Mangalayatan Projects Pvt. Ltd.

and M/s. Paryas Infosolution Pvt. Ltd. from Kolkata based shell

companies during the period 01.04.2015 to 31.03.2016 (during

the check period) despite no business activities were carried

out by the said companies and the shares were purchased at

a very high premium.

(xi) The investigation revealed that the cash acquired by Satyendar

Jain was given to the Kolkata entry operators for the purpose

of accommodation entries contemporaneously during the check 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 795

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

period as and when they were acquired and thereafter the same

were concealed and projected as untainted and sought to be

laundered in the form of share application money. The said

amount was also used for repayment of loan and purchase of

agricultural lands by the said companies.

(xii) Though the CBI in their chargesheet dated 03.12.2018 filed

in FIR No. RC-AC-I-2017-A 0005 (dated 24.08.2017) had

quantified the proceeds of crime to be Rs.1,47,60,497.67, in view

of the investigation conducted under PMLA it was established

that all the companies were beneficially owned and controlled

by Satyendar Jain, and the amount of Rs.4,81,16,435/- received

during the check period was the proceeds of crime in the hands

of Satyendar Jain. The said conclusion along with the facts

underlying the same, have also been conveyed to the CBI

under Section 66(2) of PMLA vide the letter dated 31.03.2022.

(xiii) Though the accommodation entries per se may not be the

proceeds of crime in a given case, since in the instant case,

it has been specifically alleged that the shares in the three

companies during the check period which were held by the

bogus share companies, were purchased by the Kolkata based

bogus companies as entries in lieu of cash, the source of which

cash was the public servant, namely, Saytendar Jain, he was the

beneficial owner of the shares which was a vehicle to introduce

the unaccounted cash or disproportionate pecuniary resources

which squarely fell within the meaning of proceeds of crime as

defined under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA.

11. During the course of arguments, the Court had sought clarification from

the learned ASG Mr. Raju with regard to the role of the appellantsAnkush Jain and Vaibhav Jain, as also the quantum of proceeds of

crime with which they were allegedly involved, specifically in respect

of the figures mentioned in the Prosecution Complaint against them.

Pursuant to the same, the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement

has filed his affidavit clarifying the role of the appellants – Ankush

Jain and Vaibhav Jain and further stating inter alia that the figure

of Rs.1,53,61,166/- was inadvertently mentioned at page no.-248,

as it was the amount attributed by the CBI in its Chargesheet to

Satyendar Jain, Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain individually for the

purpose of receiving total accommodation entries in lieu of cash of 

796 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Rs.4.61 Crores, however respondent’s investigation has revealed

that the entire Rs.4.81 Crores (Rs.4.61 Crores plus commission plus

Rs.15 lakhs in J.J. Ideal Estates Pvt. Ltd.) was entirely the property

of Satyendar Jain received in his companies as accommodation

entries in lieu of cash and this entire sum was sought to be declared

by the appellants Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain in the IDS as their

own income.

12. In the light of the said clarification, the Learned Senior Advocate

Ms. Arora had further submitted that the so-called inadvertent error

was not pointed out before the trial court and the High Court and

it was only during the course of arguments before this Court, the

said clarification/rectification was sought to be made, which is not

permissible. According to her, ED attains jurisdiction to investigate

only after the proceeds of crime is generated and when the same

is subjected to any process or activity as mentioned in Section 3 of

PMLA. Therefore, ED could not have increased the proceeds of crime

beyond what was taken as disproportionate assets by the CBI i.e.

1,47,60,497/-. She further submitted that as per the FIR, the figure

mentioned was Rs. 1,53,61,166/-, during the arguments and as per

the written submissions the figure mentioned was Rs. 4,81,16,435/-,

and the figure mentioned as per the affidavit is Rs.4,65,99,635/- which

does not find mention in the complaint. Thus, the allegations made

against the appellants being vague in nature, the benefit should go

to the appellants.

ANALYSIS

13. We are well conscious of the fact that the chargesheet has already

been filed in the predicate offence on 03.12.2018 for the offences

under the Prevention of Corruption Act allegedly committed by the

present appellants alongwith others, and the cognizance thereof

has already been taken by the concerned Court. The Prosecution

Complaint has also been filed by the respondent – ED against the

present appellants alongwith others for the commission of the offence

of Money laundering as defined under Section 3 read with Section

70 punishable under Section 4 of PMLA 2002. We have also been

apprised that the Special Court has fixed the Prosecution Complaint

for framing of charge against the appellants alongwith others. Under

the circumstances any observation made by us may influence the

process of trial. We, therefore would refrain ourselves from dealing 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 797

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

with the elaborate submissions made by the learned counsels for the

parties on the merits of the case, we would rather confine ourselves

to deal with the bare minimum facts necessary for the purpose of

deciding whether the appellants have been able to satisfy the twin

conditions laid down in Section 45 of the PMLA, that is (i) there are

reasonable grounds for believing that the persons accused of the

offence under the PMLA is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that

he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

14. In Gautam Kundu vs. Directorate of Enforcement (Prevention of

Money-Laundering Act), Government of India5

, while holding that

the conditions specified under Section 45 of PMLA are mandatory,

it was observed as under: -

“30. The conditions specified under Section 45 of PMLA are

mandatory and need to be complied with, which is further

strengthened by the provisions of Section 65 and also

Section 71 of PMLA. Section 65 requires that the provisions

of CrPC shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent

with the provisions of this Act and Section 71 provides

that the provisions of PMLA shall have overriding effect

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained

in any other law for the time being in force. PMLA has an

overriding effect and the provisions of CrPC would apply

only if they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this

Act. Therefore, the conditions enumerated in Section 45

of PMLA will have to be complied with even in respect

of an application for bail made under Section 439 CrPC.

That coupled with the provisions of Section 24 provides

that unless the contrary is proved, the authority or the

Court shall presume that proceeds of crime are involved

in money-laundering and the burden to prove that the

proceeds of crime are not involved, lies on the appellant.”

15. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), a three-judge bench while

upholding the validity of Section 45 had observed as under: -

“387. Having said thus, we must now address the challenge

to the twin conditions as applicable post amendment of

5 [2015] 15 SCR 499 : (2015) 16 SCC 1

798 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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2018. That challenge will have to be tested on its own

merits and not in reference to the reasons weighed with this

Court in declaring the provision, (as it existed at the relevant

time), applicable only to offences punishable for a term of

imprisonment of more than three years under Part A of the

Schedule to the 2002 Act. Now, the provision (Section 45)

including twin conditions would apply to the offence(s) under

the 2002 Act itself. The provision post 2018 amendment, is

in the nature of no bail in relation to the offence of moneylaundering unless the twin conditions are fulfilled. The

twin conditions are that there are reasonable grounds for

believing that the accused is not guilty of offence of moneylaundering and that he is not likely to commit any offence

while on bail. Considering the purposes and objects of the

legislation in the form of 2002 Act and the background in

which it had been enacted owing to the commitment made

to the international bodies and on their recommendations, it

is plainly clear that it is a special legislation to deal with the

subject of money-laundering activities having transnational

impact on the financial systems including sovereignty and

integrity of the countries. This is not an ordinary offence.

To deal with such serious offence, stringent measures

are provided in the 2002 Act for prevention of moneylaundering and combating menace of money-laundering,

including for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of

crime and to prosecute persons involved in the process or

activity connected with the proceeds of crime. In view of the

gravity of the fallout of money-laundering activities having

transnational impact, a special procedural law for prevention

and regulation, including to prosecute the person involved,

has been enacted, grouping the offenders involved in the

process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime

as a separate class from ordinary criminals. The offence

of money-laundering has been regarded as an aggravated

form of crime “world over”. It is, therefore, a separate class

of offence requiring effective and stringent measures to

combat the menace of money-laundering.

400. It is important to note that the twin conditions provided

under Section 45 of the 2002 Act, though restrict the right 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 799

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

of the accused to grant of bail, but it cannot be said that

the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute

restraint on the grant of bail. The discretion vests in the

Court which is not arbitrary or irrational but judicial, guided

by the principles of law as provided under Section 45 of

the 2002 Act.

404. As aforementioned, similar twin conditions have

been provided in several other special legislations validity

whereof has been upheld by this Court being reasonable

and having nexus with the purposes and objects sought

to be achieved by the concerned special legislations.

Besides the special legislation, even the provisions in the

general law, such as 1973 Code stipulate compliance of

preconditions before releasing the accused on bail. The

grant of bail, even though regarded as an important right

of the accused, is not a mechanical order to be passed

by the Courts. The prayer for grant of bail even in respect

of general offences, have to be considered on the basis

of objective discernible judicial parameters as delineated

by this Court from time to time, on case-to-case basis.

406. It was urged that the scheduled offence in a given

case may be a non-cognizable offence and yet rigors

of Section 45 of the 2002 Act would result in denial of

bail even to such accused. This argument is founded on

clear misunderstanding of the scheme of the 2002 Act.

As we have repeatedly mentioned in the earlier part of

this judgment that the offence of money-laundering is

one wherein a person, directly or indirectly, attempts to

indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or

is actually involved in any process or activity connected

with the proceeds of crime. The fact that the proceeds of

crime have been generated as a result of criminal activity

relating to a scheduled offence, which incidentally happens

to be a non-cognizable offence, would make no difference.

The person is not prosecuted for the scheduled offence

by invoking provisions of the 2002 Act, but only when he

has derived or obtained property as a result of criminal

activity relating to or in relation to a scheduled offence and

then indulges in process or activity connected with such 

800 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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proceeds of crime. Suffice it to observe that the argument

under consideration is completely misplaced and needs

to be rejected.”

16. In the light of the aforestated position of law propounded by the

three Judge Bench, we have prima facie examined the case alleged

against the appellants and the prima facie defense put forth by the

appellants, to satisfy ourselves whether there are reasonable grounds

for believing that the appellants are not guilty of the alleged offences

under the Act and that they are not likely to commit any offence while

on bail. Though it was urged on behalf of the respondent – ED that

the appellant Satyendar Kumar Jain is a very influential political

leader and is likely to influence the witnesses if released on bail, we

would rather objectively decide the appeals on merits.

17. The case in nutshell put forth by the respondent – ED is that the appellant

Satyendar Kumar Jain had conceptualized the idea of accommodation

entries against cash and at this instance, his close associate Shri

Jagdish Prasad Mohta had arranged a meeting between Satyendar

Kumar Jain and Rajendra Bansal, a Kolkata based accommodation

entry provider in July/ August, 2010. In the said meeting the modalities

of carrying out accommodation entries, percentage of commission,

process of cash transfer and documents to be maintained etc. were

finalized. Thus, according to the ED, Satyendar Kumar Jain was the

conceptualizer, initiator and supervisor for the entire operation of the

accommodation entries. It has been alleged that the accommodation

entries totalling to Rs.4.81 crores were received during the period

2015-16 from Kolkata based entry operators in the bank accounts of

the four companies – Paryas Infosolution Pvt. Ltd., Indo Metalimpex

Pvt. Ltd., Mangalayatan Projects Pvt. Ltd. and Akinchan Developers

Pvt. Ltd., which companies were owned/controlled by him and his

family members, and the cash totalling Rs.4,65,99,635/- approximately

was paid to the said entry operators. It has been also alleged that

the appellant Satyendar Kumar Jain received accommodation entries

of Rs.15 lakhs in his company J.J. Ideal Estate Pvt. Ltd. during the

year 2015-16 from the said Kolkata based entry operators by paying

cash amounts of Rs.15 lakhs and commission of Rs.16,800/-. Thus,

it has been alleged that Satyendar Kumar Jain committed offence of

money laundering under Section 3 of PMLA by actually acquiring,

possessing, concealing and using the process of bank to tune of

Rs.4,81,16,435/- and projecting and claiming the same as untainted.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 801

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

18. The ED has also alleged against the appellants Ankush Jain and

Vaibhav Jain inter alia that they had assisted Satyendar Kumar

Jain in the commission of the alleged offence by making separate

independent declarations under IDS 2016 for declaring undisclosed

income of Rs.8.26 crores for period from 2010-11 to 2015-16 in order

to protect Satyendar Kumar Jain. As per the case of ED, the appellants

Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain had prepared ante dated documents

with the help of Sunil Kumar Jain and Jagdish Prasad Mohta with

regard to the Directorship in Akinchan Developers Pvt. Ltd. Paryas

Infosolution Pvt. Ltd., Indo Metalimpex Pvt. Ltd., and Mangalayatan

Projects Pvt. Ltd. by becoming the Directors of the said companies

from the back date for showing their IDS declarations as genuine.

Thus, the said appellants have also committed the offence of money

laundering as defined under Section 3 of PMLA by being actually

involved in and knowingly assisting Satyendar Kumar Jain in projecting

his proceeds of crime to the tune of Rs.4,81,16,435/- as untainted in

the mode and manner stated in the Prosecution Complaint.

19. It was vehemently argued by the Learned Senior Advocate Mr.

Singhvi, for the appellant Satyendar Jain that there was gross

discrepancy in the amount of proceeds of crime calculated by the

ED in the Prosecution Complaint and in the amount with regard to

disproportionate assets mentioned by the CBI in the chargesheet filed

in the predicate offence. According to him, the amount with regard to

disproportionate assets mentioned by the CBI is Rs. 1,47,60,497/-

whereas as per the ED the proceeds of crime is Rs.4,81,16,435/-.

Even if the accommodation entries amounting to about Rs.4.6 crores

are attributed to the appellant-Satyendar Kumar Jain through his

wife’s share holdings, it would come to only Rs.59,32,122/- which

is less than one crore. He has further submitted that the appellantSatyendar Kumar Jain neither served as a Director nor had signed

any financial document during the check period and that he had

already resigned from the Directorship of the companies two years

before the commission of the alleged offence. According to him, it

was the appellants- Vaibhav Jain and Ankush Jain, and their family

members who had the significant influence over the control of the

companies involved in the case.

20. In order to appreciate the submissions of Mr. Singhvi, let us have a

cursory glance over the definitions of the words “beneficial owner”

as contained in Section 2(1)(fa), “Money laundering” as defined in 

802 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Section 2(1)(p), “Proceeds of Crime” in section 2(1)(u) and “Property”

in Section 2(1)(v), and the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA.

The said definitions read as under:

“Section 2 (1) (fa)

(fa) “beneficial owner” means an individual who ultimately

owns or controls a client of a reporting entity or the person

on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted and

includes a person who exercises ultimate effective control

over a juridical person;

Section 2 (1) (p)

(p) “money-laundering” has the meaning assigned to it

in section 3;

Section 2 (1)(u)

(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or

obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result

of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the

value of any such property or where such property is taken

or held outside the country, then the property equivalent

in value held within the country or abroad;

Explanation. --For the removal of doubts, it is hereby

clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only

derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also

any property which may directly or indirectly be derived

or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to

the scheduled offence;

Section 2 (1)(v)

(v) “property” means any property or assets of every

description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable

or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds

and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such

property or assets, wherever located;

Explanation. --For the removal of doubts, it is hereby

clarified that the term property includes property of any

kind used in the commission of an offence under this Act

or any of the scheduled offences;

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 803

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

Section 3

Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or

knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually

involved in any process or activity connected with the

proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession,

acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted

property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

Explanation. --For the removal of doubts, it is hereby

clarified that, --

(i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if

such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted

to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is

actually involved in one or more of the following processes

or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely: --

(a) concealment; or

(b) possession; or

(c) acquisition; or

(d) use; or

(e) projecting as untainted property; or

(f) claiming as untainted property,

in any manner whatsoever;

(ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of

crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time

a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of

crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or

use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as

untainted property in any manner whatsoever.”

21. The offence of money laundering as contemplated in Section 3

of the PMLA has been elaborately dealt with by the three Judge

Bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), in which it has been

observed that Section 3 has a wider reach. The offence as defined

captures every process and activity in dealing with the proceeds of

crime, directly or indirectly, and is not limited to the happening of

the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy 

804 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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to constitute an act of money laundering. Of course, the authority

of the Authorised Officer under the Act to prosecute any person for

the offence of money laundering gets triggered only if there exists

proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the Act

and further it is involved in any process or activity. Not even in case

of existence of undisclosed income and irrespective of its volume,

the definition of “Proceeds of Crime” under Section 2(1)(u) will get

attracted, unless the property has been derived or obtained as a result

of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The property must

qualify the definition of “Proceeds of Crime” under Section 2(1)(u) of

the Act. As observed, in all or whole of the crime property linked to

scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but

all properties qualifying the definition of “Proceeds of Crime” under

Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be the crime properties.

22. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the respondent

ED has placed heavy reliance on the statements of witnesses

recorded and the documents produced by them under Section 50

of the said Act, to prima facie show the involvement of all the three

appellants in the alleged offence of money laundering under Section

3 thereof. In Rohit Tandon vs. Directorate of Enforcement6

, a three

Judge Bench has held that the statements of witnesses recorded

by Prosecution – ED are admissible in evidence in view of Section

50. Such statements may make out a formidable case about the

involvement of the accused in the commission of the offence of

money laundering.

23. Again, the three Judge Bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra)

while examining the validity of the provisions contained in Section

50 held as under: -

431. In the context of the 2002 Act, it must be remembered

that the summon is issued by the Authority under Section 50

in connection with the inquiry regarding proceeds of crime

which may have been attached and pending adjudication

before the Adjudicating Authority. In respect of such action,

the designated officials have been empowered to summon

any person for collection of information and evidence to

be presented before the Adjudicating Authority. It is not

6 [2017] 13 SCR 156 : (2018) 11 SCC 46

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 805

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

necessarily for initiating a prosecution against the noticee

as such. The power entrusted to the designated officials

under this Act, though couched as investigation in real

sense, is to undertake inquiry to ascertain relevant facts to

facilitate initiation of or pursuing with an action regarding

proceeds of crime, if the situation so warrants and for

being presented before the Adjudicating Authority. It is

a different matter that the information and evidence so

collated during the inquiry made, may disclose commission

of offence of money-laundering and the involvement of the

person, who has been summoned for making disclosures

pursuant to the summons issued by the Authority. At this

stage, there would be no formal document indicative of

likelihood of involvement of such person as an accused of

offence of money-laundering. If the statement made by him

reveals the offence of money-laundering or the existence

of proceeds of crime, that becomes actionable under the

Act itself. To put it differently, at the stage of recording of

statement for the purpose of inquiring into the relevant facts

in connection with the property being proceeds of crime

is, in that sense, not an investigation for prosecution as

such; and in any case, there would be no formal accusation

against the noticee. Such summons can be issued even

to witnesses in the inquiry so conducted by the authorised

officials. However, after further inquiry on the basis of other

material and evidence, the involvement of such person

(noticee) is revealed, the authorised officials can certainly

proceed against him for his acts of commission or omission.

In such a situation, at the stage of issue of summons, the

person cannot claim protection under Article 20(3) of the

Constitution. However, if his/her statement is recorded

after a formal arrest by the ED official, the consequences

of Article 20(3) or Section 25 of the Evidence Act may

come into play to urge that the same being in the nature

of confession, shall not be proved against him. Further,

it would not preclude the prosecution from proceeding

against such a person including for consequences under

Section 63 of the 2002 Act on the basis of other tangible

material to indicate the falsity of his claim. That would be

a matter of rule of evidence.

806 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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24. In the instant case, it has been found during the course of

investigation from the statements of witnesses recorded under

Section 50 that the appellant Satyendar Jain and his family

directly or indirectly were owning/controlling the companies - M/s.

Akinchan Developers Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Paryas Infosolution Pvt. Ltd.,

M/s. Indo Metalimpex Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Mangalayatan Projects

Pvt. Ltd. He was the conceptualizer, initiator and supervisor of the

accommodation entries totalling to Rs.4.81 Crores approximately,

which were received from the Kolkata based entry operators in

the Bank accounts of the said four companies. Shri J.P. Mohta

in his statement had stated inter alia that Mr. Satyendar Jain had

informed him in June/July, 2010 that he wanted to get investment/

accommodation entries in his companies against cash payment

and therefore he introduced Mr. Jain with his friend Mr. Rajendra

Bansal who was in the business of providing accommodation

entries against cash. Mr. Rajendra Bansal in his statement under

Section 50 had stated in detail as to how his companies provided

accommodation entries to the four companies owned/controlled by

Satyendar Jain from 2010-11 to 2015-16 against cash. Mr. Rajender

Bansal had also stated that the cash was being received from

Satyendar Kumar Jain/Jagdish Prasad Mohta at Kolkata through

Hawala operators, and he used to pass on the address of Hawala

operators to the other entry operators namely Jivendra Mishra and

Abhishek Chokhani for collecting cash after taking token from them.

He used to arrange entries for the companies of Satyendar Kumar

Jain as per the details provided by Jagdish Prasad Mohta through

his companies and other entry operators. He (Mr. Bansal) used to

issue cheque/RTGS to subscribe the shares of the four companies

of Satyendar Kumar Jain receiving the amounts in cash. He had

further stated that the accommodation entries were reflected in

the books of accounts of his companies as investments in shares.

He used to give signed share applications along with signed blank

transfer deeds to Jagdish Prasad Mohta. He had further stated that

he had received cash through Hawala operators of Kolkata 40-50

times during 2010-2016 totaling to approximately 17 crores on the

instructions of Satyendar Jain/Jagdish Prasad Mohta and he had

provided accommodation entries for Satyendar Jain’s Companies

of about 17 crores, for which he had earned commission of Rs

12,40,000/- for providing/arranging such accommodation entries

to the companies of Satyendar Jain.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 807

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

25. Mr. Pankul Agarwal had stated in his statement that though he was

appointed as a Director in M/s. J.J. Ideal Estate Pvt. Ltd., he did

nothing except signing of the documents and that the said company

was controlled by Satyendar Kumar Jain and Poonam Jain, and

that he was never informed about any business activity of the said

company by them. The appellant-Vaibhav Jain himself in his statement

recorded on 27.02.2018, had stated that the cash amount of Rs.16.50

crores (approx.) was paid by him, Sunil Kumar Jain, Ankush Jain

and Satyendar Kumar Jain for taking accommodation entries in M/s.

Akinchan Developers Pvt. Ltd., Paryas Infosolution Pvt. Ltd., Indo

Metalimpex Pvt. Ltd. and Mangalayatan Projects Pvt. Ltd. through

Kolkata based entry operators, and that the entire idea was mooted by

Satyendar Kumar Jain to use it for purchasing agricultural lands and

to develop the township. The said witnesses had clearly stated that

Satyendar Kumar Jain was the conceptualizer, initiator, fund provider

and supervisor for the entire operation to procure the accommodation,

share capital/premium entries. Though, the shareholding patterns of

the said four companies are quite intricate, they do show that Mr.

Satyendar Kumar Jain through his family was controlling the said

companies directly or indirectly and that Mr. Satyendar Kumar Jain

was the “beneficial owner” within the definition of Section 2(1) (fa)

of PMLA.

26. At this juncture, it is extremely pertinent to note that the appellantsVaibhav Jain and Ankush Jain had sought to avail of the Income

Declaration Scheme, 2016 (IDS) by filing separate declarations under

Section 183 of the Finance Act, 2016 in Form-I on 27.09.2016, in

which both of the said appellants had individually declared an income

of Rs.8,26,91,750/- as investments in shares of various companies

in the assessment years 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2016-17. The

Principal Commissioner, Income Tax (IV), New Delhi vide the order

dated 09.06.2017 passed under Section 183 of the Finance Act,

2016 held that the said declaration of income of Rs.8,26,91,750/- by

each of the appellants- Vaibhav Jain and Ankush Jain was made

“by suppression and misrepresentation of facts”, and therefore they

were “void”. It is further pertinent to note that the said order of PCIT

was based on the report submitted by the ACIT, Special Range (IV)

dated 07.06.2017 with regard to the assessment proceedings in case

of M/s. Akinchan Developers Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Indo Metalimpex Pvt.

Ltd., M/s. Paryas Infosolution Pvt. Ltd. ,and Mr. Satyendar Kumar 

808 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Jain. It was noted in the said report inter alia that the said companies

had taken accommodation entries in the form of share capital from

Kolkata based shell companies. On the basis of the said report,

the notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act for the year

2011-12 an 2012-13 were issued to Mr. Satyendar Kumar Jain. The

information regarding accommodation entries was also received by

the Initiating officer for further examination and necessary action

under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988

(for short “the PBPT Act). The Initiating officer had issued provisional

attachment orders under Section 24(4) of the PBPT Act on 24.05.2017

holding that Mr. Satyendar Kumar Jain was the beneficial owner of

the bogus share capital introduced in the companies. The said order

of PCIT dated 09.06.2017 passed under Section 183 of the FA, 2016

was challenged before the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi by the

appellants-Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain by filing Writ Petition (C)

Nos. 6541 of 2017 and 6543 of 2017 which came to be dismissed

by the High Court vide the order dated 21.08.2019. The High Court

in the said judgment had elaborately dealt with all these issues and

while dismissing the said writ petitions held as under:

“30. There are eight companies whose shares were

purchased by the two petitioners, whose names have

been included in the list. Admittedly, in respect of the

shares in ADPL, proceedings under section 24(4) of the

Prohibition of Benami Property Transaction Act, 1988 have

been initiated. The petitioners have themselves enclosed

a copy of the order dated May 24, 2017 passed in respect

of the “Benamidar”, i.e., ADPL, which inter-alia notes that

the cash that was routed through accommodation entries

in the garb of share capital/premium in fact belonged to

Mr. Satyender Kumar Jain and that it was at his direction

that the entire transaction was orchestrated. It was noted

that neither of these two petitioners was either a director

or shareholder in the said company. It was noted that the

declarants had not provided the name of the “Benamidar”

through whom the investment had been routed and that

these facts were all completely within the knowledge of

the two petitioners. These conclusions of the Principal

Commissioner of Income-tax have not been convincingly

countered by either of the petitioners. In the circumstances, 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 809

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax was right in

concluding that neither of the petitioners had made a full

and true disclosure of all material facts.”

27. The said order of the High Court was challenged by the appellantsAnkush Jain and Vaibhav Jain before the Supreme Court by filing

Special Leave Petitions being SLP(C)Nos. 27522 of 2019 and 27610

of 2019, however they came to be dismissed vide the order dated

29.11.2019.

28. From the above stated facts there remains no shadow of doubt

that the appellant- Satyendar Kumar Jain had conceptualized idea

of accommodation entries against cash and was responsible for

the accommodation entries totalling to Rs. 4.81 crores (approx.)

received through the Kolkata based entry operators in the bank

accounts of the four companies i.e. M/s. Akinchan Developers Pvt.

Ltd., M/s. Paryas Infosolution Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Indo Metalimpex Pvt.

Ltd. and M/s. Mangalayatan Projects Pvt. Ltd., by paying cash and

the said companies were controlled and owned by him and his family.

Though it is true that a company is a separate legal entity from its

shareholders and directors, the lifting of corporate veil is permissible

when such corporate structures have been used for committing fraud

or economic offences or have been used as a facade or a sham for

carrying out illegal activities.

29. It has also been found that the appellants - Ankush Jain and Vaibhav

Jain had assisted the appellant-Satyendar Kumar Jain by making

false declarations under the IDS each of them declaring alleged

undisclosed income of Rs.8.26 crores in order to protect Satyendar

Kumar Jain. Though it was sought to be submitted by the learned

counsel for the appellants that the said declarations under IDS having

been held to be “void” in terms of Section 193 of FA, 2016 by the

income tax authorities, the same could not be looked into in the

present proceedings, the said submission cannot be accepted. The

declarations made by the appellants-Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain

under IDS have not been accepted by the Income Tax authorities on

the ground that they had misrepresented the fact that the investments

in the said companies belonged to the said appellants, which in fact

belonged to Mr. Satyendar Kumar Jain. The appellants could not

be permitted to take advantage of their own wrongdoing of filing

the false declarations to mislead the Income Tax authorities, and 

810 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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now to submit in the present proceedings under PMLA that the said

declarations under the IDS were void. The declarations made by them

under the IDS though were held to be void, the observations and

proceedings recorded in the said orders passed by the Authorities

and by the High Court cannot be brushed aside merely because the

said declarations were deemed to be void under Section 193 of the

Finance Act, 2016. The said proceedings clearly substantiates the

case of the respondent ED as alleged in the Prosecution Complaint

under the PMLA.

30. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the

case, we are of the opinion that the appellants have miserably failed

to satisfy us that there are reasonable grounds for believing that

they are not guilty of the alleged offences. On the contrary, there is

sufficient material collected by the respondent-ED to show that they

are prima facie guilty of the alleged offences.

31. Though Ms. Arora had faintly sought to submit that the so-called

inadvertent mistake committed by the ED with regard to the figures

mentioned in the Prosecution Complaint in respect of the role of the

appellants Ankush Jain and Vaibhav Jain should not be permitted

to be corrected, which otherwise show that the allegations against

the appellants were vague in nature, we are not impressed by the

said submission. We are satisfied from the explanation put forth in

the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-ED that it was only

an inadvertent mistake in mentioning the figure Rs.1,53,61,166/- in

the bracketed portion, which figure was shown by the CBI in its

chargesheet. The said inadvertent mistake has no significance in

the case alleged against the appellants in the proceedings under

the PMLA.

32. From the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, it is not

possible to hold that appellants had complied with the twin mandatory

conditions laid down in Section 45 of PMLA. The High Court also

in the impugned judgment after discussing the material on record

had prima facie found the appellants guilty of the alleged offences

under the PMLA, which judgment does not suffer from any illegality

or infirmity.

33. The appellants were released on bail for temporary period after their

arrest and the appellant-Satyendar Kumar Jain was released on

bail on medical ground on 30.05.2022, which has continued till this 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 811

Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement

day. He shall now surrender forthwith before the Special Court. It is

needless to say that right to speedy trial and access to justice is a

valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India, and provisions of

Section 436A of the Cr.P.C. would apply with full force to the cases

of money laundering falling under Section 3 of the PMLA, subject

to the Provisos and the Explanation contained therein.

34. In that view of the matter, all the appeals are dismissed.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeals dismissed.

Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 – The appellant issued an invitation for tender – Respondent submitted its techno bid- vide L.O.I. appellant awarded the contract to Respondent – Respondent approached High Court under Sec. 11(6) – High Court appointed sole arbitrator – Order of the High Court set aside

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 812 : 2024 INSC 218

NBCC (India) Limited

v.

Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 4417-4418 of 2024)

19 March 2024

[B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

When there is a general reference in the second contract to the

terms and conditions of the first contract, whether the arbitration

clause in the first contract would ipso facto be applicable to the

second contract.

Headnotes

Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 – The appellant issued

an invitation for tender – Respondent submitted its techno

bid- vide L.O.I. appellant awarded the contract to Respondent

– Respondent approached High Court under Sec. 11(6) – High

Court appointed sole arbitrator – Order of the High Court set aside

Held: General reference will not lead to incorporation of the

arbitration clause – Reference to arbitration clause in another

contract ought to be specific. [Paras 3 and 21-23]

Arbitration – When will an arbitration clause from a second

contract be incorporated in the first contract

Held: Conscious acceptance of arbitration clause – Reference and

incorporation are different – Reference does not ipso fact lead to

incorporation. [Paras 12-13 and 21-23]

Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sec. 7(5) – Arbitration

clause will not be incorporated by a general reference –

Conscious Acceptance – In absence of specific reference,

only execution/performance terms will apply – If no specific

reference, arbitration clause will not apply – Reference not

incorporation in the present case- General reference does not

lead to incorporation.

The Appellant had issued an invitation for tender for “Construction

of Weir with Allied Structures across river Damodar at DVC, CTPS,

Chandrapura, Dist – Bokaro, Jharkhand in response whereto, the 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 813

NBCC (India) Limited v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd.

Respondent submitted its Techno Commercial Bid. The contract for

the construction of weir was awarded to the Respondent whereafter

due to certain disputes, the Respondent issued a notice in terms

of Clause 3.34 of Section III Volume II of the Tender Documents

invoking arbitration and further seeking consent of the appellant

for the appointment of a former Judge of a High Court, as Sole

Arbitrator. The Respondent, while invoking the arbitration, had

taken recourse to Clause 2 of the Letter of Intent (L.O.I.) issued

by the Appellant while awarding the contract. Clause 2 stated thus:

“All terms and conditions as contained in the tender issued by

DVC to NBCC shall apply mutatis mutandis except where these

have been expressly modified by NBCC.” Since the Appellant did

not respond to the notice, the Respondent approached the High

Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996. High Court allowed the petition preferred by the Respondent.

Held: A perusal of sub-section (5) of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act

itself would reveal that before an arbitration clause could be read

as a part of the contract, there must be a conscious acceptance of

the arbitration clause from another document by the parties – It is

thus clear that a reference to the document in the contract should

be such that shows the intention to incorporate the arbitration clause

contained in the document into the contract. [Paras 12 and 13]

While setting aside the order of the High Court, the Supreme

Court held that a general reference to the terms and conditions

of another contract would not have the effect of incorporating

the arbitration clause – It is pertinent to note that clause 7.0 of

the L.O.I. specifically uses the word “Only” before the words “be

through civil courts having jurisdiction of Delhi alone” – When

there is a reference in the second contract to the terms and

conditions of the first contract, the arbitration clause would not

ipso facto be applicable to the second contract unless there is

specific mention/reference thereto – The present case is not a

case of ‘incorporation’ but a case of ‘reference’ – As such, a

general reference would not have the effect of incorporating the

arbitration clause – Clause 7.0 of the L.O.I, which is also a part

of the agreement, makes it amply clear that the redressal of the

dispute between NBCC and respondent has to be only through

civil courts having jurisdiction of Delhi alone – Delhi High Court

has erred in allowing the application of the respondent. [Paras

21 to 24]

814 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Case Law Cited

Inox Wind Limited v. Thermocables Limited [2018] 1

SCR 86 : (2018) 2 SCC 519- Distinguished.

M.R. Engineers and Contractors Private Limited v. Som

Datt Builders Limited (2009) 7 SCC 696- Relied on.

Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Limited [2017]

10 SCR 285 : (2017) 9 SCC 729; Elite Engineering and

Construction (Hyderabad) Private Limited represented

by its Managing Director v. Techtrans Construction India

Private Limited represented by its Managing Director

[2018] 4 SCR 585 : (2018) 4 SCC 281 – Referred to.

List of Acts

The Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

List of Keywords

Arbitration, Arbitration Agreement, lis, Letter of Intent (L.O.I),

Invitation for tender, Mutatis Mutandis, Res Integra, Ipso Facto,

Incorporation, Reference.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.4417-4418 of

2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2021 and 09.04.2021 in

ARBP No.44 of 2021 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Appearances for Parties

Gopal Shankarnarayan, Sr. Adv., Debarshi Bhadra, Ms. Jhanvi Dubey,

Sunil Mund, Kiran Kumar Patra, Advs. for the Appellant.

Sumit Kumar, Ms. Kumari Supriya, Bharath Kumar, Ms. Sakshi

Sharma, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

B.R. Gavai, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeals challenge the interim order dated 12th March

2021 and final judgment & order dated 9th April 2021, passed by the 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 815

NBCC (India) Limited v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd.

learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi (hereinafter, “High

Court”), in Arbitration Petition (Arb. P.) No. 44 of 2021, whereby

the High Court allowed the application under Section 11(6) of the

Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 (hereinafter referred to as, “the

Arbitration Act”) and appointed the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the

dispute between the parties to the present lis, arising from the Letter

of Intent dated 4th December 2006.

3. Facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals are as follows:

3.1 The appellant, NBCC (India) Limited (Formerly known as

National Buildings Construction Corporation Ltd.), is a Public

Limited Company and Government of India undertaking,

engaged in construction of power plants and other infrastructure

projects on EPC and/or PMC basis.

3.2 The respondent, M/s Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd. (Formerly

known as Durha Constructions Pvt. Ltd.), is a Private Limited

Company, engaged in the construction and infrastructure

sector.

3.3 The appellant issued an invitation for tender, being NIT No.

01-WEIR/06 dated 3rd November 2006, for “Construction of

Weir with Allied Structures across river Damodar at DVC,

CTPS, Chandrapura, Dist – Bokaro, Jharkhand – Package

“A” (hereinafter referred to as, “Construction of the Weir”),

containing inter-alia, the General Conditions of Contract,

Special Conditions of Contract, Bill of Quantity, etc. (collectively

referred to as, “Tender Documents”).

3.4 In response to the aforementioned tender, the Respondent

submitted its Techno Commercial Bid on 16th November 2006.

3.5 On fulfilment of the tender criteria, vide Letter of Intent

No. AGM/RAN/CTPS-AWARD/06/1660 dated 4th December

2006, the appellant awarded the contract for Construction

of the Weir to the respondent for a total value of Rs.

19,08,46,612/-.

3.6 With the passage of time, certain disputes arose between

the parties to the present lis & as a result, the respondent

issued a notice dated 6th March 2020, in terms of Clause

3.34 of Section III Volume II of the Tender Documents (GCC), 

816 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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thereby invoking arbitration and further seeking consent of

the appellant for the appointment of a former Judge of a High

Court, as Sole Arbitrator.

3.7 The appellant did not respond to the aforementioned notice

invoking arbitration, so the respondent filed an application

at the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.

3.8 Vide interim order dated 12th March 2021, the High Court

allowed the Arbitration Petition and proposed the appointment

of a former Judge of the High Court, as the Sole Arbitrator, to

adjudicate the dispute between the parties.

3.9 Vide final judgment & order dated 9th April 2021, the High Court

confirmed the proposed appointment of the former Judge of

the Delhi High Court, as the Sole Arbitrator.

3.10 Aggrieved by the orders of the learned single judge of the

High Court, the appellant filed the present appeals thereby

challenging both the interim order and the final judgement &

order.

3.11 This Court vide order dated 23rd July, 2021, issued notice and

stay of further proceedings of the arbitration was granted.

4. We have heard Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant & Shri Sumit Kumar,

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.

5. Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the appellant submits that the High Court has grossly erred in invoking

its power under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. It is submitted that

Clause 2.0 of the Letter of Intent dated 4th December 2006 (“L.O.I.”

for short) though states that all terms and conditions as contained

in the tender issued by the Damodar Valley Corporation (“DVC” for

short) to the NBCC shall apply mutatis mutandis, it also makes it clear

that where the terms and conditions have been expressly modified

by the NBCC, the same would not be applicable. It is submitted that

Clause 1.0 of the L.O.I. specifically states that various conditions,

i.e., contractual, financial and technical mentioned in the documents

contained therein shall be binding on the respondent for execution

of works and they shall form part of the agreement. Clause 10.0

also states that the L.O.I. shall also form a part of the agreement. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 817

NBCC (India) Limited v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd.

It is submitted that the intention is amply clear from Clause 7.0 of

the L.O.I., which states that the redressal of dispute between the

NBCC and the respondent shall only be through civil courts having

jurisdiction of Delhi alone. It further states that the laws applicable

to the contract between the parties shall be the laws enforceable in

India. It is submitted that merely on account of reference in the L.O.I.

to the terms and conditions as contained in the tender issued by the

DVC to the NBCC, Clause 3.34 of the Additional Terms & Conditions

of Contract would not apply in view of specific modification as stated

in Clause 2.0 of the L.O.I.

6. Learned Senior Counsel submits that a mere reference to the

terms and conditions without there being an incorporation in the

L.O.I. would not make the lis between the parties amenable to the

arbitration proceedings. Relying on the judgment of this Court in

the case of M.R. Engineers and Contractors Private Limited

vs. Som Datt Builders Limited1

, he submits that unless the L.O.I.

specifically provides for incorporation of the arbitration clause, a

reference to the arbitration proceedings would not be permitted

in view of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 7 of the

Arbitration Act.

7. Shri Sumit Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent,

on the contrary, submits that there is a specific reference in Clause

2.0 of the L.O.I. to the terms and conditions in the tender issued by

the DVC to the NBCC. He submits that the only modification is that

under Clause 3.34 of the Additional Terms & Conditions of Contract,

the jurisdiction is vested with the Court in the City of Kolkata only,

whereas in the L.O.I. the jurisdiction would be vested in the civil

courts having jurisdiction of Delhi alone. It is submitted that the

learned single judge of the Delhi High Court has rightly considered

this aspect and as such, no interference would be warranted in the

impugned order.

8. Sub-section (5) of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act reads thus:

“7. Arbitration Agreement.-1)……………….

xxx xxx xxx

1 (2009) 7 SCC 696

818 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing

an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement

if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to

make that arbitration clause part of the contract.”

9. The issue is no more res integra. The provisions of sub-section (5)

of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act have been considered by this

Court in the case of M.R. Engineers and Contractors Private

Limited (supra). After considering the relevant passages from

Russell on Arbitration and various English judgments, this Court

held thus:

“24. The scope and intent of Section 7(5) of the Act may

therefore be summarised thus:

(i) An arbitration clause in another document, would

get incorporated into a contract by reference, if the

following conditions are fulfilled:

(1) the contract should contain a clear reference

to the documents containing arbitration clause,

(2) the reference to the other document should

clearly indicate an intention to incorporate the

arbitration clause into the contract,

(3) the arbitration clause should be appropriate, that

is capable of application in respect of disputes

under the contract and should not be repugnant

to any term of the contract.

(ii) When the parties enter into a contract, making a

general reference to another contract, such general

reference would not have the effect of incorporating

the arbitration clause from the referred document

into the contract between the parties. The arbitration

clause from another contract can be incorporated into

the contract (where such reference is made), only by

a specific reference to arbitration clause.

(iii) Where a contract between the parties provides that

the execution or performance of that contract shall

be in terms of another contract (which contains the

terms and conditions relating to performance and a 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 819

NBCC (India) Limited v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd.

provision for settlement of disputes by arbitration),

then, the terms of the referred contract in regard

to execution/performance alone will apply, and not

the arbitration agreement in the referred contract,

unless there is special reference to the arbitration

clause also.

(iv) Where the contract provides that the standard form

of terms and conditions of an independent trade or

professional institution (as for example the standard

terms and conditions of a trade association or

architects association) will bind them or apply to the

contract, such standard form of terms and conditions

including any provision for arbitration in such

standard terms and conditions, shall be deemed to

be incorporated by reference. Sometimes the contract

may also say that the parties are familiar with those

terms and conditions or that the parties have read

and understood the said terms and conditions.

(v) Where the contract between the parties stipulates

that the conditions of contract of one of the parties

to the contract shall form a part of their contract (as

for example the general conditions of contract of

the Government where the Government is a party),

the arbitration clause forming part of such general

conditions of contract will apply to the contract

between the parties.”

10. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that when the parties

enter into a contract, making a general reference to another contract,

such general reference would not have the effect of incorporating

the arbitration clause from the referred document into the contract

between the parties. It has been held that the arbitration clause

from another contract can be incorporated into the contract (where

such reference is made), only by a specific reference to arbitration

clause. It has further been held that where a contract between the

parties provides that the execution or performance of that contract

shall be in terms of another contract (which contains the terms and

conditions relating to performance and a provision for settlement

of disputes by arbitration), then, the terms of the referred contract 

820 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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in regard to execution/performance alone will apply, and not the

arbitration agreement in the referred contract, unless there is special

reference to the arbitration clause also.

11. This Court further held that where the contract provides that the

standard form of terms and conditions of an independent trade or

professional institution will bind them or apply to the contract, such

standard form of terms and conditions including any provision for

arbitration in such standard terms and conditions, shall be deemed

to be incorporated by reference. It has been held that sometimes the

contract may also say that the parties are familiar with those terms

and conditions or that the parties have read and understood the said

terms and conditions. It has also been held that where the contract

between the parties stipulates that the conditions of contract of one

of the parties to the contract shall form a part of their contract, the

arbitration clause forming part of such general conditions of contract

will apply to the contract between the parties.

12. A perusal of sub-section (5) of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act itself

would reveal that it provides for a conscious acceptance of the

arbitration clause from another document, by the parties, as a part

of their contract, before such arbitration clause could be read as a

part of the contract between the parties.

13. It is thus clear that a reference to the document in the contract should

be such that shows the intention to incorporate the arbitration clause

contained in the document into the contract.

14. The law laid down in the case of M.R. Engineers and Contractors

Private Limited (supra) has been followed by this Court in the

cases of Duro Felguera, S.A. vs Gangavaram Port Limited2

and Elite Engineering and Construction (Hyderabad) Private

Limited represented by its Managing Director vs Techtrans

Construction India Private Limited represented by its Managing

Director3

.

15. No doubt that this Court in the case of Inox Wind Limited vs

Thermocables Limited4

 has distinguished the law laid down in the

2 [2017] 10 SCR 285 : (2017) 9 SCC 729

3 [2018] 4 SCR 585 : (2018) 4 SCC 281

4 [2018] 1 SCR 86 : (2018) 2 SCC 519

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 821

NBCC (India) Limited v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd.

case of M.R. Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (supra).

In the said case (i.e. Inox Wind Limited), this Court has held that

though general reference to an earlier contract is not sufficient for

incorporation of an arbitration clause in the later contract, a general

reference to a standard form would be enough for incorporation of

the arbitration clause. Though this Court in the case of Inox Wind

Limited (supra) agrees with the judgment in the case of M.R.

Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (supra), it holds that

general reference to a standard form of contract of one party along

with those of trade associations and professional bodies will be

sufficient to incorporate the arbitration clause. In the said case (i.e.

Inox Wind Limited), this Court found that the purchase order was

issued by the appellant therein in which it was categorically mentioned

that the supply would be as per the terms mentioned therein and in

the attached standard terms and conditions. The respondent therein

by his letter had confirmed its acceptance. This Court found that the

case before it was a case of a single-contract and not two-contract

case and, therefore, held that the arbitration clause as mentioned

in the terms and conditions would be applicable.

16. The present case is a ‘two-contract’ case and not a ‘single-contract’

case.

17. It will be relevant to refer to Clause 3.34 of the Additional Terms &

Conditions of Contract as contained in the tender issued by the DVC

to the NBCC. Clause 3.34 reads thus:

“3.34 SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES & ARBITRATION

Any dispute(s) or difference(s) arising out of or in connection

with the contract shall to the extent possible be settled

amicably between the owner and supplier/contractor.

In the event of any dispute or difference whatsoever arising

under the contract or in connection therewith including any

question relating to existence meaning and interpretation of

the contract or any alleged breach thereof the same shall

be referred to the sole arbitration of the Secretary, CEO

of Damodar Valley Corporation, Kolkata-54 or to a person

appointed by him for that purpose. The arbitration shall be

conducted in accordance with the provisions of arbitration

and conciliation law 1996 and the decision/judgment of

Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the parties.

822 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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All suits arising out of this enquiry and subsequent purchase

order, if any, are subject jurisdiction of court in the City of

Kolkata only and no other door when resolution/settlement

through mutual discussion and arbitration fails.”

18. No doubt that Clause 3.34 provides for a reference of the dispute

to the sole arbitration of the Secretary, CEO of Damodar Valley

Corporation, Kolkata-54 or to a person appointed by him for that

purpose.

19. It will also be apposite to refer to Clauses 1.0, 2.0, 7.0 and 10.0 of

the L.O.I., which read thus:

“1.0 The work shall be executed you on contractual,

financial and technical conditions of contract as

contained in the following documents which shall be

applicable and binding on you for execution of works

and shall form part of agreement with you as also

mentioned in the above mentioned NIT-01/WEIR/06

dated November 3, 2006.

(a) Notice Inviting Tender

(b) General Conditions of Contract

(c) Special Conditions of Contract

(d) Bill of Quantity

2.0 All terms and conditions as contained in the tender

issued by DVC to NBCC shall apply mutatis mutandis

except where these have been expressly modified

by NBCC.

7.0 The redressal of dispute between NBCC and you

shall only be through civil courts having jurisdiction

of Delhi alone. The laws applicable to this contract

shall be the laws enforceable in India.

10.0 This letter of intent shall also form a part of the

agreement.

20. In view of Clause 1.0, the documents stated therein shall also form

part of the agreement. In view of Clause 2.0, all terms and conditions

as contained in the tender issued by the DVC to the NBCC shall apply

mutatis mutandis except where these have been expressly modified 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 823

NBCC (India) Limited v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd.

by the NBCC. Clause 7.0 specifically provides that the redressal of

dispute between the NBCC and the respondent shall only be through

civil courts having jurisdiction of Delhi alone. Clause 10.0 further

provides that the L.O.I. shall also form a part of the agreement.

21. It is thus clear that the intention between the parties is very clear.

Clause 7.0 of the L.O.I. which also forms part of the agreement

specifically provides that the redressal of the dispute between the

NBCC and the respondent shall only be through civil courts having

jurisdiction of Delhi alone. It is pertinent to note that Clause 7.0 of

the L.O.I. specifically uses the word “only” before the words “be

through civil courts having jurisdiction of Delhi alone”.

22. As already discussed herein above, when there is a reference in the

second contract to the terms and conditions of the first contract, the

arbitration clause would not ipso facto be applicable to the second

contract unless there is a specific mention/reference thereto.

23. We are of the considered view that the present case is not a case of

‘incorporation’ but a case of ‘reference’. As such, a general reference

would not have the effect of incorporating the arbitration clause.

In any case, Clause 7.0 of the L.O.I., which is also a part of the

agreement, makes it amply clear that the redressal of the dispute

between the NBCC and the respondent has to be only through

civil courts having jurisdiction of Delhi alone.

24. In that view of the matter, we find that the learned single judge of

the Delhi High Court has erred in allowing the application of the

respondent. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The impugned

orders are quashed and set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

25. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Himanshu Rai, Hony. Associate Editor Appeals allowed.

(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)

LPG distributorships was cancelled by Respondent on the ground that the land offered by him for the showroom, was beyond the advertised location. Appellant challenged the Cancellation Letter by filing a writ petition before the High Court. Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed HPCL to proceed with the evaluation of the appellant’s candidature and decide the same within four weeks. HPCL challenged the order of Ld. Single Judge by filing writ appeal, which was allowed by way of the impugned order by the Division Bench of High Court.

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 824 : 2024 INSC 225

Tapas Kumar Das

v.

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 4420 of 2024)

19 March 2024

[Dipankar Datta* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether Division Bench of High Court was justified in reversing

the judgment and order of the Single Judge vide which the writ

petition of the Appellant was allowed and the Respondent was

directed to proceed with his candidature for LPG Distributorship.

Headnotes

Appellant’s candidature for LPG distributorships was cancelled

by Respondent on the ground that the land offered by him for

the showroom, was beyond the advertised location. Appellant

challenged the Cancellation Letter by filing a writ petition before

the High Court. Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed

HPCL to proceed with the evaluation of the appellant’s candidature

and decide the same within four weeks. HPCL challenged the order

of Ld. Single Judge by filing writ appeal, which was allowed by

way of the impugned order by the Division Bench of High Court.

Following questions were framed by this Court:

(i) Whether the land offered by the appellant for the showroom

is covered by the extent of “Location” stipulated in the

Advertisement and is compliant with the Unified Guidelines?

(ii) Whether the Division Bench was justified in its interference

with the order under challenge before it?

LPG Distributorship – Meaning of the term “Location” in the

Advertisement issued by the Respondent:

Held: There is no reference to any Gram/Village Panchayat in

Part 2 of the Advertisement although such reference is available

under Part 1 because HPCL did not intend the distributor to cater

to any rural area but a ‘Rurban’ area, which has to be given the

meaning attributed to ‘Rurban Vitrak’ in the Unified Guidelines,

which comprises of both rural and urban – If indeed an LPG 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 825

Tapas Kumar Das v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited & Ors.

distributor were intended to be appointed in village Haripal, the

‘Type of Market/Distributorship’ would have been shown as ‘Rural’

and included in Part 1 and not Part 2 of the Advertisement – Since

there was no specific column for “Gram Panchayat” in Part 2 of

the Advertisement, which was present in Part 1, and the ‘Type of

Market/Distributorship’ was not ‘Rural’, complemented by the lack

of any detail – Apart from Haripal in the “Location” without any

detailed particulars of the place, it is implied that the location of

the concerned showroom was required to be in Haripal block and

any showroom on land located in Haripal block would fall within

the requirements of the Advertisement. [Paras 19 to 24]

LPG Distributorship – Candidature under Advertisement –

Scope of interference by the Court:

Held: It is not for the Court to adjudge the nature of the

Advertisement or the intention of those who were responsible for

drawing it up, but whether the appellant’s candidature fell within the

scope of the ‘Location’ as indicated in the Advertisement.[Para 23]

Advertisement – Binding on issuing Authority:

Held: Law is well settled that when an advertisement is made

inviting applications from the general public for appointment to a

post or for admission to any course or appointment of the present

nature, the advertisement constitutes a representation to the public

and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation – It

cannot act contrary to it. [Para 24]

LPG Distributorship – Cancellation of Candidature of an

applicant – Challenge to – Defence – Reference to pleadings:

Held: The specific words ‘mouza’ and ‘village’ are not mentioned in

the Advertisement and they cannot be defined by reference to the

definitions of the same in the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 –

An order of cancellation of the candidature of an applicant, which is

the subject matter of challenge in a court of law, has to be defended

with reference to the Advertisement and the pleadings and not with

reference to what was in contemplation of the authority issuing the

Advertisement – A court cannot be swayed by the version of a party,

which is not its pleaded case, and it should confine its decision

to the points of assail/defence raised in the pleadings. [Para 25]

LPG Distributorship – Clause/Qualification in the Advertisement

cannot be modified/rewritten by the Court:

826 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Held: It is not open to a writ court, much less an appeal court,

to direct the modification of any clause/qualification in the

Advertisement to suit the interest of any particular candidate or the

issuing authority – Any such direction would amount to re-writing

the clause/qualification mentioned in the Advertisement, which

would be plainly impermissible. [Para 26]

List of Acts

Constitution of India; West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973.

List of Keywords

Advertisement; Interpretation of clauses; LPG distributorship;

Candidature; Location; Unified Guidelines for Selection of LPG

Distributorships; Binding nature; Defence; Reference to pleadings;

Modification/rewriting of clause impermissible.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.4420 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.03.2019 of the High Court

at Calcutta in MAT No.255 of 2019

Appearances for Parties

Sudipta Kumar Bose, Bharat Sood, P. S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari,

Ms. Anne Mathew, Ms. Miranda Solaman, Advs. for the Appellant.

Parijat Sinha, Ms. Divyam Dhyani, Ms. Reshmi Rea Sinha, Ms. Pallak

Bhagat, Zoheb Hossain, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dipankar Datta, J.

THE APPEAL

1. An intra-court appellate judgment and order1

 (“impugned judgment”,

hereafter) of an Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta

(“High Court”, hereafter), reversing the judgment and order2

 (“order”,

1 dated 28th March, 2019

2 dated 25th January, 2019

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 827

Tapas Kumar Das v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited & Ors.

hereafter) of a learned Single Judge, is called in question in the instant

civil appeal. Vide the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the

High Court allowed the writ appeal3

 carried by Hindustan Petroleum

Corporation Limited (“HPCL”, hereafter) from the order and set aside

the same. The Single Judge had, while allowing a writ petition4

 of Mr.

Tapas Kumar Das (“appellant”, hereafter), directed HPCL to proceed

with his candidature for LPG5

 distributorship.

BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS

2. The facts, giving rise to this appeal, lie in a narrow compass.

3. HPCL, Indian Oil Corporation Limited (“IOCL”, hereafter) and Bharat

Petroleum Corporation Limited issued a joint advertisement for LPG

distributorships at several locations in the 31st August, 2017 editions

of the Bangla dailies Bartaman and Anandabazar Patrika (“the

Advertisement”, hereafter). Entries bearing SI. Nos. 1 to 607 in the

Advertisement had 10 (ten) columns (“Part 1”, hereafter) and those

from SI. No. 608 onwards had 9 (nine) columns (“Part 2”, hereafter)6

.

The header “Gram Panchayat” did not feature in Part 2 and, hence,

had 1 (one) column less than Part 1.

4. Parts 1 and 2 of the Advertisement with the headers and to the extent

relevant for a decision on this appeal, as per the English translation

placed before us, are set out hereunder:

Part 1

SI.

No.

Oil

company

Location

(detail

particulars

of the place

where

applicable)

Gram

Panchayat

Block District Class Nature of

market / LPG

distributorship

/ City / Urban

/ Rural /

Inaccessible

area

distributorship

Amount

of

security

deposit

(in lakh)

Marketing

plan

1

-

607

[***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]

3 M.A.T. No. 255 of 2019 with C.A.N. No. 1818 of 2019.

4 W.P. 1595 (W) of 2019.

5 Liquified Petroleum Gas.

6 The Advertisement, by itself, has not been split into Parts 1 and 2; the same has been done here for ease

of reference. 

828 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Part 2

SI.

No.

Oil

company

Location

(detail

particulars

of the place

where

applicable)

Block District Class Nature of market /

LPG distributorship

/ City / Urban /

Rural / Inaccessible

area distributorship

Amount

of security

deposit (in

lakh)

Marketing

plan

608

-

623

[***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]

624 HPC Haripal Haripal Hooghly SC Rurban 3 2017-18

625

-

631

[***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]

5. Interested in obtaining an LPG distributorship qua Sl. No.624

reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste community, i.e.,

‘Location’ and ‘Block’ Haripal in the district of Hooghly, the appellant

submitted an online application for the same under the ‘SC’ category

on 16th October, 2017. The appellant’s application was found to be

in order, whereupon he was called upon to participate in the ensuing

computerised draw of lots for selection for the distributorship for

Haripal. Fortune smiled on the appellant and he emerged as winner

in the draw of lots. HPCL informed the appellant vide a letter dated

4th November, 2018 that he had been declared successful and also

that he was required to comply with the instructions contained therein.

Diligently, the appellant deposited a demand draft of Rs. 30,000/-

with HPCL and submitted relevant land documents in compliance

with the letter dated 4th November, 2018.

6. One Sujoy Kumar Das (“added respondent”, hereafter) lodged a

complaint dated 9th November, 2018 with HPCL questioning the

appellant’s candidature on the basis that the land offered by him for

the showroom was in mouza7

 Gopinagar and not in mouza Haripal.

Incidentally, the added respondent had participated in a previous

round of selection conducted by HPCL for the same location, i.e.,

Haripal, and his candidature was rejected by HPCL on the ground

7 As per Wilson’s Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms of British India, ‘Mauza’ or Mauja in Hindi and

Mauji in Bengali is a village, understanding by that term one or more clusters of habitations, and all the

lands belonging to their proprietary inhabitants : a Mauza is defined by authority to be ‘a parcel or parcels

of lands having a separate name in the revenue records, and of known limits’. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 829

Tapas Kumar Das v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited & Ors.

that the land for the showroom offered by him was not located in

village Haripal. Upon cancellation of the appellant’s candidature, the

Chief Regional Manager of HPCL (“fourth respondent”, hereafter)

intimated the same to the added respondent vide letter dated 2nd

January, 2019 and assured to him refund of Rs. 5,000/- which he

had deposited as complaint fee, shortly.

7. Close on the heels thereof, the fourth respondent addressed a letter

dated 2nd January, 2019 cancelling the appellant’s candidature for

the LPG distributorship (“Cancellation Letter”, hereafter). Therein, it

was stated that the land offered by the appellant for the showroom

at “Plot No. LR-1220, Khatian No. LR-311, Mouza-Gopinagar, Gram

Panchayat-Haripal Ashuthsh (sic, Ashutosh), Block Haripal, District

Hooghly” pursuant to a registered lease dated 16th October, 20188

 for

a period of 16 (sixteen) years was beyond the advertised location;

hence, the appellant’s proposed showroom had failed to meet the

eligibility criteria as per clause 8 A(n) of the Brochure for Unified

Guidelines for Selection of LPG Distributorships (“Unified Guidelines”,

hereafter), and the deposit of Rs. 30,000/- would stand forfeited.

8. It was then that the appellant invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the Cancellation

Letter. The Single Judge, noticing that the Advertisement showed

the location of the distributorship as Block Haripal, observed that

“there was no specific requirement of Gram Panchayat or mouza

to disqualify” the appellant’s candidature. Upon being satisfied that

the land offered by the appellant for the showroom was within the

limits of the advertised location, the learned Single Judge allowed

the writ petition, set aside the Cancellation Letter, and directed HPCL

to proceed with the evaluation of the appellant’s candidature and

decide the same within four weeks upon the appellant completing

all required formalities.

9. Aggrieved by the order, HPCL invoked the appellate jurisdiction of

the High Court and laid a challenge thereto. The Division Bench

referred to the definitions of ‘Gram Panchayat’ and ‘mouza’ in the

West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 (“Panchayat Act”, hereafter) and

while allowing the appeal by the impugned judgment, held that “mouza

Haripal has a separate and distinct existence”, the “offered land at

8 the date was subsequently corrected vide letter dated 10th January, 2019 to read 16th October, 2017. 

830 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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mouza Gopinagar is not what is contemplated in the advertisement

for appointment of LPG distributors at Haripal” and in such view of

the matter HPCL “was justified in coming to the conclusion that the

writ petitioner failed to fulfil the eligibility criteria”.

RIVAL CONTENTIONS

10. Mr. Sudipta Kumar Bose, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant, seeking our interference with the impugned judgment

submitted inter alia that:

a. The Division Bench fell into error by reading into the

Advertisement, conditions which had not been categorically

laid down by HPCL. The Advertisement did not state that the

showroom was to be located in any particular mouza, and that

the Advertisement did not refer to any Gram Panchayat as the

specific location either.

b. The appellant had been declared as the successful candidate

after due verification of his eligibility and there could have been

no occasion for HPCL to disqualify him on the complaint of the

added respondent, and that too without putting the appellant

on notice.

c. HPCL, having issued the Advertisement, could not have altered

the rules and guidelines after the appellant was declared eligible

and successful.

d. The entries from serial no. 608 onwards in the Advertisement

did not bear any column for Gram Panchayat as the locations

therein were urban or semi-urban; implying that there was

no error in the Advertisement and such an omission was

conscious.

e. The Single Judge had rightly observed that the advertised

location for the concerned showroom was Haripal with reference

to specification of Block Haripal; and since the appellant had

offered land for the showroom at a location within the jurisdictional

limits of Haripal Police Station and within geographical limits

of Haripal Block, consequently, the same should have been

considered to be covered by the advertised location.

11. Mr. Parijat Sinha, learned counsel appearing for HPCL, in support

of upholding the impugned judgment submitted inter alia that:

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 831

Tapas Kumar Das v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited & Ors.

a. The Unified Guidelines are comprehensive in nature and left

no room for ambiguity as to the location requirements to obtain

an LPG distributorship from inter alia HPCL.

b. In the State of West Bengal, villages were not identified as

units of revenue, but they were in fact identified as mouzas.

Therefore, the boundary of any village could only be defined

in terms of mouzas. Hence, the Advertisement had not been

issued for Block Haripal, but only for the mouza/village Haripal

as per the third column of Part 2 of the Advertisement. Hence,

the intention of mentioning Haripal in the third column was to

indicate Haripal mouza/village, and not the cluster of villages/

towns/cities.

c. Clause 8 A(n) of the Unified Guidelines provided for the

requirements of the showroom to be owned/leased by

the concerned applicant desirous of obtaining an LPG

distributorship. A reading of the Unified Guidelines, along with

the fact that the fifth column of Part 2 of the Advertisement

was for the District, the fourth column was for the Block, and

the third column was for the Location, meant that the third

column specified the uniqueness of the location intending it

to be for the concerned village; it would be incorrect to read

the third and fourth columns as being synonymous. Hence, a

mention of Haripal in the third column meant mouza/village

Haripal and not Block Haripal.

d. In this vein, since the appellant’s showroom fell within mouza

Gopinagar, the same made his candidature ineligible; though

located in Block Haripal, it was not within mouza Haripal.

12. Appearing for the added respondent and seeking dismissal of the

appeal, Mr. Zoheb Hossain, learned counsel submitted inter alia that:

a. The added respondent was a proper and necessary party in W.P.

1595 (W) of 2019 before the High Court since the Cancellation

Letter had been issued as a consequence of acceptance of

the complaint dated 9th November 2018. Further, the added

respondent’s appeal challenging the order was also decided

vide the impugned common judgment.

b. The added respondent was also an applicant for the LPG

distributorship as per the Advertisement, and that it would be 

832 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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prejudicial for him if the impugned judgment were set aside or

modified.

c. HPCL had, on an earlier occasion, rejected the added

respondent’s candidature for LPG distributorship on grounds

similar to the reasons for cancellation of the appellant’s

distributorship and, therefore, was justified in taking a consistent

and uniform stand.

d. Extending any relief to the appellant, on facts and in the

circumstances, could be inappropriate.

Analysis

13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

impugned judgment of the Division Bench, the order of the Single

Judge as well as the other materials on record.

14. The limited issues that we are tasked to decide in this appeal are:

(i) Whether the land offered by the appellant for the showroom

is covered by the extent of “Location” stipulated in the

Advertisement and is compliant with the Unified Guidelines?

(ii) Whether the Division Bench was justified in its interference with

the order under challenge before it?

15. A cursory look at the Advertisement informs us that it contemplated

the location of the relevant distributorships in the manner such that

the fifth column of Part 2 of the Advertisement indicated the ‘District’,

the fourth column the ‘Block’, and the third column the “Location” with

the words “particulars of the place wherever applicable” following it

in brackets. Also, in Part 1 of the Advertisement, as noted above,

there was an additional column for “Gram Panchayat”. This is

conspicuously missing from Part 2.

16. Viewed thus, what we find is that HPCL intended to appoint an LPG

distributor at a location named Haripal, situate within Haripal block

in the district of Hooghly, reserved for SC, with ‘Rurban’ shown as

the Type of Market/Distributorship. Much would, in our opinion, turn

on ‘Rurban’ which was not noticed either by the Single Judge or the

Division Bench, as the discussion follows.

17. In course of arguments, we heard Mr. Sinha submitting that there was

an error in not mentioning the “Gram Panchayat” in the Advertisement 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 833

Tapas Kumar Das v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited & Ors.

for the subject location. In other words, there was a mistake in the

Advertisement insofar as Sl. No.624 is concerned. However, a course

correction measure was sought to be adopted in the written notes of

arguments filed on behalf of HPCL which, as would unfold hereafter,

does more harm than good to its cause. It is stated in the written

notes that “from Sl. No.608 onwards, all of the locations advertised

… were either urban or semi-urban with regard to the nature of the

market/LPG distributorship; hence, the relevant Gram Panchayat was

not mentioned in the said Advertisement”. It is also stated therein that

in terms of the Advertisement, the appellant “ought to have offered

land located within (sic) in village/mouza location – Haripal (column

3), which is the advertised location” (bold in original).

18. HPCL having advertised Haripal as the location within Haripal block

for the LPG distributorship and without there being anything more in

the Advertisement with specifics as to the ‘locality’, the candidature

of the appellant and the land offered by him for the showroom had

to be considered bearing in mind the relevant clauses of the Unified

Guidelines, viz. clauses 1 c. i. and 1 y. defining ‘Rurban Vitrak’9

 and

‘Location’10, respectively, and 8 A (n) regarding ‘Showroom’11.

19. It would be convenient at this stage to look at Sl. Nos. 608 to 631

of the Advertisement, comprised in Part 2 (supra). In all but one of

the locations, LPG distributorships were on offer at the instance of

9 Rurban Vitrak: In this document, the word Rural Urban means LPG distributor located in ‘Urban Area’

and also providing service to the LPG Customers in specified ‘Rural Area’, generally covering all villages

falling within 15 Kms. From the municipal limits of the LPG distributorship location and or the area

specified by the respective OMCs. LPG distributors servicing this area will be called Rurban Vitrak.

10 Location – In this document, word location means the area identified for setting up of new LPG Distributor.

It can be a locality/village/cluster of villages/town or city which is mentioned in the Notice for Appointment

of LPG Distributors.

11 Showroom: (Applicable only for … Rurban Vitrak … locations and not for …)

The applicant should ‘Own’ a suitable shop for Showroom of minimum size … as on the last date

for submission of application as specified either in the advertisement or corrigendum (if any) at the

advertised location i.e. within the municipal/town/village limits of the place which is mentioned under the

column of ‘location’ in the advertisement.

In case locality is also specified under the column of ‘location’ in the advertisement, the candidate should

own … in the said locality.

In case an applicant has more than one shop … at the advertised location or locality as specified

under the column of ‘location’ in the advertisement, the details of the same can also be provided in the

application.

The applicant should have ownership as defined under the term ‘Own’ …

Applicants having registered lease deed commencing on any date prior to the date of advertisement

will also be considered provided the lease is valid for a minimum period of 15 years from the date of

advertisement.

… 

834 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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IOCL. Majorly, the locations have ‘Type of Market/Distributorship’

as ‘Urban’ while the rest are ‘Rurban’. In several of the locations

advertised ranging between Sl. Nos. 608 and 631, except Sl. No.624

being the subject location, the locations within brackets indicate the

locality12 where the concerned OMC13 intended to appoint an LPG

distributor. As and by way of example, one may profitably refer to

Sl. Nos. 613 and 619. While both indicate Kolkata as locations, the

former within brackets has Salt Lake within Bidhannagar Municipality

and the latter China Town within Kolkata Municipal Corporation areas.

We read Salt Lake and China Town as the ‘locality’ in the location

Kolkata to sync locality with ‘Location’. It is also significant to note

another advertised location in the district of Hooghly. Sl. No. 610

indicates that in Nabagram (Konnagar), being the ‘Location’ within

Shrirampur block, IOCL intended to appoint an LPG distributor. We

take judicial notice of the fact that Konnagar is a town and also a

municipality in the district of Hooghly with Nabagram as the locality14.

However, significantly, Sl. No. 624 does not go beyond indicating

Haripal as the location.

20. Judicial notice is also taken of the fact that Haripal is a community

development block being part of Chandannagore sub-division, in the

district of Hooghly, West Bengal. It is true that as per the Census 2011

Report downloaded from www.census2011.co.in, [being Annexure

R-1/1 of the counter affidavit of HPCL filed in this proceeding], Haripal

and Gopinagar are villages within Haripal block but, for reasons more

than one, we are not persuaded to accept the claim of HPCL that it

intended to appoint an LPG distributor at Haripal village.

21. First, the stand taken in the written notes entirely demolishes the

plinth on which the impugned judgment rests. Reference to any village

or mouza, be it Haripal or Gopinagar, is rendered irrelevant in the

circumstances in the light of the ‘Type of Market/Distributorship’ being

shown as ‘Rurban’ in the Advertisement under Column 7, which has

to be given the meaning attributed to ‘Rurban Vitrak’ in the Unified

Guidelines. If appointment of a distributor were intended for a village/

12 In terms of the definition of ‘Location’, a locality could also be a location.

13 Oil Marketing Company.

14 ‘gram’ in Nabagram is not to be mistaken for a village.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 835

Tapas Kumar Das v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited & Ors.

mouza, i.e., Haripal, it defies logic why instead of ‘Gramin Vitrak’15,

‘Rurban Vitrak’ was shown as the ‘Type of Market/Distributorship’. It

is also significant to note that if HPCL meant Haripal village as the

intended location for appointment of an LPG distributor, it has not

explained why there is no reference to any Gram/Village Panchayat

in Part 2 (supra) although such reference is available under Part

1 (supra). This, we feel, is obvious because HPCL did not intend

the distributor to cater to any rural area but a ‘Rurban’ area which

comprises of both rural and urban.

22. Secondly, the contention of HPCL that Haripal as shown both under

the columns ‘Block’ and ‘Location’ are not synonymous and that

Haripal should be read and understood as Haripal village appears

to be one advanced in desperation. The appellant, or for that matter

any other individual interested in the distributorship, could not have

possibly projected his own imagination and discover all the facts

and circumstances that were in the contemplation of the officers of

HPCL to be fulfilled by him. At the cost of repetition, Haripal under

the column ‘Location’ appears to be unqualified. In the present

case, Haripal being the advertised location and without mention of

locality but with the ‘Type of Market/Distributorship’ being shown

as ‘Rurban’, it is quite but natural for an individual to perceive that

land offered for the showroom, if not located anywhere in the entire

Haripal block, must at least be located within certain identifiable

limits having relation with Haripal, such as the jurisdictional limits of

Haripal Police Station. If indeed an LPG distributor were intended to

be appointed in village Haripal, the ‘Type of Market/Distributorship’

would undoubtedly have been shown as ‘Rural’ and included in Part

1 (supra) and not Part 2 (supra) of the Advertisement. Unless the

relevant Part and the columns thereunder of the Advertisement are

interpreted in the manner as above, the same would lead to utter

absurdity.

23. The problem can be viewed from another perspective. While

completing our task, it is not for us to adjudge the nature of the

Advertisement or the intention of those who were responsible for

15 Gramin Vitrak: In this document, the word ‘Rural Area’ will have the definition of ‘Rural’ as per census

2011. LPG distributorship located in ‘Rural Area’ will be called as Gramin Vitrak and will service the LPG

Customers of the specified rural area. Generally it will cover all villages falling within 15 KMs from the

boundary limits of the LPG distributorship location and or the area specified by the respective OMCs.

836 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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drawing it up, but whether the appellant’s candidature fell within the

scope of the ‘Location’ as indicated in the Advertisement.

24. Law is well settled that when an advertisement is made inviting

applications from the general public for appointment to a post or

for admission to any course or appointment of the present nature,

the advertisement constitutes a representation to the public and

the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot

act contrary to it. What bears heavy upon us is that, any person of

reasonable prudence could assume that since there was no specific

column for “Gram Panchayat” in Part 2 (supra) of the Advertisement,

which was present in Part 1, and the ‘Type of Market/Distributorship’

was not ‘Rural’, complemented by the lack of any detail – apart

from Haripal in the “Location” without any detailed particulars of the

place, would imply that the location of the concerned showroom was

required to be in Haripal block and any showroom on land located in

Haripal block would fall within the requirements of the Advertisement.

25. We have also kept in mind that the specific words ‘mouza’ and ‘village’

do not find any mention in the Advertisement and reference to the

definitions of the same in the Panchayat Act by the Division Bench

as well as by Mr. Sinha in course of his submissions is misconceived.

An order of cancellation of the candidature of an applicant, which is

the subject matter of challenge in a court of law, has to be defended

with reference to the Advertisement and the pleadings and not with

reference to what was in contemplation of the authority issuing the

Advertisement. It is the norm that a court cannot be swayed by the

version of a party, which is not its pleaded case, and that it should

confine its decision to the points of assail/defence raised in the

pleadings. Any such argument ought to have been traceable in the

pleadings, and could not simply have been put before this Court as

an afterthought.

26. In a situation akin to this, had the appellant, or any intending

candidate, known in advance of such a narrower requirement, then

they would likely have been more vigilant in fulfilling such criteria

for the location of the distributorship. In arguendo, unfortunately, it

is HPCL’s cross to bear that the Advertisement, if not incorrectly, is

inadequately worded. It is not open to a writ court, much less an

appeal court, to direct the modification of any clause/qualification

in the Advertisement to suit the interest of any particular candidate 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 837

Tapas Kumar Das v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited & Ors.

or the issuing authority even. Any such direction would amount to

re-writing the clause/qualification mentioned in the Advertisement,

which would be plainly impermissible.

27. Turning to the added respondent, we can only sympathize with him. If

at all the added respondent had earlier been the victim of an arbitrary

rejection of his candidature by HPCL, he ought to have challenged

such action by instituting an appropriate proceeding. Not having so

instituted, the present appeal is not an appropriate proceeding where

this Court can look into his grievance and address it.

Conclusion

28. For the reasons aforementioned, the first issue is answered in the

affirmative while the second in the negative.

29. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the

order of the Single Judge restored. The present appeal is, accordingly,

allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

30. It is, however, made clear that apart from the questions that we have

decided, no part of our observations shall be treated as expression of

opinion on the further requirements/compliances, if any, with regard

to HPCL proceeding with the appellant’s candidature for the LPG

distributorship. The same may be decided as per the applicable laws

and guidelines by the competent authority of HPCL.

31. Since the Advertisement is more than half a decade old, we hope

and trust that HPCL would henceforth proceed with expedition to

cater to the needs of its future customers.

32. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Adeeba Mujahid, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal allowed.

(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)

Whether the High Court erred in finding without any evidence that the amount alleged to have been paid as the value of share in Joint Hindu Family property is not so but for some other purpose

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 838 : 2024 INSC 224

Jugal Kishore Khanna (D) Thr. Lrs. & Anr.

v.

Sudhir Khanna & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 1591-1592 of 2020 )

19 March 2024

[Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the High Court erred in finding without any evidence

that the amount alleged to have been paid as the value of

share in Joint Hindu Family property is not so but for some

other purpose.

Headnotes

Partition Suit – Predecessors of Appellants and Respondents

- the elder (“RKK”) and younger (“ACK”) brother respectively

– two properties purchased by RKK – (i) Kamla Nagar property

in the name of his father (ii) Malcha Marg property in the

name of ACK’s wife and constructed house out of Joint Hindu

Family Business, Regal Cinema - After RKK’s death ACK raised

claim in Kamla Nagar property – Oral Settlement between

Appellants and ACK and value of latter’s share fixed at Rs.

55,000/- (Fifty-five thousand only) – The same was paid – Suit

filed by Respondents to partition properties in Kamla Nagar

and Shimla- Appellants raised partial partition in respect of

Malcha Marg property – Trial Court partly decreed the suit by

only allowing the respondents’ claim in Malcha Marg property

– Both parties approached High Court with separate Appeals

– Both Appeals decided in favour of respondents – Thus, the

two instant Appeals.

Held: With respect to the Malcha Marg property, the concurrent

findings of the Trial Court and High Court that it belonged

exclusively to the Respondents was upheld, for lack of evidence

to prove that the same was purchased out of joint family funds

– Whereas, in regard to the Kamla Nagar property, both Trial

Court and High Court, from the evidence on record, found that

there was a payment of Rs. 55,000/- (Rupees fifty-five thousand

only) by appellants to the predecessor of respondents – It can 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 839

Jugal Kishore Khanna (D) Thr. Lrs. & Anr. v.

Sudhir Khanna & Ors.

also be seen from the evidence that the appellants exclusively

enjoyed the property from the date of its purchase, It is also true

that the property was let out and rent was collected entirely by

appellants – Wealth Tax Returns of ACK from 1964-1967 shows

valuation of Kamla Nagar property to be Rs. 38,000/- (Thirty-eight

thousand only) – In year 1979, the value ought to have increased

to Rs.1,10,000/- (One lakh ten thousand only) – As contended by

the appellants, there was nothing on record to indicate that the

payment of a hefty sum of Rs. 55,000/- in the year 1979, was for

the upkeep of the HUF or on some other account or to fulfil some

other purpose but towards value of the half right held by ACK in

the property. [Paras 18, 19-21]

List of Acts

The Registration Act, 1908.

List of Keywords

Partial partition; Oral settlement.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.1591 of 2020

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2013 of the High Court

of Delhi at New Delhi in R.F.A. No.439 of 2008

With

Civil Appeal No.1592 of 2020

Appearances for Parties

Akshay Makhija, Sr. Adv., Arjav Jain, Adarsh Chamoli, Shashank

Shekhar, Ronak Baid, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Advs. for the

Appellants.

S. C. Singhal, Vibhav Mishra, Ms. Megha Gaur, Parmanand Gaur,

Tushar Bakshi, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

840 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

2. The challenge in the present appeals is to the common Judgment

and Order dated 06.12.2013 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned

Judgment”)1

 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court

of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”), wherein the

appeal filed by the respondent no.1 in respect of the Kamla Nagar

property2

, i.e., RFA No.439 of 2008, has been allowed and the appeal

filed by the appellants in respect of the Malcha Marg property3

, i.e.,

RFA No.483 of 2008, has been dismissed.

FACTS IN BRIEF:

3. The parties are common descendants of Late Shri Tek Chand

Khanna (hereinafter referred to as “TCK”), who had two sons,

Shri Roop Kishore Khanna (hereinafter referred to as “RKK”) and

Shri Attar Chand Khanna (hereinafter referred to as “ACK”). The

appellants are descendants of RKK whereas the respondents are

the successors of ACK. In the year 1941, RKK purchased a piece

of land admeasuring 344 square yards and bearing No.15-D, Kamla

Nagar, Delhi - 110007 (hereinafter referred to as the “Kamla Nagar

property”) in the name of his father TCK and a residential house

was constructed thereupon in 1950. Another property admeasuring

375 square yards bearing No.D-56, Malcha Marg, Chanakyapuri,

New Delhi - 110021 (hereinafter referred to as the “Malcha Marg

property”) was also acquired by RKK and constructed by the family

in the name of Smt. Shyama Khanna, wife of ACK. The claim of the

appellants is that the purchase and construction of the Malcha Marg

property was out of the funds provided by RKK and the income of

the family generated from Regal Cinema Business. RKK died in the

year 1978 and after that ACK claimed share in the Kamla Nagar

property claiming it to be joint family property. The appellants claim

that in 1979, in terms of an oral settlement between the parties a

sum of Rs.55,000/- (Rupees Fifty-Five Thousand) was paid through

cheques by the LRs of RKK in favour of ACK for the purchase of

the share of ACK in the Kamla Nagar property. In 1983, upon ACK

having expired, his LRs filed two suits. One claiming partition of the

properties at Shimla and another claiming partition of the Kamla Nagar

1 2013 : DHC : 6299 | 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4916.

2 Defined infra.

3 Defined infra.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 841

Jugal Kishore Khanna (D) Thr. Lrs. & Anr. v.

Sudhir Khanna & Ors.

property. The Trial Court by order dated 28.07.2008 dismissed the

suit of the Respondent No.1 with regard to the claim over the Kamla

Nagar property. However, insofar as the Malcha Marg property is

concerned, the Trial Court decided the issue of the suit being bad

on account of partial partition against the appellants, on the ground

that circumstances given by the appellants are not sufficient to prove

that the Malcha Marg property was purchased out of joint family

funds. The Respondent No.1 challenged the Trial Court order, so

far as the same pertained to the Kamla Nagar property, by filing

RFA No.439 of 2008 before the High Court whereas the appellants

challenged the decision of the Trial Court pertaining to the Malcha

Marg property by preferring RFA No.483 of 2008.

4. By the common Impugned Judgement dated 06.12.2013, the High

Court allowed the appeal filed by the Respondent No.1 [RFA No.439

of 2008] and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants [RFA No.483

of 2008]. The instant Civil Appeals emanate therefrom.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:

Re Kamla Nagar:

5. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment

of the Trial Court [the Additional District Judge, Karkardooma Courts,

Delhi] dated 28.07.2008 held that Kamla Nagar property belongs

solely to the appellants on very cogent grounds i.e., the same was

originally joint/ancestral property between RKK and ACK having been

bought in the name of TCK and later the 50% share of ACK being

bought by the appellants in a family settlement. It was pointed out that

when suggestion was put to DW1 and DW2 being Defendant No.2 and

LRs of deceased Defendant No.1 respectively, in cross-examination,

payment of Rs. 55,000/- (Rupees Fifty-Five Thousand) for betterment

of Hindu Undivided Family (hereinafter referred to as “HUF”) was

admitted. Further, the Trial Court had noted in its judgment that the

plaintiff (Respondent No.1) in his cross-examination had admitted

that the Kamla Nagar property was the only joint family property.

6. Learned counsel submitted that the appellants, who were defendants

in the suit pertaining to the Kamla Nagar property, had proved that

there was an oral settlement in the year 1979 after the demise of RKK

and in terms thereof, the LRs of RKK being Defendants No.1, 2 and

3, being sons of RKK, as also Ms. Lakshmi Khanna, wife of late RKK, 

842 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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had by 6 cheques paid an amount of Rs. 55,000/- (Rupees Fifty-Five

Thousand) towards the share of ACK in the Kamla Nagar property.

7. Thus, it was contended that rightly the Trial Court had held in

favour of the appellants that the the Kamla Nagar property no

more remained joint family property, as the 50% share of the ACK

branch was already bought by paying Rs. 55,000/- (Rupees FiftyFive Thousand) to the LRs. In support of his contention, learned

counsel further submitted that ACK in his Wealth Tax Return of the

year 1965-1967 had shown the value of the Kamla Nagar property

at around Rs.38,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Eight Thousand) and thus, in

the year 1979, the value being Rs.1,10,000/- (Rupees One Lakh

and Ten Thousand) was most reasonable and 50% of their share

being Rs.55,000/- (Rupees Fifty-Five Thousand) having been paid,

the entire property belonged to the share of the LRs of RKK.

8. However, it was contended that even the Trial Court has held that

in family settlements, it is normal for the value to be slightly on the

upper or the lower side.

9. Learned counsel submitted that though ACK has filed his Wealth Tax

Returns for the years 1964-1965, 1965-66 and 1966-67, his Wealth

Tax Returns from 1979 till his demise in 1983 were not brought before

any forum or Court nor any witness was called from the IncomeTax Department to show the same, which is another indicator that

ACK had not claimed any part of the Kamla Nagar property to be

his so as to require disclosure in his Wealth Tax Returns from 1979

till his death in 1983, which also proves the fact with regard to the

payment of Rs.55,000/- (Rupees Fifty-Five Thousand) as per the

family settlement for buying the 50% share of ACK in the Kamla

Nagar property by the appellants, who were LRs of RKK.

10. Learned counsel submitted that the High Court in the Impugned

Judgment in RFA No.439 of 2008 has taken a view that the payment

of Rs.55,000/- (Rupees Fifty-Five Thousand) was “on some other

account” and not towards any claim against the Kamla Nagar property.

It was held by the High Court that the LRs of ACK had 50% share

in the same and further the aspect of benami was specifically not

pressed at the time the RFA was heard by the High Court, as noted

in Paragraph 12 of the Impugned Judgment. Even the finding that

the payment of Rs.55,000/- (Rupees Fifty-Five Thousand) was “on

some other account” is totally erroneous and presumptuous since 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 843

Jugal Kishore Khanna (D) Thr. Lrs. & Anr. v.

Sudhir Khanna & Ors.

it is based only on surmises without there being any discussion to

show as to what was the other purpose and in the absence of such

“other account”, there was no material to prove its authenticity and

genuineness.

11. Learned counsel submitted that right from 1979 till his demise in

1983, ACK never raised any claim with respect to the Kamla Nagar

property which was in the exclusive possession of the appellants.

12. Learned counsel also contended that the payment of Rs.55,000/-

(Rupees Fifty-Five Thousand) was received by ACK in his personal

account and not his business account, which would clearly show

that it was in terms of the family settlement and not for some other

account/purpose.

Re Malcha Marg:

13. On the Malcha Marg property, learned counsel submitted that though

both the Courts below have given concurrent findings that it was not

joint family property, the appellants who were Defendants had only

taken a preliminary objection in the Written Statement to the suit

being bad for partial partition as the Malcha Marg property was not

part of the said suit. However, no serious effort was made to claim

partition/ownership of full or part of the Malcha Marg property.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS:

14. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the

Trial Court had rightly decided the issue qua the Malcha Marg property

being exclusively that of the respondents but had erred in accepting

the story of family settlement and payment of Rs.55,000/- (Rupees

Fifty-Five Thousand) for the share of the respondents in the Kamla

Nagar property and the wrong has rightly been corrected by the

High Court vide the Impugned Judgment. It was submitted that the

Trial Court findings re the Malcha Marg property was rightly upheld.

15. Learned counsel drew the attention of the Court to the crossexamination of DW1, in which he has stated that no valuation was

done from any valuer and there were no documents to show that

Rs.55,000/- (Rupees Fifty-Five Thousand) paid to ACK was towards

a full and final settlement of his share in the Kamla Nagar property.

Thus, it was submitted that in the absence of there being any proof of

either settlement or payment in lieu of the share of the respondents, 

844 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

rightly the High Court has held that the appellants have only 50%

share in the property.

16. On the legal aspect, it was submitted that Section 17 of the Registration

Act, 19084

 provides that any document or transfer or assigning any

4 ‘17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.—(1) The following documents shall be registered,

if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been examined on or

after the date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866 (20 of 1866), or the Indian

Registration Act, 1871 (8 of 1871), or the Indian Registration Act, 1877 (3 of 1877), or this Act came or

comes into force, namely—

(a) instruments of gift of immovable property;

(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or

extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of

the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property;

(c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration

on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or

interest; and

(d) lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving

a yearly rent;

(e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a Court or any

award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or

extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of

the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property:

Provided that the State Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, exempt, from

the operation of this sub-section any leases executed in any district, or part of a district, the terms

granted by which do not exceed five years and the annual rents reserved by which do not exceed

fifty rupees.

(1-A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the

purpose of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), shall be registered if they have

been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment)

Act, 2001 and, if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall

have no effect for the purposes of the said Section 53-A.

(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to—

(i) any composition-deed; or

(ii) any instrument relating to shares in a Joint Stock Company, notwithstanding that the assets of

such Company consist in whole or in part of immovable property; or

(iii) any debenture issued by any such Company and not creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or

extinguishing any right, title or interest, to or in immovable property except in so far as it entitles the

holder to the security afforded by a registered instrument whereby the Company has mortgaged,

conveyed or otherwise transferred the whole or part of its immovable property or any interest therein

to trustees upon trust for the benefit of the holders of such debentures; or

(iv) any endorsement upon or transfer of any debenture issued by any such Company; or

(v) any document other than the documents specified in sub-section (1-A) not itself creating, declaring,

assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and

upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which

will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or

(vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise

and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or

proceeding; or

(vii) any grant of immovable property by the Government; or

(viii) any instrument of partition made by a Revenue Officer; or

(ix) any order granting a loan or instrument of collateral security granted under the Land Improvement

Act, 1871 (26 of 1871), or the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883 (19 of 1883); or

(x) any order granting a loan under the Agriculturists Loans Act, 1884 (12 of 1884), or instrument for

securing the repayment of a loan made under that Act; or

(x-a) any order made under the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (6 of 1890), vesting any property

in a Treasurer of Charitable Endowments of divesting any such Treasurer of any property; or

(xi) any endorsement on a mortgage-deed acknowledging the payment of the whole or any part of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 845

Jugal Kishore Khanna (D) Thr. Lrs. & Anr. v.

Sudhir Khanna & Ors.

right or extinguishing any right regarding title and interest in an

immovable property valued at more than Rs.100/- (One Hundred)

has to be done through a document which requires registration and

the same not having been done, the presumption in law would be

that no such settlement existed between the appellants’ side and

the respondents’ side.

17. On the aspect of the Malcha Marg property, it was submitted that both

the Courts below have concurrently held in favour of the respondents

and thus, there being absolutely no evidence whatsoever to show

the same to have been bought by joint family funds, no interference

was required with such finding(s).

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

18. Having considered the matter, the Court finds that the Impugned

Judgment of the High Court needs interference. As far as the Malcha

Marg property is concerned, the Court has no hesitation to uphold

the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court that

there is nothing, even remotely, to indicate that the said property

was bought out of joint family funds, and thus, rightly it has been

held to be the exclusive property of the respondents. As such, it has

to rightly devolve on the LRs of ACK exclusively.

19. Moving on to the Kamla Nagar property, the Court finds that the

findings, unearthed during trial indicate that Rs.55,000/- (Rupees FiftyFive Thousand) was paid by the appellants’ side to the respondents’

side. There is nothing on record to indicate that it was paid for the

upkeep of the HUF or on some other account or to fulfil some other

purpose.

20. The plea of the respondents that the said amount was for the

upkeep of the HUF does not stand to reason for it is the admitted

position that the respondents or their ancestors were never living

the mortgage-money, and any other receipt for payment of money due under a mortgage when the

receipt does not purport to extinguish the mortgage; or

(xii) any certificate of sale granted to the purchaser of any property sold by public auction by a Civil

or Revenue Officer.

Explanation.—A document purporting or operating to effect a contract for the sale of immovable property

shall not be deemed to require or ever to have required registration by reason only of the fact that such

document contains a recital of the payment of any earnest money or of the whole or any part of the

purchase money.

(3) Authorities to adopt a son, executed after the 1st day of January, 1872, and not conferred by a will,

shall also be registered.’

846 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

in the Kamla Nagar property. Hence, there was no occasion for the

appellants to contribute a heavy amount of Rs.55,000/- (Rupees

Fifty-Five Thousand) in the year 1979 for the upkeep and/or

maintenance of the said property to the respondents, when the same

was exclusively being enjoyed by the appellants, who alone would

be liable for its maintenance. Moreover, there being disclosure by

ACK in his Wealth Tax Returns of the years 1964-1967 showing

the valuation of the property to be around Rs.38,000/- (Rupees

Thirty-Eight Thousand) and payment having been made in 1979

of Rs.55,000/-(Rupees Fifty-Five Thousand) does not indicate

that it was undervalued as there has been a marked increase in

the valuation from Rs.38,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Eight Thousand)

to Rs.1,10,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Ten Thousand) and payment

made of 50% i.e., Rs.55,000/- (Rupees Fifty Five Thousand), in

1979, that too in a family settlement between ACK and RKK cannot

be labelled a totally sham consideration.

21. Further, the appellants having enjoyed possession right from the

time the property was purchased and even letting out the premises

to tenants and collecting/taking rent from the tenants without any

claim raised at any point of time, would also support the claim that

ACK had not claimed any right or title over any portion of the Kamla

Nagar property during his lifetime. Had that been the case, there was

no occasion for him not to take or lay a claim to a 50% share in the

rent given by the tenants, which is clear from the finding recorded

by the High Court that there were tenants also in the Kamla Nagar

property; but the respondents never claimed any share in such

proceeds/ rent from the tenants. The issue was agitated for the very

first time only by filing the suit before the Trial Court in 1983.

22. Thus, on an overall circumspection of the facts and circumstances

and upon going through the records and submissions with the aid of

learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, the Impugned

Judgment inasmuch as it relates to the Kamla Nagar property viz.

RFA No.439 of 2008 stands set aside and the Judgment and Decree

passed by the the Additional District Judge, Karkardooma Courts,

Delhi in Suit No.70/06/83 dated 28.07.2008 relating to the Kamla

Nagar property stands restored. It is further held that the appellants

are the exclusive owners of the Kamla Nagar property described

hereinbefore. The Impugned Judgment insofar as it relates to RFA

No.483 of 2008 is upheld. Accordingly, Civil Appeal No.1591 of 2020 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 847

Jugal Kishore Khanna (D) Thr. Lrs. & Anr. v.

Sudhir Khanna & Ors.

is allowed and Civil Appeal No.1592 of 2020 is dismissed. Interim

order(s) of status quo stand vacated. Registry to draw up the Decree

Sheet accordingly.

23. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. IA No.59678 of 2023 for Early Hearing preferred by the appellants

in Civil Appeal No.1591 of 2020 does not subsist for consideration

in view of the aforesaid and is dismissed as infructuous.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Swathi H. Prasad, Hony. Associate Editor Civil Appeal No.1591 of 2020

(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Advocate) allowed and Civil Appeal No.1592

of 2020 dismissed.