six months waiting period for consent Divorce is not mandatory = whether the minimum period of six months stipulated under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (the Act) for a motion for passing decree of divorce on the basis of mutual consent is mandatory or can be relaxed in any exceptional situations = where the Court dealing with a matter is 12 satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following : i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony. 19. The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver. 13 20. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the concerned Court.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11158 OF 2017
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)No. 20184 of 2017)
Amardeep Singh …Appellant
Versus
Harveen Kaur …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.
1. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal is
whether the minimum period of six months stipulated under
Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (the Act) for a
motion for passing decree of divorce on the basis of mutual
consent is mandatory or can be relaxed in any exceptional
situations.
1
2. Factual matrix giving rise to this appeal is that marriage
between the parties took place on 16th January, 1994 at Delhi.
Two children were born in 1995 and 2003 respectively. Since
2008 the parties are living separately. Disputes between the
parties gave rise to civil and criminal proceedings. Finally, on 28th
April, 2017 a settlement was arrived at to resolve all the disputes
and seeks divorce by mutual consent. The respondent wife is to
be given permanent alimony of Rs.2.75 crores. Accordingly, HMA
No. 1059 of 2017 was filed before the Family Court (West), Tis
Hazari Court, New Delhi and on 8th May, 2017 statements of the
parties were recorded. The appellant husband has also handed
over two cheques of Rs.50,00,000/-, which have been duly
honoured, towards part payment of permanent alimony. Custody
of the children is to be with the appellant. They have sought
waiver of the period of six months for the second motion on the
ground that they have been living separately for the last more
than eight years and there is no possibility of their re union. Any
delay will affect the chances of their resettlement. The parties
have moved this Court on the ground that only this Court can
relax the six months period as per decisions of this Court.
2
3. Reliance has been placed inter alia on decision of this Court
in Nikhil Kumar vs. Rupali Kumar1 wherein the statutory
period of six months was waived by this Court under Article 142
of the Constitution and the marriage was dissolved.
The text of Section 13B is as follows:
“13-B. Divorce by mutual consent.— (1) Subject to the
provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by
a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by
both the parties to a marriage together, whether such
marriage was solemnized before or after the
commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act,
1976, on the ground that they have been living separately
for a period of one year or more, that they have not been
able to live together and that they have mutually agreed
that the marriage should be dissolved.
(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than
six months after the date of the presentation of the petition
referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen
months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in
the meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after
hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it
thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the
averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce
declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the
date of the decree.”
4. There is conflict of decisions of this Court on the question
whether exercise of power under Article 142 to waive the
statutory period under Section 13B of the Act was appropriate. In
1 (2016) 13 SCC 383
3
Manish Goel versus Rohini Goel2
, a Bench of two-Judges of
this Court held that jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142
could not be used to waive the statutory period of six months for
filing the second motion under Section 13B, as doing so will be
passing an order in contravention of a statutory provision. It was
observed :
“14. Generally, no court has competence to issue a
direction contrary to law nor can the court direct an
authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions.
The courts are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to
pass the orders or directions which are contrary to what has
been injected by law. (Vide State of Punjab v. Renuka
Singla[(1994) 1 SCC 175], State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra
[(1996) 9 SCC 309], Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co.
Ltd. [(1996) 4 SCC 453], University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand
Prakash Mishra [(1997) 10 SCC 264] and Karnataka SRTC v.
Ashrafulla Khan [(2002) 2 SC 560]
15. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Prem Chand Garg
v. Excise Commr.[AIR 1963 SCC 996] held as under: (AIR p.
1002, para 12)
“12. … An order which this Court can make in order to do
complete justice between the parties, must not only be
consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the
substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Constitution Benches of this Court in Supreme Court Bar
Assn. v. Union of India [(1998) 4 SCC 409] and E.S.P.
Rajaram v. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 186] held that under
Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court cannot altogether
ignore the substantive provisions of a statute and pass
orders concerning an issue which can be settled only
2 (2010) 4 SCC 393
4
through a mechanism prescribed in another statute. It is not
to be exercised in a case where there is no basis in law
which can form an edifice for building up a superstructure.”
5. This Court noted that power under Article 142 had been
exercised in cases where the Court found the marriage to be
totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and broken
down irretrievably. This power was also exercised to put quietus
to all litigations and to save the parties from further agony3
. This
view was reiterated in Poonam versus Sumit Tanwar4
.
6. In Neeti Malviya versus Rakesh Malviya5
, this Court
observed that there was conflict of decisions in Manish Goel
(supra) and Anjana Kishore versus Puneet Kishore6
. The
matter was referred to bench of three-Judges. However, since the
matter became infructuous on account of grant of divorce in the
meanwhile7
.
3 Para 11 ibid, noting earlier decisions in Romesh Chander v. Savitri (1995)
2 SCC 7; Kanchan Devi v. Promod Kumar Mittal (1996) 8 SCC 90; Anita Sabharwal
v. Anil Sabharwal (1997) 11 SCC 490; Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997) 4
SCC 226; Kiran v. Sharad Dutt (2000)10 SCC 243; Swati Verma v. Rajan Verma
(2004) 1 SCC 123; Harpit Singh Anand v. State of W.B. (2004) 10 SCC 505; Jimmy
Sudarshan Purohit v. Sudarshan Sharad Purohit (2005) 13 SCC 410; Durga
Prasanna Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy (2005) 7 SCC 353; Naveen Kohli v. Neelu
Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558; Sanghamitra Ghosh v. Kajal Kumar Ghosh (2007) 2 SCC 220;
Rishikesh Sharma v. Saroj Sharma (2007) 2 SCC 263; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh
(2007) 4 SCC 511 and Satish Sitole v. Ganga (2008) 7 SCC 734
4 (2010) 4 SCC 460
5 (2010) 6 SCC 413
6 (2002) 10 SCC 194
7 Order dated 23rd August, 2011 in Transfer Petition (Civil)No. 899 of 2007
5
7. Without any reference to the judgment in Manish Goel
(supra), power under Article 142 of the Constitution has been
exercised by this Court in number of cases8
 even after the said
judgment.
8. We find that in Anjana Kishore (supra), this Court was
dealing with a transfer petition and the parties reached a
settlement. This Court waived the six months period under Article
142 in the facts and circumstances of the case. In Anil Kumar
Jain versus Maya Jain9
, one of the parties withdrew the consent.
This Court held that marriage had irretrievably broken down and
though the civil courts and the High Court could not exercise
power contrary to the statutory provisions, this Court under
Article 142 could exercise such power in the interests of justice.
Accordingly the decree for divorce was granted.
8 Priyanka Singh v. Jayant Singh(2010) 15 SCC 390; Sarita Singh v.
Rajeshwar Singh (2010) 15 SCC 374; Harpreet Singh Popli v. Manmeet Kaur Pople
(2010) 15 SCC 316; Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar (2011) 5 SCC 234; Veena v.
State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) (2011) 14 SCC 614; Priyanka Khanna v. Amit Khanna
(2011) 15 SCC 612; Devinder Singh Narula v. Meenakshi Nangia (2012) 8 SCC 580;
Vimi Vinod Chopra v. Vinod Gulshan Chpra (2013) 15 SCC 547; Priyanka Chawla v.
Amit Chawla (2016) 3 SCC 126; Nikhil Kumar v. Rupali Kumar (2016) 13 SCC 383
9 (2009) 10 SCC 415
6
9. After considering the above decisions, we are of the view
that since Manish Goel (supra) holds the field, in absence of
contrary decisions by a larger Bench, power under Article 142 of
the Constitution cannot be exercised contrary to the statutory
provisions, especially when no proceedings are pending before
this Court and this Court is approached only for the purpose of
waiver of the statute.
10. However, we find that the question whether Section 13B(2)
is to be read as mandatory or discretionary needs to be gone into.
In Manish Goel (supra), this question was not gone into as it
was not raised. This Court observed :
“23. The learned counsel for the petitioner is not able to
advance arguments on the issue as to whether, statutory
period prescribed under Section 13-B(1) of the Act is
mandatory or directory and if directory, whether could be
dispensed with even by the High Court in exercise of its
writ/appellate jurisdiction.”
11. Accordingly, vide order dated 18th August, 2017, we passed
the following order :
“List the matter on 23rd August, 2017 to consider the question
whether provision of Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage, Act,
1955 laying down cooling off period of six months is a
mandatory requirement or it is open to the Family Court to
7
waive the same having regard to the interest of justice in an
individual case.
Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, senior counsel is appointed as Amicus
to assist the Court. Registry to furnish copy of necessary
papers to learned Amicus”.
12. Accordingly, learned amicus curiae has assisted the Court.
We record our gratitude for the valuable assistance rendered by
learned amicus who has been ably assisted by S/Shri Abhishek
Kaushik, Vrinda Bhandari and Mukunda Rao Angara, Advocates.
13. Learned amicus submitted that waiting period enshrined
under Section 13(B)2 of the Act is directory and can be waived by
the court where proceedings are pending, in exceptional
situations. This view is supported by judgments of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in K. Omprakash vs. K. Nalini10
,
Karnataka High Court in Roopa Reddy vs. Prabhakar
Reddy11
, Delhi High Court in Dhanjit Vadra vs. Smt. Beena
Vadra12 and Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dinesh Kumar
Shukla vs. Smt. Neeta13
. Contrary view has been taken by
Kerala High Court in M. Krishna Preetha vs. Dr. Jayan
10 AIR 1986 AP 167 (DB)
11 AIR 1994 Kar 12 (DB)
12 AIR 1990 Del 146
13 AIR 2005 MP 106 (DB)
8
Moorkkanatt14
. It was submitted that Section 13B(1) relates to
jurisdiction of the Court and the petition is maintainable only if
the parties are living separately for a period of one year or more
and if they have not been able to live together and have agreed
that the marriage be dissolved. Section 13B(2) is procedural. He
submitted that the discretion to waive the period is a guided
discretion by consideration of interest of justice where there is no
chance of reconciliation and parties were already separated for a
longer period or contesting proceedings for a period longer than
the period mentioned in Section 13B(2). Thus, the Court should
consider the questions:
i) How long parties have been married?
ii) How long litigation is pending?
iii) How long they have been staying apart?
iv) Are there any other proceedings between the
parties?
v) Have the parties attended mediation/conciliation?
vi) Have the parties arrived at genuine settlement
which takes care of alimony, custody of child or
any other pending issues between the parties?
14 AIR 2010 Ker 157
9
14. The Court must be satisfied that the parties were living
separately for more than the statutory period and all efforts at
mediation and reconciliation have been tried and have failed and
there is no chance of reconciliation and further waiting period will
only prolong their agony.
15. We have given due consideration to the issue involved.
Under the traditional Hindu Law, as it stood prior to the statutory
law on the point, marriage is a sacrament and cannot be
dissolved by consent. The Act enabled the court to dissolve
marriage on statutory grounds. By way of amendment in the year
1976, the concept of divorce by mutual consent was introduced.
However, Section 13B(2) contains a bar to divorce being granted
before six months of time elapsing after filing of the divorce
petition by mutual consent. The said period was laid down to
enable the parties to have a rethink so that the court grants
divorce by mutual consent only if there is no chance for
reconciliation.
16. The object of the provision is to enable the parties to
dissolve a marriage by consent if the marriage has irretrievably
10
broken down and to enable them to rehabilitate them as per
available options. The amendment was inspired by the thought
that forcible perpetuation of status of matrimony between
unwilling partners did not serve any purpose. The object of the
cooling off the period was to safeguard against a hurried decision
if there was otherwise possibility of differences being reconciled.
The object was not to perpetuate a purposeless marriage or to
prolong the agony of the parties when there was no chance of
reconciliation. Though every effort has to be made to save a
marriage, if there are no chances of reunion and there are
chances of fresh rehabilitation, the Court should not be powerless
in enabling the parties to have a better option.
17. In determining the question whether provision is mandatory
or directory, language alone is not always decisive. The Court has
to have the regard to the context, the subject matter and the
object of the provision. This principle, as formulated in Justice G.P.
Singh’s “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (9
th Edn., 2004),
has been cited with approval in Kailash versus Nanhku and
ors.15as follows:
15 (2005) 4 SCC 480
11
“The study of numerous cases on this topic does not
lead to formulation of any universal rule except this
that language alone most often is not decisive, and
regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and
object of the statutory provision in question, in
determining whether the same is mandatory or
directory. In an oft-quoted passage Lord Campbell
said: ‘No universal rule can be laid down as to whether
mandatory enactments shall be considered directory
only or obligatory with an implied nullification for
disobedience. It is the duty of courts of justice to try to
get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully
attending to the whole scope of the statute to be
considered.’
“ ‘For ascertaining the real intention of the
legislature’, points out Subbarao, J. ‘the court may
consider inter alia, the nature and design of the
statute, and the consequences which would follow
from construing it the one way or the other; the
impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of
complying with the provisions in question is avoided;
the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides
for a contingency of the non-compliance with the
provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the
provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the
serious or the trivial consequences, that flow
therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the
legislation will be defeated or furthered’. If object of
the enactment will be defeated by holding the same
directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if
by holding it mandatory serious general
inconvenience will be created to innocent persons
without very much furthering the object of enactment,
the same will be construed as directory.”
18. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of
the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is
12
satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory
period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering
the following :
i) the statutory period of six months specified in
Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of
one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of
parties is already over before the first motion itself;
ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts
in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of
the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite
the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of
success in that direction by any further efforts;
iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences
including alimony, custody of child or any other
pending issues between the parties;
iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.
19. The waiver application can be filed one week after the
first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver.
13
20. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the
waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion
of the concerned Court.
21. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in
Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be
open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts and
circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of
parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of
alternative rehabilitation.
22. Needless to say that in conducting such proceedings
the Court can also use the medium of video conferencing
and also permit genuine representation of the parties
through close relations such as parents or siblings where the
parties are unable to appear in person for any just and valid
reason as may satisfy the Court, to advance the interest of
justice.
14
 23. The parties are now at liberty to move the concerned
court for fresh consideration in the light of this order.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
…………………………………..J.
(ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)
…………………………………..J.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 12, 2017.
15
ITEM NO.1502 COURT NO.11 SECTION XIV
(For judgment)
 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 11158/2017
AMARDEEP SINGH Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
HARVEEN KAUR Respondent(s)
Date : 12-09-2017 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. T. R. B. Sivakumar, AOR
For Respondent(s)
 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the judgment
of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday
Umesh Lalit.
The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed reportable
judgment.
 (SWETA DHYANI) (PARVEEN KUMARI PASRICHA)
SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
16

WELCOME TO 2018

Wish you all a happy and prosperous New Year. 
God bless you all with great health, wealth and prosperity .
                                                                                                                  with regards
                                                                                                                            yours
                                                                                                                         advocatemmmohan

the appellant was sitting on the mudguard of a tractor and this was not a risk insured by the insurer. Upon this finding, the High Court allowed the appeal of the insurer and rejected the appeal filed by the appellant for enhancement of compensation. = In our view, the monthly income of the appellant, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case should be taken at Rs.4,000/-. After allowing for future prospects and making a deduction for present expenses, the compensation payable to the appellant shall stand enhanced by an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- from Rs.5,75,000/- to Rs.7,75,000/-. The amount for future medical expenses which has been fixed at Rs.30,000/- should be enhanced to Rs.1,20,000/- having regard to the serious nature of the disability. In other words, the compensation of Rs.8,66,000/- awarded by the Tribunal shall be enhanced by an additional amount of Rs.2,70,000/-. The appellant shall be entitled to interest @7% p.a. from the date of the claim petition until realization. The insurer shall deposit the compensation or, as the case may be, the balance payable in terms of this judgment within a period of 12 weeks from today before the Tribunal which shall be released to the appellant upon due verification.

1
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NOS 022911-022912 OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP (C ) Nos 6891-6892 of 2017)
HALAPPA ..... APPELLANT
Versus
MALIK SAB ..... RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 The High Court of Karnataka by a judgment dated 12 July 2011 reversed a
decision of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarding compensation to the
appellant in the amount of Rs.8,66,000/- with interest @ 7% per annum. While
reversing the award of compensation, the High Court has come to the conclusion
that the appellant was sitting on the mudguard of a tractor and this was not a risk
2
insured by the insurer. Upon this finding, the High Court allowed the appeal of
the insurer and rejected the appeal filed by the appellant for enhancement of
compensation.
2 The accident took place on 24 September 2005. The appellant was 28
years old at the time of the accident. The case of the appellant is that on 24
September 2005 he was visiting Sirigere to attend an event. A demonstration of
tractors was being held at 11.30 A.M. by Sonalika tractors. The appellant, who is
an agriculturist, claimed that when he approached the tractor, the driver was
unable to bring it to a halt as a result of which it turned turtle and collided with the
appellant resulting in his sustaining grievous injuries. A first information report
was registered at the Bharamasagara Police Station under Case Crime 147 of
2005 and a charge-sheet was filed against the driver for offences punishable
under Sections 279 and 338 of the Penal Code.
3 The appellant claimed compensation in the amount of Rs.25,00,000/-. The
appellant was examined as PW 1 in support of his claim. PW 2 Dr Jayaprakash
was examined to prove the nature of the injuries sustained by the appellant. The
evidence indicated that immediately after the accident the appellant was taken
for treatment to the community health centre, Sirigere where he was
administered first aid. He was thereafter shifted to Bapuji Hospital, Davangere
from where he was referred to the M S Ramayya Hospital, Bangalore for further
3
treatment. The medical records showed that the appellant had suffered
paraplegia with a compression fracture. The appellant has been permanently
immobilized, is wheel-chair bound, and requires artificial support for bladder and
bowel evacuation. The lower portion of his body has been paralyzed. Dr
Jayaprakash, PW 2, deposed in evidence that the disability of the appellant is
one hundred per cent since both his lower limbs have been paralyzed resulting in
a loss of bladder and bowel control.
4 Before the Tribunal the defence of the insurer was that the appellant was
riding on the mudguard of the tractor, this having been stated in the FIR.
According to the insurer, the policy of insurance did not cover the risk of anyone
other than the driver of the tractor. The Tribunal rejected the defence of the
insurer and relied upon the testimony of the appellant which was found to have
been corroborated by the evidence of PW 3, an eye-witness to the incident. On
the aspect of compensation the Tribunal noted that the appellant belongs to a
family of agriculturists which has a land holding of 5 acres and 25 gunthas. The
appellant was married. The Tribunal did not accept the plea of the appellant that
his monthly income was Rs.10,000/-, in the absence of cogent proof. The
Tribunal assumed the income of the appellant to be Rs.3,000/- per month. The
age of the appellant at the time of the accident being 28 years, the Tribunal
applied a multiplier of 16 and computed the compensation on account of the loss
of future earning capacity at Rs.5,76,000/-. An additional amount of Rs.50,000/-
4
was awarded towards loss of amenities and Rs.30,000/- for future medical
expenses. An amount of Rs.2,10,000/- was awarded towards medical expenses,
pain and suffering. Consequently, a total compensation of Rs.8,66,000/- was
awarded together with interest at 7% per annum from the date of the claim
petition until realization. The driver, owner and insurer have been held to be
jointly and severally liable.
5 The appellant filed an appeal for enhancement of compensation. The
insurer had also filed an appeal questioning its liability. The High Court has
allowed the appeal of the insurer and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant.
The High Court held that in the first information report which was registered on
the date of the accident on the basis of the statement of the appellant, it was
stated that the appellant was sitting on the mud-guard next to the driver of the
tractor. Subsequently on 30 September 2005 another statement was recorded
by the police in which the appellant stated that the accident had taken place as a
result of the rash and negligent act of the tractor driver, due to which the tractor
had turned turtle and fallen over the appellant. In the view of the High Court, the
police had attempted to protect the liability of the owner and had recorded a
further statement to support the plea that the appellant was a third party and that
the tractor had fallen upon him. The High Court has also doubted as to how the
police could have recorded the statement of the appellant on 30 September 2005
when he was shifted to M S Ramayya Hospital in Bangalore.
5
6 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the
High Court has manifestly erred in reversing the considered judgment of the
Tribunal. The appellant urged that the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal on
the basis of substantive evidence could not have been reversed purely on the
basis of the FIR. Moreover, it was urged that the insurer had not produced any
ocular evidence to displace what was stated by the appellant in the course of his
deposition and which was supported by PW 3 who had witnesses the accident.
7 On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the insurer
has supported the judgment of the High Court and urged that the finding that the
appellant was injured while riding on the mud-guard of the tractor is correct.
Consequently it was urged that the insurance policy which was issued to the
owner did not cover the risk arising from a third party riding on the tractor and
there was hence a breach of the insurance policy.
8 The judgment of the Tribunal indicates that the defence of the insurer
based on the first information report, the complaint Exh.P1 and the
supplementary statement of the appellant at Exh.P2 was duly evaluated. The
Tribunal, however, observed thus:
“…the respondent no.3 and RW.1 submitted that the petitioner has
invited the alleged unfortunate accident but except the FIR and complaint
Ex.P.1 the respondent no.3 has not produced any documents to show
that at the time of accident the petitioner was travelling as a passenger
by sitting on the engine of the tractor in question. During the course of
cross-examination RW.1 has admitted that the respondent no.3 has
6
maintained a separate file in respect of accident in question and he has
also admitted that the respondent no.3 has not produced the
investigator’s report of this case. Admittedly the respondent no.3 has not
examined any independent eye witness to the accident to prove that on
the relevant date and time of the accident the petitioner was travelling as
a passenger by sitting on the engine of the tractor. If really the petitioner
has sustained grievous injuries by falling down from the engine of said
tractor the respondent no.3 insurer could have produced the separate file
maintained by it in respect of the accident in question and it could have
also produced investigator’s report in respect of the said accident but
admittedly the respondent no.3 has not produced the said separate file
and investigator’s report in respect of the accident in question for the
reasons best known to it. On the other hand as already stated above it is
clear from the statement of petitioner on oath and eye witness and from
the supplementary statement of petitioner at Ex.P.2 and police statement
of witnesses at Ex.P.3 and Charge Sheet at Ex.P.6 it is clear that due to
rash and negligent driving of said tractor by respondent no.1 the said
tractor turtle down and fell over the petitioner who was about to board the
tractor and as a result of which the petitioner has sustained grievous
injuries. Moreover as already stated above the Investigating Officer
concern after detail investigation has filed the Charge Sheet against the
respondent no.1 for the offences punishable u/s.279 and 338 IPC…”
The High Court has proceeded to reverse the finding of the Tribunal purely on the
basis that the FIR which was lodged on the complaint of the appellant contained
a version which was at variance with the evidence which emerged before the
Tribunal. The Tribunal had noted the admission of RW1 in the course of his
cross-examination that the insurer had maintained a separate file in respect of
the accident. The insurer did not produce either the file or the report of the
investigator in the case. Moreover, no independent witness was produced by the
insurer to displace the version of the incident as deposed to by the appellant and
by PW 3. The cogent analysis of the evidence by the Tribunal has been
displaced by the High Court without considering material aspects of the evidence
on the record. The High Court was not justified in holding that the Tribunal had
7
arrived at a finding of fact without applying its mind to the documents produced
by the claimant or that it had casually entered a finding of fact. On the contrary,
we find that the reversal of the finding by the High Court was without considering
the material aspects of the evidence which justifiably weighed with the Tribunal.
We are, therefore, of the view that the finding of the High Court is manifestly
erroneous and that the finding of fact by the Tribunal was correct.
9 That leaves the Court to determine the quantum of compensation. The
medical evidence on the record shows that the lower limbs of the appellant have
been paralyzed resulting in a loss of bladder and bowel control. The medical
evidence establishes that the disability of the appellant is one hundred per cent.
The medical records have been scrutinized by the Tribunal. The appellant
suffers from traumatic paraplegia and was hospitalized for 42 days. The
appellant was 28 years of age when the accident took place on 24 September
2005. In our view, the monthly income of the appellant, having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case should be taken at Rs.4,000/-. After
allowing for future prospects and making a deduction for present expenses, the
compensation payable to the appellant shall stand enhanced by an amount of
Rs.1,50,000/- from Rs.5,75,000/- to Rs.7,75,000/-. The amount for future
medical expenses which has been fixed at Rs.30,000/- should be enhanced to
Rs.1,20,000/- having regard to the serious nature of the disability. In other
words, the compensation of Rs.8,66,000/- awarded by the Tribunal shall be
8
enhanced by an additional amount of Rs.2,70,000/-. The appellant shall be
entitled to interest @7% p.a. from the date of the claim petition until realization.
The insurer shall deposit the compensation or, as the case may be, the balance
payable in terms of this judgment within a period of 12 weeks from today before
the Tribunal which shall be released to the appellant upon due verification.
10 The appeals are allowed in the above terms with no order as to costs.
 ….....................................CJI
[DIPAK MISRA]

 …......................................J
[A.M. KHANWILKAR]
 …......................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]

New Delhi
December 15, 2017

whether the temple and its premises had been endowed by the father of the appellants, as otherwise evidenced by Exh.B6 or otherwise in accordance with the law and the procedure prescribed therefor for further consequential action, as warranted = In the wake of the above and on a consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, this appeal is disposed of with a direction to the appellants to file an appropriate representation before the concerned authority under the Act in support of their claim that the temple and its premises are the exclusive private property of theirs and their family and had not been endowed for wakf or charitable/public purposes.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6460 OF 2008
VIJENDRA KUMAR & ORS. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE COMMISSIONER, A.P. CHARITABLE
& RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS & ENDOWMENT
DEPARTMENT & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
AMITAVA ROY, J.
1. The appellants in their relentless pursuit for a
declaration that the temple, which is the subject
matter of the lis is their private place of worship and
not a public shrine, has put to challenge the
determination to the contrary made by the High Court
vide impugned judgment and order dated 10.07.2007
rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 393 of 1992.
Thereby the verdict of the Single Judge in the writ
petition filed by the appellants had been affirmed.
2
2. We have heard Mr. V.V.S. Rao, learned senior counsel
for the appellants and Mr. P. Venkat Reddy, learned
counsel for the respondents.
3. The background facts in short need be outlined at the
threshold for the desired comprehension of the issue
seeking resolution. The flow of events demonstrate
that the grandfather of the respondents, Ram Harak
Tiwari (since deceased) had acquired the premises in
question from one Kondaiah by sale deed dated
18.12.1302 Fasli corresponding to 18.12.1893 (as per
English Calendar) and as claimed by them had
installed the family idol of Shri Hanuman Ji made of
silver which was movable and not attached to the
earth exclusively for the worship by the family
members. The suit temple, as is asserted by the
respondents, came to be registered in the Books of
Endowment (Muntakab of Registry of Endowment)
recording the name of Gokarnath Tiwari, the father of
the appellants as the endower of Wakf (that is the
temple) on 16th Aban 1345 Fasli (corresponding to the
3
year 1936 as per the English Calendar). The extract
from the Registry of Endowment discloses that the
entry had been made as per the order of the Minister,
Ecclesiastical Department as contained in File
No.60/1 of 1945 Fasli (corresponding to the year 1933)
of the Directorate of Endowment. This document also
indicated that it had been published in the
contemporary Official Gazette. According to the
appellants, the initial structure was temporary in
nature being a tin shed and was later on converted
into a permanent one with RCC roof by obtaining due
sanction from the concerned municipal authority.
4. As the matter stood at that, in the year 1965 the
appellants received a letter from the Endowment
Department requiring them to submit an
account/budget of the temple on the ground that the
same had been endowed by their father for public
purpose. The appellants filed their counter in case
No.28 of 1968 before the Deputy Commissioner,
Andhra Pradesh Charitable Hindu Religious
4
Institutions and Endowments, Government of Andhra
Pradesh, Hyderabad, instituted by one Mr. Laxmanrao
and another, where they denied that the temple had
ever been dedicated or endowed to the public by their
father. They claimed as well that all the investments
made in the structure/premises were with the funds of
the family and with the due sanction of the municipal
authorities.
5. After the death of their father, Gokarnath Tiwari on
21.06.1969, the appellants continued to manage the
affairs of the temple and conduct the worship therein
as an exclusive family affair.
6. The appellants thereafter in the year 1975 filed an
application under Section 77 of the Andhra Pradesh
Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and
Endowment Act of 1966 (hereafter to be referred to as
“the Act”) with the same contention.
7. This proceeding, later on, under Section 92 of the Act,
was transferred to the Deputy Commissioner
(Endowment) at Guntur for disposal and was
5
numbered as OA 66 of 1975. By order dated
28.2.1977, this application of the appellants was
dismissed with the observation that the suit temple
was a public temple.
8. Situated thus, the appellants instituted the suit being
OS 58 of 1977 in the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil
Court, Hyderabad under Section 78 of the Act praying
for an affirmation that the suit temple was a private
property and claimed for a decree, inter alia for a
declaration:
a) That the order dated 28.2.1977 of the
Deputy Commission, Endowment, Guntur
proclaiming the temple to be a public temple
was null and void and inoperative in
law;
b) That the entry in the Register of
Endowments dated 11.11.1342 Fasli on
the basis of which the respondents claim
that the suit temple has been endowed by
their father was null and void and not
binding on them.
9. In the plaint, the appellants while restating the above
facts and reaffirming their claim that the temple was
6
their private property, elaborated that they had been
paying the taxes for the property along with the
electricity charges and that they did not receive/collect
any donation or accept any offerings from the public
for the maintenance of the suit temple and that the
same had never been dedicated to the public. They
thus, reiterated that the temple was their exclusive
private property from the time of their grand-father.
10. In their written statement, the respondents
contended that the grand-father and the father of the
appellants were only the Pujari (Worshipper/Priest) of
the suit temple and that the same was public in
nature, where large number of devotees daily visited
and worshiped the deity by making variety of offerings.
They asserted that the temple had been endowed by
the father of the appellants for charitable purposes for
the benefit of the public and that such endowment had
been registered in the Book of Endowment in the year
1342 Fasli (corresponding to 1933) pursuant to which
“Muntaqab” had been issued and have been duly
7
published in the Hyderabad Gazette. They also pleaded
that the suit was beyond time. According to them, the
temple being registered as Public Endowment, the
appellants were obligated in law to submit the budget
of income and expenditure thereof to the Endowment
Department.
11. In the suit, both sides adduced oral and
documentary evidence in support of their rival stands,
elaboration whereof is inessential. It is, however,
significant to refer to the document Exh.B6, the
extract of the entry in the Register of Endowment as
sought to be introduced by DW5, an erstwhile staff of
the Directorate of Endowment. The said document, the
Gazette publication whereof is not in dispute, prima
facie appears to be one on the basis of an extract from
File No. 60/2 of the Endowment Department of the
year 1342 Fasli (correspondingly year 1933) and has
been made on the order of the Minister, Ecclesiastical
Department conveyed through letter of the Secretary,
Judicial and Police etc. dated 11 Mehar 1345 Fasli
8
(corresponding to year 1936). The above endorsement
seems to be subscribed by the then Superintendent,
Endowments. This document, amongst others, records
the name of P. Gokarnath Tiwari, the father of the
appellants to be the endower of the premises identified
to be the suit temple with the object of “Wakf”. The
father of the appellants has been described therein to
be the (Pujari/Priest) of the temple. A copy of the
extract also appears to have been forwarded to the
father of the appellants describing him to be the
endower apart from the other public authorities, as
mentioned therein. An endorsement by the
Superintendent Endowments to this effect also is
available on the document.
12. Suffice it to state that this document appears to
be in a prescribed form with the necessary columns to
register the particulars of a public endowment, if
made, to be entered in the Register of Endowment,
maintained by the Director of Endowments, Govt. of
Hyderabad (as it was then). As a corollary, if this
9
document is admissible in law with all its probative
worth, it would determinatively clinch the issue in
favour of the respondents.
13. The Trial Court, however, by the judgment and
order dated 20.7.1981 decreed the suit of the
appellants whereupon the respondents have filed an
appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code
before the High Court. The Trial Court qua Exh.B6
was of the view that though it contained an entry in
the Book of Endowments indicating that the father of
the appellants had endowed the property in the lis for
Wakf, as the Ecclesiastical Department did not take
steps for exercising its supervision for over four
decades and therefore the appellants and their
predecessors had continued to treat the same as their
private property, the validity of the entry was doubtful.
It however noted that the entry had remained
unchallenged within one year, it could not be
expunged as well. Eventually, however the Trial Court
held the entry as null and void for the sole reason that
10
till 1965, the Department did not bother to supervise
the suit temple and the appellants continued to treat
the same as their private property by paying municipal
tax, remodeling the structures with two permissions
from the Municipality etc.
14. The learned Single Judge, on an assessment of
the materials on record, reversed the findings of the
Trial Court and held that the temple was a public
temple, both in view of the proved fact that it was
being visited by the members of the public in profuse
numbers daily with offerings in cash and kind, but
also in view of the entry in the Register of Endowment,
Exh.B6, which even otherwise in view of Section 114(e)
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permitted a
presumption of validity of official acts pertaining
thereto. The learned Single Judge, on this
consideration, negated the plea of the appellants that
neither such an endowment had been made by their
father nor any notice had been received by them with
regard thereto at any point of time. Mentionably, the
11
appellants in the suit had contended that their father
did not apply to the Ecclesiastical Department for the
endowment, as alleged and it could have been the
mischief of some of their neighbours to make such an
application under the forged signatures of their father.
According to them, the temple was their family place of
worship, which of course in view of its location, used
to be visited by the members of the public for which,
however, the same did not get transformed into a
public temple.
15. The appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeal
before the Division Bench of the High Court, which
rendered the judgment impugned. As the text thereof
would demonstrate, the High Court dwelt upon the
decisions cited at the Bar, amongst others on the
characteristics and determinants to ascertain the true
nature of a temple, private or public and eventually
affirmed that the temple involved as held by the
learned Single Judge was indeed public in nature. In
arriving at this conclusion, the High Court, inter alia
12
recorded that the evidence established, that the
members of the public do visit the temple as a matter
of right with no restriction to their access at any point
of time and that there was no material to prove that
the endower had left extensive properties belonging to
him or the family for the purpose of maintenance of
the temple for their exclusive purposes and instead it
was being run and maintained by public offerings.
Apart from taking note of the entry in the Register of
Endowments, published in the Official Gazette, the
High Court also minuted that there was nothing on
record to authenticate that there was any prohibition
to the acceptance of public subscriptions or offerings
for the temple. The presumption of validity of official
acts in terms of Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 as drawn by the learned Single Judge, was
affirmed as well qua Exh.B6 . The temple was thus
proclaimed to be a public temple.
16. Mr. Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellants
has strenuously argued that the temple property had
13
been and is the exclusive asset of the appellants and
their family as is amply established by the materials
on record and thus, the finding to the contrary being
against the weight thereof, is palpably illegal and
unsustainable in law and on facts. According to the
learned senior counsel, the private temple is a place of
worship of the appellants and their family members
and by virtue of its present location due to the
alteration in the topographical orientations from time
to time, it is situated by the public thoroughfare for
which the members of the public, while passing by the
way, do worship and offer their services without any
further involvement. The learned senior counsel has
insisted that such association of the members of the
public solely due to religious sentiments per se would
not convert the temple, which is otherwise an
exclusive family property of the appellants, into a
public institution. Mr. Rao in categorical terms denied
that the temple had ever been endowed by the father of
the appellants as it sought to be represented by the
14
entry in the Register of Endowment, Exh.B6 and urged
that no notice ever had been served on the appellants
or their father at any point of time which therefore,
renders this instrument non est in law and of no
probative worth. According to him, mere publication
of this document in the Official Gazette is not of any
decisive significance whatsoever. Mr. Rao has urged
that the overall finding that the temple is a public
temple is patently erroneous and is liable to be
set-aside.
17. The learned counsel for the respondents, to the
contrary has asserted that not only the appellants
have failed to demonstrate by adducing cogent and
convincing evidence that the temple and the premises
thereof had not been endowed to the public, the
contemporaneous entry in the Register of Endowments
maintained in the official course of business and
published in the Official Gazette leaves no manner of
doubt that the temple is a public temple. The
concurrent findings to this effect being based on
15
credible evidence on record, no interference is called
for, he maintained.
18. We have extended our thoughtful consideration
to the rival assertions. Noticeably, though the
appellants had throughout contended that the temple
and its premises are their private property, they admit
that they had received a notice/letter from the
Endowment Department in the year 1965 asking them
to submit the account/budget of the expenditure
thereof. Though, they did file their counter in Case
No. 28 of 1968 instituted by one Mr. Laxman Rao and
another in the office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Andhra Pradesh Charitable Hindu Religious Institution
and Endowments, Govt. of Andhra Pradesh contending
that the temple had never been dedicated or endowed
to the public at any point of time, they chose to file the
application under Section 77 of the Act before the
Deputy Commissioner, Hyderabad only in the year
1975. This is more so inspite of the fact that their
stand was not accepted by the Endowment
16
Department in the earlier proceeding.
19. Be that as it may, the Deputy Commissioner,
Guntur on the proceedings registered on their
application under Section 77 of the Act, having
declared the temple to be a public temple, they
instituted the suit for setting-aside the said
determination, which has eventually culminated in the
order impugned in the present appeal.
 On an analysis of the evidence adduced by the parties,
the attention to which had been drawn in course of the
arguments it is obvious that the document Exh.B6 has the
potential of being of definitive significance to decide the
issue as to whether the temple is a private temple or a
public one. The oral evidence adduced by the parties are
more or less evenly balanced and therefore does not
demand any dilation. Apropos Exh.B6, to reiterate, it is per
se in a prescribed form and is an extract from File No. 60/2
of the Endowment Department available in 1342 Fasli (year
1933). The entry is of the year 1345 Fasli (year 1936) and
has been made as per the order of the Minister,
17
Ecclesiastical Department in the Register of Endowment,
maintained by the Director of Endowment, Govt. of
Hyderabad. This document discloses that P. Gokarnath
Tiwari, the father of the appellants had endowed the suit
temple for “Wakf”, i.e. public/charitable purpose, he being
shown as the Pujari (Priest) thereof. It is not disputed that
this document had been published in the Official Gazette, a
copy thereof, as the document endorses, had also been
forwarded to the father of the appellants referring to him as
the endower of the property. On an overall consideration of
the features of this document, it would prima facie appear,
if all legal essentialities of procedure in connection
therewith had been adhered to, that an endowment had
indeed been made by the father of the appellants. Added to
this as well, is the rebuttable presumption of validity of
official acts which can be permissibly drawn in terms of
Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
20. This notwithstanding, we, in course of the
hearing, had enquired from the Assistant
Commissioner, Endowments, who was present in
18
court as to the legally prescribed procedure prevalent
at the relevant point of time for registration of the
endowment of the kind as involved. This is more so in
view of the insistent stand of the appellants that such
endowment had never been made by their father and
that no notice with regard thereto had ever been
received by him or them. They also indicated that this
could be the handiwork of some mischievous
neighbours of theirs. It is a matter of record that in
between the proceedings with regard to the status of
the temple, there was also a suit filed by the neighbors
of the appellants for a right of passage which did end
in a compromise and as claimed by them (appellants),
the ownership of the temple premises had been
established.
21. The officer concerned accordingly laid before us a
copy of the Endowment Regulations, sanctioned by the
Nizam of Hyderabad in 1349 Fasli (1940 AD), which
amongst others laid down the procedure for
compilation of the Book of Endowments, as per
19
Regulations 3 to 8. In substance these provisions
stipulated that the Book of Endowments would be
prepared in the office of the Endowment Department
and would contain all endowments which are in force
or which would be brought into force in future under
the relevant rules. It made it to be the duty for every
trustee or endower of an endowment to inform in
writing with regard to an endowment, in case it was an
immoveable property which had not been entered in
the “Book of the Endowments”, to the Director of the
Endowments concerned. As per Regulation 5, every
person had the right to inform the Director of
Endowment Department of the Taluq with regard to an
endowment which had not been entered in the Book of
Endowments and to the Director of Endowments in
case the property was situated in Hyderabad.
Regulation 6 predicated that on the receipt of every
such intimation or any other reliable information in
some other way, the Director of Endowment of the
Taluq if satisfied prima facie about any property to
20
have been endowed but not entered in the Book of
Endowments, would publish a notification in the
Tehsil Office and if the property was immovable, to
publish it in any prominent place and also at the place
where the endower resided, in addition to other places
where he thought fit and also have the same published
in the Gazette. As per Regulation 7, if no person raised
objection within the period mentioned in the
notification and if the property was found to be legally
endowed, the same would then be registered. In case,
however any objection was made within the period
specified by any person, who was interested or was
concerned with the endowed property in any capacity,
the Director of Endowments of the Taluq was required
to hold an enquiry as to whether the property had
been legally endowed or not and if proved to have been
endowed legally, to enter the same in the Book of
Endowments, together with intimation to be given to
the Director of Endowment Department, Hyderabad
Govt. Remedies to the person aggrieved have also
21
been provided. Incidentally, however, these
Endowments Regulations are of 1940 AD, i.e.
subsequent to the year of entry contained in Exh.B6.
On being queried by us, the Assistant Commissioner,
Endowment apprised the Court that the same
procedure prevailed under the earlier regulations
which are in Urdu language and are being presently in
the process of getting translated. This position has not
been disputed on behalf of the appellants. The
exercise as prescribed for registering any endowment,
under the aforementioned Regulations clearly accords
with the procedure, contemplated in law having regard
to the consequence of endowment of a private property
for public/charitable purposes. For obvious reasons,
we refrain from elaborating further in absence of better
particulars.
22. In view of the above Regulations however, and
noticing the persistent stand of the appellants that
their father had not endowed the suit premises to
render the temple a public temple and that neither he
22
nor they had ever received any notice in connection
therewith, we are of the considered opinion, in the
backdrop of the series of litigation including the suit
filed by the neighbours of the temple premises, that it
would be in fitness of things that an opportunity be
granted to the parties to adduce all evidence, oral and
documentary, at their disposal available to them to
finally and conclusively determine as to whether the
temple and its premises had been endowed by the
father of the appellants, as otherwise evidenced by
Exh.B6 or otherwise in accordance with the law and
the procedure prescribed therefor for further
consequential action, as warranted. We are inclined to
adopt this course, to reiterate, in view of the equally
balanced oral evidence on record and the formidable
significance of Exh.B6, the entry in the Register of
Endowments, which if has been prepared by following
the procedure, as prescribed by law then prevalent,
would seal the issue in favour of the respondents.
23. It is worthwhile to mention that DW5, who
23
exhibited this document, however, expressed his
ignorance as to the manner in which the same had
been prepared. There is no indication as well that this
document had been proved by him with reference to
the original records. In cross-examination, this
witness has conceded as well that he had no personal
knowledge about the application made for registering
the suit temple in the Book of Endowments and that
he was not aware as to when the “Muntaqab” had been
issued. In this view of the matter, the assertion on
behalf of the appellants that the Gazette Notification of
this document per se in absence of the proof of the
procedure of making of this entry as required in law,
would not be decisive, cannot be lightly brushed aside.
As it is, the presumption of validity of official acts, is
essentially rebuttable and can be dislodged by
convincing evidence to the contrary.
24. In the wake of the above and on a consideration
of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the
case, this appeal is disposed of with a direction to the
24
appellants to file an appropriate representation before
the concerned authority under the Act in support of
their claim that the temple and its premises are the
exclusive private property of theirs and their family
and had not been endowed for wakf or
charitable/public purposes. This should be done
within a period of four weeks herefrom. Needless to
say, the authority concerned would issue notice to the
Department to file their response and thereafter afford
adequate opportunity to both the sides to adduce
evidence and decide the issue as to whether the temple
and the premises involved are private or public in
nature by recording reasons., It is too trite to mention
that in undertaking this exercise, the adjudicating
authority would take note of all relevant facts and the
law applicable. The exercise, as ordered, should be
completed within a period of six months from the date
of filing of the representation by the appellants. In the
attendant facts and circumstances, we direct that the
status quo of the property involved, as on date shall be
25
maintained till the adjudication, as directed, is over.
The parties are hereby directed to co-operate so as to
enable the authority to meet the deadline of time fixed
by this Court.
25. The impugned judgment and order is set-aside.
We make it clear that we have not offered any final
comments on the merits of the case and the authority
would adjudicate the issue without being influenced
by any observation made hereinabove.
26. The appeal is thus, allowed in these terms. No
costs.
…........................................J.
[N.V. RAMANA]
…........................................J.
[AMITAVA ROY]
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 15, 2017.

when the validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings ? = dicta of the Supreme Court in Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 which held that “the validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it. But in the instant case there was no such inherent lack of jurisdiction.” - The suit which was decreed on 30 May 2009 was a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act which in any event, did not require a determination of the question of title. The earlier suit was a suit for injunction. The finding of fact which has been arrived at is to the effect that the land in question had ceased to be agricultural in nature on the date of the institution of the suit. Hence, it cannot be held that the decree of the trial court was a nullity. The land was not governed, as a result, by the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 since it was not agricultural and the bar under Section 185 was not attracted. There was no inherent lack of jurisdiction and the objection to the execution of the decree was without foundation

1
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 022967 OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP (C ) No 27279 of 2015)
HARPAL SINGH ..... APPELLANT
Versus
ASHOK KUMAR & ANR ..... RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 Leave granted.
2 A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, by a judgment dated 19
September 2014 rejected a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The
petition sought to challenge an order dated 21 August 2010 of the Additional
2
District Judge (North) rejecting the objections of the appellant in the course of the
execution of a decree.
3 Sometime in 2002 a suit was instituted by the respondents for a permanent
injunction, alleging that the defendants to the suit were threatening to interfere with
the possession of their lands situated at Nilothi, Delhi. The suit was dismissed by
the Civil Judge on 14 February 2005, holding it to be barred by the provisions of
Section 185 (1) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. The Trial court held that
the plaintiff had failed to place any registered document on record to establish his
ownership in respect of the land. Moreover, in the view of the trial Court, it was
necessary for the plaintiffs to first seek a declaration from the revenue court as
bhoomidars upon which alone an injunction could be sought. Subsequently, on 31
December 2005 the respondents instituted a suit under Section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act against the appellant, alleging that the appellant had forcibly taken
possession of the land. In response it was the case of the appellant that he was
neither in possession of the land nor had he dispossessed the respondents. The
suit was decreed by the trial court ex-parte on 30 May 2009, upon which execution
was initiated by the respondents as decree-holders. In the course of the execution,
the appellant filed objections on the ground that he was not concerned with the suit
property and was not in possession and on the ground that the ex-parte decree
was obtained by misrepresentation and fraud. The objections were dismissed in
default on 16 April 2010 and a warrant of possession was directed to be issued by
3
the ADJ (North)-04, Delhi. The appellant appears to have filed objections to the
execution of the decree on 12 July 2010 on the ground that Section 185 of the
Delhi Land Reforms Act bars a civil suit for the recovery of possession. The
objections were dismissed by the executing Court on 21 August 2010 with the
following observations:
“The Delhi Land Reforms Act is applicable with regard to the agricultural
land only but the land in question is not agriculture land which has been
vehemently argued by the counsel for the DH and in support of her
contention placed on record the copies of the electricity bills pertaining to
the same khasra number which is subject matter of the instant execution
proceedings. Even otherwise, it is a matter of common knowledge that
most of the rural land in Delhi has become urbanized and private colonies,
may be unauthorized, have mushroomed on such agricultural land. This
fact has since been substantiated with the help of electricity bills which
takes out the sting from the contentions raised by the counsel for the
objector and in the process strengthens the case of the DH, the arguments
is thus, brushed aside that the court lack of inherent jurisdiction on account
of the fact that land in question is governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act
being agriculture land.”
The order of the executing court was challenged by the appellant under Article 227
of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petition by its judgment dated
19 September 2014. The High Court rejected the submission that the decree
obtained under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was a nullity on the ground that
the suit was barred by Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.
4 On behalf of the appellant it has been submitted that since an earlier suit
seeking a permanent injunction was dismissed by a competent civil court in view
of the provisions of Section 185(1) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act 1954, and since
the land is ‘agricultural’ in nature, the civil court did not have jurisdiction in the
4
matter. The decree was a nullity and this defence, it was submitted, could be raised
in execution.
5 The High Court has relied upon the earlier decisions of the court following
Ram Lubbaya Kapoor v J R Chawla and others1
, in which it has been held that
to be ‘land’ for the purpose of the Delhi Land Reforms Act,1954, the land must be
held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal
husbandry and if it is not used for such purposes, it ceases to be land for the
purposes of the Act. The same view has been taken by the Delhi High Court in
Narain Singh and Anr v Financial Commissioner2
, Neelima Gupta and Ors v
Yogesh Saroha and Ors3
, and Anand J Datwani v Ms Geeti Bhagat Datwani
and Ors4
.
6 Section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act defines the expression ‘land’
as follows:
“(13) “land” except in sections 23 and 24, means land held or occupied for
purpose connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry
including pisciculture and poultry farming and includes –
(a) Buildings appurtenant thereto,
(b) Village abadis,
(c) Grovelands,
(d) Lands for village pasture or land covered by water and used for
growing singharas and other produce or land in the bed of a river and
used for casual or occasional cultivation,
But does not include

1 1986 RLR 432
2
(2008) 105 DRJ 122
3 156 (2009) DLT 129
4
(2013 (137) DRJ 146
5
land occupied by building in belts or areas adjacent to Delhi town, which
the Chief Commissioner may be a notification in the Official Gazette
declare as an acquisition thereto;”

The position of law which has been consistently followed is that where the land
has not been used for any purpose contemplated under the Land Reforms Act and
has been built upon, it would cease to be agricultural land. Once agricultural land
loses its basic character and has been converted into authorized/unauthorized
colonies by dividing it into plots, disputes of plot holders cannot be decided by the
revenue authorities and would have to be resolved by the civil court. The bar under
Section 185 would not be attracted 5
. This position of law has not been
controverted in the present proceedings.
7 The validity of a decree can be challenged before an executing court only
on the ground of an inherent lack of jurisdiction which renders the decree a nullity.
In Hira Lal Patni v Sri Kali Nath6
, this Court held thus:
“…The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings
only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking in
inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case
because the subject-matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the

5 Section 185 provides thus:
“185. Cognizance of suits, etc., under this Act- (1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other
than a court mentioned in column 7 of Schedule I shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Civil Proced8re, 1908 (5 of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned
in column 3 thereof.
(2) Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order passed under any of the proceedings
mentioned in column 3 of the Schedule 3 aforesaid.
(3) An appeal shall lie from the final order passed by a court mentioned in column 3 to the court or
authority mentioned in column 8 thereof.
(4) A second appeal shall lie from the final order passed in an appeal under sub-section (3) to the
authority, if any, mentioned against it in column 9 of the Schedule aforesaid.
6
(1962) 2 SCR 747
6
defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree
passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of
rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subjectmatter
of the suit or over the parties to it…”
In Sunder Dass v Ram Prakash7
, this court held that:
“Now, the law is well settled that an executing court cannot go behind the
decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one
exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to
be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing
it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is
lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the
court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be
declared to be void by any court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be
set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon
and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The
executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a
nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing
court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree,
because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree
at all. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340 : (1955) 1
SCR 117] and Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath [AIR 1962 SC 199 : (1962)
2 SCR 747]. It is, therefore, obvious that in the present case, it was
competent to the executing court to examine whether the decree for
eviction was a nullity on the ground that the civil court had no inherent
jurisdiction to entertain the suit in which the decree for eviction was
passed. If the decree for eviction was a nullity, the executing court could
declare it to be such and decline to execute it against the respondent.”
[See also Gaon Sabha v Nathi8
]
8 In the present case, the finding of fact which was arrived at by the executing
Court in the course of its decision on the objection to execution is that the land had
ceased to be agricultural land and was not being used for purposes contemplated

7
(1977) 2 SCC 662
8
(2004) 12 SCC 555
7
under the Delhi Land Reforms Act 1954. The High Court while affirming the view
of the executing court made the following observations:
“…But in the present case, the Decree Holder had shown electricity bills
pertaining to the same Khasra number and the Court also considered that
most rural lands in Delhi have become urbanized and private unauthorized
colonies have mushroomed on agricultural lands. Therefore, in fact, the
said land had lost its character of agricultural land. Besides, the suit was
filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for declaration and
possession along with injunction and other consequential reliefs. The
executing Court found that the objector had not shown as to how the said
suit was not maintainable. It relied upon the dicta of the Supreme Court
in Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 which held that “the
validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on
the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking inherent
jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case because
the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the
defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree
passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of
rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject
matter of the suit or over the parties to it. But in the instant case there was
no such inherent lack of jurisdiction.”
9 The above findings have not been squarely challenged in these
proceedings. The suit which was decreed on 30 May 2009 was a suit under
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act which in any event, did not require a
determination of the question of title. The earlier suit was a suit for injunction. The
finding of fact which has been arrived at is to the effect that the land in question
had ceased to be agricultural in nature on the date of the institution of the suit.
Hence, it cannot be held that the decree of the trial court was a nullity. The land
was not governed, as a result, by the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 since it was
not agricultural and the bar under Section 185 was not attracted. There was no 
8
inherent lack of jurisdiction and the objection to the execution of the decree was
without foundation.
10 For the above reasons, we find no merit in the civil appeal, which is
accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

….....................................CJI
[DIPAK MISRA]

…......................................J
[A.M. KHANWILKAR]

…......................................J
[Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi
December 15, 2017