Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 375, 376(2)(n) — Rape on false promise of marriage — Married prosecutrix — Promise legally incapable of performance — Whether consent vitiated by misconception of fact — Held, No — Where prosecutrix was aware of subsisting marriage and legal impediment to remarriage, allegation of false promise cannot sustain offence — Consensual relationship turned acrimonious — FIR and chargesheet quashed (Paras 19–24, 27–28).
Consent — Section 90 IPC — Misconception of fact — Distinction between false promise and breach of promise — Promise must be false from inception with intent to deceive — Mere failure to marry insufficient — Reiterated (Paras 17–18, 23).
Section 376(2)(n) IPC — “Repeatedly” — Requires multiple distinct acts of sexual assault — Not attracted to long-standing consensual relationship absent coercion or deception from inception (Paras 15–16, 22).
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Section 5(i) — Subsisting marriage — Legal bar to second marriage — Promise to marry during subsistence of first marriage legally unenforceable — Relevance in determining quality of consent (Paras 19–20).
Criminal Proceedings — Quashing — Article 226 / Inherent jurisdiction — Application of Bhajan Lal principles — Where allegations even if taken at face value do not disclose offence — Continuation of proceedings amounts to abuse of process (Paras 26–28).
Broken relationship — Criminalisation — Caution — Courts must distinguish genuine sexual exploitation from consensual relationships turning sour — Misuse of rape provision deprecated (Paras 21–25).
Result — Impugned High Court order set aside — FIR No. 213/2025, Chargesheet No. 269/2025 and Sessions Case No. 89/2025 quashed (Para 28).
ANALYSIS OF FACTS
The appeal arose from the refusal of the High Court of Chhattisgarh to quash FIR No. 213/2025 registered under Section 376(2)(n) IPC.
The complainant, a 33-year-old married advocate with a child, had matrimonial disputes with her husband; divorce proceedings were pending but no decree had been granted. She met the accused, also an advocate, in September 2022. A relationship developed.
The FIR alleged that the accused induced her into sexual relations on a false promise of marriage, repeatedly engaged in intercourse, impregnated her, forced abortion, and later refused marriage.
The accused contended that:
The relationship was consensual.
The complainant was fully aware of her marital status and the legal impediment to remarriage.
The allegations arose after personal discord.
The High Court granted anticipatory bail but refused to quash the FIR, observing that the question of “misconception of fact” required investigation.
The chargesheet was subsequently filed and Sessions Case instituted.
The Supreme Court examined whether, even taking the FIR at face value, ingredients of Section 376(2)(n) IPC were disclosed.
ANALYSIS OF LAW
I. Scope of Section 376(2)(n) IPC
Section 376(2)(n) IPC deals with repeated commission of rape on the same woman. The Court clarified that “repeatedly” implies multiple distinct acts of sexual assault, not a continuous consensual relationship.
In genuine cases under this provision, there is usually an initial assault followed by repeated acts under coercion, fear, or deception rendering the victim vulnerable.
The Court found no such pattern here.
II. False Promise of Marriage and Consent
The Court reiterated settled principles:
A distinction exists between a false promise and breach of promise.
A false promise must be made from inception with no intention to marry, solely to obtain consent.
Consent under Section 90 IPC is vitiated only when based on such initial fraudulent intention.
Reliance was placed on:
Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385
Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398
The Court emphasised that not every failed relationship amounts to rape.
III. Legal Impossibility of Marriage
A crucial factor was that the complainant’s marriage subsisted throughout the alleged period of sexual relationship.
Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 prohibits marriage if either party has a living spouse.
Thus, even assuming there was a promise, such promise was legally incapable of performance at the relevant time.
The Court reasoned that:
The complainant, being an advocate, was presumed aware of the legal position.
Both parties knew of her subsisting marriage.
Therefore, it was implausible that she was induced into sexual relations under a legally enforceable expectation of marriage.
This rendered the allegation of misconception untenable.
IV. Nature of Relationship
The Court characterised the case as:
A consensual relationship between adults.
Relationship turning sour.
Personal dispute given criminal colour.
The Court cautioned against the “disquieting tendency” of converting failed relationships into rape prosecutions.
The offence of rape, being grave, must be confined to cases involving genuine absence of free consent.
V. Application of Bhajan Lal Principles
The Court applied categories laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
It held that:
Even if allegations are accepted at face value, no offence under Section 376(2)(n) is made out.
Continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process.
Thus, the case fell within categories warranting quashing.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Where a prosecutrix is a legally married woman aware of the subsistence of her marriage, and the alleged promise of marriage is legally incapable of performance, consensual sexual relations between adults cannot be retrospectively characterised as rape on the ground of false promise of marriage. In absence of material showing that the promise was false from inception and intended solely to obtain consent, the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC is not made out. Criminal proceedings in such circumstances are liable to be quashed under the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal.
OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS
The impugned order of the High Court dated 03.03.2025 was set aside.
FIR No. 213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered at Sarkanda Police Station, District Bilaspur,
Chargesheet No. 269/2025, and
Sessions Case No. 89/2025
were quashed.
The appeal was allowed.
