Land Acquisition — Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act — Applicability where award passed after commencement — Scope confined to determination of compensation — Rehabilitation and resettlement not retrospectively attracted.
Where acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but the award was passed after the commencement of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, Section 24(1)(a) mandates that the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply. However, the provisions concerning rehabilitation and resettlement do not automatically apply in such cases. (Paras 14–19, 97(i), 97(ii)). Relied on: Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal; Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd v Deepak Agarwal.
Land Acquisition — Nature of Collector’s role — Collector not a Court — Limitation Act not applicable at reference stage.
The Collector, while facilitating acquisition and determining compensation, acts either in an executive or quasi-judicial capacity and does not function as a “court” within the meaning of the Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the stage of reference under Section 64 of the 2013 Act beyond the outer statutory limit prescribed therein. Once the maximum period expires, the right to seek reference stands extinguished. (Paras 21–24, 30, 74). Relied on: Sakuru v Tanaji; Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v Shah Manilal Chandulal; M.P. Steel Corporation v Commissioner of Central Excise.
Land Acquisition — Status of Authority under Chapter VIII — Judicial character — Award deemed decree.
The Authority constituted under Chapter VIII is presided over by a legally trained person and exercises powers akin to a Civil Court. The award passed by the Authority is deemed to be a decree. Proceedings before the Authority are original judicial proceedings between contesting parties. (Paras 25–33, 74).
Limitation — Section 74 of the 2013 Act — Single period of limitation — Proviso does not create separate limitation.
Section 74 prescribes a period of sixty days for filing an appeal before the High Court. The proviso permitting filing within a further sixty days does not create an independent second period of limitation but merely facilitates delayed filing within the statutory framework. There exists only one limitation regime under Section 74. (Paras 35, 75–77). Relied on: Dwarka Prasad v Dwarka Das Saraf.
Limitation — Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act — Express exclusion mandatory — Mere prescription of limitation insufficient.
Section 29(2) mandates that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply to special or local laws unless expressly excluded. The mere prescription of a specific period of limitation under a special statute does not amount to exclusion. Section 74 of the 2013 Act contains no express exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. (Paras 59–62, 76–79).
Interpretation — Section 103 of the 2013 Act — “In addition to and not in derogation of” — Coexistence with other laws.
Section 103 clarifies that the provisions of the 2013 Act are in addition to and not in derogation of other laws in force. The 2013 Act, though a special legislation and largely a complete code, is not insulated from borrowing from other enactments. Excluding the Limitation Act would render Section 103 redundant. (Paras 37–41, 78–79). Relied on: KSL and Industries Ltd v Arihant Threads Ltd; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v Union of India.
Limitation — Section 5 applicability to Section 74 appeals — High Court empowered to condone delay.
Since Section 74 does not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, Section 5 applies to appeals filed thereunder. The High Court is competent to condone delay on showing sufficient cause. A liberal approach is warranted in matters involving determination of just and fair compensation. (Paras 74–82, 97(iv)–(vi)).
Administrative Accountability — Delay by State instrumentalities — Pragmatic approach.
Repeated delays in filing appeals reflect administrative negligence and possible collusion. High Courts are directed to adopt a pragmatic rather than pedantic approach in condonation matters. State Governments are directed to ensure proper monitoring mechanisms. (Paras 84–85, 97(vii), 97(viii)). Relied on: Sheo Raj Singh v Union of India.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The central ratio of the decision is that Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 does not expressly exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and Section 103 of the 2013 Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24, including Section 5, apply to appeals filed under Section 74. Accordingly, the High Court possesses the jurisdiction to condone delay upon sufficient cause being shown.
A further ratio is that the Collector, at the pre-reference stage, is not a court and therefore Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before him once the statutory outer limit expires. However, once the matter reaches the appellate stage before the High Court, which is an indisputably judicial forum, the Limitation Act becomes applicable in the absence of express exclusion.
Additionally, in cases governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, only provisions relating to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act apply when the award is passed after its commencement; rehabilitation and resettlement provisions do not automatically extend to such cases unless specifically provided.
The impugned judgments holding that Section 5 stood excluded were therefore set aside, and the delays in filing appeals were condoned in the interest of justice.
