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Monday, December 18, 2017

We clarify that at an appropriate stage or upon completion of the investigation, if the Investigating Officer is satisfied with the explanation offered by the appellants and is of the opinion that continuance of the seizure of the stated bank accounts or any one of them is not necessary, he will be well advised to issue instruction in that behalf.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1099 OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 6474 of 2016)
TEESTA ATUL SETALVAD …Appellant(s)
:Versus:
THE STATE OF GUJARAT …Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1083 OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6477 of 2016)
JAVED IFTEKHER AHMED ANAND …Appellant(s)
:Versus:
THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …Respondent(s)
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1084 OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6476 of 2016)
CITIZENS FOR JUSTICE & PEACE …Appellant(s)
:Versus:
THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …Respondent(s)
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1085 OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6475 of 2016)
SABRANG TRUST …Appellant(s)
:Versus:
THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …Respondent(s)
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J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. The common question posed in these appeals centres around
the sweep, purport and applicability of Section 102 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”),
which reads thus:
“102. Power of police officer to seize certain property.-
(1) Any police officer may seize any property which
may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or
which may be found under circumstances which
create suspicion of the commission of any offence.
(2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in
charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the
seizure to that officer.
(3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1)
shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate
having jurisdiction and where the property seized is
such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the
Court or where there is difficulty in securing proper
accommodation for the custody of such property, or
where the continued retention of the property in
police custody may not be considered necessary for
the purpose of investigation, he may give custody
thereof to any person on his executing a bond
undertaking to produce the property before the Court
as and when required and to give effect to the further
orders of the Court as to the disposal of the same.
Provided that where the property seized under subsection
(1) is subject to speedy and natural decay
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and if the person entitled to the possession of such
property is unknown or absent and the value of such
property is less than five hundred rupees, it may
forthwith be sold by auction under the orders of the
Superintendent of Police and the provisions of
sections 457 and 458 shall, as nearly as may be
practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale.”
2. The bank accounts, in all nine, of the appellants have been
seized on the instructions of the Investigating Officer as a sequel to
the complaint filed by the members of Gulberg Co-Operative
Housing Society, registered by D.C.P. Police Station, bearing CR
No.1/2014, on 14th January, 2014 for offence punishable under
Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section
72A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The bank accounts
were seized and intimation in that behalf was given to the
concerned Magistrate on 21st January, 2014. The appellants filed a
petition before the Bombay High Court, being Writ Petition
(Criminal) No.173/2014, for quashing of the FIR and for setting
aside the freezing order which, however, was rejected on 4th
November, 2014 with liberty to the appellants to approach the
jurisdictional court. Against the said decision the appellants
preferred special leave petition before this Court, being Special
Leave Petition (Criminal) No.3330/2014, which was allowed to be
withdrawn on 5th May, 2014 with liberty to the appellants to move
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before the Competent Authority. The appellants then filed Special
Criminal Application No.2710/2014 before the High Court of
Gujarat at Ahmedabad. That application was, however, withdrawn
on 29th September, 2014 with liberty to approach the concerned
Magistrate for appropriate relief.
3. The appellants thereafter moved formal applications before the
Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court at Ahmedabad, being
Miscellaneous Application Nos.175-178/2014 which were dismissed
by common order dated 28th November, 2014 passed by Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. Aggrieved, the
appellants filed four separate revision applications before the High
Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, bearing Criminal Revision
Application Nos.249-252 of 2015. While the said revision
applications were pending, the anticipatory bail application filed by
the appellants in connection with the alleged offence came to be
rejected by the High Court by a speaking order dated 12th February,
2015. That order has been challenged by way of Special Leave
Petition (Criminal) No.1512/2015 which has been converted into
Criminal Appeal No.338/2015 and is pending for consideration by a
larger Bench in terms of order dated 19th March, 2015. The
5
appellants have been given interim protection of stay of arrest
during the pendency of the said appeal.
4. The other relevant fact to be noted is that additional offences
have been added to the FIR in relation to which the bank account
freezing directions were issued by the Investigating Officer,
punishable under Sections 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code
(“IPC”). Besides, the Competent Authority under the Foreign
Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976 issued orders on 23rd July,
2015, categorising the authorization in respect of Citizens for
Justice and Peace Trust (“CJP Trust”, appellant in Criminal Appeal
No.1084/2017), as “prior permission”. In so far as the Sabrang
Trust (appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1085/2017), vide order
dated 9th September, 2015 the Competent Authority suspended its
authorisation. It is also relevant to note that FIR has been
registered by the Competent Authority of CBI in respect of violation
of Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976. On 8th July, 2015
the appellants have been granted anticipatory bail in respect of the
said offence.
5. Be that as it may, the criminal revision applications preferred
by the appellants before the High Court of Gujarat, challenging the
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order dated 28th November, 2014 passed by the Magistrate rejecting
the prayer for lifting of the bank account freezing, were finally heard
and dismissed vide common judgment dated 6th/7th October, 2015.
This order is the subject matter of the present appeals. In other
words, the limited issue to be addressed in the present appeals is
about the justness of the action of the Investigating Officer of
freezing of stated bank accounts of the appellants in connection
with FIR registered as CR No.1/2014; and the correctness of the
approach of the Magistrate in rejecting the request for de-freezing
the bank accounts of the appellants as affirmed by the High Court
vide impugned judgment.
6. The genesis of the freezing of the bank accounts of the
appellants is the registration of the FIR bearing CR No.1/2014 on
4th January, 2014. The same reads as follows:
“First Information Report of Offence under police
Jurisdiction
(under Sec.154 of Cr.P.C)
1. Dist. Ahmedabad Po.St. D.C.P. Year-2014.
First Information no. I CR No.01/2014 Dt.4/1/2014.
2. Law
(1) IPC sec.406, 420, 120(B) and The I.T. Act. 72(A)
(2) ---
(3) ---
3. (A) Date of offence occurred and date:- year
from 2007 to till today.
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(B) Date declared of offence (Po.St.) :- 4/1/14
Time:-14:15
(C) Station diary entry no. 07/2014 Time : 14:15
4. How got information :- Oral or writing :- Writing.
5. Offence place :
(A) Distance of offence from po.st. and direction.
Beat no. / Chawky name…:-
(B) Address :- Gulberg Society, Meghani Nagar,
Ahmedabad and by the interest
(C) If the offence has occurred outside the police
station then name of that police station….:-
6. Complaint / Information :-
(A) Name : Firozkhan
(B) Name of Father : Saeed Khan Pathan
(C) Birth Date/Year : ………………
(D) Nationality : Indian
(E) Passport No………….. Dt. ……………
(F) Occupation : Business
(G) Address : 15, Shukan Residency, 2nd floor,
Opp. Sonal Cinema, Vejalpur Road, Ahmedabad City.
7. Name, Add and details of Accused :-
(1) Teesta Setalvad Resi. Nirant, Juhu Tara
Road, Mumbai
(2) Javed Anand (Husband) Resi. Nirant, Juhu
Tara Road, Mumbai
(3) Tanveer Jafri
(4) Chairman of G.B.Soc. Salim Sandhi.
(5) Secretary of G.B.Soc. Firoz Gulzar M.Pathan
and others who come out after inquiry.
8. Reason for late information :-
9. Narration of Property if lost or theft
10. Total price of theft
11. Accident (if death) death :- ……
12. Details of 1st Information :- ………
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The facts of this case are such that as mentioned on
above date, time and place, the accused named in
had conspired and exhibited the photographs and
video of Gulberg Society and other affected areas
and the accused had put up on the CJP and
Sabrang‟s websites with the help of internet against
the wishes of the complainant and on the website
appealed wealthy people to deposit donation in the
CJP‟s IDBI bank account as well as Union Bank of
India Account of Sabrang and thereby obtained
deposits of crores of rupees and used the money for
personal use by diverting in different institutions
with one/same address thereby indulging in wrong
activities in the name of religion and used Rs.
1,51,00,000/- for personal use between 2009 and
2011 thereby committed breach of trust & cheated
the victims by using internet.
13. Details of act done after registration of the
offence:-
Dtd. 04/01/2014
My name is Firozkhan Saeedkhan Pathan, Aged 41,
Business. Re.15, Shukun Residency, 2nd Floor, Opp.
Sonal Cinema, Vejalpur Road, Ahmedabad City (M)
9974240961.
On being asked personally, I am giving this
complaint that I am residing at the above mentioned
address with my family since 2004 and own a Relief
Cyber Café at Relief Road.
In the year 2002, I was residing in Bungalow No. 18,
at Gulbarg Society, Chamanpura, Omnagar Road at
Meghaninagar, with my family at the time of Godhra
Riots. This bungalow was in the name of my uncle
Anwarkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan. In this bungalow
the nominee was my aunt Jetunbibi Anwarkhan
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Pathan. But this massacre time my elder father
Anwarkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan was killed. Thus,
this bungalow is on the name of his wife Jetunbibi
Anwarkhan Pathan who was residing there. This
bungalow no. 18 was three storied. On the ground
floor in two rooms my elder uncle Anwarkhan
A.Pathan and his wife were lived. And other two
rooms my younger uncle Rashidkhan A.Pathan and
his wife Jamilabanu and my grandmother
Kherunnisha A. Pathan lived in it. On the Second
floor two rooms where my uncle Anwarkhan‟s son
Asiamkhan A.Pathan and his wife Suraiya and their
son Azar lived. And in other two rooms my elder
father Anwarkhan‟s younger son Akhtar Khan A.
Pathan and his wife Sajedabanu and their son
Sadab and daughter Farin resided. On the third
floor, I myself, my father and my mother Jehunnissa
and my younger brother Imtiyazkhan Saeedkhan
Pathan were residing. In the year 2002, after
Godhra incident, our Gulbarg Society too was burnt
by anti-social elements and 68 persons killed
including my grand mother Kherunnisha A. Pathan
Aged 80 and my uncle Anwarkhan A. Pathan Aged
70, my mother Johurannisha Saeedkhan Pathan
aged 57, my uncle‟s wife Jamilabanu Rashidkhan
Pathan aged 45 and my elder father Anwarkhan‟s
son Akhtarkhan A. Pathan and his wife Sahedabanu
Akhtarkhan and his son Sadabkhan A.Pathan. We
lived at Dariyakhan Ghummat, Shahibaug relief
camp for three months. At that time Raiskhan
Azizkhan Pathan and Teesta Setawad met us and
told that they run one NGO and had taken an
interview. They told that they would publish the
interview in their magazine namely Communalism
Combat and would help you economically and legally
and also assured of help whenever needed. I did not
know Raiskhan and Teesta Setalwad before this
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time. After that, we have taken a flat on rent at
Rakhial and live there for one year, and then, in the
year 2004, we lived in a flat which on rent, at
Juhapura for one and half year. And after that we
lived in Ambar tower flat No.28, taken on rent and
lived for one and half year there. After that in the
2007 lived in Firozalla, Nr. Vejalpur and then in the
2010, we shifted 15, Shukun Residency, 2nd floor,
Opp. Sonal Cinema, Vejalpur with my family. After
Godhra Riots, we organized programme for paying
our tribute to our departed souls at Gulbarg Society
on the 28th Feb every year and read Quran there. At
this time, one NGO CJP‟s Ms. Setalvad arrived from
Mumbai assured support in the Gulberg Society‟s
case. This Teesta Setalvad helped us till the trial
went on. She helped us only for the trial case and
not economically.
Then in the year 2007, Teesta Setalvad‟s man one
Raiskhan A. Pathan, resident of Mumbai and at
present residing in Ajit mill compound, Ajit Residency
flat, at Rakhial. They told us that we lived in a
rental house and are tired of paying rent since 2002.
So, went to sell Gulbarg Society, then Raiskhan told
us that he has to talk with her and then reply us.
After some time we the members of society were
went at M.M. Tirmizi‟s office which is at Mirzapur
and arranged a meeting there. In this meeting,
Gulbarg Society members, Raiskhan Pathan, Teesta
Setalwad and M.M. Tirmizi were present. When
Raiskhan told Teesta Setalvad that the members of
the Gulbarg Society wanted to sell their houses, she
got angry at Raiskhan and told us that we all should
not indulge in selling the society and informed that
she would handle it in her own way and asked
Raiskhan to leave the office. Thereafter Ms. Setalvad
organised a meeting of the members of the society
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and informed chairman, secretary to make a survey
of Then a matting held the members of the society
and told that chairman and secretary surveyed the
society and expressed her wish to make a museum
at this place. I will pay you the value of your houses
within a month.
After this, in 2008, on 28.2.208, when all of us
members and residents of the Gulberg Society
gathered there to commemorate the dead, Teesta
Setalvad had also visited and held a meeting. At this
meeting affected persons following Godhra from
Naroda Gaam, Queishi Yunusmiya and Odh village‟s
Anwarmiyan and Saeed Radeeq Ahmed and Hasan
Khan Pathan and Yusuf Vora and Jaffer Khan
Pathan as also affected persons from Nroda Patiya,
Sardarpura, Visnagar (Deepda Darwaza), and
Pandharwada were also present at the meeting.
Every year since 2007 Teesta Setalvad held
meetings calling affected persons and media persons
and made CDs of the opinions of affected persons
and their plight and talked of making a museum
there. At this meeting, son of former MP Ahsan Jafri,
Tanvir Jafri was also there and spoke of putting a
statute of his father Ahsan Jafri and building a
Museum there.
Then on 28.2.2009, a meeting of the members and
residents of Gulberg society and other victims from
all over Gujarat and the media and other important
people was held when all members of the society
had told her that you had said in the 2007 meeting
that within a month we would be paid. Until now no
money has been paid. Hence pay us the money, we
said. She said that we are collecting funds and as
soon as funds are collected we will be paid, we were
informed. Then, in the years 2010 and 2011 again,
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on 28.2.2002, she organized functions when also
members had asked questions, but she had made
excused and not given the money.
On 28.2.2012, this Teesta Setalvad organised a
larger, well planed programme at Gulberg Society
where the affected persons of riots, media‟s persons
and Muslim leaders had gathered. At that time, all
over Gulberg society, photos of dead persons on a
Projector were shown. Banners displayed showed as
if the Museum had been created. A large stage was
made a Shobha Mudgal, a famous classical artist
was called and a programme was held. Members of
our society had opposed this and said that since you
had not given any monies to the members and falsely
projected that you had made a museum and collected
donations, since then, strong opposition between
society members and Teesta Setalvad began. Hence
Teesta Setalvad took Tanvir Jafri, and the Chairman
and the Secretary into her confidence and in a
confidential meeting resolved that any persons who
are members of the society could sell sale their
houses to any persons of their choice regardless of
caste or religion at the price of your choosing. Now
none of the built homes will be used by us for the
Museum. The resolution that was passed by which
other society members had opposed it. In our
opposition we had said that for 12 years since the
incident took place, and since 2007, you had on the
excuse of a Museum being built amassed crores of
rupees and this fund you did not use for the Society
or for riot victims, you have not paid any monies. You
have breached our trust and cheated us. Along with
this Teesta Setalvad and resident of Surat, Tanveer
Ahsan Hussain Jafri together, from 2007 to 2012
conducted programmes, made CDs and sent to her
sister, Nargis Jafri and his younger brother Zuber
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who lived in USA via email and through hard copies.
There, they organised seminars, showed CD‟s and
wrongfully collected funds and collected crores of
rupees for this. At these seminars, now and then,
Teesta Setalvad, Tanveer Jafri, as also their persons,
Father Cedric Prakash and R.B. Shree Kumar (Retd.
D.G.P.) had visited America.
This Teesta Setalvad and Tanveer Jafri and other
persons jointly planned a conspiracy of gathering
photos etc of affected persons of Gulberg Society and
other affected locations and displayed these on the
CJP and Sabrang website and on internet against
our desires.
Then the bank account numbers of the CJP. Institute
Bank A/c. in IDBI No.014104000204736 and the
Sabrang Bank Account @ Union Bank of India
No.369102010802885 were displayed on the
internet and appeals for the fund and crores of
rupees were collected in the bank accounts. This
fund was fraudulently used for their personal
expenses through the creation of different
organisations at the same address.
We got this information under an RTI application:-
that the CJP NGO had, from 2009 to 2011 had
collected Rs.63 (sixty-three) lakhs and the Sabrang
Trust had collected Rs.88 (eighty-eight) lakhs from
local and foreign countries. The members of these
trusts not amassed these funds through
misrepresentation but also used these funds for
personal reasons. These funds were not used for the
benefit of the members of Gulberg Society. Apart from
this also, crores of rupees have also been amassed
by them and used for personal reasons and
committed a breach of trust and cheating with
affected persons.
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Therefore, a complaint against Teesta Setalvad, her
husband Javed Anand, who both live at „Nirant‟
bungalow, Juhu Tara Road, Mumbai and Tanveer
Jafri, and Chairman of Gulberg Society, Salimbhai
Sandhi and Secretary Firoz Gulzar Mohammed
Pathan and others who may be involved after
investigations, this is my complaint for a detailed
and lawful investigation. The persons unknown are
named as etc. This complaint is true as per my
knowledge which has been read and understood by
me and thereafter signed. I have received a copy of
my complaint.
Sd(C.B.Gamit)
(P.S.I. Crime)
(S.O.G. Crime)
Ahmedabad City.
Sd- Asst.-
Adl. Chief Metro Magistrate Court-11 A‟bad.”
7. Simultaneously, with the registration of the aforementioned
FIR, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Cyber Cell, Crime
Branch, Ahmedabad issued instructions to the Union Bank of
India, Juhu Tara Branch, Mumbai and IDBI, Khar Branch, Mumbai
to seize the stated bank accounts pertaining to Sabrang Trust, CJP
Trust, Teesta Atul Setalvad and Javad Anand, appellants herein.
Intimation about the seizure of concerned bank accounts was given
to the concerned Magistrate on 21st January, 2014. On the
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applications for de-freezing of the concerned bank account filed
before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court No. XI, Ahmedabad, it was
mainly contended that - the Investigating Officer had failed to
comply with the mandate of Section 102 of Cr.P.C., by not
informing the Magistrate of the action of freezing of the accounts;
the Investigating Officer has not given prior notice to the account
holders before freezing of their bank accounts; the appellant CJP
Trust, in any case, is not named as accused in the alleged crime
and is not associated with the same in any manner; the concerned
Trust maintains proper accounts which are duly audited and there
is no trace of any illegality committed in respect of receipt and
expenditure; the contributions made by foreign fund is after due
approval of the Competent Authority; the attempt of freezing of the
bank accounts of the Trust and also personal accounts of the
Trustees, in particular private appellants, was motivated and an
attempt to stifle them from carrying on their social welfare
activities; the bank accounts had no causal connection with the
commission of alleged offence in respect of which investigation was
in progress and more so, not even one donor has come forward to
question the intention or activity of the concerned Trust. These
contentions have been duly considered by the Magistrate whilst
16
rejecting the application submitted by the appellants for de-freezing
the accounts. The Magistrate took the view that the private
applicants were the Trustees of the Trusts whose bank accounts
have been seized and preliminary investigation revealed substantial
discrepancies in the accounts, including that the accounts of the
Trusts were not audited for the relevant period and the transactions
and huge withdrawals from the bank accounts raised suspicion
regarding the commission of the alleged offence. It is further held
that since the investigation was at the nascent stage and was in
progress and the private appellants were seemingly not cooperating
with the investigation, the prayer for lifting of seizure of the bank
accounts cannot be acceded to. Accordingly, the applications came
to be rejected vide a common order dated 28th November, 2014 by
the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court No.XI,
Ahmedabad.
8. Before the High Court, more or less similar arguments were
canvassed on behalf of the appellants. The High Court in paragraph
15 of the impugned judgment adverted to the gist of contentions
recorded by the Magistrate as under:
17
“15. The questions which raised in the Lower Court,
as submitted by the learned counsel for the
petitioners, were (A) That seizer of accounts was
illegal in absence of prior notice, (B) The action of
freezing of accounts in absence required intimation
to the Magistrate concerned was illegal, (C) The
accounts could not have been freezed for all times to
come and the object of the investigation could have
been achieved by requiring the petitioners to execute
a bond to compensate the State, if at all the case
against the petitioners was made out, (D) Freezing of
accounts could have been resorted only as a sequel
to crime and not for the purpose of discovery of crime,
(E) The accounts had nothing to do with proceeds of
crime and therefore continued seizure was
unnecessary. (F) That accounts were Foreign
Contribution Regularization Accounts (FCRA) under
the authorization of the Home Ministry, and
therefore, local police had no authority to freeze
them.”
9. The High Court then adverted to the arguments of the
appellants as advanced, in paragraphs 16 to 24. The first point was
about the absence of prior notice to the appellants before the
freezing of the bank accounts, which has been rejected following the
Bombay High Court Full Bench decision in the case of Vinoskumar
Ramachandran Valluvar V. The State of Maharashtra1. The
High Court then noted the contention of the appellants that the
Audit Reports of the accounts concerned were submitted to various
authorities, like Charity Commissioner, Home Ministry etc., who

1 (2011) Cri.L.J. 2522 (Bom.)
18
neither raised any objection nor found any irregularity in the
accounts. Further, different contributories including Human
Resources Development Ministry, have contributed to the corpus of
the Trust and none of the contributors or donors have ever raised
any objection about the activities of the appellants. The High Court
also noted that even United Nations Organization was one of the
donors. For obtaining donations from the said organizations, strict
procedure and formalities are required to be complied with and
have been so complied with and only thereafter the donation
amount has been released. The concerned authorities did not find
any irregularities in the transactions in question. It was then
contended that freezing of accounts cannot be for indefinite period.
The appellants can be allowed to operate the accounts upon
execution of a bond and that would subserve the interest of justice.
The appellants also contended that the accounts were re-audited by
the Chartered Accountants and no irregularity or illegality has been
found during the said re-audit. In case there is any illegality or
irregularity, the same can be deciphered by examining the entries in
the books of accounts and the vouchers in the relevant documents
which are already furnished to the Investigating Agency. It was
contended that freezing of the accounts of the Trust, in particular,
19
operated for receiving donations under the FCRA, was motivated
and to completely paralyse the working of the
Trust. It was contended that there can be no presumption that the
use of the funds from the accounts in question was not for private
purpose. It was also contended that the appellants and their
chartered accountants and auditors were extending full cooperation
with the investigation. The principal argument of the appellants was
that the power under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. could not have been
exercised as no material was produced by the investigating
authority to support the fact that the property in question was
parted with to indicate the commission of alleged offence of cheating
or breach of trust or for that matter forgery of the record. These
contentions were countered by the respondents. The High Court
then considered the relevant material placed on record and the
affidavits filed by the investigating authority highlighting the
suspicious transactions done from the stated bank accounts and
the conduct of the appellants, including the incorrect statements
made by the appellants on oath in the proceedings before the Court
regarding the maintenance of the accounts of the two Trusts. The
High Court also adverted to the decision of the coordinate Bench
while rejecting the anticipatory bail application preferred by the
20
appellants and inference drawn in support of the conclusion as to
why the prayer for anticipatory bail should be rejected. The same
has been extracted in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the impugned
judgment, which read thus:
“37. From the aforestated facts this Court drew
following inference thus:
„Thus, from the above, it is evident that the accounts
were also not audited for a long period of time, and it
is only when the FIR was registered wherein serious
allegations of misappropriation of lacs of rupees have
been alleged that all of a sudden the accounts from
April, 2003 to March, 2008 were got audited in the
year 2014.
38. On the basis of the facts available on record as
aforestated, this Court assigned the reasons as to
why custodial investigation was necessary; they
were as under:
(a) From the accounts of the Sabrang Trust and CJP,
a total amount of Rs.1,69,84,669=00 have been
transferred to the Sabrang Communication &
Publishing Pvt Ltd, a company owned by the
petitioners.
(b) From the accounts of the Sabrang Trust and of
CJP, an amount of Rs.46,91,250=00 and
Rs.28,34,804=00 were transferred to the personal
accounts of the petitioner nos. 1 & 2 respectively.
(c) From the accounts of the Sabrang Trust and CJP,
the petitioners have withdrawn Rs.1,08,73,782=00
as cash.
21
(d) From the accounts of the Sabrang Trust and CJP,
the petitioners have paid Rs.29,66,121=00 towards
Credit Card payments.
(e) The petitioners have endeavored to explain the
credit card payment running into lakhs of rupees by
stating that all such personal expenditure were
repaid to the NGO Page 40 of 48 HC-NIC Page 40 of
48 Created On Fri May 06 16:33:26 IST 2016
R/CR.RA/249/2015 JUDGMENT accounts. This
employment of public donations to personal use
needs to be investigated. The petitioners have not
submitted any debit/ credit vouchers and/or cheques
details to prove their statement.
(f) Upon scrutiny of the saving accounts
Nos.014104000142595 & 014104000142601 of the
petitioner nos. 1 & 2 with the IDBI, Mumbai, it was
noticed that both the accounts were opened on
30.04.2005. The FCRA permission from MHA for CJP
and Sabrang Trust was granted in November, 2007.
Proposal to purchase the Gulbarg Society was
mooted by petitioner no.1 orally in December, 2007
and formally in January, 2008, Resolution was
passed by the society accepting her proposal in June,
2008 and thereafter the advertisements commenced
and monies started pouring in. Further no
substantial income of any nature, except from the
CJP and Sabrang Trust, is noticed in both the above
mentioned personal accounts of the petitioners,
which were further invested in fixed deposits, shares
and mutual funds such as ICICI Prudential, Reliance
Capital, Kotak Mahindra, Franklin Templeton etc.
(g) The donations received by the Sabrang Trust and
CJP are utilized for personal purposes.
(h) Receipt of donations to the tune of
Rs.29,20,000=00 from Ashoka Foundation, Arlington,
USA, in the personal accounts of Ms. Setalvad and
Rs.6,05,442=00 as foreign remittance in Ms.
Setalvads personal account.
22
(i) Monthly withdrawal of salary by both the accused
from all the six accounts of CJP, Sabrang Trust and
Sabrang Communications.
It also appears that the custodial interrogation is
necessary for the following reasons :
1. The case of the prosecution is based on cogent
documentary evidence received from the Charity
Commissioner, Mumbai, Ministry of Home Affairs,
New Delhi, various Banks, etc. Financial details
received from these authorities require detailed
investigation.
2. The petitioners have never remained present
before any investigating agency and have employed
every means to avoid the due process of law. The
petitioners seek to avoid custodial interrogation by
the investigating authorities by dismissing cogent
documentary evidence as accounting jugglery.
Approximately 44% of the total donations received in
the Sabrang Trust and approximately 35% of the
total donations received in the CJP, were transferred
to their personal accounts.
3. Cash withdrawal running into over Rs 1.09 crore
need to be further scrutinized and examined wherein
Rs.50,000=00 to Rs.5,00,000=00 have been
withdrawn as cash on a single day.
4. Credit card details received from the UBI and Citi
Bank revealed expenditure of purely personal nature
running into lacs of rupees being serviced from the
CJP and Sabrang Trust accounts through
cheques signed by the petitioners.”
23
10. After having noticed the relevant material, the High Court
proceeded to consider the contentions germane for answering the
issue regarding de-freezing of the bank accounts and answered in
the following words:
“39. This Court is conscious of the fact that question
of custodial investigation is not under consideration.
The endeavour of the Court is to point out material in
possession of the investigating agency in relation to
the accounts in question and the conduct of the
petitioners. It is required to be noted that the
affidavit-in-reply, in the same terms as in the
aforestated bail applications, has been filed by the
State in these petitions also. From the aforestated
facts, it cannot be disputed that the investigating
agency has in its possession a considerable
material entitling it to freeze the accounts of the
petitioners under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. The power
to seize the tainted property or the property which is
doubted as tainted, on the basis of substantial
material under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. is not in
dispute. It is also settled legal position that the
investigating agency, while investigating the matter,
is the master of its case; the Courts would be loath to
interfere in the investigation in absence of serious
irregularity or illegality aimed at mala fide impairing
the right of the accused rather than serving public
interest. It may be true that the action of the
investigating agency at the inception may not be
regular, but the Court cannot be oblivious to the
collection of substantial material by the investigating
agency justifying the action under Section 102 of
Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is insignificant at this stage,
when the investigation has progressed to a
material point, to ponder around the question as
to whether the act of freezing the accounts was a
sequel to crime or the crime was detected later. If
24
the arguments to that effect advanced by the
learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted at
this stage, it would advance the public injustice
rather than serving the ends of justice. De-freezing
accounts on the basis of such arguments, may
paralyze the investigation, which cannot be
approved as an act ‘in the interest of justice.’
40. Having found the aforestated serious material
against the petitioners, it cannot be said that the
execution of the bond by the petitioners is a suitable
alternative. Securing the public interest rather than
money is the central point of consideration when
theft or manipulation of accounts meant for the
beneficiaries, is alleged. It is rightly contended by the
learned Public Prosecutor that when the
investigating agency is wanting to ascertain the
extent of the tainted accounts, and when on the basis
of material, the whole corpus of the accounts is under
the cloud of doubt, at this stage, mere execution of
bond is not going to serve the purpose of law.
41. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted
in the affidavit-in-rejoinder in Para 5.2, that the
petitioners have controverted the facts as regards
non-auditing of accounts by the petitioners for a
continuous period of six years or so as alleged by the
State with appropriate material. That is not the only
question on which the investigation is based as
indicated in detail. Irrespective of the accounts
being audited or not, serious discrepancies have
been noticed by the Court in the audited accounts
submitted to the Charity Commissioner and in the
bank statements etc. It is apparent from the
affidavit-in-reply filed by the State that they have
noticed and compared various entries in the
audited accounts with the statements of the bank
accounts. Further, this is not a stage where the
Court will appreciate the case as if in a trial. The
question is whether there is a material with the
investigating agency justifying freezing of accounts
under Section 102. The purpose of Section 102
obviously is to find out the truth after noticing the
25
material raising doubt about the commission of
offence. At this stage, it is not incumbent upon the
investigating agency to justify the material as if in a
trial and it would be suffice for it to justify the
material for the purpose of investigation. If justifiable
material for investigation is available, the Court
would not sit in appeal over such justification, as
investigation is in the absolute domain of the
investigating agency, and as pointed out earlier,
the Court may interfere only in exception
circumstances.
42. As indicated above, prima facie the entire
accounts are in serious clouds of doubt, and
therefore, freezing thereof could be the only remedy
with the investigating agency. The law must be
allowed to take its own course, even at the cost of
causing inconvenience to the accused or others, and
therefore, the petitioners cannot be heard to
complain that the consequence of legal action has
translated into paralyzing its activities.
43. It is also rightly contended by the learned
Public Prosecutor that arguments of the learned
counsel for the petitioners justifying the
transactions or offering justification as to certain
entries are more in the nature of defence than valid
arguments at this stage. Such facts are required to
be considered at this stage by the investigating
agency on cooperation of the petitioners, and later,
in the trial, if at all the case is found against the
petitioners by the investigating agency for trial, and if
the cognizance of the offence as alleged is taken by
the competent Court. Therefore, arguments that the
trusts are registered under the FCRA 1976, and that
it has various reputed contributors or the donors
including the Human Resources Development
Ministry or that the trusts have avowed objects of
brining about the communal harmony and helping
the victim and providing legal aid to them must fail.
26
44. The arguments impugning the freezing of the
accounts under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. without notice
to the petitioners are to be noted for rejection for the
simple reason that the Section 102 does not
contemplate issuance of any such notice, and for the
purpose of investigation, no notice to the suspect can
be expected under the law. Section 102 of Cr.P.C. is
an important step towards investigation and in view
of settled legal position that accused cannot have
any say in investigation, notice to the suspect is out
of question. The intention of the investigating agency
is not required to be revealed to the suspect at that
crucial stage, else, a message of alert would be
received by the suspect creating a huge room for
manipulation and or destruction of evidence.
45. It is noticed from the impugned order that the
notice of the seizure or freezing of the accounts or its
intimation was sent to the competent magistrate, and
therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners has
fairly not pressed the said argument.
46. It is also misconceived to argue that the seizure
in exercise of powers under Section 102 of Cr.P.C.
would be valid only if the accounts in question
contain the proceeds of crime.
47. There appears to be no substance in the
argument that it is only Human Resources
Development Ministry which can exercise power of
freezing or seizing of the account. There is nothing in
the language of any of the provisions of FCRA 1976
to infer any fetters on the powers of the police to
investigate even those accounts in which the
authorization to obtain the donation even from a
foreign national is granted under the FCRA Act. No
fetters, therefore can be read in the powers of
investigating agency investigating the case under the
Cr.P.C.
27
48. True it is that the learned Government Public
Prosecutor rightly concedes against perennial
freezing of accounts; however, it is for the
investigating agency, probably on conclusion of the
investigation to determine the extent of the
accounts tainted with crime and to De-freeze the
rest, if at all such Defreezing is warranted in the
facts and circumstances of the case. This issue can
be answered from another angle as contended by the
learned Public Prosecutor. If upon conclusion of the
investigation, a part of accounts is found to be
tainted, obviously it would amount to stolen property
within the meaning of Section 410 of IPC, and in such
an eventuality, by no stretch of imagination, a stolen
property can be released before trial or acquittal of
accused.
49. The argument as to applicability of the penal
provisions invoked against the petitioners cannot be
gone into at this stage when the investigation is at
crucial point and the material in this regard is yet to
be placed before the Court after conclusion of the
investigation. In fact, in view of the settled legal
position that accused has no role to play in the
investigation except as indicated in Cr.P.C., the
question as to applicability of a particular provision is
required to be left to the discretion of the
investigating agency and then to the Court as and
when and if the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. is
filed.”
11. In the present appeals, the appellants have largely reiterated
the stand taken in the proceedings before the Magistrate and the
High Court, wherefrom the present appeals have arisen. The
appellants contend that to justify the freezing of the bank accounts
the investigating authority must demonstrate that the monies held
28
in these accounts are connected with the commission of the offence.
The investigation of the alleged offence has been a roving one and
the police has investigated the entire accounts of the appellants
even beyond the period referred to in the FIR. Further, the seized
accounts have nothing to do with the subject matter of the FIR. CJP
Trust has no concern with the appeal made by the Sabrang Trust
on its website. The donations were invited by Sabrang Trust to be
deposited in its account displayed on the website. Notably, the
grants/donations made by the donors for executing specific projects
and the amounts were and still are supposed to be spent in
accordance with the agreements. The donors are private parties and
none of them has complained about the embezzlement of their
funds. The donors have been furnished with relevant information
and accounts concerning their donations. In the written
submissions filed by the appellants it is submitted that the
provisions of law sought to be invoked against the appellants and
the transactions in question must necessarily result in commission
of some offence by the appellants so as to invoke Section 102 of the
Code; whereas keeping in mind the ingredients of Sections 405 &
406, there is nothing to indicate that the said offence is made out
against the appellants. Only that private person who has
29
contributed can be heard to make grievance about entrustment and
criminal breach of trust. Not even one donor has come forward to
make such grievance. Similarly, the ingredients of offence of
cheating specified in Section 415 to be an offence under Section
420, required dishonest or fraudulent inducement of any person to
deliver any property to the accused. None of the donors have come
forward to make grievance in that behalf. It is submitted that it is
well settled that if the property is not suspected of commission of
offence, it cannot be seized under Section 102 of the Code. For, the
police officer can seize only such property which may be alleged or
suspected to have been alleged in the commission of offence.
Reliance has been placed on M.T. Enrica Lexie and Anr. v.
Doramma and Ors.2 and Sri Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal
(II), T.N. v. State of T.N. and Ors.3 to contend that in the absence
of due procedure as specified by Section 102 of the Code, seizure of
bank accounts would be illegal and more so, when it has been done
to stifle all the activities of the Trust. The counsel for the appellants,
during the course of argument, had invited our attention to various
documents and also explained the entries relied upon by the
respondents, which according to the appellants was a tenuous plea

2 (2012) 6 SCC 760
3 (2005) 8 SCC 771
30
to link the stated bank accounts with the crime under
investigation. Details have been given in the written submission as
to how the entries in the books of accounts have been distorted and
misread by the respondents.
12. The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the
investigation is still in progress and the appellants have not given
full cooperation to the Investigating Officer. Rather, the appellants
have caused hurdles in the smooth progress of the investigation of
the alleged crime. The record would reveal that proper procedure for
seizure of the bank accounts was followed and that considering the
nature of allegations in the FIR and the material gathered during
the investigation thus far, would require elaborate investigation
with regard to the subject matter of the FIR. The High Court had
elaborately analysed the material on record while considering the
prayer for grant of anticipatory bail of the private appellants and
prima facie found substance in the allegations against the
appellants of misuse of funds received by them through various
donors and that the appellants were not ready and willing to
cooperate with the investigation. The respondents would submit
that since the investigation is in progress and the material already
gathered throws up circumstances which create suspicion of the
31
commission of the alleged offence, therefore it is imperative to
continue the seizure of bank accounts until it is necessary and till
the completion of the investigation. If the Investigating Officer
eventually finds that the accounts are not tainted with the crime, he
would not hesitate to defreeze the same or to exclude the untainted
amounts.
13. We have heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel along
with Ms. Aparna Bhat, appearing for the appellants and Mr. Tushar
Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General along with Mr. Ajay
Chokshi, appearing for the State of Gujarat.
14. The sweep and applicability of Section 102 of the Code is no
more res integra. That question has been directly considered and
answered in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D.
Neogy.
4 The Court examined the question whether the police officer
investigating any offence can issue prohibitory orders in respect of
bank accounts in exercise of power under Section 102 of the Code.
The High Court, in that case, after analysing the provisions of
Section 102 of the Code had opined that bank account of the
accused or of any relation of the accused cannot be held to be

4 (1999) 7 SCC 685
32
“property” within the meaning of Section 102 of the Code.
Therefore, the Investigating Officer will have no power to seize bank
accounts or to issue any prohibitory order prohibiting the operation
of the bank account. This Court noted that there were conflicting
decisions of different High Courts on this aspect and as the
question was seminal, it chose to answer the same. In paragraph 6,
this Court noted thus:
“A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 102
indicates that the Police Officer has the power to
seize any property which may be found under
circumstances creating suspicion of the commission
of any offence. The legislature having used the
expression „any property‟ and „any offence‟ have
made the applicability of the provisions wide enough
to cover offences created under any Act. But the two
preconditions for applicability of Section 102(1) are
that it must be „property‟ and secondly, in respect of
the said property there must have been suspicion of
commission of any offence. In this view of the matter
the two further questions that arise for consideration
are whether the bank account of an accused or of his
relation can be said to be „property‟ within the
meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the
Cr.P.C. and secondly, whether circumstances exist,
creating suspicion of commission of any offence in
relation to the same………..”
15. After analysing the decisions of different High Courts, this
Court in paragraph 12, expounded the legal position thus:

33
“Having considered the divergent views taken by
different High Courts with regard to the power of
seizure under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and whether the bank account can be
held to be „property‟ within the meaning of the said
Section 102(1), we see no justification to give any
narrow interpretation to the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code. It is well known that
corruption in public offices has become so rampant
that it has become difficult to cope up with the same.
Then again the time consumed by the Courts in
concluding the trials is another factor which should
be borne in mind in interpreting the provisions of
Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the
underlying object engrafted therein, inasmuch as if
there can be no order of seizure of the bank account
of the accused then the entire money deposited in a
bank which is ultimately held in the trial to be the
outcome of the illegal gratification, could be
withdrawn by the accused and the Courts would be
powerless to get the said money which has any
direct link with the commission of the offence
committed by the accused as a public officer. We
are, therefore, persuaded to take the view that the
bank account of the accused or any of his relations
is „property‟ within the meaning of Section 102 of the
Criminal Procedure Code and a police officer in
course of investigation can seize or prohibit the
operation of the said account if such assets have
direct links with the commission of the offence for
which the police officer is investigating into.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
In the aforesaid premises, we have no hesitation to
come to the conclusion that the High Court of
Bombay committed error in holding that the police
officer could not have seized the bank account or
could not have issued any direction to the bank
officer, prohibiting the account of the accused from
being operated upon.”
34
16. After this decision, there is no room to countenance the
challenge to the action of seizure of bank account of any person
which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of the
commission of any offence.
17. In the present case, FIR has been registered at least against
three private appellants, naming them as accused. CJP Trust has
not been named as an accused in the FIR. But the investigation
thus far, according to the respondents, reveals that Teesta Atul
Setalvad and Javed Anand are actively associated with the said
Trusts and have carried out transactions which may be found
under circumstances suspicious of the commission of the alleged
offence. That is still a matter of investigation. For the present, the
Investigating Officer is of the view that there are certain
circumstances emerging from the transactions done from these
bank accounts which create suspicion of the commission of an
offence. It is on that belief he has exercised his discretion to issue
directions to seize the bank accounts pertaining to CJP Trust.
18. As regards the procedure for issuing instructions to freeze the
bank accounts, it is noticed that the same has been followed by
giving intimation to the concerned Magistrate on 21st November,
35
2014 as required in terms of Section 102 of the Code. There is
nothing in Section 102 which mandates giving of prior notice to the
account holder before the seizure of his bank account. The
Magistrate after noticing that the principle stated by the Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Dr. Shashikant D.
Karnik v. State of Maharashtra5 has been overruled in terms of
the Full Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Vinoskumar Ramachandran Valluvar (supra), rightly negatived
that contention. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has
expounded that Section 102 does not require issuance of notice to a
person before or simultaneously with the action attaching his bank
account. In the case of Adarsh Co-operative Housing Society
Limited v. Union of India & Ors.6, the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court once again considered the issue and rejected
the argument that prior notice to the account holder was required
to be given before seizure of his bank account. It also noted that the
bank account need not be only of the accused but it can be any
account creating suspicion about the commission of an offence. The
view so taken commends us.

5 (2008) Cri.L.J. 148 (Bom.)
6 (2012) Cri.L.J. 520 (Bom.)
36
19. In the case of Sri Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal (supra),
the Court while considering a transfer petition under Section 406 of
the Code, seeking transfer of the case pending before the Principal
Sessions Court, Chenglepet, to any other State outside the State of
Tamil Nadu, adverted to the circumstance of a motivated order
passed under Section 102 of the Code for freezing of 183 bank
accounts of the Mutt on the ground that the head of the Mutt was
involved in a murder case. In that context, it observed that the
power vested under Section 102 of the Code cannot be stretched to
irrelevant matters, to extremes and to a breaking point. The power
must be exercised cautiously, failing which, the discretion exercised
by the authority would be tainted with arbitrariness. In paragraph
23, the Court observed thus:
“…Again, the action of the State in directing the
banks to freeze all the 183 accounts of the Mutt in
the purported exercise of the power conferred under
Section 102 CrPC, which had affected the entire
activities of the Mutt and other associated trusts and
endowments only on the ground that the petitioner,
who is the head of the Mutt, has been chargesheeted
for entering into a conspiracy to murder
Sankararaman, leads to an inference that the State
machinery is not only interested in securing
conviction of the petitioner and the other co-accused
but also to bring to a complete halt the entire
religious and other activities of the various trusts
and endowments and the performance of pooja and
other rituals in the temples and religious places in
37
accordance with the custom and traditions and
thereby create a fear psychosis in the minds of the
people. This may deter anyone from appearing in
Court and give evidence in defence of the
accused……..”
The Court did not lay down as a proposition that it is impermissible
to freeze multiple bank accounts, even though circumstances
emanating from the nature of transactions effected from the
concerned bank accounts and the conduct of the account holders
created suspicion of the commission of an offence. The Court while
directing lifting of seizure of bank accounts had noted that the Mutt
could not be paralysed by freezing of all its bank accounts in the
guise of a direction issued under Section 102 of the Code. Further,
the continuation of the seizure of all the bank accounts even after
completion of the investigation of the case and filing of charge-sheet
was unwarranted.
20. In the case of M.T. Enrica Lexie (supra), the Court noted in
paragraph 7 that agencies had completed their respective
investigations and vessel was seized in exercise of power under
Section 102 of the Code. In Para 16, the Court noted the
concession given by the counsel for the Government that the vessel
was not the object of the crime or the circumstances which came up
38
in the course of investigation that create suspicion of the
commission of any offence. In that case, it was alleged that while
the fishing boat was sailing through the Arabian Sea, indiscriminate
firing was opened from the vessel in question, as a result of which
two innocent fishermen who were on board, died. The Counsel for
the State had also conceded that the vessel was no longer required
in connection with the offence in question. Indeed, in paragraph
14, the Court made the following observations:-
“14. The police officer in course of investigation can
seize any property under Section 102 if such property
is alleged to be stolen or is suspected to be stolen or
is the object of the crime under investigation or has
direct link with the commission of offence for which
the police officer is investigating into. A property not
suspected of commission of the offence which is
being investigated into by the police officer cannot be
seized. Under Section 102 of the Code, the police
officer can seize such property which is covered by
Section 102(1) and no other.”
These observations are in no way different from the proposition
expounded in the case of Tapas D. Neogy (supra).
21. Keeping these principles in mind and the material on record, it
is noticed that the prosecution has alleged that the two Trusts are
run by the private appellants and other accused. They were actively
involved in collecting huge funds as donation in the name of
39
providing legal assistance to the 2002 Gujarat Riot Victims. Such
donations received by the two Trusts had never reached the victims,
the members of the Gulberg Society in respect of which grievance
has been made in the subject FIR. Further, substantial
discrepancies have been noticed from the bank accounts, copies of
audited account statements and Balance Sheet. The final account
did not tally with the accounts, as submitted. The appellants did
not offer credible explanation in that regard, much less
satisfactory. According to the respondents, the conduct of the
appellants of non-cooperation during the investigation strengthens
the suspicion of the commission of an offence. They provided
incorrect information. It is also a case of non-disclosure and
suppression of material facts. These circumstances create suspicion
of the commission of offence under investigation. It is alleged by
the respondents that the appellants deliberately and intentionally
did not disclose that they have already opened new accounts and
transferred huge sums of money after knowing that stated bank
accounts of the appellants were seized on 21.01.2014 by the
investigating agency. The details of the two newly opened accounts
were not forthcoming. Further, in the proceedings filed before
different Courts, incorrect plea has been taken by the appellants,
40
suggestive of the fact that their accounts were not compliant and
duly scrutinized by the Competent Authority.
22. Suffice it to observe that as the Investigating Officer was in
possession of materials pointing out circumstances which create
suspicion of the commission of an offence, in particular, the one
under investigation and he having exercised powers under Section
102 of the Code, which he could, in law, therefore, could
legitimately seize the bank accounts of the appellants after following
the procedure prescribed in sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (3) of
the same provision. As aforementioned, the Investigating Officer
after issuing instructions to seize the stated bank accounts of the
appellants submitted report to the Magistrate concerned and thus
complied with the requirement of sub-Section (3).
23. Although both sides have adverted to statement of accounts
and vouchers to buttress their respective submissions, we do not
deem it necessary nor think it appropriate to analyse the same
while considering the matter on hand which emanates from an
application preferred by the appellants to de-freeze the stated bank
accounts pending investigation of the case. Indisputably, the
investigation is still in progress. The appellants will have to explain
41
their position to the investigating agency and after investigation is
complete, the matter can proceed further depending on the material
gathered during the investigation. The suspicion entertained by the
investigating agency as to how the appellants appropriated huge
funds, which in fact were meant to be disbursed to the unfortunate
victims of 2002 riots will have to be explained by the appellants.
Further, once the investigation is complete and police report is
submitted to the concerned Court, it would be open to the
appellants to apply for de-freezing of the bank accounts and
persuade the concerned Court that the said bank accounts are no
more necessary for the purpose of investigation, as provided in subSection
(3) of Section 102 of the Code. It will be open to the
concerned Court to consider that request in accordance with law
after hearing the investigating agency, including to impose
conditions as may be warranted in the fact situation of the case.
24. In our opinion, such a course would meet the ends of justice.
We say so also because the explanation offered by the appellants in
respect of the discrepancies in the accounts, pointed out by the
respondents, will be a matter of defence of the appellants.

42
25. We clarify that at an appropriate stage or upon completion of
the investigation, if the Investigating Officer is satisfied with the
explanation offered by the appellants and is of the opinion that
continuance of the seizure of the stated bank accounts or any one
of them is not necessary, he will be well advised to issue instruction
in that behalf.
26. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed.
…………………………….CJI.
 (Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
 (A.M. Khanwilkar)
New Delhi;
15th December, 2017.

appeal seek to overturn the judgment and order dated 04.10.2004 rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Petition No. 34886 of 1998, thereby directing the Corporation to convert the dealership of a petrol pump initially allotted in favour of the respondent No.1 (hereafter to be referred to as the “respondent”) under the discretionary quota of the Departmental Minister 2 concerned to one under its (appellant) circular No.67-2/2K4 dated 12.02.2004 and restraining it as well from interfering with the possession of the respondent of the installation premises.-Adverting to the facts of the case, to recapitulate, the dealership of the respondent had been cancelled being vitiated by favourtism due to exercise of fanciful discretion of the Departmental Minister, which was neither approved nor condoned. Nevertheless, the Corporation visibly did not act in terms of the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi in initiating the fresh process for auction. This led to the challenge to the faulty advertisement dated 05.10.1998 and the corrigendum dated 13.10.1998, the operation whereof to start with was stayed and thereafter the respondent was permitted to continue with the dealership and eventually she was directed to be awarded a fresh dealership by converting the 39 existing dealership under its policy dated 12.02.2004. The dealership of the respondent having been cancelled w.e.f. 01.12.1997, though the operation of the auction notice and the corrigendum thereto had been stayed and she had been allowed to run the outlet, we fail to comprehend as to how all these could be construed to signify that her dealership did subsist from the date of the impugned judgment and order. There was thus no scope for conversion of the existing dealership to a new dealership as ordered. In addition thereto, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the direction to award the new dealership under the prevalent policy dated 12.02.2004, having regard to the backdrop of adjudication undertaken by the Delhi High Court would amount to perpetuation of the undue benefit, earlier bestowed on her by a method held to be illegal, dubious, arbitrary and transgressive of public interest.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5565 OF 2009
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
SHASHI PRABHA SHUKLA & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
AMITAVA ROY, J.
1. The Indian Oil Corporation Limited (hereafter to be
referred to as the “IOC/Corporation”) and its
functionaries, in this appeal seek to overturn the
judgment and order dated 04.10.2004 rendered by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc.
Petition No. 34886 of 1998, thereby directing the
Corporation to convert the dealership of a petrol pump
initially allotted in favour of the respondent No.1
(hereafter to be referred to as the “respondent”) under
the discretionary quota of the Departmental Minister
2
concerned to one under its (appellant) circular
No.67-2/2K4 dated 12.02.2004 and restraining it as
well from interfering with the possession of the
respondent of the installation premises. As the
sequence of events would unfold, the attendant facts
do project a distressing state of affairs in the matter of
distribution of State largesse, seemingly motivated by
irrelevant considerations, deliberate defaults and
casual disregard to binding judicial adjudications of a
Constitutional Court.
2. We have heard Mr. Annam D.N. Rao, learned counsel
for the appellants and Mr. Tripurari Ray, learned
counsel for the respondent No. 1 . Though served, but
none has filed vakalatnama on behalf of respondent
No. 2.
3. First the skeletal facts, to facilitate the desired grip of
the issues to be addressed. The respondent herein,
claiming to be an unemployed graduate but actively
involved in activities pertaining to rural development
and welfare of women, but without any regular source
3
of livelihood, applied to the then Minister of Petroleum,
Government of India, New Delhi for being sanctioned a
petrol pump under his Special Discretionary Quota on
the National Highway, Phutahia Chauraha, Tehsil and
District Basti, U.P. The application was considered for
allotment of a retail outlet dealership on
compassionate ground and was forwarded for
necessary follow-up action to the Direction
(Marketing), Indian Oil Corporation, Bombay on
08.08.1985. In deference to the said communication,
the Corporation issued a Letter Of Intent (LOI) on
04.10.1995 for a retail outlet dealership in motor spirit
and high speed diesel oil on the National Highway at
Phutahia Chauraha, District Basti under “A” category.
Thereafter a lease deed was executed on 16.09.1996
between the respondent and the
appellant/Corporation for a period of 30 years at a
monthly rent of Rs.1650/- payable to the former by
the latter w.e.f. 01.03.1996 and was made renewable
at the option of the parties. It was inter alia agreed
4
that the appellant/Corporation would develop the
retail outlet and provide the same to the respondent
with certain facilities, such as, a suitable plot of land
duly developed as an outlet with office building,
storage, tank and pump, air facility etc.
4. The pleaded stand of the respondent in this regard
however is that though the dealership was declared to
be under “A” category, for which as per the norms, the
appellant/Corporation was required to provide the
infrastructure including land, in her case on its
persuasion and insistences, she had to purchase the
necessary land and make further investments to
make it fit for the installation by expending more than
Rs.14 lakhs, against which she was to receive a
nominal monthly lease rent of Rs.1650/-. She also
expressed her grievances with regard to the allotments
of the supplies made to her from time to time,
resulting in heavy financial loss to her in business.
5. Be that as it may, this grant of dealership to the
respondent came to be impeached along with other
5
grants in a public interest litigation being Writ
Petition(C) No.4003 of 1995 before the High Court of
Delhi by the Center for Public Interest Litigation, in all
questioning allotment of 179 retail outlets (petrol
pumps), 155 LPG distributorship and 45 SKO/LDO
dealerships from January 1993 till 1996 by the
Departmental Minister under his discretionary quota
and upon complete adjudication of the issues with the
participation of the parties involved, the proceeding
was disposed of by the judgment and order dated
29.08.1997. It was held in a sense, on a scrutiny of the
files/records produced before the Court that those
reflected unexplained surge of favourtism in the matter
of distribution of the aforementioned public
contracts/distributorships/ dealerships. Vis-a-vis the
award in favour of the respondent, it was held thus:
“A retail on National Highway Phutahia
Chauraha, Teh. & Distt. Basti, UP, has been
allotted to Smt. Shashi Prabha Shukla on her
undated application on the ground that the
applicant is unemployed graduate with keen
interest in activities relating to rural
development and welfare of women and has no
6
regular source of livelihood. From the
application it appears that the applicant is
resident of district Sultanpur, UP. The
allotment in her favour has also been made in
a casual manner as is the case in respect of
allotments in other cases noticed above. We
were told by the learned counsel for the
applicant that the applicant is president of
Youth Congress. Be that as it may, we feel that
the allotment in favour of this applicant is no
better than other allotments noticed by us.
This petrol pump is also non operational.”
6. On the basis of the findings recorded, which were held
as well to be violative of the relevant guidelines of this
Court on this issue and found to be prompted by
extraneous considerations, the assailed allotments
were directed to be cancelled and the following was
ordered:
“(1) Those who have commissioned the Petrol
Pumps/LPG/SKO, Distributorship and are
running the same shall stop operating the
Petrol Pumps etc. as the case may be, with
effect from 1st December 1997. The
Government of India/concerned Oil
Corporation shall take over the Petrol Pump
premises or distributorship premises from
these persons on 1st December 1997. The
concerned Oil Corporation shall have the
market value of the land (if it belongs to the
allottee) and/or the construction thereon
determined in a fair and just manner forthwith.
7
(2) The right to run the Petrol Pumps and/or
Distributorship taken over by the
Government/Oil Corporation concerned shall be
disposed of by way of public auction to be held,
if feasible, before 1st December 1997, so that as
far as possible, the public may not suffer or the
suffering is for minimal period. The original
allottee may also participate in the auction. The
Petrol Pump Distributorship shall be allotted to
the highest bidder who shall run it on original
terms and conditions. He shall have all the
rights in respect of the land and construction
thereon as the original allottee had on the
date of auction, subject, however, to payments
as determined by the Government/Oil
Corporation/concerned authority being made by
the highest bidder. Out of the auction money
the value of the land and construction, if
payable to the original allottee and as
determined by the Oil Corporation shall be paid
to the original allottee and the remaining
amount remitted to Prime Minister's Relief
Fund. If the successful bidder is the original
allottee he shall pay the difference between the
auction money and the value of the land and
construction as determined by the Oil
Corporation.
(3) In case any of the allottee whose allotment
has been ordered to be cancelled and who was
running business from land owned by him and
he. is unwilling to sell part with the land on
which the Petrol Pump/Distributorship is
being run, he shall intimate this fact to
Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum within two
weeks. In such a case the right to open Petrol
Pump/Distributorship, as the case may be
within the close proximity of the existing
8
location, as may be determined by the Oil
Corporation concerned, depending upon the
facts and circumstances of each case and the
need of the public, shall alone be auctioned
with a stipulation that the highest bidder
would arrange for the land/superstructure for
running the Petrol Pump/Distributorship. In
such an eventually, all connections hitherto
with the distributor whose allotment has been
cancelled shall be transferred to the
establishment of the highest bidder.
(4) The Ministry of Petroleum is directed to file
compliance report by 15th December, 1997.”
7. The above quote would yield the following salient
features of the peremptory directives:
a) The concerned petrol pumps/LPG/SKO Distributors
would stop operation on and from 01.12.1997.
b) The Government of India/all concerned Corporations
would take over the petrol pump premises or
distributorship premises on 01.12.1997.
c) The concerned Oil Corporation would have the market
value of the land, if it belongs to the allottee and/or
the construction thereon determined in a fair and just
manner forthwith.
d) The right to run the petrol pumps and/or
9
distributorships taken over by the Government/all
Corporations concerned shall be disposed of by public
auction to be held, if feasible, before 01.12.1997 so
that as far as possible, the public may not suffer or the
suffering is for a minimum period.
e) The original allottee be permitted to participate in the
auction.
f) Out of the auction money, the value of the land and
construction, if payable to the original allottee and as
determined by the all Corporations shall be paid to the
original allottee and the remaining amount would be
remitted to the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund.
g) If the successful bidder is the original allottee, he shall
pay the difference between the auction money and the
value of the land and constructions as determined by
the Corporation.
h) In case, any allottee whose allotment has been ordered
to be cancelled and who had been running business
from the land owned by him is unwilling to sell/part
with the land on which the petrol
10
pump/distributorship is being run, he would intimate
this fact to the Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum within
two weeks. In such a case, the right to open petrol
pump/distributorship, as the case may be, within the
close proximity of the existing location, as may be
determined by the Oil Corporation concerned,
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each
case and the need of the public shall alone be
auctioned with a stipulation that the highest bidder
would arrange for the land/super structure for
running the petrol pump/distributorship.
i) All connections hitherto with a distributor, whose
allotment had been cancelled, would be transferred to
the establishment of the highest bidder.
j) The Ministry of Petroleum was required to file
compliance report by 15.12.1997.
8. The Corporation accordingly on 13.10.1997, issued a
notice to the respondent intimating her that the
dealership agreement between the parties at the close
of the business hours on 30.11.1997 would be treated
11
as terminated and that she would not be entitled to
operate the outlet on and from 01.12.1997. It was also
conveyed that w.e.f. 01.12.1997, neither she nor her
agents/employees and/or representatives would be
entitled to enter the retail outlet premises. It was
clarified that all these would be without prejudice to
any other claim the Corporation might have against
her under the terms of the dealership agreement and
in law.
9. Meanwhile, the respondent had on 23.09.1997
intimated the Ministry of Petroleum, Government of
India, New Delhi that she was not interested to sell or
part with the land on which the petrol pump
distributorship was underway. She also filed SLP (C)
No. 19872 of 1997 before this Court challenging the
judgment and order dated 29.08.1997, which was
disposed of on 20.10.1997 leaving her at liberty, as
prayed for, to seek a review before the High Court.
Incidentally, the review petition filed by her was
dismissed on 07.11.1997, whereupon she
12
unsuccessfully assailed the same in a fresh special
leave petition before this Court, which too was
dismissed on 28.11.1997. Thus, the judgment and
order dated 29.08.1997 of the Delhi High Court
attained finality and eventually the retail outlet was
closed and the facilities were taken over by the
Corporation w.e.f 01.12.1997.
10. The respondent No.1 however in response to the
notice dated 13.10.1997, did call upon the Corporation
to return the land in the same condition as it had been
given to it within 15 days, stating further that failing
which, it would be required to pay rent @ Rs.
50,000/- per month for use and occupation of the
premises and also damages from 23.02.1996.
11. The Corporation thereafter issued an
advertisement dated 05.10.1998 to auction the outlet
hitherto allotted to the respondent. Certain excerpts of
the said advertisement being of decisive significance
are extracted hereinbelow:
“Pursuant to the direction of the Hon’ble High
13
 Court, Delhi by its order dated 29th
 August,
1997 as clarified/modified by its further order
dated 11.09.1998 in Writ Petition No.4003 of
1995 between Centre for Public interest
litigation and Union of India, Government
Approved Auctioneers, will auction the right to
get appointed as dealer of a company
controlled outlet of M/s. Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. Situated at the place
mentioned in the schedule hereunder on the
terms and condition Ltd.
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x
6. Terms and conditions covering the terms on
which the property is being auctioned and the
conduct of the auction may be obtained upon
payment of Rs.500/- (Rs.Five Hundred only)
by demand draft or pay order drawn in favour
of M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (M.D.)
payable at Allahabad from the Divisional office
of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. at 5th floor,
Indira Bhawan, Civil Lines, Allahabad –
211001 (U.P.) on any working day between
10.30 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. The detailed terms
and conditions of auction are displayed on the
notice Board of the above Divisional office.
SCHEDULE
Last date for submission of applications to
participate in the bid 22nd October, 1998.
Date of displaying list of eligible bidders: 28th
October, 1998
Date of auction/time of auction will be display
on the notice board at our Divisional Office,
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (M.D.), 5th Floor
14
Indira Bhawan Civil Lines, Allahabad – 211001
(U.P.)
Venue of Property: NH Phutahia Chauraha,
Place: Basti (U.P.)”
12. As the advertisement would reveal, it did contain
a categorical reference of the judgment and order
dated 29.08.1997 of the Delhi High Court, pursuant to
which the same had been made to auction the right of
a dealer of the company controlled outlet, situated at
the place mentioned at NH Phutahia Chauraha, Place:
Basti (U.P.). Subsequent thereto, by a corrigendum
dated 13.10.1998, the word “property” appearing in
Clause 6 was in essence substituted by the word
“dealership”, as would be evident from the extract of
the said corrigendum:
“In item 6 of the said notice for auction for
retail outlet of M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.
situated at NH Phutahia Chauraha, Basti
(U.P.) may be read as follows:
The word PROPERTY shall also be substituted
by the word DEALERSHIP. It is further
clarified that in case of company controlled
retail outlets only license to operate the
dealership will be substituted with the word
15
DEALERSHIP in the terms and conditions and
its Annexures being sold from our office at
Allahabad.
Other terms and conditions shall be applicable
as per earlier advertisement.”
13. Mentionably, no other record has been laid before
this Court to further elaborate on the terms and
conditions of the proposed auction.
14. To reiterate, the High Court of Delhi in its
rendition dated 29.08.1997, vis-à-vis the cases where
the allottee, whose allotment had been cancelled, was
unwilling to sell/part with a land on which the petrol
pump/distributorship was being operated, had
directed the Corporation to auction the right to open
petrol pump/distributorship within the close proximity
of the existing location, as may be determined by it,
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each
case and the need of the public with the stipulation
that the highest bidder would arrange for the
land/super structure for running the petrol
16
pump/distributorship. To put it differently, in the
eventuality where the allottee was not willing to
sell/part with the land on which the petrol
pump/distributorship was operational, the
Corporation was obligated in law to ensure the
following steps in re-auctioning the right to open petrol
pump/distributorship:
(i) Determine a location in the close proximity of the
existing location depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and the need of the
public.
(ii) Such location, as determined on the above factors,
alone to be auctioned with the stipulation that the
highest bidder would arrange for the land/super
structures for running the petrol
pump/distributorship.
15. The unambiguous precept in the above premise,
as contained in the judgment and order dated
29.08.1997 thus did cast a duty on the Corporation as
a condition precedent for the re-auction, to determine
17
a location within the close proximity of the existing
location, contingent on the facts and circumstances of
each case and the need of the public. In clear terms
therefore the Corporation was required to undertake
this conscious exercise, it being clear that the location
for the re-auction has to be essentially different from,
though in proximity of the existing location.
16. The advertisement dated 05.10.1998 along with
the corrigendum however do not disclose the exact
location for which the re-auction was notified, the
venue of the site being “NH Bhutahia Chauraha, Place:
Basti (U.P.)” and wholly identical to the one of the
existing location of the respondent. No attempt has
been made to draw our attention to any initiative
taken by the Corporation in compliance of the
directives contained in the judgment and order dated
29.08.1997 of the Delhi High Court to identify the
location as required for the fresh auction.
17. The respondent however launched her assailment
against the advertisement dated 05.10.1998 and the
18
corrigendum dated 13.10.1998, this time before the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad pleading the
same to be violative of the directions contained in the
judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 and also in
violation of her fundamental rights under Articles 14,
19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in the first instance by its
order dated 29.10.1998 stayed the operation of the
auction notices and subsequent thereto, by its order
dated 17.12.1998 directed the Corporation to permit
the respondent to run the dealership of petroleum in
the petrol pump of Phutahia Chauraha, District Basti
until the auction was held and finalized. Eventually,
by the impugned judgment and order, noticing that
the proposed auction had not taken place and that
consequently the respondent had been permitted to
run the retail outlet since 1998, directed the
Corporation, in view of its new policy dated
12.02.2004, to award fresh dealership to the
respondent thereunder and further restrained it from
19
interfering with her possession of the petrol pump
premises in question.
18. As the impugned judgment would demonstrate,
the High Court, while traversing the relevant facts,
took note of the pleaded stand of the Corporation
before it that the lease executed by the respondent
vis-à-vis the land in question did subsist, cancellation
of the dealership notwithstanding, and therefore she
was not entitled for the possession thereof and that it
had the right to induct some other dealer through the
proposed auction to operate the agency from the land
of the respondent. The High Court, while readily
dismissing this plea of the Corporation on the
touchstone of Article 300A of the Constitution of India
held that as the dealership was cancelled by the
intervention of the Delhi High Court, it was not open
for the Corporation to assert that the lease deed
executed by her in its favour did subsist thereafter in
the eye of law. Having propounded thus, the High
Court observed that because of the non-removal of the
20
fixtures, machineries and apparatus etc. from the land
by the Corporation and because of its unlawful stand
precipitating the litigation before it, the respondent
was sought to be denied the benefit of the use of land
in question for which she was permitted, by the
interim order dated 17.12.1998, to continue with the
dealership till the auction was held and finalized.
Taking note of the fact that no auction had taken place
and that the respondent had been permitted to run
the retail outlet since 1998, the High Court provided
that fresh dealership be awarded to her under the new
Policy dated 12.02.2004 of the Corporation, which
contemplated such allotments to land owners and
their nominees from within the family, directly as well
as through advertisement for locations outside
government approved marketing plans. The High
Court did also record that the entitlement of the
respondent was also cognizable in view of the fact that
she had been running the present retail outlet without
any complaint for a long period. To reiterate, the High
21
Court thus directed the Corporation to award fresh
dealership under the said policy by converting the
earlier dealership thereunder within one month and
also further restrained it from interfering with the
respondent's possession over the petrol pump
premises in question. This determination is the subject
matter of scrutiny in the present appeal.
19. Mr. Rao has insistently argued that the
dealership of the respondent having been cancelled by
the ruling dated 29.08.1997 of the Delhi High Court
which had attained finality, no direction for fresh
dealership to her under any circumstances could have
been made and thus the same being patently
erroneous, the impugned judgment and order is liable
to be set aside. According to the learned counsel, the
advertisement dated 05.10.1998 and the corrigendum
dated 13.10.1998, if cumulatively read, are in
meticulous compliance of the directions to that effect
as contained in the judgment and order dated
29.08.1997 and thus the Corporation ought to have
22
been permitted to undertake the process to its logical
end. The learned counsel for the Corporation when
confronted with the omissions in the advertisement
and absence of materials on record to authenticate
that the exercise required to be undertaken by the
Corporation for identifying a location in the proximity
of the existing location was pursued, had no
convincing explanation therefor.
20. Controverting the above, the learned counsel for
the respondent emphatically urged that in the
attendant facts and circumstances, though the
judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 of the Delhi
High Court had attained finality, the operative
direction to the Corporation to convert the existing
dealership into a new dealership under the policy
dated 12.02.2004 is unassailable and therefore no
interference in this appeal is called for. While imputing
that, the Corporation though required in cases of
dealership under category ‘A’, to provide the whole
infrastructure including the land, in the case of the
23
respondent, she was asked to make the arrangement
therefor on her own investments, the learned counsel
maintained that the advertisement dated 05.10.1998,
even if read with the corrigendum dated 13.10.1998
was apparently not in compliance of the directions of
the Delhi High Court and, therefore could not have
been given effect to. According to him, the auction had
thus been rightly stayed by the Allahabad High Court
whereafter the respondent was permitted to operate
the dealership and eventually taking note of the
prevalent policy dated 12.02.2004, the Corporation
had been rightly directed to convert her existing
dealership to a fresh dealership thereunder. It was
urged as well that the plea of the
appellant/Corporation that cancellation of the
dealership notwithstanding, the lease did subsist and
that it was entitled in law to hold a fresh auction for
the land of the respondent, was wholly untenable and
violative of the mandate of Article 300A, as held by the
Allahabad High Court.
24
21. The recorded facts and the rival assertions have
received our due consideration. The genesis of the
instant appraisal is indeed traceable to the allotment
of the retail outlet dealership to the respondent on
compassionate ground by the Departmental Minister
for Petroleum from his Special Discretionary Quota. As
hereinbefore stated, on the recommendation of the
said authority, the Corporation awarded the
dealership. This award along with identically placed
allotments, on judicial scrutiny, were directed to be
cancelled in the public interest litigation initiated by
the Center for Public Interest Litigation before the High
Court of Delhi which, by its judgment and order dated
29.08.1997, on the ground that those were vitiated
not by mere aberrations or arbitrariness, but by
uncontrolled display of favouritism. The rendition by
the High Court of Delhi in the facts and circumstances
of the cases before it, was assuredly to secure
administrative probity, transparency, objectivity and
fairness in the matter of distribution of State largesse
25
and public contracts. This decision, to reiterate, has
become final and binding on the parties. As noted
hereinabove, the Corporation in flagrant defiance and
disregard to the judicial mandate of a Constitutional
Court did not only issue the advertisement dated
05.10.1998 with the corrigendum on 13.10.1998
without either determining or specifying the exact
location for the site of dealership in the proximity of
the earlier site of the respondent, instead did take up
an incomprehensible plea that the cancellation of the
dealership notwithstanding, the lease of the land of the
respondent with it did subsist and that it was entitled
in law to induct the new dealer through the auction
process initiated, to the same location. The underlying
objective in issuing the direction to determine and
specify a location in the proximity of the existing site
was with the avowed purpose of avoiding confrontation
and possible litigation and also to ensure smooth and
uninhibited supply of petrol and HSD from the new
outlet at the fresh venue.
26
22. In the facts of the present case, we subscribe to
the view of the High Court of Allahabad that with the
termination of the dealership, the lease between the
parties also stood extinguished and therefore, the
respondent being the owner of the land and she
having expressed her disinclination to sell or part with
it, the Corporation by no means could have
contemplated to award the new dealership to a third
party on her land. On this clear premise, the failure of
the Corporation to act in terms of the directions
containing in the judgment and order of the Delhi High
Court and in contending that the land of the
respondent was available for commissioning the new
dealership is patently wrong besides being
contumaciously irreverent and abusively
non-compliant thereof. The approach and attitude of
the Corporation in making the advertisement dated
05.10.1998 with the corrigendum dated 13.10.1998
and in taking the apparently untenable stand that
notwithstanding the cancellation of the dealership of
27
the respondent, her land was available for the new
process, is thus visibly militative of the rule of law
besides being destructive of the salutary objective with
which the High Court of Delhi had directed
cancellation of the dealership/distributorship of the
respondent along with others, being vitiated by the
vice of nepotism and favourtism. This we say, as
having regard to the progression of events, we are left
with the impression, in view of the persistent
omissions and commissions of the Corporation, that it
is not unlikely that all these might have been
strategised to eventually benefit the respondent in the
long run. The pleaded stand of the Corporation that
despite the cancellation of the dealership of the
respondent, her land was still available, flies in the
face of the determination to the contrary as recorded
in the judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 and only
reflects the pre-determined mind of its functionaries
for reasons unknown, though inferable. It is really
incomprehensible as to how in spite of such explicit
28
and clear observations and directions of the High
Court of Delhi in its judgment and order dated
29.08.1997, either such a stand could have been
taken or the fresh auction process could have been
initiated without undertaking the initiatives required
for specifying/identifying the new location. To
reiterate, no material has been placed before us to
demonstrate to the contrary. This is more so, as in the
advertisement dated 05.10.1998, there is a reference
of the judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 of the
Delhi High Court. A bare perusal of this document
would show the venue to be “NH Phutahia Chauraha
place: Basti (UP)”, the same as of the dealership of the
respondent.
23. It is no longer res integra that a public authority,
be a person or an administrative body is entrusted
with the role to perform for the benefit of the public
and not for private profit and when a prima facie case
of misuse of power is made out, it is open to a court to
draw the inference that unauthorized purposes have
29
been pursued, if the competent authority fails to
adduce any ground supporting the validity of its
conduct.
24. The following extract from the Halsbury’s Laws of
England, Fourth Edition, Vol.1(1) Administrative Law
provide the foundation of these observations:
“A public authority may be described as a
person or administrative body entrusted
with functions to perform for the benefit of the
public and not for private profit. Not every
such person or body is expressly defined as
public authority or body, and the meaning of a
public authority or body may vary according to
the statutory context.”
25. In re, the duties, responsibilities and obligations
of a public authority in a system based on rule of law,
unfettered discretion or power is an anathema as every
public authority is a trustee of public faith and is
under a duty to hold public property in trust for the
benefit of the laity and not for any individual in
particular. The following excerpts from the Foulkes
30
Administrative Law, 7th Edition at page 174
provide the elaborate insight:
“A true trust exists when one person, the
trustee, is under a duty to hold the trust
property vested in him for the benefit of other
persons, the beneficiaries. The term ‘trust’ is,
however, used in a much wider sense. We may
speak of government being ‘entrusted’ with
power, of Parliament as the trustee which the
nation has authorized to act on its behalf.
The purpose of the use of the concept in such
contexts is of course to emphasize that the
powers and duties of such bodies should be
exercised not for the advancement of their own
interest, but that of the others, to underline
their obligation to others.
26. The distinction between the power of a public
authority and a private person has since been
succinctly brought about in the following quote from
the celebrated work “Administrative Law”, Tenth
Edition by H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth:
“The common theme of all the authorities so
far mentioned is that the notion of absolute or
unfettered discretion is rejected. Statutory
power conferred for public purposes is
conferred as it were upon trust not absolutely
– that is to say, it can validly be used only in
the right and proper way which parliament
when conferring if is presumed to have
31
intended. In a system based on rule of law,
unfettered governmental discretion is
contradictory in terms …....………………
The powers of public authorities are therefore
essentially different from those of private
persons. A man making his will may, subject
to any rights of his dependants, dispose of his
property just as he may wish. He may act out
of malice or a spirit of revenge, but in law this
does not affect his exercise of his power. In the
same way a private person has an absolute
power to allow whom he likes to use his land,
to release a debtor, or, where the law permits,
to evict a tenant, regardless of his motives.
This is unfettered discretion. But a public
authority may do none of these things unless it
acts reasonably and in good faith and upon
lawful and relevant grounds of public interest.”
27. In Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress vs.
State of M.P.
1
, this Court was seised as well with the
nature of the norms to be adhered to for allotment of
land, grant of quotas, permits, licenses etc. by way of
distribution thereof as State largesse. The following
observations provide the guiding comprehension:
65. What needs to be emphasised is that the
State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities
cannot give largesse to any person according
to the sweet will and whims of the political
entities and/or officers of the State. Every
1
(2011) 5 SCC 29
32
action/decision of the State and/or its
agencies/instrumentalities to give largesse or
confer benefit must be founded on a sound,
transparent, discernible and well-defined
policy, which shall be made known to the
public by publication in the Official Gazette
and other recognised modes of publicity and
such policy must be implemented/executed by
adopting a non-discriminatory and
non-arbitrary method irrespective of the class
or category of persons proposed to be
benefited by the policy. The distribution of
largesse like allotment of land, grant of quota,
permit licence, etc. by the State and its
agencies/instrumentalities should always be
done in a fair and equitable manner and the
element of favouritism or nepotism shall not
influence the exercise of discretion, if any,
conferred upon the particular functionary or
officer of the State.
66. We may add that there cannot be any
policy, much less, a rational policy of allotting
land on the basis of applications made by
individuals, bodies, organisations or
institutions dehors an invitation or
advertisement by the State or its
agency/instrumentality. By entertaining
applications made by individuals,
organisations or institutions for allotment of
land or for grant of any other type of largesse
the State cannot exclude other eligible persons
from lodging competing claim. Any allotment
of land or grant of other form of largesse by
the State or its agencies/instrumentalities by
treating the exercise as a private venture is
liable to be treated as arbitrary, discriminatory
and an act of favouritism and/or nepotism
violating the soul of the equality clause
33
embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution.
28. In his work Administrative Law (6th Edn.)
Prof. H.W.R. Wade highlighted the distinction
between powers of public authorities and those of
private persons in the following words:
“The common theme of all the authorities so
far mentioned is that the notion of absolute or
unfettered discretion is rejected. Statutory
power conferred for public purposes is
conferred as it were upon trust, no absolutely
—that is to say, it can validly be used only in
the right and proper way which Parliament
when conferring it is presumed to have
intended. Although the Crown's lawyers have
argued in numerous cases that unrestricted
permissive language confers unfettered
discretion, the truth is that, in a system based
on the rule of law, unfettered governmental
discretion is a contradiction in terms.”
29. While rejecting the theory of absolute discretion,
Lord Reid observed in Padfield v. Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food2
:
“… Parliament must have conferred the
discretion with the intention that it should be
used to promote the policy and objects of the
Act; the policy and objects of the Act must be
2
 [1968] AC 997
34
determined by construing the Act as a whole
and construction is always a matter of law for
the court. In a matter of this kind it is not
possible to draw a hard and fast line, but if
the Minister, by reason of his having
misconstrued the Act or for any other reason,
so uses his discretion as to thwart or run
counter to the policy and objects of the Act,
then our law would be very defective if persons
aggrieved were not entitled to the protection of
the court.”
30. The role of the Government as provider of services
and benefits to the people was noticed in Ramana
Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority
of India3
 in the following words:
“11. Today the Government in a welfare State,
is the regulator and dispenser of special
services and provider of a large number of
benefits, including jobs, contracts, licences,
quotas, mineral rights, etc. The Government
pours forth wealth, money, benefits, services,
contracts, quotas and licences. The valuables
dispensed by Government take many forms,
but they all share one characteristic. They are
steadily taking the place of traditional forms of
wealth. These valuables which derive from
relationships to Government are of many kinds.
They comprise social security benefits, cash
grants for political sufferers and the whole
scheme of State and local welfare. Then again,
thousands of people are employed in the State
3
 (1979) 3 SCC 489
35
and the Central Governments and local
authorities. Licences are required before one
can engage in many kinds of businesses or
work. The power of giving licences means
power to withhold them and this gives control
to the Government or to the agents of
Government on the lives of many people. Many
individuals and many more businesses enjoy
largesse in the form of government contracts.
These contracts often resemble subsidies. It is
virtually impossible to lose money on them and
many enterprises are set up primarily to do
business with the Government. The
Government owns and controls hundreds of
acres of public land valuable for mining and
other purposes. These resources are available
for utilisation by private corporations and
individuals by way of lease or licence. All these
mean growth in the Government largesse and
with the increasing magnitude and range of
governmental functions as we move closer to a
welfare State, more and more of our wealth
consists of these new forms. Some of these
forms of wealth may be in the nature of legal
rights but the large majority of them are in the
nature of privileges.”
31. In the same vein, in Natural Resources
Allocation, In Re4
, this Court summed up the long
line of judicial enunciations on this theme thus:
“107. From a scrutiny of the trend of decisions it
is clearly perceivable that the action of the State,
whether it relates to distribution of largesse,
grant of contracts or allotment of land, is to be
4 Special Reference No.1 of 2012
36
tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the
Constitution. A law may not be struck down for
being arbitrary without the pointing out of a
constitutional infirmity as McDowell case has
said. Therefore, a State action has to be tested
for constitutional infirmities qua Article 14 of the
Constitution. The action has to be fair,
reasonable, non-discriminatory, transparent,
non-capricious, unbiased, without favouritism
or nepotism, in pursuit of promotion of healthy
competition and equitable treatment. It should
conform to the norms which are rational,
informed with reasons and guided by public
interest, etc. All these principles are inherent in
the fundamental conception of Article 14. This is
the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.”
32. This Court in Center for Public Interest
Litigation and others Vs. Union of India and
others5
, while examining the challenge to the
allocation of 2G Telecom Services, reflected on the
considerations that should inform the process thereof
and observed thus:
95. This Court has repeatedly held that
wherever a contract is to be awarded or a
licence is to be given, the public authority must
adopt a transparent and fair method for making
selections so that all eligible persons get a fair
opportunity of competition. To put it differently,
5
(2012) 3 SCC 2
37
the State and its agencies/instrumentalities
must always adopt a rational method for
disposal of public property and no attempt
should be made to scuttle the claim of worthy
applicants. When it comes to alienation of
scarce natural resources like spectrum, etc. it is
the burden of the State to ensure that a
non-discriminatory method is adopted for
distribution and alienation, which would
necessarily result in protection of
national/public interest.
33. Jurisprudentially thus, as could be gleaned from
the above legal enunciations, a public authority in its
dealings has to be fair, objective, non-arbitrary,
transparent and non-discriminatory. The discretion
vested in such an authority, which is a concomitant of
its power is coupled with duty and can never be
unregulated or unbridled. Any decision or action
contrary to these functional precepts would be at the
pain of invalidation thereof. The State and its
instrumentalities, be it a public authority, either as an
individual or a collective has to essentially abide by
this inalienable and non-negotiable prescriptions and
cannot act in breach of the trust reposed by the polity
and on extraneous considerations. In exercise of
38
uncontrolled discretion and power, it cannot resort to
any act to fritter, squander and emasculate any public
property, be it by way of State largesse or contracts
etc. Such outrages would clearly be unconstitutional
and extinctive of the rule of law which forms the
bedrock of the constitutional order.
34. Adverting to the facts of the case, to recapitulate,
the dealership of the respondent had been cancelled
being vitiated by favourtism due to exercise of fanciful
discretion of the Departmental Minister, which was
neither approved nor condoned. Nevertheless, the
Corporation visibly did not act in terms of the
judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi in
initiating the fresh process for auction. This led to the
challenge to the faulty advertisement dated
05.10.1998 and the corrigendum dated 13.10.1998,
the operation whereof to start with was stayed and
thereafter the respondent was permitted to continue
with the dealership and eventually she was directed to
be awarded a fresh dealership by converting the
39
existing dealership under its policy dated 12.02.2004.
The dealership of the respondent having been
cancelled w.e.f. 01.12.1997, though the operation of
the auction notice and the corrigendum thereto had
been stayed and she had been allowed to run the
outlet, we fail to comprehend as to how all these could
be construed to signify that her dealership did subsist
from the date of the impugned judgment and order.
There was thus no scope for conversion of the existing
dealership to a new dealership as ordered. In addition
thereto, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the
direction to award the new dealership under the
prevalent policy dated 12.02.2004, having regard to
the backdrop of adjudication undertaken by the Delhi
High Court would amount to perpetuation of the
undue benefit, earlier bestowed on her by a method
held to be illegal, dubious, arbitrary and transgressive
of public interest. In other words, the award of new
dealership to the respondent in the prevailing facts
and circumstances, in our estimate, would amount to
40
allowing the respondent to enjoy the premium of the
illegality and arbitrariness resorted to in granting her
the earlier dealership and reward her as a beneficiary
of unlawful administrative patronage. In our view, the
award of new dealership to the respondent would
wholly undermine the purpose of cancelling her earlier
dealership and annihilate the very objective of
securing transparency, fairness and non-arbitrariness
in the matter of distribution of public contract. In
taking the steps for initiating a fresh process of
auction, to state the least, the defaults and
de-relictions of the Corporation and its functionaries
are writ large and deserve to be strongly deprecated.
The omissions and commissions do have the potential
of suggesting pre-determined perceptions and
motivations in aid of the respondent, resulting in such
disagreeable culmination in her favour. The time lag,
according to us, per se cannot purge the vitiation of
the award of dealership originally granted to the
respondent, to entitle her to the relief granted by the
41
impugned judgment and order, by way of a boon for
the inexplicable faults and remiss in duty of the
functionaries of the Corporation. In supervening public
interest and to uphold the rule of law as well as
imperative of administrative fairness, transparency
and objectivity, we are thus not inclined to sustain the
impugned judgment and order. It is, therefore set
aside so far as it holds that the respondent is entitled
to a new dealership at her location under the Policy
dated 12.02.2014. We hereby reiterate that the
dealership of the respondent at her present location
stands cancelled w.e.f. 01.12.1997. The Corporation
would now take immediate steps to this effect as
permissible in law without fail. The Corporation would
also initiate a fresh process for award of new
distributorship/dealership in the area and at a
location to be determined by it, if it considers it
necessary in public interest strictly in conformity with
law and the constitutionally recognized norms of
transparency, objectivity and fairness.
42
35. In the singular facts and circumstances, we are
greatly anguished and appalled by the manner in
which the Corporation and its functionaries have acted
in the face of the judgment and order dated
29.08.1997 of the Delhi High Court. We have no
hesitation to record that we are left with the
impression that the failures on their part may not be
wholly bona fide. In this view of the matter, we direct
the Corporation to cause an in-house inquiry to be
made to fix the liability of the errant officials on the
issue and decide appropriate action(s) against them in
accordance with law within a period of two months
herefrom. The Corporation after completing this
exercise would submit a report before this Court for
further orders, if necessary. We make it clear that any
breach or non-compliance of this direction would be
per se construed to be a contempt of this Court with
penal consequences as contemplated in law. The
appeal is allowed. No costs.
43
…........................................J.
[N.V. RAMANA]
…........................................J.
[AMITAVA ROY]
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 15, 2017.

A demonstration of tractors was being held at 11.30 A.M. by Sonalika tractors. The appellant, who is an agriculturist, claimed that when he approached the tractor, the driver was unable to bring it to a halt as a result of which it turned turtle and collided with the appellant resulting in his sustaining grievous injuries. The lower portion of his body has been paralyzed. Dr Jayaprakash, PW 2, deposed in evidence that the disability of the appellant is one hundred per cent since both his lower limbs have been paralyzed resulting in a loss of bladder and bowel control.The High Court has proceeded to reverse the finding of the Tribunal purely on the basis that the FIR which was lodged on the complaint of the appellant contained a version which was at variance with the evidence which emerged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal had noted the admission of RW1 in the course of his cross-examination that the insurer had maintained a separate file in respect of the accident. The insurer did not produce either the file or the report of the investigator in the case. Moreover, no independent witness was produced by the insurer to displace the version of the incident as deposed to by the appellant and by PW 3. The cogent analysis of the evidence by the Tribunal has been displaced by the High Court without considering material aspects of the evidence on the record. The High Court was not justified in holding that the Tribunal had 7 arrived at a finding of fact without applying its mind to the documents produced by the claimant or that it had casually entered a finding of fact. On the contrary, we find that the reversal of the finding by the High Court was without considering the material aspects of the evidence which justifiably weighed with the Tribunal. We are, therefore, of the view that the finding of the High Court is manifestly erroneous and that the finding of fact by the Tribunal was correct.The appellant suffers from traumatic paraplegia and was hospitalized for 42 days. The appellant was 28 years of age when the accident took place on 24 September 2005. In our view, the monthly income of the appellant, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case should be taken at Rs.4,000/-. After allowing for future prospects and making a deduction for present expenses, the compensation payable to the appellant shall stand enhanced by an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- from Rs.5,75,000/- to Rs.7,75,000/-. The amount for future medical expenses which has been fixed at Rs.30,000/- should be enhanced to Rs.1,20,000/- having regard to the serious nature of the disability. In other words, the compensation of Rs.8,66,000/- awarded by the Tribunal shall be 8 enhanced by an additional amount of Rs.2,70,000/-. The appellant shall be entitled to interest @7% p.a. from the date of the claim petition until realization.

1
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NOS 022911-022912 OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP (C ) Nos 6891-6892 of 2017)
HALAPPA ..... APPELLANT
Versus
MALIK SAB ..... RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 The High Court of Karnataka by a judgment dated 12 July 2011 reversed a
decision of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarding compensation to the
appellant in the amount of Rs.8,66,000/- with interest @ 7% per annum. While
reversing the award of compensation, the High Court has come to the conclusion
that the appellant was sitting on the mudguard of a tractor and this was not a risk
2
insured by the insurer. Upon this finding, the High Court allowed the appeal of
the insurer and rejected the appeal filed by the appellant for enhancement of
compensation.
2 The accident took place on 24 September 2005. The appellant was 28
years old at the time of the accident. The case of the appellant is that on 24
September 2005 he was visiting Sirigere to attend an event. A demonstration of
tractors was being held at 11.30 A.M. by Sonalika tractors. The appellant, who is
an agriculturist, claimed that when he approached the tractor, the driver was
unable to bring it to a halt as a result of which it turned turtle and collided with the
appellant resulting in his sustaining grievous injuries. A first information report
was registered at the Bharamasagara Police Station under Case Crime 147 of
2005 and a charge-sheet was filed against the driver for offences punishable
under Sections 279 and 338 of the Penal Code.
3 The appellant claimed compensation in the amount of Rs.25,00,000/-. The
appellant was examined as PW 1 in support of his claim. PW 2 Dr Jayaprakash
was examined to prove the nature of the injuries sustained by the appellant. The
evidence indicated that immediately after the accident the appellant was taken
for treatment to the community health centre, Sirigere where he was
administered first aid. He was thereafter shifted to Bapuji Hospital, Davangere
from where he was referred to the M S Ramayya Hospital, Bangalore for further
3
treatment. The medical records showed that the appellant had suffered
paraplegia with a compression fracture. The appellant has been permanently
immobilized, is wheel-chair bound, and requires artificial support for bladder and
bowel evacuation. The lower portion of his body has been paralyzed. Dr
Jayaprakash, PW 2, deposed in evidence that the disability of the appellant is
one hundred per cent since both his lower limbs have been paralyzed resulting in
a loss of bladder and bowel control.
4 Before the Tribunal the defence of the insurer was that the appellant was
riding on the mudguard of the tractor, this having been stated in the FIR.
According to the insurer, the policy of insurance did not cover the risk of anyone
other than the driver of the tractor. The Tribunal rejected the defence of the
insurer and relied upon the testimony of the appellant which was found to have
been corroborated by the evidence of PW 3, an eye-witness to the incident. On
the aspect of compensation the Tribunal noted that the appellant belongs to a
family of agriculturists which has a land holding of 5 acres and 25 gunthas. The
appellant was married. The Tribunal did not accept the plea of the appellant that
his monthly income was Rs.10,000/-, in the absence of cogent proof. The
Tribunal assumed the income of the appellant to be Rs.3,000/- per month. The
age of the appellant at the time of the accident being 28 years, the Tribunal
applied a multiplier of 16 and computed the compensation on account of the loss
of future earning capacity at Rs.5,76,000/-. An additional amount of Rs.50,000/-
4
was awarded towards loss of amenities and Rs.30,000/- for future medical
expenses. An amount of Rs.2,10,000/- was awarded towards medical expenses,
pain and suffering. Consequently, a total compensation of Rs.8,66,000/- was
awarded together with interest at 7% per annum from the date of the claim
petition until realization. The driver, owner and insurer have been held to be
jointly and severally liable.
5 The appellant filed an appeal for enhancement of compensation. The
insurer had also filed an appeal questioning its liability. The High Court has
allowed the appeal of the insurer and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant.
The High Court held that in the first information report which was registered on
the date of the accident on the basis of the statement of the appellant, it was
stated that the appellant was sitting on the mud-guard next to the driver of the
tractor. Subsequently on 30 September 2005 another statement was recorded
by the police in which the appellant stated that the accident had taken place as a
result of the rash and negligent act of the tractor driver, due to which the tractor
had turned turtle and fallen over the appellant. In the view of the High Court, the
police had attempted to protect the liability of the owner and had recorded a
further statement to support the plea that the appellant was a third party and that
the tractor had fallen upon him. The High Court has also doubted as to how the
police could have recorded the statement of the appellant on 30 September 2005
when he was shifted to M S Ramayya Hospital in Bangalore.
5
6 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the
High Court has manifestly erred in reversing the considered judgment of the
Tribunal. The appellant urged that the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal on
the basis of substantive evidence could not have been reversed purely on the
basis of the FIR. Moreover, it was urged that the insurer had not produced any
ocular evidence to displace what was stated by the appellant in the course of his
deposition and which was supported by PW 3 who had witnesses the accident.
7 On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the insurer
has supported the judgment of the High Court and urged that the finding that the
appellant was injured while riding on the mud-guard of the tractor is correct.
Consequently it was urged that the insurance policy which was issued to the
owner did not cover the risk arising from a third party riding on the tractor and
there was hence a breach of the insurance policy.
8 The judgment of the Tribunal indicates that the defence of the insurer
based on the first information report, the complaint Exh.P1 and the
supplementary statement of the appellant at Exh.P2 was duly evaluated. The
Tribunal, however, observed thus:
“…the respondent no.3 and RW.1 submitted that the petitioner has
invited the alleged unfortunate accident but except the FIR and complaint
Ex.P.1 the respondent no.3 has not produced any documents to show
that at the time of accident the petitioner was travelling as a passenger
by sitting on the engine of the tractor in question. During the course of
cross-examination RW.1 has admitted that the respondent no.3 has
6
maintained a separate file in respect of accident in question and he has
also admitted that the respondent no.3 has not produced the
investigator’s report of this case. Admittedly the respondent no.3 has not
examined any independent eye witness to the accident to prove that on
the relevant date and time of the accident the petitioner was travelling as
a passenger by sitting on the engine of the tractor. If really the petitioner
has sustained grievous injuries by falling down from the engine of said
tractor the respondent no.3 insurer could have produced the separate file
maintained by it in respect of the accident in question and it could have
also produced investigator’s report in respect of the said accident but
admittedly the respondent no.3 has not produced the said separate file
and investigator’s report in respect of the accident in question for the
reasons best known to it. On the other hand as already stated above it is
clear from the statement of petitioner on oath and eye witness and from
the supplementary statement of petitioner at Ex.P.2 and police statement
of witnesses at Ex.P.3 and Charge Sheet at Ex.P.6 it is clear that due to
rash and negligent driving of said tractor by respondent no.1 the said
tractor turtle down and fell over the petitioner who was about to board the
tractor and as a result of which the petitioner has sustained grievous
injuries. Moreover as already stated above the Investigating Officer
concern after detail investigation has filed the Charge Sheet against the
respondent no.1 for the offences punishable u/s.279 and 338 IPC…”
The High Court has proceeded to reverse the finding of the Tribunal purely on the
basis that the FIR which was lodged on the complaint of the appellant contained
a version which was at variance with the evidence which emerged before the
Tribunal. The Tribunal had noted the admission of RW1 in the course of his
cross-examination that the insurer had maintained a separate file in respect of
the accident. The insurer did not produce either the file or the report of the
investigator in the case. Moreover, no independent witness was produced by the
insurer to displace the version of the incident as deposed to by the appellant and
by PW 3. The cogent analysis of the evidence by the Tribunal has been
displaced by the High Court without considering material aspects of the evidence
on the record. The High Court was not justified in holding that the Tribunal had
7
arrived at a finding of fact without applying its mind to the documents produced
by the claimant or that it had casually entered a finding of fact. On the contrary,
we find that the reversal of the finding by the High Court was without considering
the material aspects of the evidence which justifiably weighed with the Tribunal.
We are, therefore, of the view that the finding of the High Court is manifestly
erroneous and that the finding of fact by the Tribunal was correct.
9 That leaves the Court to determine the quantum of compensation. The
medical evidence on the record shows that the lower limbs of the appellant have
been paralyzed resulting in a loss of bladder and bowel control. The medical
evidence establishes that the disability of the appellant is one hundred per cent.
The medical records have been scrutinized by the Tribunal. The appellant
suffers from traumatic paraplegia and was hospitalized for 42 days. The
appellant was 28 years of age when the accident took place on 24 September
2005. In our view, the monthly income of the appellant, having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case should be taken at Rs.4,000/-. After
allowing for future prospects and making a deduction for present expenses, the
compensation payable to the appellant shall stand enhanced by an amount of
Rs.1,50,000/- from Rs.5,75,000/- to Rs.7,75,000/-. The amount for future
medical expenses which has been fixed at Rs.30,000/- should be enhanced to
Rs.1,20,000/- having regard to the serious nature of the disability. In other
words, the compensation of Rs.8,66,000/- awarded by the Tribunal shall be
8
enhanced by an additional amount of Rs.2,70,000/-. The appellant shall be
entitled to interest @7% p.a. from the date of the claim petition until realization.
The insurer shall deposit the compensation or, as the case may be, the balance
payable in terms of this judgment within a period of 12 weeks from today before
the Tribunal which shall be released to the appellant upon due verification.
10 The appeals are allowed in the above terms with no order as to costs.
 ….....................................CJI
[DIPAK MISRA]

 …......................................J
[A.M. KHANWILKAR]
 …......................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]

New Delhi
December 15, 2017

No further notice before imposition of a penalty in department equiry. = In this case, the Respondent had sufficient opportunity to respond to the Report of the Inquiring Authority and to the findings of the Disciplinary Authority disagreeing with the Inquiring Authority regarding Charge Nos. 6 and 8. He is not entitled to any further notice before imposition of a penalty. Apart from the requirement of a second show-cause notice before imposition of penalty no other point was raised in this Appeal.

Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL No .22970 of2017
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.25040 of 2012)
STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS. .... Appellants
 Versus
B.R. SAINI …. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
Leave granted.
2. The Respondent who was working in the
Appellant-Bank was removed from service. The order of
removal was set aside by a Single Judge of the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh. The judgment of the
learned Single Judge was affirmed by a Division Bench. The
correctness of the judgment of the High Court is challenged
in this Appeal.
3. Articles of Charges framed against the Respondent
when he was working as an Officer MMGS-II are as follows:
“ CHARGE No. 1
You availed Demand Loans fraudulently under
fake signatures of the depositors/ owners of the
STDRs.
1 | P a g e
 CHARGE No. 2
You closed certain Demand Loans granted at the
branch before the date of inspection and
reopened the same on the same day with a view
to avoid inspection of securities charged to
Demand Loans.
 CHARGE No. 3
Certain fraudulent Demand Loans availed by you,
were liquidated out of proceeds of cheques
purchased by you, drawn on your personal
Savings Bank A/c No. 01190077112 maintained at
Sector 22, Chandigarh branch through the
account of Shri Sant Ram.
 CHARGE No. 4
You availed ACC Loans fraudulently under take
signatures and without supporting revenue
records to justify quantum of loan.
 CHARGE No. 5
Certain fraudulent ACC Loan availed by you, were
liquidated out of proceeds of cheques purchased
by you, drawn on your savings Bank Account No.
01190077112 maintained at Sector 22,
Chandigarh Branch, through the accounts of Shri
Hira Pal, a part time Sweeper, who has alleged
that he has not requested for purchase of any
cheque in DD and further alleged that you got
blank cheques signed by him drawn on his CC SBF
A/c No.48.
 CHARGE No. 6
You got purchased your personal cheques in DD
at Karnal Branch, without keeping sufficient
balance in your account.
 CHARGE No. 7
You purchased cheques of heavy amount drawn
on your personal savings Bank A/c in the accounts
of Shri Hira Pal, a part time sweeper and Shri Sant
Ram Sharma, without keeping sufficient balance
in your account. Further you exercised financial
2 | P a g e
powers not vested with you. You also caused
delay in payment of these DDs.
 CHARGE No. 8
Your account shows transactions of heavy
amounts, which are much above your known
sources of income.
You have thus violated Rule 50 (3) & 50 (4) of
State Bank of India Officers Service Rules. ”
4. Shri A.K. Sharma, SMGS-IV was appointed as an Inquiring
Authority in terms of Rule 68 (2) (ii) of the State Bank of India
Officers Service Rules (for short “the Rules”). A detailed Inquiry
was held and the Inquiring Authority concluded that the Charge
Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 were proved, Charge No. 6 was partly proved
and Charge Nos. 3 and 8 were not proved. The Disciplinary
Authority disagreed with the findings of the Inquiring Authority
qua Charge Nos. 6 and 8. A copy of the Report of the Inquiring
Authority along with reasons for the disagreement was forwarded
to the Respondent. The Respondent submitted his explanation to
the findings of the Inquiring Authority as well as the disagreement
of the Disciplinary Authority regarding Charge Nos. 6 and 8.
5. The Disciplinary Authority was not empowered to impose
a major penalty as per Rule 66 (3) (iii) of the Rules. He
transmitted the entire record which contained the findings of the
Inquiring Authority, reasons of disagreement regarding Charge
Nos. 6 and 8, the explanation submitted by the Respondent and
3 | P a g e
the bio-data of the Respondent to the Appointing Authority. The
Appointing Authority by an Order dated 22nd January, 2000
considered the entire material which was sent to him and
imposed a penalty of “removal from service” on the Respondent.
6. The Respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh questioning the legality of the
order of dismissal. A learned Single Judge of the High Court
allowed the Writ Petition relying upon the judgment of this Court
in State Bank of India & Ors. v. Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty
& Anr.1
 wherein it was held that even when the Rule does not
contemplate issuance of a notice before imposing a punishment,
principles of natural justice would require an opportunity to be
given to the delinquent employee as per the judgment cited
supra. The Appellants filed a Letters Patent Appeal which was
dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court in which it was
held that an order of removal cannot be passed without a
show-cause notice against the proposed punishment. The
Appellant-Bank is in appeal challenging the judgments of the High
Court in this Appeal.
7. Rule 68 (3) of the State Bank of India Officers Service
Rules is as under:
“68.(3)(i) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not
itself the Inquiring Authority, may, for reasons to
be recovered by it in writing, remit the case to
1 (2009) 7 SLR 347
4 | P a g e
the Inquiring Authority-whether the Inquiring
Authority is the same or different-for fresh or
further inquiry and report, and the Inquiring
Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold further
inquiry according to the provisions of sub-rule (2)
as far as may be.
(ii) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees
with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on
any article of charge, record its reasons for such
disagreement and record its own findings on
such charge, if the evidence on record is
sufficient for the purpose.
(iii) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to
its findings on all or any of the articles of charge,
is of the opinion that any of the penalties
specified in rule 67 should be imposed on the
officer, it shall, not-with-standing anything
contained in sub-rule (4), make an order
imposing such penalty.
(iv) If the Disciplinary Authority or the Appointing
Authority, as the case may be, having regard to
its findings on all or any of the articles of charge,
is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it
may pass an order exonerating the officer
concerned.”
8. As stated above, the Disciplinary Authority after supplying
the Report of the Inquiring Authority had given an opportunity to
the Respondent to submit his explanation, which he did. In view
of the disability of the Disciplinary Authority in passing an “order
of removal” under Rule 68 (2), the entire record was sent to the
Appointing Authority who examined the matter and passed an
“order of removal”.
5 | P a g e
9. In State Bank of India v. Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty
(supra) which is the basis of the judgment of the High Court, it
was held that the Appointing Authority could not pass an order
imposing a major penalty. In that case, the Disciplinary Authority
sent the Records to the Appointing Authority who passed order of
“dismissal from service”. It is not clear from the judgment as to
whether the delinquent officer in that case was given a notice by
the Disciplinary Authority before the records were sent to the
Appointing Authority. This Court held that even in the absence of
any Rule requiring a notice to be given, the principles of natural
justice would require an opportunity to the delinquent employee.
It was not held in the said judgment that even if the Inquiry
Report was furnished and an opportunity was given to the
delinquent there is a further requirement of another opportunity
before imposing the penalty. This Court found that before
imposition of a major penalty the delinquent was entitled for an
opportunity of being heard. The High Court was wrong in holding
that the delinquent employee is entitled for a notice before the
penalty is imposed.
10. Though Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, 1951 is
not applicable to the Officers of the Appellant-Bank; in Managing
Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar2
 , this Court held that
2 (1993) 4 SCC 727
6 | P a g e
Government servants as well as others are governed by their
service rules and that whenever an Inquiry is conducted and a
punishment is awarded, a delinquent employee is entitled to a
copy of Report of the Inquiring Authority and an opportunity to
submit his explanation. The absence of any rule providing for an
opportunity to be given to a delinquent employee before
imposition of a penalty cannot be taken advantage of by the
employer. However, there is no requirement of a second show
cause notice before imposition of a penalty.
11. In this case, the Respondent had sufficient opportunity to
respond to the Report of the Inquiring Authority and to the
findings of the Disciplinary Authority disagreeing with the
Inquiring Authority regarding Charge Nos. 6 and 8. He is not
entitled to any further notice before imposition of a penalty.
Apart from the requirement of a second show-cause notice before
imposition of penalty no other point was raised in this Appeal.
12. For the aforementioned reasons, the Appeal is allowed
and the judgment of the High Court is set aside.

 ........................................J.
 [S.A. BOBDE]
 ..……................................J.
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi;
December 15, 2017
7 | P a g e

Sunday, December 17, 2017

contributory negligence ? = in Sudhir Kumar (supra) where it was held as follows : “9.If a person drives a vehicle without a licence, he commits an offence. The same, by itself, in our opinion, may not lead to a finding of negligence as regards the accident. It has been held by the courts below that it was the driver of the mini truck who was driving rashly and negligently. It is one thing to say that the appellant was not possessing any licence but no finding of fact has been arrived at that he was driving the two-wheeler rashly and negligently. If he was not driving rashly and negligently which contributed to the accident, we fail to see as to how, only because he was not having a licence, he would be held to be guilty of contributory negligence…- there was no visible damage to the lorry but that it was the motor cycle which had suffered damage and that there was no eye-witness. The award of the tribunal indicates that absolutely no evidence was produced by the insurer to support the plea that there was contributory negligence on the part of the appellant.- In view of the above position, we are of the view that the deduction of forty per cent which was made on the ground of contributory negligence is without any basis. Accordingly, we direct that the appellant shall be entitled to an additional amount of Rs 4.60 lakhs which was wrongly disallowed. We direct that the respondent shall accordingly pay an additional amount of Rs 4,60,000, over and above the amount which has been awarded by the High Court. This amount shall also carry interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum as awarded by the High Court, from the date of the petition until realization. The insurer shall deposit the amount before the tribunal within 3 months which shall be released to the appellant.

1
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 22966 OF 2017
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27398 of 2016]
SRI DINESH KUMAR. J. @ DINESH J, .....APPELLANT

Versus
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD & ORS. .....RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 Leave granted.
2 The present appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of
Karnataka dated 13 April 2016.
2
3 On 18 June 2012, the appellant who was riding a motorcycle bearing
registration No.KA-04/EL-4782 met with an accident with a mini lorry belonging
to the Second and Third respondents. The lorry was insured with the First
respondent. As a result of the accident, the appellant suffered grievous injuries.
The medical certificate issued by the Bangalore Baptist Hospital (Exhibits P-13
and P-14) indicate spinal injuries.
4 The appellant was twenty six years of age on the date of the accident and
was working as a patroller in a private company. His income was Rs.11,000/- per
month. The appellant filed a claim for compensation before the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal, seeking compensation in the amount of Rupees 40 lakhs. The
appellant examined a doctor (PW 5) who deposed that the extent of permanent
physical disability of the spine was thirty four per cent. The tribunal did not accept
that the disability was thirty four per cent, noting that the doctor in his cross
examination admitted that he had not personally treated the appellant and that
the medical evidence did not provide a cogent determination of the extent of
disability. The Tribunal assessed the disability at ten per cent. The income of the
appellant was taken at Rs 11,000 per month and a multiplier of seventeen was
applied. The loss of income due to disability was computed at Rs 2,25,000.
Medical expenses were computed at Rs 3,85,000. The Tribunal computed the
total compensation (including conventional heads) at Rs 9 lakhs. However, the
tribunal held that the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence to the extent
3
of forty per cent and hence granted sixty per cent of Rs 9 lakhs amounting to Rs
5.40 lakhs. In appeal, the High Court has enhanced the award of medical
expenses by a further sum of Rs 1,77,775 on the basis of the bills produced by
the appellant. On the aspect of contributory negligence, the High Court affirmed
the finding of the tribunal. The award of compensation of Rs 9 lakhs has been
enhanced to Rs 10,77,775 and, after making a deduction of forty per cent
towards contributory negligence, the appellant has been held entitled to an
amount of Rs 6,46,665. All the respondents have been held to be jointly and
severally liable.
5 The respondents have been served in these proceedings. None has
appeared.
6 On behalf of the appellant, it has been submitted that both the tribunal and
the High Court were manifestly in error in holding the appellant to be guilty of
contributory negligence to the extent of forty per cent. It has been submitted that
the tribunal as well as the High Court proceeded on the erroneous premise that
since the appellant had failed to produce the driving licence, an adverse
inference on the aspect of contributory negligence would have to be drawn.
Moreover, it was submitted that the entire discussion on contributory negligence
4
is conjectural and is not worthy of acceptance. In this regard, reliance was placed
on the judgment of this Court in Sudhir Kumar Rana v Surinder Singh1
.
7 Both the tribunal, and in appeal in the High Court, have found fault with the
appellant for not having produced his driving licence. The tribunal noted that the
appellant had admitted in the course of his cross-examination that the road
where the accident took place was a two way road and that on each side, three
vehicles could pass at a time. A suggestion was put to the appellant that while
trying to overtake another vehicle, he had approached the offending lorry from
the right side as a result of which the accident took place. The appellant denied
the suggestion. The award of the tribunal indicates that absolutely no evidence
was produced by the insurer to support the plea that there was contributory
negligence on the part of the appellant.
8 Insofar as the judgment of the High Court is concerned, the Division Bench
has placed a considerable degree of importance on the fact that there was no
visible damage to the lorry but that it was the motor cycle which had suffered
damage and that there was no eye-witness. We are in agreement with the
submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant that plea of
contributory negligence was accepted purely on the basis of conjecture and
without any evidence. Once the finding that there was contributory negligence on
1 (2008) 12 SCC 436
5
the part of the appellant is held to be without any basis, the second aspect which
weighed both with the tribunal and the High Court, that the appellant had not
produced the driving licence, would be of no relevance. This aspect has been
considered in a judgment of this Court in Sudhir Kumar (supra) where it was
held as follows :
“9.If a person drives a vehicle without a licence, he commits an
offence. The same, by itself, in our opinion, may not lead to a
finding of negligence as regards the accident. It has been held
by the courts below that it was the driver of the mini truck who
was driving rashly and negligently. It is one thing to say that the
appellant was not possessing any licence but no finding of fact
has been arrived at that he was driving the two-wheeler rashly
and negligently. If he was not driving rashly and negligently
which contributed to the accident, we fail to see as to how, only
because he was not having a licence, he would be held to be
guilty of contributory negligence…
10. The matter might have been different if by reason of his rash
and negligent driving, the accident had taken place.”
9 In view of the above position, we are of the view that the deduction of forty
per cent which was made on the ground of contributory negligence is without any
basis. Accordingly, we direct that the appellant shall be entitled to an additional
amount of Rs 4.60 lakhs which was wrongly disallowed. 
6
10 We direct that the respondent shall accordingly pay an additional amount
of Rs 4,60,000, over and above the amount which has been awarded by the High
Court. This amount shall also carry interest at the rate of eight per cent per
annum as awarded by the High Court, from the date of the petition until
realization. The insurer shall deposit the amount before the tribunal within 3
months which shall be released to the appellant.
11 The appeal is allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to
costs.
……......................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 .................................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ................................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi
December 15, 2017