CBI is yet to examine and analyse the role of the private respondents in this case and there is no evidence of their complicity in the crime and there is not even a pointer of involvement of respondents herein in the alleged crime. Their involvement cannot be established until and unless, there is some substantial evidence against them. Learned single Judge, while granting interim bail to the private respondents till the presentation of Challan had laid down certain conditions which are as follows:- “As a result of my above discussion, I find merits in both the petitions and the same are allowed. Order dated 07.10.2017 granting interim bail to the petitioners is made absolute, till the presentation of Challan, subject to the following terms:- (i) that the petitioners shall make themselves available for interrogation by the investigating agency as and when required; (ii) that the petitioners shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the accusation against them so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to investigating agency; (iii) that the petitioners shall not leave India without the prior permission of the Court. (iv) that the petitioners will seek regular bail on the presentation of Challan in Court.” In our considered opinion, without expressing anything on the merits of the case as the investigation is still under progress and the CBI is yet to come to a conclusion regarding the involvement of the private respondents in the crime, the private respondents herein have made out a case for grant of protection by way of interim bail till the presentation of Challan by the CBI as has been passed by learned single Judge. Therefore, the order passed by learned single Judge granting interim bail to the answering respondents till the presentation of Challan cannot be faulted with.

1
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2152-2153 OF 2017
(Arising out of
Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 9783-9784 OF 2017)
 Diary No. 38240 of 2017
Barun Chandra Thakur .... Appellant(s)
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation and Others. .... Respondent(s)
O R D E R
R.K. Agrawal, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) The present appeal is directed against the judgment and
order dated 21.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Miscellaneous Nos.
M-35002 and 35003 of 2017 whereby learned single Judge of
the High Court had granted interim bail to Mr. Ryan Pinto, Dr.
Augustine Francis Pinto and Mrs. Grace Pinto-the top
management executive of the Ryan International School till the
presentation of challan subject to certain conditions.
2
3) Brief facts:
(a) On 08.09.2017, the appellant herein dropped his son
Pradyumn Thakur, aged 7 years, and his daughter, Vidhi
Thakur to their School, viz., Ryan International School,
Bhondsi at 8:00 a.m. At 08:10 a.m., the appellant received a
phone call of his wife who asked him to immediately call Ms.
Anju Dudeja of the said School. When the appellant contacted
Ms. Anju Dudeja, she told him that his son had a cut on his
neck and is profusely bleeding. She asked him to reach
Badshahpur Hospital where he was being taken. The
appellant, along with his wife, left for Badshahpur Hospital
but on the way he received a call from Ms. Anju Dudeja that
they were taking the child to Artemis Hospital. On reaching
there, the appellant found that there was a cut on the right
side of his son’s neck up to the ear and his son was in
Emergency Ward. The Doctor informed the appellant that his
son Pradyumn had died.
(b) On receipt of the information, the police recorded a First
Information Report (FIR) being No. 250 of 2017 dated
3
08.09.2017 at Police Station Bhondsi, Gurugram and arrested
one Ashok Kumar, son of Amichand, on the same day. The
State Government (Haryana), issued a Notification dated
17.09.2017, requesting the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI) to take up the investigation. The Ministry of Personnel,
Public Grievances and Pension (Department of Personnel and
Training) Government of India, New Delhi, vide Notification
dated 22.09.2017, transferred the investigation of the case to
the CBI which re-registered the FIR already registered by the
police authorities as case bearing No.
RC8(S)/2017/SC-III/New Delhi on 22.09.2017 itself which is a
reproduction of the FIR recorded by the police authorities at
Police Station Bhondsi, Gurugram.
(c) The private respondents, viz., Mr. Ryan Pinto, Dr.
Augustine Francis Pinto and Mrs. Grace Pinto approached the
Bombay High Court by filing Anticipatory Bail Application
being Nos. 1599 and 1608 of 2017 for grant of transit/
anticipatory bail. Learned single Judge of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, vide order dated 12.09.2017 in
Anticipatory Bail Application No. 1599 of 2017 granted interim
4
stay from arrest of these persons and the matter was posted
for 13.09.2017. On coming to know about the filing of the
above anticipatory bail applications, the appellant herein
approached the High Court of Bombay by filing the
intervention application opposing the transit bail. Learned
single Judge of the High Court, vide order dated 14.09.2017,
rejected the anticipatory bail applications being Nos. 1599 and
1608 of 2017. However, the interim relief granted by the High
Court vide order dated 12.09.2017 was extended till 5:00 p.m.
of 15.09.2017 subject to certain conditions.
(d) It may be relevant to mention here that immediately on
the next date of the incident, that is, on 09.09.2017, a
Resolution was passed by the District Bar Association,
Gurugram condemning the brutal and dastardly act of the
accused unanimously resolving that no Member of the Bar
would appear/represent the accused before the Court or any
other Forum. A similar Resolution was passed by the District
Bar Association, Sohna.
(e) The private respondents approached the Punjab &
Haryana High Court on 15.09.2017 by filing CRM-M Nos.
5
35002 and 35003 of 2017 for grant of interim bail. However,
the said petition was accepted by the Registry of the High
Court on 17.09.2017 and the copy of the said petition was
supplied to the office of learned Advocate General for the State
of Haryana on 18.09.2017. It appears that in the meantime,
Dr. Augustine Francis Pinto approached this Court by filing a
writ petition (criminal) being No. 139 of 2017 seeking transfer
of case from the Punjab & Haryana High Court to Delhi which
was taken up on 18.09.2017 and this Court disposed of the
writ petition while deprecating the practice of the Bar
Associations to pass a Resolution of this nature and also
recorded the fact that the Bar Associations have withdrawn
the Resolution.
(f) CRM-M Nos. 35002 and 35003 of 2017 for grant of
interim bail were taken up by the Punjab & Haryana High
Court but the effective order was passed only on 28.09.2017
staying the arrest of the private respondents till 07.10.2017
when the matter was directed to be listed. The appellant
approached this Court by filing a petition for Special Leave to
Appeal being Diary No. 30996 of 2017 which was taken up on
6
13.10.2017 by this Court when learned counsel for the
appellant informed this Court that the appeal had become
infructuous.
(g) Learned single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment
and order dated 07.10.2017 in CRM-M Nos. 35002 and 35003
of 2017, considered the submissions made by the respective
parties including that of the appellant and while fixing the
cases for 05.12.2017 granted interim bail to the private
respondents with certain directions. The operative portion of
the order dated 07.10.2017 is reproduced below:-
“It is a case where a student of a school has been murdered.
After registration of the case, investigation with CBI is still at
initial stage. It is working on the theory of possibilities and
trying to analyse certain facts and evidence collected so far
in the matter. The petitioner are admittedly resident of
Mumbai. The question before the investigation agency is as
to whether the provisions of Section 75 of the JJ Act or 12 of
POCSO Act are attracted against the petitioner; whether the
child was in direct and actual control of petitioners; or they
have any other role in this case.
Keeping in view the facts discussed above, I find it
appropriate to give time to the investigation agency to
analyse the evidence before it, look into the role of
petitioners in this case and apprise this Court with further
progress in the investigation and evidence against petitioners
co9llected during investigation.
On behalf of Ryan Augustine Pinto, it has been argued
that he has no concern with the Trust running Ryan Schools
but a magazine of the Ryan International School, Bhondsi,
Gurugram shows that it has a message with his photograph,
when he is mentioned as CEO of Ryan International Group.
By joining the investigation, petitioner Ryan Augustine Pinto
7
will be in a position to place required material before the CBI
regarding allegations against him that he is in management
of the school.
Consequently, petitioners in both the petitions are
directed to join the investigation by the CBI on receipt of
notice in this regard. In the event of their arrest being
required, they will be allowed interim bail in case bearing
FIR No. RC 8(S)/2017/SC-III/New Delhi dated 22.09.2017
for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with
Section 34 IPC, Section 25 of the Arms Act, Section 75 of the
JJ Act and Section 12 of POCSO, Act, 2012 (earlier FIR No.
250 dated 08.09.2017 registered at Police Station Bhondsi,
Gurugram) till next date on their furnishing bonds to the
satisfaction of Investigation Agency. However, they shall
abide by the terms and conditions as envisaged under
Section 438(2)(i) to (iv) Cr.P.C. failing which they shall loose
the benefit of interim bail allowed to them.
Further report relating to investigation be submitted
on the next date.
List on 05.12.2017.”
(h) The appellant, once again approached this Court by filing
petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) being Nos.
8044-8045 of 2017 challenging the order dated 07.10.2017
passed by learned single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court. This Court, vide order dated 06.11.2017, disposed of
the special leave petitions by requesting the High Court to
dispose of the bail applications within a period of 10 (ten) days
hence. This Court was inclined to made such request as the
High Court had granted interim protection to the private
respondents under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal
8
Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) for a long period.
Pursuant to the order dated 06.11.2017 passed by this Court,
learned single Judge of the High Court, considered the matter
afresh and vide judgment and order dated 21.11.2017, made
absolute the interim bail granted on 07.10.2017 to the private
respondents till the presentation of the challan subject to
certain conditions.
4) We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the records.
5) Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
private respondents while approaching the High Court for
grant of interim bail/anticipatory bail have concealed and
suppressed the material facts. He further contended that the
respondents have also committed/indulged in fraud.
According to him, they ought to have approached the Sessions
Court, Gurugram, instead of directly approaching the High
Court when on 15.09.2017, the Resolution passed by the
District Bar Associations Gurugram and Sohna dated
09.09.2017 to the effect that no lawyer will represent the
accused in the instant matter, stood withdrawn. He further
9
submitted that the private respondents have committed
heinous offence as would be clear from the averments made by
the CBI in the reply affidavit filed by it before the High Court.
A special reference was made to the following averments:-
“……The interrogation of the petitioner is very much
essential in the interest of investigation of the case and also
to unearth the larger conspiracy behind the murder of a
seven years old boy in his school. Any relief at this stage in
the form of anticipatory bail may hamper the course of
investigation of the case as there is every possibility that he
will misuse the liberty granted by this Hon’ble Court.
4(1) That the petitioners is not entitled to relief (s) as
prayed for. The petition is misconceived apart from being
meritless and hence deserves to be dismissed……”
“4(J)-(P) ….Prima facie it seems that the careless attitude of
the Management has aided to the murder of Master
Pradhyuman in the washroom of the school and accordingly
local police arrested two school officials namely Francis
Thomas and Jayesh Thomas in the instant case.
10. That the contention of petitioner at paragraph 10 of
the petition are opposed by the prosecution on the following
grounds:
i) That CBI has taken up the investigation of the
case and the investigation of this case is still
pending at crucial stage. Larger conspiracy
behind the murder of a seven year old boy is yet
to be unearthed.
iii) That the possibility of him being members of the
conspiracy behind the murder of Master
Pradhuman in the washroom of Ryan
International School, Sohna Road, Bhondsi,
Gurugram on 08.09.2017 and its abetment,
destruction of the evidence by him cannot be
ruled out as he is within the ambit of
investigation and he is to be dealt by the law at
par with other accused.
iv) That CBI has taken up the investigation of this
case on 22.09.2017, the records of the school
10
management and those of the head office of
Ryan International Group of Institutions have
not been collected by CBI and the investigation
is at a preliminary stage.”
Learned counsel, thus, contended that even the CBI, on the
materials and possibilities of the involvement of the private
respondents, had opposed the plea of grant of interim
bail/anticipatory bail, and therefore, the High Court ought not
to have granted interim bail to them.
6) Learned senior counsel for the private respondents,
however, submitted that from a reading of the FIR registered
by the Police Station, Bhondsi, Gurugram, which was
re-registered by the CBI, there is no allegation against the
private respondents. Learned senior counsel further
submitted that even the CBI in the reply affidavit filed before
the High Court as also the documents produced before learned
single Judge at the time of hearing of the matter does not
show any involvement of the private respondents in the alleged
offence. He, thus, submitted that the order dated 21.11.2017
passed by learned single Judge does not call for any
interference.
11
7) We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
various pleas raised by learned counsel for the parties.
8) In our considered opinion, the private respondents
cannot be held guilty of any suppression, concealment or
fraud in this matter for the simple reason that the petitions
were prepared on 15.09.2017 and accepted by the Registry of
the Punjab & Haryana High Court on 17.09.2017. The fact
relating to the withdrawal of the Resolution passed by the
District Bar Associations, Gurugram and Sohna cannot be
said to be in the knowledge of the private respondents.
Moreover, this plea had been dealt with by learned single
Judge in the order dated 07.10.2017 and had been negated.
9) Further, we cannot lose sight of the fact that this
incident had received wide coverage in the media, both
electronic and print. In fact, it can be said that there was a
trial by media, therefore, when the private respondents have
directly approached the High Court for grant of
anticipatory/interim bail under Section 438 of the Code, that
too when the High Court has concurrent jurisdiction, we
12
cannot find any fault with the action of the private
respondents.
10) Coming to the merits of the case, on going through the
FIR registered by the Police Station, Bhondsi dated 08.09.2017
which admittedly has been re-registered by the CBI, we find
that no allegation has been made against the private
respondents herein. Learned single Judge of the High Court,
after considering the material and evidence on record as also
the material produced by the CBI before it has held as under:-
“14. From the submissions of learned retainer counsel for
CBI, it appears that against petitioners investigation of the
case and the evidence collected by investigating agency
stand at the same stage as it was on 07.10.2017. While
allowing interim relief to the petitioners on 28.09.2017, it
was ordered that if required, petitioners will be called and
joined in investigation of the case, however, till 07.10.2017,
they were never called to join the investigation. Vide order
dated 07.10.2017, petitioners in both the petitions were
directed to join the investigation on receipt of notice in this
regard and it has been fairly conceded that no notice calling
upon the petitioners to join investigation have been issued
till date.”
16. In para 9 of preliminary submissions, it has again been
submitted that here is possibility of petitioners being
member of conspiracy behind the crime in this case. In para
12 of the para-wise reply, it has been stated that CBI has yet
to examine and analyze the role of petitioners in this case.
Similar pleas have also been raised in the reply filed in
petition CRM-M-35002-2017.
17. The question, which arise for consideration at this stage
is as to whether CBI intends to arrest petitioner without any
13
evidence of their complicity in the crime only on the basis of
possibilities and probabilities. The answer to this question
will be in negative. It is not disputed that in the
investigation conducted so far, there is not even a pointer of
involvement of petitioners in the crime in this case. Some
lapse or negligence on the part of school management or
even of the trustees or other office bearer of the school if
found at any point of time, may not be a pointer towards
their complicity in commission of murder of a school
student, until and unless there is some substantial evidence
of their involvement in this crime. While passing order dated
07.10.2017, it was observed that CBI “is working on the
theory of possibilities and trying to analyze certain facts and
evidence collected so far in the mater, as such, it will be
appropriate to give time to investigating agency to analyze
the evidence before it, look into the role of petitioners in this
case and apprise this Court with further progress in the
investigation and evidence against petitioners collected
during investigation. Till date, status of investigation
against the petitioners is at the same stage as it was on the
date of passing of order dated 07.10.2017. It is a case where
a seven years old student of the school was brutally
murdered in the school. It is not only an unfortunate
incident but also a gruesome and heinous crime and the
State Government thought it appropriate to hand over the
investigation of the case to CBI, a premier investigating
agency of the country. As admitted by learned counsel
representing CBI, petitioners have not ever been called for
joining the investigation and CBI has arrested a student of
the school as main accused for murder of Pradyumn and is
concentrating on his role in committing the crime. It has not
come on record that this crime with committed by the
conductor (Ashok), who was arrested by the police on the
day of occurrence or the student arrested by the CBI in this
case, in conspiracy with the petitioners or he had ever any
contact with them. Petitioners Dr. Augustine Francis Pinto
and Mrs. Grace Pinto (in CRM-M-35003-2017) are trustees
of Saint Xavier’s Education Trust, which is running several
school in the country. The status of petitioner Ryan
Augustine Pinto (in CM-M-35002-2017) with regard to the
management of the school in which crime was committed is
yet to be ascertained. It will also be a point of investigation
for the Investigating Agency as to whether the petitioners,
while living in Mumbai, are directly responsible for any lapse
of the Administration in the School.”
14
11) Thus, as on date, the CBI is yet to examine and analyse
the role of the private respondents in this case and there is no
evidence of their complicity in the crime and there is not even
a pointer of involvement of respondents herein in the alleged
crime. Their involvement cannot be established until and
unless, there is some substantial evidence against them.
Learned single Judge, while granting interim bail to the private
respondents till the presentation of Challan had laid down
certain conditions which are as follows:-
“As a result of my above discussion, I find merits in both the
petitions and the same are allowed. Order dated 07.10.2017
granting interim bail to the petitioners is made absolute, till
the presentation of Challan, subject to the following terms:-
(i) that the petitioners shall make themselves
available for interrogation by the investigating
agency as and when required;
(ii) that the petitioners shall not, directly or
indirectly, make any inducement, threat or
promise to any person acquainted with the facts
of the accusation against them so as to dissuade
him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to
investigating agency;
(iii) that the petitioners shall not leave India without
the prior permission of the Court.
(iv) that the petitioners will seek regular bail on the
presentation of Challan in Court.” 
15
12) In our considered opinion, without expressing anything
on the merits of the case as the investigation is still under
progress and the CBI is yet to come to a conclusion regarding
the involvement of the private respondents in the crime, the
private respondents herein have made out a case for grant of
protection by way of interim bail till the presentation of
Challan by the CBI as has been passed by learned single
Judge. Therefore, the order passed by learned single Judge
granting interim bail to the answering respondents till the
presentation of Challan cannot be faulted with.
13) In view of the foregoing discussion, we therefore, do not
find any good ground to interfere with the order dated
21.11.2017 passed by learned single Judge of the High Court.
The appeal is dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their
own costs.
………………….……………………J.
 (R.K. AGRAWAL)
.…....…………………………………J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 11, 2017. 

Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C- whether the amendment application filed by the plaintiff deserves to be allowed or not = We thus allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court as well as the order of the Additional District Judge. The amendment application I.A. No. 1001 of 2011 stand allowed. Both the parties have led their evidences and case has already been fixed for hearing, however, to avoid any prejudice to the parties, justice will be served in giving a limited opportunity to the parties to lead additional evidence, if they so desire.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.19977 OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 26695/2017)
MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRA …APPELLANT
VERSUS
ROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment of
Delhi High Court dated 02.08.2017 by which judgment,
the Writ Petition filed by the appellant challenging
the order of Additional District Judge dismissing the
application of the plaintiff under Order VI Rule 17
of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to
as “C.P.C.”) has been dismissed. Facts in brief
necessary to be noted for deciding the appeal are:-
The appellant and respondent No.5 are sons of
respondent No.1. Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are
wife, son and daughter of another brother of
appellant. The appellant’s father Late Shri O.P.
2
Mehra alongwith his wife and three minor sons came to
Delhi from Lahore after Partition. Shri O.P. Mehra
died in 1951. The respondent No.1 and her sons were
held entitled to compensation under Order of
Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi dated 14.08.1956.
The respondent No. 1 was declared as highest bidder
in a public auction for a House No. D-4, Lajpat
Nagar, area measuring 300 sq. yds. which amount was
adjusted from the claim to which the respondent No.1
and her sons were held entitled.
Another property was also allotted in the name of
respondent No.1 of area measuring 200 sq. yds. at
G-11, Nizamuddin, New Delhi. The property G-11,
Nizamuddin was sold by respondent No.1 in the year
2000. On 04.11.2009, the appellant filed a Suit No.
2082 of 2009 against the respondents seeking
partition of the suit property described in Appendix
A. In Appendix A, only property mentioned was Plot
No.D-4, Lajpat Nagar, Part-II, New Delhi.
Written statement was filed by the respondent and
on 17.05.2010, issues were framed by the Court.
10.08.2010 was fixed for recording the evidence of
the plaintiff. The plaintiff prayed for time for
3
producing evidence. On 17.01.2011, plaintiff filed an
application under Order VI Rule 17 praying for
amendment of the plaint. By the application
plaintiff sought to add certain pleadings and a
prayer claiming share in the sale proceeds received
by defendant No.1 from sale of the property of
Nizamuddin. Application filed by the plaintiff was
objected by the defendants by filing a reply. It was
pleaded that several opportunities were given to the
plaintiff to lead evidence and last opportunity was
given on 08.12.2010 to file his evidence by
28.01.2011. It was further pleaded that in the sale
document of Nizamuddin property, plaintiff himself
was a witness. The relief which is sought to be
amended is barred by time and is altogether a
separate cause of action. Plaintiff filed a rejoinder
in which it was stated that plaintiff came to know
that plaintiff had undivided share in the property at
Nizamuddin only in November, 2010. He further stated
that he informed all the facts to his earlier counsel
but in the plaint the mention of Nizamuddin property
was not made by earlier counsel and while preparing
for evidence in the suit, the fact was noticed by the
4
plaintiff only in November, 2010 and hence
application for amendment has been filed. The Court
passed on order on 26.07.2011 granting the plaintiff
four week’s time as a last opportunity to file the
examination-in-chief of his witnesses subject to
payment of Rs.5,000/-, with regard to I.A. No.1001 of
2011, it was stated “Needless to say in Case I.A.
No.1001/2011 is allowed, appropriate orders for
evidence of the plaintiff would be made.” Parties led
evidence and suit was fixed for final disposal. On
14.02.2014, an order was passed directing that
amendment application shall be considered at the time
of final hearing of the suit. Plaintiff filed an
application for amendment of issues, which was
rejected by the High Court on 09.02.2015. The
plaintiff filed a FAO (OS) No.196 of 2015, in which
Division Bench of the High Court by order dated
28.04.2015 directed the learned Single Judge to
decide the amendment application I.A. No. 1001 of
2011. In the meantime on account of pecuniary
jurisdiction of the case, the suit was transferred to
the Court of Additional District Judge, Saket. The
Additional District Judge took up the amendment
5
application and vide order dated 24.10.2016 rejected
the amendment application. The trial court took the
view that the suit for recovery of money of his share
could have been filed by plaintiff within three years
from the date of sale. The trial court held that the
amendment sought is barred by time, hence the
application was rejected.
A Writ Petition under Article 227 was filed by
the plaintiff in the High Court challenging the order
dated 24.10.2016, which has been dismissed by the
High Court by the impugned judgment, against which
this appeal has been filed.
2. We have heard Ms. Shobha, learned counsel for the
appellant. Shri S.B. Upadhyay, learned counsel was
heard for respondent No.1, Shri Rana S. Biswas and
Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay, has been heard for respondent
No.5. Learned counsel for respondent No.5 having
adopted the submissions raised on behalf of
respondent No.1, we shall hereinafter refer to the
submissions of respondent No.1 and respondent No.5 as
submissions on behalf of respondents.

6
3. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of the
appeal contends that the application filed by the
plaintiff for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 was
not barred by time. Relying on Article 110 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, learned counsel submits that
the limitation for enforcing a right to share in a
joint family property is twelve years, hence the
claim was not barred by time. The High Court on one
hand refrained itself from saying anything on the
issue of limitation on Article 110 of the Limitation
Act and on the other hand has given an approval to
the view of the learned Additional District Judge
that suit is barred by time. The High Court has
failed to appreciate that parties have already led
evidence relating to proposed amendment which fact
was recorded by the High Court on 14.02.2014 and only
a formal order of allowing amendment was required,
which would not have caused any prejudice to the
defendant. The High Court on technical grounds has
rejected the amendment application whereas it is well
settled that amendment applications are to be
liberally considered and unless any prejudice is
shown to be caused to the defendant, the applications
7
are allowed.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the
submission of the appellant contends that amendment
application filed by the appellant could not have
been allowed in view of Proviso to Order VI Rule 17
C.P.C. It is submitted that trial in the suit has
already commenced and plaintiff failed to show that
in spite of due diligence, he could not raise the
matter earlier, hence the trial court has rightly
rejected the amendment application. It is further
stated that claim was barred by time. The amendment
sought to be made related to claim for recovery of
money for which limitation is only three years, as
has been rightly held by the trial court. There is no
substance in the case of the plaintiff that due to
mistake of earlier counsel, the Nizamuddin property
could not be included in the plaint. Plaintiff
himself has verified the plaint and cannot be allowed
to take any such plea. The Proviso to Order VI Rule
17 does not permit any such amendment as now prayed
by plaintiff. It is submitted that there was no due
diligence at all on the part of the
appellant-plaintiff so as to enable the Court to
8
allow the amendment exercising the power reserved to
the Court under Proviso. The appellant in his
repllication has stated that Lajpat Nagar property
was the one and the only joint family property. By
allowing the amendment, the very nature of the suit
shall be changed, causing great prejudice to
respondent No.1. Learned counsel for the respondents
have also raised submissions regarding the merits of
the claim of the plaintiff.
5. We have considered the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties and have perused the records.
6. Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. as it now exists is as
follows:-
17. Amendment of Pleadings.- The Court may at
any stage of the proceedings allow either
party to alter or amend his pleadings in such
manner and on such terms as may be just, and
all such amendments shall be made as may be
necessary for the purpose of determining the
real questions in controversy between the parties:
Provided that no application for amendment
shall be allowed after the trial has commenced,
unless the court comes to the conclusion
that in spite of due diligence, the party
could not have raised the matter before the
commencement of trial.
7. By Amendment Act 46 of 1999 with a view to shortage
9
litigation and speed of the trial of the civil suits,
Rule 17 of Order VI was omitted, which provision was
restored by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 with a rider in
the shape of the proviso limiting the power of
amendment to a considerable extent. The object of
newly inserted Rule 17 is to control filing of
application for amending the pleading subsequent to
commencement of trial. Not permitting amendment
subsequent to commencement of the trial is with the
object that when evidence is led on pleadings in a
case, no new case be allowed to set up by amendments.
The proviso, however, contains an exception by
reserving right of the Court to grant amendment even
after commencement of the trial, when it is shown
that in spite of diligence, the said pleas could not
be taken earlier. The object for adding proviso is
to curtail delay and expedite adjudication of the
cases. This Court in Salem Advocate Bar
Association, T.N. Vs. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC
344 has noted the object of Rule 17 in Para 26 which
is to the following effect:
“26. Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code deals with
amendment of pleadings. By Amendment Act 46 of
1999, this provision was deleted. It has again
10
been restored by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 but
with an added proviso to prevent application
for amendment being allowed after the trial
has commenced, unless the court comes to the
conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the
party could not have raised the matter before
the commencement of trial. The proviso, to
some extent, curtails absolute discretion to
allow amendment at any stage. Now, if application
is filed after commencement of trial, it
has to be shown that in spite of due diligence,
such amendment could not have been
sought earlier. The object is to prevent frivolous
applications which are filed to delay
the trial. There is no illegality in the provision.”
8. The judgment on which much reliance has been placed
by learned counsel for the appellant is Rajesh Kumar
Aggarwal & Ors. Vs. K.K. Modi & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC
385. This Court had occasion to consider and
interpret Order VI Rule 17 in Paragraphs 15 and 16,
in which following has been held:-
“15. The object of the rule is that the courts
should try the merits of the case that come
before them and should, consequently, allow
all amendments that may be necessary for determining
the real question in controversy between
the parties provided it does not cause
injustice or prejudice to the other side.
16. Order 6 Rule 17 consists of two parts.
Whereas the first part is discretionary (may)
and leaves it to the court to order amendment
of pleading. The second part is imperative
(shall) and enjoins the court to allow all
amendments which are necessary for the purpose
11
of determining the real question in controversy
between the parties.”
9. Although Order VI Rule 17 permits amendment in the
pleadings “at any stage of the proceedings”, but a
limitation has been engrafted by means of Proviso to
the fact that no application for amendment shall be
allowed after the trial is commenced. Reserving the
Court’s jurisdiction to order for permitting the
party to amend pleading on being satisfied that in
spite of due diligence the parties could not have
raised the matter before the commencement of trial.
In a suit when trial commences? Order XVIII of the
C.P.C. deal with “Hearing of the Suit and Examination
of Witnesses”. Issues are framed under Order XIV. At
the first hearing of the suit, the Court after
reading the plaint and written statement and after
examination under Rule 1 of Order XIV is to frame
issues. Order XV deals with “Disposal of the Suit at
the first hearing”, when it appears that the parties
are not in issue of any question of law or a fact.
After issues are framed and case is fixed for hearing
and the party having right to begin is to produce his
evidence, the trial of suit commences. This Court in
12
Vidyabai & Ors. Vs. Padmalatha & Anr., (2009) 2 SCC
409 held that filing of an affidavit in lieu of
examination-in-chief of the witnesses amounts to
commencement of proceedings. In Paragraph 11 of the
judgment, following has been held:-
“11. From the order passed by the learned
trial Judge, it is evident that the respondents
had not been able to fulfil the said
precondition. The question, therefore, which
arises for consideration is as to whether the
trial had commenced or not. In our opinion, it
did. The date on which the issues are framed
is the date of first hearing. Provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure envisage taking of
various steps at different stages of the proceeding.
Filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief
of the witness, in our
opinion, would amount to “commencement of proceeding”.”
10.Coming to the facts of the present case, it is clear
from the record that issues were framed on 17.05.2010
and case was fixed for recording of evidence of
plaintiff on 10.08.2010. Plaintiff did not produce
the evidence and took adjournment and in the meantime
filed an application under Order VI Rule 16 or 17 on
17.01.2011. Thereafter the Court on 26.07.2011 has
granted four week’s time as the last opportunity to
file the examination-in-chief. It is useful to quote
Paragraph 4 of the Order, which is to the following
13
effect:-
4. In view of the above, it is directed as
follows:-
(i) Having regard to the delay which has
ensued, subject to the plaintiff paying
costs of Rs.5,000/- each to the
contesting defendant No.1 and 5 within a
period of one week, the plaintiff is
permitted four weeks time as a last
opportunity to file the
examination-in-chief of his witnesses on
affidavit.
(ii) The matter shall be listed before the
Joint Registrar for recording of
plaintiffs evidence on 29th August, 2011.
(iii) The case shall be listed before court
for direction on 18th January, 2012.
(iv) Needless to say in case IA No. 1001/2011
is allowed, appropriate orders for
evidence of the plaintiff would be
made.”

11.Thus technically trial commenced when the date was
fixed for leading evidence by the plaintiff but
actually the amendment application was filed before
the evidence was led by the plaintiff. The parties
led evidence after the amendment application was
filed. In this context, it is necessary to notice the
order of the High Court dated 14.02.2014, which
records that evidence of both the parties have been
concluded. Most important fact to be noticed in the
14
order is that the Court recorded the statement of
plaintiff’s counsel that parties have led evidence in
view of the amendment sought in the plaint. Order
dated 14.02.2014 is to the following effect:-
“The evidence of both the parties has been
concluded. The matter has been listed for
final disposal. Learned counsel for the
plaintiff has pointed out the order dated 26th
July, 2011 wherein observation was made that
in case I.A. No. 1001/2011 under Order VI Rule
17 CPC for amendment of the plaint is allowed,
appropriate order for evidence of the
plaintiff would be made. As a matter of fact,
plaintiffs counsel stated that the parties
have also led evidence in view of amendment
sought in the plaint and the same covered in
the evidence produced by the parties. The
defendants, however, alleged that the said
amendment was unnecessary and was opposed by
the defendants and issue involved in the said
circumstances be considered at the time of
final hearing of suit as defendant No.1 is
more than 85 years old lady, the suit itself
be decided.
List this matter in the category of Short
cause on 22 May, 2014……”
12.By same order dated 14.02.2014, the Court directed
amendment application be taken at the time of final
hearing. As noticed above, when plaintiff sought for
framing additional issues which application was
rejected, the matter was taken before the Division
Bench and the Division Bench ultimately has directed
15
the learned Single Judge to consider the amendment
application. Subsequently, the amendment application
was rejected on 24.10.2016.
13.The Proviso to Order VI Rule 17 prohibited
entertainment of amendment application after
commencement of the trial with the object and purpose
that once parties proceed with the leading of
evidence, no new pleading be permitted to be
introduced. The present is a case where actually
before parties could led evidence, the amendment
application has been filed and from the order dated
14.02.2014, it is clear that the plaintiff’s case is
that parties has led evidence even on the amended
pleadings and plaintiff’s cases was that in view of
the fact that the parties led evidence on amended
pleadings, the allowing the amendment was mere
formality. The defendant in no manner can be said to
be prejudiced by the amendments since plaintiff led
his evidence on amended pleadings also as claimed by
him.
14.This Court in Chander Kanta Bansal Vs. Rajinder
16
Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117 has noted the object
and purpose of amendment made in 2002. In Para 13,
following has been held:-
“13. The entire object of the said amendment
is to stall filing of applications for amending
a pleading subsequent to the commencement
of trial, to avoid surprises and the parties
had sufficient knowledge of the other’s case.
It also helps in checking the delays in filing
the applications. Once, the trial commences on
the known pleas, it will be very difficult for
any side to reconcile. In spite of the same,
an exception is made in the newly inserted
proviso where it is shown that in spite of due
diligence, he could not raise a plea, it is
for the court to consider the same. Therefore,
it is not a complete bar nor shuts out entertaining
of any later application. As stated
earlier, the reason for adding proviso is to
curtail delay and expedite hearing of cases.”
15.Looking to the object and purpose by which limitation
was put on permitting amendment of the pleadings, in
substance, in the present case no prejudice can be
said to have caused to the defendant since the
evidence was led subsequent to the filing of the
amendment application. We thus are of the view that
looking to the purpose and object of the Proviso,
present was a case where it cannot be held that
amendment application filed by the plaintiff could
not be considered due to bar of the Proviso.
17
16.Now, we come to the one of the main reason given by
the trial court in rejecting the application that the
claim was barred by limitation. The Nizamuddin
property, which property was sought to be added in
the suit for partition was a property, which was sold
by respondent No.1 in the year 2000, in which the
plaintiff was also one of the witnesses. The trial
court took the view that the suit was simplicitor for
recovery of money for which limitation is only three
years from the date of sale and not twelve years as
claimed by the applicant. With regard to the
limitation, the plaintiff-appellant relies on Article
110 of the Limitation Act, which is to the following
effect:-
Article
No.
Description of
Suitt
Period of
Limitation
Time from
which
period
begins to
run
110 By a person
excluded from a
joint family
property to
enforce a right
to share therein.
Twelve
Years
When the
exclusion
becomes
known to
the
plaintiff
17.Present is not a case of simply recovery of money.
Plaintiff’s claim is to enforce a right to share in
18
the Nizamuddin property, which was sold in the year
2000 and according to plaintiff, the limitation is
twelve years as per Article 110. The High Court has
also noted the order of Additional District Judge
holding that claim is barred by time. The High Court
refrained from expressing any final opinion on the
question of limitation but observed that the view
taken by the Additional District Judge is correct.
It is relevant to refer to Para 28 of the judgment,
which is to the following effect:-
“The learned Additional District Judge in the
impugned order has also accepted the
contention of the counsel for the
respondents/defendants of the relief sought to
be added by way of amendment being barred by
time and Articles 106 and 110 of the Schedule
to the Limitation Act being not applicable.
The counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff has
been unable to show any precedent that a claim
for a definite share in the sale proceeds of,
a property would be governed by Articles 106
and Article 110 supra. However, the same
being in the nature of entering into the
merits of the amendment, I refrain from
dealing with the said aspect, though the view
taken by the learned Additional District Judge
appears to be reasonable and plausible.”
18.In the facts of the present case, final determination
as to whether the claim could be held to be barred by
time could have been decided only after considering
19
the evidence led by the parties. Whether plaintiff
had any share in the property, which was sold in the
year 2000 and what was the nature of his share and
whether he can claim recovery of his share within
twelve years were all the questions on which final
adjudication could have been made after considering
the evidence and at the stage of considering the
amendment in the facts of the present case, it was
too early to come to a conclusion that limitation was
only three years and not twelve years as claimed by
the plaintiff. The High Court on the one hand
refrained from expressing any opinion and on the
other hand has expressed his agreement with the view
taken by the Additional District Judge rejecting the
application as barred by time.
19.While considering the prayer of amendment of the
pleadings by a party, this Court in the case of
Mahila Ramkali Devi & Ors. Vs. Nandram (Dead)
through Legal Representatives & Ors., (2015) 13 SCC
132 has again reiterated the basic principles, which
are to be kept in mind while considering such
applications in Paragrpahs 20, 21 and 22, which is
20
quoted as below:-
“20. It is well settled that rules of procedure
are intended to be a handmaid to the administration
of justice. A party cannot be refused
just relief merely because of some mistake,
negligence, inadvertence or even infraction
of rules of procedure. The court always
gives relief to amend the pleading of the
party, unless it is satisfied that the party
applying was acting mala fide or that by his
blunder he had caused injury to his opponent
which cannot be compensated for by an order of
cost.
21. In our view, since the appellant sought
amendment in Para 3 of the original plaint,
the High Court ought not to have rejected the
application.
22. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National
Building Material Supply3, this Court held
that the power to grant amendment to pleadings
is intended to serve the needs of justice and
is not governed by any such narrow or technical
limitations.”
20.Although, learned counsel for the parties in their
submissions have raised various submissions on the
merits of the claim of the parties, which need no
consideration by us since the only issue which has to
be considered is as to whether the amendment
application filed by the plaintiff deserves to be
allowed or not. We make it clear that we have neither
entered into merits of the claim nor have expressed
21
any opinion on the merits of the claim of either
party and it is for the trial court to consider the
issues on merits while deciding the suit.
21.Taking into overall consideration of the facts of the
present case and specially the fact that evidence by
the parties was led after the filing of the amendment
application, we are of the view that justice could
have been served in allowing the amendment
application. We thus allow the appeal and set aside
the order of the High Court as well as the order of
the Additional District Judge. The amendment
application I.A. No. 1001 of 2011 stand allowed.
Both the parties have led their evidences and case
has already been fixed for hearing, however, to avoid
any prejudice to the parties, justice will be served
in giving a limited opportunity to the parties to
lead additional evidence, if they so desire.
22.We thus direct that the parties may file this order
before the trial court within two weeks from today,
on receipt of the order, the trial court shall
consider on framing of additional issue, if necessary
22
and shall thereafter grant opportunity to the parties
to lead additional evidence, if any. The entire
exercise shall be completed within three months and
thereafter suit be decided finally. The parties
shall bear their own costs. We make it clear that we
have not expressed any opinion on merits of the case
including on the question of applicability of Article
110 of the Limitation Act and all the issues shall be
decided on the basis of materials on record without
being influenced by any observation made by us.
..........................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
..........................J.
NEW DELHI, ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
DECEMBER 11, 2017.

U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board. = we issue the following directions: (1) The results prepared by the Board consequent upon the decision dated 2nd November, 2015 of the High Court should be declared by the Board within two weeks from today. (2) Candidates appointed and working as Trained Graduate Teachers pursuant to the declaration of results on the earlier occasions, if found unsuccessful on the third declaration of results, should not be removed from service but should be allowed to continue. (3) Candidates now selected for appointment as Trained Graduate Teachers (after the third declaration of results) should be appointed by the State by creating supernumerary posts. However, these newly appointed Trained Graduate Teachers will not be entitled to any consequential benefits.

C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 1 of 21
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 367 OF 2017
Ran Vijay Singh & Ors. …Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. …Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 355, 354, 356-357, 358 AND 366 OF 2017
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J
1. What a mess! This is perhaps the only way to describe the events
that have transpired in the examination conducted by the U.P. Secondary
Education Services Selection Board. We have reached the present stage
of judgment after eight long years of uncertainty for, and three
evaluations of the answer sheets of, more than 36,000 candidates who
took the examination for recruitment as Trained Graduate Teachers way
back in January 2009. Hopefully today, their travails, as those of the U.P.
Secondary Education Services Selection Board, will come to a
satisfactory end.
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 2 of 21
2. On 15th January, 2009 the U.P. Secondary Education Services
Selection Board (for short the “Board”) published an advertisement
inviting applications for recruitment to the post of Trained Graduate
Teachers in Social Science. The recruitment was to be in accordance with
the provisions of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board
Act, 1982 and the Rules framed thereunder.
3. More than 36,000 candidates took the written examination held
pursuant to the advertisement and the result of the written examination
was declared by the Board on 18th June, 2010. It may be mentioned that
the written examination was based on multiple choice answers which
were to be scanned on OMR sheets.
4. The candidates who qualified in the written examination were
called for an interview held between 16th and 26th July, 2010. Eventually,
the combined result (written examination and interview) was declared on
14th September, 2010. According to the appellants, they were successful
in the written examination as well as in the interview and were amongst
those who were in the select list for recruitment.
5. Some candidates who were not successful in the written
examination or in the interview filed writ petitions in the Allahabad High
Court between 2010 and 2011. All these writ petitions were dismissed by
a learned Single Judge. The reasons for dismissal of these writ petitions
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 3 of 21
were that there was no provision for re-evaluation of the answer sheets in
the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act,
1982 or the Rules framed thereunder. Reliance was also placed by the
learned Single Judge for dismissing writ petitions on the decision of this
Court in Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission v. Mukesh
Thakur1
in which this Court considered a large number of its earlier
decisions and held: “Thus, the law on the subject emerges to the effect
that in the absence of any provision under the statute or statutory
rules/regulations, the Court should not generally direct revaluation.”
6. Another batch of writ petitions (having 77 writ petitioners) came to
be listed before another learned Single Judge of the High Court. The
subject and issues were the same and the learned Single Judge admitted
these writ petitions for final hearing notwithstanding the dismissal of
several similar petitions. The challenge made by the writ petitioners was
to seven questions/answers in the written examination which, according
to them, had incorrect key answers. The learned Single Judge personally
examined those seven questions and concluded that:
(a) The correct answer of question no. 24 in History paper
would be option (1).
(b) For question no. 25, History paper, option (2) is correct.
(c) Option (2) is the correct answer of question no. 36 of
History paper.

1
(2010) 6 SCC 759
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 4 of 21
(d) Option (2) is correct answer in respect to question no. 37
of History paper.
(e) Question no. 40 of History paper is wrongly framed.
(f) In question no. 43, there may be two correct answers, i.e.
options (1) and (3).
(g) In question no.32 of Civics Paper, option (3) would be the
correct answer.
The learned Single Judge then proceeded to observe:
“It cannot be doubted that being a selection body for appointment
of Teachers in Secondary Schools, the Selection Board was under
a pious as well as statutory obligation to hold selection very
carefully, meticulously and in the most honest and correct
manner. The job of Selection Board could not have been
completed by mere holding a selection without caring whether
examination is being conducted correctly and properly, whether
all the questions have been framed in a proper manner, whether
the answer(s), if it is multiple choice examination, have been
given with due care and caution so as to leave no scope of error
or mistake therein etc. In fact if such a mistake is committed, it
causes a multi-edged injury to an otherwise studious, intelligent
and well conversant student who understand the subject, well
knows the relevant details and correct answers but suffers due to
sheer negligence of the examining body. The obligation of
examining body cannot be allowed to whittle out in any manner
for any reason whatsoever. For the fault of examining body, a
candidate cannot be made to suffer.”
7. On this basis, the learned Single Judge passed a judgment and
order dated 8th February, 2012 directing re-examination of the answer
sheets of these 77 writ petitioners. It was further directed that in case
these writ petitioners are selected then those at the bottom of the select
list would automatically have to be pushed out.
8. In must be recorded that the learned Single Judge did refer to and
cite several decisions of this Court on the subject or re-evaluation but
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 5 of 21
unfortunately did not appreciate the law laid down. The learned Single
Judge relied on Manish Ujwal v. Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati
University2
but failed to appreciate that the six disputed answers under
consideration in that case were demonstrably wrong and this was not in
dispute and even the learned counsel appearing for the University did not
question this fact. The decision is clearly distinguishable on facts.
9. Be that as it may, the issue that remained in Manish Ujwal was of
the appropriate orders to be passed. While considering this, the following
cautionary measures were suggested:
“….it is necessary to note that the University and those who
prepare the key answers have to be very careful and abundant
caution is necessary in these matters for more than one reason.
We mention few of those; first and paramount reason being the
welfare of the student as a wrong key answer can result in the
merit being made a casualty. One can well understand the
predicament of a young student at the threshold of his or her
career if despite giving correct answer, the student suffers as a
result of wrong and demonstrably erroneous key answers; the
second reason is that the courts are slow in interfering in
educational matters which, in turn, casts a higher responsibility
on the University while preparing the key answers; and thirdly, in
cases of doubt, the benefit goes in favour of the University and
not in favour of the students.”
10. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge, the
Board preferred Special Appeal No. 442 of 2012 before the Division
Bench of the High Court. Some candidates also preferred Special Appeals
directed against the judgment and order dated 8
th February, 2012. The

2
(2005) 13 SCC 744
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 6 of 21
Special Appeal filed by the Board was dismissed by a Division Bench of
the High Court on 13th March, 2012. In some other Special Appeal filed
by a candidate, it was stated by the Board on 11th April, 2012 that the
answer sheets of all the candidates would be re-evaluated in the light of
the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
11. Following up on this, the judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge was implemented on 10th September, 2012 and the reevaluated
results of the written examination of all candidates were
declared. As a result of the re-evaluation, it appears that some candidates,
who were declared successful in the combined result declared on 14
th
September, 2010 were now declared unsuccessful. The appellants before
us were not affected by the re-evaluation of the written examination and
continued in the select list.
12. Thereafter, a set of petitions was filed including some before this
Court and eventually it came to pass that those aggrieved by the order
passed by the Division Bench on 13th March, 2012 could file review
petitions.
13. On 12th May, 2014 the Board published the final select list of
candidates who had qualified in the written examination as well as in the
interview. In this final select list, the appellants did not find a place and,
therefore, they challenged the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8th
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 7 of 21
February, 2012. According to the appellants the learned Single Judge had
incorrectly re-evaluated the seven disputed questions and had arrived at
incorrect answers to these questions.
14. The Division Bench heard all the review petitions as well as the
appeals and passed an order dated 28th April, 2015 referring the seven
disputed questions/answers for consideration by a one-man Expert
Committee. On or about 18th May, 2015 the Expert Committee gave its
Report to which the appellants filed objections. Eventually, by the
judgment and order dated 2nd November, 2015 the Division Bench
directed a fresh evaluation of the answer sheets on the basis of the Report
of the Expert Committee. This decision of the Division Bench is under
challenge before us.
15. During the pendency of the appeals in this Court, the third reevaluation
was completed by the Board. The result of the third reevaluation
has been kept in a sealed cover. The sealed cover was initially
filed before us but later returned to learned counsel for the Board.
16. We are pained that an examination for recruitment of Trained
Graduate Teachers advertised in January, 2009 has still not attained
finality even after the passage of more than eight years. The system of
holding public examinations needs to be carefully scrutinised and
reviewed so that selected candidates are not drawn into litigation which
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 8 of 21
could go on for several years. Be that as it may, we have still to tackle
the issues before us.
17. It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the Uttar
Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 and the
Rules framed thereunder do not provide for any re-evaluation of the
answer sheets and, therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have
undertaken that exercise at all. Reference was made to the following
passage from Mukesh Thakur which considered several decisions on the
subject and held:
“In view of the above, it was not permissible for the High Court
to examine the question papers and answer sheets itself,
particularly, when the Commission had assessed the inter se merit
of the candidates. If there was a discrepancy in framing the
question or evaluation of the answer, it could be for all the
candidates appearing for the examination and not for Respondent
1 only. It is a matter of chance that the High Court was
examining the answer sheets relating to Law. Had it been other
subjects like Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics, we are unable
to understand as to whether such a course could have been
adopted by the High Court. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that such a course was not permissible to the High
Court.”
18. A complete hands-off or no-interference approach was neither
suggested in Mukesh Thakur nor has it been suggested in any other
decision of this Court – the case law developed over the years admits of
interference in the results of an examination but in rare and exceptional
situations and to a very limited extent.
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 9 of 21
19. In Kanpur University v. Samir Gupta3
this Court took the view
that “…. the key answer should be assumed to be correct unless it is
proved to be wrong and that it should not be held to be wrong by an
inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation. It must
be clearly demonstrated to be wrong, that is to say, it must be such as no
reasonable body of men well-versed in the particular subject would
regard as correct.” In other words, the onus is on the candidate to clearly
demonstrate that the key answer is incorrect and that too without any
inferential process or reasoning. The burden on the candidate is therefore
rather heavy and the constitutional courts must be extremely cautious in
entertaining a plea challenging the correctness of a key answer. To
prevent such challenges, this Court recommended a few steps to be taken
by the examination authorities and among them are: (i) Establishing a
system of moderation; (ii) Avoid any ambiguity in the questions,
including those that might be caused by translation; and (iii) Prompt
decision be taken to exclude the suspect question and no marks be
assigned to it.
20. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary
Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth4
is perhaps the leading case
on the subject and concerned itself with Regulation 104 of the

3
(1983) 4 SCC 309
4
(1984) 4 SCC 27
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 10 of 21
Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Boards
Regulations, 1977 which reads:
“104. Verification of marks obtained by a candidate in a
subject.—(1) Any candidate who has appeared at the Higher
Secondary Certificate examination may apply to the Divisional
Secretary for verification of marks in any particular subject. The
verification will be restricted to checking whether all the answers
have been examined and that there has been no mistake in the
totalling of marks for each question in that subject and
transferring marks correctly on the first cover page of the answer
book and whether the supplements attached to the answer book
mentioned by the candidate are intact. No revaluation of the
answer book or supplements shall be done.
(2) Such an application must be made by the candidate through
the head of the junior college which presented him for the
examination, within two weeks of the declaration of the
examination results and must be accompanied by a fee of Rs 10
for each subject.
(3) No candidate shall claim, or be entitled to revaluation of his
answers or disclosure or inspection of the answer books or other
documents as these are treated by the Divisional Board as most
confidential.”
21. The question before this Court was: Whether, under law, a
candidate has a right to demand an inspection, verification and
revaluation of answer books and whether the statutory regulations framed
by the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary
Education governing the subject insofar as they categorically state that
there shall be no such right can be said to be ultra vires, unreasonable and
void.
22. This Court noted that the Bombay High Court, while dealing with a
batch of 39 writ petitions, divided them into two groups: (i) Cases where
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 11 of 21
a right of inspection of the answer sheets was claimed; (ii) Cases where a
right of inspection and re-evaluation of answer sheets was claimed. With
regard to the first group, the High Court held the above Regulation 104(3)
as unreasonable and void and directed the concerned Board to allow
inspection of the answer sheets. With regard to the second group of cases,
it was held that the above Regulation 104(1) was void, illegal and
manifestly unreasonable and therefore directed that the facility of reevaluation
should be allowed to those examinees who had applied for it.
23. In appeal against the decision of the High Court, it was held by this
Court that the principles of natural justice are not applicable in such
cases. It was held that: “The principles of natural justice cannot be
extended beyond reasonable and rational limits and cannot be carried to
such absurd lengths as to make it necessary that candidates who have
taken a public examination should be allowed to participate in the process
of evaluation of their performances or to verify the correctness of the
evaluation made by the examiners by themselves conducting an
inspection of the answer books and determining whether there has been a
proper and fair valuation of the answers by the examiners.”
24. On the validity of the Regulations, this Court held that they were
not illegal or unreasonable or ultra vires the rule making power conferred
by statute. It was then said:
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 12 of 21
“The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy
evolved by the Legislature and the subordinate regulation-making
body. It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the
purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness
and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any
drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will
not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the
ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but
is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate
the purposes of the Act. The Legislature and its delegate are the
sole repositories of the power to decide what policy should be
pursued in relation to matters covered by the Act and there is no
scope for interference by the Court unless the particular provision
impugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity,
in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the
regulation-making power or its being inconsistent with any of the
provisions of the parent enactment or in violation of any of the
limitations imposed by the Constitution. None of these vitiating
factors are shown to exist in the present case…..”.
It was also noted by this Court that:
“..the High Court has ignored the cardinal principle that it is not
within the legitimate domain of the Court to determine whether
the purpose of a statute can be served better by adopting any
policy different from what has been laid down by the Legislature
or its delegate and to strike down as unreasonable a bye-law
(assuming for the purpose of discussion that the impugned
regulation is a bye-law) merely on the ground that the policy
enunciated therein does not meet with the approval of the Court
in regard to its efficaciousness for implementation of the object
and purposes of the Act.”
25. Upholding the validity of Regulation 104, this Court then
proceeded on the basis of the plain and simple language of the Regulation
to hold that “The right of verification conferred by clause (1) is subject to
the limitation contained in the same clause that no revaluation of the
answer books or supplements shall be done and the further restriction
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 13 of 21
imposed by clause (3), prohibiting disclosure or inspection of the answer
books.”
This Court then concluded the discussion by observing:
“As has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court, the Court
should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to
what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters
in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing
technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day
working of educational institutions and the departments
controlling them. It will be wholly wrong for the Court to make a
pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the problems of this
nature, isolated from the actual realities and grass root problems
involved in the working of the system and unmindful of the
consequences which would emanate if a purely idealistic view as
opposed to a pragmatic one were to be propounded. It is equally
important that the Court should also, as far as possible, avoid any
decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, rule or bye-law
which would bring about the result of rendering the system
unworkable in practice. It is unfortunate that this principle has
not been adequately kept in mind by the High Court while
deciding the instant case.”
26. In Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Chairman, Bihar Public Service
Commission5
the question under consideration was whether the High
Court was right in directing re-evaluation of the answer book of a
candidate in the absence of any provision entitling the candidate to ask
for re-evaluation. This Court noted that there was no provision in the
concerned Rules for re-evaluation but only a provision for scrutiny of the
answer book “wherein the answer-books are seen for the purpose of
checking whether all the answers given by a candidate have been
examined and whether there has been any mistake in the totalling of

5
(2004) 6 SCC 714
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 14 of 21
marks of each question and noting them correctly on the first cover page
of the answer-book.” This Court reiterated the conclusion in Paritosh
Bhupeshkumar Sheth that “in the absence of a specific provision
conferring a right upon an examinee to have his answer-books reevaluated,
no such direction can be issued.”
27. The principle laid down by this Court in Paritosh Bhupeshkumar
Sheth was affirmed in Secy., W.B. Council of Higher Secondary
Education v. Ayan Das6
and it was reiterated that there must be finality
attached to the result of a public examination and in the absence of a
statutory provision re-evaluation of answer scripts cannot be permitted
and that it could be done only in exceptional cases and as a rarity.
Reference was also made to Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Chairman,
Bihar Public Service Commission, Board of Secondary
Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda
7
and President, Board of Secondary
Education v. D. Suvankar8
.
28. The facts in Central Board of Secondary Education v. Khushboo
Shrivastava9
are rather interesting. The respondent was a candidate in the
All India Pre-Medical/Pre-Dental Entrance Examination, 2007 conducted
by the Central Board of Secondary Education (for short “the CBSE”).
Soon after the results of the examination were declared, she applied for

6
(2007) 8 SCC 242
7
(2004) 13 SCC 383
8
(2007) 1 SCC 603
9
(2014) 14 SCC 523
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 15 of 21
re-evaluation of her answer sheets. The CBSE declined her request since
there was no provision for this. She then filed a writ petition in the Patna
High Court and the learned Single Judge called for her answer sheets and
on a perusal thereof and on comparing her answers with the model or key
answers concluded that she deserved an additional two marks. The view
of the learned Single Judge was upheld by the Division Bench of the
High Court.
29. In appeal, this Court set aside the decision of the High Court and
reiterating the view already expressed by this Court from time to time and
allowing the appeal of the CBSE it was held:
“We find that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pramod
Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission has
clearly held relying on Maharashtra State Board of Secondary
and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar
Sheth that in the absence of any provision for the re-evaluation of
answer books in the relevant rules, no candidate in an
examination has any right to claim or ask for re-evaluation of his
marks. The decision in Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar
Public Service Commission was followed by another three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas
Ranjan Panda in which the direction of the High Court for reevaluation
of answer books of all the examinees securing 90% or
above marks was held to be unsustainable in law because the
regulations of the Board of Secondary Education, Orissa, which
conducted the examination, did not make any provision for reevaluation
of answer books in the rules.
In the present case, the bye-laws of the All India PreMedical/Pre-Dental
Entrance Examination, 2007 conducted by
the CBSE did not provide for re-examination or re-evaluation of
answer sheets. Hence, the appellants could not have allowed such
re-examination or re-evaluation on the representation of
Respondent 1 and accordingly rejected the representation of
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 16 of 21
Respondent 1 for re-examination/re-evaluation of her answer
sheets......
In our considered opinion, neither the learned Single Judge nor
the Division Bench of the High Court could have substituted
his/its own views for that of the examiners and awarded two
additional marks to Respondent 1 for the two answers in exercise
of powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution
as these are purely academic matters. .....”
30. The law on the subject is therefore, quite clear and we only propose
to highlight a few significant conclusions. They are: (i) If a statute, Rule
or Regulation governing an examination permits the re-evaluation of an
answer sheet or scrutiny of an answer sheet as a matter of right, then the
authority conducting the examination may permit it; (ii) If a statute, Rule
or Regulation governing an examination does not permit re-evaluation or
scrutiny of an answer sheet (as distinct from prohibiting it) then the Court
may permit re-evaluation or scrutiny only if it is demonstrated very
clearly, without any “inferential process of reasoning or by a process of
rationalisation” and only in rare or exceptional cases that a material error
has been committed; (iii) The Court should not at all re-evaluate or
scrutinize the answer sheets of a candidate – it has no expertise in the
matter and academic matters are best left to academics; (iv) The Court
should presume the correctness of the key answers and proceed on that
assumption; and (v) In the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to the
examination authority rather than to the candidate.
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 17 of 21
31. On our part we may add that sympathy or compassion does not
play any role in the matter of directing or not directing re-evaluation of an
answer sheet. If an error is committed by the examination authority, the
complete body of candidates suffers. The entire examination process does
not deserve to be derailed only because some candidates are disappointed
or dissatisfied or perceive some injustice having been caused to them by
an erroneous question or an erroneous answer. All candidates suffer
equally, though some might suffer more but that cannot be helped since
mathematical precision is not always possible. This Court has shown one
way out of an impasse – exclude the suspect or offending question.
32. It is rather unfortunate that despite several decisions of this Court,
some of which have been discussed above, there is interference by the
Courts in the result of examinations. This places the examination
authorities in an unenviable position where they are under scrutiny and not
the candidates. Additionally, a massive and sometimes prolonged
examination exercise concludes with an air of uncertainty. While there is
no doubt that candidates put in a tremendous effort in preparing for an
examination, it must not be forgotten that even the examination authorities
put in equally great efforts to successfully conduct an examination. The
enormity of the task might reveal some lapse at a later stage, but the Court
must consider the internal checks and balances put in place by the
examination authorities before interfering with the efforts put in by the
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 18 of 21
candidates who have successfully participated in the examination and the
examination authorities. The present appeals are a classic example of the
consequence of such interference where there is no finality to the result of
the examinations even after a lapse of eight years. Apart from the
examination authorities even the candidates are left wondering about the
certainty or otherwise of the result of the examination – whether they have
passed or not; whether their result will be approved or disapproved by the
Court; whether they will get admission in a college or University or not;
and whether they will get recruited or not. This unsatisfactory situation
does not work to anybody’s advantage and such a state of uncertainty
results in confusion being worse confounded. The overall and larger
impact of all this is that public interest suffers.
33. The facts of the case before us indicate that in the first instance the
learned Single Judge took it upon himself to actually ascertain the
correctness of the key answers to seven questions. This was completely
beyond his jurisdiction and as decided by this Court on several occasions,
the exercise carried out was impermissible. Fortunately, the Division
Bench did not repeat the error but in a sense, endorsed the view of the
learned Single Judge, by not considering the decisions of this Court but
sending four key answers for consideration by a one-man Expert
Committee.
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 19 of 21
34. Having come to the conclusion that the High Court (the learned
Single Judge as well as the Division Bench) ought to have been far more
circumspect in interfering and deciding on the correctness of the key
answers, the situation today is that there is a third evaluation of the answer
sheets and a third set of results is now ready for declaration. Given this
scenario, the options before us are to nullify the entire re-evaluation
process and depend on the result declared on 14th September, 2010 or to go
by the third set of results. Cancelling the examination is not an option.
Whichever option is chosen, there will be some candidates who are likely
to suffer and lose their jobs while some might be entitled to consideration
for employment.
35. Having weighed the options before us, we are of opinion that the
middle path is perhaps the best path to be taken under the circumstances of
the case. The middle path is to declare the third set of results since the
Board has undertaken a massive exercise under the directions of the High
Court and yet protect those candidates may now be declared unsuccessful
but are working as Trained Graduate Teachers a result of the first or the
second declaration of results. It is also possible that consequent upon the
third declaration of results some new candidates might get selected and
should that happen, they will need to be accommodated since they were
erroneously not selected on earlier occasions.
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 20 of 21
36. Learned counsel for the appellants contended before us that in case
her clients are not selected after the third declaration of results, they will be
seriously prejudiced having worked as Trained Graduate Teachers for
several years. However, with the middle path that we have chosen their
services will be protected and, therefore, there is no cause for any
grievance by any of the appellants. Similarly, those who have not been
selected but unfortunately left out they will be accommodated.
37. As a result of our discussion and taking into consideration all the
possibilities that might arise, we issue the following directions:
(1) The results prepared by the Board consequent upon the
decision dated 2nd November, 2015 of the High Court
should be declared by the Board within two weeks from
today.
(2) Candidates appointed and working as Trained Graduate
Teachers pursuant to the declaration of results on the earlier
occasions, if found unsuccessful on the third declaration of
results, should not be removed from service but should be
allowed to continue.
(3) Candidates now selected for appointment as Trained
Graduate Teachers (after the third declaration of results)
should be appointed by the State by creating supernumerary
posts. However, these newly appointed Trained Graduate
Teachers will not be entitled to any consequential benefits.
38. Before concluding, we must express our deep anguish with the turn
of events whereby the learned Single Judge entertained a batch of writ
C.A. Nos.367 of 2017 etc. Page 21 of 21
petitions, out of which these appeals have arisen, even though several
similar writ petitions had earlier been dismissed by other learned Single
Judge(s). Respect for the view taken by a coordinate Bench is an essential
element of judicial discipline. A judge might have a difference of opinion
with another judge, but that does not give him or her any right to ignore
the contrary view. In the event of a difference of opinion, the procedure
sanctified by time must be adhered to so that there is demonstrated
respect for the rule of law.
39. With the above directions, the appeals and miscellaneous
applications are disposed of.
...……………………J
(Madan B. Lokur)

.…………………....J
(Deepak Gupta)
New Delhi;
December 11, 2017

NO OFFENCE UNDER Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act - As not show that the appellant had committed rape on the victim on the ground that she belonged to Scheduled Caste. = In the present case, unamended Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act is applicable as the occurrence was on the night of 8/9.12.1995. From the unamended provisions of Section 3(2) (v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, it is clear that the statute laid stress on the intention of the accused in committing such offence in order to belittle the person as he/she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. The evidence and materials on record do not show that the appellant had committed rape on the victim on the ground that she belonged to Scheduled Caste. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act can be pressed into service only if it is proved that the rape has been committed on the ground that PW-3 Phoola Devi belonged to Scheduled Caste community. In the absence of evidence proving intention of the appellant in committing the offence upon PW-3-Phoola Devi only because she belongs to Scheduled Caste community, the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act cannot be sustained In the result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon him are set aside and the appeal is partly allowed. - So far as the conviction of the appellant under Section 376(2)(g) IPC and other offences and sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him are confirmed. As the appellant had already undergone more than ten years, the appellant is ordered to be released forthwith unless he is required in any other case.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1182 OF 2015
ASHARFI …Appellant
Versus
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ....Respondent
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of the Allahabad High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 8270 of 2007 dated 29.01.2013 in and by
which the High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of the
appellant awarded by the trial court. The trial court vide its judgment
dated 30.11.2007 convicted the appellant for the offences under
Sections 450, 376(2)(g), 323 IPC and under Section 3(2)(v) of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 [for short 'the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act]. For
conviction under Section 376(2)(g) IPC, the appellant was sentenced
Page No. 1 of 6
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years with fine of Rs. 8,000/-
with default clause and for conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the
SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, the appellant was sentenced to
undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 10,000/- with default clause.
The appellant was also imposed sentence of imprisonment for other
offences under Indian Penal Code.
2. Case of the prosecution is that on the intervening night of
8/9.12.1995, appellant Asharfi and one Udai Bhan are alleged to have
forcibly opened the door and entered inside the house of PW-3-Phoola
Devi and PW-4-Brij Lal and said to have committed rape on PW-3
Phoola Devi. PW-4-Brij Lal was kept away on the point of pistol. On
raising alarm, neighbours (PW-1-Rassu and PW-2-Baghraj) came
there and on seeing them, the accused persons ran away threatening
the witnesses. Based on the complaint lodged by the complainant Brij
Lal, FIR was registered in Case Crime No.76 of 1996 under Sections
376/452/323/506 IPC and under Section 3(1) 12 SC/ST Act against
appellant and one Udai Bhan. After completion of investigation,
chargesheet was filed against the appellant and the said Udai Bhan for
the abovesaid offences. As noted above, the appellant and Udai Bhan
were convicted for various offences by the trial court. In the appeal
Page No. 2 of 6
preferred by the appellant before the High Court, the High Court
affirmed the conviction of the appellant and the said Udai Bhan.
3. We have heard the learned amicus curiae appearing for the
appellant. None appeared on behalf of the respondent. We have
carefully perused the impugned judgment and materials on record.
4. So far as the conviction under Section 376(2)(g) IPC is
concerned, based upon the evidence of PW-3-Phoola Devi and PW-4
Brij Lal and the medical evidence, both the courts below recorded
concurrent findings that the charge of rape has been proved. We are
not inclined to interfere with the same and also the sentence of ten
years of imprisonment imposed upon him. We also find no perversity
with respect to the conviction and sentence of the appellant with
respect to other offences under Indian Penal Code.
5. In respect of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
Prevention of Atrocities Act, the appellant had been sentenced to life
imprisonment. The gravamen of Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Prevention
of Atrocities Act is that any offence, envisaged under Indian Penal
Code punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more,
against a person belonging Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, should
have been committed on the ground that "such person is a member of
Page No. 3 of 6
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to
such member". Prior to the Amendment Act 1 of 2016, the words used
in Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act are "......on
the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe".
6. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act has now
been amended by virtue of Amendment Act 1 of 2016. By way of this
amendment, the words ".......on the ground that such person is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe" have been
substituted with the words "........knowing that such person is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe". Therefore, if
subsequent to 26.01.2016 (i.e. the day on which the amendment came
into effect), an offence under Indian Penal Code which is punishable
with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, is committed upon a
victim who belongs to SC/ST community and the accused person has
knowledge that such victim belongs to SC/ST community, then the
charge of Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act is
attracted. Thus, after the amendment, mere knowledge of the accused
that the person upon whom the offence is committed belongs to SC/ST
Page No. 4 of 6
community suffices to bring home the charge under Section 3(2)(v) of
the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.
7. In the present case, unamended Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
Prevention of Atrocities Act is applicable as the occurrence was on the
night of 8/9.12.1995. From the unamended provisions of Section 3(2)
(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, it is clear that the statute
laid stress on the intention of the accused in committing such offence
in order to belittle the person as he/she belongs to Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe community.
8. The evidence and materials on record do not show that the
appellant had committed rape on the victim on the ground that she
belonged to Scheduled Caste. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
Prevention of Atrocities Act can be pressed into service only if it is
proved that the rape has been committed on the ground that PW-3
Phoola Devi belonged to Scheduled Caste community. In the absence
of evidence proving intention of the appellant in committing the offence
upon PW-3-Phoola Devi only because she belongs to Scheduled
Caste community, the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v)
of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act cannot be sustained.
Page No. 5 of 6
9. In the result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(2)(v)
of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed
upon him are set aside and the appeal is partly allowed.
10. So far as the conviction of the appellant under Section 376(2)(g)
IPC and other offences and sentence of imprisonment imposed upon
him are confirmed. As the appellant had already undergone more than
ten years, the appellant is ordered to be released forthwith unless he is
required in any other case.
…….…………...………J.
[RANJAN GOGOI]
…………….……………J.
[R. BANUMATHI]
New Delhi;
December 8, 2017
Page No. 6 of 6

whether the Arbitral Tribunal was justified in awarding interest on various claims for different periods to the claimant (respondent No.1), namely, (i) for a pre-reference period, i.e., 04.03.1996 to 05.05.1999 @ 15% p.a.; (ii) pendent lite, i.e., for the period from 06.05.1999 to 09.09.2002 @ 12% p.a.; and (iii) post reference period, i.e., 09.09.2002 till payment @ 18% p.a., total (first and second) Rs.12,89,033/- on the awarded sum.= It is a well-settled principle in Arbitration Law that the award of an Arbitral Tribunal once passed is binding on the parties. The reason being that the 17 parties having chosen their own Arbitrator and given him an authority to decide the specific disputes arising between them must respect his decision as far as possible and should not make any attempt to find fault in each issue decided by him only because it is decided against one party. It is only when the issue decided is found to be bad in law in the light of any of the specified grounds set out in Section 34 of the Act, the Court may consider it appropriate to interfere in the award else not. The case at hand falls in former category.;“Now, we have often had occasion to say that when the State deals with a citizen it should not ordinarily rely on technicalities, and if the State is satisfied that the case of the citizen is a just one, even though legal defences may be open to it, it must act, as has been said by eminent judges, as an honest person.”;The aforementioned observations has full application to the case at hand because here also, the appellant (railways) pursued their technical legal point up to this Court against respondent No.1 (claimant) without even raising it at any stage of proceedings much less to find out whether it could be made a ground under Section 34 of the Act to seek its setting aside. All was being done to defeat respondent No.1’s just claim of interest which was rightly awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal and upheld by the Courts below on other grounds

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.8530 OF 2009
Union of India ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
M/s. Susaka Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the Union of India
against the final judgment and order dated
11.02.2005 passed by the High Court of Bombay in
Appeal (Ld) No.666 of 2003 in Arbitration Petition
No.96 of 2003 whereby the Division Bench of the
High Court allowed the appeal filed by respondent
No.1 herein and set aside the order dated
21.04.2003 passed by the Single Judge in
Arbitration Petition No.96 of 2003.
2
2. The issue involved in the appeal is short and,
therefore, it is not necessary to set out the entire
factual scenario of the case except to the extent
necessary to appreciate the issue.
3. In short, the question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the Arbitral
Tribunal was justified in awarding interest on
various claims for different periods to the claimant
(respondent No.1), namely, (i) for a pre-reference
period, i.e., 04.03.1996 to 05.05.1999 @ 15% p.a.;
(ii) pendent lite, i.e., for the period from 06.05.1999
to 09.09.2002 @ 12% p.a.; and (iii) post reference
period, i.e., 09.09.2002 till payment @ 18% p.a.,
total (first and second) Rs.12,89,033/- on the
awarded sum.
Brief facts:
4. A works contract (repairing work of 25 No.
stators of TAO-659 Traction Motors of Electric
Locomotives type WCAMI of Electric Loco
3
Shed-Valsad) was awarded by the Union of India
(Railways) - the appellant herein to respondent No.1
(claimant) on 19.12.1994.
5. In execution of the works contract, various
disputes arose between the parties. Since the
General Conditions of Contract (in short, “GCC”)
contained Clause 56(1) to decide the disputes
arising out of the contract through arbitration,
respondent No.1(claimant) invoked the arbitration
clause and filed an application in the High Court of
Bombay under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”)
praying therein for appointment of the Arbitral
Tribunal in terms of Clause 56(1) and to make a
reference to the Arbitral Tribunal for deciding the
disputes which had arisen between the parties.
6. The High Court, by order dated 27.07.2001,
with consent of both the parties allowed respondent
No.1's application and referred the various claims (1
4
to 17) made by the respondent (claimant) against
the appellant for their adjudication by the Arbitral
Tribunal, which consisted of three Arbitrators
(Railway Officials). The order making the reference
to the Arbitral Tribunal reads as under:
“There is no dispute that claims Nos. 1
to 13 which are mentioned in the letter dated
19th August, 1999, Exhibit “B” to the
Application, are already referred for
arbitration to Shri B.B. Verma, Presiding
Joint Arbitrator & FA & CAO (I), Churchgate
and two other Arbitrators, (i) Shri Arunendra
Kumar, Jt. Arbitrator & CRSE, Churchgate
and (ii) Shri S.K. Kulshrestha, Jt. Arbitrator &
CE, N.F. Railway.
2. By Consent, claim at Sr. No. 16 (Claim
No. 2.1) and at Sr. No. 17 (Claim No. 2.2) are
also referred for arbitration to the same
Arbitrators who shall decide these claims
along with claim Nos. 1 to 15. They shall also
be free to decide pre-reference interest,
Pendente lite interest, further interest and
costs considering the agreement. The
Respondent shall be free to file
counter-claim, if any.”
7. Parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Arbitral Tribunal, filed their statement of
claim/reply etc. and adduced evidence. The Arbitral
Tribunal, by their unanimous reasoned award dated
5
11.09.2002, partly allowed the claims of respondent
No.1 against the appellant as under:
Claim
No.
Brief
Description
Claim
Amount in
Rs.
Amount
awarded in
Rs.
1.1 Loss
suffered due
to
under-utiliz
ation of
equipment
purchased
specially for
this
contract.
6,97,554 3,48,777
1.2 Material
purchased
not utilized.
3,00,723 3,00,723
1.3 Loss of
Profit
4,65,409
(Revised to
Rs.
4,44,620)
2,32,703
1.4,1.5 &
2.1
1.4
–Overheads
during
contracted
period
under
utilized- 1.5
–Overheads
from
9.6.1995 to
4.3.1996 –
2.1
–Overheads
from
5.3.1996 to
30.06.1996
4,65,409
3,89,165
3,06,748
3,41,830
1.7 & 2.2 1.7 –
Amount for
the period
1.7.94 to
3,28,085 1,64,042
6
29.6.1996
2.2 –
Amount for
the period
5.3.96 to
30.09.1996
1,24,174
1.6 Payment
under price
variation
clause
85,106 85,106
1.8 & 2.3
2.4
Payment of
pre lite
interest
from
13.12.95 to
5.5.99
As accrued 12,89,033
Total 27,62,214
8. The appellant-Union of India, felt aggrieved of
the Arbitral Award, challenged its legality by filing
an application under Section 34 of the Act in
Bombay High Court (Single Judge).
9. The Single Judge, by order dated 21.04.2003,
allowed the appeal in part and made two
modifications in the arbitral award with respect to
the date of award of interest on the claim of
respondent No.1 for damages and on the claim of
one purchase item. The Single Judge made the
interest payable from the date of award till
7
realization. So far as the challenge to other claims
including award of interest on such claims were
concerned, the Single Judge rejected the appellant’s
all objections and upheld the award in totality for all
purposes.
10. Respondent No.1 (claimant), felt aggrieved
against that part of the order of the Single Judge
which interfered in part in the arbitral award, filed
appeal before the Division Bench. So far as the
appellant-Union of India was concerned, they did
not file any appeal against that part of the order of
the Single Judge which had rejected substantially
their application filed under Section 34 of the Act.
In this view of the matter, the award to that extent
became final.
11. By impugned judgment, the Division Bench of
the High Court allowed respondent No.1’s appeal
and set aside the order of the Single Judge. It was
held that no ground under Section 34 of the Act had
8
been made out by the Union of India to modify the
award to the extent of awarding interest on the
claim. In other words, in the opinion of Division
Bench, the ground on which the limited interference
was made by the Single Judge for setting aside a
part of the Award in relation to award of interest
from a particular date on two (2) claims to
respondent No.1 (claimant) was not a ground falling
under Section 34 of the Act and, therefore, the order
of Single Judge was not legally sustainable. It was
accordingly set aside resulting in upholding of the
entire award and dismissal of Section 34 application
in its entirety. It is against this order, the Union of
India (Railways) felt aggrieved and filed the present
appeal by way of special leave in this Court.
12. Heard Ms. Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel
for the appellant and Mr. Vinay Navare, learned
counsel for respondent No.1.
9
13. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel,
appearing for the appellant (Union of India) while
challenging the legality and correctness of the
impugned judgment has argued only one point.
14. According to learned counsel, the Arbitral
Tribunal mis-conducted in awarding interest on
various claims and, therefore, a ground to set aside
the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act is
made out.
15. Placing reliance on Clause 13(3) of GCC,
learned counsel urged that since clause 13(3)
provides that no interest will be payable upon the
earnest money or the security deposit or amounts
payable to the contractor under the contract (except
Government securities), respondent No.1 (claimant)
was not entitled to claim interest on any of the
heads.
16. In other words, the submission was that the
Arbitral Tribunal mis-conducted in awarding
10
interest to respondent No.1 (claimant) on their
various claims when the clause 13(3) of GCC did not
allow them to claim any interest on the sums
payable under the contract except on Government
securities, if deposited with the appellant.
17. It was, therefore, her submission that the
award to this extent was not legally sustainable
and, therefore, it was liable to be set aside under
Section 34 of the Act. Learned counsel elaborated
this submission by placing reliance on the
provisions of the Act and some decided cases cited
at the Bar.
18. In reply, learned counsel for respondent No.1
(claimant) supported the impugned judgment and
contended that the aforementioned point urged by
the appellant was neither raised nor urged before
the Arbitral Tribunal nor the High Court, i.e., Single
Judge and also Division Bench and hence it cannot
be permitted to be raised, for the first time, in an
11
appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution for
want of any factual foundation and finding by any
Court on such plea.
19. Having heard learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we are
inclined to accept the argument of learned counsel
for respondent No.1 as, in our view, it has a force
and hence deserves acceptance.
20. It is not in dispute that the appellant did not
raise the plea based on clause 13(3) of the GCC
against respondent No.1 at any stage of the
proceedings either in their reply filed before the
Arbitral Tribunal or/and in submissions except
raising it, for the first time, before this Court in this
appeal.
21. On the other hand, we find that in Section 11
(5) proceedings, the appellant did not raise this
objection in their reply and instead gave their
express consent to refer the issue of award of
12
interest payable on various claims (1 to 17) to
Arbitral Tribunal considering the said claim to be
arbitrable under the contract.
22. In our opinion, the appellant could have
registered their objection before the Single Judge at
the time of making a reference to the Arbitral
Tribunal by pointing out Clause 13(3) of GCC or
could have reserved their right to raise such
objection before the Arbitral Tribunal. It was,
however, not done.
23. Not only that, we further find that the
appellant, in their reply, filed before the Arbitral
Tribunal also did not raise this plea and allowed the
Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate the said issue on
merits.
24. If the appellant was so keen to place reliance
on clause 13(3) of GCC to defeat the claim of
respondent No.1 relating to the award of interest on
various claims, then it was necessary for the
13
appellant to have raised such plea specifically, in
their reply, before the Arbitral Tribunal. No such
plea was raised even before the Arbitral Tribunal.
25. Though we find that the appellant raised this
ground, for the first time, in Section 34 proceedings
[see-ground (cc)] before the Single Judge but again
this ground was not pressed at the time of
arguments. It is clear from the perusal of the Single
Judge’s order. Not only that, the appellant again
did not raise this plea before the Division Bench.
26. In the light of aforementioned factual scenario
emerging from the record of the case, we cannot
grant any indulgence to the appellant (Union of
India) to raise such plea for the first time here. In
our view, it is a clear case of waiver or/and
abandonment of a plea at the initial stage itself.
27. Everyone has a right to waive and to agree to
waive the advantage of a law made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his
14
private capacity, which may be dispensed with
without infringing any public right or public policy.
Cuilibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto. (See
Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes 12th
Edition at page 328)
28. If a plea is available-whether on facts or law, it
has to be raised by the party at appropriate stage in
accordance with law. If not raised or/and given up
with consent, the party would be precluded from
raising such plea at a later stage of the proceedings
on the principle of waiver. If permitted to raise, it
causes prejudice to other party. In our opinion, this
principle applies to this case.
29. In our opinion, the appellant is otherwise not
entitled to raise the plea on yet another ground. It
is not in dispute that the appellant’s application
filed under Section 34 of the Act was partly allowed
by the Single Judge only to the extent of two claims
regarding award of interest. In other words, the
15
application suffered dismissal substantially on all
other claims except two claims mentioned above.
However, despite suffering substantial dismissal,
the appellant did not file any appeal to challenge the
part dismissal of their application.
30. In this view of the matter, in our view, the
order of the Single Judge insofar as it resulted in
dismissal of the appellant’s application became final
and attained finality. In order to keep the issue
alive, the appellant was under obligation to file
regular appeal before the Division Bench against
that part of the Single Judge’s order by which their
application under Section 34 of the Act in relation to
all other claims had been dismissed. It was only
then in the event of dismissal of the appeal, the
issues raised therein could have been pursued in
appeal to this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution and that too only on the grounds
16
raised therein and decided against the appellant. It
was, however, not done by the appellant.
31. In our opinion, therefore, this is yet another
infirmity which renders the appeal devoid of any
merit.
32. In our considered view, the grant of award of
interest on arbitrable claims by the Arbitral
Tribunal is not inherently illegal or against any
public policy or per se bad in law or beyond the
powers of the Arbitral Tribunal. In other words, it is
permissible to award interest in arbitrable claims by
the Arbitral Tribunal.
33. Indeed, Section 31(7) (a) and (b) of the Act
empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to award interest on
the awarded sum and secondly, it is always subject
to the agreement between the parties.
34. It is a well-settled principle in Arbitration Law
that the award of an Arbitral Tribunal once passed
is binding on the parties. The reason being that the
17
parties having chosen their own Arbitrator and
given him an authority to decide the specific
disputes arising between them must respect his
decision as far as possible and should not make any
attempt to find fault in each issue decided by him
only because it is decided against one party. It is
only when the issue decided is found to be bad in
law in the light of any of the specified grounds set
out in Section 34 of the Act, the Court may consider
it appropriate to interfere in the award else not. The
case at hand falls in former category.
35. This case reminds us of the apt observations
made by former Chief Justice M.C. Chagla in Firm
Kaluram Sitaram vs. The Dominion of India, AIR
1954 Bombay 50. That was also a case between the
Railways and private party (citizen) wherein the
learned Chief Justice, in his distinctive style of
writing, commented upon the manner in which the
Railway contested the case against the private party
18
(citizen) by raising some technical pleas and
observed as under:
“Now, we have often had occasion to say that
when the State deals with a citizen it should
not ordinarily rely on technicalities, and if
the State is satisfied that the case of the
citizen is a just one, even though legal
defences may be open to it, it must act, as
has been said by eminent judges, as an
honest person.”
36. The aforementioned observations has full
application to the case at hand because here also,
the appellant (railways) pursued their technical
legal point up to this Court against respondent No.1
(claimant) without even raising it at any stage of
proceedings much less to find out whether it could
be made a ground under Section 34 of the Act to
seek its setting aside. All was being done to defeat
respondent No.1’s just claim of interest which was
rightly awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal and upheld
by the Courts below on other grounds.
37. Learned counsel for the appellant did not urge
any other point to attack the impugned judgment
19
including the reasoning given in support of the
award of interest except to urge the aforesaid point
to challenge its legality, which we have repelled by
not permitting the appellant to raise it in this
appeal.
38. In view of foregoing discussion, we find no
merit in the appeal, which thus fails and is
accordingly dismissed.
………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...
……..................................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
New Delhi;
December 08, 2017