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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Thursday, December 14, 2017

whether in view of the joint purchase and declaration in Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88, the two Appellants and Respondent no.1 are co-bhumidhars to the extent of 1/3rd share of each, or is Respondent no. 1 owner to the extent of 1/10th share only as contended by the Appellants?


NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.21012 OF 2017
(arising out of SLP (C) No.31002 of 2015)
VIJAY KUMAR AND ANOTHER ..........Appellant(s)
VERSUS
BAL KRISHAN AND OTHERS ......Respondent(s)
With
CIVIL APPEAL No.21013 OF 2017
(arising out of SLP (C) No.34286 of 2017 @ SLP(C)…. CC
No.21194/2015)
VIJAY KUMAR AND ANOTHER ..........Appellant(s)
VERSUS
BAL KRISHAN AND OTHERS ......Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
Delay in SLP(C)….(CC) No. 21194 of 2015 is condoned.
Leave granted in both special leave petitions.
1
2. The challenge in these two appeals, is to the order dated
7.08.2013 allowing W.P. (M/S) No. 1209 of 2002 preferred by
the Respondent, and the order dated 23.07.2015 dismissing
MCC No. 554 of 2013 for recall of the same, preferred by the
Appellants who were the Respondents in the writ petition.
3. The Appellants and Respondent no.1, as plaintiffs,
together filed Revenue Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88 under
Section 229(B) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as “U.P.Z.A.L.R. Act”)
for declaration of bhumidari rights in respect of the suit lands
against Omprakash and Balraj Singh. The suit was decreed
on 18.04.1991 by the Assistant Collector, declaring them to be
joint bhumidhars of the suit lands. Appeal No. 150/98 of
1990-91 preferred against the same was dismissed on
24.03.1993 by the Additional Commissioner. In Suit No.
22/108 of 1991-92 preferred by the Respondent under Section
176 of the U.P.Z.A.L.R. Act for a partition and declaration of
his share, he was held entitled to 1/10th share only by the
2
Assistant Collector on 26.04.1995. Pursuant to an order of
remand by the Additional Commissioner on 19.12.1995, the
Assistant Collector on 23.12.1998 held that the suit lands
having been recorded in the joint names of the parties, the
Respondent was entitled to 1/3rd share and the regional
Patwari was directed to prepare separate kurrah and map.
4. The Appellants appeal against the order of the Assistant
Collector was allowed on 19.05.1999 by the Commissioner
holding that the Respondent was entitled to 1/10th share. The
second appeal by the Respondent was dismissed on
19.09.2002. Aggrieved, the Respondent preferred W.P.(M/S)
No. 1209 of 2002 assailing the same. The learned Single
Judge allowed the writ petition holding that the declaration of
the Respondent having 1/10th share only in the suit lands
suffered from perversity as it did not take into consideration
the decree in Revenue Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88 preferred
jointly declaring them as co-bhumidars and which had
3
attained finality. The order of the Assistant Collector dated
23.12.1998 was restored.
5. Subsequently, the Appellants preferred MCC 544 of 2013
for recall of the order dated 7.08.2013 seeking to assail the
finding on merits in the garb of a review application.
Dismissing the same it was observed that in absence of any
material with regard to the respective shares, and more
particularly in view of the pleadings in the joint plaint followed
by a declaration of co-bhumidars, the order called for no
interference.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
The short question for consideration is whether in view of the
joint purchase and declaration in Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88,
the two Appellants and Respondent no.1 are co-bhumidhars to
the extent of 1/3rd share of each, or is Respondent no. 1 owner
to the extent of 1/10th share only as contended by the
Appellants?
4
7. Indisputably, Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88 was filed by the
Appellants and the Respondent together as plaintiffs for
declaration of co-bhumidari rights over the entire suit lands.
There is no evidence of any partition having taken place
between them. The rejoinder by the Appellant to the counter
affidavit filed by Respondent no.1, does not deny that before
the order of status quo was passed in the present proceedings
on 08.01.2016, the impugned order stood complied on
22.09.2015 in Execution Case no. 22/69 of 2012-13.
8. The impugned orders call for no interference. The
appeals are dismissed.
………………………………….J.
(R.K. Agrawal)
……….………………………..J.
(Navin Sinha)
New Delhi,
December 08, 2017
5

whether in view of the joint purchase and declaration in Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88, the two Appellants and Respondent no.1 are co-bhumidhars to the extent of 1/3rd share of each, or is Respondent no. 1 owner to the extent of 1/10th share only as contended by the Appellants?


NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.21012 OF 2017
(arising out of SLP (C) No.31002 of 2015)
VIJAY KUMAR AND ANOTHER ..........Appellant(s)
VERSUS
BAL KRISHAN AND OTHERS ......Respondent(s)
With
CIVIL APPEAL No.21013 OF 2017
(arising out of SLP (C) No.34286 of 2017 @ SLP(C)…. CC
No.21194/2015)
VIJAY KUMAR AND ANOTHER ..........Appellant(s)
VERSUS
BAL KRISHAN AND OTHERS ......Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
Delay in SLP(C)….(CC) No. 21194 of 2015 is condoned.
Leave granted in both special leave petitions.
1
2. The challenge in these two appeals, is to the order dated
7.08.2013 allowing W.P. (M/S) No. 1209 of 2002 preferred by
the Respondent, and the order dated 23.07.2015 dismissing
MCC No. 554 of 2013 for recall of the same, preferred by the
Appellants who were the Respondents in the writ petition.
3. The Appellants and Respondent no.1, as plaintiffs,
together filed Revenue Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88 under
Section 229(B) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as “U.P.Z.A.L.R. Act”)
for declaration of bhumidari rights in respect of the suit lands
against Omprakash and Balraj Singh. The suit was decreed
on 18.04.1991 by the Assistant Collector, declaring them to be
joint bhumidhars of the suit lands. Appeal No. 150/98 of
1990-91 preferred against the same was dismissed on
24.03.1993 by the Additional Commissioner. In Suit No.
22/108 of 1991-92 preferred by the Respondent under Section
176 of the U.P.Z.A.L.R. Act for a partition and declaration of
his share, he was held entitled to 1/10th share only by the
2
Assistant Collector on 26.04.1995. Pursuant to an order of
remand by the Additional Commissioner on 19.12.1995, the
Assistant Collector on 23.12.1998 held that the suit lands
having been recorded in the joint names of the parties, the
Respondent was entitled to 1/3rd share and the regional
Patwari was directed to prepare separate kurrah and map.
4. The Appellants appeal against the order of the Assistant
Collector was allowed on 19.05.1999 by the Commissioner
holding that the Respondent was entitled to 1/10th share. The
second appeal by the Respondent was dismissed on
19.09.2002. Aggrieved, the Respondent preferred W.P.(M/S)
No. 1209 of 2002 assailing the same. The learned Single
Judge allowed the writ petition holding that the declaration of
the Respondent having 1/10th share only in the suit lands
suffered from perversity as it did not take into consideration
the decree in Revenue Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88 preferred
jointly declaring them as co-bhumidars and which had
3
attained finality. The order of the Assistant Collector dated
23.12.1998 was restored.
5. Subsequently, the Appellants preferred MCC 544 of 2013
for recall of the order dated 7.08.2013 seeking to assail the
finding on merits in the garb of a review application.
Dismissing the same it was observed that in absence of any
material with regard to the respective shares, and more
particularly in view of the pleadings in the joint plaint followed
by a declaration of co-bhumidars, the order called for no
interference.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
The short question for consideration is whether in view of the
joint purchase and declaration in Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88,
the two Appellants and Respondent no.1 are co-bhumidhars to
the extent of 1/3rd share of each, or is Respondent no. 1 owner
to the extent of 1/10th share only as contended by the
Appellants?
4
7. Indisputably, Suit No. 22/15 of 1987-88 was filed by the
Appellants and the Respondent together as plaintiffs for
declaration of co-bhumidari rights over the entire suit lands.
There is no evidence of any partition having taken place
between them. The rejoinder by the Appellant to the counter
affidavit filed by Respondent no.1, does not deny that before
the order of status quo was passed in the present proceedings
on 08.01.2016, the impugned order stood complied on
22.09.2015 in Execution Case no. 22/69 of 2012-13.
8. The impugned orders call for no interference. The
appeals are dismissed.
………………………………….J.
(R.K. Agrawal)
……….………………………..J.
(Navin Sinha)
New Delhi,
December 08, 2017
5

Monday, December 11, 2017

Carrying such passengers may be a breach of the policy, but it cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach as to bring the insurance policy to an end and to terminate the insurance policy.= The driver, on a cold wintery night, gave lift to some persons standing on the road. It was a humanitarian gesture. It cannot be said to be such a breach that it nullifies the policy. No doubt, these passengers turned against the driver and stole the truck, but this, the driver could not have foreseen. In the cases cited above, such claims where there is breach of policy, have been treated to be non-standard claims and have been directed to be settled at 75%. - As far as the second ground is concerned, we fail to understand how the arbitration proceedings between the financer and the insurer, relating to recovery of the loan amount, can in any way, negate the rights of the insured against the insurance company.


1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 21552 OF 2017
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 34605 OF 2015)
MANJEET SINGH …APPELLANT (S)
Versus
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
LTD. & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Deepak Gupta, J.
Leave granted.
2. None has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent
no. 2 despite service. Hence, the matter has been heard in the
absence of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2.
3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the appellant
Manjeet Singh purchased a second-hand Tata open truck
under a Hire Purchase agreement dated 13.10.2003 for a sum
of Rs. 8,57,000/- from Respondent No.2. The vehicle was
hypothecated in favour of Respondent No.2. It was insured for
2
a value of Rs.7,28,000/- and the insurance policy was valid
from 25.09.2004 to 24.09.2005. On 12.12.2004, the vehicle
was being driven by Sanjay Kumar on the National Highway
near Karnal. Some persons gave a signal to the driver to stop
the vehicle. After he stopped, they requested the driver to give
them lift up to Yamuna Nagar since no other mode of transport
was available. Since it was a cold wintery night, the driver
gave a lift to these persons. After a little while, one of the
passengers requested the driver to stop the truck on the
pretext that he had to answer the call of nature. When the
truck driver stopped the truck, the three passengers assaulted
the driver, tied his hands and legs with a rope and threw him
in a nearby field and fled away with the vehicle.
4. An FIR was lodged at Police Station, Ladwa on
13.12.2004 and the respondent no. 2, finance company was
intimated about the theft. The complainant had also given a
letter of authority to the finance company to negotiate and
settle the claim with the insurance company. However, no
settlement was arrived at and the claim was not settled and
repudiated vide letter dated 11.11.2005 on the ground of
breach of terms of the policy. The owner-complainant filed a
3
claim petition before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Forum (for short ‘the District Forum’) alleging that the
insurance company was liable to compensate him for the loss
caused to him by the theft of the truck. The main defence
taken by the respondent no. 2, insurance company was that
the driver of the vehicle, by giving a lift to the passengers, had
violated the terms of the policy and, as such, there was breach
of policy and the insurance company was not liable. This
ground found favour with the District Forum. The appeal filed
by the claimant before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission (for short ‘the State Commission’) was rejected
and so was the revision filed before the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission (for short ‘the National
Commission’). The District Forum also rejected the claim on
the ground that the arbitration proceedings had been initiated
by the Respondent No. 2, finance company against the
complainant and they were at the final stage.
5. As far as the first ground is concerned, we are of the
considered opinion, that the District Forum had not properly
appreciated the scope and ambit of the policy. The violation of
the condition should be such a fundamental breach so that
4
the claimant cannot claim any amount whatsoever. As far as
the violation in carrying passengers is concerned, this has
consistently been held not to be a fundamental breach and, in
this behalf, we may make reference to the judgments of this
Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran
Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Nitin Khandelwal, (2008) 11 SCC 259, Lakhmi Chand v.
Reliance General Insurance, (2016) 3 SCC 100 and B.V.
Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 647.
6. In Lakhmi Chand case (supra), this Court held that to
avoid its liability, the insurance company must not only
establish the defence that the policy has been breached, but
must also show that the breach of the policy is so fundamental
in nature that it brings the contract to an end.

7. In the present case, the appellant who is the owner, was
not at fault. His driver gave a lift to some passengers.
Carrying such passengers may be a breach of the policy, but it
cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach as to bring
the insurance policy to an end and to terminate the insurance
policy.
The driver, on a cold wintery night, gave lift to some
persons standing on the road. It was a humanitarian gesture.

5
It cannot be said to be such a breach that it nullifies the
policy. No doubt, these passengers turned against the driver
and stole the truck, but this, the driver could not have
foreseen. In the cases cited above, such claims where there is
breach of policy, have been treated to be non-standard claims
and have been directed to be settled at 75%.

8. As far as the second ground is concerned, we fail to
understand how the arbitration proceedings between the
financer and the insurer, relating to recovery of the loan
amount, can in any way, negate the rights of the insured
against the insurance company.

9. In view of the above discussion, we allow the appeal, set
aside the orders of the courts below and direct the respondent
no.1-insurance company to pay 75% of the insured amount of
Rs.7,28,000/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum
from the date of filing the claim petition till the deposit of the
amount. In addition, the insurance company shall also pay
another sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation. Since the
financer is also a party to the petition, the amount shall be
deposited before the District Forum, and in case the claim of
the financer has not been settled in terms of the arbitration
6
award, then the deposited amount shall first be used to pay
the awarded amount and the balance, if any, shall be paid to
the appellant.
The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid
terms. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
….……………………..J.
(MADAN B. LOKUR)
.….…………………….J.
(DEEPAK GUPTA)
New Delhi
December 08, 2017

scope of summons under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C.= It is settled law that at the stage of framing of charge, the accused cannot ordinarily invoke Section 91. However, the court being under the obligation to impart justice and to uphold the law, is not debarred from exercising its power, if the interest of justice in a given case so require, even if the accused may have no right 2 to invoke Section 91. To exercise this power, the court is to be satisfied that the material available with the investigator, not made part of the chargesheet, has crucial bearing on the issue of framing of charge.= ordinarily the Court has to proceed on the basis of material produced with the charge sheet for dealing with the issue of charge but if the court is satisfied that there is material of sterling quality which has been withheld by the investigator/prosecutor, the court is not debarred from summoning or relying upon the same even if such document is not a part of the charge sheet. It does not mean that the defence has a right to invoke Section 91 Cr.P.C. de hors the satisfaction of the court, at the stage of charge.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2114 OF 2017
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)No.8279 of 2016)
NITYA DHARMANANDA @ K. LENIN & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SRI GOPAL SHEELUM REDDY ALSO KNOWN
AS NITHYA BHAKTANANDA AND ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2115 OF 2017
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)No.1176 of 2017)
STATE OF KARNATAKA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
GOPAL SHEELUM REDDY ALSO KNOWN
AS NITHYA BHAKTANANDA …RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. Delay condoned. Leave granted.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the State, the
complainant, the accused and the learned amicus, Mr. Siddharth
Luthra, Senior Advocate.
1
3. The respondent, Gopal Sheelum Reddy alias Nithya
Bhaktananda, was charge sheeted for offences, inter alia, under
Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent
approached the High Court with the prayer that the entire
material available with the investigator, which was not made part
of the chargesheet, ought to be summoned under Section 91 of
the Cr.P.C.
The High Court, reversing the contrary view of the trial
court, allowed the said application.
4. Contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the view
of the High Court is contrary to law laid down by this Court in
State of Orissa versus Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC
568 and reiterated in the subsequent decisions. The defence
could not be considered at the stage of framing of charge so as to
avoid a mini trial.
5. Learned counsel for the defence, on the other hand,
submitted that if the investigator is not fair and the material of
sterling quality, though seized during investigation and available
with him, is deliberately left out from the chargesheet, there is no
bar for the court to summon the said material.
6. It is settled law that at the stage of framing of charge, the
accused cannot ordinarily invoke Section 91. However, the court
being under the obligation to impart justice and to uphold the law,
is not debarred from exercising its power, if the interest of justice
in a given case so require, even if the accused may have no right
2
to invoke Section 91. To exercise this power, the court is to be
satisfied that the material available with the investigator, not
made part of the chargesheet, has crucial bearing on the issue of
framing of charge.

7. In Debendra Nath Padhi, supra, it was observed:
“25. Any document or other thing envisaged under
the aforesaid provision can be ordered to be
produced on finding that the same is “necessary or
desirable for the purpose of investigation, inquiry,
trial or other proceedings under the Code”. The first
and foremost requirement of the section is about the
document being necessary or desirable. The
necessity or desirability would have to be seen with
reference to the stage when a prayer is made for the
production. If any document is necessary or desirable
for the defence of the accused, the question of
invoking Section 91 at the initial stage of framing of a
charge would not arise since defence of the accused
is not relevant at that stage. When the section refers
to investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings, it
is to be borne in mind that under the section a police
officer may move the court for summoning and
production of a document as may be necessary at
any of the stages mentioned in the section. Insofar as
the accused is concerned, his entitlement to seek
order under Section 91 would ordinarily not come till
the stage of defence. When the section talks of the
document being necessary and desirable, it is implicit
that necessity and desirability is to be examined
considering the stage when such a prayer for
summoning and production is made and the party
who makes it, whether police or accused. If under
Section 227, what is necessary and relevant is only
the record produced in terms of Section 173 of the
Code, the accused cannot at that stage invoke
Section 91 to seek production of any document to
show his innocence. Under Section 91 summons for
3
production of document can be issued by court and
under a written order an officer in charge of a police
station can also direct production thereof. Section 91
does not confer any right on the accused to produce
document in his possession to prove his defence.
Section 91 presupposes that when the document is
not produced process may be initiated to compel
production thereof.”

8. In Hardeep Singh Etc. versus State of Punjab and
ors. Etc. (2014) 3 SCC 92 a Bench of five-Judges observed:
“19. The court is the sole repository of justice and a duty
is cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it
will be inappropriate to deny the existence of such
powers with the courts in our criminal justice system
where it is not uncommon that the real accused, at
times, get away by manipulating the investigating
and/or the prosecuting agency. The desire to avoid trial
is so strong that an accused makes efforts at times to
get himself absolved even at the stage of investigation
or inquiry even though he may be connected with the
commission of the offence.”
9. Thus, it is clear that while ordinarily the Court has to proceed
on the basis of material produced with the charge sheet for
dealing with the issue of charge but if the court is satisfied that
there is material of sterling quality which has been withheld by
the investigator/prosecutor, the court is not debarred from
summoning or relying upon the same even if such document is
not a part of the charge sheet. It does not mean that the defence
has a right to invoke Section 91 Cr.P.C. de hors the satisfaction of
the court, at the stage of charge.

4
10. Accordingly, the view to the contrary in the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained and is set aside.

11. The trial court may now proceed to deal with the issue of
framing of charge in the light of the observations made
hereinabove and also to proceed with the matter expeditiously in
accordance with law.
The parties are directed to appear before the trial court for
further proceedings on Monday, the 12th February, 2018.
We record our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance
rendered by Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned senior counsel, as
amicus.
The appeals are accordingly disposed of.
………………………………J.
(ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)
………………………………J.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 7, 2017.
5

whether by virtue of the provisions contained in section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2013”), the proceedings lapsed in the instant case. = when proceedings are kept pending by interim orders by 22 filing successive petitions, the provisions of section 24 cannot be invoked by such landowners.


1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.20982 OF 2017
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.2131 of 2016
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHAILENDRA (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS. & ORS. ..RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The question arises whether by virtue of the
provisions contained in section 24 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act of 2013”), the proceedings
lapsed in the instant case.

3. The facts in short are that the Indore Development
Authority (for short, “the IDA”) established under
2
section 38 of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh
Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short, “the Adhiniyam of 1973”)
prepared a Master Plan which came into force on
21.3.1995, formulated scheme Nos.124(A) and (B) under
section 50(1) of the Adhiniyam of 1973 and decided to
acquire land for the purpose of constructing Ring Road
and Link Road on the outskirts of Indore city. The ring
road has been fully constructed. The land was acquired
for the purpose of constructing Link Road, for joining
the major road to the Ring Road under Scheme 124(B).
Possession of the land is stated to be with the
encroachers and not with the landowners. The
compensation was deposited by the IDA with the Land
Acquisition Collector. The landowners were informed to
collect it but they had refused and did not receive the
compensation. The IDA published the schemes as per the
provisions of the Adhiniyam of 1973. On 6.2.1991, a
prayer was made to the Collector to acquire the land and
on 2.3.1994 compensation was deposited with the Land
Acquisition Collector. Notification under section 4 was
3
issued on 23.12.1994. Section 17(1) was also invoked.
Enquiry under section 5A was dispensed with. Declaration
under section 6 was published on 17.3.1995 under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Act of 1894”). Respondent No.1 – owner filed
objections before the Land Acquisition Officer claiming
compensation of Rs.32,50,000/-. Award was passed by the
LAO on 14.3.1997 and the sum awarded to respondent No.1
was Rs.7,90,813/-. A belated W.P. No.1182 of 1997 was
filed for quashing the acquisition proceedings. It was
allowed on 28.8.1998 holding that the scheme lapsed on
expiry of three years. Enquiry under section 5A was
illegally dispensed with. Letters Patent Appeal No.480
of 1998 was preferred before the Division Bench and on
29.1.2000 an order of status quo was passed. The LPA was
dismissed as not maintainable. However this Court
remitted the matter to the High Court to file writ
appeal under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha
Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.
4
On 4.4.2007 the High Court directed maintenance of
status quo.
4. The respondent filed an application raising the
ground under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It was
resisted by the IDA on the ground that the acquisition
had been completed and the amount has been deposited
with the Land Acquisition Collector. Construction is
almost complete. If it is not completed in the remaining
area, it will cause great hardship to the citizens and
widening of road was necessary for smooth flow of
traffic. The High Court by the impugned order dated
3.11.2014 held that the proceedings had lapsed in view
of the decisions of this Court in Pune Municipal
Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki &
Anr. (2014) 3 SCC 183 and Shree Balaji Nagar Residential
Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353.
5. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel urged
that there was no lapse of proceedings in the instant
case as compensation was offered but was not accepted by
5
landowners. For their own refusal they cannot lay the
blame at the door of the IDA. The provisions of section
24 cannot come to the rescue of such incumbents. Even if
the compensation has not been deposited with the
Reference Court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894
the effect would be of payment of higher interest under
section 34. The expression used in section 24 of the Act
of 2013 is ‘compensation has not been paid’. It is not
that that the expression used is that it has not been
deposited under section 31. It was further submitted
there was no lapse of the proceedings under the Act of
1894 in view of non-deposit under section 31. The only
liability was of higher interest of 9% for the first
year from the date of taking possession and thereafter
to pay the interest at 15%. When the consequence of
lapse of land acquisition proceedings was not provided
in the Act of 1894, in case of failure to deposit under
section 31(2), the provision of section 34 is attracted
regarding payment of interest. Thus it could not be said
that due to failure to deposit or in the case of
6
refusal, proceedings would lapse. Section 24(2) would
apply to a case where compensation has not been tendered
to the landowners and has not been deposited with the
Land Acquisition Collector for payment. In other words,
no arrangement has been made by the acquisitioning
authority or the beneficiary for payment of
compensation. The provisions of section 24 would not be
applicable in case there is refusal to accept the
compensation and there was litigation by the landowner
or on his behalf by successor-in-interest, to quash the
land acquisition proceedings in such a case for their
own wrong and for non-acceptance of compensation, it
could not be claimed by such incumbents when they have
themselves obtained interim orders from the court or
where the proceedings have been illegally quashed by the
High Court and an appeal etc. is pending to invoke the
benefit of the provisions of section 24 of the Act of
2013. In the instant case award has been passed,
compensation has been deposited with the Land
Acquisition Collector for payment to landowners and they
7
had declined to accept it. The stale claims are also
being agitated in this Court under the guise of section
24 whereas it does not protect such claims. It was also
submitted that when the High Court has illegally quashed
the notification and interim order was passed, the
benefit of section 24 cannot enure to the landowners in
such cases as the act of court cannot prejudice anybody.
6. It was contended on behalf of the landowners that
the impugned order is proper. It is in tune with Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra) and other decisions like
Shree Balaji (supra) etc. referred to therein, hence no
case for interference was made out.
Sections 31 and 34 of the Act of 1894 are extracted
hereunder :
“31. Payment of compensation or deposit of
same in Court. - (1) On making an award
under section 11, the Collector shall
tender payment of the compensation awarded
by him to the persons interested entitled
thereto according to the award and shall
pay it to them unless prevented by some
one or more of the contingencies mentioned
in the next sub-section.
8
(2) If they shall not consent to receive
it, or if there be no person competent to
alienate the land, or if there be any
dispute as to the title to receive the
compensation or as to the apportionment of
it, the Collector shall deposit the amount
of the compensation in the Court to which
a reference under section 18 would be
submitted:
Provided that any person admitted to
be interested may receive such payment
under protest as to the sufficiency of the
amount:
Provided also that no person who has
received the amount otherwise than under
protest shall be entitled to make any
application under section 18:
Provided also that nothing herein
contained shall affect the liability of
any person, who may receive the whole or
any part of any compensation awarded under
this Act, to pay the same to the person
lawfully entitled thereto.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this
section the Collector may, with the
sanction of [appropriate Government]
instead of awarding a money compensation
in respect of any land, make any
arrangement with a person having a limited
interest in such land, either by the grant
of other lands in exchange, the remission
of land-revenue on other lands held under
the same title, or in such other way as
may be equitable having regard to the
interests of the parties concerned.
9
(4) Nothing in the last foregoing
sub-section shall be construed to
interfere with or limit the power of the
Collector to enter into any arrangement
with any person interested in the land and
competent to contract in respect thereof.
34. Payment of interest.-- When the amount
of such compensation is not paid or
deposited on or before taking possession
of the land, the Collector shall pay the
amount awarded with interest thereon at
the rate of [nine per centum] per annum
from the time of so taking possession
until it shall have been so paid or
deposited:
[Provided that if such compensation or any
part thereof is not paid or deposited
within a period of one year from the date
on which possession is taken, interest at
the rate of fifteen per centum per annum
shall be payable from the date or expiry
of the said period of one year on the
amount of compensation or part thereof
which has not been paid or deposited
before the date of such expiry.]”
7. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is extracted
hereunder :
“24. Land acquisition process under Act
No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have
lapsed in certain cases.–(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act, in any case of land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894,—
10
(a) where no award under section 11 of
the said Land Acquisition Act has been
made, then, all provisions of this Act
relating to the determination of
compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section
11 has been made, then such
proceedings shall continue under the
provisions of the said Land
Acquisition Act, as if the said Act
has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1), in case of land
acquisition proceedings initiated under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of
1894), where an award under the said
section 11 has been made five years or
more prior to the commencement of this Act
but the physical possession of the land
has not been taken or the compensation has
not been paid the said proceedings shall
be deemed to have lapsed and the
appropriate Government, if it so chooses,
shall initiate the proceedings of such
land acquisition afresh in accordance with
the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been
made and compensation in respect of a
majority of land holdings has not been
deposited in the account of the
beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries
specified in the notification for
acquisition under section 4 of the said
Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.”
11
Provisions of section 12 of the Act of 1894 are
extracted hereunder :
“12. Award of Collector when to be final.
- (1) Such award shall be filed in the
Collector's office and shall, except as
hereinafter provided, be final and
conclusive evidence, as between the
Collector and the persons interested,
whether they have respectively appeared
before the Collector or not, of the true
area and value of the land, and the
appointment of the compensation among the
persons interested.
(2) The Collector shall give immediate
notice of his award to such of the persons
interested as are not present personally
or by their representatives when the award
is made.”
8. Shri Patwalia, learned senior counsel, urged that
the expression used ‘compensation has not been paid’ in
section 24(2) does not relate to deposit of the amount
as envisaged under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. The
proviso to sub-section (2) of section 24 uses the
expression “where an award has been made and
compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings
has not been deposited in the account of the
12
beneficiaries”. Compensation in respect of a majority of
land holdings is not deposited in the account of
beneficiaries, is not applicable as it was not the case
set up and that the claim was not made under the proviso
to sub-section (2) of section 24. There is vast
difference between the provision of section 24(2) and
its proviso. The expressions payment and deposit are
used with different objectives. They have to be given
the proper meanings which aspect has not been considered
in any of the decisions relied upon by the High Court
including Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).
9. It was also submitted by learned senior counsel on
behalf of the IDA that in case of failure to deposit the
amount before the Reference Court where the “reference
would be submitted”, the only consequence to follow
would be higher rate of interest as per the amended
provision of section 34. The proviso has been added in
the year 1984 providing 15% interest payable from the
date of expiry of the said period of one year and for
the first year the rate of interest would be 9% per
13
annum. The proceedings of acquisition would not lapse.
It is in order to save the liability to make payment of
higher interest that the provision of section 31 has
been enacted, and the rate of interest, as prescribed
under section 34, is higher than in any Government
security/FD with the bank. Thus the failure to deposit
the amount in the Reference Court entails the
consequence of attraction of section 34. Thus, the
proceedings would not lapse under the Act of 1894. When
it was so contemplated that under the Act of 1894 the
provisions of section 24 cannot be assigned that meaning
which would invalidate the proceedings owing to the
procedural lapse of deposit of the amount in the court
where the reference would be submitted.
10. It was also submitted that section 24 in fact is
attracted to a case where there is deliberate failure on
the part of the acquisitioning authority not only to
tender the amount but also where no arrangement has been
made and the amount has not been deposited with the Land
Acquisition Collector, and the land has been acquired.
14
Proviso to section 24(2) makes it clear that the amount
of compensation required to be deposited in the account
of beneficiaries (in case of failure to make the
deposit) with respect to majority of the land holdings,
all the beneficiaries would become entitled for higher
compensation under the new Act. In case amount has been
tendered/deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector
and has been deposited in the separate account of the
beneficiaries in the concerned Treasury as per the
provisions of the Finance Code/Rules of the concerned
State, that has to be treated as sufficient compliance
of the proviso to section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
11. It was urged that in case landowners do not
consent to receive the amount, the Collector was
required to deposit it in the Reference Court as
provided in section 31(2) but failure to make the
deposit has been culled out in the Act itself as
provided in section 34. Thus proceedings would not
lapse.
15
12. It was also urged that section 31 of the Act
clearly shows that consequence of non-compliance of
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) thereof is not that
of the acquisition proceedings becoming invalid. The Act
of 1894 never intended that the consequence of
non-compliance of said provision of the Act, proceedings
would become invalid. Reliance has been placed on Hissar
Improvement Trust vs. Rukmani Devi and Anr. (1990)
(Supp) SCC 806 in which this Court has laid down thus :
“5. It cannot be gainsaid that interest is
due and payable to the landowner in the
event of the compensation not being paid
or deposited in time in Court. Before
taking possession of the land, the
Collector has to pay or deposit the amount
awarded, as stated in Section 31, failing
which he is liable to pay interest as
provided in Section 34.
7. We make it clear that insofar as the
landowner is concerned, his right to be
compensated is enforceable against the
State. It is the liability of the
Collector in terms of the relevant
provisions to pay the amount awarded,
together with interest in the event of the
amount not being paid in time. The
liability of the appellant-Trust arising
under its agreement with the Government
for payment in respect of the property
16
acquired is a matter on which we express
no view.”
13. Reliance has also been placed on Shri Kishan Das &
Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 274, wherein
this Court has observed that the liability to pay the
interest arises when possession of the acquired land
was taken and the amount was not deposited under
section 31. This Court took note of the delay caused by
the petitions filed by the claimants in the High Court
and this Court, and held that even payment of interest
under section 34 cannot be ordered. This Court has
observed in Shri Kishan Das (supra) thus :
“3. Shri S.B. Sanyal, learned senior
counsel for the appellants, contended that
the award was made on March 22, 1983
though the acquisition was made in
September 1976. Therefore, the appellants
should be compensated by payment of
interest @ 12 per cent per annum. In
support of his contention, he placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in
Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and
Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 44 and in particular on
paragraph 16 of the judgment. It is seen
that in Ram Chander's case even after the
dismissal of the writ petitions by this
Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi
17
[1975] 1 SCR 802, no action was taken by
the Land Acquisition Officer to pass the
award. Thus, till 1980-81 no award was
made in respect of any of the
acquisitions. Under these circumstances,
this Court had directed the Government to
pay interest @ 12 per cent on the amount
awarded to compensate the loss caused to
the appellants therein. In this case it is
seen that though the notification was
issued in September 1976, the writ
petitions came to be filed in the High
Court immediately thereafter in 1977 in
the High Court and obviously further
proceedings were stayed. Accordingly, the
Land Acquisition Officer delayed the
award. After the dismissal of the writ
petitions, the appellants came to this
Court and obtained status quo. Obviously,
the Land Acquisition Officer was not in a
position to pass the award immediately.
Thereafter it would appear that he passed
the award on March 22,1983. Section 34 of
the Act obligates the State to pay
interest from the date of taking
possession under the unamended Act @ 6 per
cent and after the Amendment Act 68 of
1984 at different rates mentioned therein.
The liability of the State to pay interest
ceases with the deposit made as per
Section 34 of the Act. Further liability
would arise only when the court on
reference under Section 18 enhances the
compensation under Section 28 of the Act.
Similarly, in an appeal under Section 54
of the Act if the appellate court further
increases the compensation, then again
similar obligation under Section 28
arises.
18
4. In the light of the operation of the
respective provisions of Sections 34 and 28 of
the Act, it would be difficult to direct
payment of interest. In fact, Section 23(1-A)
is s set off for loss in cases of delayed
awards to compensate the person entitled to
receive compensation; otherwise a person who is
responsible for the delay in disposal of the
acquisition proceedings will be paid premium
for dilatory tactics. It is stated by the
learned Counsel for the respondents that the
amount of interest was also calculated and
total amount was deposited in the account of
the appellants by the Land Acquisition Officer
after passing the award, i.e., on November 15,
1976 in a sum of Rs.20,48,615. Under these
circumstances, the liability to pay interest
would arise when possession of the acquired
land was taken and the amount was not
deposited. In view of the fact that
compensation was deposited as soon as the award
was passed, we do not think that it is a case
for us to interfere at this stage.”
14. It was also urged that ordinarily when a reference
is submitted, the Collector should deposit the amount
of compensation into court, but the deposit of the
amount is not a condition precedent to the
entertainability of the reference as held in Jogesh
Chandra v. Yakub Ali, 29 IC 111.
19
15. It was also urged that the payment is tendered by
issue of a notice on the party fixing the date on which
and the place where the payment would be made. The
notice is given along with the notice of award under
section 12(2) in which the date on which possession
would be taken is also mentioned.
16. It was also urged that there are Financial
Department’s orders in various States prevailing as
well as in certain States Civil Court Rules also
prevail which require the deposit of the Government
money in the Treasury after particular time necessarily
money goes to the treasury. Thus, a deposit in the
treasury in the landowner’s account cannot be said to
be illegal or impermissible as that is as per the
standing orders and it is a matter of procedure only
where the deposit is made. In case the deposit is made
in the treasury, liability would still remain to make
the payment of interest under section 34 of the Act of
1894. There are five methods of making payment: (i) by
direct payments; (ii) by order on treasury; (iii) by
20
money order; (iv) by cheque; and (v) by deposit in a
treasury. They are governed by the rules contained in
the Civil Account Code and in the local instructions
issued by various Provincial Governments, which are
required to be scrupulously followed. For Punjab,
Financial Commissioner’s standing order No.28 paras 74
and 75 lay down such procedure. It was also urged that
in Damadilal v. Parashram, AIR 1976 SC 2229, it was
observed that payment by cheque is a valid tender.
17. It was also urged that when a reference is made to
a District Court and in case amount of compensation is
increased, the amount also is required to be deposited
as ordered by the court but it would not invalidate
acquisition proceedings. Reliance has been placed on
Viraraghava v. Krishnasami, ILR 6 Mad. 347 in which it
was observed that the money paid into the treasury is
to be considered as money or movable property impressed
with the trusts and obligations of the immovable
property which it represents. The rights of parties to
21
the land, and to any mortgage on, or interest in it,
are transferred to the compensation money.
18. It was also urged that the object of such deposit
is to prevent unnecessary prolongation of the
proceedings and accumulation of Collector’s liability
for interest. When a party willfully refuses to receive
payment by depositing the money in the court, the
liability for interest will cease. It was also urged
that section 32 does not intend to give the advantage
of one’s own act or the act of the court.
19. It was also urged that this Court is also bound to
prevent the abuse of process of law. The cases which
have been concluded are being revived. In spite of not
accepting the compensation deliberately and statements
are made in the court that they do not want to receive
the compensation at any cost and they are agitating the
matter time and again after having lost the matters and
when proceedings are kept pending by interim orders by
22
filing successive petitions, the provisions of section
24 cannot be invoked by such landowners.

20. There is already a reference made as to the
applicability of section 24 in SLP [C] No.10742/2008 --
Yogesh Neema & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors. vide order
dated 12.1.2016. There are several other issues arising
which have been mentioned above but have not been
considered in Pune Municipal Corpn. (supra). Thus, here
is a case where the matter should be considered by a
larger Bench. Let the matter be placed before Hon’ble
the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.
………………………………………………J.
(ARUN MISHRA)
………………………………………………J.
(AMITAVA ROY)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 7, 2017.