recovering the amount of financial loss sustained - out of the gratuity and employer’s contribution towards provident fund payable to the respondent/employee.= Special Rules relating to gratuity, mentioned supra, makes it amply clear that the employee who has been dismissed for his misconduct and if such misconduct has caused financial loss to the bank, he shall not be eligible to receive the gratuity to the extent of financial loss caused to the bank. So also, Clause 19 of the Provident Fund Regulations permits the bank to deduct the payment of provident fund to the extent of financial loss caused to the bank from the bank’s contribution. Both the aforementioned Clauses are plain and simple. They are unambiguous. Since Rule 12 of the Gratuity Rules and Clause 19 of the Provident Fund Regulations permit the bank to withhold gratuity and deduct the bank’s contribution towards provident fund, in such matters, the bank was justified in recovering the amount of financial loss sustained by it, which was caused by the respondent, from out of the gratuity and employer’s contribution towards provident fund payable to the respondent/employee.

1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9666 OF 2010
CANARA BANK AND ANOTHER ..APPELLANTS
VERSUS
LALIT POPLI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. ..RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
1. The judgment dated 12.09.2008 in LPA No. 553 of 2008
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi is called in
question in this appeal.
2. Brief facts leading to this appeal are:
The respondent – Lalit Popli, who is now dead and
represented through his legal heirs, was employed as a clerk in
appellant’s bank and was dismissed from service on 30.06.1995,
2
consequent upon a departmental enquiry in which he was found
guilty of fraudulently withdrawing an amount of Rs.1,07,000/- from
the saving account of a customer. The Manager of the Bank (Shri
Meenakshisundaram), an officer (Shri S.S. Bhutani) as well as
Special Assistant (Shri Rakesh Tyagi) was also indicted and they
were also found guilty of negligence in relation to the very same
incident. The disciplinary authority by its order dated 18th
September, 1994 awarded the punishment of ‘censure’ to the
Manager of the Bank (Shri Meenakshisundaram) and ordered
recovery of Rs.77,000/- from him. Likewise, the disciplinary
authority by its order dated 23rd January, 1995 awarded the
punishment of ‘censure’ to Shri S.S. Bhutani and Shri Rakesh Tyagi
and ordered recovery of Rs.15,000/- from each of them. The
appeals filed by the said three employees challenging the orders of
the disciplinary authority were also dismissed and they did not
carry the matter any further and they deposited the amount, as
ordered against them.
Insofar as the respondent – Lalit Popli is concerned, the
disciplinary authority by its order dated 30th June, 1995 awarded
the punishment of ‘dismissal from service’.
3
3. The respondent preferred Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2269 of
1995 challenging the order of dismissal, which came to be allowed
by learned Single Judge of the High Court vide his order dated 7th
August, 1998 and the order of dismissal was set aside. The
appellant – Bank filed an appeal against the order of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court being LPA No. 465 of 1998. During
the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court, it
was decided by the bank to withhold an amount of Rs.74,180.09,
payable to the respondent, which included the gratuity and
provident fund(employer’s contribution) and to keep the same in a
fixed deposit with a view to adjust the said amount towards any
loss caused to the bank by the respondent. LPA No. 465 of 1998,
after hearing, was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court
and the order of dismissal was restored. Further appeal by the
respondent was dismissed by this Court by a detailed judgment on
18.02.2003 (reported as Lalit Popli vs. Canara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC
583).
After the dismissal of the matter by this Court, the
respondent made number of representations to the bank to release
the amount of gratuity and the employer’s contribution towards
4
provident fund, which was held up by the bank, by pointing out
that the bank had already recovered the entire amount of loss
caused to the bank from the other three employees as mentioned
supra, and therefore it was not justified on the part of the bank in
withholding the terminal benefits payable to the respondent. The
bank replied to the respondent that since the matter was sub judice
before the Court, the bank was unable to accede to his request.
After the dismissal of the matter by this Court, the bank vide its
order dated 24.06.2003 decided to recover the amount of
Rs.1,07,000/- from the respondent and to refund the amount
already recovered from the other three employees, to them. By
then, the amount of Rs.74,180.09, which was kept in a fixed
deposit, had attained the maturity value of Rs.1,08,923/-. The
bank ordered that out of Rs.1,08,923/-, an amount of
Rs.1,07,000/- be adjusted against the loss caused to the bank by
the respondent, who had withdrawn the said amount by forging the
signature of the account holder. Though, the bank had earlier
decided to recover the said amount from the respondent, the bank
could not recover from the respondent since the matter as against
the respondent was sub judice before the Courts of law at various
5
stages. Only after the litigation ended in finality up to this Court,
the bank passed an order to recover Rs.1,07,000/- from the
respondent and therefore the bank adjusted Rs.1,07,000/- out of
Rs.1,08,923/- (the maturity value of Rs.74,180.09), towards loss
caused to the bank by the respondent and remaining amount of
Rs.1,923/- was released in favour of the respondent.
4. Being aggrieved by such action of the bank, the
respondent approached the High Court by preferring Writ
Petition(Civil) No. 6149 of 2003, which came to be allowed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court holding that the bank had
already recovered the loss caused to the bank from the other three
employees, who were indicted and punished in relation to the very
incident and therefore any further amount sought to be recovered
from the respondent would be impermissible inasmuch as the bank
would be doubly enriching itself. The order of the learned Single
Judge is affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA
No. 553/2008, which is impugned before this Court in this appeal.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, who argued in
support of their respective cases.
6
6. This Court in the first round of litigation by its judgment
dated 18.02.2003 had given a categorical finding that it was the
respondent who committed forgery which ultimately led to the loss
caused to the bank. Thus, his case stood on a different footing from
the other three employees. Since the amount recovered from the
other three employees, who were imposed penalty of ‘censure’, is
refunded to them, the bank had to recover the amount of loss
caused to it from the person who was the author of the forgery.
Looking to the material on record, we find that the other
three officials were held to be negligent in their duty and as held by
this Court in its judgment dated 18.02.2003, that it was the
respondent, who committed forgery of the signature of the account
holder, consequent upon which the bank had suffered loss to the
tune of Rs.1,07,000/-. Therefore, the bank has taken an equitable
decision to recover the entire amount from the respondent and to
refund the amount already recovered from the other three officials,
because they were only found to be negligent in their duty.
7. Rule 12 of the Canara Bank Employees’ Gratuity Fund
Rules (for short, ‘Gratuity Rules’), Clause 19 of the Canara Bank
Staff Provident Fund Regulations, 1994 (for short, Provident Fund
7
Regulations) and Rule 3(4) of Chapter VIII of the General Conduct
Rules, governing the services of the employees fully support the
action taken by the bank against the respondent in withholding the
amount of gratuity and employer’s contribution towards provident
fund.
8. Rule 3(4) of Chapter VIII of the General Conduct Rules
states that “an employee who is dismissed for misconduct shall not
be entitled to gratuity”.
Rule 12 of Gratuity Rules reads thus:
“Rule 12. Notwithstanding anything contained in the
preceding Clauses where an employee has been
dismissed for misconduct and such misconduct has
caused financial loss to the Bank, he shall not be
eligible to receive the gratuity to the extent of the
financial loss caused to the Bank.”
Likewise, Clause 19 of Provident Fund Regulations reads
thus:
“Clause 19. If a member causes financial loss to the
Bank by misconduct, fraud, gross negligence or other
conduct of like nature and is dismissed from the
service of the Bank or is permitted to leave the service
of the Bank in consequence of such misconduct,
fraud, gross negligence or other like conduct, the
amount of such financial loss sustained by the Bank
shall be deduced by the Trustees from the Bank’s
8
contribution out of the amount due to the member and
be paid to the Bank.”
Special Rules relating to gratuity, mentioned supra,
makes it amply clear that the employee who has been dismissed for
his misconduct and if such misconduct has caused financial loss to
the bank, he shall not be eligible to receive the gratuity to the extent
of financial loss caused to the bank. So also, Clause 19 of the
Provident Fund Regulations permits the bank to deduct the
payment of provident fund to the extent of financial loss caused to
the bank from the bank’s contribution. Both the aforementioned
Clauses are plain and simple. They are unambiguous. Since Rule
12 of the Gratuity Rules and Clause 19 of the Provident Fund
Regulations permit the bank to withhold gratuity and deduct the
bank’s contribution towards provident fund, in such matters, the
bank was justified in recovering the amount of financial loss
sustained by it, which was caused by the respondent, from out of
the gratuity and employer’s contribution towards provident fund
payable to the respondent/employee.
9. Thus, in our considered opinion, the High Court was not
justified in setting aside the decision of the bank to recover the
9
amount of loss sustained by it from the respondent, particularly
when the bank is empowered to do so, as discussed supra.
Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. The judgment and order
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA No.
553/2008 dated 12.09.2008 dismissing the appeal filed by the
bank, as also, by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
allowing Writ Petition(C) No.6149 of 2003 dated 30.05.2008 filed by
the respondent are set aside and the Writ Petition(C) No. 6149 of
2003 filed by the respondent stands dismissed and it is held that
the bank has rightly recovered the loss of Rs.1,07,000/- sustained
by it from the respondent. However, there shall be no order as to
costs.
……………………………………J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
NEW DELHI; …………………………………….J.
DECEMBER 6, 2017. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR]

Since we have held that the respondents-tenants are liable to be evicted on the ground of non-renewal of rent agreement and determination of tenancy and transfer of tenancy right in violation of terms of rent agreement, we are not proposed to go into the ground of default in payment of rent and compliance of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972. - The courts below did not properly appreciate that after service of eviction notice on 09.04.1979 continuance of respondents' possession in the demised premises had become illegal. -The High Court did not appreciate that the respondents have sub-let the property to third party and are earning huge profits by simply paying a meager rent of Rs.800/- per month.- The respondents-tenants cannot squat on the property and make a profit for themselves at the cost of the appellant-landlord and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 20915 OF 2017
[Arising out of SLP(C) No.27765 of 2010]
Smt. Syed Sughra Zaidi …Appellant
Versus
Laeeq Ahmad (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 09.10.2009
passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Revision Petition No.543 of
1989 dismissing the revision petition filed by the original
plaintiff/landlord thereby affirming the judgment of the trial court
dismissing the ejectment suit of the plaintiff/landlord.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the suit property No.37(old), 17
and 18 (new numbers) situated at Beli Bazar, Meerut was let out by
the original plaintiff/landlord (Nazar Mohammad Zaidi) to the original
Page No. 1 of 12
defendants (Abdul Qayuum and Hazi Anvaruul Haq) by way of
registered rent agreement dated 12.08.1968 for a period of ten years
at the rent of Rs.750/- per month. There was a specific term in the
rent agreement which envisaged renewal of the rent agreement by
execution of a separate registered agreement for a further period of
five years at enhanced rent from Rs.750/- to Rs.800/- per month.
After expiry of the original term of lease, landlord (Nazar Mohammad
Zaidi) filed ejectment suit in SCC Suit No. 2 of 1981 for eviction of
defendants/tenants inter alia on the pleas:- (i) that the period of lease
has expired; the defendants/tenants have failed to get the fresh lease
deed executed at the enhanced rent of Rs.800/- per month; (ii) the
defendants/tenants have put up construction of shops in the suit
premises and let out the same to third party in violation of the terms of
the rent agreement; and (iii) default in payment of rent and municipal
tax by the defendants.
4. Respondents-tenants contested the suit stating that they have
taken every possible step to get the lease deed renewed for a further
period of five years and also sent the rent @ Rs.800/- per month as
per the terms of the lease deed dated 12.08.1968 to the original
plaintiff who refused to receive the same. The tenants further pleaded
Page No. 2 of 12
that the entire arrears of rent, damages along with interest etc. have
been deposited in the court under Section 20(4) of the Uttar Pradesh
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
(for short 'U.P. Act 13 of 1972') and the suit for eviction is liable to be
dismissed.
5. Upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence, the trial
court framed eleven issues and dismissed the suit on the ground that
the plaintiff/landlord has not been able to establish any of the grounds
for eviction specified under Section 20 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972.
Insofar as the issue of construction by defendants/tenants allegedly in
violation of terms of rent agreement was concerned, the trial court
held that the construction was in consonance with the terms of the
rent agreement and there was nothing in the rent agreement which
restricted the right of defendants/tenants to raise construction in the
premises. So far as non-renewal of the rent agreement is concerned,
the trial court held that there was reluctance on the part of the
plaintiff/landlord to renew the rent agreement. The trial court further
held that there was no default in payment of rent and the tenants
continued paying the rent even after lapse of lease period at the
enhanced rate of rent. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff/landlord
Page No. 3 of 12
approached the High Court by way of revision and the same came to
be dismissed by the impugned order.
6. Mr. V. Shekhar, learned senior counsel for the appellant
contended that the lease deed dated 12.08.1968 was for a fixed
period of ten years and it can further be extended for five years on
executing fresh deed and since the defendants-tenants failed to get
any fresh deed executed, their continuance in possession had
become illegal after service of legal notice for eviction. It was further
contended that the courts below failed to appreciate that the
respondents defaulted many times in payment of rent and payment of
house tax to municipality and even on the plea under Section 20(4) of
the U.P. Act 13 of 1972, the tenants defaulted in regularly depositing
the admitted amount and therefore, the respondents-tenants are
liable to be evicted.
7. Reiterating the findings of the High Court and the trial court, the
learned counsel for respondents-tenants submitted that the courts
below recorded concurrent findings that every possible step was
taken by the respondents-tenants and it was the plaintiff-landlord who
Page No. 4 of 12
failed to renew the rent agreement and the concurrent findings so
recorded cannot be interfered with.
8. Upon consideration of the rival contentions and materials on
record, the question falling for consideration is whether after expiry of
the lease period and the determination of the tenancy whether the
respondents-tenants can continue in possession of the suit property,
when the lease was not renewed?
9. The suit property was let out to the respondents-tenants by a
registered rent agreement dated 12.08.1968 for a period of ten years
on rent @ Rs.750/- per month. There was a specific term in the rent
agreement which envisaged renewal of the rent agreement by
execution of a separate rent agreement for a further period of five
years at enhanced rent from Rs. 750/- to Rs.800/- per month. The
lease was not renewed and thereafter the landlord issued a notice to
the respondents-tenants on 09.04.1979 seeking vacant possession of
the suit property on account of determination of lease due to efflux of
time.
10. The trial court was of the view that there was no violation of the
terms of the lease deed as they had put in sufficient efforts in getting
Page No. 5 of 12
the rent agreement renewed. For arriving at such conclusion, the trial
court and the High Court placed reliance upon Ex. A-18 (13.06.1978)
a notice allegedly issued by the plaintiff's advocate Gulzar Mohd.
intimating the tenants that they are willing to renew the lease as per
the terms of the rent agreement provided the tenants pay enhanced
rent @ Rs.800/- per month. This piece of evidence was categorically
denied by the landlord. The trial court did not keep in view the denial
of the appellant-landlord regarding issuance of Ex. A-18 notice
(13.06.1978). In the light of denial of issuance of Ex. A-18 notice, it
was necessary to adduce evidence to prove that Ex. A-18 notice was
actually issued on instructions by the landlord. The burden was upon
the respondents-tenants to prove that the said notice was issued by
advocate Gulzar Mohd. on the instructions of the landlord. The trial
court pointed out that the respondents-tenants had taken steps to
examine the said advocate; but he had not appeared before the court.
From the materials on record, it is not known as to what steps were
taken by the tenants to examine the said advocate Gulzar Mohd. The
trial court, in our view, could have very well exercised its power under
Order XVI Rule 14 CPC and summoned the said advocate as
witness. In the absence of examination of the said advocate Gulzar
Page No. 6 of 12
Mohd., the trial court ought not to have placed reliance upon Ex.
A-18 notice alleged to have been issued on the instructions of the
landlord.
11. Ex. A-18 notice (13.06.1978) is said to have been issued on the
instructions of the landlord. As pointed out earlier, the landlord issued
eviction notice on 09.04.1979 seeking vacant possession of the
premises. If really Ex. A-18 notice dated 13.06.1978 was issued at
the instance of the landlord offering to renew the lease, there was no
requirement of issuance of eviction notice on 09.04.1979 calling upon
the respondents-tenants to hand over the vacant possession of the
suit property. The courts below erred in ignoring landlord's denial of
issuance of Ex. A-18 notice (13.06.1978) and non-examination of
advocate Gulzar Mohd. The High Court was not right in holding that
the respondents-tenants have taken steps to get renewal of rent
agreement and there was reluctance only on the part of the landlord.
Be it noted, the tenants have not approached the court to get renewal
of lease agreement beyond 12.08.1978.
12. As pointed out earlier, on 09.04.1979, the landlord issued a
notice to the respondents-tenants seeking vacant possession of the
Page No. 7 of 12
demised premises on account of determination of lease due to efflux
of time. After lapse of lease period, if a lessee continues in
possession of the demised premises in absence of an assent by
lessor, then he is a tenant by sufferance and exposes himself to be
sued for ejectment at any time without any prior notice or demand of
possession.
13. The term in the lease agreement for renewal of lease deed does
not ipso facto extend the tenure or term of the lease. So far as the
clause for renewal in the lease deed is concerned, it was held in Delhi
Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish (1973) 2 SCC 825
that such covenant only entitled a lessee to obtain a fresh lease in
accordance with and in due satisfaction of the law governing the
making of leases. In the absence of renewal of rent agreement, in
our considered view, the possession of the respondents-tenants in the
demised premises has become unlawful and they are liable to be
evicted.
14. Yet another ground for eviction is construction of shops in the
suit premises by the tenants and sub-letting the same in violation of
terms of rent agreement. Though, there is a clause in the rent
Page No. 8 of 12
agreement enabling the tenants to put up construction, there is no
clause in the lease agreement permitting the tenants to transfer his
interest of tenancy to third party. It is the case of the appellant that in
violation of the rent agreement, Anwar Ul Haq who was one of the
original tenants, transferred his interest of tenancy in favour of third
respondent Mohd. Ilyas alias Chaman. The appellant-landlord
specifically denied that such transfer of interest in the tenancy was
with the consent of the original landlord. On the other hand, the
respondents-tenants in support of their claim submitted that such
transfer of interest in tenancy had taken place with the consent and
knowledge of the original landlord, relied upon Exs. A1 to A7 which
are the receipts said to have been signed by the original landlord
issuing to Mohd. Ilyas alias Chaman as one of the tenants. In view of
specific denial by the appellant-landlord that they have permitted such
transfer of interest, the receipts Exs. A1 to A7 ought to have been
proved by adducing evidence. The respondents-tenants, though
relied upon the said documents, had not taken steps to prove those
documents.
15. On those issues, the courts below recorded findings that the
rent agreement nowhere prohibited any of the tenants from
Page No. 9 of 12
transferring their interest in tenancy and therefore, there was no
violation of any of the terms of the rent agreement. In noting so, the
trial court lost sight of the fact that in the rent agreement, parties
specifically incorporated clause (9), permitting sub-letting by tenants.
Had the parties agreed to create or transfer of interest in the tenancy
in favour of third party, they would have added a specific term in that
regard in the rent agreement. Though, sub-letting of the premises for
commercial purpose was agreed to by the original parties, transfer of
interest in tenancy leading to creation of third party interest in the suit
property could not have been done in the absence of a specific term
in the rent agreement. Thus, the respondents-tenants are liable to be
evicted on the ground of violation of terms of rent agreement by
transfer of interest in tenancy to respondent No. 3 - Mohd. Ilyas alias
Chaman.
16. So far as the default in payment of rent and the deposit arrears
of rent by the defendants and whether the respondents are entitled to
the benefits of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972, the courts
below recorded concurrent findings that Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act
13 of 1972 has been complied with. According to the
appellant-landlord, the respondents have failed to regularly deposit
Page No. 10 of 12
the rent in the trial court and there was no compliance of Section
20(4) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972. Since we have held that the
respondents-tenants are liable to be evicted on the ground of
non-renewal of rent agreement and determination of tenancy and
transfer of tenancy right in violation of terms of rent agreement, we
are not proposed to go into the ground of default in payment of rent
and compliance of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972.
17. The courts below did not properly appreciate that after service
of eviction notice on 09.04.1979 continuance of respondents'
possession in the demised premises had become illegal. The High
Court did not appreciate that the respondents have sub-let the
property to third party and are earning huge profits by simply paying a
meager rent of Rs.800/- per month. The respondents-tenants cannot
squat on the property and make a profit for themselves at the cost of
the appellant-landlord and the judgment of the High Court cannot be
sustained.
18. In the result, the impugned judgment is set aside and this
appeal is allowed. The respondents-tenants and the sub-tenants
inducted by them and any other person claiming through them are
Page No. 11 of 12
directed to hand over vacant possession of the suit premises within a
period of one year from today, failing which the respondents-tenants
and their sub-tenants or other persons claiming through them shall be
liable for contempt of Court in addition to other proceedings. No order
as to costs.
…….…………...………J.
[KURIAN JOSEPH]
…………….……………J.
[R. BANUMATHI]
New Delhi;
December 06, 2017
Page No. 12 of 12

whether property tax recoverable from the tenant under Section 67(3) of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 (for short ‘NDMC Act’) as arrears of rent by the landlord/owner can be considered to be forming part of the rent for the purpose of seeking eviction or ejectment of such tenant who defaults in payment of such recoverable tax as rent and when the rent including recoverable tax in respect of the tenanted premises exceeds Rs.3500/- per month, thereby losing protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short ‘Rent Act’).= we are of the view that though the Rent Act is an earlier Act when compared to the NDMC Act, it is a special enactment with regard to the matter in issue and has a non-obstante clause. The NDMC Act is not a special enactment insofar as landlord-tenant issue is concerned and it contains Section 411 which provides that other laws not to be disregarded. Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act merely gives a right to recover the tax in respect of the premises as rent. It does not override the Rent Act insofar as obviating the effect of Section 7(2) of the Rent Act. In our opinion, the tax recoverable from the tenant under Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act as arrears of rent by the appellant cannot be considered to be forming part of the rent for the purpose of seeking eviction/ejectment of the respondent who defaults in payment of such recoverable tax as rent.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURSIDCITON
CIVIL APPEAL NO.20913 OF 2017
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.17117 of 2016)
ATMA RAM PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. … APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
S.ABDUL NAZEER, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal involves an important question of law as to
whether property tax recoverable from the tenant under Section
67(3) of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 (for short
‘NDMC Act’) as arrears of rent by the landlord/owner can be
considered to be forming part of the rent for the purpose of
seeking eviction or ejectment of such tenant who defaults in
payment of such recoverable tax as rent and when the rent
2
including recoverable tax in respect of the tenanted premises
exceeds Rs.3500/- per month, thereby losing protection of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short ‘Rent Act’).
3. The appellant/plaintiff is the owner/landlord of the building
known as Atma Ram Mansion (previously known as Scindia
House), Connaught Circus, New Delhi-110001 by virtue of a
registered sale-deed dated 31.5.1980 executed by previous
owners in favour of the plaintiff. The respondent/defendant has
been a tenant in respect of a portion of the aforesaid property.
The rent of tenanted premises prior to termination of tenancy was
Rs.1438/- per month exclusive of electricity and water charges.
The defendant has been paying service tax of Rs.148/- on the
said amount of Rs.1438/- and thus the last paid rent was
Rs.1586/- per month.
4. Pursuant to the amendment of the New Delhi Municipal
Council (Determination of Annual Rent) Byelaws, 2009, (for
brevity ‘the Byelaws 2009’) the house tax on the properties
situated in the New Delhi Municipal Council (for short ‘NDMC’)
area was assessable on the basis of Unit Area System. The
3
tenanted premises in occupation of the defendant fell within the
jurisdiction of NDMC. The house tax payable on the said property
in accordance with the Unit Area System comes to Rs.9,64,710/-
per annum, i.e. Rs.80,392.50 per month. According to the
plaintiff, the defendant was liable to pay the said amount. The
plaintiff issued a notice dated 6.7.2009 calling upon the
defendant to pay the entire house tax or pay its monthly
installment. However, the defendant neither replied to the same
nor deposited/paid house tax to the plaintiff. The plaintiff issued
a further notice dated 8.12.2009 calling upon the defendant to
pay the house tax. The defendant did not come forward to make
payment of the house tax. In order to safeguard its property and
to avoid any penal action, the plaintiff deposited the total house
tax of Rs.2,94,23,237/- on the basis of self-assessment of the
property tax with NDMC. After payment of the house tax, the
plaintiff again sent a notice dated 7.4.2010 calling upon the
defendant to pay the said amount of tax. The notice was returned
with the report “left without address”.
4
5. According to the plaintiff, the tax paid on the suit property
was far more than the initial rent, the amount of property tax
levied by NDMC and the initial rent became recoverable as
arrears of rent and the suit property having fetched rent above
Rs.3500/- per month has ceased the protection of the Rent Act.
As such the plaintiff vide legal notice dated 16.6.2010,
terminated the tenancy of the defendant without prejudice to its
legal rights. The defendant sent a reply dated 23.7.2010 denying
its liability to pay the rent. Therefore, plaintiff filed the aforesaid
suit for a decree for possession of the tenanted premises, for
damages/mesne profits of Rs.6,24,600/- per month w.e.f.
1.5.2011 till 31.5.2011 and for directing an enquiry under Order
XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘CPC’)
for assessment of future damages/mesne profits till the delivery
of vacant possession of the tenanted premises.
6. The defendant filed the written statement denying its liability
to pay the enhanced rent. It was contended that the plaintiff has
no authority or power to increase the rent on its own. It was
further contended that the tenanted premises is governed by the
5
Rent Act and that the defendant is a protected tenant. The NDMC
byelaws cannot govern the relationship of landlord and tenant by
by-passing the provisions of the Rent Act. It was further
contended that the house tax cannot be treated as arrears of
rent, which takes away the premises from the ambit of the Rent
Act. It was denied that the premises are governed by the Transfer
of Property Act. It was contended that Section 67 of the NDMC
Act speaks of apportionment of liability of tax when the premises
are let out and sub-let. It is only the right to recover the house
tax for which the landlord is entitled to. He cannot go for eviction
of the tenant on any ground which is not specified under the Rent
Act. Therefore, the suit for possession filed by the plaintiff in a
court other than the court of Rent Controller is barred by the
provisions of Section 50 of the Rent Act.
7. The plaintiff filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 read
with Section 151 of the CPC for passing a decree for possession
of the tenanted premises for the reasons mentioned therein. The
defendant opposed the application by filing objections.
6
8. The trial Court passed an order dated 12.8.2013 granting
decree of possession of the tenanted premises in favour of the
plaintiff. The High Court by the order dated 30.5.2016 has set
aside the order of the trial Court and has remanded the matter to
the trial Court. The appellant has called in question the legality
and correctness of the said order in this appeal.
9. Shri Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant/plaintiff, submits that after coming into force of the
Byelaws 2009, the property tax in the NDMC area was to be
assessed on the basis of unit area system instead of previous
basis of property tax on actual rent. As a result, the annual
property tax payable for the area occupied by the respondent
worked out at Rs.9,64,710/- p.a. i.e Rs.80,392.50/- per month
when divided over twelve months period. The respondent failed to
pay the house tax despite repeated request of the appellant;
therefore the appellant was left with no alternative but to deposit
entire arrears of tax. The appellant issued a notice dated
16.06.2010 terminating the tenancy on the failure of the
respondent to pay the said amount of rent and instituted the suit
7
under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is
contended that the rate of rent per month was Rs.1438/- and
after adding the tax, it exceeded Rs.3500/- per month. Therefore,
the tenant lost protection of the Rent Act. It is argued that the
full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ganga Ram v. Mohd.
Usman reported in ILR (1978) 1 Delhi page 139, has laid down
that the amount of tax on building or land becomes part of the
rent. Section 121(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957
(for short ‘the Corporation Act’) enables the landlord to recover
from the tenant in excess of the amount of house tax which has
been levied on the building and which is in excess of the amount
which would be leviable on the amount of contracted rent
received from the tenant. The Full Bench held that the landlord is
entitled to recover, under Section 121(1) of the said Act, the
enhanced amount of house tax from the tenant notwithstanding
the contract of tenancy and the provisions of Section 7(2) and
Section 4 of the Rent Act. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section
121 of the Corporation Act is in pari materia with sub-sections (1)
and (3) of Section 67 of the NDMC Act. For the reasons set out in
8
the judgment of the Full Bench in Ganga Ram (supra), the High
Court ought to have dismissed the appeals.
10. It is further argued that Section 7(2) of the Rent Act could
not be the basis for denying the benefit of Section 67(3) of the
NDMC Act. The tax component becomes a part of the rent. If the
tax component is added to the monthly rent, the total rent of the
premises exceeds Rs.3,500/-. It is submitted that the property
tax has to be fictionally treated as rent under Section 67(1) of the
NDMC Act because in the absence of the same; the landlord
would be compelled to pay the whole amount of tax which is
recoverable from him and would be left to an expensive and
cumbersome remedy of filing a civil suit for recovery of such tax.
It is submitted that the liability to pay excess property tax is
solely that of tenant and the landlord has been provided with
‘rights and remedies’ for recovery of such amounts as rents.
Therefore, the High Court was not justified in holding that the
property tax will not constitute rent to enable the appellant to
seek ejectment/possession of the suit property. In this
connection, he has relied on the decisions of this Court in
9
Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Augustine, (1957) SCR 20,
Bombay Municipal Corporation v. Life Insurance
Corporation, Bombay (1970) 1 SCC 791, Raju Kakara Shetty
v. Ramesh Prataprao Shirole, (1991) 1 SCC 570, D.C. Bhatia
v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 104 and Calcutta Gujarati
Education Society v. Calcutta Municipal Corpn., (2003) 10
SCC 533.
11. Shri Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent submits that the contractual rent of the suit property
was Rs.1,586/- per month. The Rent Act is a special enactment,
and has a non-obstante clause and the NDMC Act does not
contain a non-obstante clause. Section 411 of the NDMC Act
provides that other laws not to be disregarded. The primacy of
the statue would have to be determined on the basis of the
intention of the legislature. The NDMC Act is a general enactment
and the special enactment prevails over the general enactment. It
is pointed out that Section 67(3) of NDMC Act permits the
landlord to recover rent. However, for non-payment of the rent
which includes tax component, the landlord cannot sue for
10
eviction/ejectment of the tenant. Alternatively, it is argued that
even if the NDMC Act prevailing over the Rent Act, still this Court
has to harmoniously construe the provisions so as to ensure that
latter enactment does not violate the Rent Act. Section 67(3) of
the NDMC Act merely gives a right to recover the rent and even if
the latter enactment was to override the earlier enactment in so
far as obviating the effect of Section 7(2) of the Rent Act, still the
tax could not be added as a rent for the purpose of determining
as to whether the tenant will lose the protection under the Rent
Act by adding the said rent to the contractual rent so as to
consider it above Rs.3,500/- per month.
12. The issue which arises for consideration in the present
matter is regarding the interplay of Section 67(3) of the NDMC
Act vis-à-vis Section 7(2) of the Rent Act. Under Section 67(3)
the landlord has been given the right to recover the house tax
from the tenant as if the same were rent whereas under Section
7(2) of the Rent Act, there is a specific bar to recover any tax as
rent from the tenant.
11
13. Having regard the contentions urged, let us first consider as
to whether in Ganga Ram (supra) Delhi High Court has taken a
view that the tax recoverable under the Corporation Act can be
made a part of the rent for the purpose of eviction/ejectment of a
tenant. In Ganga Ram (supra) the tenant had sub-let a portion
of the property and was receiving rents from the sub-tenant.
After taking into consideration the rents received by the tenant
from the sub-tenant and the rent payable by him to the landlord,
the corporation determined the rateable value on the basis that
the premises was fetching higher rent than that of the rent paid
by the tenant to the landlord. It was the case of the landlord that
he was entitled, under Section 121(1) of the Corporation Act, to
recover from the tenant the difference between the amount of
property tax levied on the property and the amount of tax which
would be leviable upon the premises if the tax was calculated only
on the amount of rent paid by the tenant to the landlord without
taking into consideration the rent received by the tenant from the
sub-tenant. Taking into consideration this plea, the Court framed
second question for determination as under:
12
“(2) If so, whether the landlord is entitled to recover
under section 121 of the Corporation Act the
enhanced amount of house tax from the tenant
notwithstanding the contract of tenancy and the
provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 7 and 4 of
the Delhi Rent Control Act?”
14. It was held that the bar created by the provisions in the
Rent Control Act pertains to “normal tax on a building” occupied
by tenant. Bar containing in Section 7(2) in the Rent Act pertains
to normal tax on a building occupied by a tenant while Section
121(1) of the Corporation Act deals with the particular
contingency where the property tax levied for the tenanted
premises if more than the amount which would have been levied,
had the assessment been made on the basis of the rent payable
by the tenant to the landlord. The Court held that landlord is
entitled to recover, under Section 121 of the Corporation Act, the
enhanced amount of house tax from the tenant notwithstanding
the contract of tenancy and the provisions of sub-section (2) of
Section 7 and Section 4 of the Rent Act. The Court has not
considered the question relating to eviction of a tenant under the
provisions of Rent Act where protection is accorded to the tenant
from eviction.
13
15. The question for consideration in this appeal is entirely
different. The question is whether non-payment of property tax
recoverable from the tenant as rent can be a ground for his
eviction/ejectment from the premises. The Rent Act is beneficial
and also restrictive in nature. It is primarily an Act to provide for
the control of rents and evictions. It is settled that while
interpreting the provisions of this Act, the Courts are under a
legal compulsion to harmoniously read the provisions of the Act
so as to balance the rights of the landlord and the obligations of
the tenant towards each other, keeping in mind that one of the
objects of the legislature while enacting the Rent Act was to curb
the tendency of the greedy landlords to throw out the tenants
paying lower rent and to rent out the premises at the market
rate. Section 14 occurring in Chapter 3 of the Rent Act provides
for controlling of eviction of tenants. It puts an embargo as
regards recovery of possession of any premises at the instance of
the landlord unless the Controller satisfies himself as regards
existence of any of the grounds specifically referred to in the
proviso appended thereto.
14
16. Section 2(i) of the Rent Act defines the “premises”. Section
3(c) states, “nothing in the Act shall apply to any premises
whether residential or not, whose monthly rent exceeds Rs.
3,500/-“. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 puts an embargo on the
landlord not to recover from the tenant any amount of tax on the
building or land imposed in respect of the premises occupied by
the tenant. This provision is as under:
“(2) Where a landlord pays in respect of the
premises any charge for electricity or water
consumed in the premises or any other charge levied
by a local authority having jurisdiction in the area
which is ordinarily payable by the tenant, he may
recover from the tenant the amount so paid by him;
but the landlord shall not recover from the tenant
whether by means of an increase in rent or
otherwise the amount of any tax on building or land
imposed in respect of the premises occupied by the
tenant.”
17. Section 50 of the Rent Act bars the civil court to entertain
any suit or proceedings insofar as it relates to the fixation of
standard rents in relation to any premises to which the Rent Act
applies or to eviction of any tenant therefrom or to any other
matter which the controller is empowered by or under the said
Act.
15
18. It is also relevant to notice two provisions of the NDMC Act
namely; sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 67 which are as
under:
“67. Apportionment of liability for property tax
when the premises are let or sub-let.-(1) If any
land or building assessed to property tax is let, and
its rateable value exceeds the amount of rent
payable in respect thereof to the person upon whom
under the provision of section 66 the said tax is
leviable, that person shall be entitled to receive from
his tenant the difference between the amount of the
property tax levied upon him and the amount which
would be leviable upon him if the said tax was
calculated on the amount of rent payable to him.
(2) .................
(3) Any person entitled to receive any sum under
this section shall have, for the recovery thereof, the
same rights and remedies as if such sum were rent
payable to him by the person from whom he is
entitled to receive the same.”
19. Yet another provision which requires consideration is Section
411 of the NDMC Act, which reads as under:
“411. Other laws not to be disregarded.- Save as
provided in this Act nothing contained in this Act
shall be construed as authorising the disregard by
the Council or the Chairperson or any municipal
officer or other municipal employee of any laws for
the time being in force.”
20. While the normal principle is that the latter enactment will
prevail in cases where the latter enactment has a non-obstante
clause, that is, giving it overriding effect and secondly, if it is also
16
held to be a special enactment with regard to the matter in issue.
In the instant case, the earlier enactment has a non-obstante
clause in Section 14 which grants protection to the tenant from
being evicted from any premises “notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order of
decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be
made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against
a tenant.” Thus the earlier enactment which is a special
enactment has a non-obstante clause and the latter enactment
which is not a special enactment as far as landlord tenant issue is
concerned and the same does not have a non-obstante clause
and in fact, has a section namely Section 411 which provides that
other laws not to be disregarded.
21. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur
and Ors., (1981)1 SCC 315, this Court was considering a conflict
between the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Life Insurance
Act, 1956. It was held that so far as matters concerning industrial
dispute are concerned, the Industrial Disputes Act would prevail
17
over the latter enactment i.e. Life Insurance Corporation of India
Act.
22. In Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Viswa Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd. and Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 288, it was held that Rent
Act of 1947 will prevail over the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960, so far as the protection of the tenant from
eviction is concerned. Here also, both the Acts held a
non-obstante clause but still the earlier enactment was held to
cover the field and hence, was to be given primacy over the latter
enactment.
23. As seen from the abovementioned judgments, this Court has
held that an earlier enactment will prevail over a latter enactment
even if, there is a non-obstante clause in the latter enactment, if
it were to be held that the earlier enactment is a special
enactment on the particular subject being in issue.
24. Assuming that the latter enactment prevailing over the
earlier enactment were to apply to this case, the two enactments
have to be harmoniously construed so as to ensure that the latter
18
enactment does not cause violence to the intent of the earlier
enactment.
In St Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1992)1 SCC
558, it has been held thus:-
“140. … The golden rule of interpretation is
that words should be read in the ordinary,
natural and grammatical meaning and the
principle of harmonious construction merely
applies the rule that where there is a general
provision of law dealing with a subject, and a
special provision dealing with the same
subject, the special prevails over the general.
If it is not constructed in that way the result
would be that the special provision would be
wholly defeated”.
Similarly, in Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar and
Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 76 this Court has held as under:
“10. While determining the question whether a
statute is a general or a special one, focus must be
on the principal subject-matter coupled with a
particular perspective with reference to the
intendment of the Act. Keeping in mind this basic
principle, we will have to examine the provisions of
the two Acts to find out whether it is possible to
construe harmoniously the provisions of Section 4 of
the Finance Act and Section 49 of the Sugarcane
Act……….”
19
25. In Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani
Cements Limited and Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 319, it was held that
when a general law and a special law dealing with the same
aspect dealt with by the general law are in question, the general
law to the extent dealt with by the special law is impliedly
repealed.
26. The object of the Rent Act is to provide protection to tenants
who under common law, including Transfer of Property Act could
be evicted from the premises let out to them at any time by the
landlord on the termination of their tenancy. It restricts the right
of the landlord to evict the tenant at their will. It is a special law
in relation to landlord and tenant issue. Therefore, the Rent Act
has to prevail insofar as landlord and tenant issue is concerned.
27. Let us now consider the judgments relied upon by Shri
Dushyant Dave. In Karnani Property Ltd. (supra) by agreement
of the parties, the rent fixed included payment of the additional
amenities and services. In Bombay Municipal Corporation
(supra) the question relating to eviction of a tenant has not been
20
considered. In Raju Kakara Shetty (supra) the statutory right to
recover the education cess in respect of demised premises from
the occupant–tenant was quantified by agreement of the parties.
In D.C. Bhatia (supra) this Court has considered the validity of
Section 3(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In Calcutta
Gujarati Education Society (supra) this Court has not
considered the eviction of a tenant nor the interplay between a
provision similar to sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Rent Act
and Section 231 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980
which is pari materia with Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act. Hence,
these judgments have no application to the facts of the instant
case.
28. Therefore, we are of the view that though the Rent Act is an
earlier Act when compared to the NDMC Act, it is a special
enactment with regard to the matter in issue and has a
non-obstante clause. The NDMC Act is not a special enactment
insofar as landlord-tenant issue is concerned and it contains
Section 411 which provides that other laws not to be disregarded.
Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act merely gives a right to recover the
21
tax in respect of the premises as rent. It does not override the
Rent Act insofar as obviating the effect of Section 7(2) of the Rent
Act. In our opinion, the tax recoverable from the tenant under
Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act as arrears of rent by the appellant
cannot be considered to be forming part of the rent for the
purpose of seeking eviction/ejectment of the respondent who
defaults in payment of such recoverable tax as rent.
29. The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed
with no orders as to costs.
…………………………………………J.
(J. CHELAMESWAR)
…………………………………………J.
(S. ABDUL NAZEER)
New Delhi;
December 06, 2017.

the civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of validity under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.

1
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. ___________ OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 33813 of 2011)
H. N. Jagannath & Ors. ...........Appellants
Versus
State of Karnataka & Ors. ........Respondents
J U D G M E N T
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
Leave granted.
1. The judgment dated 19.04.2011 passed by the High Court
of Karnataka at Bangalore in writ appeal no. 1575 of 2007
(LA-BDA) is called into question in this appeal. By the impugned
judgment, the Division Bench though did not interfere with the
Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in writ petition no.
49357 of 2004 dated 15.03.2007, disposed of the Writ Appeal
observing that respondent no. 4 herein (appellant before the
Division Bench) should work out its remedy in the suit in
2
accordance with law and if a suit is filed, the said suit shall be
considered without being influenced by the observations made in
the course of the Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge.
Thus, the Division Bench virtually relegated the parties to the
civil court once again by granting permission to respondent no. 4
to approach the civil court.
2. This matter is a classic example as to how a litigant before
the Court takes disadvantage of the process of law and the court
by repeatedly tapping the doors of the courts for almost the same
relief, after losing legal battles on a number of occasions.
3. Records reveal that the Bangalore Development Authority
(hereinafter “BDA”) respondent no. 12 herein, issued notification
dated 16.11.1977 under Section 17(1) of BDA Act (almost similar
to Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) proposing to
acquire a vast extent of land in two villages, namely Leggere and
Jaraka Bande Kaval. The purpose of acquisition was to form a
residential layout called “Extension of Mahalakshmi Layout” (also
called Nandini Layout). An extent of 393 acres 25 guntas in
survey no. 1 of Jaraka Bande Kaval village out of the total extent
of 519 acres 37 guntas was also notified. The preliminary
notification included the land belonging to respondent no. 4
3
located in survey no. 1 of Jaraka Bande Kaval village measuring
25 acres 20 guntas. The preliminary notification was published
in the official gazette on 22.12.1977. The final declaration dated
30.08.1979 (gazetted on 20.09.1979) was issued under Section
19(1) of the BDA Act (almost similar to Section 6(1) of Land
Acquisition Act). On 04.06.1985, the Additional Land Acquisition
Officer passed an award in respect of the land measuring 127
acres 21 guntas in survey no. 1 of Jaraka Bande Kaval Village
including the land in dispute (the land belonging to respondent
no. 4) measuring 25 acres 20 guntas. It was noted by the
Additional Land Acquisition Officer that respondent no. 4 had
filed a petition before him in response to the notice issued under
Sections 9, 10 & 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. The award dated
04.06.1985 mentioned supra passed by the Additional Land
Officer was approved by the Government of Karnataka on
19.09.1986 and consequently the award amount was deposited
by BDA in the Court.
4. Respondent no. 4 herein had filed a suit for injunction in
respect of the disputed property (which was also acquired as
mentioned supra), before the 10th Additional City Civil Judge,
Bangalore in O.S. No. 10488 of 1985 against BDA on 28.06.1985.
4
The Trial Court passed an ex-parte order of injunction in favour
of respondent no. 4 on 20.06.1985. After passing the award, the
possession of the land in question was taken on 23.09.1986; a
panchanama was drawn evidencing taking of possession.
Subsequently the Trial Court by its order dated 01.10.1986
modified its earlier ex-parte interim order of injunction and
permitted BDA to form a road. On 31.10.1986, BDA handed over
possession to its engineering section for the formation of the
road. A notification under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition
Act was issued on 20.11.1987 disclosing the factum of taking of
possession of the land including the land in question.
Respondent no. 4 chose to withdraw the suit in O.S. No. 10488 of
1985 on 30.01.1989 without seeking any liberty to file afresh
suit. The Trial Court’s order reads thus:
“Memo filed not pressing the suit.
Suit dismissed. No costs.”
5. However, respondent no. 4 filed another suit for permanent
injunction against BDA for protecting its alleged possession,
before 13th Additional City Civil Court, Bangalore in O.S. No.
3551 of 1989. In the said suit also, the order of temporary
injunction was granted on 10.07.1989 in favour of respondent
5
no. 4 herein. However, the Trial Court by its order dated
08.03.1990 modified the order of temporary injunction earlier
granted, on an application filed by BDA and confined the order of
injunction only to existing structures. The civil court while
modifying the order of temporary injunction as mentioned above
has noted in paragraph 6 of its order that BDA has acquired the
property and has taken the possession of the property. It is also
observed that the title vests with BDA.
When the facts stood thus, respondent no. 4 filed writ
petition no. 17040 of 1991 (after a delay of 10 years from the date
of the final declaration) challenging the preliminary and final
acquisition notifications. The learned Single Judge by his order
dated 28.08.1991 dismissed the said writ petition on the ground
of delay and laches. Against such dismissal, the respondent no. 4
filed writ appeal no. 2798 of 1991 before the Division Bench of
the High Court, which also came to be dismissed on 25.11.1991.
Respondent no. 4 did not stop at that stage. It approached
the High Court once again by filing writ petition no. 31007 of
1992 praying for a direction to the State Government to consider
its representation for de-notification and for re-conveyance of the
land. The High Court by its order dated 09.12.1992 disposed of
6
the writ petition with the observation that the government will
hear and dispose of the representation of respondent no. 4 herein
in accordance with law. The State Government by its order dated
15.02.1993 rejected the representation of respondent no. 4.
Challenging such order of dismissal by the State Government,
respondent no. 4 filed writ petition no. 33996 of 1993 which also
came to be dismissed on 09.02.1996. Respondent no. 4 in the
meanwhile had approached the High Court of Karnataka by filing
writ petition 25719 of 1994 praying for a direction against BDA
not to form the road in the land in dispute. The said writ petition
came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 02.07.1996.
6. In the meanwhile, the State Government by its order dated
17.11.1994 had permitted respondent no. 4 to run a school
situated on the land in question. However, the government by its
order dated 29.04.1997 modified its earlier order dated
17.11.1994. Thereafter respondent no. 4 filed yet another writ
petition (5th writ petition before the High Court) being writ
petition no. 1071 of 1998 to implement the government order
dated 17.11.1994. On being objected to by BDA, the petition
came to be dismissed on 05.10.1999.
7
7. Respondent no. 4 filed yet another suit for injunction, i.e.
O.S. No. 16147 of 1999 (3rd suit). The said suit came to be
dismissed for default. Thereafter, the respondent no. 4 once
again approached the High Court of Karnataka by filing Writ
petition no. 49339 of 2004 (6th Writ Petition) for the following
reliefs.
a) The scheme formed by BDA for residential
layout lapsed under Section 27 of the BDA
Act.
b) Lay-out plan is illegal.
c) There was no vesting of land in BDA.
d) Allotment of sites to various allottees
including the appellants herein petitioners
was illegal.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ
petition on 15.03.2007 by specifically noting that the possession
was taken by BDA, layout was formed, and sites are carved out
and distributed to the allottees who were put in possession of the
sites. The appellants herein are all allottees of the sites (who are
43 in number). The learned Single Judge also noticed that the
allottees have put up constructions and are residing in their
respective houses constructed on the sites allotted. The learned
Single Judge further noticed that the contentions taken and
8
reliefs prayed for by respondent no. 4 though they were available
for respondent no. 4 to be urged earlier, were not urged by it and
therefore, the said prayers are barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of C.P.C.
Respondent no. 4 filed writ appeal no. 1575 of 2007 before
the Division Bench questioning the judgment of dismissal by the
learned Single Judge in writ petition no. 49339 of 2004. The
Division Bench by its impugned judgment as mentioned supra,
though did not interfere in the order passed by the learned Single
Judge, proceeded to grant the liberty to respondent no. 4 to work
out its remedy in civil court once again. The Division Bench has
strangely observed that in case the suit is filed, the same is to be
considered without being influenced by the observations made by
the learned Single Judge. Thus, the Division Bench though did
not interfere in the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has
virtually ignored all the aforementioned facts, including
successive judgments made by the civil court as well as the High
Court of Karnataka in six writ petitions including the one in writ
petition 49339 of 2004, and has virtually kept open all the
questions including the question of title and possession, which
means that the Civil Court is directed to go into the validity of the
9
acquisition notification, award proceedings and the factum of
taking of possession by BDA pursuant to acquisition proceedings.
8. The learned Counsel Shri S. N. Bhat appearing on behalf of
the appellants/allottees of sites contends that the Division Bench
has erred in giving liberty to respondent no. 4 to file a civil suit
which would throw open a fresh round of litigation in respect of
the acquisition made as far back as 1977-79; the appellants and
other similar allottees have constructed houses on the plots and
have been residing therein for decades; the matter of acquisition
has attained finality and has come to a definite rest; the Division
Bench is not justified in reviving the dispute which had long been
given a legal quietus after a series of litigations. Lastly he
submits that it was not open for the Division Bench to unsettle
the settled state of affairs involving thousands of persons who are
purchasers of the plots.
9. The learned Counsel for respondent no. 4, per contra,
contended that the Division Bench is justified in granting liberty
to it to approach the civil court afresh inasmuch as the
possession of the property still remains with respondent no. 4;
respondent no. 4 is running an orphanage and a school for poor
children; since the possession of the property is not taken by
10
BDA, the disputed property is entitled to be held by respondent
no. 4 as the owner thereof. In other words, the argument in
favour of respondent no. 4 is that the disputed property in
question needs to be de-notified in favour of respondent no. 4 and
possession should continue in its favour and hence the Division
Bench is justified in granting permission to respondent no. 4 to
file a Civil Suit afresh by raising all the contentions as are
available in law.
10. It is not in dispute that the property in question along with
other properties was acquired by the BDA in accordance with law
by issuing notifications under Section 17(1) and 19(1) of the BDA
Act as far back as in the year 1977 and in the year 1979. The
BDA has formed and allotted the sites. Most of the allottees have
constructed houses and are residing peacefully. However,
respondent no. 4 still contends that possession has remained
with it and therefore the acquisition needs to be set aside and
that the land should be de-notified. As detailed supra,
respondent no. 4 has already approached the civil court thrice
and High Court on six occasions. Whenever the suits are
withdrawn, respondent no. 4 has not sought any liberty to
approach the civil court once again. Thus, it was not open for
11
respondent no. 4 to approach the civil court repeatedly for the
very reliefs. Consistently, the civil court on three occasions has
negatived the contention of the appellant.
11. Even when respondent no. 4 approached the High Court of
Karnataka by filing the writ petitions and writ appeals, it has
failed. Futile attempts have been made by respondent no. 4 only
to see that the allottees are harassed and to keep the litigation
pending. After the final notification, an award was passed and
compensation was deposited. Possession was taken and the
same was evidenced by the Panchanama prepared as far back as
23.09.1986. Notification under Section 16(2) of the Land
Acquisition Act was issued on 20.01.1987 disclosing the factum
of taking possession of the land in question. Attempt made by
respondent no. 4 for getting the disputed land de-notified has
also failed as far back as 15.01.1993, when the State Government
has rejected the representation of respondent no. 4 seeking
de-notification. The writ petition filed by respondent no. 4
challenging such order of dismissal of the representation was also
dismissed. Despite the same, respondent no. 4 is pursuing the
matter by filing writ petition after writ petition. It is a clear case
of abuse of process of law as well as the Court.
12
12. We do not find any reason to interfere in the finding of fact
rendered by the learned Single Judge that possession was taken
by BDA on 23.09.1986. There is nothing to be adjudicated
further in respect of the title or possession of the property. The
title as well as the possession of the property has vested with the
BDA for about more than 30 years prior to this day and sites were
formed and allotted to various persons including the appellant
herein. In the light of such voluminous records and having
regard to the fact that respondent no. 4 has been repeatedly
making futile attempts by approaching the courts of law by
raising frivolous contentions, the Division Bench ought not to
have granted liberty to respondent no. 4 to approach the civil
court once again for the very same relief, for which it has failed
earlier. In view of this, learned counsel for the appellant is
justified in contending that the Division Bench has completely
erred in reviving the dispute which had long been given a legal
quietus after a series of litigations. The Judgment of the Division
Bench, if allowed to stand, will unsettle the settled state of affairs
involving hundreds of allottees of sites who have constructed the
houses and are residing therein. The impugned judgment of the
Division Bench virtually sets at naught a number of judgments
13
rendered by the civil court as well as the High Court in the very
matter (and was given without any reason much less a valid
reason).
13. The Division Bench has erroneously conferred jurisdiction
upon the civil court to decide the validity of the acquisition. This
Court has repeatedly held in a number of judgments that, by
implication, the power of a civil court to take cognizance of such
cases under Section 9 of the CPC stands excluded and the civil
court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of validity under
Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act. It is only the High Court which will consider such matter
under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit, per se is
not maintainable for adjudicating the validity or otherwise of the
acquisition notifications & proceedings arising therefrom. This
Court in the case of Bangalore Development Authority vs Brijesh
Reddy & Anr. [2013 (3) SCC 66] while considering the acquisition
notifications issued under BDA Act observed thus:
“It is clear that the Land Acquisition Act is a
complete code in itself and is meant to serve
public purpose. By necessary implication,
the power of the civil court to take
cognizance of the case under Section 9 CPC
stands excluded and a civil court has no
jurisdiction to go into the question of the
14
validity or legality of the notification under
Section 4, declaration under Section 6 and
subsequent proceedings except by the High
Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of
the Constitution. It is thus clear that the
civil court is devoid of jurisdiction to give
declaration or even bare injunction being
granted on the invalidity of the procedure
contemplated under the Act. The only right
available for the aggrieved person is to
approach the High Court under Article 26
and this Court under Article 136 with
self-imposed restrictions on their exercise of
extraordinary power.”
A similar view is taken by this Court in other cases. The
Judgments of this Court in Laxmi Chand & Ors. vs Gram
Panchayat, Kararia & Ors. [1996 (7) SCC 218], Shri Girish Vyas
vs State of Maharashtra [2012 (3) SCC 619], State of Bihar vs
Dhirendra Kumar & Ors. [1995 (4) SCC 229], Commissioner,
Bangalore Development Authority vs K. S. Narayan [206 (8) SCC
336] & Commissioner, Mutha Associates & Ors. vs State of
Maharashtra [2013 (14) SCC 304] considered the acquisition
proceedings relating to the lands which were acquired either
under the provisions of the BDA Act or under the Land
Acquisition Act. In all these judgments, similar question arose i.e.
as to whether the civil court had jurisdiction to decide the validity
of the acquisition notifications or not.
15
14. Having regard to the discussion made supra, in our
considered opinion, it is a clear case of contempt committed by
respondent no.4 by repeatedly approaching the courts of law for
almost the same relief which was negatived by the courts for
three decades. However, we decline to initiate contempt
proceedings and to impose heavy costs, under the peculiar facts
and circumstance of this case.
15. It is to be noted that the Division Bench has given liberty
to respondent no. 4 to work out his remedy in a civil suit without
even setting aside the findings of the learned Single Judge and
the findings rendered in the judgments passed by the Civil Court
and the High Court of Karnataka in a number of matters
(mentioned supra). In our opinion the Division Bench of the High
Court of Karnataka has in a casual manner relegated the parties
to the civil court to work out their remedies in the suit which is to
be instituted afresh by respondent no. 4. Thus, the said
conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court is not
sustainable in law. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated
19.04.2011 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Karnataka at Bangalore in writ appeal no. 1575 of 2007
16
(LA-BDA), and consequently the order dated 15.07.2011 (wherein
certain corrections are made subsequently) of the Division Bench
in Misc. Writ petition no. 7549 of 2011 are set aside. The
Judgment of the Learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition
Number 49357 of 2004 stands restored. Appeal is allowed.
.................................................J.
(ARUN MISHRA)
.................................................J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
New Delhi
December 06, 2017

right to collect the tolls let by the Corporation to the person concerned. It squarely attracts Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and partakes the character of a “Lease”.= the contract in question is a “Lease” as defined in Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and is accordingly chargeable to payment of stamp duty as per the rates prescribed in Article 35 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act as “Lease”.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.3695 OF 2009
Nasiruddin & Anr. Etc. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The State of Uttar Pradesh
through Secretary ….Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No.3714 OF 2009
CIVIL APPEAL No.3709 OF 2009
CIVIL APPEAL No.3705 OF 2009
CIVIL APPEAL No.3699 OF 2009
CIVIL APPEAL No.3711 OF 2009
CIVIL APPEAL No.3702 OF 2009
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) These appeals are filed against the judgment
and order dated 22.05.2006 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ
2
Petition Nos. 9661/2005, 21327/2006,
13249/2003, 12958/2004, 26755/2004,
31238/2005, 44533/2005, 31058/2003,
22817/2006, 12957/2004 and 44532/2005
whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petitions
filed by the appellants herein.
2) In order to appreciate the short issue arising in
this bunch of appeals, it is necessary to set out few
relevant facts hereinbelow.
3) Respondent No.3 is a “Nagar Nigam Meerut”
also called “Municipal Corporation Meerut” in the
State of U.P. (hereinafter referred to as “the
Corporation”). The Corporation is constituted and
governed by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 (for short “the
Act”). Its area of operation is in the city of Meerut.
4) In exercise of powers conferred by Section 541
(41) of the Act, the Corporation has framed Bye-laws
for implementing the provisions of the Act and for
3
regulating various activities meant essentially for
the benefit of the residents/public of Meerut city.
Clause 41 of the Bye-laws empowers the
Corporation to fix any fees for grant of any license,
sanction or permission to person(s) by and under
the Act.
5) In March 2004, the Corporation issued an
advertisement inviting bids from public at large for
letting out the right of collection of (1) realization of
Tehbazari Fee from squatters, vendors, kiosks and
(2) for collecting parking fees.
6) So far as the connecting appeals are
concerned, they pertain to other cities of U.P. but
relate to the same aforementioned activities. The
appellants participated in the public auction held by
the Corporation. Their bids were finally accepted.
7) The Corporation accordingly informed to the
appellants individually about acceptance of their
bids and entered into a formal contract with each
4
appellant to enable them to carry out the work of
collection of what is called as “Tehbazari” and
“Parking Fees” in terms of the contract. One such
contract is (Annexure P-10). The period of contract
was up to 31.03.2005.
8) The execution of contract led to the disputes
among the appellants, Corporation and the
Collector of Stamps, namely, what is the true nature
of the contract and how much stamp duty is
payable by the appellants on the contract under the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short “the Stamp Act”).
9) The Corporation, vide their letter (Annexure
P-8), requested the appellants to deposit the
requisite stamp duty payable under the Stamp Act
whereas the Collector of Stamps requested the
appellants to pay stamp duty @ Rs.70/- per
thousand on the contract amount treating the
contract as Lease.
5
10) The appellants felt aggrieved of the demand
raised by the Collector of Stamps and filed writ
petitions in the Allahabad High Court. The
Allahabad High Court placing reliance on its
previous decisions in Munindra Nath Upadhaya
vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (W.P. No.4978 of 1994)
(1995) 2 UPLBEC 1789 and Mohammad Ali vs.
Board of Revenue, U.P. (AIR 1987 Allahabad 348)
upheld the demands raised by the Collector of
Stamps and finding no fault therein dismissed the
writ petitions which has given rise to filing of these
appeals by special leave by the unsuccessful writ
petitioners in this Court.
11) Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
find no merit in these appeals. In our opinion, the
conclusion arrived at by the High Court in the case
of Mohammad Ali vs. Board of Revenue, U.P.
6
(supra) is just and proper calling for no interference
for the reasons given by us hereinbelow.
12) Sections 2(12), 2(14), 2(16) and Article 35 of
Schedule I to the Stamp Act are relevant for
deciding the question arising in the case. They read
as under:
“2(12) “Executed” and “execution”, used with
reference to instruments, mean “signed” and
“signature”.
2(14) “Instrument” includes every document
by which any right or liability is, or purports
to be, created, transferred, limited, extended,
extinguished or recorded.
2(16) “Lease” means a lease of immovable
property, and includes also –
(a) a patta;
(b) a Kabuliyat or other undertaking in
writing, not being a counterpart of a lease, to
cultivate, occupy, or pay or deliver rent for,
immovable property;
(c) any instrument by which tolls of any
description are let;
(d) any writing on an application for a
lease intended to signify that the application
is granted;
7
Article 35 of Schedule 1.
Description of
Instrument
Proper Stamp-duty
LEASE, including an
under-lease or sub-lease
and any agreement to let
or sub-let
(a) where by such lease
the rent is fixed and no
premium is paid or
delivered—
(i) where the
lease purports
to be for a
term of less
than one year;
(ii) where the
lease purports
to be for a
term of not
less than one
year but not
more than
three years;
(iii) where the
lease purports
to be for a
term in excess
of three years;
(iv) where the
lease does not
purport to be
for any
definite term;
The same duty as a
Bond (No.15) for the
whole amount payable
or deliverable under
such lease.
The same duty as Bond
(No. 15) for the
amount or value of the
average annual rent
reserved.
The same duty as a
Conveyance (No. 23)
for a consideration
equal to the amount or
value of the average
annual rent reserved.
The same duty as a
Conveyance (No.23)
for a consideration
equal to the amount or
value of the average
annual rent which
would be paid or
delivered for the first
ten years if the lease
continued so long.
8
(v) where the
lease purports
to be in
perpetuity.
(b) where the lease is
granted for a fine or
premium or for money
advanced and where
no rent is reserved.
(c) where the lease is
granted for a fine or
premium or for money
advanced in addition to
rent reserved.
Exemptions
(a) Lease, executed in
The same duty as a
Conveyance (No. 23)
for a consideration
equal to one-fifth of
the whole amount of
rents which would be
paid or delivered in
respect of the first fifty
years of the lease.
The same duty as a
Conveyance (No. 23)
for a consideration
equal to the amount or
value of such fine or
premium or advance
as set forth in the
lease.
The same duty as a
Conveyance (No. 23)
for a consideration
equal to the amount or
value of such fine or
premium or advance
as set forth in the
lease, in addition to
the duty which would
have been payable on
such lease if no fine or
premium or advance
had been paid or
delivered:
Provided that, in any
case when an
agreement to lease is
stamped with the ad
valorem stamp
required for a lease,
and a lease in
pursuance of such
agreement is
9
the case of a cultivator
and for the purposes of
cultivation (including a
lease of trees for the
production of food or
drink) without the
payment or delivery of
any fine or premium,
when a definite term is
expressed and such
term does not exceed
one year, or when the
average annual rent
reserved does not
exceed one hundred
rupees.
subsequently
executed, the duty on
such lease shall not
exceed eight annas.
13) The expression “Lease” defined in Section
2(16) clause (c) shows that it also includes therein
“any instrument by which tolls of any description are
let”.
14) Similarly the expression “executed” and
“execution” with reference to any instrument, as
defined in Section 2(12) of the Stamp Act, means
“signed” and “signature”.
15) Likewise the expression “Instrument” defined
in Section 2(14) shows that it includes therein every
document by which any right or liability is, or
10
purports to be created, transferred, limited,
extended, extinguished or recorded.
16) In our considered opinion, reading of the
contract in question would show that it was meant
to collect tolls (fees) called “Tehbazari” in local
parlance from squatters, venders, kiosks etc. and
was for collecting parking fees. Such contract, in
our view, is regarded as an instrument by which
tolls of any description are let. In other words, by
awarding such contract to the appellants, the
Corporation had let their right to the appellants to
collect the fees from a class of persons and for
carrying on particular activity in the city.
17) The expression “Lease” under the Stamp Act
has a wider meaning as compared to its original
meaning contained in Section 105 of Transfer of
Property Act (for short “the T.P. Act”). If “Lease”
under Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act includes
therein four specified category of documents set out
11
in clauses (a) to (d), we do not find any such
inclusion in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property
Act. It is for this reason, we are of the view that the
definition of “Lease” for the purpose of Stamp Act is
extensive in nature. It is also clear from the use of
the expression “and includes also” in Section 2 (16)
of the Stamp Act.
18) So by fiction, “any instrument by which tolls of
any description are let” is considered as “Lease” for
the purpose of payment of stamp duty under the
Stamp Act.
19) Justice G.P. Singh, the learned author in his
book “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” in
13th edition - at pages 179 and 180 has dealt with
this subject under the heading “Definition sections
or interpretation clause”. In its sub-heading (a)
“Restrictive and extensive definition”, the author
has explained as to where the words “mean”,
“include”, “includes”, and “means and includes” are
12
used in any definition clause in the Act then how
such definition should be interpreted. The following
passage is apposite to quote.
“(a) Restrictive and extensive definitions
The Legislature has power to define a word
even artificially. So the definition of a word
in the definition section may either be
restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may
be extensive of the same. When a word is
defined to ‘mean’ such and such, the
definition is prima facie restrictive and
exhaustive; whereas, where the word defined
is declared to ‘include’ such and such, the
definition is prima facie extensive. When by
an amending Act, the word ‘includes’ was
substituted for the word ‘means’ in a
definition section, it was held that the
intention was to make it more extensive.
Further, a definition may be in the form of
‘means and includes’, where again the
definition is exhaustive, on the other hand, if
a word is defined ‘to apply to and include’,
the definition is understood as extensive.
These meanings of the expressions ‘means’,
‘includes’ and ‘means and includes’ have
been reiterated in Delhi Development
Authority vs. Bhola Nath Sharma, (2011) 2
SCC 54. The use of word ‘any’ e.g. any
building also connotes extension for ‘any’ is a
word of very wide meaning and prima facie
the use of it excludes limitation.”
20) In our opinion, the aforesaid rule of
interpretation applies while interpreting the
13
definition of Lease under Section 2(16) of the Stamp
Act.
21) As mentioned above, the Corporation in these
cases awarded the contract to the appellants to
recover the tolls (fees) from squatters, vendors,
kiosks etc. and for parking the vehicles in specified
places. The contract was, therefore, for recovery of
tolls and created rights and liabilities in favour of
contracting parties qua each other. It cannot be
disputed that the expression “tolls of any
description” in clause (c) would include all kinds of
levy, charges, fees etc. which the Corporation is
entitled to charge under its Bye-laws (41). A fortiori,
the fees in question would also fall under Section
2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act.
22) In our opinion, the contract in question also
satisfied the definition of the expression
“Instrument” as defined in Section 2(14) of the
Stamp Act because it created a right and liability
14
and lastly, it also satisfied the definition of
expression “executed” and “execution" as defined in
Section 2 (12) of the Stamp Act because it contained
the signature of contracting parties.
23) Learned counsel for the appellants, however,
placed reliance on the decision of this Court in New
Bus-Stand Shop Owners Association vs.
Corporaton of Kozhikode & Anr. [2009 (10) SCC
455] and contended that in the light of the law laid
down in the case of New Bus-stand Shop Owners
Association (supra), the contract in question has
characteristics of a “license” but not of a “lease”
and, therefore, the contract would attract a stamp
duty payable on a License Deed under the Stamp
Act.
24) In our view, the law laid down in the case of
New Bus-stand Shop Owners Association (supra)
is not applicable to the case at hand and is
distinguishable on facts.
15
25) In the case of New Bus-stand Shop Owners
Association (supra), the Corporation of Kozhikode
had let out their shops to several persons and
executed agreement in their favour. The question,
however, arose as to the true nature of the
agreement, whether it is a “license agreement” or a
“lease agreement”. Their Lordships on construction
of the terms of agreement held that the agreement
was a license and accordingly chargeable to stamp
duty as “License” under the Kerala Stamp Act.
26) Such is not the case here. The case at hand
relates to the right to collect the tolls let by the
Corporation to the person concerned. It squarely
attracts Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and
partakes the character of a “Lease”.
27) In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of
the considered opinion that the contract in question
is a “Lease” as defined in Section 2(16)(c) of the
Stamp Act and is accordingly chargeable to payment
16
of stamp duty as per the rates prescribed in Article
35 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act as “Lease”. The
conclusion arrived at by the Single Judge in
Mohammad Ali vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. (supra)
is, therefore, correct which we support with our
reasoning given supra.
28) In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals are
found to be devoid of any merit. They are
accordingly dismissed.
…...……..................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
………...................................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
New Delhi;
December 06, 2017