In the present case the Appellant was subjected to sexual intercourse during broad day light. The fact that she was so subjected at the time and in the manner stated by her, stands proved. Three witnesses had immediately come on the scene of occurrence and found that she was raped. The immediate reporting and the consequential medical examination further support her testimony. By very nature of the offence, the close proximity with the offender would have certainly afforded sufficient time to imprint upon her mind the identity of the offender. In Malkhansingh v. State of M.P.[2] in a similar situation where identification by prosecutrix for the first time in court was a matter in issue, this Court had observed: "She also had a reason to remember their faces as they had committed a heinous offence and put her to shame. She had, therefore, abundant opportunity to notice their features In fact on account of her traumatic and tragic experience, the faces of the appellants must have got imprinted in her memory, and there was no chance of her making a mistake about their identity." 12. Furthermore, the appellant had gone to the extent of stating in her first reporting that she would be in a position to identify the offender and had given particulars regarding his identity. The clothes worn by the offender were identified by her when called upon to do so. In the circumstances there was nothing wrong or exceptional in identification by her of the accused in court. We find her testimony completely trustworthy and reliable. Consequently we hold that the case against Respondent No.1 stands proved. Since the trial court had found the age of the Appellant to be 10-13 years of age, we take the age to be on the maximum scale i.e. 13 years. In our considered view, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the revision. No other view was possible and the case therefore warrants interference by this Court. We accordingly allow the appeal and convict Respondent No.1 for having committed the offence under Section 376(1) IPC and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for seven years and also impose a fine of Rs.5,000/- which in its entirety shall be made over to the Appellant. In the event such fine is not deposited, Respondent No.1 shall undergo further sentence of simple imprisonment for six months. We, however, confirm the acquittal of Respondent No.1 for the offence under Section 3(2)(V) of the Act. Respondent No.1 shall be taken into custody forthwith to undergo the sentence as aforesaid.-"We accordingly allow the appeal and convict Respondent No.1 for having committed the offence under Section 376(1) IPC and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for seven years and also impose a fine of Rs.5,000/- which in its entirety shall be made over to the Appellant. In the event such fine is not deposited, Respondent No.1 shall undergo further sentence of simple imprisonment for six months. We, however, confirm the acquittal of Respondent No.1 for the offence under Section 3(2)(V) of the Act. Respondent No.1 shall be taken into custody forthwith to undergo the sentence as aforesaid."

                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1581 OF 2009



Ms. S                                            .... Appellant

Versus

Sunil Kumar & Anr.                                    .... Respondents



J U D G M E N T



Uday Umesh Lalit, J.




1.    This appeal by special leave challenges the judgment and  order  dated
20.11.2007 passed by the High  Court  of  Chhattisgarh  dismissing  Criminal
Revision No.550 of 2007 preferred  by  the  Appellant  through  her  natural
guardian.   By dismissing said criminal revision  the  High  Court  affirmed
the view taken by the trial court acquitting  Respondent No.1 herein of  the
charges under Section 376(2)(f) of  the  IPC  and  Section  3(2)(V)  of  the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)  Act,  1989
(for short "the Act").  Though the present appeal  has  been  filed  in  the
name of the Appellant, in view of Section 228A of the  IPC  we  direct  that
the cause title shall stand amended and be read as  "Ms.  S.   versus  Sunil
Kumar and another".

2     The case of the prosecution is that  in  the  forenoon  of  14.01.2006
while the Appellant was guarding her crops, a person aged about 20-22  years
wearing a shirt with red stripes and black  trouser  came.   He  called  the
Appellant by making a signal, whereupon she started running.  He  ran  after
her, caught her  and  after  removing  her  undergarments  committed  sexual
intercourse.  He also bit the lip of the Appellant.  She  shouted  for  help
which attracted the attention of three persons, namely, PWs 2, 4 and 6  (the
names of these witnesses are not being given as one of them is  the  brother
of  the  Appellant  and  they  shall  hereafter  be  referred  to  by  their
designation in the trial).   PW-4 i.e. the brother of the Appellant ran  for
catching that person but was unable to catch him and the person ran away.

3.    The reporting in respect of the  aforesaid  incident  was  immediately
made by the Appellant  in  Patharia  Police  Station  and  FIR  Ext.P-1  was
registered under Section 376 IPC.  In the first  information  report  itself
the Appellant had stated the complexion of the man to be "sanwla",  that  he
was wearing shirt with red stripes and that he was  unable  to  speak.   She
further stated that she would be able to identify that  man.  The  Appellant
was immediately sent for medical examination.  PW-7  Dr.  Vibha  Sindur  did
the medical examination and found following features:
         "1. The age of the prosecutrix was about 10 years.
There was a cut injury on the lower lip and a   swelling on the upper lip.

There was an aberration of 3 x 5 cms in the     waist.

                           On internal examination
1.  The hymen was freshly ruptured and it was bleeding.

2.  Two slides of the vagina were prepared and were handed over  to  the  IO
for chemical examination.

3. According to the doctor the prosecutrix  was        subjected  to  sexual
intercourse."


4.    During the course of investigation  the  blood-stained  soil  and  the
plain soil from the place of  occurrence  was  seized  vide  Ext.P-14.   The
caste certificate (Ext.P-13) of the Appellant was also  seized.   Respondent
No.1 was arrested vide arrest panchnama Ext.P-18 and was  sent  for  medical
examination.  PW-13 Dr. D.R. Singraul found him  capable  of  having  sexual
intercourse.  The shirt with red stripes and black trouser were also  seized
from Respondent No.1 vide Ext.P-17.  These garments were then  produced  for
identification before the witnesses including the Appellant  who  identified
said garments.  Though the Appellant had clearly stated that  she  would  be
able to identify the man,  no  test  identification  parade  was  conducted.
During the investigation the age of the Appellant was found  to  be  between
10-14 years by PW-9 Dr. Anil Pratap Singh upon X-Ray examination.

5.    After completion of investigation  Respondent  No.1  was  charged  for
having committed offences under the aforesaid Sections and sent  for  trial.
  The Appellant was examined as  PW-1  who  stated  about  the  incident  in
question and re-iterated the contents  of  the  FIR.   She  also  identified
Respondent No.1 in court though she did not  know  the  name  of  Respondent
No.1, nor the village that he belonged.  PWs 2, 4 and 6  who  after  hearing
the shouts for help had arrived at the  place  of  incident,  supported  her
version as regards the fact that she was subjected to rape.    However  none
of these witnesses  could  identify  Respondent  No.1.    The  Investigating
Officer was examined as PW-10 who accepted that from the  first  information
report it appeared that the offence was committed  by  some  unknown  person
but could not give reason why test identification parade was not  conducted.
 In his cross examination, a  suggestion  was  given  by  the  defence  that
Respondent No. 1-Accused was unable  to  speak.  He  explained  that  on  an
earlier occasion, a complaint  was  made  by  the  maternal  grandfather  of
Respondent No. 1 stating about his disability, that he  was  lost  and  that
Respondent No. 1 was found in pursuance of such complaint.

6.    The trial court after considering the entire material on  record  came
to the conclusion that the age of the Appellant was 10-13 years of  age  and
that she was minor at the time of incident.  It was held  that  the  medical
evidence  on  record  clearly  showed  that  she  was  subjected  to  sexual
intercourse.  Though the statements of the Appellant and  PWs  2,  4  and  6
clearly established the fact that she was subjected  to  sexual  intercourse
at the time and in the manner alleged, the trial court observed that PWs  2,
4 and 6 had failed to identify Respondent No.1.   Despite the fact that  the
Appellant had identified Respondent No.1 in court, the trial court  observed
that  in  the  absence  of  any  prior  test  identification   parade   such
identification in court for the first time was not good enough.
      Though the  finding  was  recorded  that  the  Appellant  belonged  to
Scheduled Caste community nothing was discussed whether  the  offence  under
Section 3(2)(V) was otherwise made out. Giving him benefit of doubt  on  the
question of identification, Respondent No.1 was  acquitted  of  the  charges
leveled against him, vide judgment of the trial court  dated  27.02.2007  in
Special Session Case No.68 of 2006.

7.    The Appellant being aggrieved filed Criminal  Revision  under  Section
397 read with 401 of  the  Cr.P.C.  in  the  High  Court.   The  High  Court
affirmed  the  view  taken  by  the  trial  court   that   since   no   test
identification parade was arranged, the identification by the Appellant  for
the first time in court was not sufficient.  For  the  lapses  committed  by
the Investigating Officer in not arranging the test  identification  parade,
the High Court recommended departmental action against him but  went  on  to
observe that the acquittal by the trial court was  on  sound  reasoning  and
that there was no illegality or infirmity  in  the  judgment  of  acquittal.
The High Court therefore dismissed the revision.  It appears that there  was
delay of 81 days in filing the revision and the revision was dismissed  both
on merits as well as on delay.

8.    The present appeal has been preferred by  the  prosecutrix/  Appellant
through Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.  Despite service  of  notice
upon Respondent No.1 no appearance was entered on his  behalf  and  as  such
this Court appointed Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, learned advocate as Amicus  Curiae
to assist the court on behalf of Respondent No.1.  We must place  on  record
appreciation for the assistance rendered by her.

9.     Mr.  Kanhaiya  Priyadarshi,  learned  advocate  appearing   for   the
appellant submitted that the testimony  of  the  Appellant  was  cogent  and
supported by the other evidence on record.  There  was  immediate  reporting
and the  fact  that  she  was  subjected  to  sexual  intercourse  was  well
established.  Three  witnesses  had  immediately  arrived  pursuant  to  her
shouts who corroborated the factum of  rape.  The  Appellant  in  her  first
reporting had clearly stated that she would be able to identify  the  person
and  had  given  sufficient  indication   regarding   his   identity.    Her
identification in court, in the circumstances was not flawed  on  any  count
and ought to be accepted.   His  submissions  were  well  supported  by  Ms.
Shashi Juneja, learned advocate appearing for  the  State  who  invited  our
attention to Ashok Debbarama @ Achak Debbarma v.  State  of  Tripura[1]  and
submitted that the identification for  the  first  time  in  court  is  good
enough and can be relied upon if the witness is  otherwise  trustworthy  and
reliable.  Ms. Vanshaja Shukla learned Amicus Curiae  fairly  accepted  that
it is only as a matter of prudence that the courts require and  insist  upon
test identification parade and that it would entirely depend upon facts  and
circumstances if the testimony of the  witness  is  otherwise  found  to  be
trustworthy and reliable.

10.   It has consistently been held by this Court that what  is  substantive
evidence is the identification of an accused in court by a witness and  that
the prior identification in a test identification parade is   used  only  to
corroborate the identification in court.   Holding  of  test  identification
parade  is  not  the  rule  of  law  but   rule   of   prudence.    Normally
identification  of  the  accused  in  a  test  identification  parade  lends
assurance so that the subsequent identification in court during trial  could
be  safely  relied  upon.   However,  even  in  the  absence  of  such  test
identification  parade,  the  identification   in   court   can   in   given
circumstances be relied upon, if the witness is  otherwise  trustworthy  and
reliable. The law on the point is well-settled and succinctly laid  down  in
Ashok Debbarma (supra).

11.   In the present case the Appellant was subjected to sexual  intercourse
during broad day light.  The fact that she was so subjected at the time  and
in  the  manner  stated  by  her,  stands  proved.   Three   witnesses   had
immediately come on the scene of occurrence and found that  she  was  raped.
The immediate reporting and the consequential  medical  examination  further
support her testimony. By very nature of the offence,  the  close  proximity
with the offender would have certainly afforded sufficient time  to  imprint
upon her mind the identity of the offender.  In  Malkhansingh  v.  State  of
M.P.[2]  in a similar situation where identification by prosecutrix for  the
first time in court was a matter in issue, this Court had observed:
"She also had a reason to remember their  faces  as  they  had  committed  a
heinous offence  and  put  her  to  shame.   She  had,  therefore,  abundant
opportunity to notice their features In fact on  account  of  her  traumatic
and tragic experience, the faces of the appellants must have  got  imprinted
in her memory, and there was no chance of her making a mistake  about  their
identity."

12.   Furthermore, the appellant had gone to the extent of  stating  in  her
first reporting that she would be in a position  to  identify  the  offender
and had given particulars regarding his identity.  The clothes worn  by  the
offender were identified  by  her  when  called  upon  to  do  so.   In  the
circumstances there was nothing wrong or exceptional  in  identification  by
her of the accused in court.  We find her testimony  completely  trustworthy
and reliable.  Consequently we hold that the case  against  Respondent  No.1
stands proved.  Since the trial court had found the age of the Appellant  to
be 10-13 years of age, we take the age to be on the maximum  scale  i.e.  13
years.  In our  considered  view,  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in
dismissing the revision. No other view was possible and the  case  therefore
warrants interference by this Court.  We accordingly allow  the  appeal  and
convict Respondent No.1 for  having  committed  the  offence  under  Section
376(1) IPC and sentence him to undergo  imprisonment  for  seven  years  and
also impose a fine of Rs.5,000/- which in its entirety shall  be  made  over
to the Appellant.  In the event such fine is not deposited, Respondent  No.1
shall undergo further sentence of simple imprisonment for six  months.   We,
however, confirm the acquittal of Respondent  No.1  for  the  offence  under
Section 3(2)(V) of the Act.  Respondent No.1 shall  be  taken  into  custody
forthwith to undergo the sentence as aforesaid.


                                  .............................J.
                                  (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)


                                  .............................J.
                                  (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
April 10, 2015


ITEM NO.1D              COURT NO.13               SECTION IIA

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

                     Criminal Appeal  No(s).  1581/2009

Satwantin Bai                                             Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

SUNIL KUMAR & ANR.                                 Respondent(s)



Date : 10/04/2015      This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
            judgment today.


For Appellant(s)       Mr. Kanhaiya Priyadarshi, Adv. (SCLSC)


For Respondent(s)      Ms. Shashi Juneja, Adv.
                       Mr. C. D. Singh, Adv.

                       Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Adv. (A.C.)


      Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Uday  Umesh  Lalit  pronounced  the  reportable
judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice  Pinaki  Chandra  Ghose
and His Lordship.

      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  reportable  judgment  as
follows:-

"We accordingly allow the appeal and  convict  Respondent  No.1  for  having
committed the offence under Section 376(1) IPC and sentence him  to  undergo
imprisonment for seven years and also impose a fine of Rs.5,000/-  which  in
its entirety shall be made over to the Appellant.  In the  event  such  fine
is not deposited, Respondent No.1 shall undergo further sentence  of  simple
imprisonment  for  six  months.   We,  however,  confirm  the  acquittal  of
Respondent  No.1  for  the  offence  under  Section  3(2)(V)  of  the   Act.
Respondent No.1 shall  be  taken  into  custody  forthwith  to  undergo  the
sentence as aforesaid."


      (R.NATARAJAN)                                 (SNEH LATA SHARMA)
       Court Master                                    Court Master
          (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
-----------------------
[1]    (2014) 4 SCC 747
[2]    (2003) 5 SCC 746

The assertion in the cross-examination of PW1 Chatra Ram does not in any way detract from the role clearly attributed by the witness to Surja Ram. The witness did not say that Surja Ram never got down from the vehicle or that he had not accompanied Hapu Ram. The cross-examination also did not challenge such assertion by the witness that both Hapu Ram and Surja Ram had made Jeevan Ram get down from the vehicle near the well. The above quoted portion in the cross-examination very clearly deals with the role of Hapu Ram. This portion does not in any way detract from the role attributed to Surja Ram. The High court was plainly wrong in relying on this portion in the cross-examination to give benefit of doubt to Surja Ram. The testimony of PW 1 Chatra Ram, is consistent and not in any way shaken in cross-examination as regards Surja Ram. 10. In our view, Surja Ram was an equal participant in the crime. His role in bringing Jeevan Ram forcibly and making him sit in the vehicle, thereafter making him sit in the front, and finally in making him get down near the well and strangulating him, was rightly relied upon by the Trial Court. The High Court committed gross error in granting him benefit of doubt. Given the status of record, such view is not a possible view at all. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court acquitting Surja Ram. The conviction as ordered by the Trial Court is restored. Surja Ram is convicted under Sections 302 and 201 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- on the first count and for 3 years and fine of Rs. 1.000/- on the second count. The sentences shall run concurrently. The Respondent Surja Ram be taken in custody forthwith to undergo the sentence awarded to him.

                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.566 of 2008

State of Rajasthan                           .... Appellants

                                   Versus

Surja Ram                                    .... Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.


1.    This appeal by Special Leave challenges the judgment and  order  dated
22.08.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan  at  Jodhpur
in DB Criminal Jail Appeal No. 27 of 2003 acquitting the  Respondent  herein
of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC.

2.     Initially  six  Persons  were  alleged  to  have  committed  offences
punishable under Sections 147, 341, 149, 364, 302 , 201  read  with  Section
120B of IPC.  One of them named  Chatra  Ram  was  granted  pardon  and  was
examined as PW1 in the trial. Out of  five  accused  who  faced  the  trial,
Bhanwru Ram and Mohan Ram were acquitted by the Trial  Court.  It  convicted
Hapu Ram and Surja Ram for the offences under Sections  341,  364,  302  IPC
read with 120B IPC, while the other accused named  Raju  Ram  was  convicted
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC.  In the appeals preferred  by
convicted accused, the High Court affirmed the conviction  and  sentence  of
Hapu Ram under Section  302  of  IPC  while  acquitting  him  of  the  other
charges. The other two namely Surja Ram and Raju Ram were acquitted  of  all
the charges. In the Special Leave  Petition  preferred  by  the  State,  the
Petition as against Raju Ram was dismissed  by  this  court  but  leave  was
granted as against accused Surja Ram.  This matter  is therefore  restricted
as regards challenge to the acquittal of Surja Ram by the High Court .

3.     Complainant  PW4  Om  Prakash  submitted  written  report  at  Police
Station, Nagaur at 10:15 p.m. on 12.5.1998, that on  10.5.1998  he  and  his
father Jeevan Ram were returning after attending a marriage around  11:00pm,
when the motor cycle tyre  got  punctured  .  Father  Jeevan  Ram  told  the
complainant to proceed with the Motor Cycle while he  would  return  in  the
tractor of one Mohan Ram.  The report further stated  that  his  father  had
since then not returned. Pursuant to this report FIR No.  206  of  1998  was
registered and matter was investigated. One  of  the  suspects   Chatra  Ram
having being granted pardon, charges were framed against Five accused  under
Sections 147, 341/149, 120B,  364,  302  and  201  IPC  and  the  trial  was
conducted in the Court of Addl. Dist. & Sessions Judge (Fast  Track)  Nagaur
vide Sessions Case No. 72/2001.

4.    PW1 Chatra Ram deposed that on 10.5.1998, his Jeep came  to  be  hired
by Raju Ram and Surja Ram for going to Village Budi  with  Raju  Ram,  Mohan
Ram, Surja Ram, Bhanwru Ram as occupants. On the way Hapu Ram  joined  them.
While passing along they found Jeevan Ram on the road,  whereupon  the  jeep
was stopped and Hapu Ram and Surja Ram got down.  They  brought  Jeevan  Ram
forcibly and made him sit in the jeep. The witness stated that he and  Mohan
Ram resisted but Hapu Ram said that they be dropped at Nagaur  otherwise  he
would kill all of them. Hapu Ram was having a  pistol  in  his  hand.  Later
Mohan Ram  left at which stage Surja Ram and Hapu Ram caught hold of  Jeevan
Ram and made him sit in the front between them. Hapu Ram with the pistol  in
his hand had stated that if anybody raised any protest he would  kill  them.
The jeep was then taken towards Bidasar.  After going for  about  15-20  kms
from Village Katar, the jeep was stopped near a well  by  the  side  of  the
road.  The jeep was taken close to the well. Hapu Ram  and  Surja  Ram  made
Jeevan Ram get down, then strangulated him by the cycle tube and  threw  him
in the well. Hapu Ram had threatened them not to  say  anything  to  anyone.
The witness further stated that  before  strangulating  him,  Hapu  Ram  had
asked Jeevan Ram to marry his younger daughter with him.  During  the  trial
the prosecution  produced one letter marked as Exh. P21 written by Hapu  Ram
stating that his marriage with the daughter of  Jeevan  Ram  should  not  be
cancelled and had given  threats  therein.  PW  4  Om  Prakash,  complainant
reiterated the contents of his complaint.

5.    The Trial Court found that the case was established  as  against  Hapu
Ram,Surja Ram and Raju Ram. It convicted Hapu Ram and Surja Ram  principally
for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced them to undergo  life
imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25,000/- each, in default whereof to  undergo
simple imprisonment for 3 years. They were  also  convicted  under  Sections
341, 364 and 201 of IPC, while accused Raju Ram was convicted under  Section
302 read with 34 IPC. The other two accused Bhanwru Ram and Mohan  Ram  were
acquitted of all the charges.

6.    The convicted accused carried  the  matter  by  filing  DB  Crl.  Jail
Appeal No.27 of 2003 and 74 of 2003. The  High  Court  while  affirming  the
conviction of Hapu Ram under Section 302  IPC  and  under  Section  201  IPC
acquitted him of other charges. He was sentenced to  life  imprisonment  for
offence under Section 302 with fine of Rs.5,000/-  and  for  sentence  of  3
years under Section 201 of  IPC with a fine of Rs.  1,000/-.  The  sentences
were to run concurrently. The High court however  acquitted  Surja  Ram  and
Raju Ram of all the charges.

7.    While dealing with the eye witness account through PW1 Chatra  Ram  as
regards the role of Surja Ram, the High Court observed as under:-
     "...Witness stated that Surja Ram and Hapu  Ram  strangulated  deceased
Jiwan Ram, but in the cross-examination, said witness stated  that  deceased
Jiwan Ram was strangulated by Hapu Ram and before doing so,  even  Hapu  Ram
asked deceased Jiwan Ram to marry his younger daughter and, in  that  event,
he would be relieved, but his proposal was not accepted by  Jiwan  Ram  and,
at that time, accused Hapu Ram strangulated deceased by a cycle tube.  Thus,
the allegation of strangulation by Surja Ram  was  not  made  in  the  cross
examination. Hence conviction of accused Surja Ram under Section 302 of  IPC
cannot be maintained because of contradiction in the statement...."

 With this view the High Court acquitted Surja Ram of all the charges.

8.    Mr. Puneet Parihar, learned advocate appearing for State of  Rajasthan
submitted that  the  assessment  made  by  the  High  Court  was  completely
incorrect. Referring to the testimony PW1 Chatra Ram, it was submitted  that
the role of Hapu Ram  and  Surja  Ram  as  stated  by  the  witness  in  his
examination in chief was :-
Both Hapu Ram and Surja Ram had got down and  brought  Jeevan  Ram  forcibly
and made him sit in the vehicle.

Later, both had caught hold of him and made him sit in  the  front   between
them.

After bringing the vehicle close to the well, Hapu Ram and  Surja  Ram  made
Jeevan Ram get down. They strangulated him with cycle tube and threw him  in
the well.

The relevant portion from the cross-examination of  the  witness  which  was
relied upon by the High Court was to the following effect :-
".....I had seen Hapu  Ram  rounding  tube  in  his  neck  and  drawing  him
forcibly towards well, nothing else I  had  seen.  I  had  not  seen  as  to
whether the deceased Jeevan Ram  was  going  on  his  foot  or  the  accused
persons were drawing him..."

Ms. Aiswarya Bhati, learned Advocate for the Respondent submitted  that  the
view taken by the High Court in the  circumstance,  did  not  call  for  any
interference.

9.     The assertion in the cross-examination of PW1 Chatra Ram does not  in
any way detract from the role clearly attributed by  the  witness  to  Surja
Ram. The witness did not say that Surja Ram never got down from the  vehicle
 or that he had not accompanied Hapu Ram.  The  cross-examination  also  did
not challenge such assertion by the witness that both  Hapu  Ram  and  Surja
Ram  had made Jeevan Ram get down from the vehicle near the well. The  above
quoted portion in the cross-examination very clearly deals with the role  of
Hapu Ram.  This  portion  does  not  in  any  way  detract  from  the   role
attributed to Surja Ram. The High court was  plainly  wrong  in  relying  on
this portion in the cross-examination to give  benefit  of  doubt  to  Surja
Ram. The testimony of PW 1 Chatra Ram, is consistent  and  not  in  any  way
shaken in cross-examination as regards Surja Ram.

10.      In our view, Surja Ram was an equal participant in the  crime.  His
role in bringing Jeevan Ram forcibly and making  him  sit  in  the  vehicle,
thereafter making him sit in the front, and finally in making him  get  down
near the well and strangulating him, was rightly relied   upon by the  Trial
Court. The High Court committed gross  error  in  granting  him  benefit  of
doubt. Given the status of record, such view is not a possible view at  all.
We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the  High
Court acquitting Surja Ram. The conviction as ordered by the Trial Court  is
restored.  Surja Ram is convicted under Sections 302 and 201 IPC  read  with
Section 34 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and to  pay  fine  of  Rs.
5,000/- on the first count and for 3 years and fine of Rs.  1.000/-  on  the
second count. The sentences shall run  concurrently.  The  Respondent  Surja
Ram be taken in custody forthwith to undergo the sentence awarded to him.

.............................J.
                                  (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)



                                  .............................J.
                                  (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
April 10, 2015


ITEM NO.1C               COURT NO.13               SECTION II

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

                      Criminal Appeal  No(s).  566/2008

STATE OF RAJASTHAN                                 Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

SURJA RAM                                          Respondent(s)

Date : 10/04/2015      This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
            judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Shiv Mangal Sharma, AAG
                       Mr. Puneet Parihar, Adv.
                       Ms. Anjali Chauhan, Adv.
                       Mr. Milind Kumar, Adv.

For Respondent(s)      Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Adv.
                       Mr. T. Gopal, Adv.
                       Mr. Hemendra Sharma, Adv.
                       Mr. Amit Verma, Adv.
                       Mr. Adarsh K. Tiwari, Adv.
                       Mr. Pawan Kr. Saini, Adv.
                       Ms. Madhurima Ghosh, Adv.
                       Ms. Neha Meena, Adv.

      Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh  Lalit  pronounced  the  non-reportable
judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice  Pinaki  Chandra  Ghose
and His Lordship.

      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  non-reportable  judgment
as follows:-

"We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the  judgment  and  order  of  the
High Court acquitting Surja Ram. The conviction  as  ordered  by  the  Trial
Court is restored.  Surja Ram is convicted under Sections 302  and  201  IPC
read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay  fine
of Rs. 5,000/- on the first count and for 3 years and fine  of  Rs.  1.000/-
on the second count. The sentences shall run  concurrently.  The  Respondent
Surja Ram be taken in custody forthwith to undergo the sentence  awarded  to
him."


      (R.NATARAJAN)                                 (SNEH LATA SHARMA)
       Court Master                                    Court Master
        (Signed non-reportable judgment is placed on the file)

We have perused the entire record including the dying declarations. In our view dying declaration Ext. 96 as recorded by the Executive Magistrate is the most crucial document. Said document itself records the appropriate satisfaction and certification by the medical professional namely PW7 Dr. Vijay Kalne before and after recording of the dying declaration. PW7 Dr. Vijay Kalne clearly stated in his deposition that he had examined Sadhana and found her pulse and Blood Pressure normal, that she was well oriented and that she was mentally fit. He further stated that he was all the time present while the statement recorded. In the circumstances the dying decalration Ext. 96 is absolutely reliable. On the point that Pradip had set Sadhana ablaze, there is no inconsistency in any of the dying declarations and they in unison point the finger at him. Even with respect to the role of Pravin the declarations Exts. 96 and 98 are quite consistent. There may be some exaggeration on part of PW 1 Suryakanata and PW 5 Narmadabai, but the supplementary statement of Sadhana dated 7.11.1995 put the matter completely beyond any doubt. 12. The dying declaration Ext.96, in our view is definitely trustworthy. It also stands corroborated on material aspects by other declaration Ext.98. If some exaggeration on part of PW1 Suryakanta and PW5 Narmadabai is eschewed, their oral testimonies also lend full support. Whether Sadhana was able to speak coherently is a matter which stands dealt with by PW7 Dr. Vijay Kalne, and we have no hesitation in placing reliance on dying declaration Ext.96. The High Court was in error in discarding said dying declaration. The view which weighed with the High Court was not even a possible view. We, therefore hold that the charges under Sections 302 and 354 as against Pradip and Pravin respectively stand fully proved. We affirm the acquittal of Pradip with regard to charge under Section 498A of the IPC. 13. In the circumstances we allow these appeals and set aside the judgment and order of acquittal recorded by the High Court. The respondent Pradip is convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-. Respondent Pravin is convicted under Section 354 IPC and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs.500/-, in default whereof to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one month. Both the respondents Pradip and Pravin be taken in custody forthwith to undergo the sentence awarded to them.

                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.2071-2072 of 2008


State of Maharashtra Etc.                             .... Appellant


                       Vs.

Pravin Mahadeo Gadekar  Etc.                          .... Respondents




                       JUDGMENT




Uday Umesh Lalit, J.


1.    These appeals by Special Leave are directed against the  judgment  and
order dated 7.12.2007 passed by the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay,
Bench at Nagpur in Crl. Appeal Nos. 255 of 2001 and 306 of 2004.

2.    Deceased  Sadhana,  daughter  of  PW  5  Narmadabai,  was  married  to
respondent Pradip four to five years prior to the date of  incident.   After
marriage, Sadhana was residing with Pradip in  the  matrimonial  home  where
the other inmates  were  Parwatabai  mother-in-law  and  respondent  Pravin,
brother-in-law. After the marriage, Sadhana  was  subjected  to  cruelty  by
Pradip and other in laws and she was constrained to  leave  her  matrimonial
home.  A report was lodged by Sadhana on the  basis  of  which  these  three
persons were prosecuted.  However the dispute was settled  and  she  started
co-habiting with Pradip.

3.    It is the case of  prosecution  that  in  the  morning  of  6.11.1995,
deceased Sadhana suffered burn injuries.  Her husband Pradip  also  suffered
burn injuries.  Both were rushed to Distt. Hospital,  Akola  for  treatment.
One Shelke gave information to police on telephone.  PW1 Suryakanta,  friend
of Sadhana and PW5 Narmadabai, mother of Sadhana visited her  separately  in
the hospital and Sadhana is  stated  to  have  disclosed  that  her  husband
Pradip poured kerosene on her and kept pallu of her  saree  on  the  lighted
cooking gas setting her ablaze.

4.     In the night intervening 6.11.1995 and 7.11.1995  while  Sadhana  was
undergoing treatment, arrangements were made to record her statement.    PW8
Vijay Singh Pawar who was working as Naib Tehsildar, Akola was requested  to
record her statement.  He therefore went to the  Distt.  Hospital,  met  PW7
Dr. Vijay Kalne, Medical Officer  Distt.  Hospital  and  asked  vide  Ext.95
whether Sadhana was in a position to make a statement.  PW7 Dr. Vijay  Kalne
examined Sadhana and vide Ext.  92  certified  that  she  was  conscious  to
record Dying Declaration.  After such certification PW 8 Vijay  Singh  Pawar
proceeded to record the statement Ext.96 of Sadhana.   In  response  to  the
question how the incident had occurred she stated  inter  alia  that  Pravin
had attempted to commit rape on her few days  back  and  when  she  narrated
this to Pradip after he came back, Pradip poured kerosene  on  her  and  set
her ablaze.  At the end  of  the  statement,  mark  of  her  right  toe  was
appended vide Ext. 96 as  her  hands  had  sustained  burn  injuries.  After
conclusion of the statement, endorsement was made by PW7 Dr. Vijay Kalne  at
3.25 am vide Ext.93 that the patient  was  conscious  to  record  the  dying
declaration.

5.     Pursuant  to  the  aforesaid  statement,  FIR  was  registered  under
Sections 498A, 307, 354 read with 34 IPC in city  Kotwalli  Police  Station,
Akola  against  Pradip,  Pravin  and  their  mother   Parvatabai.     In   a
supplementary statement recorded on 7.11.1995  Sadhana  clarified  that  her
brother-in-law Pravin had come to rape her on Monday, that he  had  molested
her but had not committed any rape on her and that upon her  raising  shouts
he had gone away.

6.    Her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.  was  recorded  by  police  on
8.11.1995 where she stated that  in  the  night  intervening  2.11.1995  and
3.11.1995 Pravin had held her in his arms and outraged her modesty and  that
when Pradip came back from Nagpur on 5.11.1995,  she  complained  about  the
incident.  She further stated  how  Pradip  set  her  ablaze  on  6.11.1995.
Sadhana succumbed to her burn injuries on 10.11.1995 and the  offence  under
Section 302 IPC was registered against the  accused.   The  post-mortem  was
conducted on the same  day  by  PW6  Dr.  Prashant  Waichal  in  the  Distt.
Hospital at Akola who found second degree burn injuries  to  the  extent  of
96% spread over head, neck and  face.    After  investigation  police  filed
charge-sheet against  Pradip,  Pravin  and  Parwatabai  for  offences  under
Sections 498A, 302 read with 34 IPC.  Pravin was  additionally  charged  for
offence under Section 354 IPC.

7.    The prosecution examined nine witnesses.  PW 7 Dr. Vijay Kalne in  his
deposition stated that the  Executive  Magistrate  had  made  a  request  in
writing to certify if Sadhana was  conscious  and  fit  to  give  her  dying
declaration.   The witness stated that he examined  the  patient  and  found
that her pulse and Blood Pressure were normal, that she  was  well  oriented
and was mentally fit.  After having so examined he gave a  certificate  vide
Ext. 92.  He further stated that after the statement was recorded, he  again
examined the patient and gave a certificate that  she  was  conscious  while
the dying declaration was recorded. His later certification  was  marked  as
Ext. 93.   He further stated that  he  was  present  all  throughout.    PW8
Vijay Singh Pawar stated how he had  requested  PW  7  Dr.  Vijay  Kalne  to
examine Sadhana and that during the entire course  of  declaration  she  was
completely conscious. He stated that he had faithfully  recorded  the  dying
declaration as stated by Sadhana.   The trial  court  by  its  judgment  and
order dated 4.0.2001 in Sessions Case No. 113 of 1996 convicted  Pradip  for
the offence punishable under  Section  498A  and  sentenced  him  to  suffer
rigorous imprisonment for two years and payment  of  fine  of  Rs.500/-,  in
default whereof to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months.   He
was also convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life  imprisonment
and payment of fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default  whereof  to  suffer  rigorous
imprisonment for two years.  Pravin and Parwatabai  were  acquitted  of  the
offences under Sections  498A  and  302  read  with  34  IPC.   Pravin  was,
however, convicted for offence  under  Section  354  IPC  and  sentenced  to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and payment of fine  of  Rs.500/-,
in default  whereof  to  suffer  further  rigorous  imprisonment  for  three
months.

8.    While holding Pradip guilty under Section 302  IPC,  the  trial  court
principally relied upon dying declaration Ext. 96 recorded by the  Executive
Magistrate i.e. PW 8 Vijay Singh Pawar.   It was  observed  that  the  dying
declaration  did  not  suffer  from  any  infirmity  nor  were   there   any
circumstances to show that it was not  truthful.    As  regards  oral  dying
declaration as deposed to by PW 1 Suryakanta  and  PW5  Narmadabai,  it  was
observed  that  though  there  were   inconsistencies,   their   depositions
completely supported the dying declaration Ext. 96.   As  regards  the  burn
injuries suffered by Pradip it was observed that while putting saree  border
on the lighted burner of the cooking gas, the  flames  might  have  engulfed
Pradip as well.

9.    Respondents Pravin and Pradip preferred Crl. Appeals No. 255  of  2001
and 307 of 2004 respectively in the High Court challenging their  conviction
and  sentence.  The  High  Court  observed  that  there  were   four   dying
declarations on record.   The  first  being  the  oral  declaration  to  PW1
Suryakanta, the second being as deposed to by PW5 Narmadbai, the  third  was
Ext. 96 as recorded by the Executive Magistrate and the last  was  Ext.  98,
i.e. her statement as recorded by  the  police  under  Section  161  Cr.P.C.
which now  could  be  treated  as  dying  declaration.    According  to  PW1
Suryakanta, Sadhana was raped by Pravin while PW5 Narmadbai stated  that  he
had outraged her modesty.  At the same time the dying  declaration  recorded
by the Executive Magistrate stated that there was an attempt to commit  rape
and the statement recorded by the police again stated that he  outraged  her
modesty.  These inconsistencies and difference in conversations referred  to
in  such  declarations,  according  to  the  High  Court  made   all   dying
declarations unreliable.  It was observed that  Pradip  had  also  sustained
burn injuries in the same transaction which were not explained at  all.   It
was further observed that the  evidence  produced  by  the  prosecution  was
inadequate to bring home the  charge  under  Section  498A  of  IPC  against
Pradip. The High Court thus acquitted Respondents Pradip and Pravin  of  all
the charges.

10.   Shri A.P. Mayee, learned advocate appearing for  the  State  submitted
that in so far as the assertion that said Sadhana was set  afire  by  Pradip
who had poured kerosene on her, there was  no  inconsistency  amongst  dying
declarations.    The  dying  declaration  Ext.  96  recorded  by   PW8   had
undoubtedly stated that Pravin had attempted to commit rape on her few  days
earlier. The statement recorded by the police Ext. 98 and the  supplementary
statement had put the matter in clear perspective when Sadhana  stated  that
Pravin had come to rape her but had not  succeeded  and  had  molested  her.
Mr. Sanjay Jha, learned advocate appearing  for  the  respondents  submitted
that a person who had suffered 96% burn injuries would not be in a  position
to think and speak  coherently  and  as  such  the  dying  declarations  are
completely suspect.  He further submitted that  such  a  patient  must  have
been given  sedatives,  which  again  would  make  it  impossible  to  think
coherently.

11.   We have perused the entire record including  the  dying  declarations.
In our  view  dying  declaration  Ext.  96  as  recorded  by  the  Executive
Magistrate is the most crucial document. Said document  itself  records  the
appropriate satisfaction  and  certification  by  the  medical  professional
namely PW7  Dr.  Vijay  Kalne  before  and  after  recording  of  the  dying
declaration. PW7 Dr. Vijay Kalne clearly stated in his  deposition  that  he
had examined Sadhana and found her pulse and  Blood  Pressure  normal,  that
she was well oriented and that she was mentally fit. He further stated  that
he was  all  the  time  present  while  the  statement  recorded.    In  the
circumstances the dying decalration Ext. 96 is absolutely reliable.  On  the
point that Pradip had set Sadhana ablaze, there is no inconsistency  in  any
of the dying declarations and they in unison point the finger at him.   Even
with respect to the role of Pravin the declarations  Exts.  96  and  98  are
quite  consistent.   There  may  be  some  exaggeration  on  part  of  PW  1
Suryakanata and PW 5 Narmadabai, but the supplementary statement of  Sadhana
dated 7.11.1995 put the matter completely beyond any doubt.


12.  The dying declaration Ext.96, in our view  is  definitely  trustworthy.
It also  stands  corroborated  on  material  aspects  by  other  declaration
Ext.98.  If some exaggeration on part of PW1 Suryakanta and  PW5  Narmadabai
is eschewed,  their  oral  testimonies  also  lend  full  support.   Whether
Sadhana was able to speak coherently is a matter which stands dealt with  by
PW7 Dr. Vijay Kalne, and we have no hesitation in placing reliance on  dying
declaration Ext.96.  The High Court was in error in  discarding  said  dying
declaration.  The view which weighed with the High  Court  was  not  even  a
possible view.  We, therefore hold that the charges under Sections  302  and
354 as against Pradip  and  Pravin  respectively  stand  fully  proved.   We
affirm the acquittal of Pradip with regard to charge under Section  498A  of
the IPC.






13.         In the circumstances we allow these appeals and  set  aside  the
judgment and order of acquittal recorded by the High Court.  The  respondent
Pradip  is  convicted  under  Section  302  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo
imprisonment for life and to pay fine of  Rs.1,000/-.     Respondent  Pravin
is convicted  under  Section  354  IPC  and  sentenced  to  suffer  rigorous
imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs.500/-, in default  whereof
to  suffer  further  rigorous  imprisonment  for  one  month.     Both   the
respondents Pradip and Pravin be taken in custody forthwith to  undergo  the
sentence awarded to them.



                                       .............................J.
                                       (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)


                                       ...........................J.
                                       (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
April 10, 2015
ITEM NO.1B               COURT NO.13               SECTION IIA

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

                   Criminal Appeal  No(s).  2071-2072/2008

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC.                          Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

PRAVIN MAHADEO GADEKAR ETC.                        Respondent(s)



Date : 10/04/2015      These appeals were called on for pronouncement
            of judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee, Adv.
                       Mr. Charudatta Mahindrakar, Adv.
                       Mr. A. Selvin Raja, Adv.
                       Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, Adv. (N.P.)

For Respondent(s)      Mr. Sanjay Jha, Adv.
                       Mr. R.D. Rathore, Adv.
                       Mr. Amit S., Adv.
                       Dr. Kailash Chand, Adv. (N.P.)

      Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh  Lalit  pronounced  the  non-reportable
judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice  Pinaki  Chandra  Ghose
and His Lordship.

      The  appeals  are  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed  non-reportable
judgment as follows:-

"In the circumstances we allow these appeals and set aside the judgment  and
order of acquittal recorded by the High  Court.  The  respondent  Pradip  is
convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to  undergo  imprisonment  for
life and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-.  Respondent Pravin  is  convicted  under
Section 354 IPC and  sentenced  to  suffer  rigorous  imprisonment  for  six
months and to pay fine of Rs.500/-, in default  whereof  to  suffer  further
rigorous imprisonment for one  month.    Both  the  respondents  Pradip  and
Pravin be taken in custody forthwith to  undergo  the  sentence  awarded  to
them."



      (R.NATARAJAN)                                 (SNEH LATA SHARMA)
       Court Master                                    Court Master
        (Signed non-reportable judgment is placed on the file)

Sections 147, 302 read with Section 149 IPC.- the time and occurrence was between 8 to 9 pm, the night was dark, -the accused were strangers to the witnesses and no test identification was conducted during the investigation.-the accused persons were not in the front of the tractor or in the light of the tractor-The informant PW3 Lalaram turned hostile and could not identify the assailants-PW4 Ramkaran. His behaviour in leaving the place of occurrence and not reporting the matter to any one is extremely unnatural.- as to how "one child" who was on the tractor, has after investigation been found to be none other than PW5 Ramratan, aged about 22 years and a stout person. - High court rightly acquitted the accused nothing to interfere - 2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPROTS

 PW3 Lalaram at 11.30 pm  on
21.05.1982 that at about 8.30 pm while  returning  from  his  field  he  had
stayed at piao of Padmaji for having water and  smoke.  
That  time  he  saw
Bhagirath, resident of Tausar ploughing his field with a tractor  driven  by
PW4 Ramkaran.
 He also saw "one child" sitting on the  tractor,  whose  name
he did not know.
 While so sitting at piao  he  saw  that  the  respondents-
accused and one more person armed with lathis  and  kassies  had  formed  an
unlawful  assembly  and  entered  into  the  field  of  Bhagirath.
 As  per
reporting, he was able to identify them all in the light of the tractor  and
he had seen accused-respondent  Manglaram  stopping  the  tractor  whereupon
Bhagirath came down from the tractor.
Accused  Sampat  Ram  then  allegedly
inflicted a kassi blow on the head of Bhagirath  who  fell  down.   Treating
him to be dead all the accused ran away.  PW3  Lalaram  went  to  the  spot,
remained there for about an hour and since nobody appeared he left the  dead
body of Bhagirath there itself.

The  informant  PW3
Lalaram  turned  hostile  and  could  not  identify  the  assailants.    PW4
Ramkaran, driver of the tractor could identify all the  accused  and  stated
that respondent Sampat Ram had dealt kassi blow on  the  head  of  Bhagirath
while the others with their lathis had  given  blows  to  him.   He  further
stated that immediately  after  the  incident  he  had  left  the  place  of
occurrence with his tractor to his house.  The person who  was  referred  to
as "one child" in the initial reporting, according to  the  prosecution  was
PW5 Ramratan.   As a matter of fact, PW5 Ramratan was aged  about  22  years
and a stout person.  He could identify  only  one  accused  i.e.  respondent
Sampat Ram, who allegedly was carrying a kassi and had given a blow  on  the
head of Bhagirath.
The High Court observed that the time and occurrence was between 8  to
9 pm, the night was dark, the accused were strangers to  the  witnesses  and
no test identification was  conducted  during  the  investigation.   It  was
further observed that according to PW4 Ramkaran, the  accused  persons  were
not in the front of the tractor  or  in  the  light  of  the  tractor.   His
behaviour in leaving the place of occurrence and not  reporting  the  matter
to anyone was found to be against normal human behaviour.   As  regards  PW5
Ramratan who was a total stranger and  whose  very  presence  was  doubtful,
material contradictions were also found in his statement.   On  the  overall
analysis of the matter the prosecution witnesses  who  claimed  to  be  eye-
witnesses were found to be unreliable and untrustworthy by the  High  Court.
The High Court, thus, allowed the  appeal  and  acquitted  the  respondents-
accused of all the charges.

We have gone though the record and considered the  rival  submissions.
PW3 Lalaram, having turned hostile, the  matter  completely  hinges  on  the
testimony  of  PW4  Ramkaran.   His  behaviour  in  leaving  the  place   of
occurrence and not reporting the matter to any one is  extremely  unnatural.
The incident having  occurred  in  the  darkness  and  as  accepted  by  PW4
Ramkaran it was not in front of the tractor, the chance and opportunity  for
him to have sufficiently identified the assailants is also doubtful.   There
is nothing on record as to how "one child"  who  was  on  the  tractor,  has
after investigation been found to be none  other  than  PW5  Ramratan,  aged
about 22 years and a stout person.-2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPROTS

In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance as its existence is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning [See Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh[10]]. In the case at hand, it had come in the evidence that the accused-appellant was suspicious of the illicit relationship between the deceased and his wife. The accused has taken the plea that he was never married. It is noteworthy that the materials brought on record go a long way to show that after the death of his brother he had entered into the wedlock with his sister-in-law as per the tradition of the community, that is, 'Kareva' marriage. The said facet of evidence has really not been assailed or shaken. Thus, it has been established that there was suspicion by the accused that the deceased was having relationship with his brother's wife and that had aroused his anger. The said motive further strengthens the case of the prosecution.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 486 OF 2010

Raja @ Rajinder                              ... Appellant
                                   Versus
State of Haryana                             ... Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

      The present appeal is directed against the judgment  and  order  dated
7.09.2009 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in  Criminal
Appeal No. 770-DB of 2006, whereby the  Division  Bench  has  confirmed  the
judgment  of  conviction  and  order  of  sentence  passed  by  the  learned
Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Sirsa  in  Sessions  Case  No.  357  of   2003
convicting the present appellant for the offences punishable under  Sections
302 and Section 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)  and
sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and payment of  fine
of Rs.5000/- under Section 302 and rigorous imprisonment of three years  and
fine of Rs.1000/- under Section 201 read with Section 34  IPC  with  default
clause for the fine  amount  in  respect  of  both  the  offences  with  the
stipulation that both the sentences would be concurrent.
2.    Bereft of unnecessary details,  the  prosecution  case,  as  has  been
unfurled is that on 18.1.2003 about 6.30 p.m., Het Ram,  the  deceased,  had
left his home with  the  accused-appellant  and  did  not  return  till  the
morning of 19.1.2003.  The family members of the deceased searched  for  him
at various places and made enquiries from the relations  but  despite  their
best efforts, he could not be found.  In  course  of  that  enquiry  it  was
revealed by the owner of a tea-stall that on 18.01.2003 about 8.30 p.m.  the
appellant and the deceased had taken tea together and  thereafter  they  had
left that place.  Being so informed by the tea stall owner,  Subhash,  PW-8,
brother of the deceased along with Pala Ram and Ramesh went to the house  of
the accused-appellant, and came to learn from his father Krishan Kumar,  the
co-accused, that Raja had gone to village Kharia but could not be  contacted
as the telephone number of village Kharia was  out  of  order.   Thereafter,
Subhash, PW-8, the informant returned to his house  and  waited  till  night
for the return of Het Ram.  When the  deceased  did  not  come  till  night,
Subhash along with his  relations  again  proceeded  to  the  house  of  the
appellant who was present in the house, and informed them that in the  night
of 18.01.2003 he and the deceased had taken tea together but when they  were
returning to their houses, a Sikh boy met them and Het Ram  went  with  that
boy on his motor cycle.   After  getting  the  said  information,  when  the
informant and others were returning from the  house  of  the  accused,  they
noticed blood stains in the street in front  of  the  houses  of  Mohan  and
Mahender Singh. It aroused suspicion  of  the  informant  that  his  brother
might have been murdered by the appellant and the dead body could have  been
disposed of.  The motive behind the incident, as  mentioned,  was  that  the
appellant was indulged in  consuming  poppy  husk  and  the  father  of  the
appellant had a suspicion that the deceased was instrumental in  making  his
son a drug addict.  On the basis of the aforesaid allegations,  an  FIR  No.
45 dated 20.1.2003 was lodged  at  the  police  station  Rania.   After  the
criminal law was set in motion, the investigating agency went to  the  place
where blood stains were found and prepared the  site  plan  and  seized  the
bloodstained earth.  On the  next  day,  police  went  to  village  Bani  in
connection with the  investigation  and  blood  stains  were  found  on  the
stairs, platform and wall of a  well  situated  in  the  old  Abadi  of  the
village.  The police  collected  the  bloodstained  bricks  from  there  and
noticed a bundle inside the well and eventually recovered the dead  body  of
Het Ram which was found inside the said bundle.   The  investigating  agency
sent the dead body for  post-mortem  to  the  General  Hospital,  Sirsa  and
arrested the accused on 22.1.2003.  During the investigation  the  appellant
suffered disclosure statement, Exh. P. EE, to the effect that he  had  taken
Het Ram to the tea stall and thereafter to his 'Nohra' on a  false  pretext,
where he had caused a blow with a knife on the neck of Het Ram  about  10.00
P.M. on 18.01.2003.  Het Ram tried to escape but he chased him and when  the
deceased fell down in front of the house of  Mahender  Singh,  he  inflicted
several blows with the knife on the  chest  and  the  waist  region  of  the
deceased. Being unable to drag the dead body back to his courtyard, he  took
the help of his father for the disposal of the body.  The  blanket  worn  by
the deceased was burnt in the courtyard of the appellant.   Thereafter,  the
bloodstained clothes of the appellant and the knife were  recovered  by  the
police from the pit of latrine on the basis of the statement of the accused-
appellant. The parcels of bloodstained earth, bloodstained  clothes  of  the
accused and the deceased, the seized knife and other materials were sent  to
the Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban, for examination and  the  report,
Exhibit P.RR, was received by the prosecution.   During  the  investigation,
statement of Sukha, PW-7, was recorded on 21.1.2003 wherein  he  had  stated
that the deceased was  murdered  by  the  appellant  as  the  appellant  was
suspicious that  the  deceased  had  illicit  relationship  with  his  wife.
Similar statement was also made by Nanak, PW-9.  The  investigating  officer
recorded  statement  of  number  of  witnesses  and  after  completing   the
investigation, placed the chargesheet against the accused-appellant for  the
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 read  with  Section  34  IPC.
The co-accused, Krishan Kumar,  was  chargesheeted  for  the  offence  under
Sections 201 read with Section 34 IPC.   After  the  chargesheet  was  laid,
the competent court committed the matter to the court of Session for  trial.
 The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
3.    The prosecution in order to substantiate the charges levelled  against
the accused persons  examined  as  many  as  13  witnesses.   The  principal
witnesses are Dr. N.K. Mittal, PW-1, who had conducted  the  post-mortem  on
the dead body of the deceased, Sukha, PW-7, Subhash, PW-8,  the  brother  of
the deceased and the informant, Nanak, PW-9, Mahender, PW-10, who  had  seen
the deceased and the appellant having tea together  in  the  tea  stall  and
Kalawati, PW-11, mother of the  deceased  who  had  witnessed  the  deceased
leaving the house in the company of the accused-appellant.
4.    The accused persons in  their  statements  u/s  313  of  the  Code  of
Criminal  Procedure  (CrPC)  denied  the  allegations  and   pleaded   false
implication.  They claimed that accused-Raja was neither married  to  anyone
nor addicted to opium and, therefore,  the  alleged  motive  to  commit  the
murder of Het Ram was totally baseless.  They  further  denied  having  made
any disclosure statements to the police  and  stated  that  the  police  had
planted articles to  create  evidence  against  the  accused.   The  accused
persons chose not to adduce any evidence in their defence.
5.    The learned trial Judge, on the  basis  of  the  material  brought  on
record, came to hold that the whole case rested on  circumstantial  evidence
and the prosecution had been able to establish  the  chain  in  completeness
against the accused persons and accordingly convicted the appellant and  his
father  and  sentenced  them,  as  has  been  stated  hereinbefore.    Being
dissatisfied, the appellant  and  his  father  had  preferred  the  criminal
appeal wherein the High Court had affirmed the conviction  and  sentence  of
the appellant but as far as his father, Krishan Kumar, is  concerned,  while
maintaining the conviction, modified the sentence of Krishan  Kumar  imposed
by the trial Judge  and  restricted  it  to  the  period  already  undergone
without interfering with the quantum of fine.  The present appeal  has  been
preferred by Raja assailing his conviction and sentence.
6.    We have heard Mr. M.M. Kashyap, learned counsel for the appellant  and
Mr. Vikas Sharma, learned counsel for the State.
7.    As the  factual  matrix  would  show,  the  case  of  the  prosecution
entirely  hinges  on  circumstantial  evidence.   When  a  case   rests   on
circumstantial  evidence,  the  Court  has  to   be   satisfied   that   the
circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be  drawn,  must
be cogently and firmly established;  those  circumstances  should  be  of  a
definite tendency unerringly pointing towards  guilt  of  the  accused;  the
circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form  a  chain  so  complete  that
there is no escape from the conclusion that  within  all  human  probability
the  crime  was  committed  by  the  accused  and   none   else;   and   the
circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete  and
incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the  guilt  of
the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with  the  guilt
of the accused but should be inconsistent with his  innocence.  [See  Padala
Veera Reddy v. State of A.P.[1]]
8.    In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab[2], it has been laid down  that:

      "..... the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is  to  be
      drawn  should  be  fully  proved  and  those  circumstances  must   be
      conclusive in nature to connect the accused with the  crime.  All  the
      links in the chain of events must be established beyond  a  reasonable
      doubt and the established circumstances should be consistent only with
      the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused  and  totally  inconsistent
      with his innocence. In a case based on  circumstantial  evidence,  the
      court has to be on its guard to avoid the danger of allowing suspicion
      to take the place of legal proof and has to be watchful to  avoid  the
      danger of being swayed by emotional considerations,  howsoever  strong
      they may be, to take the place of proof."

9.    From the aforesaid it is clear as day that the Court  is  required  to
evaluate the circumstantial evidence to see that the chain  of  events  have
been  established  clearly  and  completely  to  rule  out  any   reasonable
likelihood of the innocence of the accused.  Needless  to  say  whether  the
chain is complete or not would depend on the facts of  each  case  emanating
from the evidence and no universal yardstick should ever be  attempted  [See
Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab[3]].
10.   In the instant case, the circumstances that have been  established  by
the  prosecution  are  that  the  deceased  had  accompanied  the   accused-
appellant, being called by him, from his house in  the  early  part  of  the
evening on the date of occurrence.  The mother of  the  deceased,  Kalawati,
PW-11, has deposed in that regard.  Thereafter, from  the  material  brought
on record, it is clearly revealed that the appellant was  seen  at  the  tea
stall with the deceased.  The said fact has been deposed  by  Mahender,  PW-
10.  Thus, from the aforesaid evidence, two facts are  established,  namely,
the accused and the deceased had left the house of  the  deceased  and  were
seen taking tea together at the tea stall.  It is submitted by  the  learned
counsel for the appellant that the last  seen  theory  as  advanced  by  the
prosecution is not acceptable inasmuch as the owner of  the  tea  stall  has
not been examined.  When  the  testimony  of  the  aforesaid  two  witnesses
deserve acceptance and receive corroboration from the other evidence on  the
record, no adverse inference should be drawn because of  non-examination  of
the tea stall owner, who, as has been submitted by the learned  counsel  for
the appellant, is a material witness.  It is well settled in law  that  non-
examination of  a  material  witness  is  not  a  mathematical  formula  for
discarding the weight of the testimony available on record, if the  same  is
natural, trustworthy and convincing [See State of H.P.  v.  Gian  Chand[4]].
That apart, he was not such a witness who alone was  the  competent  witness
to depose about a fact and his  non-examination  would  really  destroy  the
version of the prosecution.
11.   Another reason for acceptance of the last  seen  theory  is  that  the
brother of the deceased, Subhash, PW-8, has testified that he  had  enquired
from the accused as  regards  the  whereabouts  of  the  deceased,  for  the
deceased had accompanied the accused and at that juncture  the  accused  had
replied that at the tea stall a Sikh boy came and  the  deceased  went  with
him.  As per the prosecution case, the deceased  and  the  accused  are  co-
villagers.  In his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC,  the  accused-
appellant totally denied to have accompanied the  deceased.   Learned  trial
Judge and the High Court  have  placed  reliance  on  the  evidence  of  the
mother, Kalawati, PW-11, the brother, Subhash,  PW-8  and  Mahender,  PW-10.
The cumulative reading  and  apposite  appreciation  of  the  said  evidence
proves beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased  was  last  seen  with  the
accused.
12.   Another circumstance that has been proven is  about  the  recovery  of
knife, blood-stained clothes and  the  ashes  of  the  burnt  blanket.   The
seizure witnesses Sukha, PW-7 and Nanak, PW-9 have proven the  seizure.   It
is submitted by the learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  that  police  had
recorded the confessional statement of the accused-appellant at  the  police
custody and thereafter, as  alleged,  had  recovered  certain  things  which
really do not render any assistance to the prosecution, for  the  confession
recorded before  the  police  officer  is  inadmissible.   That  apart,  the
accused had advanced the plea that the articles and the weapon were  planted
by the investigating agency.  To appreciate the said  submission  in  proper
perspective, we may profitably reproduce a passage from  State  of  U.P.  v.
Deoman Upadhyaya[5]:
      "The expression, 'accused of any offence' in Section 27, as in Section
      25, is also descriptive of the person concerned i.e. against a  person
      who is accused of an offence,  Section  27  renders  provable  certain
      statements made by him while  he  was  in  the  custody  of  a  police
      officer. Section 27 is founded on the principle that even  though  the
      evidence relating to  confessional  or  other  statements  made  by  a
      person, whilst he is in the custody of a police  officer,  is  tainted
      and therefore inadmissible, if the truth of the information  given  by
      him is assured by the discovery of a fact, it may be  presumed  to  be
      untainted and is therefore declared provable insofar as it  distinctly
      relates to the fact thereby discovered. Even though Section 27  is  in
      the form of  a  proviso  to  Section  26,  the  two  sections  do  not
      necessarily deal with the evidence of  the  same  character.  The  ban
      imposed by Section 26 is against the proof of confessional statements.
      Section 27 is concerned with  the  proof  of  information  whether  it
      amounts to a confession or not, which leads to discovery of facts.  By
      Section 27, even if a fact is deposed to as discovered in  consequence
      of  information  received,  only  that  much  of  the  information  is
      admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered."

13.    In  State  of  Maharashtra  v.  Damu[6],  while  dealing   with   the
fundamental facet of Section 27 of the  Evidence  Act,  the  Court  observed
that the basic idea embedded in  the  said  provision  is  the  doctrine  of
confession by subsequent events, which is founded on the principle  that  if
any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength of  any  information
obtained from  a  prisoner,  such  a  discovery  is  a  guarantee  that  the
information supplied by the prisoner is true. It  further  stated  that  the
information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature,  but  if  it
results in discovery of a  fact  it  becomes  a  reliable  information  and,
therefore,  the  legislature  permitted  such  information  to  be  used  as
evidence by restricting the admissible portion to the minimum.
14.   Thus, if an accused person gives  a  statement  that  relates  to  the
discovery of a fact in consequence  of  information  received  from  him  is
admissible.   The  rest  part  of  the  statement  has  to  be  treated   as
inadmissible.   In view of the same, the recovery made at  the  instance  of
the accused-appellant has been rightly accepted by the trial Court  as  well
as by the High Court, and we perceive no flaw in it.
15.   Another circumstance which has been taken note of by  the  High  Court
is that the blood-stained clothes and the weapon, the knife,  were  sent  to
the Forensic Science Laboratory.  The report obtained  from  the  Laboratory
clearly shows that blood stains were found on the  clothes  and  the  knife.
True it is, there has been no matching of the blood  group.   However,  that
would not make a difference in the facts of the present case.   The  accused
has not offered any explanation  how  the  human  blood  was  found  on  the
clothes and the knife.  In this regard,  a  passage  from  John  Pandian  v.
State[7] is worth reproducing:
      "The discovery appears to be credible. It has been  accepted  by  both
      the courts below and we find no reason to discard it.  This  is  apart
      [pic]from the fact that this weapon was sent to the  forensic  science
      laboratory (FSL) and it has  been  found  stained  with  human  blood.
      Though the blood group could not be ascertained, as the  results  were
      inconclusive, the accused had to give some explanation as to  how  the
      human blood came on this weapon. He gave none.  This  discovery  would
      very positively further the prosecution case."

      In view of the aforesaid,  there  is  no  substantial  reason  not  to
accept the recovery of the weapon used in the crime.   It  is  also  apt  to
note here that Dr. N.K. Mittal, PW-1, has clearly opined that  the  injuries
on the person of the deceased could be caused by  the  knife  and  the  said
opinion has gone unrebutted.
16.   Another circumstance which needs to be noted is that  Sukha,  PW-7,  a
taxi driver, has deposed that on 18.1.2003 about 11.00  p.m.  while  he  was
going to Fatehabad for taking passengers, he saw a bullock  cart  parked  in
front of the house of the accused and certain persons were  tying  a  bundle
in a "palli".  On query being made by him,  the  accused  persons  told  him
that they are carrying manure to  the  fields.   Though,  this  witness  has
given an exaggerated version  and  stated  differently  about  the  time  of
arrest, yet his testimony to the effect that he had seen the accused with  a
bundle in "palli" at a particular place cannot be  disbelieved.   The  maxim
"falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus", is not applicable in India.  In  Krishna
Mochi v. State of Bihar[8], it has been held thus:
      "The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in  omnibus  has  no  application  in
      India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The  maxim  falsus
      in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing,  false  in  everything)
      has not received general acceptance ... nor has  this  maxim  come  to
      occupy the status of the rule of law. It is merely a rule of  caution.
      All that it amounts to,  is  that  in  such  cases  testimony  may  be
      disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded."

17.   In Yogendera v. State of Rajasthan[9], it  has  been  ruled  that  the
Court must assess the extent to which the deposition of  a  witness  can  be
relied upon.  The court must make every attempt to separate falsehoods  from
the truth, and it must only be in  exceptional  circumstances,  when  it  is
entirely impossible to separate the grain from the chaff, for the  same  are
so inextricably intertwined, that the entire  evidence  of  such  a  witness
must be discarded.  Thus viewed, the version of PW-7 to the extent that  has
been stated hereinabove is totally acceptable and credible.
18.   In a case based on circumstantial evidence,  motive  assumes     great
significance as its existence is an enlightening  factor  in  a  process  of
presumptive reasoning [See Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr.  v.  State  of
Andhra Pradesh[10]].  In the case at hand, it had come in the evidence  that
the accused-appellant was suspicious of  the  illicit  relationship  between
the deceased and his wife.  The accused has  taken  the  plea  that  he  was
never married.  It is noteworthy that the materials brought on record  go  a
long way to show that after the death of his brother  he  had  entered  into
the wedlock with his sister-in-law as per the tradition  of  the  community,
that is, 'Kareva' marriage.  The said facet of evidence has really not  been
assailed or shaken.  Thus, it has been established that there was  suspicion
by the accused that the deceased was having relationship with his  brother's
wife and that had aroused his anger.  The said  motive  further  strengthens
the case of the prosecution.
19.    In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the  considered  opinion
that the appeal preferred by the appellant is totally devoid  of  merit  and
is accordingly dismissed.


                                             .............................J.
                                                               (Dipak Misra)






                                             ..........................., J.
                                                     (N.V. Ramana)
New Delhi
April 10, 2015
-----------------------
[1]  1989 Supp (2) SCC 706
[2]  1995 Supp (4 SCC 259
[3]  (2007) 13 SCC 90
[4]  (2001) 6 SCC 71
[5]  AIR 1960 SC 1125
[6]  (2000) 6 SCC 269
[7]  (2010) 14 SCC 129
[8]  (2002) 6 SCC 81
[9]  (2013) 12 SCC 399
[10]  (1993) 2 SCC 684