maintainability of the complaint filed by the 4th respondent and the legality and legitimacy of the procedure adopted by the Lokayukta, U.P. in making the recommendations set out in the report dated 4th October, 2011.What the Third Schedule to the Act contemplates is that the Lokayukta in the course of an investigation under the Act will not investigate a crime or determine the question as to whether the matter "shall go to, or shall continue to be prosecuted in a court or not". In the present case, the recommendations of the Lokayukta were merely for an investigation as to whether a case for prosecution of the appellant is made out or not. Accordingly, the matter was investigated and presently is under trial in a court of competent jurisdiction. All the said subsequent facts as noted in details at the very outset make it clear that even if the contentions of the appellant with regard to the Third Schedule to the Act are to be accepted, (we make it clear that we do not accept the same), the question that would arise has become wholly academic.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.3581 OF 2015
      [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.13697 of 2012]

RANG NATH MISHRA                 ...APPELLANT

                             VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ORS.                              ...RESPONDENTS





                                  JUDGMENT




RANJAN GOGOI, J.


1.          Leave granted.

2.          The challenge  in  this  appeal  is  to  the  order  dated  11th
November, 2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in  Writ-
C No.62471 of 2011 by which the writ petition filed  by  the  appellant  has
been dismissed.

3.          The challenge in the writ petition, inter alia, was against  the
report dated 4th  October,  2011  of  the  Lokayukta,  U.P.  containing  the
following recommendations:

|"(1)  |The Charged Public Servant, Minister|
|      |of Secondary Education, Shri Ranga  |
|      |Nath Mishra, as the sources of      |
|      |income of the properties earned by  |
|      |him from 2007 onwards are not known,|
|      |therefore, for prosecution under    |
|      |section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention  |
|      |of Corruption Act, 1988, criminal   |
|      |investigation be got done by an     |
|      |independent agency like C.B.C.I.D.  |
|      |or Uttar Pradesh Vigilance          |
|      |Commission, and his prosecution be  |
|      |considered to be initiated.         |
|(2)   |On the basis of the illegal         |
|      |possession of the Gram Sabha land of|
|      |Gat No.666 Mi/O.106 Hect. in Village|
|      |Aurai, Bhadohi,  District Sant Ravi |
|      |Das Nagar, the proceedings be       |
|      |initiated against the charged Public|
|      |Servant Shri Ranga Nath Mishra,     |
|      |under Section 122 of the Abolition  |
|      |of Zamindari Act, and the concerned |
|      |Dy. District Collector should       |
|      |register the case and the aforesaid |
|      |land of the Gram Sabha be ordered to|
|      |be released from his possession.    |
|(3)   |During the aforesaid criminal       |
|      |proceedings and release of the land |
|      |from his possession, for taking     |
|      |independent action as per the       |
|      |Investigation Unit and as per the   |
|      |rules of the competent authority,   |
|      |the Charged Public Servant, Minister|
|      |of Secondary Education, be removed  |
|      |from the portfolio of the Minister  |
|      |so that the aforesaid legal         |
|      |proceedings could be carried out    |
|      |independently.                      |
|(4)   |The Criminal Investigation be done  |
|      |through such an agency which can    |
|      |also investigate into the           |
|      |investments of such properties made |
|      |in the State and outside the State. |
|(5)   |The compliance report in respect of |
|      |the aforesaid recommendations be    |
|      |made available within a month."     |

4.          As the aforesaid recommendations of  the  Lokayukta,  U.P.  have
been implemented and necessary action in terms thereof has been  taken,  the
relief prayed for in this appeal has been truncated to  a  declaration  that
the aforesaid report dated 4th October,  2011  of  the  Lokayukta,  U.P.  is
contrary to the mandatory procedure prescribed under the  U.P.  Lokayukta  &
Up-Lokayuktas Act, 1975 (for the sake of  convenience  hereinafter  referred
to as "the Act") and  that  the  said  report  suffers  from  vice  of  non-
application of mind.

5.          The brief facts antecedent to  the  report  dated  4th  October,
2011 of the Lokayukta, U.P. may now be conveniently taken  note  of  at  the
outset.

            It appears that the  respondent  No.4  in  the  present  appeal,
Swami Nath  Misra,  had  submitted  an  undated  complaint  to  the  Hon'ble
President of India, Prime Minister of India, Governor of U.P.,  Lucknow  and
Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Income Tax  Department,  New  Delhi
demanding an enquiry in to the alleged acquisition of  huge  assets  by  the
appellant who was then serving as a Cabinet Minister in the State  of  Uttar
Pradesh.  The said  complaint  was  reiterated  by  a  reminder  dated  27th
August, 2010 which was, inter alia, addressed  to  the  Lokayukta,  U.P.   A
communication dated  18th October, 2010 was addressed to  the  appellant  by
the Secretary of the Lokayukta, U.P.  intimating  him  that  the  Lokayukta,
U.P. has decided to hold a preliminary enquiry into the  complaint,  a  copy
of which was forwarded  to  the  appellant.   The  said  letter  dated  18th
October, 2010 was followed by another letter dated 18th November,  2010.  It
appears that the 2nd communication (reminder) dated 27th August,  2010  sent
by the complainant, inter alia, to the Lokayukta, U.P. was  not  accompanied
by an affidavit of the complainant which apparently was filed later i.e.  on
22nd December, 2010.  This  was  done  apparently  when  the  appellant  had
demanded  that  a  copy  of  such  affidavit  be  made  available  to   him.
Thereafter, a letter dated 14th February, 2011 was sent  by  the  office  of
the Lokayukta, U.P. to the  appellant  intimating  him  that  the  complaint
filed against  the  appellant  has  been  accepted  for  investigation.  The
appellant raised an objection dated 10th April,  2011  with  regard  to  the
maintainability of the complaint on the ground of its improper  presentation
and also on the ground that the complaint was not supported by an  affidavit
of the complainant, as required.  No specific order was passed on  the  said
objection raised by the appellant.  Instead, correspondences were  exchanged
by and between the office of the Lokayukta, U.P. and the  appellant  seeking
and submitting the replies of the appellant and the documents in support  of
the stand taken by the appellant  in  the  said  replies.   Eventually,  the
report dated 4th October, 2011 was submitted, the  contents  of  which  have
already been noted. It is the  legality  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  said
report rendered in the aforesaid circumstances that  was  challenged  before
the High Court resulting in the decision dated  11th  November,  2011  which
has been impugned in the present appeal before us.

6.          The facts and events that have occurred after submission of  the
report dated 4th October, 2011 of the Lokayukta, U.P. may now be taken  note
of.

            On the basis of the said report of the Lokayukta, U.P. the  then
Chief Minister of the State of Uttar Pradesh had dropped the appellant  from
the Council of Ministers on the  very  next  day  i.e.  5th  October,  2011.
Thereafter, an Open Vigilance Enquiry against the appellant was ordered  and
on the basis of the report of the said enquiry a decision was taken  that  a
criminal case under the Prevention of Corruption  Act,  1988  be  instituted
against  the  appellant  by  the  Vigilance   Department   of   the   State.
Accordingly,   a  FIR  was  filed  against  the  appellant  which  was  duly
investigated and charge-sheet dated 30th July, 2013 was filed in  the  court
of competent jurisdiction.  Cognizance of the  offences  alleged  was  taken
and subsequently on 19th August, 2013 charges have been framed  against  the
appellant  in  the  Court  of  the  learned  Special  Judge  (Prevention  of
Corruption  Act),  Varanasi  under  Sections  13(1)(e)  and  13(2)  of   the
Prevention of Corruption Act,  1988.   The  appellant  is  presently  facing
trial in the said case.

7.          Insofar as the  recommendations  of  the  Lokayukta,  U.P.  with
regard to the Gram Sabha land allegedly in the possession of  the  appellant
is concerned, the enquiries held had exonerated the appellant.

8.           We  have  heard  Dr.  Rajeev  Dhawan,  learned  Senior  Counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,  learned  counsel
for the State  of  Uttar  Pradesh.  We  have  also  considered  the  written
arguments submitted for and on behalf of the parties.

9.          The challenge made by the appellant  primarily  revolves  around
the maintainability of the complaint filed by the  4th  respondent  and  the
legality and legitimacy of the procedure adopted by the Lokayukta,  U.P.  in
making the recommendations set out in the report dated 4th October, 2011.

10.         To appreciate the arguments advanced by  the  rival  parties  it
will be necessary to take note of the relevant provisions of the  Act  which
are extracted below:

|   |"7. Matters which may be investigated by   |
|   |Lokayukta or Up-Lokayukta.- (1) Subject to |
|   |the provisions of this Act and on a        |
|   |complaint involving a grievance or an      |
|   |allegation being made in that behalf the   |
|   |Lokayukta may investigate any action which |
|   |is taken by, or with the general or        |
|   |specific approval of -                     |
|   |(i) a Minister or a Secretary; and         |
|   |(ii) any public servant referred to in     |
|   |sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iv) of      |
|   |clause (j) of section 2; or                |
|   |(iii) any other public servant being a     |
|   |public servant of a class or sub-class of  |
|   |public servants notified by the State      |
|   |Government in consultation with the        |
|   |Lokayukta, in this behalf.                 |
|   |                                           |
|   |(2)Subject to the provisions of this Act   |
|   |and on a complaint involving a grievance or|
|   |an allegation being made in that behalf, an|
|   |Up-Lokayukta may investigate any action    |
|   |which is taken by or with the general or   |
|   |specific approval of any public servant not|
|   |being a Minister, Secretary or other public|
|   |servant referred to in sub-section (1).    |
|   |                                           |
|   |(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in  |
|   |sub-section (2), the Lokayukta may, for    |
|   |reasons to be recorded in writing,         |
|   |investigate any action which may be        |
|   |investigated by an Up-Lokayukta under that |
|   |sub-section.                               |
|   |                                           |
|   |(4) Where two or more Up-Lokayuktas are    |
|   |appointed under this Act, the Lokayukta    |
|   |may, by general or special order, assign to|
|   |each of them, matters which may be         |
|   |investigated by them under this Act:       |
|   |                                           |
|   |Provided that no investigation made by an  |
|   |Up-Lokayukta under this Act, and no action |
|   |taken or thing done by him in respect of   |
|   |such investigation shall be open to        |
|   |question on the ground only that such      |
|   |investigation related to a matter which is |
|   |not assigned to him by such order.         |
|   |8. Matters not subject to investigation.-  |
|   |(1) Except as hereinafter provided, the    |
|   |Lokayukta or an Up-Lokayukta shall not     |
|   |conduct any investigation under this Act-  |
|   |                                           |
|   |(a) except on a complaint made under and in|
|   |accordance with section 9; or              |
|   |                                           |
|   |(b) in the case of a complaint involving a |
|   |grievance in respect of any action,-       |
|   |(i) if such action relates to any matter   |
|   |specified in the Third Schedule; or        |
|   |(ii) if the complainant has or had any     |
|   |remedy by way of proceeding before any     |
|   |Tribunal or Court of law:                  |
|   |                                           |
|   |Provided that nothing in sub-clause (ii)   |
|   |shall prevent the Lokayukta or an          |
|   |Up-Lokayukta from conducting an            |
|   |investigation if he is satisfied that such |
|   |person could not or cannot, for sufficient |
|   |cause, have recourse to a remedy referred  |
|   |to in that sub-clause.                     |
|   |                                           |
|   |(2) The Lokayukta or an Up-Lokayukta shall |
|   |not investigate any action,-               |
|   |(a) in respect of which a formal and public|
|   |inquiry has been ordered under the Public  |
|   |Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (Central Act|
|   |37 of 1850), by the Government of India or |
|   |by the State Government; or                |
|   |                                           |
|   |(b) in respect of a matter which has been  |
|   |referred for inquiry under the Commissions |
|   |of Inquiry Act, 1952 (Central Act 60 of    |
|   |1952), by the Government of India or by the|
|   |State Government.                          |
|   |                                           |
|   |(3) The Lokayukta or an Up-Lokayukta shall |
|   |not investigate any complaint which is     |
|   |excluded from his jurisdiction by virtue of|
|   |a notification issued under section 19.    |
|   |                                           |
|   |(4) The Lokayukta or an Up-Lokayukta shall |
|   |not investigate,-                          |
|   |                                           |
|   |(a) any complaint involving a grievance, if|
|   |the complaint is made after the expiry of  |
|   |twelve months from the date on which the   |
|   |action complained against becomes known to |
|   |the complainant;                           |
|   |                                           |
|   |(b) any complaint involving an allegation, |
|   |if the complaint is made after the expiry  |
|   |of five years from the date on which the   |
|   |action complained against is alleged to    |
|   |have taken place:                          |
|   |                                           |
|   |Provided that the Lokayukta or an          |
|   |Up-Lokayukta may entertain a complaint     |
|   |referred to in clause (a), if the          |
|   |complainant satisfies him that he had      |
|   |sufficient cause for not making the        |
|   |complaint within the period specified in   |
|   |that clause.                               |
|   |                                           |
|   |(5) In the case of any complaint involving |
|   |a grievance, nothing in this Act shall be  |
|   |construed as empowering the Lokayukta or an|
|   |Up-Lokayukta to question any administrative|
|   |action involving the exercise of a         |
|   |discretion except where he is satisfied    |
|   |that the elements involved in the exercise |
|   |of the discretion are absent to such an    |
|   |extent that the discretion cannot be       |
|   |regarded as having been properly exercised.|
|   |                                           |
|   |                                           |
|   |(6) The Lokayukta or an Up-Lokayukta shall |
|   |not investigate any complaint involving a  |
|   |grievance against a public servant referred|
|   |to in sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) of |
|   |clause (j) of section 2.                   |
|   |                                           |
|   |9. Provisions relating to complaints-      |
|   |(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, |
|   |a complaint may be made under this Act to  |
|   |the Lokayukta or an Up-Lokayukta-          |
|   |                                           |
|   |(a) in the case of a grievance, by the     |
|   |person aggrieved;                          |
|   |                                           |
|   |(b) in the case of an allegation, by any   |
|   |person other than a sitting public servant:|
|   |                                           |
|   |                                           |
|   |Provided that, where the person aggrieved  |
|   |is dead or is for any reason unable to act |
|   |for himself, the complaint may be made by  |
|   |any person who in law represents his estate|
|   |or, as the case may be, by any person who  |
|   |is authorized by him in this behalf.       |
|   |                                           |
|   |Provided further that in the case of a     |
|   |grievance involving a complaint referred to|
|   |in sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of section|
|   |2, the complaint may be made also by an    |
|   |organization recognized in that behalf by  |
|   |the State Government.                      |
|   |                                           |
|   |(2) Every complaint shall be accompanied by|
|   |the complainant's own affidavit in support |
|   |thereof and also affidavits of all persons |
|   |from whom he claims to have received       |
|   |information of facts relating to the       |
|   |accusation, verified before a notary       |
|   |together with all documents in his         |
|   |possession or power pertaining to the      |
|   |accusation and a sum of Two thousand rupees|
|   |shall be paid as security along with the   |
|   |complaint, in respect to complaint         |
|   |involving allegatio, filed under the Uttar |
|   |Pradesh Lokayukta and Up-Lokayuktas        |
|   |(Complaint) Rules, 1977.                   |
|   |                                           |
|   |(3) Every complaint and affidavit under    |
|   |this section as well as any schedule or    |
|   |annexure thereto shall be verified in the  |
|   |manner laid down in the Code of Civil      |
|   |Procedure, 1908, for the verification of   |
|   |pleadings and affidavits respectively.     |
|   |                                           |
|   |(4) Not less than three copies of the      |
|   |complaint as well as of each of its        |
|   |annexures shall be submitted by the        |
|   |complainant.                               |
|   |                                           |
|   |(5) A complaint which does not comply with |
|   |any of the foregoing provisions shall not  |
|   |be entertained.                            |
|   |                                           |
|   |(6) Notwithstanding anything, contained in |
|   |sub-sections (1) to (5), or in any other   |
|   |enactment, any letter written to the       |
|   |Lokayukta or Up-Lokayukta by a person in   |
|   |police custody, or in gaol or in any asylum|
|   |or other place for insane persons, shall be|
|   |forwarded to the addressee unopened and    |
|   |without delay by the police officer or     |
|   |other persons in charge of such gaol,      |
|   |asylum, or other place, and the Lokayukta  |
|   |or Up-Lokayukta, as the case may be, may   |
|   |entertain it and treat it as a complaint,  |
|   |but no action in respect of such complaint |
|   |shall be taken unless it is accompanied or |
|   |subsequently supported by an affidavit     |
|   |under sub-section (2).                     |
|   |10. Procedure in respect of                |
|   |investigations.-(1) Whether the Lokayukta  |
|   |or an Up-Lokayukta proposes (after making  |
|   |such preliminary inquiry, if any, as he    |
|   |deems fit) to conduct any investigation    |
|   |under this Act, he-                        |
|   |                                           |
|   |(a) shall forward a copy of the complaint  |
|   |to the public servant concerned and the    |
|   |competent authority concerned;             |
|   |                                           |
|   |(b) shall afford to the public servant     |
|   |concerned an opportunity to offer his      |
|   |comments on such complaints; and           |
|   |                                           |
|   |(c) may make such orders as to the safe    |
|   |custody of documents relevant to the       |
|   |investigation, as he deems fit.            |
|   |                                           |
|   |(2) Every such investigation shall be      |
|   |conducted in private, and in particular,   |
|   |the identity of the complainant and of the |
|   |public servant affected by the             |
|   |investigation shall not be disclosed to the|
|   |public or the press whether before, during |
|   |or after the investigation:                |
|   |                                           |
|   |Provided that, the Lokayukta or an         |
|   |Up-Lokayukta may conduct any investigation |
|   |relating to a matter of definite public    |
|   |importance in public, if he, for reasons to|
|   |be recorded in writing, thinks fit to do   |
|   |so.                                        |
|   |                                           |
|   |(3) Save as aforesaid, the procedure for   |
|   |conducting any such investigation shall be |
|   |such as the Lokayukta or, as the case may  |
|   |be, the Up-Lokayukta considers appropriate |
|   |in the circumstances of the case.          |
|   |                                           |
|   |(4) The Lokayukta or an Up-Lokayukta may,  |
|   |in his discretion, refuse to investigate or|
|   |cease to investigate any complaint         |
|   |involving a grievance or, an allegation, if|
|   |in his opinion-                            |
|   |                                           |
|   |(a) the complaint is frivolous or          |
|   |vexatious, or is not made in good faith; or|
|   |                                           |
|   |                                           |
|   |(b) there are no sufficient grounds for    |
|   |investigating or, as the case may be, for  |
|   |continuing the investigation; or           |
|   |                                           |
|   |(c) other remedies are available to the    |
|   |complainant and in the circumstances of the|
|   |case it would be more proper for the       |
|   |complainant to avail of such remedies.     |
|   |                                           |
|   |(5) In any case where the Lokayukta or an  |
|   |Up-Lokayukta decides not to entertain a    |
|   |complaint or to discontinue any            |
|   |investigation in respect of a complaint or |
|   |to discontinue any investigation in respect|
|   |of a complaint, he shall record his reasons|
|   |therefor and communicate the same to the   |
|   |complainant and the public servant         |
|   |concerned.                                 |
|   |                                           |
|   |(6) The conduct of an investigation under  |
|   |this Act in respect of any action shall not|
|   |affect such action, or any power or duty of|
|   |any public servant to take further action  |
|   |with respect to any matter subject to the  |
|   |investigation.                             |
|   |THE THIRD SCHEDULE                         |
|   |[ See SECTION 8 (1) (b) (i) ]              |
|   |                                           |
|   |(a) Action taken for the purpose of        |
|   |investigating crime or protecting the      |
|   |security of the Sate.                      |
|   |                                           |
|   |(b) Action taken in the exercise of powers |
|   |in relation to determining whether a matter|
|   |shall go to, or shall continue to be       |
|   |prosecuted in a court or not.              |
|   |                                           |
|   |(c) Action taken in matters which arise out|
|   |of the terms of a contract governing purely|
|   |commercial relations of the administration |
|   |of the Government or of the local authority|
|   |or other corporation, company or society,  |
|   |as the case may be, with customers or      |
|   |suppliers except where the complainant     |
|   |alleges harassment or gross delay in       |
|   |meeting contractual obligations.           |
|   |(d) Action taken in respect of appointments|
|   |other than an appointment referred to in   |
|   |clause (ii) of clause (d) of section 2,    |
|   |removals, pay, discipline, superannuation  |
|   |or other matters relating to conditions of |
|   |service of public servants but not         |
|   |including action relating to claims, for   |
|   |pension, gratuity, provident fund or to any|
|   |claims which arise on retirement, removal  |
|   |or termination of service.                 |
|   |                                           |
|   |(e) Grant of honours and awards."          |

11.         Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the
appellant  has  very  strenuously  urged  that   the   investigation/enquiry
undertaken by the Lokayukta, U.P. in the present case being in respect of  a
matter covered by the Third Schedule  is  barred  under  the  provisions  of
Section 8(1)(b)(i) of the Act read with the Third Schedule.  It  is  further
argued that there was no complaint to the  Lokayukta,  U.P.  as  mandatorily
required under Section 9 and assuming that the reminder dated  27th  August,
2010 can be treated as a complaint it was not supported by an  affidavit  of
the complainant. Dr. Dhawan has further argued that  under  Rule  5  of  the
Uttar Pradesh Lokayukta and Up-Lokayukta Complaint Rules, 1977  (hereinafter
referred to as "the Rules") framed under  the  Act,  a  complainant  can  be
granted an opportunity to make up the deficiencies in the  complaint  within
a fixed period.  The provisions of the said Rules, however, cannot  override
the requirement of filing an affidavit which is mandated by Section 9(2)  of
the Act.  Alternatively, it is urged that even if the said  deficiency  i.e.
absence of the affidavit of the complainant can be cured what  had  happened
in the present case is that the said affidavit of the complainant was  filed
on 22nd December, 2010 whereas notice of preliminary enquiry was  issued  to
the appellant on 18th October, 2010.  Dr. Dhawan has further argued that  in
the present case no preliminary enquiry was held inasmuch as no decision  on
such preliminary enquiry was  communicated  to  the  appellant  as  required
under the Act. Furthermore, it is urged that  the  Lokayukta,  U.P.  in  the
present case had acted in undue haste inasmuch as though  the  appellant  on
29th September, 2011 had prayed for 15 days' time to furnish  the  requisite
documents, the report was published on 4th October, 2011  without  reference
to and due consideration of the request made by the  appellant.  Lastly,  it
is urged that there was no investigation in the case as mandated by the  Act
and no opportunity of personal hearing was afforded to the appellant.

12.         Controverting the aforesaid submissions made on  behalf  of  the
appellant, Shri Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, learned  counsel  for  the  State  of
Uttar Pradesh has urged that the objections raised by the  appellant  before
this Court are mere reiterations of what has been   urged  before  the  High
Court. All such pleas were adequately considered by the High  Court  in  the
impugned order dated 11th November, 2011 and there is  no  basis  to  reopen
the said findings and conclusions  of  the  High  Court.  Pointing  out  the
provisions of Section 10(3) of the Act, Shri Mehrotra  has  urged  that  the
procedure for conducting a proceeding under the  Act  would  be  as  may  be
considered appropriate by the Lokayukta in the  facts  of  any  given  case.
Shri Mehrotra has further urged that in the present case on receipt  of  the
report of the Lokayukta necessary action has  been  taken  and  presently  a
criminal trial is pending against the appellant. There will,  therefore,  be
no basis for this Court to interdict the report of the Lokayukta.

13.         We have  considered  the  submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the
parties.

14.         It is correct that on 18th October, 2010 when the appellant  was
intimated by the office of the Lokayukta that a decision has been  taken  to
hold a preliminary enquiry into the complaint filed by the  respondent  No.4
and a  copy  of  the  complaint  along  with  the  enclosures  thereto  were
forwarded to the appellant, the complaint filed  was  not  supported  by  an
affidavit of the complainant - respondent No.4. The said  fact  was  pointed
out by the appellant in his letter dated 20th December,  2010  addressed  to
the Secretary, Lokayukta, U.P.  Thereafter, it appears that the  complainant
had filed an affidavit on 22nd December, 2010 in support of  the  complaint.
The said affidavit was taken on record and thereafter a  letter  dated  14th
February, 2011 was sent by  the  Under  Secretary  of  the  Lokayukta,  U.P.
informing the appellant that the complaint filed by the 4th  respondent  has
been  accepted  for  investigation.   Though  not  expressly  mentioned  the
reception/acceptance of the affidavit of  the  complainant  filed  belatedly
was permissible  in  view  of  the  provisions  of  Rule  5  of  the  Rules.
Thereafter,   the   appellant   raised   his   objections   regarding    the
maintainability of  the  complaint  and  the  affidavit  filed.  Instead  of
passing a specific order on the aforesaid issue  of  maintainability  raised
by the appellant it  appears  that  communications  were  addressed  by  the
office of the Lokayukta, U.P. to the  appellant  asking  for  submission  of
replies and documents which communications were duly  responded  to  by  the
appellant from time to time i.e. 5th July, 2011, 5th August, 2011  and  24th
August, 2011. The said facts would indicate that the  preliminary  objection
raised by the appellant did not find favour of the Lokayukta. The  same  was
not  expressly  recorded  but  clearly  evident  from  the  steps  taken  in
continuance of the proceeding which was not objected to by the appellant.

15.      On receipt of the documents  submitted  by  the  appellant  on  the
various dates mentioned above, the office of the Lokayukta, U.P.  by  letter
dated 20th September, 2011 asked for further documents  from  the  appellant
i.e. consolidated audited balance  sheet  of  last  three  years  of  Keshav
Prasad Indravati Devi  Smriti  Seva  Samiti,  Modern  Girls  Inter  College,
Abhaypur, Keshav Prasad Indravati Devi Balika Inter  College  Sahsepur,  the
Registration Certificate of Income Tax made  in  Form  12-A  in  respect  of
Keshav Prasad Indravati Devi Smriti Seva Samiti and  copies  of  Income  Tax
Return filed in Form 7 in last three  years  in  respect  of  Keshav  Prasad
Indravati Devi Smriti Seva Samiti.   The  appellant  by  letter  dated  29th
September, 2011 asked for 15 days' time.  Instead on 4th October,  2011  the
report of the Lokayukta, U.P. was submitted.

16.          Though  the  first  complaint  (undated)   submitted   by   the
respondent No.4 was not addressed  to  the  Lokayukta,  U.P.,  the  reminder
dated 27th August, 2010 was addressed, inter alia, to  the  Lokayukta,  U.P.
If that is so, there is no reason why the same cannot be understood to be  a
complaint to the Lokayukta, U.P. for further action on  the  basis  thereof.
If reception/acceptance of a subsequent  affidavit  of  the  complainant  in
support of a complaint filed earlier  is  contemplated  by  Rule  5  of  the
Rules, we do not see why any fault  can  be  found  in  the  action  of  the
Lokayukta, U.P.  in  accepting  the  affidavit  dated  22nd  December,  2010
submitted by the complainant.  Though the notice dated  18th  October,  2010
for preliminary enquiry was issued  at  an  earlier  stage,  it  is  by  the
communication dated 14th February, 2011, (after  receipt  of  the  affidavit
dated 22nd  December,  2010)  that  the  appellant  was  informed  that  the
complaint of the respondent No.4 has been accepted for  investigation  under
Section 10(1)(a) of the Act.  If, in the light of the aforesaid  facts,  the
Lokayukta, U.P. had decided to proceed further in the matter and had  issued
communications to the appellant  asking  for  his  reply  and  documents  in
defence which were adequately responded  to  by  the  appellant  on  several
dates, as  noticed  earlier,  we  do  not  see  how  the  appellant  can  be
understood to be justified in raising  the  issue  of  defect  of  procedure
before the High Court  and  before  this  Court.  The  capitulation  of  the
relevant dates and events leave no room  for  doubt  that  all  requirements
under the Act have been complied with in the instant case.

17.         While it is  correct  that  the  report  of  the  Lokayukta  was
submitted without affording any  opportunity  of  personal  hearing  to  the
appellant and the request for time for submission of the documents  made  by
the appellant on 29th September, 2011 was  refused  by  the  Lokayukta,  the
said facts cannot constitute good and sufficient basis  for  this  Court  to
find fault with the conduct of the proceedings by the  Lokayukta,  U.P.   in
view of the provisions of  Section  10(3)  of  the  Act  which,  as  already
noticed, leaves to the Lokayukta the discretion to adopt such  procedure  as
may be considered appropriate in the given facts of the case.  No  prejudice
also has been caused to the appellant who had taken part in the  proceedings
at every stage.  The refusal to grant further  time  to  the  appellant,  an
issue over which some grievance has been raised, is a matter  of  discretion
vested in the Lokayukta and any decision thereon  either  way  cannot  be  a
legitimate basis for interference.

18.         Before parting, the issue with regard  to  the  jurisdiction  of
the Lokayukta to proceed in the instant matter in view of the provisions  of
the Third Schedule to the Act must be answered.  What the Third Schedule  to
the  Act  contemplates  is  that  the  Lokayukta  in  the   course   of   an
investigation under the Act will not investigate a crime  or  determine  the
question as to whether the matter "shall go to,  or  shall  continue  to  be
prosecuted in a court or not".  In the present case, the recommendations  of
the Lokayukta were merely for an investigation as  to  whether  a  case  for
prosecution of the appellant is made out or  not.  Accordingly,  the  matter
was investigated and presently is  under  trial  in  a  court  of  competent
jurisdiction. All the said subsequent facts as noted in details at the  very
outset make it clear that even if the  contentions  of  the  appellant  with
regard to the Third Schedule to the Act are to  be  accepted,  (we  make  it
clear that we do not accept the same), the question  that  would  arise  has
become wholly academic.



19.         In the light of the above, we find no merit in this appeal.   It
is accordingly dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.

                                                     ....................,J.
                                (RANJAN GOGOI)



                                                     ....................,J.
                                (N.V. RAMANA)
NEW DELHI
APRIL 10, 2015

The attempt of the petitioner to bring in the provision for arbitration contained in the "solutions programme" as a part of the terms of her employment with the respondent No.2 remains wholly unsubstantiated. Not only the employment contract signed by the petitioner does not contain any specific clause of arbitration or makes the provision for arbitration contained in the "solutions programme" applicable to her employment, the clause providing for exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in Bombay specifically negate the claim of the existence of an arbitration clause in the contract of employment of the petitioner. There is no specific incorporation of the provisions for arbitration contained in the "solutions programme" to the case of the petitioner by any other communication though a bald assertion to the said effect has been made by the petitioner in her pleadings which has remained unsubstantiated. Even on a hypothetical application of the "solutions programme" the provisions contained therein with regard to conduct of arbitration proceedings in terms with the Federal Arbitration Act and the National Rules for resolution of employment disputes of the American Arbitration Association would specifically exclude the provisions of Part I including Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act on the strength of the decisions of this Court in Bhatia International Vs. Bulk Trading S.A. & Anr.[1] followed in Videocon Industries Limited Vs. Union of India & Anr.[2] and Yograj Infrastructure Limited Vs. Ssang Yong Engineering and Construction Company Limited[3] which would be applicable to the issue having regard to the point of time when the question had arisen. Besides, under Section 7 of the 1996 Act the parties to an arbitration agreement must agree to submit their disputes to arbitration. What is contemplated under the "solutions programme" is a mere possibility of the employee seeking arbitration as opposed to an obligation to refer all disputes to arbitration. Also as held by this Court in K.K. Modi Vs. K.N. Modi & Ors.[4] an integral element of Section 7 of the 1996 Act is the agreement of the parties to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator. The same is not to be found in the "solutions programme" which leaves the employee with an option to accept or reject the decision of the arbitrator. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to invoke this Court's jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, it will not be necessary for this Court to go into certain other issues that have been raised by the contesting parties, namely, whether the petitioner's claim is time barred and whether the same has been instituted with oblique/collateral motives.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                  ARBITRATION PETITION (CIVIL) NO.3 OF 2008


PAYAL CHAWLA SINGH                           ...PETITIONER (S)
                             VERSUS

THE COCA-COLA CO. & ANR.                ...RESPONDENT (S)


                                  JUDGMENT

The  petitioner  is  a  former  employee  of  Coca-Cola  India,  Inc.,   the
respondent No.2 herein.   At the time of joining the respondent  company  an
agreement dated 20.09.1995 was entered into between the petitioner  and  the
respondent No.2, relevant features of which will be noticed in  due  course.
It  appears  that  while  in  employment  in  the  respondent  company,  the
petitioner had complained of gender discrimination and harassment  primarily
on account of the service conditions relating to pay  and  emoluments.   The
complaint of the petitioner was sought to be  redressed  by  the  respondent
company by appointing an independent  investigator  and  thereafter  through
mediation proceedings which did not yield  any  result.   With  effect  from
28.07.2004, the petitioner's resignation  from  service  in  the  respondent
No.2 company became effective and payment in full and  final  settlement  of
her claims had also been tendered and received by the petitioner.

 It appears that on 05.12.2006 the petitioner issued a legal notice  to  the
respondents  invoking  the  arbitration  mechanism  under   the   "solutions
programme"  and  claiming  compensation  against   harassment   and   gender
discrimination that she claimed to have suffered during the  course  of  her
employment and even after her resignation.  While it will not  be  necessary
to go into the detailed facts and circumstances in which the  grievances  of
the petitioner came to be resurrected  after  her  resignation,  suffice  it
will be to notice that an SMS message  received  around  this  time  by  the
petitioner from one Mr. Adil Malia, Vice-President, Human Resources  of  the
respondent  No.2  company,  apparently,  had  triggered  off  the  aforesaid
response of  the  petitioner.   The  demand  for  arbitration  made  by  the
petitioner was refused by the respondent on the ground that  the  "solutions
programme" was not applicable to the petitioner and the same was meant  only
for employees of the first respondent  in  the  United  States  of  America.
This has led to the filing of the instant application  under  Section  11(6)
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for  short  the  "1996  Act")
resulting in the proceedings in question.

It will be necessary, at this stage, to take note  of  the  details  of  the
"solutions programme" in terms of which the petitioner claims the  mechanism
for  arbitration  contained  therein  to  be  a  part  of  the  contract  of
employment between her and the respondents.

Some time in the year 1999  four  African-Americans  who  were  current  and
former employees of the first  respondent  had  filed  a  complaint  seeking
declaratory, injunctive and other equitable  reliefs  and  compensatory  and
punitive damages on account of alleged/claimed infringement and  deprivation
of rights of the aforesaid persons by the respondent No.1.   On  16.11.2000,
a settlement was arrived at between the aforesaid  employees  of  the  first
respondent and the company.  The  said  settlement  formed  a  part  of  the
consent  decree  dated  07.06.2001  of  an  United  States  District   Court
(Georgia).  The aforesaid decree, inter alia, provided for  constitution  of
a task force to  continuously  evaluate  the  human  resource  policies  and
practices of the first respondent and also to consider whether  implementing
an arbitration procedure would be appropriate.   The  task  force  submitted
its report from time to time and it was in the 3rd annual  report  submitted
on 01.12.2004 that of the various problem resolution methods, the  following
were also incorporated:-
"4)   Mediation- this involves a neutral third  party  outside  the  Company
and  is  available  only  for  resolution  of  legal   disputes,   such   as
discrimination or harassment.

5)    Arbitration - If mediation fails to resolve the legal dispute  to  the
employee's satisfaction,  arbitration  is  available.   This  requires  both
parties to explain their sides to a trained arbitrator, usually an  attorney
or judge."

This, in essence is the "solutions programme" on which  the  petitioner  has
based her claim.  According to the petitioner the "solutions  programme"  is
applicable to all employees of Coca Cola Company, Inc. and its  subsidiaries
including Cola Cola India (Respondent No.2).  The petitioner  has  contended
that even  admitting  that  the  arbitration  provision  in  the  "solutions
programme" applies only to employees based in the United  States,  the  same
has  been  expressly  invoked  in  the  case  of  the   petitioner   through
correspondence, e-mails etc.  The  petitioner  relies  on  an  e-mail  dated
25.09.2002 issued by Coca  Cola  Company  informing  its  employees  of  the
change in policy and the extension  of  the  "solutions  programme"  to  all
employees world wide.  The petitioner also relies  on  a  blank  memo  dated
20.12.2002 with an intake form sent to  the  petitioner  for  accessing  the
conflict  resolution  mechanism  to  resolve  harassment  issues.   As   the
respondents had refused to  comply  with  the  demand  notice  sent  by  the
petitioner for appointment of an arbitrator, the instant petition  has  been
filed under the provisions of 1996 Act.

In reply, the respondent contend that the employment agreement  between  the
petitioner and the respondent No.2 dated 20.09.1995  does  not  contain  any
arbitration  clause.   According  to   the   respondents,   the   "solutions
programme" is not applicable to employees of subsidiaries of the  respondent
No.1 outside the United States of America and the same in fact applies  only
to  the  United  States  based  employees  of  the  first  respondent.   The
provisions for arbitration contained in the "solutions  programme"  are  not
incorporated in the petitioner's employment agreement dated 20.09.1995.   It
is further contended that by an amendment  of  the  petitioner's  employment
agreement made on 05.07.1996 a  provision  was  inserted  to  the  following
effect:-

"In case of any dispute the jurisdiction to entertain and try  such  dispute
shall vest exclusively in a court in Bombay".

The respondents  have  further  contended  that  the  "solutions  programme"
contemplated arbitration in the United States of America under  the  Federal
Arbitration Act and incorporates the National Rules for  the  resolution  of
employment  disputes  of  the  American   Arbitration   Association   (AAA).
Therefore, according to the respondents, even assuming that  the  "solutions
programme" is applicable to the petitioner, the specific  reference  to  the
Federal Arbitration Act in the "solutions programme" and  the  applicability
of the  procedure  visualized  by  the  National  Rules  for  resolution  of
employment  disputes  of  the   American   Arbitration   Association   would
specifically exclude the applicability of Part I of the 1996  Act.   On  the
aforesaid basis, it is submitted, that the present application  filed  under
Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act will not be  maintainable.   Furthermore,  the
respondents contend that the  "solutions  programme"  does  not  contemplate
mandatory  recourse  to  arbitration  under  the  1996   Act.    It   merely
contemplates a possibility of the employees seeking arbitration  as  opposed
to an obligation to refer all disputes arising to  arbitration  inasmuch  as
under the "solutions programme" it is also open to an employee  to  approach
the Court instead of invoking arbitration.  It  is  further  submitted  that
the mandatory requirement under Section 7 of the 1996 Act  obliging  parties
to abide by the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal  is  departed  from  under
the "solutions programme" wherein an employee has a  choice  to  accept  the
arbitrator's decision and the legal dispute  or  reject  such  decision  and
pursue other legal options.


Having heard the petitioner-in-person and Shri Amit  Sibal,  learned  senior
counsel appearing for the respondents, this Court  unhesitatingly  comes  to
the conclusion that there is no binding arbitration  agreement  between  the
petitioner and her employer so as to  enable  this  Court  to  exercise  its
jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of  the  1996  Act.   The  attempt  of  the
petitioner to bring in  the  provision  for  arbitration  contained  in  the
"solutions programme" as a part of the terms  of  her  employment  with  the
respondent No.2 remains wholly unsubstantiated.   Not  only  the  employment
contract signed by the petitioner does not contain any  specific  clause  of
arbitration  or  makes  the  provision  for  arbitration  contained  in  the
"solutions programme" applicable to her  employment,  the  clause  providing
for exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in Bombay specifically  negate  the
claim of  the  existence  of  an  arbitration  clause  in  the  contract  of
employment of the petitioner.  There is no  specific  incorporation  of  the
provisions for arbitration contained in the  "solutions  programme"  to  the
case of the petitioner by any other communication though  a  bald  assertion
to the said effect has been made by the petitioner in  her  pleadings  which
has remained unsubstantiated.  Even on a  hypothetical  application  of  the
"solutions programme"  the  provisions  contained  therein  with  regard  to
conduct of arbitration proceedings in terms  with  the  Federal  Arbitration
Act and the National Rules for resolution  of  employment  disputes  of  the
American Arbitration Association would specifically exclude  the  provisions
of Part I including Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act on  the  strength  of  the
decisions of this Court in Bhatia International  Vs.  Bulk  Trading  S.A.  &
Anr.[1]  followed in Videocon  Industries  Limited  Vs.  Union  of  India  &
Anr.[2] and Yograj Infrastructure Limited Vs.  Ssang  Yong  Engineering  and
Construction Company Limited[3] which  would  be  applicable  to  the  issue
having regard to the point of time when the question  had  arisen.  Besides,
under Section 7 of the 1996 Act the  parties  to  an  arbitration  agreement
must agree to submit their disputes to  arbitration.  What  is  contemplated
under the "solutions programme"  is  a  mere  possibility  of  the  employee
seeking arbitration as opposed to an obligation to  refer  all  disputes  to
arbitration.  Also as held by this Court  in  K.K.  Modi  Vs.  K.N.  Modi  &
Ors.[4]  an integral element of Section 7 of the 1996 Act is  the  agreement
of the parties to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator.  The  same  is
not to be found in the "solutions programme" which leaves the employee  with
an option to accept or reject the decision of the arbitrator.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that  the  petitioner  is  not
entitled to invoke this Court's jurisdiction  under  Section  11(6)  of  the
1996 Act.  In view of the aforesaid conclusion, it  will  not  be  necessary
for this Court to go into certain other issues that have been raised by  the
contesting parties, namely, whether the petitioner's claim  is  time  barred
and whether the same has been instituted with oblique/collateral motives.

In  view  of  the  foregoing  discussions,  the  application  filed  by  the
petitioner has to fail.  It  is  accordingly  dismissed.   However,  in  the
facts and circumstances of the case there will be  no  order  as  to  costs.


                                        ..................................J.
                                          (RANJAN GOGOI)

NEW DELHI
APRIL 10, 2015
-----------------------
[1]    (2002) 4 SCC 105
[2]    (2011) 6 SCC 161
[3]    (2011) 9 SCC 735\
[4]    (1998) 3 SCC 573

there is no need for the registration of the FIR under Section 9 of the Lokayukta Act, in relation to the matters to be investigated under Section 8 of the Lokayukta Act. Therefore, in the light of the above contentions urged on behalf of the parties and in view of the law laid down by this Court under the Lokayukta Act and keeping in mind the apprehension expressed by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant with regard to the investigation that may be carried out by the Lokayukta Police, we are of the considered view that the learned Judge of the High Court has rightly declined to exercise his inherent power to quash the proceedings, which does not call for our interference in this appeal. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be just and proper for this Court to see that justice is meted out and the case is fairly investigated by the Corps of Detectives (COD) of the State. The said investigation shall be entrusted to an officer of the rank equivalent to the Superintendent of Police in the COD.

                               NON REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.594 OF 2015
                 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (Crl.) NO. 108 OF 2015)


YUNUS ZIA                                     .........APPELLANT

                                     Vs.

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.               ......RESPONDENTS



                                  O R D E R


V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.
        Leave granted.
    This appeal is directed against  the  impugned  order  dated  14.07.2014
passed in  Criminal  Petition  No.  2859  of  2012  by  the  High  Court  of
Judicature of Karnataka at Bangalore, wherein the High  Court  has  declined
to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,
1973 (in short "CrPC"). The appellant has prayed to set aside the  same  and
quash the criminal proceedings initiated against  him  by  the  respondents,
urging various legal grounds.
Mr. L. Nageswar Rao, the learned senior counsel on behalf of  the  appellant
has submitted that  the  second  respondent,  Inspector  of  Police  of  the
Karnataka  Lokayukta  (in  short  "the  Lokayukta"),  has  made  allegations
against the appellant under Sections 120B and  420  of  the  IPC  and  under
Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption  Act,  1988  (in
short "the P.C. Act").  A case has been registered by the second  respondent
and an FIR has been lodged against the appellant without following  the  due
procedure contemplated under Section 9 of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act,  1984
(in short "the Lokayukta Act") which deals with the provisions  relating  to
complaints and investigations, where any person can make a  complaint  under
the Lokayukta Act, either to  the  Lokayukta  or  to  the  Upalokayukta.  It
provides for making a complaint in the form of settlement  supported  by  an
affidavit in such forms and  in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed.  The
relevant provisions of the Lokayukta Act read thus:
"9. Provisions relating to complaints and investigations-
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, any person may make  a  complaint
under this Act to the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta.
Provided that in case of a grievance, if the person  aggrieved  is  dead  or
for any reason, unable to act for himself, the complaint may be made  or  if
it is already made, may be prosecuted by his  legal  representatives  or  by
any other person who is authorized by him in writing in this behalf.
(2) Every complaint shall be made in the form of a  statement  supported  by
an affidavit and in such forms and in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3)Where the Lokayukta  or  an  Upalokayukta  proposes,  after  making  such
preliminary inquiry as he deemed fit  to  conduct  any  investigation  under
this Act, he.-
(a)  shall  forward  a  copy  of  the  complaint  and  in  the  case  of  an
investigation initiated suo-motu by him, the  opinion  recorded  by  him  to
initiate the investigation under sub-section (1) or (2),  as  the  case  may
be, of section 7;
to the public servant and the Competent Authority concerned;
(b) shall afford  to  such  public  servant  an  opportunity  to  offer  his
comments on such complaint or opinion recorded  under  sub-section  (1)  and
(2) of section 7 as the case may be;
(c) may make such order as to the safe custody of documents relevant to  the
investigation, as he deems fit.
(4) Save as aforesaid, the procedure for conducting any  such  investigation
shall be such, and may be held  either  in  public  or  in  camera,  as  the
Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta, as the case may be, considers appropriate  in
the circumstances of the case.
(5) The Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta may,  in  his  discretion,  refuse  to
investigate or cease to investigate any complaint involving a  grievance  or
an allegation, if in his opinion,-
(a)the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith;
(b)There are no sufficient grounds for investigating or,  as  the  case  may
be, for continuing the investigation; or
(c)  Other  remedies  are  available  to  the   complainant   and   in   the
circumstances of the case it would be more proper  for  the  complainant  to
avail such remedies.
(6) In any case where the  Lokayukta  or  an  Upalokayukta  decides  not  to
entertain a complaint or to discontinue any investigation in  respect  of  a
complaint he shall record his reasons therefore and communicate the same  to
the complainant and the public servant concerned.
(7) The conduct of an investigation under this Act against a Public  servant
in respect of any action shall not affect such action, or any power or  duty
of any other public servant to take  further  action  with  respect  to  any
matter subject to the investigation."

Further, the learned senior  counsel  has  relied  upon  Section  7  of  the
Lokayukta Act, wherein on receipt of such complaint,  either  the  Lokayukta
or the Upalokayukta can make such preliminary enquiry as he may deem fit  to
conduct an investigation under the Act. He can initiate investigation  under
Section 7(1) & (2) of the Lokayukta  Act  on  the  public  servant  and  the
competent authority concerned as defined under Section 2(4)(a)to(d)  of  the
Lokayukta Act. The relevant provision of the Lokayukta Act reads thus:-
"7. Matters which may be investigated by the Lokayukta and an Upalokayukta.-

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act,  the  Lokayukta  may  investigate
any action which is taken by or with the general or specific approval of,-
(a) (i)  the Chief Minister;
    (ii) a Minister;
    (iii)a member of the State Legislature;
    (iv) the Chairman and Vice-Chairman  (by  whatever  name  called)  or  a
member of an authority, board, or a committee, a statutory or  non-statutory
body or a  corporation  established  by  or  under  any  law  of  the  State
Legislature  including  a  society,  cooperative  society  or  a  Government
company within the meaning of  section  617  of  the  Companies  Act,  1956,
nominated by the State Government; in any case where a  complaint  involving
a grievance or an allegation is made in respect of such action.
(b) any other public servant holding a post  or  office  carrying  either  a
fixed pay, salary or remuneration of more than rupees  twenty  thousand  per
month or a pay scale the  minimum  of  which  is  more  than  rupees  twenty
thousand, as may be revised from time to time in any case where a  complaint
involving a grievance or an allegation is made in respect of such action  or
such action can be or could have been, in  the  opinion  of  the  Lokayukta,
recorded in writing, the subject of a grievance or an allegation.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the Act, an  Upalokayukta  may  investigate
any action which is taken by or with the general or  specific  approval  of,
any public servant not being the Chief Minister,  Minister,  Member  of  the
Legislature, Secretary or other public servant refereed  to  in  sub-section
(1), in any case where a complaint involving a grievance  or  an  allegation
is made in respect of such action or such action can be or could have  been,
in the opinion of the Upalokayukta, recorded in writing. the  subject  of  a
grievance or an allegation."

Section 8 of the Lokayukta Act further states that:-
"8. Matters not subject to investigation:-
(1)  Except as hereinafter provided, the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta  shall
not conduct any investigation under this Act in  the  case  of  a  complaint
involving a grievance in respect of any action, -
(a)  if such action relates to any matter specified in the Second  Schedule;
or
(b) if the  complainant  has  or  had,  any  remedy  by  way     of  appeal,
revision, review or other proceedings   before any tribunal,  Court  officer
or other authority and has not availed of the same.
(2) The Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta shall not investigate, -
(a)  any action in respect of which a formal and  public  enquiry  has  been
ordered with the prior concurrence of the Lokayukta or an  Upalokayukta,  as
the case may be;
(b) any action in respect of a matter which has been referred  for  inquiry,
under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 with the prior concurrence of  the
Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta, as the case may be;
(c) any complaint involving a grievance made after the expiry  of  a  period
of six months from the date on which the action  complained  against  become
known to the complainant; or
(d) any complaint involving an allegation made  after  the  expiry  of  five
years from the date on which the action complained  against  is  alleged  to
have taken place:
Provided that he may entertain a complaint referred to in  clauses  (c)  and
(d) if the complainant satisfies  that  he  had  sufficient  cause  for  not
making the complaint within the period specified in those clauses.
(3) In the case of any complaint involving a grievance, nothing in this  Act
shall be construed  as  empowering  the  Lokayukta  or  an  Upalokayukta  to
question any administrative action involving the exercise  of  a  discretion
except where he is satisfied that the elements involved in the  exercise  of
the discretion are absent to such an extent that the  discretion  can  prima
facie be regarded as having been improperly exercised."

The learned senior counsel for the  appellant  by  placing  strong  reliance
upon the aforesaid provisions of the Lokayukta Act, has  contended  that  it
is applicable in relation to the persons who were enumerated  under  Section
2 of the Lokayukta Act, which reads thus:-
"2. (1) xxx
(2) "Allegation" in relation to a public servant  includes  any  affirmation
that such public servant-
(a) has abused his position as such public servant to  obtain  any  gain  or
favour to himself or to any other person or to cause undue harm or  hardship
to any other person;
(b) was actuated in the discharge of his functions as  such  public  servant
by personal interest or improper or corrupt motives;
(c) is guilty of corruption, favouritism, nepotism or lack of  integrity  in
his capacity as such public servant;
                   OR
(d) has failed to act in accordance with the norms of integrity and  conduct
which ought to be followed by public servants  of  the  class  to  which  he
belongs:
(3) "Chief Minister" means the Chief Minister of Karnataka;
(4) "Competent Authority" in relation to a public servant means-
(a)  in the case of Chief Minister or a member  of  the  State  Legislature,
the Governor acting in his discretion;
(b) in the case of a Minister or Secretary, the Chief Minister;
(c) in the case  of  a  Government  servant  other  than  a  Secretary,  the
Government of Karnataka;
(d) in the case of any other  public  servant,  such  authority  as  may  be
prescribed;
(5) "corruption" includes anything made punishable under Chapter IX  of  the
Indian Penal Code or under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947;
(6) "Government Servant" means a  person  who  is  a  member  of  the  Civil
Services of the State of Karnataka or who holds a civil post or  is  serving
in connection with the affairs of the State of Karnataka  and  includes  any
such person whose services are temporarily placed at  the  disposal  of  the
Government of India, the Government of another State, a local  authority  or
any person whether incorporated or not, and also any person in  the  service
of the Central or another State Government or a  local  or  other  authority
whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of the  Government  of
Karnataka."

After  placing  strong  reliance  upon  the  aforesaid  provisions  of   the
Lokayukta Act, the learned senior counsel has submitted that  the  appellant
herein is neither a government servant nor is or was  at  any  time  holding
the post of Chief Minister, Member of Legislature and Chairman  etc.  as  is
enumerated in the aforesaid Sections of the Lokayukta  Act.  Therefore,  the
suo-moto complaint  registered  by  the  second  respondent  in  the  Police
Station of Lokayukta against  the  appellant  is  without  jurisdiction  and
therefore, the same is liable to be quashed.  He  has  submitted  that  this
important aspect of the matter has not been considered by the learned  judge
of the High Court and he has declined to grant the prayer of  the  appellant
without examining the legal submissions urged before it.  Therefore, he  has
urged that the impugned order is vitiated in law and the same is  liable  to
be set aside by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, the  learned  senior  counsel
on behalf of the respondents has rebutted the  aforesaid  legal  contentions
urged on behalf of the appellant, stating that the Inspector  of  Police  of
the Lokayukta has taken note of the news item published in the Newspaper  on
28.12.2011 in 'Vijaya Karnataka' a Kannada  daily,  which  was  repeated  on
3.1.2012 in 'Bangalore Mirror' and on 05.01.2012  in  The  Times  of  India,
English edition. The complaint against the appellant  has  not  been  lodged
either before the Lokayukta or Upa lokayukta but  the  same  was  registered
suo-moto at the Police Station attached to the Lokayukta and therefore,  the
procedure provided under  the  provisions  of  the  Lokayukta  Act  was  not
required to be followed as  contended  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  on
behalf of the appellant.
The learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  has  further
contended that the registration of the complaint by  the  second  respondent
suo-moto on the basis of the Newspaper publication is permissible in law  as
the same is in accordance with the judgments of this Court in the  cases  of
C. Rangaswamaiah & Ors. v.  Karnataka  Lokayukta  &  Ors.[1]  and  State  Of
Karnataka v. Kempaiah[2].  These judgments have  been  adverted  to  by  the
Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in the case of  State  of  Karnataka,
by Chief Secretary and Ors. v.  Basavaraj   Guddappa   Maliger[3].   In  the
Kempaiah's case referred to supra, this Court affirmed the judgment  of  the
Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that the Upalokayukta had  no
power to investigate into a crime allegedly committed by the public  servant
under the provisions of the P.C.Act, however, this Court did not  quash  the
FIR. Further, this Court made it clear that the FIR registered  against  the
petitioner is not quashed and that it is open  to  the  State  to  have  the
offence  investigated  in  accordance  with  law.   Further,   in   the   C.
Rangaswamaiah's  case,  this  Court  has  held  that  the  police  wing   on
deputation to the Lokayukta, if authorised under Section 17 of  the  P.C.Act
and Section 2(d) of the CrPC, is legally entitled to  register  a  case  and
investigate the matter and file a charge sheet in a competent court  of  law
under the provisions of the P.C.Act and the CrPC.  The  relevant  paragraphs
of C. Rangaswamaiah (supra), read thus:
"21. The next question is whether when the State  Government  had  sent  the
police officers on deputation to the Lokayukta, it was permissible  for  the
Government to entrust them with additional duties under  the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act, 1988?

22. The learned Single Judge as well as  the  Division  Bench  are  one,  as
already stated, in accepting that  the  police  officers  of  the  State  on
deputation continue to remain as public  servants  in  the  service  of  the
State Government, as long as they are not absorbed in  the  Lokayukta.  This
legal position is absolutely unassailable because  the  State  of  Karnataka
has merely lent the services of these officers  to  the  Lokayukta  and  the
officers continue to be employees of the State. In spite of  the  deputation
of these officers  with  the  Lokayukta,  the  relationship  of  master  and
servant between the State of Karnataka and these  officers  does  not  stand
terminated (State of Punjab v. Inder Singh).

23. There is no dispute that though these officers are on  deputation,  they
are otherwise of the requisite rank as contemplated by  Section  17  of  the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and that  other  formalities  under  that
Act are  satisfied  for  entrustment  of  duties  under  the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act, 1988. Question is  whether  these  police  officers  of  the
State can be invested with powers of investigation under Section 17  of  the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by the State under its  statutory  powers
traceable to the same section?"


Further, it has been  contended  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
respondents that the second respondent has registered the case on the  basis
of the abovementioned report published in the Newspaper referred  to  supra,
after satisfying  himself  with  the  fact  that  the  material  information
published in the aforesaid newspapers  are  cognisable  offences  punishable
under Section 420 and 120B of the IPC, for which he can suo-moto register  a
complaint in the Police Station attached to the Lokayukta.  He  has  further
made the categorical submission that the case is neither registered  against
the appellant on the complaints submitted to the Lokayukta or  Upalokayukta,
in the prescribed form by  the  second  respondent  nor  the  due  procedure
contemplated under Section 9(2) & (3) of the Act  has  been  followed  after
holding preliminary enquiry. Thus, he  has  made  it  very  clear  that  the
initiation of the  proceedings  against  the  appellant  is  not  under  the
provisions of the Lokayukta Act but the same has  been  done  in  accordance
with the provisions of the CrPC and the second respondent  who  is  attached
to the Police Station of Lokayukta can register the FIR and investigate  the
case independently against the appellant as held by this Court in the  cases
referred  to  supra.  Therefore,  the  learned  senior   counsel   for   the
respondents  has  fairly  submitted  that  if  the  appellant  has  got  any
grievance  or  apprehension  for  registering  and  investigating  the  case
against him  by  the  second  respondent,  then  this  Court  may  pass  the
appropriate order to transfer the case to any police agency  in  the  state.
He has placed reliance upon the cases referred  to  supra  and  has  further
made it clear that  transferring  of  the  case  registered  by  the  second
respondent to any other police agency in the State of  Karnataka  shall  not
be henceforth construed  or  understood  as  an  act  beyond  the  scope  of
authority of the  Lokayukta  Police  to  register  case/cases  against  such
persons and investigate the offences under the provisions  of  the  CrPC  or
under the P.C.Act.
We have heard both the learned senior counsel for the  parties  and  perused
the reports published in the Newspapers on the dates mentioned  above  which
were taken into consideration suo-moto by the second respondent, wherein  he
has registered the  FIR  after  being  satisfied  with  the  material  facts
published in the Newspapers  that  there  is  a  cognisable  offence  to  be
investigated by the police against the appellant. The same cannot  be  found
fault with either by the High Court or by this Court  for  the  reason  that
the second respondent,  who  is  on  deputation  to  the  Lokayukta,  is  an
Inspector of Police attached to the State of Karnataka.  Therefore,  he  has
got every power under Section 2(d) of the CrPC, to  act  suo-moto  and  take
cognisance of the offence/offences alleged to have  been  committed  by  the
appellant  on  the  basis  of  the  reports  published  against  him,  which
according to him warranted  registration  of  an  FIR  and  investigate  the
matter against him in accordance with law.
The learned senior counsel on behalf of the  respondents  has  rightly  made
the categorical submission that there is no need  for  the  registration  of
the FIR under Section 9 of the Lokayukta Act, in relation to the matters  to
be investigated under Section 8 of the  Lokayukta  Act.  Therefore,  in  the
light of the above contentions urged on behalf of the parties  and  in  view
of the law laid down by this Court under the Lokayukta Act  and  keeping  in
mind the apprehension expressed by the learned senior counsel on  behalf  of
the appellant with regard to the investigation that may be  carried  out  by
the Lokayukta Police, we are of the considered view that the  learned  Judge
of the High Court has rightly declined to exercise  his  inherent  power  to
quash the proceedings, which does not call  for  our  interference  in  this
appeal.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it would  be  just
and proper for this Court to see that justice is meted out and the  case  is
fairly investigated by the Corps of Detectives (COD) of the State. The  said
investigation shall be entrusted to an officer of  the  rank  equivalent  to
the Superintendent of Police in the COD.

For the foregoing reasons and  the  decisions  of  this  Court  referred  to
supra, we direct the second respondent  to  transmit  the  FIR  to  the  COD
Bangalore for further investigation in the matter.  The COD  represented  by
the Director General of Police must entrust the same to the officer  of  the
rank of Superintendent of Police for conducting impartial investigation  and
proceed with the matter in accordance with law.

We make it amply clear that the direction is given to second  respondent  to
transfer the case registered against the appellant to COD, keeping  in  view
the facts and circumstances of this particular case only and  it  shall  not
be construed as precedent for any future case(s)  before  the  Lokayukta  or
the courts. In view of the judgments of this Court  referred  to  supra,  we
hold that the second respondent has  the  right  to  register  a  cognizable
offence against any person under the provisions of the  IPC,  CrPC  and  the
P.C. Act. The same shall be legal and valid.


The appeal is  dismissed.  The  order  dated  05.01.2015  granting  stay  of
further proceedings shall stand vacated.



    ..................................................................J.
                              [V. GOPALA GOWDA]





..................................................................J.
                              [C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi,
April 9, 2015

ITEM NO.1B-For JUDGMENT     COURT NO.11               SECTION IIB

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal  No(s)........./2015 arising from SLP(Crl.) NO. 108/2015

YUNUS ZIA                                          Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.                          Respondent(s)

Date : 09/04/2015 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. GOPALA GOWDA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. NAGAPPAN

For Appellant(s)
                     Mr. Vikash Singh,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. V. N. Raghupathy,Adv.


            Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced  the  judgment  of
the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.Nagappan.
            Leave granted.
            The appeal is dismissed in terms of  the  signed  Non-Reportable
Judgment.

    (VINOD KR.JHA)                              (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
      COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER
            (Signed Non-Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

-----------------------
[1]   [2] (1998)  6  SCC  66
[3]   [4] (1998)  6  SCC  103
[5]   [6]   ILR 2003 KARNATAKA 3589