Once the Tribunal, after appreciating relevant evidence, has come to a conclusion that the job workers were the manufacturers and the respondent - the loan licensee, was not the manufacturer, we see no reason to interfere with the said findings of fact, especially when the same is correct and not perverse. We are, therefore, in agreement with the findings arrived at by the Tribunal that the job workers are the manufacturers.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1761  OF 2007



      COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, GOA     ... APPELLANT

                                     VS.

      M/S. COSME FARMA LABORATORIES LTD.       ... RESPONDENT




                                    WITH


    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1759, 2276/2007, 5857, 7302-7303/2010 AND 7512/2009






                          J U D G M E N T


ANIL R. DAVE, J.


1.    A common order No.A/1559 to  1563/WZB/2006  (EB)  dated  14th  August,
2006 in Appeal Nos. E/3292 to 3295 of 2004 passed by the Customs Excise  and
Service  Tax  Appellate  Tribunal,  West  Zonal  Bench,  Mumbai,  has   been
challenged in these appeals. The facts giving rise to  the  present  appeals
in a nut-shell are as under:

2.    The respondent is a manufacturer of medicaments having  license  under
the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,  1940.   The  respondent  not
only manufactures certain medicaments  but  also  gets  certain  medicaments
manufactured through other job workers so the respondent is a loan  licensee
- who is also permitted to get drugs manufactured at different places  under
the provisions  of  the  Drugs  and  Cosmetics  Act,  1940  and  Rules  made
thereunder.  Under the agreement entered into between the respondent on  one
hand and the job workers on the other hand, raw material as well as  packing
material is supplied to the job workers and as per the instructions  of  the
respondent loan licensee, the job workers manufacture the medicaments  under
the supervision of the loan licensee, i.e. the respondent so as to see  that
the quality of the  medicaments  manufactured  by  the  job  workers  is  as
prescribed by the loan licensee.

3.    Several notices had been given to the respondent as  well  as  to  the
job workers by the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise  calling  upon
them to show cause as to why the respondent, the  loan licensee  should  not
be treated as a manufacturer as per the provisions  of  the  Central  Excise
and Salt Act, 1944 in respect of the medicaments  manufactured  by  the  job
workers and on that basis the  respondent  was  also  called  upon  to  make
payment of certain duty and the job workers were also called  upon  to  show
cause as to why they should not be directed to pay penalty etc.

4.    After hearing the concerned parties,  the  Commissioner  came  to  the
conclusion that  the  respondent  was  a  manufacturer  of  the  medicaments
manufactured at the premises of its job workers within the  meaning  of  the
provisions of the Central Excise and Salt  Act,  1944  and  the  Rules  made
thereunder.

5.    Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of  the  Commissioner  dated
6th August, 2004, the  respondent  filed  the  appeals  before  the  CESTAT,
Mumbai.  The Division Bench of the CESTAT heard the  appeals  but  both  the
Members of the Bench recorded separate  judgments.  The  Member  (Technical)
allowed the appeals and set aside the order dated 6th  August,  2004  passed
by the Commissioner, whereas the Member (Judicial)  upheld  the  said  order
passed by the Commissioner and held that  the  appeals  were  liable  to  be
dismissed. In the aforesaid circumstances, as the  said  Members  had  given
different opinions, the appeals were referred to  a  third  Member  for  his
decision.  The third  Member  (Technical),  ultimately,  after  hearing  the
concerned parties agreed with the views expressed by the Member  (Technical)
and the Tribunal finally allowed the appeals filed by the respondent.

6.    Against the said order passed by the CESTAT, the appellant  has  filed
the present appeals before this Court.

7.    In all these cases, we are concerned with the period  commencing  from
1998 to 2003 and  the  issues  involved  in  the  appeals  are  whether  the
respondent, who was getting its medicaments  manufactured  through  the  job
workers, can be considered to be an  independent  manufacturer  and  another
question is about the assessable value of the  medicaments  manufactured  by
the job workers for the purpose of assessment under the Central Excise  Act,
1944.

8.    The learned counsel appearing for the  appellant,  i.e.  the  Revenue,
had submitted that the view expressed by the Tribunal is  incorrect.   As  a
matter of fact, the respondent should have been treated  as  a  manufacturer
in view of the fact that the raw material as well as  the  packing  material
for manufacturing the medicaments had been supplied  by  the  respondent  to
the  job  workers  and  the  respondent  was  having  supervision  over  the
manufacturing activity though the said activity was  being  carried  out  at
different places, where the job workers were working.

9.    The learned counsel had taken us through the provisions of  Rule  69-A
and Form No.24A of the Drugs and Cosmetic Rules, 1945.  They pertain to  the
provisions  with  regard  to  the  manufacturer  of  medicaments,  who  gets
medicaments manufactured at different places and by  different  persons.  He
had drawn our attention to the fact that as per the provisions of the  Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Rules made thereunder, liability in  respect
of the quality of the medicament was that of the respondent  and  therefore,
the respondent was the real manufacturer and not the job  workers.   He  had
further submitted that though the job workers were doing the work  in  their
own premises, the raw  material  as  well  as  packing  material  was  being
supplied to them by the  respondent  and  they  were  working  under  strict
supervision of the respondent loan  licensee  and  therefore,  in  fact  the
respondent loan licensee was the manufacturer. Even in Form No.24A  referred
to hereinabove, the respondent used to give details of the places where  the
job workers were carrying out manufacturing process  under  the  supervision
of the respondent. It had been further submitted that as the  loan  licensee
was the manufacturer of medicaments under its own brand name, the  price  at
which the goods, i.e. the medicaments were being  sold  was  the  assessable
value in respect of the medicaments in question.  The  learned  counsel  had
relied upon the judgments delivered in the case of M/s.  Ujagar  Prints  and
others v. Union of India and others (1989 (3) SCC 488)  and  Pawan  Biscuits
Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Patna (2000 (6)  SCC  489)  to
substantiate his case to the effect that the price at which the  goods  were
sold for the first time in the market would be the assessable value  of  the
goods in question.

10.   Thus, it had been submitted by  the  learned  counsel  that  the  view
expressed by the Tribunal was incorrect and the respondent should have  been
treated as a manufacturer and the value at which the goods had been sold  in
the market by the respondent should be treated as assessable value.

11.   On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing  for  the  respondent
had submitted that the view expressed by the Tribunal was  just,  legal  and
proper and had further submitted that the appeals deserved to be  dismissed.
He had taken us through  the  provisions  of  the  agreements  entered  into
between the  respondent  and  the  job  workers  in  detail.   It  had  been
submitted by him that the issue, whether the job workers are  manufacturers,
is an issue pertaining to the fact and as the  Tribunal  had  arrived  at  a
conclusion that the job workers were the manufacturers,  this  Court  should
not re-appreciate the evidence or reconsider the issue with  regard  to  the
same.  If it is done so, there would not be any finality with regard to  the
question of fact ascertained by the Tribunal. It had also been submitted  on
behalf of the respondent that the job workers  were  the  manufacturers  for
the reason that  the  entire  activity  with  regard  to  manufacturing  was
carried out in their premises. Supply of raw material  as  well  as  packing
material to them by the respondent was not relevant.  It  was  duty  of  the
job workers to manufacture medicaments as per the quality prescribed by  the
respondent and, in fact, the manufacturing activity  was  done  by  the  job
workers and therefore, the Tribunal, by majority, had rightly  decided  that
the job workers were the manufacturers.  He had also  tried  to  distinguish
the  judgments  relied  upon  by  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
appellant.

12.    So  far  as  the  assessable  value  of  the  goods  manufactured  is
concerned, the learned counsel had relied upon  the  judgment  delivered  in
Pawan Biscuits (supra). According to him, the goods manufactured by the  job
workers were sent by the job workers to the  respondent.   The  job  workers
were not selling the goods in the market and therefore, the value  at  which
the goods were transferred to  the  respondent  by  the  job  workers  would
become assessable value and for determining the said value,  the  principles
laid down by this Court in the case of Pawan  Biscuits  (supra)  are  to  be
followed.

13.   Looking at the law laid down in the aforesaid judgment by this  Court,
the assessable value is  to  be  determined  by  adding  the  value  of  raw
material to the cost of labour work and profit of the  job  workers.   Thus,
for the purpose of determining the  assessable  value,  only  the  aforesaid
factors can be considered and not the market value at which  the  respondent
was selling the medicaments.

14.   It had been further submitted by the  learned  counsel  appearing  for
the respondent that the respondent-company was a loan licensee  as  per  the
provisions of  the  Drugs  and  Cosmetics  Act,  1940  and  the  Rules  made
thereunder.  He had submitted that the manufacturer of drugs/medicaments  is
having  certain  responsibilities  with  regard  to  quality  of  the  drugs
manufactured.   Even  if   a   manufacturer   gets   the   drugs/medicaments
manufactured by another person and sells the same under his brand name,  the
manufacturer,   who   has   been   given   license   to   manufacture    the
drugs/medicaments, is responsible and is liable under the provisions of  the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.  A manufacturer, under the  aforestated  Act,
has nothing to do with payment of duty under the provisions of  the  Central
Excise Act, 1944 and therefore, the  revenue  authorities  should  not  have
looked into the provisions of the Drugs and  Cosmetics  Act,  1940  for  the
purpose of determining duty payable under  the  provisions  of  the  Central
Excise Act, 1944.

15.   In view  of  the  aforestated  legal  position,  the  learned  counsel
appearing for the respondent  had  submitted  that  the  appeals  should  be
dismissed as the Tribunal has rightly decided all the relevant issues.

16.   We have heard the learned senior counsel for  the  parties  at  length
and have also considered the order passed by the Tribunal  as  well  as  the
judgments referred to by the learned counsel.


17.   In our opinion, the submissions made on behalf of the  respondent  are
correct and the appeals deserve to be dismissed  for  the  reason  that  the
manufacturing activity was done only by the job workers  in  their  premises
and with the help of their labour force and machinery.  Simply  because  the
job workers had to adhere to the quality control or the  specification  with
regard to the quality prescribed by the respondent, it would not  mean  that
the respondent is the manufacturer.

18.   At the outset, we would like to clarify that the  term  'manufacturer'
or the loan licensee used under the provisions of the  Drugs  and  Cosmetics
Act, 1940 has  nothing  to  do  with  the  manufacturing  activity  or  term
'manufacture' under the provisions of the Central Excise  Act,  1944.   Both
the Acts referred to hereinabove have been enacted for  different  purposes.
The provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 pertain  to  manufacture
of drugs and quality of the drugs etc.  The manufacturer of  the  drugs  has
to see that the quality of the drugs manufactured by him is as  per  certain
standards and if there is any defect in the drugs  manufactured  by  him  or
someone working under him, he becomes responsible or liable under  the  said
Act.  There is also a provision in the said Act with regard to  getting  the
drugs manufactured by someone else.  So a  manufacturer,  who  is  having  a
license to  manufacture,  can  get  the  drugs/medicaments  manufactured  by
another person under his supervision and he would be  liable  if  the  drugs
manufactured by someone else are not as per the prescribed  quality.  Though
the drugs/medicaments might not have been manufactured by the one who  is  a
licensee and the actual manufacturer is guilty of manufacturing  substandard
drugs, the licensee becomes responsible and liable under the  provisions  in
the said Act.

19.   On the other hand, the provisions of
the Central Excise Act, 1944 are for the purpose of  imposing  duty  on  the
goods manufactured. The manufacturer becomes liable to pay certain  duty  as
per the provisions of the said Act.

20.   Thus, the term 'loan licensee' used by the learned  counsel  appearing
for the appellant is not much relevant as we  are  not  concerned  with  the
quality or standard  of  the  drugs/medicaments  manufactured  by  the  loan
licensee or anybody else manufacturing medicaments for him.

21.   The learned counsel appearing for the respondent had  also  drawn  our
attention to a copy of one  of  the  agreements  entered  into  between  the
respondent and the job workers.  Upon going through the said  agreement,  we
find that the said agreement shows that the job workers  were  not  assigned
the work as agents of the respondent.  The said  agreement  shows  that  the
relationship between the parties is that of the principal and the  principal
and not that of the principal and the agent.  Thus, it  is  clear  that  the
job workers were not manufacturing the drugs as agents of the respondent  or
on behalf of the respondent, but they were carrying  out  the  manufacturing
activity independently and therefore, they were manufacturers of  the  drugs
as per the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

22.   In the light of the above factual position, it is  also  pertinent  to
find out whether the respondent is a manufacturer under  the  provisions  of
the  Central  Excise  Act,  1944.   Whether  a  person  has  manufactured  a
particular item or whether a person is  a  manufacturer  is  a  question  of
fact. Once the Tribunal, after appreciating relevant evidence, has  come  to
a conclusion that the job workers were the manufacturers and the  respondent
- the loan  licensee,  was  not  the  manufacturer,  we  see  no  reason  to
interfere with the said findings  of  fact,  especially  when  the  same  is
correct and  not  perverse.   We  are,  therefore,  in  agreement  with  the
findings  arrived  at  by  the  Tribunal  that  the  job  workers  are   the
manufacturers.

23.    Once  it  has  been  determined  that  the  job   workers   are   the
manufacturers, the assessable value of the goods would be  a  sum  total  of
cost of raw material, labour charges and profit of the job workers,  as  per
circular No.619/10/2002-CX dated 19th February, 2002 and the law  laid  down
by this Court in the case of Pawan Biscuits  (supra)  and  other  cases.  In
such a case, the price at which the respondent brand owner sells  its  goods
would not be the assessable value because the duty is  to  be  paid  at  the
stage at which the goods are manufactured and not  at  the  stage  when  the
goods are sold.

24.   For the aforesaid reasons, we do not agree with the  submissions  made
on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue. We  dismiss  all
the appeals along with the main appeal, with no order as to costs.




                                                     .....................J.
                                                              [ANIL R. DAVE]




                                                     .....................J.
                                                               [DIPAK MISRA]
New Delhi;
April 7, 2015.

whether a female member of the husband's family could be made a party to the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ? - yes – Section 2(q) - the proviso widens the scope of the said definition by including a relative of the husband or male partner within the scope of a complaint, which may be filed by an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage.-2015 S.C. ( 2011) MSKLAWREPORTS

in relation to the interpretation of the expression "respondent" in Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. For the sake of reference, Section 2(q) of the above-said Act is extracted hereinbelow :-

"2(q). "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act:

Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner."

From the above definition it would be apparent that although Section 2(q) defines a respondent to mean any adult male person, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, the proviso widens the scope of the said definition by including a relative of the husband or male partner within the scope of a complaint, which may be filed by an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage.

It is true that the expression "female" has not been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or the male partner. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression "relative", nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only.

 In such circumstances, it is clear that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. -2015 S.C. ( 2011) MSKLAWREPORTS

Or.38, rule 5 C.P.C - Attachment before judgment as a leverage for coercing the defendant to settle the suit claim should be discouraged. The power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC is drastic and extraordinary power. Such power should not be exercised mechanically or merely for the asking. It Should be used sparingly and strictly in accordance with the Rule. The purpose of Order 38 Rule 5 is not to convert an unsecured debt into a secured debt. Any attempt by a plaintiff to utilize the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 as a leverage for coercing the defendant to settle the suit claim should be discouraged. Instances are not wanting where bloated and doubtful claims are realised by unscrupulous plaintiffs by obtaining orders of attachment before judgment and forcing the defendants for out of court settlement, under threat of attachment. - 2015 S.C.(2007) MSKLAWREPORTS

Or.38, rule 5 C.P.C - Attachment before judgment as a leverage for coercing the defendant to settle the suit claim should be discouraged. 
The power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC is drastic and extraordinary power.
Such power should not be exercised mechanically or merely for the asking.
It Should be used sparingly and strictly in accordance with the Rule. 
The purpose of Order 38 Rule 5 is not to convert an unsecured debt into a
secured debt. 
Any attempt by a plaintiff to utilize the provisions of Order
38 Rule 5 as a leverage for coercing the defendant to settle the suit claim
should be discouraged. 
Instances are not wanting where bloated and doubtful
claims are realised by unscrupulous plaintiffs by obtaining orders of
attachment before judgment and forcing the defendants for out of court
settlement, under threat of attachment. - 2015 S.C.(2007) MSKLAWREPORTS

Secs.399 , 402 I.P.C. and sec.25 of Arms Act - Acquitted - when the High court felt that there is exaggeration and padding on the part of Investigation Officer and when at the time of alleged recovery of fire arm absence of independent witness and when arrest or recovery not in the presence of any Gazetted Officer and when the Complainant (PW-6) has himself investigated the crime and when the accused who are armed with deadly weapon with blue uniform shirt for dacoity on the liquor shop and when neither of them offered any resistance nor caused any injury to any of the police personnel - the accused is entitled for Benefit of doubt - Lower courts committed wrong- allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant - 2015 SC msklawreports

                   


"The statement of ASI Sube Singh and H.C. Ram Singh cannot  be  believed  to
the effect that they  had  over  heard  the  conversation  of  the  accused,
details of which are given above to show that the  accused  were  discussing
their plan in detail to commit dacoity  on  the  liquor  shop,  situated  at
Meerut Road, Karnal.  It is apparently exaggeration and padding on the  part
of Investigating Officer."

Strangely, even after observing as above, the High Court  has  believed  the
prosecution story in respect of offences punishable under Sections  399  and
402 IPC, and one in respect of offence punishable under Section 25  of  Arms
Act.
The High Court has erred in law in not taking note  of  the  following
facts apparent from the evidence on record: -



In a day light incident at 1.20  p.m.  within  the  limits  of  City  Police
Station, Karnal, there is no public or any other independent witness of  the
arrest of the appellant along with other accused from the place of  incident
nor that of the alleged recovery of fire arm said to  have  been  made  from
two of them.
(It is not a case where arrest or recovery has  been  made  in
the presence of any Gazetted Officer.)


Complainant  (PW-6)  has  himself  investigated  the  crime,  as  such,  the
credibility of the investigation is  also  doubtful  in  the  present  case,
particularly, for the reason that except  the  police  constables,  who  are
subordinate to him, there is no other witness to the incident.


It is not natural that the six accused, four of whom were armed with  deadly
weapons, neither offered any resistance nor caused any injury to any of  the
police personnel before they are apprehended by the police.


It is strange that all the accused were wearing blue  shirts,  as  if  there
was a uniform provided to them.


It is hard to believe that the appellant and three others  did  not  try  to
run away as at the time of the noon they must have  easily  noticed  from  a
considerable distance that some policemen are coming towards them.   (It  is
not the case of the prosecution that police personnel were not in uniform.)

In view of the above facts and circumstances, which are  apparent  from  the
evidence on record, we find that both the courts below have erred in law  in
holding that the prosecution has  successfully  proved  charge  of  offences
punishable under Sections 399 and 402 IPC, and one punishable under  Section
25 of Arms Act against appellant  Jasbir  Singh  @  Javri  @  Jabbar  Singh,
beyond reasonable doubt.  In our  opinion,  it  is  a  fit  case  where  the
appellant is entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubt,  and  deserves
to be acquitted.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.  The Conviction  and  sentence  recorded
against appellant Jasbir Singh @ Javri @ Jabbar  Singh  under  Sections  399
and 402 IPC and one punishable under Section 25 of Arms Act, is  hereby  set
aside.  The appellant shall  be  released  forthwith,  if  not  required  in
connection with any other trial. - 2015 SC msk law reports

   

Muslim Women Divorced/alleged to be divorced - maintainability of sec.125 Cr.p.c. - Jurisdiction of Family court & Magistrate court - Apex court held that it was already decided by constitution Bench etc., that a Divorced Muslim women is entitled for maintenance and the family court as well as magistrate court both has got jurisdiction to entertain the application under sec.125 Cr.P.C. - No women left with empty hands pending trial with out granting interim maintenance - Retirement of husband is not a ground for reducing the maintenance amount already granted pending appeal 2015 SC msk law reports

The  learned  Family  Judge,  Family
Court, Lucknow while  dealing  with  the  application  forming  the  subject
matter Criminal Case No. 1120 of 1998 did not accept the  primary  objection
as regards the maintainability under Section 125 CrPC as the  applicant  was
a Muslim woman and came to hold even after the divorce  the  application  of
the wife under Section 125  CrPC  was  maintainable  in  the  family  court.
Thereafter, the learned Family Judge appreciating the  evidence  brought  on
record came to opine that the marriage between the parties had  taken  place
on 26.4.1992; that the husband had given divorce on 18.6.1997; that she  was
ill treated at her matrimonial home; and that  she  had  come  back  to  her
parental house and  staying  there;  that  the  husband  had  not  made  any
provision for grant of  maintenance; that the wife did not have  any  source
of income to support her, and the plea advanced by the husband that she  had
means to sustain her had not been proved; that as the  husband  was  getting
at the time of disposal of the application as  per  the  salary  certificate
Rs.17654/- and accordingly directed that a sum of Rs.2500/- should  be  paid
as monthly maintenance allowance from the date of submission of  application
till the date of judgment and thereafter Rs.4000/- per month from  the  date
of judgment till the date of remarriage.

The High Court took note  of
the fact that the husband had retired on  1.4.2012 and consequently  reduced
the maintenance allowance to Rs.2000/-from 1.4.2012 till remarriage  of  the
appellant herein.  Being of this view the learned Single Judge modified  the
order passed by the Family Court.  Hence,  the  present  appeal  by  special
leave, at the instance of the wife.

the applicability of Section  125
CrPC to a Muslim woman who has been  divorced. 

 In  Shamim  Bano  v.  Asraf Khan[7], 
this Court after referring to the Constitution Bench  decisions  in
Danial Latifi v. Union of India[8] and Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P.[9]  had
opined as follows:-
"13.  The  aforesaid  principle  clearly  lays  down  that  even  after   an
application has been filed under the provisions of the Act,  the  Magistrate
under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in  favour  of  a  divorced
Muslim woman and the parameters and  the  considerations  are  the  same  as
stipulated in Section 125 of the Code. We may note that  while  taking  note
of the factual score to  the  effect  that  the  plea  of  divorce  was  not
accepted by  the  Magistrate  which  was  upheld  by  the  High  Court,  the
Constitution Bench opined that as the Magistrate could exercise power  under
Section 125 of the Code for grant of maintenance in  favour  of  a  divorced
Muslim woman under the Act, the order  did  not  warrant  any  interference.
Thus, the emphasis was laid on the retention of the power by the  Magistrate
under Section 125 of the Code and the effect of ultimate consequence.

Slightly recently, in  Shabana  Bano  v.  Imran  Khan[10],  a  two-Judge
Bench, placing reliance on Danial Latifi (supra), has ruled that:-

"21. The appellant's petition under Section 125 CrPC would  be  maintainable
before the Family Court as long as  the  appellant  does  not  remarry.  The
amount of maintenance to  be  awarded  under  Section  125  CrPC  cannot  be
restricted for the iddat period only."

Though the aforesaid decision was rendered interpreting  Section  7  of  the
Family  Courts  Act,  1984,  yet  the  principle  stated  therein  would  be
applicable, for the same is in consonance with the principle stated  by  the
Constitution Bench in Khatoon Nisa (supra)."

 In view of the aforesaid dictum, there can be no shadow of doubt  that
Section 125 CrPC has been rightly held  to  be  applicable  by  the  learned
Family Judge.

INTERIM MAINTENANCE - COMPULSORY 
 But what is disturbing is  that
though the application for grant of maintenance was filed in the year  1998,
it was not decided till 17.2.2012.  It is also shocking to note  that  there
was no order  for  grant  of  interim  maintenance.   It  needs  no  special
emphasis to state that when an  application  for  grant  of  maintenance  is
filed by the wife the delay in disposal  of  the  application,  to  say  the
least, is  an  unacceptable  situation.   It  is,  in  fact,  a  distressing
phenomenon.  An application for grant of maintenance has to be  disposed  of
at the earliest.  The family courts, which have  been  established  to  deal
with the matrimonial disputes, which include application under  Section  125
CrPC, have become absolutely  apathetic  to  the  same.  

Retirement is not ground for reducing quantum of maintenance

 In the instant case, as is  seen,  the  High  Court  has  reduced  the
amount of maintenance from Rs.4,000/- to Rs.2,000/-.  As  is  manifest,  the
High Court has become oblivious of the fact that she  has  to  stay  on  her
own.  Needless to say,  the  order  of  the  learned  Family  Judge  is  not
manifestly perverse.  There is nothing perceptible  which  would  show  that
order is a sanctuary of errors.  In fact, when the order is based on  proper
appreciation  of  evidence  on  record,  no  revisional  court  should  have
interfered with the reason on the base that  it  would  have  arrived  at  a
different or another conclusion.  When substantial justice  has  been  done,
there was no reason to interfere.  There may be a shelter over her  head  in
the parental house, but other  real  expenses  cannot  be  ignored.   Solely
because the husband had retired, there was no justification  to  reduce  the
maintenance by 50%.  It is not a huge fortune that was showered on the  wife
that it deserved reduction.  It only reflects the  non-application  of  mind
and, therefore, we are unable to sustain the said order. - 2015 S.C. MSKLAW REPORTS