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Wednesday, April 8, 2015

Section 3A envisages a Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) for implementing slum rehabilitation schemes. Section 3B provides for slum rehabilitation scheme. The power to frame a general rehabilitation scheme is vested in the State Government or the SRA concerned with the previous sanction of the State Government for rehabilitation of slums and hutment colonies in such areas. Section 3C vests power in the Chief Executive Officer of the concerned SRA to declare an area as slum rehabilitation area if such declaration is found justified in the light of an already published Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.9363 OF 2011


 Balasaheb Arjun Torbole & Ors.                    .....Appellants

      Versus

The Administrator & Divisional Commissioner
& Ors.                                         .....Respondents


                                   W I T H

                             C.A.No.9147 of 2011




                               J U D G M E N T



SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

These civil appeals are directed  against  judgment  of  Bombay  High  Court
dated 31.08.2010  in  W.P.(L)  No.1915  of  2010  and  dated  10.08.2010  in
W.P.No.316 of 2010 respectively  whereby the  writ  petitions  preferred  by
the appellants were dismissed.  For the sake  of  brevity  facts  have  been
taken from C.A.No.9363 of 2011.  The  High  Court  negatived  all  the  five
contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants and upheld the order  dated
17.04.2010 passed by the High Powered Committee of the Govt. of  Maharashtra
dismissing Appeal No.62 of 2010 preferred by  the  appellants  to  challenge
the sanction of a scheme by  the  Slum  Rehabilitation  Authority  of  lands
bearing CTS No.106, 106/1 to 5, 107/1 to 9, 108(Part), 111(Part),  111/1  to
77, 80 to 132 and 112(Part) of Village  Kurla,  Hutatma  Prabhakar  Keluskar
Marg (Match Factory Lane), Kurla(West),  Mumbai  and  also  the  orders  for
their eviction from the private lands.
On behalf of the appellants, only C.A.No.9363 of 2011 was argued  at  length
by learned advocate Mr. Sanjay Parikh.  He made it clear  that  this  appeal
relates not to the municipal plots but  only  to  private  plots  which  are
owned privately bearing plot nos.106, 107 and 108.  It  is  the  appellants'
case that a total of 124 families occupied dwellings in the  slums  existing
over said  plots.   According  to  Mr.  Parikh  the  respondent  authorities
committed error of law in treating the slum area over  municipal  plots  and
those over private plots as one slum area.  This, according to  Mr.  Parikh,
deprived  the  slum  residents  over  private  plots  of  having  their  own
redevelopment activity limited to private plots as per the wishes of 70%  of
its occupants.  As per his submission, by illegally declaring a common  slum
area over two different kinds of lands, one  owned  by  municipal  authority
and the other by private persons, the rights  of  the  petitioners  to  have
their own say has been diluted and adversely affected.  In other words,  the
major grievance of the appellants  is  that  the  respondents  have  wrongly
treated that there exists a  consent  for  redevelopment  from  70%  of  the
occupants.  Such claim, according to appellants, must be  rejected  and  the
appellants  should  be  allowed  to  have  the   redevelopment   through   a
cooperative  of  occupants  of  private  plots   exclusively.    The   other
contention of the  appellants  is  that  their  does  not  exist  any  valid
Annexure II with respect to the private plots.
On the other hand, Mr. Shyam Divan, Sr. Advocate, appearing  for  respondent
no.10 relied upon the same very legal provisions which were  highlighted  by
Mr. Parikh to submit that there is no requirement in law to  divide  a  slum
area on the basis of nature of ownership of the concerned  plots  and  since
the private plots  and  municipal  plots  are  contiguous,  hence,  for  the
purpose of redevelopment slum over both was  rightly  treated  as  one  slum
area and the same is permissible under the regulations.  As a corollary,  it
was  submitted  that  if  the  socalled  merger  is  permissible  then   the
requirement of consent of 70% of the occupants stands  fully  complied.   It
was further submitted that as a fact the  High  Powered  Committee  and  the
High Court have found that there exists valid Annexure  II  issued  even  in
respect of slums over private plots.
Mr. C.A. Sundaram, Sr. Advocate, appearing for respondent no.8  who  is  the
developer as well as owner of private  lands,  highlighted  the  rights  and
liabilities of owners of land declared  as  slum  area  and  submitted  that
there was no violation of law in grant of  approval  to  the  rehabilitation
scheme in the instant case to which respondent no.8 had given  his  consent.
Mr. Sishodia, Sr. Advocate appearing for the Slum  Rehabilitation  Authority
as well as  Mr.  Atul  Chitale,  Sr.  Advocate  for  the  Respondent  No.12-
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai also  defended  the  action  of  the
authorities as well as order of the High Court upholding the decision  taken
by the High Powered Committee.
The relevant facts and relief sought by the appellants can very usefully  be
culled out from paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the judgment under appeal :

"1.   What is challenged in this writ petition  under  Article  226  of  the
Constitution of India is the order dated 17 April 2010 of the  High  Powered
Committee of the Government of Maharashtra, dismissing Appeal No.62 of  2010
of the present petitioners.  In the appeal, the petitioners  challenged  the
sanction of a scheme by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority on  lands  bearing
CTS No.106, 106/1 to 5, 107/1 to 9, 108(pt), 111(pt), 111/1  to  77,  80  to
132 & 112(pt) of village  Kurla,  Hutatma  Prabhakar  Keluskar  Marg  (Match
Factory Lane), Kurla (West), Mumbai.  A Letter of Intent was issued for  the
whole plot on 29 April 2006.  Out of the above plots, plot Nos.106, 107  and
108 are the plots in question which were earlier owned  by  respondent  No.8
and were subsequently declared  as  slums.   The  other  lands  are  of  the
Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Mumbai.   The  petitioners  herein  are
residents in the slums on private plots owned by respondent No.8.

2.    The competent authority declared the above private plots  as  well  as
Mumbai Municipal Corporation plots to be slum areas under  section  4(1)  of
the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and  Redevelopment)  Act,
1971 (for short 'Slum Act') by a notification dated 29  January  2003.   The
slum dwellers residing on both municipal plots and private  plots  formed  a
society in the name of respondent No.10 and  requested  respondent  No.8  to
implement the slum  scheme.   Respondent  No.8  is  owner-cum-developer  and
respondent No.10 being their developer as per  their  own  proposal  to  the
Slum Rehabilitation Authority (for short  'SRA').   On  30  June  2004,  the
competent authority decided the eligibility of  the  slum  dwellers  of  the
private plots and  held  that  out  of  the  occupants  of  124  structures,
occupants of 76 structures were eligible and that out of those, only 19  had
given consent which amounted to 25%.  Thereupon, on  13  January  2004,  the
respondent-Municipal  Corporation  issued  Annexure-II  for  the  BMC  Plots
certifying that out of 367 slum dwellers, 251 were eligible and all of  them
have given their  consent  which  represented  100%  of  the  eligible  slum
dwellers.  Since there was one proposal submitted by  respondent  Nos.8  and
10 for both the plots i.e. BMC plots and private plots, the officers of  SRA
prepared a report and on taking the consent of the  slum  dwellers  of  both
BMC plots and private plots, came to the conclusion  that  the  consent  was
given by 81.32% of the slum dwellers of all the  plots  taken  together  for
which one common scheme was submitted.  On 29 June 2006,  SRA  approved  the
Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and issued  a  Letter  of  Intent  in  favour  of
respondent Nos.8 and 10.  On 14 February 2007,  SRA  approved  the  building
plans for composite development of the Municipal plots as  well  as  private
plots.  On 9 September 2009, SRA issued a revised Letter of  Intent  with  a
condition that respondent Nos.8 and 10 shall rehabilitate all eligible  slum
dwellers  as  held  by  the   competent   authority/Municipal   Corporation.
Condition No.23 of the Letter of Intent provides that individual  agreements
of at least 70% of the eligible slum dwellers shall be  submitted  prior  to
the Commencement Certificate.

3.    In the meantime, the petitioners who are residents  in  the  slums  on
the private plots, were not shifting to the transit tenements.   The  Deputy
Collector, Kurla issued show-cause notices  to  the  petitioners  and  after
hearing them, passed the impugned order dated 25 May 2009 under sections  33
and 38 of the Slum Act  requiring  the  petitioners  to  vacate  the  slums.
Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners  filed  an  appeal  before  the
Appellate Authority viz. Divisional Commissioner,  Konkan  Division,  Mumbai
who dismissed the appeal on 13 August 2009 after  hearing  the  petitioners.
The petitioners thereafter filed a writ petition before this court  and  the
petitioners were relegated the  alternative  remedy  for  filing  an  appeal
before the Committee.  The petitioners, accordingly, filed appeal  No.62  of
2010 before the High Powered Committee on 15 March 2010.  The  High  Powered
Committee issued notice to the  respondents  and  respondent  Nos.8  and  10
filed their reply.  The petitioners as  well  as  respondent  Nos.8  and  10
filed their written statement.  After the  hearing  concluded  on  17  April
2010, by an order dated 17 April 2010, the High Powered Committee  dismissed
the appeal.  Hence the present writ petition which came to be  filed  on  17
August 2010."

At  the  outset  it  is  deemed  proper  to  take  note  of  relevant  legal
provisions.  Sections 2(15) and 2(19) of the Maharashtra Regional  and  Town
Planning Act, 1966 (for short, '1966  Act')  define  'local  authority'  and
'planning authority' in following terms :

"2(15) 'local authority' means -

the Bombay Municipal Corporation  constituted  under  the  Bombay  Municipal
Corporation Act, or the Nagput Municipal Corporation constituted  under  the
City  of  Nagpur  Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1948,   or   any   Municipal
corporation constituted under the Bombay  Provincial  Municipal  Corporation
Act, 1949,

a Council and a Nagar Panchayat constituted under the Maharashtra  Municipal
Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township Act 1965.

(i)  a Zilla Parishad constituted under the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads  and
Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961,

      (ii) the Authority constituted under the Maharashtra Housing and  Area
Development Act, 1976,

      (iii)  the Nagpur  Improvement  Trust  constituted  under  the  Nagpur
Improvement Trust Act, 1936

which  is  permitted  by  the  State  Government  for  any  area  under  its
jurisdiction to exercise the powers of a Planning Authority under this Act;

... ... ... ... ...

2(19) 'Planning Authority' means a local authority and includes -

a Special Planning Authority constituted or  appointed  or  deemed  to  have
been appointed under Section 40;

in respect of the slum rehabilitation area declared under Section 3C of  the
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement Clearance and Redevelopment) Act,  1971,
the Slum Rehabilitation Authority appointed under Section  3A  of  the  said
Act;"


It is relevant to note that 'Planning Authority'  not  only  means  a  local
authority but also includes by reference, the Slum Rehabilitation  Authority
(SRA)  appointed  under  Section  3-A  of   the   Maharashtra   Slum   Areas
(Improvement Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971  (for  short  'the  1971
Act') in respect of a slum rehabilitation area.
The power available to the planning authority to  modify  final  development
plan under sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the 1966 Act has also  been  now
vested in the SRA appointed under Section 3-A of the 1971 Act by adding sub-
section(1B) to Section 37 through an amendment of  1996.   This  sub-section
reads as follows :

"(1B) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section  (1),  if  the  Slum
Rehabilitation Authority appointed under section 3A of the Maharashtra  Slum
Areas (Improvement, Clearance and  Redevelopment)  Act,  1971  is  satisfied
that a modification of any part  of,  or  any  proposal  made  in,  a  final
Development plan is required to be  made  for  implementation  of  the  Slum
Rehabilitation Scheme declared under the said Act, then, it  may  publish  a
notice in the  Official  Gazette,  and  in  such  other  manner  as  may  be
determined by it, inviting objections and suggestions from any  person  with
respect to the proposed modification not later than one month from the  date
of such notice; and shall also serve notice on all persons affected  by  the
proposed modification, and after giving  a  hearing  to  any  such  persons,
submit the proposed modification (with amendments, if  any),  to  the  State
Government to sanction."

The Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888  was  also  amended  in  1996  to
insert Section 354AAA which enables vesting of  power  of  the  Commissioner
and the Corporation  relating  to  building  regulations  etc.  in  the  SRA
appointed under the 1971 Act.  It reads as follows :

"354AAA. Empowerment of Slum Rehabilitation Authority for implementation  of
Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any  other
provisions of this Act, the State Government may,  by  notification  in  the
Official Gazette, direct that the powers  of  the  Commissioner  under  this
Chapter and the  powers  of  the  Corporation  and  the  Committees  of  the
Corporation under this Act, if any, relating  to  building  regulations  and
matters ancillary or consequential thereto, shall be exercised by  the  Slum
Rehabilitation  Authority  appointed  under  the  Maharashtra   Slum   Areas
(Improvement,  Clearance  and  Redevelopment)  Act,  1971,  for   the   slum
rehabilitation area declared under that Act."

The Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and  Redevelopment)  Act,
1971  (the  1971  Act)  was  enacted  to  make  better  provision  for   the
improvement  and  clearance  of  slum  areas  in   the   State   and   their
redevelopment  and  for  the  protection  of  occupiers  from  eviction  and
distress warrants.   Its  following  provisions  are  deemed  relevant  and,
therefore, reproduced hereinbelow :

"2(ga) 'Slum area'  means  any  area  declared  as  such  by  the  Competent
Authority under sub-section (1) of section 4 and includes  any  area  deemed
to be a slum area under section 4A;

(h) 'Slum clearance' means the clearance of any slum area by the  demolition
and removal of building therefrom;

(h-a) 'Slumlord' means a person,  who  illegally  takes  possession  of  any
lands (whether  belonging  to  Government,  local  authority  or  any  other
person) or enters into or creates illegal tenancies  or  leave  and  licence
agreements or any  other  agreements  in  respect  of  such  lands,  or  who
constructs unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or  gives  such
lands to any persons on rental or leave and licence basis for  construction,
or use and occupation, of unauthorized structures, or  who  knowingly  gives
financial aid to any persons for taking illegal possession  of  such  lands,
or for construction of unauthorized structures thereon, or who  collects  or
attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent,  compensation  or
other charges by criminal intimidation, or who evicts or attempts  to  evict
any such occupiers by force without resorting to the  lawful  procedure,  or
who abets in any manner the doing of any of the above-mentioned things.

(h-b) 'Slum Rehabilitation Area' means a slum rehabilitation area,  declared
as such under sub-section (1) of section 3C by the  Competent  Authority  in
pursuance of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme notified under section 3B;

(h-c)  'Slum  Rehabilitation  Authority'  means  the   Slum   Rehabilitation
Authority or Authorities appointed by the  State  Government  under  section
3A;

(h-d) 'Slum Rehabilitation Scheme'  means  the  Slum  Rehabilitation  Scheme
notified under section 3B;"

Section 3A envisages a Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) for  implementing
slum rehabilitation schemes.  Section 3B provides  for  slum  rehabilitation
scheme.  The power to frame a general rehabilitation  scheme  is  vested  in
the State Government or the SRA concerned with the previous sanction of  the
State Government for rehabilitation of slums and hutment  colonies  in  such
areas.  Section 3C vests  power  in  the  Chief  Executive  Officer  of  the
concerned SRA to declare  an  area  as  slum  rehabilitation  area  if  such
declaration is found justified in the light of  an  already  published  Slum
Rehabilitation Scheme.  Section 3C runs as follows :

"3C. Declaration of a slum rehabilitation area.-(1) As soon as may be  after
the publication of the  Slum  Rehabilitation  Scheme,  the  Chief  Executive
Officer on being satisfied that circumstances exist in respect of any  area,
justifying its declaration  as  slum  rehabilitation  area  under  the  said
scheme, may by an order published in  the  Official  Gazette,  declare  such
area  to  be  a  'slum  rehabilitation  area'.   The  order  declaring  slum
rehabilitation area (hereinafter referred to  as  'the  slum  rehabilitation
order') shall also be  given  wide  publicity  in  such  manner  as  may  be
specified by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority.

(2) Any person aggrieved by the slum rehabilitation order may,  within  four
weeks of the publication of such order  prefer  an  appeal  to  the  Special
Tribunal; and the decision of the Special Tribunal shall be final.

(3)  On  the  completion  of  the  Slum  Rehabilitation  Scheme,  the   Slum
Rehabilitation Area shall cease to be such area."

The other relevant provisions of the 1971 Act include Section 4 which  vests
power in the Competent Authority to declare an  area  to  be  a  slum  area.
Against such declaration in the Official Gazette, appeal is provided to  the
Tribunal provided it is filed  within  30  days.   The  Competent  Authority
under the Act has also been vested with power under Section  11  to  declare
any slum area to be a clearance area from which buildings found  to  be  not
fit for human habitation may be cleared in accordance  with  the  provisions
of the Act.
It  is  not  in  dispute  that  for  its  own  lands  the  Bombay  Municipal
Corporation has been appointed as the Competent Authority  under  Section  3
of the  1971  Act.   For  private  lands,  the  concerned  Deputy  Collector
(Encroachment) has been appointed as the Competent Authority.
The Bombay Municipal Corporation has framed Development Control  Regulations
for Greater Bombay under the provisions of Section  159  of  the  1966  Act.
These Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 1991 (for  brevity
'DCR') came into force on 25.03.1991.  Regulation 33(10) was inserted  later
in 1997.  Its salient features are as follows :

"I. Eligibility for redevelopment Scheme.-(a)  For  redevelopment  of  slums
including pavements, whose inhabitants' names and structures appear  in  the
electoral roll prepared with reference to 1st January 1995 or a  date  prior
thereto, but where the inhabitants stay at present  in  the  structure,  the
provisions of Appendix IV  shall  apply  on  the  basis  of  a  tenement  in
exchange for an independently numbered structure.

(b)   Subject to the foregoing provisions, only the actual occupants of  the
hutment shall be held eligible and the so called structure-owner other  than
the actual occupant, if any, even if his name  is  shown  in  the  electoral
roll for the structure, shall have no right whatsoever to the  reconstructed
tenement against that structure.

II. Definition of  Slum,  Pavement,  and  Structure  of  hut.-(i)  For  this
purpose, slums shall mean those censused, or declared and notified,  in  the
past or hereafter under the Maharashtra Slum Areas  (Improvement,  Clearance
and  Redevelopment)  Act,  1971.   Slum  shall  also   mean   areas/pavement
stretches hereafter notified as Slum Rehabilitation Areas.

If any  area  fulfills  the  conditions  laid  down  in  section  4  of  the
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act,  1971
to qualify as slum area and has  been  censused  or  declared  and  notified
shall be deemed to be and treated as Slum Rehabilitation Areas.

Slum rehabilitation area shall also mean any area declared as  such  by  the
Slum Rehabilitation Authority though preferably fulfilling  conditions  laid
down in section 4 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance  and
Redevelopment) Act, 1971 to  qualify  as  slum  areas  and/or  required  for
implementation of  any  slum  rehabilitation  project.   Any  area  where  a
project under Slum Rehabilitation Scheme has been approved by CEO/SRA  shall
be deemed slum rehabilitation area.

Any area required or proposed for the purpose of construction  of  temporary
or permanent transit camps  and  so  approved  by  the  Slum  Rehabilitation
Authority shall also be deemed to be  and  treated  as  Slum  Rehabilitation
Areas and projects  approved  in  such  areas  by  the  Slum  Rehabilitation
Authority shall be deemed to be Slum Rehabilitation Projects.

A pavement shall mean any Municipal/Government/Semi-Government pavement  and
shall include any viable stretch  of  the  pavement  as  may  be  considered
viable for the purpose of Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.

A structure shall mean all the  dwelling  areas  of  all  persons  who  were
enumerated as living in that one numbered house in  the  electoral  roll  of
the latest date, upto 1st January, 1995 and  regardless  of  the  number  of
persons, or location of rooms or access.

A composite building  shall  mean  a  building  comprising  both  rehab  and
freesale components or parts thereof in the same building.

Censused shall mean those slums located on lands  belonging  to  Government,
any undertaking of Government, or Brihan Mumbai  Municipal  Corporation  and
incorporated in the records of the land  owning  authority  as  having  been
censused in 1976, 1980 or 1985 or prior to 1st January 1995.

III.  Joint ownership with spouse.-The reconstructed tenement  shall  be  of
the ownership of the hutment-dweller and spouse conjointly, and shall be  so
entered and be deemed to be so entered in the records  of  the  co-operative
housing society, including the share  certificates  or  all  other  relevant
documents.

IV.    Denotification  as  Slum  Rehabilitation  Area.-Slum   Rehabilitation
Authority on being satisfied  that  it  is  necessary  so  to  do,  or  when
directed by the State Government, shall  denotify  the  slum  rehabilitation
area."

      Appendix IV contains various guidelines  as  indicated  in  Regulation
33(10) and some of the relevant guidelines are extracted hereinbelow :

" RIGHT OF THE HUTMENT DWELLERS-

Hutment dwellers, in the slum or on  the  pavement  eligible  in  accordance
with the provisions of  Development  Control  Regulation  33(10)  shall,  in
exchange for their structure, be given free of cost a  residential  tenement
having a carpet area of [20.90 sq.m. (225 sq.ft)]  including  balcony,  bath
and watercloset, but excluding common areas.

... ... ... ... ...

1.3   All eligible hutment dwellers taking part in the  slum  rehabilitation
scheme shall have to be rehabilitated according to the  provisions  in  this
Appendix.  It may be in situ and in the same plot as far as possible.

... ... ... ... ...

1.7   The individual agreement entered into between hutment-dweller and  the
owner/developer/co-operative housing  society/NGO  shall  be  in  the  joint
names of pramukh hutment-dweller and spouse for every structure.

... ... ... ... ...

1.15  Where 70 per cent or more of the eligible hutment-dwellers in  a  slum
or pavement in a viable stretch at one place agree to join a  rehabilitation
scheme, it may be considered for approval.

       Provided  that  nothing  contained  herein  shall   apply   to   Slum
Rehabilitation  Projects  undertaken  by  the  State  Government  or  Public
authority or as the case may be a Government Company as defined  in  section
617 of the Companies Act, 1956 and being owned and controlled by  the  State
Government.

... ... ... ... ...

2. BUILDING PERMISSION FOR SLUM REHABILITATION PROJECTS :--

2.1   The proposal for each Slum Rehabilitation Project shall  be  submitted
to the Slum Rehabilitation Authority with all the necessary  documents,  no-
objection certificates, and  the  plans  as  may  be  decided  by  the  Slum
Rehabilitation Authority from time to time.

2.2   The approval to the Project shall be given by the Slum  Rehabilitation
Authority within a period of 30 days from the  date  of  submission  of  all
relevant documents.  In the  event  of  a  failure  by  Slum  Rehabilitation
Authority to do so, the said approval shall be deemed to  have  been  given,
provided the Project is in accordance with the provisions in this Appendix.

... ... ... ... ...

3.14  Amalgamation/Sub-division of Plots and Balancing of  FSI  thereon.-Any
land declared as slum rehabilitation area or on  which  slum  rehabilitation
project has been sanctioned, if it is spread on part or parts of  C.S.  Nos.
or CTS  Nos.  or  S.Nos.  shall  be  treated  as  natural  amalgamation/sub-
division/s of that C.S. or  C.T.S.  or  S.No.  or  F.P.  No.  for  which  no
separate approval for amalgamation/sub-division of land would be necessary.

... ... ... ... ...

3.16  The Chief Executive Officer,  Slum  Rehabilitation  Authority  may  if
required adjust the boundary of the plot  declared  as  slum  rehabilitation
area so as to suit the building design and  provide  proper  access  to  the
Project.

... ... ... ... ...

7.7   Wherever slum and  municipal/MHADA  property  are  found  together  or
adjoining it would be eligible for redevelopment using  provisions  of  both
DCR 33(7) and  DCR 33(10). Development of slum and contiguous non-slum  area
under any other provisions of regulations may be allowed together  in  order
to promote flexibility of  design  as  well  as  to  raise  more  resources,
provided that the FSI of non-slum quantum of area  shall  be  restricted  to
that permissible in the surrounding Zone inclusive of admissible TDR on non-
slum area.  Such a project shall be  deemed  to  be  a  Slum  Rehabilitation
Project and plans for non-slum area including the plans for  admissible  TDR
shall be approved by CEO, SRA.  The power under D.C.  Regulation  11(4)  for
shifting  and/or  interchanging  the  purpose  of  designations/reservations
shall be exercised by  the  Chief  Executive  Officer,  Slum  Rehabilitation
Authority in respect of slum rehabilitation areas/projects.

7.8   In case of two or more number of slums taken  up  for  development  by
same owner/developer/NGO/Co-operative Society of  the  Slum  dwellers,  both
Rehab and Free Sale Components  of  the  said  slums  can  be  combined  and
located in any proportion in those plots provided in any plot, the FSI  does
not exceed 2.5 subject to the condition that the said slums  have  the  same
ratio of Rehab component to Free Sale Component as laid down in  the  Clause
3.3 to 3.5 of this Appendix."

Besides the statutory provisions and statutory  regulations  of  1991  which
have been modified from time to  time,  the  concerned  authority  has  also
issued guidelines for the implementation of Slum  Rehabilitation  Scheme  in
Greater  Mumbai  and  also  circulars  reflecting  policy  decisions.    The
guidelines, inter alia, indicate the procedure  for  submission,  processing
and approval of slum rehabilitation schemes.  For the  purpose  of  deciding
the controversy at hand paragraphs 2, 3,  4,  5,  8  and  11  of  clause  IV
relating to the procedure for submission indicate that 70% or  more  of  the
eligible hutment dwellers in a slum or pavement in a viable stretch  at  one
place have to show their willingness to join slum rehabilitation scheme  and
come together to form cooperative society of all eligible  hutment  dwellers
through a resolution to that effect.  The  chief  promoter,  office  bearers
and the members  of  the  proposed  society  should  collect  the  necessary
documents and get the plot surveyed/measured and prepare  map  of  the  plot
showing slum structures with the help of surveyors attached  to  the  office
of   Additional   Collector   (Encroachment)   or   the   Deputy   Collector
(Encroachment) of the zone.
The  procedure   for   submission,   processing   and   approval   of   slum
rehabilitation schemes also contains a guideline  that  by  undertaking  the
survey, information of the proposed members/slum  dwellers  should  also  be
collected and Annexure II prescribed by SRA should be filled  up  so  as  to
give the details of land occupied by the slum dwellers, number and  type  of
structures such as residential, industrial etc. and  the  list  of  eligible
and ineligible occupants and consent to join  the  scheme.   The  guidelines
also disclose that earlier the procedure of filling up  Annexure  II  format
was required to be carried  on  by  competent  authorities  but  by  way  of
subsequent simplification of procedure it is now required to  be  filled  up
by the promoter/cooperative housing society itself for  submitting  building
proposal to SRA.  The decision to search a competent developer to act  as  a
promoter can be taken up by the  proposed  cooperative  housing  society  of
slum dwellers  but  it  has  been  clarified  that  the  society  itself  or
NGO/developer/owner can take up slum rehabilitation scheme  as  a  promoter.
The promoter has to appoint  an  architect  to  prepare  the  plans  of  the
development of the slum area as per  DCR  33(10).   All  required  documents
such as building plan, layout plan etc. along with Annexure I,  Annexure  II
and Annexure III are to be submitted to SRA by the architect along with  the
application for approval of the slum rehabilitation  scheme.   The  proposal
so submitted is subjected to a pre-scrutiny by a designated engineer of  SRA
to ensure that it is complete with all documents and then the proposals  are
accepted.  Thereafter the scrutiny of Annexures I,  II  and  III  begins  in
different wings such as Building Permissions, Eligibility Certification  and
Accounts & Finance respectively.
The guidelines also indicate that circular no.4 dated  27.08.1997  had  been
issued by SRA to give details of the simplified procedure  in  the  form  of
Appendix -  D.   Inter  alia,  this  circular  provides  that  in  order  to
facilitate  the  disposal  of  slum  rehabilitation  schemes  submitted  for
approval, the architect/developer or society bearers may submit Annexure  II
in duplicate, as prepared by them  in  the  prescribed  proforma  signed  by
owner/developer/CP/NGO.  A copy of the same will be then  forwarded  to  the
competent  authority  for  getting  it  certified.   The  proposal  will  be
scrutinized on the basis of Annexure  II  submitted  by  the  architect  but
approval will be on the basis of certified Annexure II  from  the  competent
authority and for this the SRA will follow up with the respective  competent
authority.
While replying to the arguments  of  Mr.  Sanjay  Parikh,  counsel  for  the
appellants in both the appeals, Mr. Shyam Divan highlighted the basic  facts
first from the records of Civil Appeal No.9147 of 2011  to  show  that  plot
nos.106, 107 and 108 are the  concerned  private  plots  which  are  subject
matter of Civil Appeal No.9363 of 2011.  The  remaining  plots,  i.e.,  plot
no.109(pt), 110(pt), 111(pt) and 112(pt) are the concerned  municipal  plots
which are subject matter of the other civil appeal.  His stand is  that  the
notification dated 13.02.2003, no doubt  contained  a  declaration  of  slum
area under Section 3 of the 1971 Act even in respect of plots  of  Municipal
Corporation but that will not make any difference.  He referred  to  various
documents to point out that the concerned  plots  of  Municipal  Corporation
were censused slum colony as per  municipal  records  and  hence  they  were
covered under the definition of 'slum' recognized  under  Regulation  33(10)
which is part of Development Control Regulations for  Greater  Mumbai,  1991
(DCR).  It was  also  pointed  out  that  Chief  Executive  Officer  of  SRA
approved the slum development scheme covering the slum over municipal  plots
as well as private plots on 26.03.2006 resulting into issuance of letter  of
intent on 29.06.2006 and first intimation of approval (planning  permission)
on 14.02.2007.  Thereafter only 6 persons preferred  an  appeal  before  the
Maharashtra Slum Areas Tribunal with a  prayer  to  quash  the  notification
dated 13th February 2003 containing  declaration  of  slums  in  respect  of
municipal plots.  This appeal bearing no.22 of 2009 suffered from  delay  of
6 years which was not condoned by the  Tribunal  but  while  dismissing  the
same on 11.08.2009, the Tribunal noted the lacuna in the case of  appellants
that they had failed to support even their claim that  they  were  residents
of the municipal plots or that there did not exist any slum  over  the  area
and how they were affected by the declaration when the owner  of  the  land,
the Municipal  Corporation,  had  no  objection  to  such  declaration  with
respect to  its  own  land.   The  writ  petition  bearing  No.316  of  2010
preferred against the order of the Tribunal was  dismissed  by  order  dated
10.8.2010, under appeal in Civil Appeal No.9147 of  2011.   The  High  Court
noticed that out of 6 petitioners only petitioner no.1 was  an  occupant  of
structure over the Municipal Corporation land whereas petitioner nos.2 to  4
resided on private lands and being not concerned with  the  municipal  plots
could not maintain the writ petition.  With respect to petitioner no.1,  the
court noticed that his name was included in Annexure II of  the  SRA  scheme
and he had accepted an amount of Rs.60,000/- as rent in  lieu  of  temporary
transit accommodation and hence the High Court  held  that  petitioner  no.1
was  estopped  from  challenging  the   notification   declaring   Municipal
Corporation plot as slum area.
No reply to the grounds mentioned by the High Court for dismissing the  writ
petition has been offered on behalf of  the  appellants  in  C.A.No.9147  of
2011 and as noted earlier, Mr.  Parikh  has  confined  his  submissions  and
arguments only against SRA scheme for the private  plots  which  is  subject
matter of C.A.No.9363 of 2011.  The main two contentions of Mr. Parikh  that
there is no valid Annexure II for the private plots; and there was no  valid
consent of 70%  of  slum  dwellers  because  the  consent  was  not  counted
separately for residents of private plots have been  addressed  and  replied
at length.
In respect of Annexure II, Mr. Divan has placed reliance upon  Annexure  P-6
to C.A.No.9363 of 2011 and some other materials from the same  very  record.
He pointed out that  in  the  synopsis,  against  the  date  05.03.2004  the
appellants have averred in following words:-  "Dy.  Collector  (E/I)-Chembur
recorded the findings of his enquiry conducted on 20.11.2004 in the list  of
Annexure II that not a single  person  on  private  plots  gave  consent  in
favour of Jan Kalyan Society.  A true and correct copy  of  the  eligibility
list of Annexure II  as  verified  by  the  Deputy  Collector  (E/I)-Chembur
purportedly acting as competent authority dated 5.3.2004 is  Annexure  P-6".
In continuation of above the appellants have also averred that 17  residents
were not present on 20.01.2004 and on the basis of their consents  allegedly
given in the year 2001, the Deputy Collector (E/R)-Chembur  wrongly  treated
them to have given consent  to  the  slum  rehabilitation  scheme.   It  was
pointed out that the  document  Annexure  P-6  dated  05.03.2004  bears  the
signature of concerned Deputy Collector and discloses verified list  of  124
persons containing all the required details including consent  etc.  and  on
that basis it has been submitted  that  appellants'  contention  that  there
exists no Annexure II for the private plots is against their  own  pleadings
and contrary to records.  By referring to  the  prayers  made  in  the  writ
petition, it was also shown that there was no prayer to set aside  or  quash
Annexure II for the private plots.
The appellants have failed to produce any worthwhile material to  show  that
there was no Annexure II submitted before the  SRA  or  that  there  was  no
verification made by the competent authority.  The records clearly  disclose
that there was an objection raised by the verifying authority that only  25%
slum dwellers of private plots have consented to the  rehabilitation  scheme
and not  the  70%  as  required  by  the  regulations  and  the  guidelines.
However, such objection  was  considered  and  overruled  by  the  competent
authority under the 1971 Act by holding that  there  was  no  illegality  or
error in clubbing the  adjoining  municipal  plots  and  private  plots  and
treating the same as a slum area and permitting slum  rehabilitation  scheme
for such slum area in aggregate as consent of 70% of the slum  dwellers  was
found existing.  In such a situation, we do not find merit in the  stand  of
the appellants that their writ petition should  have  been  allowed  on  the
ground that there was no Annexure II available for the private plots.
When in aggregate consent of 70% or more slum dwellers  has  been  obtained,
the essential purpose of slum rehabilitation scheme cannot be put  to  peril
on the ground that certain procedures were not  strictly  followed  or  some
steps were against procedures prescribed in the guidelines  for  preparation
of Annexure II in a prescribed format.  From  the  documents  submitted  and
shown at the stage of hearing it  has  been  noticed  that  even  subsequent
claims of some slum dwellers that they are eligible for rehabilitation  have
been verified and many have been allowed on the basis of relevant  documents
because it is not infrequent that at the time of one particular checking  or
verification some dwellers may be absent and might have gone to  some  other
place.  Clearly  the  process  of  preparation  of  the  list  described  as
Annexure II and its verification is meant to find out the claims of  genuine
slum  dwellers  who  may  be  eligible   for   benefits   under   the   slum
rehabilitation scheme.  Such beneficial provisions meant to  ameliorate  the
poor condition of slum dwellers, in  our  considered  view,  should  not  be
jettisoned only on technical grounds or procedural  infirmities  unless  the
persons coming to the court and seeking relief  through  writ  petition  are
able to show that they have suffered injustice or legal injury.
In the present case, the only legal injury to appellants as per  submissions
of Mr. Parikh is that if the private plots were  treated  as  separate  slum
area, the residents of these plots alone could have formed and  carried  out
development scheme through their own cooperative  society  and  gained  some
advantages including monetary.  Such a plea is too far-fetched to  establish
legal injury to the appellants who claim to be slum  dwellers  and  on  such
plea, in our considered view the appellants  could  not  have  been  granted
relief in writ jurisdiction which has been rightly denied  to  them,  albeit
for other reasons, after considering all their pleas on merits.
The only other substantial issue raised by Mr. Parikh that there could  have
been no clubbing of private  lands  with  municipal  lands  for  purpose  of
counting consent of 70% of the slum dwellers is also  found  to  be  without
any merits.  Mr. Divan rightly relied upon  DCR  of  1991  and  particularly
clause 1.15 of Appendix IV which clearly shows  that  70%  or  more  of  the
eligible hutment dwellers in a slum or pavement in a viable stretch  at  one
place can agree to join a rehabilitation scheme.  There is no merit  in  the
submission on behalf of the appellants that the clause "in a viable  stretch
at one place" should be read only in conjunction with  the  word  'pavement'
and not the word 'slum' although the use of the word 'or' between  slum  and
pavement clearly  shows  both  have  to  be  treated  at  same  footing  and
therefore both are qualified by the clause  "in  a  viable  stretch  at  one
place".  Clause 3.14 providing for  amalgamation/sub-division  of  plots  of
Appendix IV of the DCR 1991 also goes a long way to support  the  submission
that the  statutory  provisions  clearly  permit  natural  amalgamation/sub-
division of plots for the sanction of slum rehabilitation  project  as  well
as for planning of Floor Space Index (FSI) thereto.  Clause 7.7 and  7.8  in
the same Appendix D lend further support to the aforesaid arguments  of  Mr.
Divan.
Although it is not directly related to issues  under  consideration  already
noticed earlier, Mr. Sundaram has placed reliance on several  provisions  of
Appendix IV noted above which is part of  DCR  1991  to  highlight  that  in
respect of private plots the owner has been given a  recognition  and  role.
The relevant provisions to support  the  aforesaid  submission  are  in  the
introductory para 1 of Appendix IV as well as in  schedule  annexed  to  the
general  slum  rehabilitation  scheme  notified   by   the   Government   of
Maharashtra in the Gazette dated 09.04.1998.  The relevant  provisions  such
as 2(B) and 11(B) & (C) do show that the owner can  also  be  the  developer
for implementing slum rehabilitation scheme  and  before  carrying  out  the
redevelopment work of the slum located over private lands,  the  consent  of
owner is required otherwise in given circumstances the Government will  have
to acquire such land if slum rehabilitation scheme is to be implemented.
Mr.  Shishodia,  learned  senior  advocate  for  the   Slum   Rehabilitation
Authority also placed reliance upon Section 4 of  the  1971  Act  to  submit
that slum contemplated under the Act is over an area and not plot  and  that
the  plot  numbers  are  relevant  only   for   the   limited   purpose   of
identification of the area over which a slum  may  be  found  existing.   He
supported the submission of Mr. Divan by referring to clause  1.3  and  1.15
of Appendix IV of DCR 1991.  According to him, the use of the  term  "....in
the same plot as far as possible" in clause 1.3 supports the  interpretation
advanced by Mr. Divan to the expression "in a viable stretch at  one  place"
in clause 1.15 and these provisions, according to him, go  to  show  that  a
slum is not plot specific but area  specific  and  hence  there  is  nothing
wrong in the action of SRA in treating the  contiguous  area  comprising  of
municipal plots as well as private plots as a  slum  area  and  approving  a
slum rehabilitation scheme for the same after ascertaining that  consent  of
at least 70% of the residents of such slum area was available in  favour  of
the rehabilitation scheme.
In our considered view, the submissions advanced by Mr. Divan, Mr.  Sundaram
and Mr. Shishodia  deserve  to  be  accepted  as  having  merit.   Mr.  Atul
Chitale, learned senior advocate for the Municipal Corporation has  referred
to Section 159 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,  1966  for
showing that  it  vests  power  to  make  regulations  and,  therefore,  the
Development Control Regulations framed under such statutory  provision  have
to be followed by the concerned authorities and such  regulations  providing
for   eligibility   for   redevelopment   scheme,   definitions   of   slum,
qualification as slum area on account  of  being  censused  or  declared  as
such, their treatment as deemed slum rehabilitation  areas  etc.  cannot  be
ignored by the concerned authorities be it the Municipal Corporation or  the
SRA until a particular provision is challenged and found to be  ultra  vires
on account of lack of power to frame the regulations or  conflict  with  any
superior  law.   According  to  Mr.  Chitale,  in  the  present   case   the
authorities have acted in accordance with law and,  therefore,  neither  the
Committee nor the High Court found it fit to  interfere  with  the  approved
rehabilitation scheme which will benefit all the slum dwellers of  the  slum
area comprising of lands belonging to the Municipal Corporation as  well  as
private lands and for which consent of more than 70% of such  slum  dwellers
was found available after proper verification.
In view of discussions made above and on finding merit  in  the  submissions
advanced on behalf of respondents we record our  agreement  with  the  views
expressed by the High Court that there  is  no  illegality  in  clubbing  of
private land and Municipal Corporation land for declaring a contiguous  area
as a slum area for the purposes of approving a  slum  rehabilitation  scheme
for such area.  As discussed earlier, we find no merit in the submission  on
behalf of the appellants that the required  particulars  were  not  compiled
and were not available in the form of Annexure II for the private  lands  or
it led to illegality and  vitiated  the  approval  of  the  particular  slum
rehabilitation scheme for the slum area  in  question.   In  our  view,  the
authorities had verified  the  particulars  contained  in  Annexure  II  and
thereafter they were entitled to treat the entire slum  area  existing  over
private lands as well as Municipal Corporation lands as one  slum  area  and
since consent of 70% or more of slum dwellers of such  area  was  available,
the authorities did not commit any illegality so as to vitiate the grant  of
approval for slum development scheme in question.
The appellants have relied upon judgment of Bombay High Court  in  the  case
of Om Sai Darshan CHS v. State of Maharashtra  reported  in  2006(5)  All.MR
323 in support of the proposition stated in paragraph 15  of  that  judgment
that so far as grant of approval to Annexure  II  is  concerned,  the  power
vests in the competent authority and not in the SRA.  There  is  no  quarrel
with the  aforesaid  proposition.   In  this  case  the  facts  reveal  that
Annexure II was verified by the  competent  authority  and  it  found  after
verification that only 25% of the  slum  dwellers  over  private  plots  had
given their consent for the rehabilitation scheme.   The  opinion  regarding
adequacy of consent and its legal implications in the context  of  a  larger
slum area extending to private as well as municipal  lands  was  beyond  the
competence of the authority having power  to  verify  the  actual  state  of
affairs in respect of particulars  of  Annexure  II.   The  opinion  of  the
competent verifying or certifying authority that consent  was  only  of  25%
slum dwellers was based  upon  a  wrong  premise  that  the  slum  area  was
required to be divided in at least 2 parts,  based  upon  ownership  of  the
lands comprising the entire slum area.  This view was rightly  not  accepted
by the SRA.  When the entire slum area was  treated  as  one  slum  area  on
which more than 70% slum dwellers were found to have  given  their  consent,
there was no  legal  impediment  in  acting  upon  the  particulars  already
verified as per Annexure II available with the authorities.   Hence  in  the
facts of the case the judgment noted above does not help the appellants.
Mr. Parikh, has also placed reliance upon a judgment of this  Court  in  the
case of Pramila Suman Singh v. State of Maharashtra  (2009)  2  SCC  729  in
support of the proposition that a composite slum area could not be  declared
as such when it covered private  lands  as  well  as  Municipal  Corporation
lands.  The facts of  that  case  were  quite  different  and  as  noted  in
paragraph 29, the SRA had rejected the plan of the appellant  of  that  case
for as many as five reasons including the  reason  that  appellant  had  not
submitted proper Annexure II.  In paragraph 52 this Court had  recorded  its
satisfaction that the appellant had not annexed Annexure II  in  respect  of
concerned plot along with her original application and therefore this  Court
found no legal infirmity in the impugned order of  the  authority.   Clearly
the issue decided in that case was quite different and  hence  the  judgment
is not of any help to the appellants  in  this  case.   It  may  however  be
useful to note that in para 50 this Court made observations  to  the  effect
that (i) Annexure  II  may  not  have  any  statutory  force  as  it  was  a
requirement under the guidelines and (ii) a conformity with  the  guidelines
is required to be maintained unless the guidelines are  found  to  be  ultra
vires.  In the context of facts of the present  case  it  is  sufficient  to
observe that non statutory provisions can hardly  be  treated  as  mandatory
unless their non  observance  is  shown  to  have  caused  legal  injury  by
affecting some valuable  rights  of  the  writ  petitioners.   As  discussed
earlier no such case could be made out by the appellants so  as  to  require
interference  on  account  of  alleged  shortcomings   in   preparation   or
verification of Annexure II.
The written submissions raise some other minor issues  too  but  these  were
not raised before and decided by the High  Court.   Hence  we  refrain  from
going into such issues.  It is, however, necessary to  record  that  in  the
light of statutory provisions brought about through amendments in  the  1966
Act and in the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 and in  the  light  of
provisions of 1971 Act, the SRA was  competent  to  approve  the  Scheme  by
taking the required ancillary decisions.
In course of arguments, it has  been  shown  to  us  by  filing  details  of
petitioners/appellants that out of a total of 97, 60  are  eligible  and  33
non-eligible.  Name of 4 petitioners, i.e., 90, 91, 93 and  97  are  not  in
Annexure II to which several other persons have  been  added  after  further
verification of later claims, during the pendency  of  the  litigation.   It
has also been shown through a summary  that  pending  the  hearing  of  this
appeal, 26 appellants have settled their dispute and handed over  possession
of their respective structures.  The impugned judgment  of  the  High  Court
also records in paragraph 25 that out of a total of 443 slum  dwellers,  82%
slum dwellers had already given consent for redevelopment of  the  slum  and
redevelopment  is  going  on   by   allotment   of   permanent   alternative
accommodation to the slum dwellers.  Majority of occupants of the  municipal
plot as noted in the High Court judgment had vacated their  structures  long
back.  Photographs produced before us show that  redevelopment  activity  is
going on and permanent structures have come up on a large area.  Such  facts
also, in our  estimate,  were  rightly  considered  by  the  High  Court  as
relevant for dismissing the writ petitions.
In the result, we find no merit in the appeals and the  same  are  dismissed
but without any order as to costs.


.....................................J.
[M.Y. EQBAL]


.....................................J.
[SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
New Delhi.
April 01, 2015
-----------------------
29


JURISDICTION - Section 17 of SARFAESI Act - Private Treaty Agreement - specific performance of an agreement to sell - immovable property was situate in New Mumbai, Maharashtra. - Clause 9(e)(viii) of the Agreements :"Disputes, if any, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of Mumbai Court/Tribunals only" - Hence Calcutta High court has no jurisdiction - Mumbai court only has got jurisdiction - 2015 S.C. MSK LAW REPORTS




Whether the suit for specific performance filed by Excel  was  a  "suit  for
land"?
Whether the Private Treaty Agreement conferred an exclusive jurisdiction  on
the Court of Mumbai and if so, Whether or not ARCIL waived  this  clause  by
participating in impleadment application without protest?
Whether the jurisdiction of civil Court is barred in  the  present  case  by
virtue of Section 17 of SARFAESI Act?

The suit was effectively a "suit for land" and the  immovable  property  was
situate in New Mumbai, Maharashtra. 
Therefore, as per clause 12  of  Letters
Patent the suit should be filed in a Court having  territorial  jurisdiction
over the immovable property.
That the alleged Private  Treaty  Agreement  between  ARCIL  and  Excel  was
entered into pursuant to Section 13(4) of the  SARFAESI  Act  and  even  the
sale was to be conducted by execution of sale  certificate  as  provided  in
Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules,  2002  (hereinafter  referred  to  as
"Rules"). 
Therefore, the jurisdiction of civil court is excluded.
That the Private Treaty Agreement provided  that  Mumbai  Court  would  have
exclusive jurisdiction.
On the question of suit for specific performance of  an  agreement  to  sell
being a suit for land, this Court has laid down a clear principle  in  Adcon
Electronics Pvt. Ltd. vs. Daulat Ram and Anr., (2001)  7  SCC  698,  that  a
suit for specific performance simplicitor without a prayer for  delivery  of
possession is not a suit for land as Section 22 of the Specific Relief  Act,
1963 categorically bars any Court to grant such relief of  possession  in  a
suit for specific performance unless specifically sought
In  view  of  this
judgment, in the present case, the only question for  our  determination  in
the plaint is whether a prayer for delivery of possession is sought  or  not
? The prayer sought is issuance of sale certificate  which  is  provided  in
Appendix V to the Rules under SARFAESI Act. 
The sale  certificate  reads  as
follows:
"Whereas   the   undersigned   being   the   authorised   officer   of   the
............................   (name   of   the   institution)   under   the
Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial  Assets  and  Enforcement  of
Security Interest Act, 2002 and in exercise of the  powers  conferred  under
Section 13 read with Rule 12 of the  Security  Interest  Enforcement  Rules,
2002  sold  on  behalf  of  the  ...........................  (name  of  the
secured creditor/institution) in favour of the  ............................
(purchaser), the immoveable property shown in the schedule below secured  in
favour of the ............................ (name of  the  secured  creditor)
by  ........................  (the  names  of  the  borrowers)  towards  the
financial facility .............................  (description)  offered  by
.............................   (secured    creditor).    The    undersigned
acknowledge the receipt of the sale  price  in  full  and  handed  over  the
delivery  and  possession  of  the  scheduled  property.  The  sale  of  the
scheduled property was made free from all encumbrances known to the  secured
creditor listed below on deposit of the money demanded by the undersigned."


It may be noted that the sale certificate sought under the  prayer  requires
the delivery of possession of the suit property.  Thus,  we  find  that  the
prayer for delivery of possession was an implicit one in the  present  case.
The prayer as sought in the plaint could not have been granted  without  the
delivery of possession of the suit property as the sale  certificate  itself
contemplates the delivery of the immovable property.
 Thus, in view  of  this
we find that the Adcon Electronics would not apply as  there  was  a  prayer
for delivery of possession in the present case. Therefore, we hold that  the
present suit was indeed a suit for land.

Exclusive jurisdiction
Now, we shall consider as to which court has the jurisdiction  to  entertain
and try the suit. 
Clause  5  of  the  Agreement  entered  into  between  the
parties reads as under:

"The  payment/cheque  shall  be  drawn  and  made  payable  in  Mumbai.  The
jurisdiction shall be Courts of Mumbai."


Clause 9(e)(viii) of the Agreements further reads as follows:

"Disputes,  if  any,  shall  be  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of   Mumbai
Court/Tribunals only"

It is clear from these two clauses that the intention of the parties to  the
Agreement was to restrict limitation to the forums/courts  of  Mumbai  only.

This Court in Swastik Gases P. Ltd. vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,  (2013)
9 SCC 32, has held as under:

"The very existence of a jurisdiction  clause  in  an  agreement  makes  the
intention of the  parties  to  an  agreement  quite  clear  and  it  is  not
advisable to read such a clause in the agreement  like  a  statute.  In  the
present case, only the Courts in Kolkata had jurisdiction to  entertain  the
disputes between the parties."

Therefore,  we are of the opinion that the Courts  of  Mumbai  were  granted
exclusive jurisdiction as per the Agreement and we find no reason to  create
any exception to the intention of the parties.

In view of the above-mentioned two findings that the present suit is a  suit
for land, and that the parties had granted  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  the
Court of Mumbai, the jurisdiction  of  the  Court  at  Calcutta  is  clearly
ousted as per law. Thus, from the  above  conclusion  it  appears  that  the
plaint will have to be returned by the Calcutta High Court as  it  does  not
have the jurisdiction. 
Therefore, we are of the view that  the  question  of
jurisdiction  of  the  Debt  Recovery  Tribunal  need   not   be   answered.
Consequently, this appeal is dismissed. 
The parties may proceed to take  any
appropriate measure in an appropriate forum as provided in  law  to  enforce
their rights. - 2015 S.C. MSK LAWREPORTS

we fail to appreciate as to on what basis, the appellants can claim the compensation at the rate of Rs.100/- per sq. yard or more. In our view it was necessary for the appellants to have filed copies of the sale deed to prove the fair market rate prevailing on the date of acquisition (04.11.1977). Since the only evidence which was adduced was to prove the potentialities of the acquired land, the courts below took into account the potentialities and the rate of adjacent land fixed by the Courts and accordingly fixed the rate. We do not find any illegality in such approach of the courts below.




                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 7377 OF 2008


Bhupal Singh and Others                      Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS



State of Haryana                        Respondent(s)


                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 8635-8636 OF 2014
                     CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 8637-8638 OF 2014
                                     AND
                     CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6184-6185 OF 2010


                               J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1.     Civil Appeal No. 7377 of 2008  is  filed  against  the  judgment  and
order dated 19.10.2005 passed by the High Court of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at
Chandigarh in Regular First Appeal No. 363  of  1989  which  arises  out  of
order dated 21.11.1988 passed by the Additional District Judge Faridabad  in
Land Acquisition Case No. 15 of 1988.  Civil Appeal Nos. 8635-8636  of  2014
& 8637-8638 of 2014 are filed against the final judgment  and  orders  dated
07.05.2010 along  with  modified  orders  dated  23.07.2010  and  27.05.2010
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Regular First Appeal  Nos.
2214 of 2010 (O&M) and 2253 of 2010  (O&M)  respectively  whereby  the  High
Court disposed of both the R.F.As in terms of order dated 19.10.2005  passed
in R.F.A. No. 363 of 1989.    Civil Appeal Nos. 6184-6185 of 2010 are  filed
against the judgment and order  dated  20.10.2009  in  R.F.A.  No.  3165  of
1993(O&M) and Cross Objection Petition No. 85-CL of 2009.
2.    By impugned judgment/orders, the Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court
partly  allowed  the  first  appeals  filed   by   the   appellants   herein
(claimants/landowners) and enhanced the quantum of compensation  payable  to
the claimants at the rate of Rs.50/- per sq. yard  for  their  lands,  which
were acquired by the State under the Land Acquisition Act 1894  (hereinafter
referred to as  "The Act").  Dissatisfied with  the  judgment/orders  passed
by the High Court, the claimants/land owners have filed  these  appeals  for
enhancement of the compensation.
3.    The question  that  arises  for  consideration  in  these  appeals  is
whether the High Court was justified in partly allowing  the  appeals  filed
by the claimants/landowners by awarding compensation at the rate of  Rs.50/-
per sq. yard for their lands which were acquired by the State  or  the  rate
should have been more than Rs.50/- per sq. yard?
4.    In order to appreciate the controversy involved in these  appeals,  it
is necessary to state the relevant facts infra.
5.    The appellants are the owners of the  land  described  hereinbelow  in
relation to the appellants in the appeals:
(i)   Appellants in of C.A. No. 7377 of 2008  and  C.A.  Nos.  6184-6185  of
2010 are the owners of the land acquired in  village  Atmadpur  Hadbast  No.
127, Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Faridabad.  AND
(ii)  Appellants in C.A. Nos. 8635-8636 of 2014 and 8637-8638  of  2014  are
the owners of the land acquired  in village  Mawai,  Hadbast  Nos.  126   4,
Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Faridabad.

6.    In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 4 of  the  Act,  the
State Government issued a notification on 04.11.1977 and  acquired  a  large
chunk of land measuring 689  Kanals  and  17  Marlas  in  village  Atmadpur,
Hadbast  No.  127,  Tehsil  Ballabhgarh  District  Faridabad,  Haryana   (as
mentioned in Award No.13 of 1982-83 -filed as Annexure P-1 in C.A. No.  7377
of 2008), 66 Kanals 15 Marlas  and 149  Kanals  and  18  Marlas  in  Village
Mawai, Hadbast Nos. 126 &  4,  Tehsil  Ballabgarh,  District  Faridabad  (as
mentioned in Award No.12 of 1982-83  &  Award  No.  1  of  1984-85-filed  as
Annexures P-1 & P-3 respectively in C.A. Nos. 8635-36 of  2014  &  8637-8638
of 2014) and 445 Kanals 12 Marlas  in village  Atmadpur,  Hadbast  No.  127,
Tehsil Ballabhgarh District Faridabad, Haryana (as mentioned in Award  dated
06.04.1989 passed by the reference  Court  of  Land  Acquisition  Collector-
filed as Annexure P-1 in C.A. Nos.  6184-85  of  2010)  for  development  of
residential colonies for the  public  at  large.  It  was  followed  by  the
declaration published  on  01.11.1980  under  Section  6  of  the  Act.  The
aforementioned land belonging to the appellants was also  acquired  pursuant
to these notifications.
7.    This led  to  initiation  of  the  proceedings  for  determination  of
compensation payable to  each  of  the  landowners  including  that  of  the
appellants herein by the Land Acquisition Officer  (in  short  "the   LAO").
Under Section 9 of the Act, notices were issued to  the  appellants  calling
upon them to participate in the land acquisition proceedings to  enable  the
LAO to determine the  fair  market  value  of  the  lands  on  the  date  of
acquisition  as  provided  under  Section  23  of  the  Act  so   that   the
compensation would be paid to the  land  owners  at  such  determined  rate.
Accordingly, the LAO held an enquiry and after affording an  opportunity  to
the appellants passed award  dated  18.11.1982  and  02.05.1984  fixing  the
compensation @ Rs.16.52 per square yard being the fair market value  of  the
acquired land payable to the appellants.
8.    Feeling aggrieved by the said awards, the appellants sought  reference
to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act for re-determination  of  the
compensation made by the LAO. The reference  Court,  on  the  basis  of  the
evidence adduced, partly answered the reference in favour of the  appellants
and accordingly enhanced the rate of compensation from Rs.16.52  per  square
yard to Rs.22/- per square yard. In other words, the  Reference  Court  held
that the appellants were entitled to get compensation  for  their  lands  at
the rate of Rs.22/-  per square yard being the fair market  value  of  their
lands on the date of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act.
9.    Dissatisfied with the determination made by the reference  Court,  the
appellants filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the  High  Court
and challenged the legality and correctness of the award  of  the  Reference
Court out of which these appeals arise.
10.   The Division Bench of the High  Court,  by  impugned  judgment/orders,
partly allowed the appeals filed by the appellants and accordingly  enhanced
the compensation payable to the appellants.  The High Court  held  that  the
fair market value/rate of the acquired lands on the date of acquisition  for
the appellants' land was  Rs.50/- per square yard and hence  the  appellants
were entitled to get the compensation for their acquired lands at  the  rate
of Rs.50/- per square yard  along  with  other  statutory  benefits  payable
under   the   Act.   It    is    against    these    judgment/orders,    the
claimants/landowners have filed  these  appeals  by  way  of  special  leave
before this Court.
11.   Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
12.    Shri  Nidhesh  Gupta,  learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for   the
appellants placing reliance on decisions in   Haji  Mohd.  Ekramul  Haq  vs.
State of W.B. 1959 Supp(1) SCR 922, State of Kerala  vs.  P.P.  Hassan  Koya
(1968) 3 SCR 459, Bhag Singh & Ors. vs. UT of Chandigarh (1985) 3  SCC  737,
Municipal Committee, Bhatinda & Ors. vs. Balwant Singh  (1995)  5  SCC  433,
Union of India & Ors. vs. Mangatu Ram & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 59, V.  Hanumantha
Reddy vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal R. Officer (2003)  12  SCC  642,
General Manager, ONGC Ltd. Vs. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel & Anr.  (2008)  14
SCC 745, Maharunnisa vs. Commissioner & Land  Acquisition  Officer,  Bijapur
(2009) 9  SCC  750,  Chandrashekhar  &  Ors.  vs.  Additional  Special  Land
Acquisition Officer, (2009) 14 SCC  441,  Valliyammal  &  Anr.  vs.  Special
Tehsildar (Land Acquisition) & Anr., (2011) 8 SCC 91,  Chandrashekar  (Dead)
by L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr.,  (2012)  1  SCC  390,
Salaha Begaum & Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition  Officer,  (2013)  11  SCC
426 and Digamber & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2013) 14 SCC  406,
contended that the High Court having  rightly  held  in  appellants'  favour
that a case for enhancement in payment  of  compensation  for  the  acquired
land is made out, erred in enhancing the compensation  only  @  Rs.50/-  per
square yard.  According to the learned senior counsel, having regard to  the
nature of the potentiality of the use of the lands which was duly proved  by
the appellants by adducing evidence and rightly recognized by the Courts  in
appellants' favour by returning finding on this issue, the  appellants  were
entitled to claim enhancement  in  the  compensation  at  the  rate  ranging
between Rs.100/- per square yard to Rs.200/- per square  yard  in  place  of
Rs.50/- per square yard. Learned senior counsel  pointed  out  that  several
acres of lands situated near the acquired lands in  question  were  acquired
by the State  Government  between  the  years  1980  to  1989-1990  and  for
acquisition of these lands, the State Government paid compensation to  their
landowners @ Rs.300/- to Rs.325/- per square yard pursuant to orders of  the
Courts.  Learned senior counsel, therefore,  contended  that  if  Rs.300/-to
Rs.325/- is taken to be the rate of the  similarly  situated  lands  in  the
year 1989-1990 and if 10% is reduced  retrospectively  on  yearly  basis  of
Rs.300/-to Rs.325/-, then in such event, the fair market value of the  lands
in question prevailing in the year 1977,  i.e.,  the  year  of  acquisition,
could safely be determined between Rs.100/- to  Rs.200/-  per  square  yard.
Lastly and in the alternative, learned senior counsel contended that in  any
event, the High Court having rightly held that the appellants were  entitled
to claim compensation at the enhanced rate of Rs.63/- per square yard  erred
in eventually awarding compensation at the rate of Rs.50/- per  square  yard
without there being any basis. According to him,  the  appellants  therefore
were entitled to get the compensation at the enhanced rate  of  Rs.63/-  per
square yard instead of Rs. 50/- per square yard on the basis of  finding  of
the High Court.
13.   In contra, learned Counsel for the  respondent-  State  supported  the
impugned judgment and contended that no case is made out on facts or/and  in
law to call for any interference  in  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High
Court. Learned counsel while refuting the contention of  Mr.  Nidesh  Gupta,
learned senior counsel appearing for  the  appellants,  contended  that  the
fair market value of the lands in  question  cannot  be  determined  in  the
manner suggested by Mr. Gupta.   According  to  him,  firstly  in  order  to
determine the fair market value of the  acquired  land,  as  provided  under
Section 23 of the Act, one is required to take into account  the  prevailing
market rate of the similarly situated lands in nearby area of  the  acquired
land on the date of the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the  Act
but in no case the rate of the lands either sold or acquired  subsequent  to
the date of issuance of the notification  in  question  can  be  taken  into
consideration.  Learned  counsel  pointed  out  that  the  appellants  never
claimed compensation at the rate of Rs.200/- per square yard  as  was  urged
before this Court for the first time and hence at best the appellants  could
be considered for award of compensation at the rate of  Rs.63/-  per  square
yard but not beyond this rate.

14.   Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties  and  on  perusal  of
the record of the case, we find force in the alternative submission  of  the
learned senior counsel for the appellants  mentioned  above  and  hence  are
inclined to allow these appeals in part and accordingly modify the  impugned
award in  favour  of  the  appellants  to  the  extent  indicated  below  by
enhancing the rate of the  land  per  square  yard  for  re-determining  the
payment of the compensation and other statutory benefits payable  under  the
Act to the appellants.

15.   Law on the question as to how the Court is required to  determine  the
fair market value of the acquired land is fairly  well  settled  by  several
decisions of this Court and remains no more res  integra.  This  Court  has,
inter  alia,  held  that  when  the  acquired  land  is  a  large  chunk  of
undeveloped land having potential and was acquired for  residential  purpose
then while determining the fair market value of the lands  on  the  date  of
acquisition, the appropriate deductions are also required to be made.
16.   It is apposite to take note of some of the decisions of this Court  on
the issue relevant for the disposal of these appeals:
(i)   In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha & Ors.  v.  Amritsar  Improvement  Trust  &
Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 419, this  Court  opined  that  where  a  large  area  of
undeveloped land is  acquired,  provision  has  to  be  made  for  providing
minimum amenities of town life. Accordingly, it was held  that  a  deduction
of 20% of the total acquired  land  should  be  made  for  land  over  which
infrastructure has to be raised (space for roads,  etc.).   Apart  from  the
aforesaid, it was also held that the cost of raising  infrastructure  itself
(like roads, electricity, water, underground drainage, etc.) needs  also  to
be taken into  consideration.  To  cover  the  cost  component  for  raising
infrastructure, the Court held that the deduction to be applied would  range
between 20% to 33%. Commutatively  viewed,  it  was  held,  that  deductions
would range between 40% and 53%.
(ii)  In Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition  Officer,  Poona
& Anr. (1988) 3 SCC 751 while referring to the factors  which  ought  to  be
taken into consideration while determining the market value of the  acquired
land, it was observed that a smaller plot  was  within  the  reach  of  many
whereas for a larger block of land there were implicit disadvantages.  As  a
matter of illustration, it was mentioned that a large block  of  land  would
first have to be developed by preparing  its  layout  plan.  Thereafter,  it
would require carving out roads, leaving open spaces, plotting  out  smaller
plots, waiting for purchasers (during which the invested money would  remain
blocked). Likewise, it was pointed out  that  there  would  be  other  known
hazards  of  an   [pic]entrepreneur.   Based   on   the   aforesaid   likely
disadvantages it was held that these factors could be discounted  by  making
deductions by way of allowance at an appropriate rate ranging  from  20%  to
50%. These deductions, according  to  the  Court,  would  account  for  land
required to be set apart for developmental activities. It  was  also  sought
to be clarified that the applied deduction  would  depend  on,  whether  the
acquired land was rural or urban, whether building activity was  picking  up
or was stagnant, whether the waiting period during which the  capital  would
remain locked would  be  short  or  long;  and  other  like  entrepreneurial
hazards.
(iii) In Kasturi & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC  354,  this  Court
opined that in respect of agricultural land or undeveloped  land  which  has
potential value for housing or commercial purposes,  normally  1/3rd  amount
of compensation should be deducted depending upon the  location,  extent  of
expenditure involved for development, the area required for roads and  other
civic amenities, etc. It was also opined that appropriate  deductions  could
be made for making plots for residential and  commercial  purposes.  It  was
sought to be explained that the acquired land may be plain  or  uneven,  the
soil of the acquired land may be soft or hard, the acquired land may have  a
hillock or may be low-lying or may have deep ditches.  Accordingly,  it  was
pointed out that expenses involved for development  would  vary  keeping  in
mind the facts and circumstances of each case. In Kasturi case, it was  held
that normal deductions on account of  development  would  be  1/3rd  of  the
amount of compensation. It was, however, clarified that in  some  cases  the
deduction could be more than  1/3rd in other cases even less than 1/3rd.
(iv)  In Lal Chand v. Union of India & Anr., (2009) 15 SCC 769, it was  held
that to  determine  the  market  value  of  a  large  tract  of  undeveloped
agricultural land (with potential for development), with reference  to  sale
price of small developed plot(s), deductions varying between 20% to  75%  of
the price of such developed plot(s) could be made.
(v)   In A.P. Housing Board v. K. Manohar Reddy & Ors., (2010) 12  SCC  707,
having examined the existing case law on the point  it  was  concluded  that
deductions on account of development could vary between 20% to 75%.  In  the
peculiar facts of  the  case,  a  deduction  of  1/3rd  towards  development
charges was made from the  awarded  amount  to  determine  the  compensation
payable.
(vi)  In Special Land Acquisition  Officer  &  Anr.  v.  M.K.  Rafiq  Saheb,
(2011) 7 SCC 714, this Court after having concluded that the land which  was
the  subject-matter  of  acquisition  was  not  agricultural  land  for  all
practical purposes and no agricultural activities could be  carried  out  on
it, concluded that in order [pic]to determine fair compensation, based on  a
sale transaction of a small piece of developed  land  (though  the  acquired
land was a large chunk), the deduction made by the High Court at 50%,  ought
to be increased to 60%.
17.   After taking note of the aforesaid cases  and  placing  reliance  upon
the principles laid down therein, this Court in  Chandrashekar  and  Others,
(supra) observed as under:
"It is essential to earmark appropriate deductions out of the  market  value
of an exemplar land, for each of the two components referred to above.  This
would be the first step towards balancing  the  differential  factors.  This
would pave the way for determining  the  market  value  of  the  undeveloped
acquired land on the basis of market value of the developed exemplar land.

As far back as in 1982, this Court in Brig. Sahib  Singh  Kalha  case  held,
that the permissible deduction could  be  up  to  53%.  This  deduction  was
divided by  the  Court  into  two  components.  For  the  "first  component"
referred to in the foregoing paragraph, it was held that a deduction of  20%
should be made. For the "second component", it was held that  the  deduction
could range between 20% to 33%. It is therefore apparent  that  a  deduction
of up to 53% was the norm laid down by the Court as far  back  as  in  1982.
The aforesaid norm remained unchanged for a  long  duration  of  time,  even
though, keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances  emerging  from
case to case, different deductions were applied by  this  Court  to  balance
the differential factors between the exemplar land and  the  acquired  land.
Recently however, this Court has approved a higher component of deduction.

In 2009 in Lal Chand case and in 2010 in A.P.  Housing  Board  case  it  has
been held that while applying the sale consideration of  a  small  piece  of
developed  land,  to  determine  the  market  value  of  a  large  tract  of
undeveloped acquired land, deductions between 20% to 75% could be made.  But
in 2009 in Subh Ram case, this Court restricted  deductions  on  account  of
the "first component" of development, as also, on  account  of  the  "second
component" of development  to  33%  each.  The  aforesaid  deductions  would
roughly amount to 67% of the component of  the  sale  consideration  of  the
exemplar sale transaction(s)."


18.   Keeping  the  aforesaid  principles  in  mind,  we  have  perused  the
evidence in these cases. It is not in dispute that the acquisition  of  land
in question was made in the year 1977 and  it  was  for  a  large  chunk  of
undeveloped agriculture land.  It is also not in dispute  that  it  was  for
construction of "residential purpose". It is further  not  in  dispute  that
the appellants did not file any sale deed in evidence in  support  of  their
case to prove the fair market value of the  acquired  land.  All  that  they
adduced was an oral evidence of some witnesses to prove the potentiality  of
the lands by showing its location, proximity to  the  main  road  which  was
passing in the area and named some industries  and  hospitals  operating  in
the nearby areas of the acquired lands etc.
19.   Taking all these factors in mind and  on  appreciation  of  this  oral
evidence,  the  LAO,  Reference  Court  and  the  High  Court  fixed   their
respective rates as mentioned above, namely, Rs.16.52, Rs.22/- and Rs.  50/-
per Square yard.
20.   As rightly argued by learned senior counsel for the appellants, it  is
not in dispute that the High Court did hold in appellants' favour that  they
were entitled to claim compensation at the rate of Rs.63/- per  Square  yard
in the concluding para of the impugned judgment  basing  its  finding  after
taking into consideration  the  potentialities  of  land  and  rate  of  one
adjacent land of the acquired  land  which  was  also  found  to  have  been
acquired at the same time as determined by the Courts.
21.   In the light of this finding, we fail to  appreciate  as  to  why  the
High Court then assessed the rate at Rs.50/- per square  yard  in  place  of
Rs.63/- per sq. yard. In other words, having rightly come  to  a  conclusion
that the fair  market  value  of  the  land  in  question  on  the  date  of
acquisition  (04.11.1977)  was  Rs.63/-  per  square  yard,  there  was   no
justification on the part of the High Court to have then reduced it  to  any
rate less than Rs.63/- much  less  to  Rs.50/-   per  square  yard.  In  our
considered view, it should have been  fixed  at  Rs.63/-   per  square  yard
only.
22.   We have also given  our  anxious  consideration  to  the  whole  issue
keeping in view the peculiar facts, evidence  adduced  and  the  law  quoted
above for determining the fair market value of  the  land  on  the  date  of
notification (04.11.1977). Having regard  to  the  total  scenario  emerging
from the record of the case and the findings recorded by  the  Courts  below
on the issues such as location of land, its potentiality, surroundings,  the
rate of the adjacent land determined by the Courts,  the  condition  of  the
acquired underdeveloped lands,  the  expenditure  required  to  develop  the
acquired land to start the activities, per cent of deductions  to  be  made,
its proximity to the various places in  the  nearby  town  (Faridabad),  and
lastly, the fact that the appellants failed to file any  sale  deed  of  any
parcel of land (be that of small piece of land or  big)  sold  in  the  near
proximity of the acquired land, the  fair  market  value  of  the  lands  in
question as on 04.11.1977 (date of acquisition)  can  reasonably  be  worked
out to  "Rs.63/- per Square Yard".    In  other  words,  in  our  considered
opinion, the High Court was not right in determining the  fair  market  rate
of the acquired land at Rs.50/- per Square yard and instead it  should  have
determined the fair market rate of the acquired land in question at "Rs.63/-
 per Square Yard".  We accordingly now fix it.
23.   We are not impressed by the submission of learned senior  counsel  for
the appellant when he submitted that we should take into  consideration  the
fair market value of the adjacent land determined by  the  Court  which  was
acquired 10 years subsequent to the acquisition  in  question  in  1989-1990
and then go on reducing its value 10%  every  year  to  determine  the  fair
market value of the land in question. To say the least, this  submission  is
wholly misconceived being against the settled principle of law  relating  to
land acquisition cases.
24.   As rightly argued by learned counsel  for  the  respondent,  the  fair
market value of the  acquired  land  is  required  to  be  determined  under
Section 23 of the Act on the basis of the market rate of the adjacent  lands
similarly  situated  to  the  acquired  lands  prevailing  on  the  date  of
acquisition or/and prior to acquisition but not subsequent to  the  date  of
acquisition. In appropriate cases, addition of 10% per annum  escalation  in
the prices specified in the sale deeds (if filed and relied on) in  relation
to adjacent similarly situated lands for fixing  the  market  value  of  the
acquired land may be permitted.  Such is, however, not  the  case  in  hand.
Here is the case where firstly, no sale deeds were filed by  the  appellants
to prove the fair market value of the acquired land and secondly, what  they
now want this Court to do is to take into consideration the  rate  of  those
lands which were acquired  ten  years  after  the  date  of  acquisition  in
question and then reduce the value of such land by 10% every year so  as  to
determine the fair market value of the acquired land  in  question.  In  our
view, such procedure for determination is not provided in the Act.
25.   We also cannot accept the submission of the learned  counsel  for  the
appellants when he contended that  the  appellants  are  entitled  to  claim
compensation at the rate ranging between Rs.100/- to Rs.200/- per sq.  yard.
 As observed supra, since the appellants failed to file  any  sale  deed  of
the lands to prove the price of the lands prevailing at  the  relevant  time
(04.11.1977), we fail to appreciate as to on what basis, the appellants  can
claim the compensation at the rate of Rs.100/- per sq.  yard  or  more.   In
our view it was necessary for the appellants to have  filed  copies  of  the
sale deed  to  prove  the  fair  market  rate  prevailing  on  the  date  of
acquisition (04.11.1977).  Since the only evidence which was adduced was  to
prove the potentialities of the acquired land, the courts  below  took  into
account the potentialities and the  rate  of  adjacent  land  fixed  by  the
Courts and accordingly fixed the rate.  We do not  find  any  illegality  in
such approach of the courts below.
26.   We have arrived  at  the  figure  of  "Rs.63/-  per  sq.  yard"  after
applying all relevant factors, which we have mentioned above.  In our  view,
the rate determined by this Court is just, reasonable  and  represents  fair
market value of the lands in question on the date of  acquisition.   Indeed,
in such cases, one can never come to any exact  figure  of  price  of  lands
because in the very nature of things, the prices  are  bound  to  vary  from
land to land and further they also  depend  upon  the  individual  buyer-to-
buyer,  seller-to-seller  and  the  reasons  which  led  to  such  sale  and
purchase.  However, Courts in such cases always  exercise  their  discretion
within the permissible parameters after  appreciating  the  entire  evidence
brought on record and applying the relevant legal principles. We  have  kept
these factors in mind.
27.   In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals filed by the  appellants-
landowners deserve to be allowed and are accordingly allowed in  part.   The
impugned  judgment  and  orders  are  accordingly  modified  to  the  extent
indicated above.
28.   The concerned LAO is directed to calculate  the  compensation  payable
to the appellants  (land  owners)  for  their  acquired  lands  pursuant  to
notification issued under Section 4 of the Act on 04.11.1977  "at  the  rate
of  Rs.63/-  per  sq.  yard"  and  accordingly   calculate   all   statutory
compensation such as solatium, interest etc. payable under the Act to  every
land owner.
29.   Let this calculation be made, as directed above, by the  LAO  and  the
amount so calculated and worked out be paid to the appellants (land  owners)
after making proper verification of their claim cases  within  three  months
from the date of receipt of this judgment.  No costs.

                       .............................................J.
                             [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]


               ..............................................J.
                             [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]


      New Delhi;
      April 01, 2015.

-----------------------
31


Section 80HHC of income tax Act -when not applies - when the assessment admittedly had not earned any profits from the export of the Marine products. and On the other hand, when it had suffered a loss. - The deduction permissible under Section 80HHC is only a deduction of the profits of the assessee from the export of the goods or merchandise. - By the very terms of Section 80HHC, it is clear that the assessee was not entitled to any benefit thereunder in the absence of any profits. - 2015 SC msklawreports



What is the correct method  of  computation  of  deductions
under Section 80HHC(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the given  facts  and
circumstances,
 Finance Act of 1983 introduced Section 80HHC of the  Income
Tax Act, providing  incentives  to  exporters  and  deductions  for  persons
involved in the export business.
Section 80HHC(3)(b) provided  the  formula
for the computation of deduction  for  persons  who  do  not  have  business
exclusively of export out of India, that is  to  say,  in  cases  where  the
assessee is having turnover and income from  business in India  as  well  as
from the export business.
 On 05.07.1990,  the  Central  Board  of  Direct  Taxes  (CBDT)  issued
Circular No.564 dated 05.07.1990 giving detailed guidelines as  to  how  the
deductions  under  Section  80HHC  are  to  be  calculated.  
 The   formula prescribed by CBDT circular is as follows:
|Profit of the       |X   |Export Turnover     |
|Business            |    |                    |
|                    |    |Total Turnover      |


the Assessing Officer passed fresh order  dated  28.05.1992
giving effect to the orders of the  ITAT.  
While  giving  the  effect,  the
Assessing Officer found that the appellant had not earned any  profits  from
the export of Marine products and in fact, from the  said  export  business,
it had suffered a loss.
Therefore, according to the Assessing  Officer,  as
per Section 80AB, the deduction under Section 80HHC  could  not  exceed  the
amount of income included in the total income.
He found that as the  income
from export of Marine product business was in the negative i.e. there was  a
loss, the deduction  under  Section  80HHC  would  be  nil,  even  when  the
assessee is entitled to deduction  under  the  said  provision.

 "Whether on the facts and  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the
Tribunal was right in law in holding that the deduction  admissible  to  the
assessee under Section 80HHC is nil?"


  The High Court has now pronounced on the aforesaid  question  referred
to it by the impugned judgment  dated  20.08.2002  answering  this  question
against the assessee holding as under:
      "5.  In this case,  the  assessment  admittedly  had  not  earned  any
profits from the export of the Marine products.  On the other hand,  it  had
suffered a loss.  The deduction permissible under Section 80HHC  is  only  a
deduction of the profits of the assessee from the export  of  the  goods  or
merchandise.  By the very terms of Section  80HHC,  it  is  clear  that  the
assessee was not entitled to any benefit thereunder in the  absence  of  any
profits.

            The question referred to us therefore is  answered  against  the
assessee and in favour of the revenue."
Apex court held that

Therefore, we are of the opinion that  the  view  taken  by  the  High
Court is correct on the facts of this case. With  this,  there  may  not  be
need to  answer  the  second  facet  of  the  problem  as  the  question  of
computation of deduction does not arise. However, we find  that  even  here,
the approach of the ITAT is correct.
   In the present case, the domestic income in respect of  which  benefit
is sought is from dividend  income,  interest  income,  profit  or  sale  of
shares and fees received from arranging finance for the assessee's  clients.
 The Tribunal has recorded this aspect as under:
      13.  It is, however, seen from the assessee's Profit  &  Loss  Account
for the year of account ending on  31.03.1989  that  the  aggregate  sum  of
Rs.26,04,477 (which the assessee has labeled as  total  turnover)  comprised
not only export turnover of Rs.16,67,084 but also the following items  which
cannot properly be regarded as turnover:

|(1)  |Brokerage received for arranging  |:|Rs.8,50,321|
|     |Finance for the assessee's claims | |           |
|(2)  |Dividend                          |:|Rs.        |
|     |                                  | |5,247      |
|(3)  |Interest                          |:|Rs.        |
|     |                                  | |7,212      |
|(4)  |Profit on sale of shares          |:|Rs.        |
|     |                                  | |74,913     |
|     |                                  | |Rs.9,37,693|

The  Tribunal  observed  that  aforesaid  four   items   are   income
simplicitor and cannot  be  covered  by  the  expression  "total  turnover".
Following discussion of the Tribunal in this behalf needs to be quoted:

       "17.   Now  the  mode  and  mechanics  of  computing  the   deduction
admissible  to  an  assessee  falling  under  Section  80HHC(3)(b)   clearly
proceeds on the basis that in trading transactions profit, or, as  the  case
may be, loss is embedded  in  the  gross  turnover.   The  most  significant
conclusion that flows from the said provision is that when Section  80HHC(3)
talks of turnover, it talks of trading receipts and not  of  receipts  which
are of the nature of income to start with.   It  should,  therefore,  follow
that the  aggregate  sum  of  Rs.9,37,693/-  referred  to  supra  cannot  be
regarded as turnover, and that by the same token, it should be left  out  of
reckoning for purposes of computing deduction  admissible  to  the  assessee
under Section 80HHC.  If this exercise is done, we are back  to  Proposition
No.1.  This would mean that the deduction admissible to the  assessee  under
Section 80HHC would be nil, especially in view of the fact that  the  export
business of the assessee has resulted in a loss.

                          xx          xx         xx

 But a manufacturer may not invariably  be  able  to  export,  in  their
entirety, the goods or merchandise manufactured.  He may export  a  part  of
them and sell the rest in India.  Given the paramount need  to  give  fillip
to exports, Parliament clearly intended that the benefit  of  Section  80HHC
should not be denied in such cases.  But the difficulty  in  such  cases  is
that  the  profits  attributable  to  exports  cannot  be   ascertain   with
precision.  This is because not only the manufacturing activities  but  also
the selling activities (including the  activities  connected  with  exports)
from a continuous, integrated whole.  Even so, the intention of  Parliament,
was to extend the benefit of Section 80HHC to  the  extent  of  the  profits
generated by exports.  With this end  in  view,  Parliament  incorporated  a
rule of thumb in Section 80HHC(3)(b).  As long as the assessee  has  cleared
profits in a particular year of account,  export  profits  are  computed  by
applying to total profits the ratio which export  turnover  bears  to  total
turnover."
We  are  in  agreement  with  the  aforesaid  view  of  the  Tribunal.
Therefore, even otherwise, the formula  as  sought  to  be  applied  by  the
appellant does not become applicable on the facts of this case.
Thus, from every angle the matter is to be  looked  into,  the  appeal
lacks merit.  Same is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. - 2015 SC msklawreports