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Wednesday, April 8, 2015

we fail to appreciate as to on what basis, the appellants can claim the compensation at the rate of Rs.100/- per sq. yard or more. In our view it was necessary for the appellants to have filed copies of the sale deed to prove the fair market rate prevailing on the date of acquisition (04.11.1977). Since the only evidence which was adduced was to prove the potentialities of the acquired land, the courts below took into account the potentialities and the rate of adjacent land fixed by the Courts and accordingly fixed the rate. We do not find any illegality in such approach of the courts below.




                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 7377 OF 2008


Bhupal Singh and Others                      Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS



State of Haryana                        Respondent(s)


                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 8635-8636 OF 2014
                     CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 8637-8638 OF 2014
                                     AND
                     CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6184-6185 OF 2010


                               J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1.     Civil Appeal No. 7377 of 2008  is  filed  against  the  judgment  and
order dated 19.10.2005 passed by the High Court of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at
Chandigarh in Regular First Appeal No. 363  of  1989  which  arises  out  of
order dated 21.11.1988 passed by the Additional District Judge Faridabad  in
Land Acquisition Case No. 15 of 1988.  Civil Appeal Nos. 8635-8636  of  2014
& 8637-8638 of 2014 are filed against the final judgment  and  orders  dated
07.05.2010 along  with  modified  orders  dated  23.07.2010  and  27.05.2010
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Regular First Appeal  Nos.
2214 of 2010 (O&M) and 2253 of 2010  (O&M)  respectively  whereby  the  High
Court disposed of both the R.F.As in terms of order dated 19.10.2005  passed
in R.F.A. No. 363 of 1989.    Civil Appeal Nos. 6184-6185 of 2010 are  filed
against the judgment and order  dated  20.10.2009  in  R.F.A.  No.  3165  of
1993(O&M) and Cross Objection Petition No. 85-CL of 2009.
2.    By impugned judgment/orders, the Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court
partly  allowed  the  first  appeals  filed   by   the   appellants   herein
(claimants/landowners) and enhanced the quantum of compensation  payable  to
the claimants at the rate of Rs.50/- per sq. yard  for  their  lands,  which
were acquired by the State under the Land Acquisition Act 1894  (hereinafter
referred to as  "The Act").  Dissatisfied with  the  judgment/orders  passed
by the High Court, the claimants/land owners have filed  these  appeals  for
enhancement of the compensation.
3.    The question  that  arises  for  consideration  in  these  appeals  is
whether the High Court was justified in partly allowing  the  appeals  filed
by the claimants/landowners by awarding compensation at the rate of  Rs.50/-
per sq. yard for their lands which were acquired by the State  or  the  rate
should have been more than Rs.50/- per sq. yard?
4.    In order to appreciate the controversy involved in these  appeals,  it
is necessary to state the relevant facts infra.
5.    The appellants are the owners of the  land  described  hereinbelow  in
relation to the appellants in the appeals:
(i)   Appellants in of C.A. No. 7377 of 2008  and  C.A.  Nos.  6184-6185  of
2010 are the owners of the land acquired in  village  Atmadpur  Hadbast  No.
127, Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Faridabad.  AND
(ii)  Appellants in C.A. Nos. 8635-8636 of 2014 and 8637-8638  of  2014  are
the owners of the land acquired  in village  Mawai,  Hadbast  Nos.  126   4,
Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Faridabad.

6.    In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 4 of  the  Act,  the
State Government issued a notification on 04.11.1977 and  acquired  a  large
chunk of land measuring 689  Kanals  and  17  Marlas  in  village  Atmadpur,
Hadbast  No.  127,  Tehsil  Ballabhgarh  District  Faridabad,  Haryana   (as
mentioned in Award No.13 of 1982-83 -filed as Annexure P-1 in C.A. No.  7377
of 2008), 66 Kanals 15 Marlas  and 149  Kanals  and  18  Marlas  in  Village
Mawai, Hadbast Nos. 126 &  4,  Tehsil  Ballabgarh,  District  Faridabad  (as
mentioned in Award No.12 of 1982-83  &  Award  No.  1  of  1984-85-filed  as
Annexures P-1 & P-3 respectively in C.A. Nos. 8635-36 of  2014  &  8637-8638
of 2014) and 445 Kanals 12 Marlas  in village  Atmadpur,  Hadbast  No.  127,
Tehsil Ballabhgarh District Faridabad, Haryana (as mentioned in Award  dated
06.04.1989 passed by the reference  Court  of  Land  Acquisition  Collector-
filed as Annexure P-1 in C.A. Nos.  6184-85  of  2010)  for  development  of
residential colonies for the  public  at  large.  It  was  followed  by  the
declaration published  on  01.11.1980  under  Section  6  of  the  Act.  The
aforementioned land belonging to the appellants was also  acquired  pursuant
to these notifications.
7.    This led  to  initiation  of  the  proceedings  for  determination  of
compensation payable to  each  of  the  landowners  including  that  of  the
appellants herein by the Land Acquisition Officer  (in  short  "the   LAO").
Under Section 9 of the Act, notices were issued to  the  appellants  calling
upon them to participate in the land acquisition proceedings to  enable  the
LAO to determine the  fair  market  value  of  the  lands  on  the  date  of
acquisition  as  provided  under  Section  23  of  the  Act  so   that   the
compensation would be paid to the  land  owners  at  such  determined  rate.
Accordingly, the LAO held an enquiry and after affording an  opportunity  to
the appellants passed award  dated  18.11.1982  and  02.05.1984  fixing  the
compensation @ Rs.16.52 per square yard being the fair market value  of  the
acquired land payable to the appellants.
8.    Feeling aggrieved by the said awards, the appellants sought  reference
to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act for re-determination  of  the
compensation made by the LAO. The reference  Court,  on  the  basis  of  the
evidence adduced, partly answered the reference in favour of the  appellants
and accordingly enhanced the rate of compensation from Rs.16.52  per  square
yard to Rs.22/- per square yard. In other words, the  Reference  Court  held
that the appellants were entitled to get compensation  for  their  lands  at
the rate of Rs.22/-  per square yard being the fair market  value  of  their
lands on the date of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act.
9.    Dissatisfied with the determination made by the reference  Court,  the
appellants filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the  High  Court
and challenged the legality and correctness of the award  of  the  Reference
Court out of which these appeals arise.
10.   The Division Bench of the High  Court,  by  impugned  judgment/orders,
partly allowed the appeals filed by the appellants and accordingly  enhanced
the compensation payable to the appellants.  The High Court  held  that  the
fair market value/rate of the acquired lands on the date of acquisition  for
the appellants' land was  Rs.50/- per square yard and hence  the  appellants
were entitled to get the compensation for their acquired lands at  the  rate
of Rs.50/- per square yard  along  with  other  statutory  benefits  payable
under   the   Act.   It    is    against    these    judgment/orders,    the
claimants/landowners have filed  these  appeals  by  way  of  special  leave
before this Court.
11.   Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
12.    Shri  Nidhesh  Gupta,  learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for   the
appellants placing reliance on decisions in   Haji  Mohd.  Ekramul  Haq  vs.
State of W.B. 1959 Supp(1) SCR 922, State of Kerala  vs.  P.P.  Hassan  Koya
(1968) 3 SCR 459, Bhag Singh & Ors. vs. UT of Chandigarh (1985) 3  SCC  737,
Municipal Committee, Bhatinda & Ors. vs. Balwant Singh  (1995)  5  SCC  433,
Union of India & Ors. vs. Mangatu Ram & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 59, V.  Hanumantha
Reddy vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal R. Officer (2003)  12  SCC  642,
General Manager, ONGC Ltd. Vs. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel & Anr.  (2008)  14
SCC 745, Maharunnisa vs. Commissioner & Land  Acquisition  Officer,  Bijapur
(2009) 9  SCC  750,  Chandrashekhar  &  Ors.  vs.  Additional  Special  Land
Acquisition Officer, (2009) 14 SCC  441,  Valliyammal  &  Anr.  vs.  Special
Tehsildar (Land Acquisition) & Anr., (2011) 8 SCC 91,  Chandrashekar  (Dead)
by L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr.,  (2012)  1  SCC  390,
Salaha Begaum & Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition  Officer,  (2013)  11  SCC
426 and Digamber & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2013) 14 SCC  406,
contended that the High Court having  rightly  held  in  appellants'  favour
that a case for enhancement in payment  of  compensation  for  the  acquired
land is made out, erred in enhancing the compensation  only  @  Rs.50/-  per
square yard.  According to the learned senior counsel, having regard to  the
nature of the potentiality of the use of the lands which was duly proved  by
the appellants by adducing evidence and rightly recognized by the Courts  in
appellants' favour by returning finding on this issue, the  appellants  were
entitled to claim enhancement  in  the  compensation  at  the  rate  ranging
between Rs.100/- per square yard to Rs.200/- per square  yard  in  place  of
Rs.50/- per square yard. Learned senior counsel  pointed  out  that  several
acres of lands situated near the acquired lands in  question  were  acquired
by the State  Government  between  the  years  1980  to  1989-1990  and  for
acquisition of these lands, the State Government paid compensation to  their
landowners @ Rs.300/- to Rs.325/- per square yard pursuant to orders of  the
Courts.  Learned senior counsel, therefore,  contended  that  if  Rs.300/-to
Rs.325/- is taken to be the rate of the  similarly  situated  lands  in  the
year 1989-1990 and if 10% is reduced  retrospectively  on  yearly  basis  of
Rs.300/-to Rs.325/-, then in such event, the fair market value of the  lands
in question prevailing in the year 1977,  i.e.,  the  year  of  acquisition,
could safely be determined between Rs.100/- to  Rs.200/-  per  square  yard.
Lastly and in the alternative, learned senior counsel contended that in  any
event, the High Court having rightly held that the appellants were  entitled
to claim compensation at the enhanced rate of Rs.63/- per square yard  erred
in eventually awarding compensation at the rate of Rs.50/- per  square  yard
without there being any basis. According to him,  the  appellants  therefore
were entitled to get the compensation at the enhanced rate  of  Rs.63/-  per
square yard instead of Rs. 50/- per square yard on the basis of  finding  of
the High Court.
13.   In contra, learned Counsel for the  respondent-  State  supported  the
impugned judgment and contended that no case is made out on facts or/and  in
law to call for any interference  in  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High
Court. Learned counsel while refuting the contention of  Mr.  Nidesh  Gupta,
learned senior counsel appearing for  the  appellants,  contended  that  the
fair market value of the lands in  question  cannot  be  determined  in  the
manner suggested by Mr. Gupta.   According  to  him,  firstly  in  order  to
determine the fair market value of the  acquired  land,  as  provided  under
Section 23 of the Act, one is required to take into account  the  prevailing
market rate of the similarly situated lands in nearby area of  the  acquired
land on the date of the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the  Act
but in no case the rate of the lands either sold or acquired  subsequent  to
the date of issuance of the notification  in  question  can  be  taken  into
consideration.  Learned  counsel  pointed  out  that  the  appellants  never
claimed compensation at the rate of Rs.200/- per square yard  as  was  urged
before this Court for the first time and hence at best the appellants  could
be considered for award of compensation at the rate of  Rs.63/-  per  square
yard but not beyond this rate.

14.   Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties  and  on  perusal  of
the record of the case, we find force in the alternative submission  of  the
learned senior counsel for the appellants  mentioned  above  and  hence  are
inclined to allow these appeals in part and accordingly modify the  impugned
award in  favour  of  the  appellants  to  the  extent  indicated  below  by
enhancing the rate of the  land  per  square  yard  for  re-determining  the
payment of the compensation and other statutory benefits payable  under  the
Act to the appellants.

15.   Law on the question as to how the Court is required to  determine  the
fair market value of the acquired land is fairly  well  settled  by  several
decisions of this Court and remains no more res  integra.  This  Court  has,
inter  alia,  held  that  when  the  acquired  land  is  a  large  chunk  of
undeveloped land having potential and was acquired for  residential  purpose
then while determining the fair market value of the lands  on  the  date  of
acquisition, the appropriate deductions are also required to be made.
16.   It is apposite to take note of some of the decisions of this Court  on
the issue relevant for the disposal of these appeals:
(i)   In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha & Ors.  v.  Amritsar  Improvement  Trust  &
Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 419, this  Court  opined  that  where  a  large  area  of
undeveloped land is  acquired,  provision  has  to  be  made  for  providing
minimum amenities of town life. Accordingly, it was held  that  a  deduction
of 20% of the total acquired  land  should  be  made  for  land  over  which
infrastructure has to be raised (space for roads,  etc.).   Apart  from  the
aforesaid, it was also held that the cost of raising  infrastructure  itself
(like roads, electricity, water, underground drainage, etc.) needs  also  to
be taken into  consideration.  To  cover  the  cost  component  for  raising
infrastructure, the Court held that the deduction to be applied would  range
between 20% to 33%. Commutatively  viewed,  it  was  held,  that  deductions
would range between 40% and 53%.
(ii)  In Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition  Officer,  Poona
& Anr. (1988) 3 SCC 751 while referring to the factors  which  ought  to  be
taken into consideration while determining the market value of the  acquired
land, it was observed that a smaller plot  was  within  the  reach  of  many
whereas for a larger block of land there were implicit disadvantages.  As  a
matter of illustration, it was mentioned that a large block  of  land  would
first have to be developed by preparing  its  layout  plan.  Thereafter,  it
would require carving out roads, leaving open spaces, plotting  out  smaller
plots, waiting for purchasers (during which the invested money would  remain
blocked). Likewise, it was pointed out  that  there  would  be  other  known
hazards  of  an   [pic]entrepreneur.   Based   on   the   aforesaid   likely
disadvantages it was held that these factors could be discounted  by  making
deductions by way of allowance at an appropriate rate ranging  from  20%  to
50%. These deductions, according  to  the  Court,  would  account  for  land
required to be set apart for developmental activities. It  was  also  sought
to be clarified that the applied deduction  would  depend  on,  whether  the
acquired land was rural or urban, whether building activity was  picking  up
or was stagnant, whether the waiting period during which the  capital  would
remain locked would  be  short  or  long;  and  other  like  entrepreneurial
hazards.
(iii) In Kasturi & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC  354,  this  Court
opined that in respect of agricultural land or undeveloped  land  which  has
potential value for housing or commercial purposes,  normally  1/3rd  amount
of compensation should be deducted depending upon the  location,  extent  of
expenditure involved for development, the area required for roads and  other
civic amenities, etc. It was also opined that appropriate  deductions  could
be made for making plots for residential and  commercial  purposes.  It  was
sought to be explained that the acquired land may be plain  or  uneven,  the
soil of the acquired land may be soft or hard, the acquired land may have  a
hillock or may be low-lying or may have deep ditches.  Accordingly,  it  was
pointed out that expenses involved for development  would  vary  keeping  in
mind the facts and circumstances of each case. In Kasturi case, it was  held
that normal deductions on account of  development  would  be  1/3rd  of  the
amount of compensation. It was, however, clarified that in  some  cases  the
deduction could be more than  1/3rd in other cases even less than 1/3rd.
(iv)  In Lal Chand v. Union of India & Anr., (2009) 15 SCC 769, it was  held
that to  determine  the  market  value  of  a  large  tract  of  undeveloped
agricultural land (with potential for development), with reference  to  sale
price of small developed plot(s), deductions varying between 20% to  75%  of
the price of such developed plot(s) could be made.
(v)   In A.P. Housing Board v. K. Manohar Reddy & Ors., (2010) 12  SCC  707,
having examined the existing case law on the point  it  was  concluded  that
deductions on account of development could vary between 20% to 75%.  In  the
peculiar facts of  the  case,  a  deduction  of  1/3rd  towards  development
charges was made from the  awarded  amount  to  determine  the  compensation
payable.
(vi)  In Special Land Acquisition  Officer  &  Anr.  v.  M.K.  Rafiq  Saheb,
(2011) 7 SCC 714, this Court after having concluded that the land which  was
the  subject-matter  of  acquisition  was  not  agricultural  land  for  all
practical purposes and no agricultural activities could be  carried  out  on
it, concluded that in order [pic]to determine fair compensation, based on  a
sale transaction of a small piece of developed  land  (though  the  acquired
land was a large chunk), the deduction made by the High Court at 50%,  ought
to be increased to 60%.
17.   After taking note of the aforesaid cases  and  placing  reliance  upon
the principles laid down therein, this Court in  Chandrashekar  and  Others,
(supra) observed as under:
"It is essential to earmark appropriate deductions out of the  market  value
of an exemplar land, for each of the two components referred to above.  This
would be the first step towards balancing  the  differential  factors.  This
would pave the way for determining  the  market  value  of  the  undeveloped
acquired land on the basis of market value of the developed exemplar land.

As far back as in 1982, this Court in Brig. Sahib  Singh  Kalha  case  held,
that the permissible deduction could  be  up  to  53%.  This  deduction  was
divided by  the  Court  into  two  components.  For  the  "first  component"
referred to in the foregoing paragraph, it was held that a deduction of  20%
should be made. For the "second component", it was held that  the  deduction
could range between 20% to 33%. It is therefore apparent  that  a  deduction
of up to 53% was the norm laid down by the Court as far  back  as  in  1982.
The aforesaid norm remained unchanged for a  long  duration  of  time,  even
though, keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances  emerging  from
case to case, different deductions were applied by  this  Court  to  balance
the differential factors between the exemplar land and  the  acquired  land.
Recently however, this Court has approved a higher component of deduction.

In 2009 in Lal Chand case and in 2010 in A.P.  Housing  Board  case  it  has
been held that while applying the sale consideration of  a  small  piece  of
developed  land,  to  determine  the  market  value  of  a  large  tract  of
undeveloped acquired land, deductions between 20% to 75% could be made.  But
in 2009 in Subh Ram case, this Court restricted  deductions  on  account  of
the "first component" of development, as also, on  account  of  the  "second
component" of development  to  33%  each.  The  aforesaid  deductions  would
roughly amount to 67% of the component of  the  sale  consideration  of  the
exemplar sale transaction(s)."


18.   Keeping  the  aforesaid  principles  in  mind,  we  have  perused  the
evidence in these cases. It is not in dispute that the acquisition  of  land
in question was made in the year 1977 and  it  was  for  a  large  chunk  of
undeveloped agriculture land.  It is also not in dispute  that  it  was  for
construction of "residential purpose". It is further  not  in  dispute  that
the appellants did not file any sale deed in evidence in  support  of  their
case to prove the fair market value of the  acquired  land.  All  that  they
adduced was an oral evidence of some witnesses to prove the potentiality  of
the lands by showing its location, proximity to  the  main  road  which  was
passing in the area and named some industries  and  hospitals  operating  in
the nearby areas of the acquired lands etc.
19.   Taking all these factors in mind and  on  appreciation  of  this  oral
evidence,  the  LAO,  Reference  Court  and  the  High  Court  fixed   their
respective rates as mentioned above, namely, Rs.16.52, Rs.22/- and Rs.  50/-
per Square yard.
20.   As rightly argued by learned senior counsel for the appellants, it  is
not in dispute that the High Court did hold in appellants' favour that  they
were entitled to claim compensation at the rate of Rs.63/- per  Square  yard
in the concluding para of the impugned judgment  basing  its  finding  after
taking into consideration  the  potentialities  of  land  and  rate  of  one
adjacent land of the acquired  land  which  was  also  found  to  have  been
acquired at the same time as determined by the Courts.
21.   In the light of this finding, we fail to  appreciate  as  to  why  the
High Court then assessed the rate at Rs.50/- per square  yard  in  place  of
Rs.63/- per sq. yard. In other words, having rightly come  to  a  conclusion
that the fair  market  value  of  the  land  in  question  on  the  date  of
acquisition  (04.11.1977)  was  Rs.63/-  per  square  yard,  there  was   no
justification on the part of the High Court to have then reduced it  to  any
rate less than Rs.63/- much  less  to  Rs.50/-   per  square  yard.  In  our
considered view, it should have been  fixed  at  Rs.63/-   per  square  yard
only.
22.   We have also given  our  anxious  consideration  to  the  whole  issue
keeping in view the peculiar facts, evidence  adduced  and  the  law  quoted
above for determining the fair market value of  the  land  on  the  date  of
notification (04.11.1977). Having regard  to  the  total  scenario  emerging
from the record of the case and the findings recorded by  the  Courts  below
on the issues such as location of land, its potentiality, surroundings,  the
rate of the adjacent land determined by the Courts,  the  condition  of  the
acquired underdeveloped lands,  the  expenditure  required  to  develop  the
acquired land to start the activities, per cent of deductions  to  be  made,
its proximity to the various places in  the  nearby  town  (Faridabad),  and
lastly, the fact that the appellants failed to file any  sale  deed  of  any
parcel of land (be that of small piece of land or  big)  sold  in  the  near
proximity of the acquired land, the  fair  market  value  of  the  lands  in
question as on 04.11.1977 (date of acquisition)  can  reasonably  be  worked
out to  "Rs.63/- per Square Yard".    In  other  words,  in  our  considered
opinion, the High Court was not right in determining the  fair  market  rate
of the acquired land at Rs.50/- per Square yard and instead it  should  have
determined the fair market rate of the acquired land in question at "Rs.63/-
 per Square Yard".  We accordingly now fix it.
23.   We are not impressed by the submission of learned senior  counsel  for
the appellant when he submitted that we should take into  consideration  the
fair market value of the adjacent land determined by  the  Court  which  was
acquired 10 years subsequent to the acquisition  in  question  in  1989-1990
and then go on reducing its value 10%  every  year  to  determine  the  fair
market value of the land in question. To say the least, this  submission  is
wholly misconceived being against the settled principle of law  relating  to
land acquisition cases.
24.   As rightly argued by learned counsel  for  the  respondent,  the  fair
market value of the  acquired  land  is  required  to  be  determined  under
Section 23 of the Act on the basis of the market rate of the adjacent  lands
similarly  situated  to  the  acquired  lands  prevailing  on  the  date  of
acquisition or/and prior to acquisition but not subsequent to  the  date  of
acquisition. In appropriate cases, addition of 10% per annum  escalation  in
the prices specified in the sale deeds (if filed and relied on) in  relation
to adjacent similarly situated lands for fixing  the  market  value  of  the
acquired land may be permitted.  Such is, however, not  the  case  in  hand.
Here is the case where firstly, no sale deeds were filed by  the  appellants
to prove the fair market value of the acquired land and secondly, what  they
now want this Court to do is to take into consideration the  rate  of  those
lands which were acquired  ten  years  after  the  date  of  acquisition  in
question and then reduce the value of such land by 10% every year so  as  to
determine the fair market value of the acquired land  in  question.  In  our
view, such procedure for determination is not provided in the Act.
25.   We also cannot accept the submission of the learned  counsel  for  the
appellants when he contended that  the  appellants  are  entitled  to  claim
compensation at the rate ranging between Rs.100/- to Rs.200/- per sq.  yard.
 As observed supra, since the appellants failed to file  any  sale  deed  of
the lands to prove the price of the lands prevailing at  the  relevant  time
(04.11.1977), we fail to appreciate as to on what basis, the appellants  can
claim the compensation at the rate of Rs.100/- per sq.  yard  or  more.   In
our view it was necessary for the appellants to have  filed  copies  of  the
sale deed  to  prove  the  fair  market  rate  prevailing  on  the  date  of
acquisition (04.11.1977).  Since the only evidence which was adduced was  to
prove the potentialities of the acquired land, the courts  below  took  into
account the potentialities and the  rate  of  adjacent  land  fixed  by  the
Courts and accordingly fixed the rate.  We do not  find  any  illegality  in
such approach of the courts below.
26.   We have arrived  at  the  figure  of  "Rs.63/-  per  sq.  yard"  after
applying all relevant factors, which we have mentioned above.  In our  view,
the rate determined by this Court is just, reasonable  and  represents  fair
market value of the lands in question on the date of  acquisition.   Indeed,
in such cases, one can never come to any exact  figure  of  price  of  lands
because in the very nature of things, the prices  are  bound  to  vary  from
land to land and further they also  depend  upon  the  individual  buyer-to-
buyer,  seller-to-seller  and  the  reasons  which  led  to  such  sale  and
purchase.  However, Courts in such cases always  exercise  their  discretion
within the permissible parameters after  appreciating  the  entire  evidence
brought on record and applying the relevant legal principles. We  have  kept
these factors in mind.
27.   In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals filed by the  appellants-
landowners deserve to be allowed and are accordingly allowed in  part.   The
impugned  judgment  and  orders  are  accordingly  modified  to  the  extent
indicated above.
28.   The concerned LAO is directed to calculate  the  compensation  payable
to the appellants  (land  owners)  for  their  acquired  lands  pursuant  to
notification issued under Section 4 of the Act on 04.11.1977  "at  the  rate
of  Rs.63/-  per  sq.  yard"  and  accordingly   calculate   all   statutory
compensation such as solatium, interest etc. payable under the Act to  every
land owner.
29.   Let this calculation be made, as directed above, by the  LAO  and  the
amount so calculated and worked out be paid to the appellants (land  owners)
after making proper verification of their claim cases  within  three  months
from the date of receipt of this judgment.  No costs.

                       .............................................J.
                             [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]


               ..............................................J.
                             [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]


      New Delhi;
      April 01, 2015.

-----------------------
31


Section 80HHC of income tax Act -when not applies - when the assessment admittedly had not earned any profits from the export of the Marine products. and On the other hand, when it had suffered a loss. - The deduction permissible under Section 80HHC is only a deduction of the profits of the assessee from the export of the goods or merchandise. - By the very terms of Section 80HHC, it is clear that the assessee was not entitled to any benefit thereunder in the absence of any profits. - 2015 SC msklawreports



What is the correct method  of  computation  of  deductions
under Section 80HHC(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the given  facts  and
circumstances,
 Finance Act of 1983 introduced Section 80HHC of the  Income
Tax Act, providing  incentives  to  exporters  and  deductions  for  persons
involved in the export business.
Section 80HHC(3)(b) provided  the  formula
for the computation of deduction  for  persons  who  do  not  have  business
exclusively of export out of India, that is  to  say,  in  cases  where  the
assessee is having turnover and income from  business in India  as  well  as
from the export business.
 On 05.07.1990,  the  Central  Board  of  Direct  Taxes  (CBDT)  issued
Circular No.564 dated 05.07.1990 giving detailed guidelines as  to  how  the
deductions  under  Section  80HHC  are  to  be  calculated.  
 The   formula prescribed by CBDT circular is as follows:
|Profit of the       |X   |Export Turnover     |
|Business            |    |                    |
|                    |    |Total Turnover      |


the Assessing Officer passed fresh order  dated  28.05.1992
giving effect to the orders of the  ITAT.  
While  giving  the  effect,  the
Assessing Officer found that the appellant had not earned any  profits  from
the export of Marine products and in fact, from the  said  export  business,
it had suffered a loss.
Therefore, according to the Assessing  Officer,  as
per Section 80AB, the deduction under Section 80HHC  could  not  exceed  the
amount of income included in the total income.
He found that as the  income
from export of Marine product business was in the negative i.e. there was  a
loss, the deduction  under  Section  80HHC  would  be  nil,  even  when  the
assessee is entitled to deduction  under  the  said  provision.

 "Whether on the facts and  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the
Tribunal was right in law in holding that the deduction  admissible  to  the
assessee under Section 80HHC is nil?"


  The High Court has now pronounced on the aforesaid  question  referred
to it by the impugned judgment  dated  20.08.2002  answering  this  question
against the assessee holding as under:
      "5.  In this case,  the  assessment  admittedly  had  not  earned  any
profits from the export of the Marine products.  On the other hand,  it  had
suffered a loss.  The deduction permissible under Section 80HHC  is  only  a
deduction of the profits of the assessee from the export  of  the  goods  or
merchandise.  By the very terms of Section  80HHC,  it  is  clear  that  the
assessee was not entitled to any benefit thereunder in the  absence  of  any
profits.

            The question referred to us therefore is  answered  against  the
assessee and in favour of the revenue."
Apex court held that

Therefore, we are of the opinion that  the  view  taken  by  the  High
Court is correct on the facts of this case. With  this,  there  may  not  be
need to  answer  the  second  facet  of  the  problem  as  the  question  of
computation of deduction does not arise. However, we find  that  even  here,
the approach of the ITAT is correct.
   In the present case, the domestic income in respect of  which  benefit
is sought is from dividend  income,  interest  income,  profit  or  sale  of
shares and fees received from arranging finance for the assessee's  clients.
 The Tribunal has recorded this aspect as under:
      13.  It is, however, seen from the assessee's Profit  &  Loss  Account
for the year of account ending on  31.03.1989  that  the  aggregate  sum  of
Rs.26,04,477 (which the assessee has labeled as  total  turnover)  comprised
not only export turnover of Rs.16,67,084 but also the following items  which
cannot properly be regarded as turnover:

|(1)  |Brokerage received for arranging  |:|Rs.8,50,321|
|     |Finance for the assessee's claims | |           |
|(2)  |Dividend                          |:|Rs.        |
|     |                                  | |5,247      |
|(3)  |Interest                          |:|Rs.        |
|     |                                  | |7,212      |
|(4)  |Profit on sale of shares          |:|Rs.        |
|     |                                  | |74,913     |
|     |                                  | |Rs.9,37,693|

The  Tribunal  observed  that  aforesaid  four   items   are   income
simplicitor and cannot  be  covered  by  the  expression  "total  turnover".
Following discussion of the Tribunal in this behalf needs to be quoted:

       "17.   Now  the  mode  and  mechanics  of  computing  the   deduction
admissible  to  an  assessee  falling  under  Section  80HHC(3)(b)   clearly
proceeds on the basis that in trading transactions profit, or, as  the  case
may be, loss is embedded  in  the  gross  turnover.   The  most  significant
conclusion that flows from the said provision is that when Section  80HHC(3)
talks of turnover, it talks of trading receipts and not  of  receipts  which
are of the nature of income to start with.   It  should,  therefore,  follow
that the  aggregate  sum  of  Rs.9,37,693/-  referred  to  supra  cannot  be
regarded as turnover, and that by the same token, it should be left  out  of
reckoning for purposes of computing deduction  admissible  to  the  assessee
under Section 80HHC.  If this exercise is done, we are back  to  Proposition
No.1.  This would mean that the deduction admissible to the  assessee  under
Section 80HHC would be nil, especially in view of the fact that  the  export
business of the assessee has resulted in a loss.

                          xx          xx         xx

 But a manufacturer may not invariably  be  able  to  export,  in  their
entirety, the goods or merchandise manufactured.  He may export  a  part  of
them and sell the rest in India.  Given the paramount need  to  give  fillip
to exports, Parliament clearly intended that the benefit  of  Section  80HHC
should not be denied in such cases.  But the difficulty  in  such  cases  is
that  the  profits  attributable  to  exports  cannot  be   ascertain   with
precision.  This is because not only the manufacturing activities  but  also
the selling activities (including the  activities  connected  with  exports)
from a continuous, integrated whole.  Even so, the intention of  Parliament,
was to extend the benefit of Section 80HHC to  the  extent  of  the  profits
generated by exports.  With this end  in  view,  Parliament  incorporated  a
rule of thumb in Section 80HHC(3)(b).  As long as the assessee  has  cleared
profits in a particular year of account,  export  profits  are  computed  by
applying to total profits the ratio which export  turnover  bears  to  total
turnover."
We  are  in  agreement  with  the  aforesaid  view  of  the  Tribunal.
Therefore, even otherwise, the formula  as  sought  to  be  applied  by  the
appellant does not become applicable on the facts of this case.
Thus, from every angle the matter is to be  looked  into,  the  appeal
lacks merit.  Same is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. - 2015 SC msklawreports

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

Evidence Act - Admissibility of previous depositions -2015 S.C.(1976) MSKLAWREPORTS

Evidence Act - Admissibility of previous depositions - Apex court held that
(i) The admissions by the 3rd defendant were substan-
 tive  evidence of the facts admitted and  such  admissions,
 duly proved, were admissible evidence irrespective of wheth-
 er the party making them appeared in the witness box or not,
 and  whether  that  party when appearing as  a witness  was
 confronted  with those statements in case a  statement con-
 trary  to those admissions was made. They were  taken into
 consideration against the 3rd defendant and not against  the
 2nd defendant. [975 H, 976 A-B]
 
 (ii)  There is no requirement of the Evidence  Act that
 unless the  admissions were adverse to his  interests when
 made,  they  could not be read against  the  person  making
 them. [976 F]
 (iii) The contention that the evidence of the admissions
 is admissible only in terms of s. 33 of the Evidence Act was
 untenable  because  that section deals with  statements  of
 persons  who  cannot  be called as witnesses  and  does  not
 restrict  or override the provisions relating to  admissions
 in the Evidence Act. [977 A-C] -2015 S.C.(1976) MSKLAWREPORTS

Monday, April 6, 2015

sec. 40,41,42 of Indian Evidence Act - admissions made in earlier criminal proceedings is admissible in evidence - Apex court held that It is now almost well-settled that, save and except for Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act which refers to Sections 40, 41, and 42 thereof, a judgment of a criminal court shall not be admissible in a civil suit. What, however, would be admissible is the admission made by a party in a previous proceeding. The admission of the appellant was recorded in writing. -2015 S.C.(2009) MSKLAWREPORTS



Whether the admission of guilt in criminal case in respect of some transaction made by respondent is admissible in the present case to the extent of fact that there was transaction between the parties?

 Respondent examined himself as a witness in the suit. 
He stated that the appellant being his cousin brother, no document was executed.
He also testified that in the criminal case, appellant having admitted his crime and 7 pledge of jewellery with him, a fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed and on in default thereof, imprisonment of five days was ordered.

 Indisputably, the judgment in the criminal case was marked as an exhibit.

 It is now almost well-settled that, save and except for Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act which refers to Sections 40, 41, and 42 thereof, a judgment of a criminal court shall not be admissible in a civil suit.

What, however, would be admissible is the admission made by a party in a previous proceeding. The admission of the appellant was recorded in writing. While he was deposing in the suit, he was confronted with the question as to whether he had admitted his guilt and pleaded guilty of the charges framed.2015 S.C.(2009) MSKLAWREPORTS

Saturday, April 4, 2015

Whether the application under sec.12, should be filed in Form-II as prescribed under Rule 6(1) of the Rules and verified in the prescribed manner with out any modification ? - No whether calling and according consideration to Domestic Incident Report of a Protection Officer or the Service Provider is sine qua non for passing an order, interim or final, on an application under section 12(1) of the Act? - No -2015 J & K ( 2014) msklawreports



whether calling and according consideration to Domestic Incident Report of a Protection Officer or the Service Provider is sine qua non for passing an order, interim or final, on an application under section 12(1) of the Act?
A comparative reading of sections 4, 9 and 10 of the Act and Rules 4 and 8 of the Rules on one hand and section 12 of the Act on the other would make it clear that giving of information about domestic violence to the Protection Officer under section 4 or to Service Provider under section10 and making an application seeking relief under section 12(1) or two different and independent aspects of the Act. Making an application under section 12(1) to the Magistrate is no way linked with or dependent upon providing information to the Protection Officer or the Service Provider. To say the other way, giving information to Protection Officer or Service Provider and their report to the Magistrate in no way can be taken as a sine qua non for making an application under section 12(1) to the Magistrate. It is open to an aggrieved person to straightway make an application to the Magistrate under section 12(1) seeking one or more reliefs under the Act. The only interpretation that can be given to the proviso to section 12(1) of the Act is that the Magistrate before passing any order on the application of the aggrieved person will have to accord consideration to a Domestic Incident Report of a Protection Officer or a report of a Service Provider, if such a report has been received by the Magistrate. Key to such interpretation seem to have been made available in the proviso itself by use of word any . Proviso does not mandate calling for a report from a Protection Officer or Service Provider but refers to any report received from a Protection Officer or Service Provider, which, however, would be available only in a case where information to the Protection Officer or a Service Provider about an act of domestic violence had been given by the aggrieved person himself or by any person .

Whether the application under sec.12, should be filed in Form-II as prescribed under Rule 6(1) of the Rules and verified in the prescribed manner with out any modification ?
 Rule 6(1) reads as under: 6. Applications to the Magistrate.- (1) Every application of the aggrieved person under section 12 of the Act shall be in Form II or as nearly as possible thereto.
On its plain reading, it would be clear Rule 6(1) does not make it mandatory for the applicant to prepare an application under section 12(1) of the Act in Form II only. 
The Rule provides also that it may be as nearly as possible to Form-II. 
Form-II on its reading would show that it mainly provides for giving the name of the person (aggrieved person/Protection Officer/any other person on behalf of aggrieved person) who makes the application and details about the order(s) sought from the Magistrate, that is, Protection Order under section 18/Residence Order under section 19/ Monetary Reliefs under section 20/ Custody Order under section 21/Compensation Order under section.
 It may be stated in this regard that the Act is a welfare legislation to provide for effective protection of rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution, who were victims of domestic violence. A relief sought under the Act will not be defeated merely on technical defects like application having not been filed in prescribed form unless the application does not convey or make out what is required and sufficient for grant of the relief. - 2015 J & K ( 2014) msklawreports