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Tuesday, May 6, 2014

culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, IPC, - In the absence of motive to cause death and the injuries too never disclosed as that of such a fatal one to cause death and when the injuries were caused in spur of movement on sudden fight - it is not murder punishable under sec.302 but punishable under sec.304 not amounting to murder - The evidence produced against the accused does not show that the accused had any motive to cause death of the deceased or have intended to cause such bodily injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. Evidence on record also does not establish that the injuries caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause his death or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat of exchange of words accused caused injuries on the body of the deceased which caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the murder as defined in Section 300, IPC, have not been established against the accused. In our opinion, the accused was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, IPC, and considering the fact that the accused had no intention to either cause the death of the deceased or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the deceased, it would be sufficient to impose on accused a sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months.= MANJEET SINGH … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH … RESPONDENT = 2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41473

  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to murder under Section 304, IPC, -  In the absence of motive to cause death and the injuries too never disclosed as that of such a fatal one to cause death and when the injuries were caused in spur of movement on sudden fight - it is not murder punishable under sec.302 but punishable under sec.304  not amounting to murder - The  evidence  produced  against the accused does not show that the accused had any motive to cause death  of the deceased or have intended to  cause  such  bodily  injuries  which  were sufficient in the ordinary course of  nature  to  cause  the  death  of  the deceased. Evidence on record also  does  not  establish  that  the  injuries caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause  his  death or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat  of exchange of words accused caused injuries on the body of the deceased  which caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the  murder  as  defined  in Section 300, IPC, have not been established  against  the  accused.  In  our opinion, the accused was  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to murder under Section 304, IPC, and considering the  fact  that  the  accused had no intention to either cause the death of the  deceased  or  cause  such bodily injury as is likely to cause death  of  the  deceased,  it  would  be sufficient  to  impose  on  accused  a  sentence  of  seven  years  rigorous imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs.5,000/-  and  in  default  of payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months.=

 High  Court  dismissed  the
appeal and affirmed the judgment  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  dated  27th
March, 2002 in Sessions Trial No.17-S/7 of  2001  wherein  the  Trial  Court
convicted the appellant and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and  also
to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence  under  Section  302  IPC  and  in
default,  further  imprisonment  for  one  year.  The  appellant  was   also
sentenced by the Trial Court for  the  offence  under  Section  324  IPC  to
undergo imprisonment for  six  months  and  to  pay  fine  of  Rs.500/-,  in
default, further simple imprisonment for one month. The appellant  was  also
sentenced  for  the  offence  under  Section  27  of  Arms  Act  to  undergo
imprisonment for three months and to pay  fine  of  Rs.1000/-,  in  default,
further simple imprisonment for one month.  The  Trial  Court  ordered  that
all the aforesaid sentences shall run concurrently.=

 what is  the  nature
of offence that the accused has committed.  The  evidence  produced  against
the accused does not show that the accused had any motive to cause death  of
the deceased or have intended to  cause  such  bodily  injuries  which  were
sufficient in the ordinary course of  nature  to  cause  the  death  of  the
deceased. Evidence on record also  does  not  establish  that  the  injuries
caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause  his  death
or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat  of
exchange of words accused caused injuries on the body of the deceased  which
caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the  murder  as  defined  in
Section 300, IPC, have not been established  against  the  accused.  In  our
opinion, the accused was  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to
murder under Section 304, IPC, and considering the  fact  that  the  accused
had no intention to either cause the death of the  deceased  or  cause  such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death  of  the  deceased,  it  would  be
sufficient  to  impose  on  accused  a  sentence  of  seven  years  rigorous
imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs.5,000/-  and  in  default  of
payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months.

27.     We, accordingly, set aside  the  conviction  of  the  accused  under
Section 302, IPC but hold him guilty of the offence under Section  304,  IPC
and sentence him to seven years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/-
, in default of payment of fine a further imprisonment of  six  months.  The
conviction and sentences for the offence under Section 324, IPC and  Section
27 of the Arms  Act  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  are  affirmed.  All  the
sentences shall run concurrently. If the accused-Manjeet Singh has  not  yet
undergone the sentence imposed and affirmed by us, and is  not  in  custody,
he be taken into custody to serve the remainder.

2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41473            
A.K. PATNAIK, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA

                                                            REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1695 OF 2005

MANJEET SINGH                           … APPELLANT
                                        VERSUS
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                          … RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

        The appellant has assailed the judgment  dated  18th  October,  2004
passed by the High Court of Himachal  Pradesh,  Shimla  in  Criminal  Appeal
No.259 of 2002. By the  impugned  judgment  the  High  Court  dismissed  the
appeal and affirmed the judgment  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  dated  27th
March, 2002 in Sessions Trial No.17-S/7 of  2001  wherein  the  Trial  Court
convicted the appellant and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and  also
to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence  under  Section  302  IPC  and  in
default,  further  imprisonment  for  one  year.  The  appellant  was   also
sentenced by the Trial Court for  the  offence  under  Section  324  IPC  to
undergo imprisonment for  six  months  and  to  pay  fine  of  Rs.500/-,  in
default, further simple imprisonment for one month. The appellant  was  also
sentenced  for  the  offence  under  Section  27  of  Arms  Act  to  undergo
imprisonment for three months and to pay  fine  of  Rs.1000/-,  in  default,
further simple imprisonment for one month.  The  Trial  Court  ordered  that
all the aforesaid sentences shall run concurrently.

2.      The facts of the prosecution case as stated by Jai  Pal  (PW.5)  are
that he was carrying business of taxi in Shimla. On 31st December,  2000  at
about 9 p.m. he had gone to Hotel Apsara at Cart  Road,  Shimla  to  inquire
from Budhi Singh (PW.8), Manager of the Hotel Apsara regarding  the  booking
of his taxi by some passenger staying  in  the  Hotel.  Budhi  Singh  (PW.8)
asked Jai Pal (PW.5) to come  after  some  time.  Both  of  them  then  went
together to Hotel Basant for  celebrating  New  Year.  They  took  wine  and
dinner together and remained in the said Hotel till 12 o’clock.  Thereafter,
Budhi Singh(PW.8) returned  to  Hotel  Apsara  while  Jai  Pal  (PW.5)  came
towards Cart Road where he met Romi Kapoor (PW.6), Pawan Kumar (PW.7),  Deep
Chand and Rajnish alias Rintu who inquired about the booking of  a  room  in
the Hotel as earlier agreed upon. Jai Pal (PW.5) went to  the  Hotel  Apsara
where he did not find Budhi Singh (PW.8), Therefore,  he  went  upstairs  in
the Hall of the Hotel where  he  found  accused  Manjeet  Singh  along  with
Balraj and Surender Kumar were taking liquor. Jai Pal (PW.5)  inquired  from
the appellant-accused, Manjeet Singh about  the  Manager  of  the  Hotel  to
which the accused  was  alleged  to  have  retorted  that  he  was  not  the
Chowkidar of the Hotel so as to know and tell about  the  Manager.  Accused-
Manjeet Singh was further alleged to have started abusing Jai Pal (PW.5)  by
proclaiming that he was serving in Punjab Police. The  accused  was  further
alleged to have started beating Jai Pal (PW.5) by giving him a fist blow  on
his mouth.  Jai Pal (PW.5) ran outside. He met the above-named  Romi  Kapoor
(PW.6), Deep  Chand,  Pawan  Kumar  (PW.7)  and  Rajnish.  He  narrated  the
incident to them. Romi Kapoor (PW.6), Rajnish alias Rintu  and  Pawan  Kumar
(PW.7) went inside the Hall while Jai Pal (PW.5)  and  one  Roshan  remained
standing at the entrance of the Hotel. Rajnish  alias  Rintu  inquired  from
the accused-Manjeet Singh as to the cause of his having  given  beatings  to
Jai Pal (PW.5). The accused was alleged to have told his companions,  Balraj
and Surender Kumar to tell Rajnish and his friends about the  cause  of  the
beatings to Jai Pal (PW.5). Balraj and Surender Kumar were then  alleged  to
have abetted  and  instigated  the  accused  by  saying  “Carbine  Ka  Kamal
Dekhao”. Whereupon accused was alleged to have fired shots from his  Carbine
which hit Rajnish alias Rintu, Romi Kapoor (PW.6), Jai Pal (PW.5) and  Pawan
Kumar (PW.7). Rajnish alias Rintu sustained two shots on his  chest  and  he
fell down on the ground. The accused and Balraj were  alleged  to  have  run
away after the gun shots. Jai Pal (PW.5)  lifted  Rajnish  alias  Rintu  and
carried him to I.G.M.C. Hospital, Shimla, where he was declared dead.

3.      On  the  telephonic  message  of  one  Pradeep  Kumar,  Jagdish  Ram
(PW.25), Station House Officer,  Police  Station  Sadar  reached  the  spot.
Surender Kumar, a companion of the accused, was apprehended from the  toilet
of the Hotel. Since, the injured persons  had  already  been  taken  to  the
Hospital, Jagdish  Ram  (PW.25)  went  to  the  Hospital  and  recorded  the
statement of Jai Pal (PW.5), on the basis of which a case for  the  offences
under Section 302, 307 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC came to be  formally
registered vide F.I.R. No.1/2001.

4.      Post-mortem examination was conducted by  Dr.  V.K.  Mishra  (PW.24)
who found the following two ante-mortem bullet injuries  on  the  person  of
the deceased Rajnish alias Rintu:

           “(i) A circular wound of entry one centimeter in  diameter,  1.5
                 cm medial to right  nipple,  18  cm  below  right  shoulder
                 joint. Dry clotted blood  was  present  around  the  wound.
                 There was no blackening, tattooing, singeing, burning etc;


           (ii) A circular wound of entry 1 cm x ½ cm between the  base  of
                 1st and 2nd metatarsal bone of left foot, dorsum  with  dry
                 clotted blood present  around  the  wound.  No  blackening,
                 tattooing, singeing, burning etc. noticed over the skin.”

        In the opinion of Dr. V.K. Mishra (PW.24),  the  death  was  due  to
haemorrhagic shock as a result  of  laceration  of  lung  due  to  gun  shot
injury.
5.      On Medical Examination of Romi Kappor (PW.6), Dr.  M.P.  Singh(PW.1)
found the following injuries on the person of Romi Kapoor:
           “Local Examination


            1. A CLW 1 cm X 0.5 cm X 1 cm in  size  placed  horizontally  on
               little side of left  upper  arm  on  lower  part  of  deltoid
               muscle, red in colour  with  dark  edges  due  to  soot  with
               irregular margins which were depressed.


            2. A. CLW 1 cm   0.5  cm   1  cm  in  size  placed  horizontally
               approximately 2.5 cm lateral to first would on lateral inside
               of left upper arm  on  lower  part  of  deltoid  muscle  with
               irregular margins elevated and  margins  deliberated  red  in
               colour. Same marks were present over sweater and shirt worn.”

      As per the opinion of the doctor,  injuries  Nos.1  &  2  were  bullet
injuries and the same were dangerous to the life as per  rule  of  gun  shot
injuries. The Doctor has also issued MLC Ext. PW-2/B in respect of the  said
injuries.
6.      On the same day, Dr. M.P. Singh (PW.1)  has  also  examined  injured
Pawan Kumar and observed as under:
           “Local injuries:
A CLW   over right foot approximately 5  cm  about  tip  of  right  big  toe
placed horizontally 1 cm  0.5 cm  1 cm in size with  irregular  margins  red
in colour.


A bruise bluish in colour present 1 cm X 0.5 cm  in  size  placed  obliquely
over fifth metatars o-phalangel joint running lately on right foot.


              On the basis of x-ray report, the injury  Nos.1  and  2  were
              declared dangerous to the life and were fresh in duration and
              were caused by a blunt weapon.  The  Doctor  has  issued  MLC
              Ext.PW-1/C.”


        On the same day, Dr. M.P. Singh (PW.1)  has  also  examined  injured
Jai Pal (PW.5) and found as under:
           “Local Injuries
           1. A CLW 1.5 cm in size placed in the middle of  inner  side  of
              upper lip placed obliquely upwards and lately on  left  side,
              reddish scabbing over lip present with clotted blood.
           2. A bruise present over upper lip in the centre reddish blue in
              colour 1 cm X 0.5 cm in  size  placed  vertically.  No  other
              injury was present. Teeth were  normal.  Injuries  No.1and  2
              were simple and the duration of injuries was within 24  hours
              and were caused by blunt weapon.”

      After his examination Doctor has issued MLC Ext.PW-1/D.


7.      The accused-Manjeet Singh too was subjected to medical  examination,
which was carried out by Dr. Dinesh Rana (PW.2) on  1st   January,  2001  at
about 5.55 p.m.  The  accused  at  the  time  of  such  medical  examination
complained of pain in the fifth knuckle region of the left hand.  X-ray  was
advised. However, local examination revealed the presence of  a  red  colour
contusion and swelling on such knuckle region. The accused  also  complained
of breaking of upper incisor tooth. He was referred to  Dental  Surgeon.  On
the basis of dental opinion, such injury  was  opined  to  be  of  a  simple
nature having been caused within the probable duration of 24 hours.

8.      Balraj, a companion of the accused, was also medically  examined  by
Dr. Dinesh Rana (PW.2). Following injuries were found on his person:
           “(i) 4 cm 1 cm abrasion over the dorsum of right fore-arm;


           (ii) 1.5 cm x 1.5 cm round abrasion red  in  colour,  above  the
                 writ joint;


           (iii)        3.5 cm x 2 cm abrasion, read in colour with  linear
                 scratch in the mid. 3 cm outer  aspect  of  the  left  knee
                 joint;


           (iv)         Multiple irregular abrasions on the entire  lateral
                 aspect of the left lower leg. Red in colour, and


           (v)  Small irregular abrasion on the left side of the  forehead.
                 Red in colour.”




      All the injuries were opined to be of simple nature having been caused
with a blunt weapon within the probable duration of 24 hours.
9.      The other companion of  the  accused,  namely,  Surender  Kumar  was
medically examined by Dr. Rajneesh Sharma (PW.4) on  1st  January,  2001  at
about 4.35 a.m. One injury, that is, laceration over the fore-head 1.5 cm  x
1 cm x 0.5 cm was found. He was smelling of liquor and  there  was  slurring
of speech. The injury was simple in nature having been caused with  a  blunt
weapon with the probable duration of 6 hours.
10.     On having been produced by the  accused,  Carbine-Ex.P4  with  empty
magazine  vide  memo  Ex.PW5/C  were  taken   into   possession   by   Gulam
Mohammad(PW.26), Additional Station House Officer of Police  Station  Sadar,
who had partially investigated the case. Six live  cartridges  Ex.P1  to  P6
were also produced by the accused, which were  taken  into  possession  vide
memo Ex.PW5/D by Gulam Mohammad(PW.26).  Six  empty  cartridges  were  taken
into possession from the spot by Gulam Mohammad(PW.26) vide  memo  Ex.PW5/E.
Service belt of the accused, which was lying on the bed in the Hall  of  the
Hotel was also taken into possession vide memo Ex.PW5/F.
11.     The Ballistic Expert to whom the carbine, live and empty  cartridges
were sent for examination, vide report Ex.PW25/E has opined that  the  empty
cartridges were fired from the carbine Ex.P4.
12.     On completion of the investigation the accused along  with  his  two
companions Balraj and Surinder Kumar were sent up for trial.
        The accused was charged for the substantive offences  under  Section
302 and 307 IPC, and under Section 27  of  the  Arms  Act,  1959.   His  two
companions, Balraj and Surinder Kumar, were charged for  the  offence  under
Section 114 read with Sections 302 and 307  IPC,  for   having  abetted  and
instigated the commission of the offences under Section 302 and 307  IPC  by
the accused.

13.     The accused and his two companions pleaded not guilty to the  charge
and claimed trial. The prosecution in support of its case examined  as  many
as 26 witnesses.

14.     The learned Additional  Sessions  Judge,  on  consideration  of  the
evidence coming on the record,  by  the  impugned  judgment,  convicted  and
sentenced the accused- Manjeet Singh as mentioned above.

15.     The accused was acquitted of the offence under Section 307 IPC.  The
two companions of the accused, Balraj and Surinder Kumar were  acquitted  of
all the charges framed against them.

16.     By the impugned judgment the High Court noticed the submission  made
on behalf of the appellant and on appreciation of  the  evidence  on  record
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and  sentences  imposed  by
the Trial Court.

17.     Learned counsel for the accused  has  assailed  the  conviction  and
sentence on the ground that the accused had acted in exercise of  the  right
of private defence. It was submitted that the genesis of the occurrence  was
different from what the prosecution has suggested and highlighted. In  fact,
the occurrence had taken place in the manner suggested  by  the  accused  in
his defence. The deceased and his companions had made a forcible entry  into
the Hall of the Hotel and started beating the accused and  his  two  friends
and in such course they had tried to snatch the  carbine,  which  got  fired
during the scuffle.

18.     From the record, we find  that  neither  the  accused  nor  his  two
companions in the statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., has  stated
that the deceased and his  companions  were  the  aggressors  and  that  the
accused was acting in exercise of the right of  private  defence.  In  fact,
their case is that of total denial.  There  is  nothing  on  the  record  to
suggest that the accused or his companions received injuries  at  the  hands
of the deceased or the deceased tried to snatch the carbine of the  accused.
No evidence has been brought on record that the deceased and his  companions
entered the Hall of the Hotel with arms.
19.     Under Section 96, IPC, “Nothing is an offence which is done  in  the
exercise of the right of private defence”. Right of private defence  of  the
body and of property has been enumerated under Section 97, IPC,  subject  to
the restrictions contained in Section 99,  IPC.  As  per  the  said  section
every person has a right to defend-
               “First.  -      His own body,  and  the  body  of  any  other
                        person, against any  offence  affecting  the  human
                        body;


             Secondly   -The property, whether movable or    immovable,  of
                       himself or of any other person, against any act which
                       is an offence falling under the definition of  theft,
                       robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or  which  is
                       an attempt to  commit  theft,  robbery,  mischief  or
                       criminal trespass.”

        Section 102, IPC, deals with commencement  and  continuance  of  the
right of private defence of the body as follows:
             “Section 102. Commencement and continuance  of  the  right  of
             private defence of the body.- The right of private defence  of
             the body commences as soon as  a  reasonable  apprehension  of
             danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to  commit
             the offence though the offence may not  have  been  committed;
             and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the
             body continues.”



        The extent and limitations  of  the  right  of  private  defence  is
prescribed under Section 96 to 106, IPC. Such a right can be exercised  only
to defend the unlawful action and not to retaliate.
20.     This Court in  George Dominic Varkey v. The State of Kerala,  (1971)
3 SCC 275, has held:

             “6……Broadly stated, the right  of  private  defence  rests  on
             three ideas: first, that there must be no more harm  inflicted
             than is necessary for the purpose of defence;  secondly,  that
             there must be reasonable apprehension of danger  to  the  body
             from the attempt  or  threat  to  commit  some  offence;  and,
             thirdly,  the  right  does  not  commence  until  there  is  a
             reasonable apprehension. It is entirely a question of fact  in
             the circumstances of a case  as  to  whether  there  has  been
             excess of private defence within the meaning of the 4th clause
             of Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code, namely, that  no  more
             harm is  inflicted  than  is  necessary  for  the  purpose  of
             defence. No one can be expected to find any pattern of conduct
             to meet a particular case. Circumstances must  show  that  the
             court can find that there was apprehension to life or property
             or  of  grievous  hurt.  If  it  is  found  that   there   was
             apprehension to life or property or of grievous hurt the right
             of private defence is  in  operation.  The  person  exercising
             right of private defence is entitled to stay and overcome  the
             threat.”

21.     In  Moti Singh v. State of  Maharashtra,  (2002)  9  SCC  494,  this
Court held that dimension of the injuries may not  be  serious,  it  is  the
situs of  the  injuries  that  would  indicate  whether  the  accused  could
reasonably entertain the apprehension that at least  grievous  injuries/hurt
would be caused to him by the assaulters unless aggression is thwarted.
22.     In the present case during the course of  cross-examination  of  the
prosecution witnesses, especially Jai Pal(PW.5), Romi Kapoor  (PW.6),  Pawan
Kumar (PW.7), Satish Kumar (PW.9) and Charanjeet Singh  (PW.12)  an  attempt
has been made on behalf of the  accused  to  set  up  the  case  of  private
defence.
23.     In  Rajender Singh and others v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4  SCC  298,
dealing with the similar proposition this Court held as follows:
             “Non-explanation of the injuries on the person of the accused,
             ipso facto, cannot be held to  be  fatal  to  the  prosecution
             case. Ordinarily, the prosecution is not  obliged  to  explain
             each and every injury on  the  person  of  the  deceased  even
             though such injuries might have been caused during the  course
             of the occurrence and they are minor in nature. But where  the
             injuries are grievous, non-explanation of such injuries  would
             attract the Court to look at the prosecution case with  little
             suspicion on the ground that the  prosecution  has  suppressed
             the true version of the incident.”



24.     Evidence of eye-witnesses, especially of the  injured,  namely,  Jai
Pal  (PW.5),  Romi  Kapoor  (PW.6)  and  Pawan  Kumar  (PW.7),   which   are
trustworthy, when  read  together,  we  find  that  non-explanation  of  the
injuries on the person of the accused and his two companions cannot be  held
to be fatal to the prosecution case.
25.     Satish Kumar (PW.9), an independent witness, who  was  also  staying
and sleeping in the Hall where the occurrence had  taken  place,  though  he
was declared hostile, has admitted the correctness of the prosecution  story
in the following terms:
             “It is correct that when I woke up on hearing the noise, I saw
             a boy coming in the hall and inquiring about the Manager  from
             the accused Manjit. It is correct that one of  the  associates
             of accused Manjit, i.e., one driver stated  that  we  are  not
             Chowkidar, so you tell the Manager. It is  correct  that  upon
             this accused persons started beating that boy  and  thereafter
             other associates of that boy also came in  the  hall  of  that
             hotel after about 5-7 minutes.”

        In answer to Court question, PW.9 has staed:
             “The driver who was with accused Manjit was heavily drunk  and
             was also abusing the other party and Manjit accused  tried  to
             prevail upon him  and  thereafter  said  driver  attempted  to
             assault those 4-5 persons present in the hall  and  thereafter
             free fighting between the parties.”

        The above statement of Satish Kumar  (PW.9)  lends  support  to  the
prosecution story to show that it was the accused who was the aggressor  and
that the accused had not acted in private defence.
26.     The question now requires to determine is as to what is  the  nature
of offence that the accused has committed.  The  evidence  produced  against
the accused does not show that the accused had any motive to cause death  of
the deceased or have intended to  cause  such  bodily  injuries  which  were
sufficient in the ordinary course of  nature  to  cause  the  death  of  the
deceased. Evidence on record also  does  not  establish  that  the  injuries
caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause  his  death
or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat  of
exchange of words accused caused injuries on the body of the deceased  which
caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the  murder  as  defined  in
Section 300, IPC, have not been established  against  the  accused.  In  our
opinion, the accused was  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to
murder under Section 304, IPC, and considering the  fact  that  the  accused
had no intention to either cause the death of the  deceased  or  cause  such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death  of  the  deceased,  it  would  be
sufficient  to  impose  on  accused  a  sentence  of  seven  years  rigorous
imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs.5,000/-  and  in  default  of
payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months.

27.     We, accordingly, set aside  the  conviction  of  the  accused  under
Section 302, IPC but hold him guilty of the offence under Section  304,  IPC
and sentence him to seven years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/-
, in default of payment of fine a further imprisonment of  six  months.  The
conviction and sentences for the offence under Section 324, IPC and  Section
27 of the Arms  Act  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  are  affirmed.  All  the
sentences shall run concurrently. If the accused-Manjeet Singh has  not  yet
undergone the sentence imposed and affirmed by us, and is  not  in  custody,
he be taken into custody to serve the remainder.

28.     The appeal stands  disposed  of  with  the  above  observations  and
directions.

                                                      ……………………………………………………J.
                                       (A.K. PATNAIK)




                                                     …….……….……………………………………J.
NEW DELHI,                          (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
APRIL 25, 2014.



ITEM NO.1B               COURT NO.10             SECTION IIB
(For Judgment)

            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 1695 OF 2005

MANJEET SINGH                                     Appellant (s)
                 VERSUS
STATE OF H.P.                                     Respondent(s)

Date: 25/04/2014  This Appeal was called on for pronouncement of
    judgment today.
CORAM :
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. AGRAWAL

For Appellant(s)        Mr. Prashant Chaudhary,Adv.

For Respondent(s)    Ms. Pragati Neekhra,Adv.


         Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya  pronounced  the
   reportable judgment of the Bench comprising  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  A.K.
   Patnaik and His Lordship.
                The conviction of the accused under Section 302, IPC is set
   aside but he is held guilty of the offence under Section 304, IPC and is
   sentenced to undergo seven  years  rigorous  imprisonment  and  fine  of
   Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine a further imprisonment of  six
   months. The conviction and sentences for the offence under Section  324,
   IPC and Section 27 of the  Arms  Act  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  are
   affirmed. All the sentences shall  run  concurrently.  If  the  accused-
   Manjeet Singh has not yet undergone the sentence  imposed  and  affirmed
   and is not in custody, he be taken into custody to serve the remainder.
                The appeal stands  disposed  of  in  terms  of  the  signed
   reportable judgment.


              [RAJNI MUKHI]                       [USHA SHARMA]
               SR. P.A.                   COURT MASTER

        (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

commuting the death sentence= considering the age of the accused, the possibility of reforming him cannot be ruled out. He cannot be termed as social menace. Further, the case does not fall under the “rarest of rare” category. We, therefore, are unable to uphold the death sentence. 48. For the reasons aforesaid we are commuting the death sentence of accused-Lalit Kumar Yadav alias Kuri to that of life imprisonment but affirm the rest part of the conviction and sentence = This Court in Ramnaresh and others v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257, applying the various principles to the facts of the said case and taking into consideration the age of the accused, possibility of the death of the deceased occurring accidently and the possibility of the accused reforming themselves held that the accused cannot be termed as social menace and commuted the sentence of death to that of life imprisonment (21 years). 42. In the present case, on the question of quantum of sentence the argument raised on behalf of the appellant is that the accused was young at the time of commission of offence i.e. 21 years of age, that he had no intention to kill the deceased and there is no past criminal antecedent. 43. On the other hand, learned counsel for the state contended that it was a heinous crime and the case of the appellant is similar like the case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee (supra). 44. We have noticed the case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee (supra). In the said case accused was a security guard and was responsible for providing security to the residents of the flats. Instead of that he used to tease a young girl child of one of the lady residents. On the complaint of the lady resident, he was transferred. To avenge the same he went up to the flat of the lady and committed rape on her daughter and then murdered her brutally. That was a case where the protector of residents becomes the offender. 45. The case of the appellant is not similar. The Trial Court and the High Court wrongly held that the case of the appellant is similar to that of Dhananjoy Chatterjee. 46. In the present case, the circumstantial evidence comes to only one conclusion that appellant attempted to commit rape and because of resistance he committed the murder of the deceased. The appellant was aged about 21 years at the time of offence. Initially when the matter for confirmation of death sentence was heard by the two learned Judges of the High Court there was a divided opinion, one Judge confirmed the death sentence while the other acquitted the appellant. It is the other Bench which affirmed the death sentence. It is not the case of the Prosecution that the appellant cannot be reformed. In fact the possibility of his reformation cannot be ruled out. There is no criminal antecedent of the appellant. The Court has to consider different parameters as laid down in Bachan Singh (supra) followed by Machhi Singh (supra) and balance the mitigating circumstances against the need for imposition of capital punishment. 47. While we apply the various principles to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that considering the age of the accused, the possibility of reforming him cannot be ruled out. He cannot be termed as social menace. Further, the case does not fall under the “rarest of rare” category. We, therefore, are unable to uphold the death sentence. 48. For the reasons aforesaid we are commuting the death sentence of accused-Lalit Kumar Yadav alias Kuri to that of life imprisonment but affirm the rest part of the conviction and sentence. The appeal is partly allowed only with regard to the quantum of sentence.= LALIT KUMAR YADAV @ KURI … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH … RESPONDENTS = 2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41472

 commuting  the  death  sentence=  considering the age  of  the  accused,  the
possibility of reforming him cannot be ruled out.  He cannot  be  termed  as
social menace. Further, the case does not fall under the  “rarest  of  rare”
category.  We, therefore, are unable to uphold the death sentence.
48.     For the reasons aforesaid we are commuting  the  death  sentence  of
accused-Lalit Kumar Yadav alias  Kuri  to  that  of  life  imprisonment  but
affirm the rest part of the conviction and sentence  =

This Court in Ramnaresh and others v. State of Chhattisgarh,  (2012)
4 SCC 257, applying the various principles to the facts  of  the  said  case
and taking into consideration the age of the  accused,  possibility  of  the
death of the deceased  occurring  accidently  and  the  possibility  of  the
accused reforming themselves held that  the  accused  cannot  be  termed  as
social  menace  and  commuted  the  sentence  of  death  to  that  of   life
imprisonment (21 years).
42.     In the present case, on the question  of  quantum  of  sentence  the
argument raised on behalf of the appellant is that the accused was young  at
the time of commission of offence i.e. 21 years  of  age,  that  he  had  no
intention to kill the deceased and there is no past criminal antecedent.
43.     On the other hand, learned counsel for the state contended  that  it
was a heinous crime and the case of the appellant is similar like  the  case
of Dhananjoy Chatterjee (supra).
44.     We have noticed the case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee  (supra).   In  the
said case accused was a security guard and  was  responsible  for  providing
security to the residents of the flats.  Instead of that he used to tease  a
young girl child of one of the lady residents.   On  the  complaint  of  the
lady resident, he was transferred.  To avenge the same he  went  up  to  the
flat of the lady and committed rape on her daughter and  then  murdered  her
brutally. That was a case where  the  protector  of  residents  becomes  the
offender.
45.     The case of the appellant is not similar.  The Trial Court  and  the
High Court wrongly held that the case of the appellant is  similar  to  that
of Dhananjoy Chatterjee.
46.     In the present case, the circumstantial evidence comes to  only  one
conclusion  that  appellant  attempted  to  commit  rape  and   because   of
resistance he committed the murder of the deceased.  The appellant was  aged
about 21 years at the time  of  offence.   Initially  when  the  matter  for
confirmation of death sentence was heard by the two learned  Judges  of  the
High Court there was a  divided  opinion,  one  Judge  confirmed  the  death
sentence while the other acquitted the appellant.  It  is  the  other  Bench
which affirmed the death sentence.  It is not the case  of  the  Prosecution
that the appellant cannot be reformed.   In  fact  the  possibility  of  his
reformation cannot be ruled out.  There is no  criminal  antecedent  of  the
appellant.  The Court has to consider different parameters as laid  down  in
Bachan Singh (supra) followed  by  Machhi  Singh  (supra)  and  balance  the
mitigating  circumstances  against  the  need  for  imposition  of   capital
punishment.
47.     While we apply the various principles to the facts  of  the  present
case, we are of the opinion that considering the age  of  the  accused,  the
possibility of reforming him cannot be ruled out.  He cannot  be  termed  as
social menace. Further, the case does not fall under the  “rarest  of  rare”
category.  We, therefore, are unable to uphold the death sentence.
48.     For the reasons aforesaid we are commuting  the  death  sentence  of
accused-Lalit Kumar Yadav alias  Kuri  to  that  of  life  imprisonment  but
affirm the rest part of the conviction and sentence.  The appeal  is  partly
allowed only with regard to the quantum of sentence.
2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41472            
A.K. PATNAIK, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
                                                                REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1022  OF 2006




    LALIT KUMAR YADAV @ KURI                           … APPELLANT


                                   Versus
    STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                     …
    RESPONDENTS




                               J U D G M E N T




    Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.


          This appeal is directed against the impugned common judgment dated
    11th August, 2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature at  Allahabad,
    Lucknow Bench in Capital Sentence Reference No.1 of 2005 with  Criminal
    Appeal No.252 of 2005 from Jail and Criminal Appeal No.  384  of  2005.
    By the impugned common judgment the  High  Court  while  dismissed  the
    appeal preferred by the appellant, answered the reference affirming the
    death sentence imposed by the Trial Court  for  the  offence  committed
    under Section 302 IPC for having committed murder of Km.  ‘x’  (victim:
    original name  not  disclosed).   The  High  Court  also  affirmed  the
    conviction and sentence passed against the appellant under Section  376
    read with Section 511 of Indian Penal Code for having made  an  attempt
    to commit rape on Km. ‘x’ aged about 18  years  and  sentenced  him  to
    undergo five years rigorous imprisonment thereunder.
    2.  Initially the appeal  was  heard  by  the  Division  Bench  of  the
    Allahabad High  Court,  Lucknow  Bench  and  after  conclusion  of  the
    arguments the Hon’ble Judges  pronounced  their  judgments  but  had  a
    divided opinion; one Hon’ble Judge affirmed the order of conviction and
    sentence recorded by the  Trial  Court  and  the  other  Hon’ble  Judge
    reversed the whole judgment and the order of the Trial  Court  and  out
    rightly acquitted the accused-appellant on both the counts.  Therefore,
    the case was referred under Section 392 Cr.PC  to  a  third  Judge  who
    after hearing the parties  and  on  appreciation  of  evidence  by  the
    impugned  judgment  dated  11th  August,  2006  dismissed  the  appeals
    preferred by the appellant and another on  his  behalf.   The  judgment
    rendered by the Trial Court has  been  upheld  and  the  reference  was
    answered confirming the penalty of death sentence.
    3.  Learned counsel appearing  for  the  appellant,  inter  alia,  made
    following submissions in assailing the judgment under appeal:
                (i)     `The prosecution has failed to produce any  witness
    to prove the very factum of the registration of the FIR.   Irrespective
    of the same it is ante-timed.
                 (ii)     Ram  Chandra  Chauarasiya  (PW-1)  is  a   highly
    interested witness and has entered into the witness box  only  for  the
    purpose of achieving the conviction of the appellant. The statement  of
    PW-1 is not   corroborated  by  any  one  even  though  witnesses  were
    available for the same.
           (iii) Sriram(PW-9), who was produced to prove recovery  memo  is
    not an independent but an interested witness who is the  son-in-law  of
    brother of PW-1.
           (iv) The ‘polythene’ bag in which the ‘sickle’ was  wrapped  was
    taken by the Investigating Officer without any seal from  the  site  of
    recovery.
           (v)  The alleged recovery of clothes ‘Baniyan and towel’ do  not
    satisfy  the  mandate  of  Section  27  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act.
    Therefore, the result of chemical examiner is of no value to prove  the
    charge.
           (vi) Identification by sniffer dog cannot be taken  as  evidence
    for the purpose of establishing guilt of the appellant.
    4.  Before we proceed to discuss the merits of the  above  contentions,
    it is desirable to notice the case of the prosecution and  evidence  on
    record as recapitulated below:
    5.  On 23.2.2004, Ram Chandra Chaurasiya (PW-1) and his wife  Vidyawati
    residents  of  village  Gogulpur,  Police  Station  Satrikh,   District
    Barabanki had gone to their agricultural field.  When they returned  to
    their house at 2.30 p.m., they were informed by  their  daughter  Guddi
    that their another daughter Km.‘x’ had gone  to  beckon  them  at  1.30
    p.m., as on that day, Govind, the son of Ram Chandra Chaurasiya’s  sala
    (brother-in-law) had come to their house, his two daughters thought  it
    proper to inform their parents and it was in this background  that  Km.
    ‘x’ had gone to inform and summon her parents.  All the family  members
    had a long wait for Km.‘x’ to return but when she did not come back  up
    to 4.00p.m., Ram Chandra Chaurasiya (PW-1)  and  Vidyawati  both  being
    worried left in search of their daughter.  When they were going through
    the agricultural fields, they were shocked to see their daughter Km.‘x’
    lying dead in pool of blood in the plot of one Vishwanath.  Ram Chandra
    Chaurasiya (PW-1) lodged a written report (Ext. Ka.1) at Satrikh Police
    Station where upon a case was registered and  the  then  Station  House
    Officer Shri Ashok Kumar Yadav assumed the charge of investigation  and
    immediately swung into action.  He visited the site of  occurrence  and
    soon sent for the dog squad.  An Inspector of the  Crime  Investigation
    Department, who was In-charge of a sniffer dog, named ‘Raja’ arrived at
    the place of occurrence late in the evening. He  instructed  ‘Raja’  to
    pick up the smell of culprit from the site of occurrence and then  find
    out some clue of the crime and the criminal.  ‘Raja’  who  was  a  very
    well trained dog of German Shepherd species and who had earlier  helped
    to uncover many crimes, smelt all the important spots around  the  dead
    body at the site of occurrence and chasing the trail of the same smell,
    it walked  along  with  police  personnel  and  villagers  behind,  and
    straightaway reached  at  the  house  of  the  accused-appellant.   The
    appellant and his brother wrapped with blankets  were  sleeping  inside
    their house.  ‘Raja’ barked at the blanket  of  the  accused-appellant,
    who was immediately grabbed over by the police. On the next day i.e. on
    24th  February,  2004,  the  Investigating  Officer  recovered  at  the
    instance of accused-appellant the bloodstained  Baniyan  (vest)  and  a
    Gamchha (towel) of the accused-appellant and also Hansiya (scythe) used
    in the commission of crime.  The chemical examiner  on  examination  of
    the three recovered articles noticed that there was blood  on  all  the
    said incriminating articles.  The inquest report was also  prepared  on
    24th February, 2004 by the Investigating Officer.  As  recited  in  the
    said report, the throat of the victim of occurrence was  found  chopped
    off.  Her neck was barely connected with the trunk.  The dupatta of the
    deceased was found embedded in the large wound and all the five fingers
    of her left hand had cut wounds.  Her dead body was packed  and  sealed
    in a bundle and sent for post-mortem.  Although the scene at  the  site
    of occurrence revealed that the Salwar (trouser) of the girl  had  been
    untied and taken off down and she was found in the naked state and also
    there were the signs of violence all  around  which  indicated  that  a
    ferocious attempt to commit rape on her was made, yet the Doctor  found
    that the girl had not been ravished.
    6.          The Investigating Officer prepared the  site  plan  of  the
    occurrence.  He collected ordinary and bloodstained  earth  from  there
    and packed them in separate boxes.  The trampled  wheat  plants  around
    the dead body revealed a tale of violence.  Both the  chappals  of  the
    deceased were also lying at a distance.  After  interrogating  all  the
    relevant witnesses, collecting the relevant reports including the post-
    mortem, the Investigating Officer accomplished  the  investigation  and
    submitted a charge-sheet against the accused appellant.
    7.  Lalit Kumar Yadav pleaded not guilty before  the  Trial  Court  and
    denied all the incriminating allegations  levelled  against  him.   He,
    however, admitted that he had been arrested by the police at 11.00 p.m.
    on 23rd February, 2004, i.e. the date of occurrence.
    8.  The prosecution examined as many as ten witnesses in support of the
    prosecution story. Ram Chandra Chaurasiya (PW-1) is the father  of  the
    deceased.  He proved his report and also testified  that  the  accused-
    appellant had teased the deceased girl a few days before the occurrence
    and when Km.‘x’ complained about the incident of teasing to her  cousin
    Ashok Kumar, the latter had scolded the appellant. Unfortunately, Ashok
    Kumar died subsequent to the  occurrence.   He  also  proved  that  the
    police called a dog who after smelling the site of  occurrence  tracked
    down to the house of the accused and caught him.
    9.  Ram Prakash Yadav (PW-2) was the witness to whom the appellant  had
    allegedly confessed about the commission of crime.   He  was,  however,
    declared hostile and it was suggested  that  he  being  a  ‘Yadav’  had
    helped the accused by retracting his earlier statement.   He,  however,
    confirmed the fact of a sniffer dog being brought to the village by the
    police.
    10. Similarly, Ram Prakash (PW-3),  S/o  Jagannath  turned  hostile  by
    rejecting the suggestion of the prosecution that the  accused-appellant
    conveyed and confessed to him that he had killed the girl as she was  a
    girl of easy virtue.
    11. Abdul Lais Khan (PW-4) is the handler of the  German  Shepherd  Dog
    known as ‘Raja’. The said dog was taken to  the  village  in  the  late
    evening on the date  of  occurrence.   Shri  Khan  was  then  the  Sub-
    Inspector in the Crime Research Branch (Dog Squad),  District  Lucknow.
    He testified that at about 8 p.m. on February 23, 2004, he was directed
    by the Senior of Superintendent of Police, Lucknow to go to the site of
    occurrence.  Accordingly, he arrived there at 8.30 p.m.  alongwith  the
    German shepherd dog named as ‘Raja’. He started the search  work  at  9
    p.m., it being a night with dark all around,  a  patromax  lantern  was
    lightened  up  near  the  dead  body  of  the  victim.   He  asked  for
    arrangement of more light  which  was  provided  by  the  Investigating
    Officer and then he instructed the dog to smell the footprints  of  the
    culprit around the dead body and then set the dog scot-free  and  asked
    it to move. He alongwith  the  police  personnel  and  other  villagers
    walked behind the dog.  After walking about 1 k.m. the dog  reached  in
    the village Gokulpur Aseni.  It then  traversed  through  the  Khadanja
    street.   After tracking the street in front of 10-12 houses,  the  dog
    entered into a thatched house, where two boys were resting on a  wooden
    cot.  The dog barked at the accused Lalit Kumar who was  identified  by
    Abdul Lais Khan in the Court as the same person, who was smelled by the
    dog and whom it had attempted to pounce and catch hold. However, in the
    meantime,  the  Station  House  Officer  of  Police   Station   Satrikh
    apprehended Lalit Kumar. In nutshell, according to the evidence of this
    witness, the accused was  the  offender  whose  footprints  were  there
    around the dead body.
    12. Head Constable Ram Prakash Shailesh (PW-5) had  prepared  the  chik
    report Ex.Ka.5 on the basis of Ram Chandra Chaurasiya’s written  report
    (Ext.Ka.1). He registered  the  case  in  the  General  Case  Diary  at
    Sl.No.33 on 23rd February, 2004 and submitted its copy Ext.Ka.6.
    13. Dr. Arun Chandra Dwivedi (PW-6) is the Doctor,  who  conducted  the
    post mortem of the victim’s corpse  and  prepared  the  autopsy  report
    (Ext.Ka.7).  He proved the said  report  before  the  Trial  Court  and
    testified that the neck of the deceased was  almost  severed  from  the
    trunk with a namesake junction of the skin. He confirmed  that  it  was
    possible for the neck of the victim being severed by the sickle  having
    small teeth.
    14. It is significant  to  note  that  Dr.  Arun  Chandra  Dwivedi  was
    summoned by the High Court under Sections 367(1) and 391 of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure with a view to ascertain as  to  whether  the  major
    injury by which there was almost a severance of the neck from the trunk
    could possibly be caused with the sickle (Mat.-Ex.8). High Court  while
    passing an order on July 13, 2005 expressed that something  lacking  so
    far as the use of sickle was concerned.   The  doctor  deposed  in  the
    Court that the major incised wound found on the neck  could  have  been
    caused by the sharp edged ‘hansia’ (sickle) but it could not  be  asked
    in the Trial Court as to whether this kind of injury could possibly  be
    caused by the aforesaid ‘hansia’ Mat.-Ext.8, which  had  teeth  on  its
    blade. In common parlance such a ‘hansia’ curved in design is known  as
    ‘Aaridar’ – means blade with teeth.  Dr. Dwivedi  appeared  before  the
    High Court. The sealed bundle of the sickle was opened in the Court and
    shown to Dr. Arun Chandra Dwivedi,  who  was  then  posted  as  Medical
    Officer, District Hospital, Barabanki. He  testified  before  the  High
    Court that the injuries shown in the post mortem report Ext.Ka.7  could
    possibly be caused by the sickle Mat.-Ext.8. It was also stated by  him
    that the injuries in the  fingers  of  the  deceased  could  have  been
    sustained by the victim while defending herself.
    15. Head-Constable Devtadeen (PW-7) took out on March 16, 2004 the  two
    sealed bundles of this case  from  ‘malkhana’  of  the  Police  Station
    Satrikh at 2.30 p.m. and after making an entry in the G.D. went to  the
    Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barabanki and obtained a letter,  a
    copy  addressed  to  the  Chemical  Examiner  for  examination  of  the
    incriminating articles. Then on  17th  March,  2004,  he  went  to  the
    laboratory and deposited both  bundles  alognwith  the  letter  in  the
    laboratory.
    16. Constable Awadhesh Kumar (PW-8) proved that  he  carried  the  dead
    body of the victim to the mortuary for autopsy.
    17.  Sriram  (PW-9)  is  a  relative  of  the  informant  Ram   Chandra
    Chaurasiya.  He came to participate in the cremation  of  the  latter’s
    daughter.  In the evening, the Investigating Officer met him and  asked
    him to accompany him to the accused-appellant’s house.  He  went  there
    along with other village  men.  The  accused  had  taken  all  of  them
    including the Investigating Officer inside the house and took  out  the
    sickle wrapped in a ‘polythene’ and  his  clothes  namely  Baniyan  and
    Gamchha. To depic this discovery, memo  Ex.K.12  was  prepared  by  the
    Investigating Officer. This witness identified his signature on it.
    18. Sub-Inspector Ashok  Kumar  Yadav  (PW  10)  is  the  Investigating
    Officer of this  case.   According  to  his  evidence,  this  case  was
    registered in his presence at the  Satrikh  Police  Station.   He  then
    reached at the site of occurrence at about  6.30  p.m.,  inspected  the
    site of occurrence, saw the dead body lying in the  agricultural  field
    of Vishwanath, prepared the site-plan Ext.Ka.13 and then contacted  his
    higher authorities and asked for a Dog Squad.  He sent his  own  police
    jeep for bringing the dog.  The Deputy Superintendent of  Police  Deena
    Nath Dubey was also present at the  site  of  occurrence.   Abdul  Lais
    Khan, Sub-Inspector, incharge  of  the  Dog  arrived  at  the  site  of
    occurrence long after the sunset and examined the site in the light  of
    patromax.  Shri Khan instructed the dog to smell  the  entire  site  of
    occurrence as also the dead body and then the said dog with the help of
    the trail of the smell reached at the house of  the  accused,  who  was
    lying on a ‘takhat’, i.e., the wooden cot.  The dog barked at  him.  He
    then interrogated the accused about his relationship with the deceased.
     At 7 p.m. on the other day, he prepared the inquest report  (Ext.Ka.4)
    and  interrogated  other  witnesses.  The  accused  was  then  formally
    arrested and he led to the recovery of  the  sickle  (Mat.-Ext.8),  his
    Gamchha (Mat.-Ext.9) and Baniyan (Mat.-Ext.10). After completing  other
    formalities  of  interrogating  the  witnesses  and  collecting   other
    material exhibits, the Investigating Officer brought  the  accused  and
    the sealed bundles and boxes  of  the  incriminating  articles  to  the
    police station. On having completed the  task  of  investigation,  this
    witness submitted charge-sheet Ext.Ka.28 against the accused.
    19. The defence of the appellant was that of denial. The  appellant  in
    his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. stated  the  charges  had  been
    wrongly framed  and  also  denied  all  the  incriminating  allegations
    levelled against him.
    20. The prosecution relied upon four pieces of circumstantial  evidence
    first,  Sniffer Dog- tracking  evidence,   the  other  is  recovery  of
    sickle i.e. the weapon which was used by the  appellant  to   cut   the
    neck of  the girl,  the  third  is  the  recovery  of  clothes  of  the
    appellant and past conduct of the appellant pertaining to  eve  teasing
    of the deceased girl.
    21. Relying upon the prosecution case and the evidence led  in  support
    thereof, the learned trial  court  held  the  accused-appellant  guilty
    under Sections 302 and 376 read with Section 511 of the I.P.C. and then
    sentenced him to death for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C.  and  5
    years rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 read with
    Section 511 of the IPC.  The High Court on reference affirmed the death
    sentence.
    22. There is a suspicion on  the  veracity  of  the  First  Information
    Report (Ext. Ka-1) with reference to  its  entry  in  the  G.D.  Report
    (Ext.Ka-6).  According to recital of  the  G.D.  report  (Ex.Ka.6)  Ram
    Chandra Chaurasiya himself submitted his written report at  the  police
    station.   The reference was made it to the testimony  of  Ram  Chandra
    Chaurasiya (PW-1), father of the victim who testified that he  dictated
    the report and got it sent to the police station. He however, could not
    recollect the name of the villager who carried the said report.    This
    was the ground  taken  by  the  counsel  for  the  appellant  to  raise
    suspicion on the veracity of  the  first  information  report.    As  a
    matter of fact, there is nothing inconsistent between the testimony  of
    the  PW-1 and  G.D. Report.  The  FIR  (Ext.Ka.1)   takes  few   facts.
    Neither  any accused was named in it nor there  is  any  infirmity.   A
    perusal of the  said report would  reveal  that  the  informant  (PW-1)
    mainly disclosed  in it that his daughter Km.‘x’  aged about  18  years
    had gone in search of her parents, was found dead in  the  agricultural
    field  of Vishwanath on 23rd February, 2004.  It was  also  added  that
    some person  incised her neck.   A  prayer  for  necessary  action  was
    pressed into service.    The occurrence came to the notice of informant
    PW-1 after 4.00 p.m.  and the written report   was  submitted  at  6.10
    p.m. on the same day at  Satrikh Police Station, about 7 kms.  from the
    village.   Looking  to  the gravity of the offence  and  shock  of  the
    family members of the deceased, it cannot be said that there  is  delay
    in reporting the matter to the police.
           We, therefore, find that there is no inconsistency on the  point
    to act.
    23. The  second  submission  of  the  appellant  is  that  Ram  Chandra
    Chaursiya (PW-1)  is highly interested witness and his statement is not
    corroborated by any other witness though available.
           Ram Chandra Chaursiya (PW-1) disclosed that a  few  days  before
    the   date  of  occurrence,   accused  teased  his  daughter  and  also
    threatened her. Her  daughter  Km.‘x’   explained   about  the  accused
    misconduct to her  cousin Ashok Kumar. Later, on  having  received  the
    complaint about  the indecent behaviour  of  the  accused,  he  scolded
    him.  Unfortunately, Ashok Kumar died subsequently but the evidence  of
    the  victim’s father is quite convincing and  worth   to  believe.   In
    fact in FIR he has not named the accused. Merely because  PW-1  is  the
    father of the deceased victim girl,  his evidence cannot be doubted  on
    that count in absence of any suspicion.
    24. The next argument assails the testimony of  Sriram  (PW-9)  on  the
    ground that he is related to the deceased.  He fairly stated that he is
    son-in-law of Ram Chandra’s cousin. He has come from Ibrahimpur village
    of district Barabanki. He was the person  who  accompanied  the  police
    party to the house of the  accused.   He  has  fully  corroborated  the
    testimony of the Investigating Officer and testified that  the  accused
    leading the police party and a few citizens  including  himself  opened
    the door of his house and had taken out the sickle lying below the cot.
    He rejected the defence suggestion that the Investigating  Officer  had
    pointed out towards the sickle; rather asserted that it was the accused
    himself  who  had  picked  up  the  sickle  and  handed  over  to   the
    Investigating Officer.  The  accused  unwrapped  the  sickle  from  the
    ‘polythene’ sheet.   The  Investigating  Officer  retained  the  sickle
    alongwith polythene.  There is slight variance on the point of time  of
    it being prepared.  Whereas it is recited in the recovery memo that the
    police party being led by the accused arrived at the accused  house  at
    6.00 p.m., Sriram (PW-9) disclosed that it  was  about  7.00-7.30  p.m.
    when the memo was prepared.  It  is  the  common  experience  that  the
    daylight continues even after sunset upto 20-25 minutes.  The villagers
    give approximate timing generally based on the  position  of  the  sun.
    So, the possibility of the recovery memo being prepared in the daylight
    at the time of the day meeting with night popularly called as ‘Dusk’ is
    absolutely credible.   The  variance  besides  being  insignificant  is
    justified, as after recovery, it would have taken  some  time  for  the
    Investigating Officer to  finish  the  job  after  completing  all  the
    relevant formalities including examination of the weapon.    The  whole
    recovery memo is found written in the handwriting of the  Investigating
    Officer.  Therefore, in the time of  its  preparation  has  no  adverse
    bearing.  Only because Sriram (PW-9) is being related to  the  deceased
    there can be no reason to doubt the veracity of his  testimony  as  his
    presence in the village on 24.02.2004 is  justified.  On  having  heard
    about Ram Chandra’s daughter death, in ordinary course being a relative
    he came to express his condolence and participated in the cremation  of
    the girl.  He cannot be stated to be chance witness.  In  fact  nothing
    could be extracted from his cross-examination,  which  might  be  given
    indication of his being not a  probable  witness  of  the  recovery  of
    sickle and recovery memo (Ext. Ka-12).  We, therefore,  find  that  his
    presence in the village being most natural and probable,  his  evidence
    is full of credit and acceptable.
    25. The next contention made  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  was  that
    polythene in the Sickle wrapped and taken by Investigating Officer  was
    without any seal at the time of recovery.  This contention is untenable
    on the face of recovery memo itself.  In the latter part of  this  memo
      (Ext.Ka-12), description of the  Sickle  is  given  and  then  it  is
    recited in clear terms that it was sealed then and there  in  a  packet
    and recovery memo prepared.
                The Investigating Officer (PW-10) has also stated  that  on
    the statement of the accused, the sickle was recovered from  his  house
    in presence of witness Sriram (PW-9) and  also  got  recovered  Gamchha
    (Towel) and Baniyan of the accused.  The recovery of the  sickle  which
    was kept in the clothes under the Cot was made from the  house  of  the
    accused.  The Investigating Officer has also stated that the sickle was
    having bloodstains and after taking the sickle and bloodstained Gamchha
    and Baniyan in custody he sealed the same.
    26. The validity of recovery proceeding  has  been  questioned  by  the
    learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that  the  confessional
    statement is not admissible under Sections 25  and  26  of  the  Indian
    Evidence Act.    However,  Section  27  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,
    provides as follows:


           “27. How much  of  information  received  from  accused  may  be
           proved.-  Provided  that,  when  any  fact  is  deposed  to   as
           discovered in consequence of information received from a  person
           accused of any offence, in the custody of a police  officer,  so
           much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession  or
           not as it relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may
           be proved.”




          Therefore, in the light of aforesaid provisions, the statement  of
    accused so far as it relates to giving  of  information  regarding  the
    hiding of the sickle and recovery of the same can be taken into account
    to prove the truth of the incident and to prove the statements of other
    witnesses which corroborated the same.
    27. In Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657, this Court
    noticed the scope and ambit of Section 27 of the  Indian  Evidence  Act
    and observed:
           “16. The various requirements of the section can be summed up as
           follows:
           (1) The fact of which evidence is sought to  be  given  must  be
           relevant to the issue.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the
           provision has nothing to do with the question of relevancy.  The
           relevancy of the fact discovered must be  established  according
           to the prescriptions relating to  relevancy  of  other  evidence
           connecting  it  with  the  crime  in  order  to  make  the  fact
           discovered admissible.
           (2) The fact must have been discovered.
           (3)  The  discovery  must  have  been  in  consequence  of  some
           information received from the accused and not by  the  accused’s
           own act.
           (4) The person giving the information must  be  accused  of  any
           offence.
           (5) He must be in the custody of a police officer.
           (6) The discovery  of  a  fact  in  consequence  of  information
           received from an accused in custody must be deposed to.
           (7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates
           distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The
           rest is inadmissible.”


    28. In Pandurang Kalu Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC  490,
    this Court observed:
           “5. Even the recent decision in State  of  Maharashtra  v.  Damu
           (2000) 6 SCC 269 this Court followed Pulukuri Kottaya  AIR  1947
           PC 67  with approval. The  fallacy  committed  by  the  Division
           Bench as per the impugned judgment is  possibly  on  account  of
           truncating the word “fact” in Section 27  of  the  Evidence  Act
           from the adjoining word “discovered”. The essence of Section  27
           is that it was  enacted  as  a  proviso  to  the  two  preceding
           sections (see Sections 25 and 26) which imposed a  complete  ban
           on the admissibility of any confession made by an accused either
           to the police or to  anyone  while  the  accused  is  in  police
           custody. The object of making a provision in Section 27  was  to
           permit a certain portion of the statement made by an accused  to
           a police officer admissible in  evidence  whether  or  not  such
           statement is confessional or non-confessional. Nonetheless,  the
           ban against admissibility would stand lifted  if  the  statement
           distinctly related to  a  discovery  of  fact.  A  fact  can  be
           discovered by the police (investigating officer) pursuant to  an
           information elicited from the accused  if  such  disclosure  was
           followed by one or more of a variety of causes. Recovery  of  an
           object is only one such cause. Recovery, or even  production  of
           object by itself need not necessarily result in discovery  of  a
           fact. That is why Sir John Beaumont said in Pulukuri Kottaya AIR
           1947 PC 67 (p. 70, para 10) that “it is fallacious to treat  the
           ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object
           produced”. The following sentence of the learned Law Lord in the
           said decision,  though  terse,  is  eloquent  in  conveying  the
           message highlighting the pith of the ratio: (AIR p. 70, para 10)
            “Information supplied by  a  person  in  custody  that  ‘I  will
           produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’ does not lead
           to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered  many  years
           ago. It leads to the discovery of  the  fact  that  a  knife  is
           concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if
           the knife is proved to have been used in the commission  of  the
           offence, the fact discovered is very relevant.”


    29. In Bodh Raj alias Bodha and others v. State of Jammu  and  Kashmir,
    AIR 2002 SC 3164,  it  was  held  that  a  statement  even  by  way  of
    confession made in police custody which distinctly relates to the facts
    discovered  is  admissible  in  evidence  against  the  accused.    The
    statement which is admissible under Section 27 is the one which is  the
    information leading to discovery.  Thus what is  admissible  being  the
    information, same has to be proved and not the opinion formed on it  by
    the police officer.  The exact information given by the  accused  while
    in custody which led to the recovery of the article has to  be  proved;
    the exact information must be adduced through evidence.
    30. In the present case the recovery of ‘Gamchha’ and ‘Baniyan’ at  the
    instance of the accused from the underneath  the  Takhat  (Cot)  is  an
    important factor that connects the accused with the crime.    According
    to the report of the chemical examiner and serologist, blood  was  also
    found on the said ‘Gamchha’ and ‘Baniyan’  belonging  to  the  accused.
    This leads to the conclusion that at the time of committing murder  the
    accused was wearing the  ‘Gamchha’  and  ‘Baniyan’  and  thereafter  he
    concealed them underneath the Takhat.
          Therefore, the  aforesaid  contention  raised  on  behalf  of  the
    appellant that the alleged recovery of clothes i.e. Gamchha and Baniyan
    do not satisfy the mandate of Section 27 of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act
    cannot be sustained.
    31. It was lastly urged on behalf of the appellant that  identification
    of accused by sniffer dog cannot be relied upon as it is not admissible
    in order to prove the guilt of the appellant.
                Similar  contention  was  raised  in  Abdul  Rajak  Murtaja
    Dafedar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 234, wherein  this  Court
    opined “that in the present state of scientific knowledge  evidence  of
    dog tracking, even if admissible, is not ordinarily of  much weight.”
    32. In Gade Lakshmi Mangaraju alias Ramesh v. State of A.P.,  (2001)  6
    SCC  205,  this  Court  noticed  the  criticism  advanced  against  the
    reception of evidence pertaining to sniffer  dog.   The  objection  was
    that the life and liberty of human being should not be made  to  depend
    on animals sensibilities and that the possibility of a  dog  misjudging
    the smell or mistaking the track cannot be ruled out, for many  a  time
    such mistakes have happened.   In the said  case,  this  Court  relying
    decision in Abdul Rajak Murtaja Dafedar (supra) case held:
           “17. We are of the view that criminal  courts  need  not  bother
           much about the  evidence  based  on  sniffer  dogs  due  to  the
           inherent  frailties  adumbrated  above,   although   we   cannot
           disapprove the investigating agency employing such sniffer  dogs
           for helping the investigation to track down criminals.”


    33. In Dinesh Borthakur v. State of Assam, (2008) 5 SCC 697, while  the
    same question was  considered,  referring  to  Gade  Lakshmi  Mangaraju
    (supra) case this Court held “the law in  this  behalf,  therefore,  is
    settled that while the services of a sniffer dog may be taken  for  the
    purpose of investigation, its faculties cannot be taken as evidence for
    the purpose of establishing the guilt of an accused.”
    34. In the present case, the services of a sniffer dog  was  taken  for
    investigation. The said dog traced the  accused  and  he  was  formally
    arrested in the evening of the next day.   The  Investigating  Officer,
    Ashok Kumar Yadav (PW-10) corroborated the evidence of Abdul Lais  Khan
    (PW-4) to the effect that  ‘Raja’ sniffer dog after  picking  up  scent
    from the place of occurrence tracked down the  house  of  the  accused.
    What is relevant to note is that the accused has not been convicted  on
    the ground that the sniffer dog tracked down the house of  the  accused
    and barked at him.  The evidence of dog tracking  only  shows  how  the
    accused was arrested.   The Trial Court and the Appellate Court noticed
    the motive of the accused.  Ram Chandra Chaurasiya (PW-1) disclosed  in
    his evidence that a few days before the date of occurrence, the accused
    has teased his daughter and also threatened her.  Her  daughter  Km.‘x’
    complained about the misconduct of the  accused  to  her  cousin  Ashok
    Kumar and the latter admonished the accused for the same.  Ashok  Kumar
    died subsequently but the  evidence  of  the  girl’s  father  is  quite
    convincing and  worthy  of  credit.   The  aforesaid  incident  clearly
    reflects upon the motive of the accused.
          The prosecution has brought on record evidence as to string of her
    trouser was found untied and the trouser had been taken down.  She  was
    lying naked when found dead.  The  scene  at  the  site  of  occurrence
    indicates that the trouser of the deceased had been taken down  with  a
    view to outrage her modesty.  A  portion  of  her  dupatta  were  found
    thrust in her mouth so as to gag her.  The other part  of  the  dupatta
    was found in the incised wound on the neck so as to  soak  blood.   The
    pair of the chappals of the deceased was  lying  at  a  distance.   The
    wheat plants were noticed to be trampled which indicates violence and a
    scuffle between the victim and  the  assailant.   The  episode  of  eve
    teasing of the girl indicates that the accused wanted sex with her  and
    it was in this background that he made a forcible attempt to rape  her.
    It appears that the girl was  bold  and  brave  and  she  resisted  the
    accused forceful attempt which enraged  and  provoked  the  accused  to
    eventually commit the heinous act.
          Since there is no direct  evidence  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the
    accused  the  Trial  Court  and  the  Appellate  Court  considered  the
    circumstances which led towards the accused.   Admittedly,  nobody  was
    named in the FIR but referring to the incident that Km.‘x’ was murdered
    the  FIR  was  lodged.   Since  nobody  was  named  in  the   FIR   the
    Investigating Officer took the help  of  the  dog  squad  and  the  dog
    handler Abdul Lais  Khan  (PW-4)  came  with  the  dog.   Dog  tracking
    proceeding was done and the dog tracked the accused. The said  fact  is
    not disputed.  The  accused  who  was  then  taken  into  custody  gave
    statement regarding commission of crime.  Though the statement  is  not
    admissible, at his instance the sickle as well as blood stained  cloths
    were recovered.  The report proved that the sickle was  blood  stained.
    The Doctor has given statement that the injury caused upon  the  victim
    could have been caused by the weapon so recovered which establish  that
    the said weapon  was  used  in  committing  the  murder.   Ram  Chandra
    Chaurasiya (PW-1) father of the victim had given statement that earlier
    also the accused eve-teased his daughter Km.‘x’ for  which  his  nephew
    Ashok Kumar  scolded  accused.   Ram  Prakash  (PW-3)  although  turned
    hostile had made statement that accused had confessed to him that since
    the girl has refused sexual relationship with him he had murdered  her.
    Though such statement cannot be relied upon independently to  hold  the
    accused guilty, other chain of evidence reaches to only one  conclusion
    i.e. against the accused.  Recovery of handkerchief from the  place  of
    murder, with the mark of “Heart” and inscription of the words  “I  Love
    You”,  establishes that some person were closed to her.   The  position
    of her cloth of the lower body “salwar” establish that the person tried
    to have sex with the girl and the injuries on the fingers of  the  girl
    also established that she protested somehow.  These circumstances  also
    lead to the conclusion that the person who could not succeed in outrage
    the modesty of the girl, murdered her.   There  is  no  other  evidence
    contrary to it.  Further, there is no  evidence  to  suggest  that  the
    father of the deceased had any enmity or grudge with anyone who may  be
    suspected to have committed the murder.  All these circumstances proved
    that it is nobody else but the accused who attempted to commit rape and
    murdered the deceased Km.‘x’.
35.     On the point of awarding death sentence,  a  Constitution  Bench  of
this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980), 2 SCC 684 observed:
            “206. Dr Chitale has suggested these mitigating factors:
            “Mitigating circumstances.—In the exercise of its discretion  in
            the above cases, the court shall take into account the following
            circumstances:
            (1) That the  offence  was  committed  under  the  influence  of
            extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
            (2) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or  old,  he
            shall not be sentenced to death.
            (3) The probability that the accused w
            ould not commit criminal acts of violence as would constitute  a
            continuing threat to society.
            (4) The  probability  that  the  accused  can  be  reformed  and
            rehabilitated. The  State  shall  by  evidence  prove  that  the
            accused does not satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) above.
            (5) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the  accused
            believed  that  he  was  morally  justified  in  committing  the
            offence.
            (6) That the accused acted under the  duress  or  domination  of
            another person.
            (7) That the  condition  of  the  accused  showed  that  he  was
            mentally  defective  and  that  the  said  defect  impaired  his
            capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.


            207. We will do no more  than to say that these are  undoubtedly
            relevant circumstances and must be given  great  weight  in  the
            determination of sentence.........”


    36. In Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC  470,  this  Court
    discussed the circumstances in which the death sentence can be  awarded
    and summarised the guidelines indicated in Bachan Singh(Supra) as under


            “38. In this background the guidelines indicated in Bachan Singh
            case will have to be culled out and applied to the facts of each
            individual case where the question of imposing of death sentence
            arises. The following  propositions  emerge  from  Bachan  Singh
            case:


            “(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be  inflicted  except
            in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
            (ii) Before opting for the death penalty  the  circumstances  of
            the ‘offender’ also require to be taken into consideration along
            with the circumstances of the ‘crime’.
            (iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and  death  sentence  is  an
            exception. In other words death sentence must  be  imposed  only
            when life imprisonment appears to be  an  altogether  inadequate
            punishment having regard to the relevant  circumstances  of  the
            crime, and provided, and only provided,  the  option  to  impose
            sentence of imprisonment  for  life  cannot  be  conscientiously
            exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances  of  the
            crime and all the relevant circumstances.
            (iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
            has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating  circumstances
            have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to  be
            struck between the aggravating and the mitigating  circumstances
            before the option is exercised.”


37.     The nature, motive, impact  of  a  crime,  culpability,  quality  of
evidence, socio-economic circumstances, impossibility of rehabilitation  are
the factors which the court may take into consideration while  dealing  with
such cases as was spelt out in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v.  State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498.
38.     In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (1994) 4  SCC  220,
while affirming award of death  sentence  by  the  High  Court,  this  Court
noticed the rising crime rate in recent  years  particularly  violent  crime
against women.   In the said case, this Court reiterated the principle  that
it is not possible  to  lay  down  any  cut  and  dry  formula  relating  to
imposition of sentence but the object of sentencing should be  to  see  that
crime does not go unpunished and the  victim  of  the  crime,  as  also  the
society, has the satisfaction that justice has been done.    The  said  case
concerned with the rape and murder of an 18 year  old  girl  by  a  security
guard of the flat where she lived.   The Court found it to  be  a  fit  case
for imposition of capital punishment.
39.     This Court in many cases such as Atbir v. Govt.  of  NCT  of  Delhi,
(2010) 9 SCC 1, case confirmed the  death  sentence  awarded  by  the  trial
Court as affirmed by the High Court for  different  reasons  after  applying
the principles enunciated in the judgments referred to above.
40.     In Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State  of  Maharashtra,  (2013)  5  SCC
546, this Court noticed aggravating circumstances (crime test) –  mitigating
circumstances- (criminal test) and rarest of rare  case  –  (R-R  test)  and
observed:
           “52. Aggravating circumstances as pointed out above, of  course,
           are not exhaustive so also the mitigating circumstances.  In  my
           considered view, the tests that we have to apply, while awarding
           death sentence are “crime test”, “criminal test”  and  the  “R-R
           test” and not the “balancing test”. To award death sentence, the
           “crime test” has to  be  fully  satisfied,  that  is,  100%  and
           “criminal  test”  0%,  that  is,  no   mitigating   circumstance
           favouring the accused. If there is  any  circumstance  favouring
           the accused,  like  lack  of  intention  to  commit  the  crime,
           possibility of reformation, young age  of  the  accused,  not  a
           menace to the  society,  no  previous  track  record,  etc.  the
           “criminal test” may favour the  accused  to  avoid  the  capital
           punishment. Even if both the tests are satisfied, that  is,  the
           aggravating  circumstances  to  the  fullest   extent   and   no
           mitigating circumstances favouring the accused, still we have to
           apply finally the rarest of the rare case test (R-R  test).  R-R
           test depends upon the perception of the society that is “society-
           centric” and not “Judge-centric”, that is, whether  the  society
           will approve the awarding of death sentence to certain types  of
           crimes or not. While applying that test, the court has  to  look
           into variety  of  factors  like  society’s  abhorrence,  extreme
           indignation and antipathy to certain types of crimes like sexual
           assault and murder of  intellectually  challenged  minor  girls,
           suffering from physical disability, old and  infirm  women  with
           those disabilities, etc. Examples are only illustrative and  not
           exhaustive. The courts  award  death  sentence  since  situation
           demands so, due to constitutional compulsion, reflected  by  the
           will of the people and not the will of the Judges.”


41.     This Court in Ramnaresh and others v. State of Chhattisgarh,  (2012)
4 SCC 257, applying the various principles to the facts  of  the  said  case
and taking into consideration the age of the  accused,  possibility  of  the
death of the deceased  occurring  accidently  and  the  possibility  of  the
accused reforming themselves held that  the  accused  cannot  be  termed  as
social  menace  and  commuted  the  sentence  of  death  to  that  of   life
imprisonment (21 years).
42.     In the present case, on the question  of  quantum  of  sentence  the
argument raised on behalf of the appellant is that the accused was young  at
the time of commission of offence i.e. 21 years  of  age,  that  he  had  no
intention to kill the deceased and there is no past criminal antecedent.
43.     On the other hand, learned counsel for the state contended  that  it
was a heinous crime and the case of the appellant is similar like  the  case
of Dhananjoy Chatterjee (supra).
44.     We have noticed the case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee  (supra).   In  the
said case accused was a security guard and  was  responsible  for  providing
security to the residents of the flats.  Instead of that he used to tease  a
young girl child of one of the lady residents.   On  the  complaint  of  the
lady resident, he was transferred.  To avenge the same he  went  up  to  the
flat of the lady and committed rape on her daughter and  then  murdered  her
brutally. That was a case where  the  protector  of  residents  becomes  the
offender.
45.     The case of the appellant is not similar.  The Trial Court  and  the
High Court wrongly held that the case of the appellant is  similar  to  that
of Dhananjoy Chatterjee.
46.     In the present case, the circumstantial evidence comes to  only  one
conclusion  that  appellant  attempted  to  commit  rape  and   because   of
resistance he committed the murder of the deceased.  The appellant was  aged
about 21 years at the time  of  offence.   Initially  when  the  matter  for
confirmation of death sentence was heard by the two learned  Judges  of  the
High Court there was a  divided  opinion,  one  Judge  confirmed  the  death
sentence while the other acquitted the appellant.  It  is  the  other  Bench
which affirmed the death sentence.  It is not the case  of  the  Prosecution
that the appellant cannot be reformed.   In  fact  the  possibility  of  his
reformation cannot be ruled out.  There is no  criminal  antecedent  of  the
appellant.  The Court has to consider different parameters as laid  down  in
Bachan Singh (supra) followed  by  Machhi  Singh  (supra)  and  balance  the
mitigating  circumstances  against  the  need  for  imposition  of   capital
punishment.
47.     While we apply the various principles to the facts  of  the  present
case, we are of the opinion that considering the age  of  the  accused,  the
possibility of reforming him cannot be ruled out.  He cannot  be  termed  as
social menace. Further, the case does not fall under the  “rarest  of  rare”
category.  We, therefore, are unable to uphold the death sentence.
48.     For the reasons aforesaid we are commuting  the  death  sentence  of
accused-Lalit Kumar Yadav alias  Kuri  to  that  of  life  imprisonment  but
affirm the rest part of the conviction and sentence.  The appeal  is  partly
allowed only with regard to the quantum of sentence.


                                                       ……………………………………………….J.
                                                  (A.K. PATNAIK  )




                                                       ……………………………………………….J.
                                        (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
APRIL 25, 2014.
ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.10                SECTION II
(For Judgment)

            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 1022 OF 2006


LALIT KUMAR YADAV @ KURI                          Appellant (s)

                 VERSUS

STATE OF U.P.                                     Respondent(s)

Date: 25/04/2014  These Appeals were called on for pronouncement of
    judgment today.

CORAM :
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. AGRAWAL


For Appellant(s)    Mr. Pranesh,Adv.


For Respondent(s)   Mr. Gaurav Dhingra,Adv.



         Hon'ble Mr. Justice  Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya  pronounced  the
       reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice  A.K.
       Patnaik and His Lordship.
         The appeal ____ in terms of the signed reportable judgment


              [RAJNI MUKHI]                       [USHA SHARMA]
               SR. P.A.                   COURT MASTER

        (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)