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Showing posts with label IPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IPC. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 6, 2014

culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, IPC, - In the absence of motive to cause death and the injuries too never disclosed as that of such a fatal one to cause death and when the injuries were caused in spur of movement on sudden fight - it is not murder punishable under sec.302 but punishable under sec.304 not amounting to murder - The evidence produced against the accused does not show that the accused had any motive to cause death of the deceased or have intended to cause such bodily injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. Evidence on record also does not establish that the injuries caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause his death or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat of exchange of words accused caused injuries on the body of the deceased which caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the murder as defined in Section 300, IPC, have not been established against the accused. In our opinion, the accused was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, IPC, and considering the fact that the accused had no intention to either cause the death of the deceased or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the deceased, it would be sufficient to impose on accused a sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months.= MANJEET SINGH … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH … RESPONDENT = 2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41473

  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to murder under Section 304, IPC, -  In the absence of motive to cause death and the injuries too never disclosed as that of such a fatal one to cause death and when the injuries were caused in spur of movement on sudden fight - it is not murder punishable under sec.302 but punishable under sec.304  not amounting to murder - The  evidence  produced  against the accused does not show that the accused had any motive to cause death  of the deceased or have intended to  cause  such  bodily  injuries  which  were sufficient in the ordinary course of  nature  to  cause  the  death  of  the deceased. Evidence on record also  does  not  establish  that  the  injuries caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause  his  death or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat  of exchange of words accused caused injuries on the body of the deceased  which caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the  murder  as  defined  in Section 300, IPC, have not been established  against  the  accused.  In  our opinion, the accused was  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to murder under Section 304, IPC, and considering the  fact  that  the  accused had no intention to either cause the death of the  deceased  or  cause  such bodily injury as is likely to cause death  of  the  deceased,  it  would  be sufficient  to  impose  on  accused  a  sentence  of  seven  years  rigorous imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs.5,000/-  and  in  default  of payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months.=

 High  Court  dismissed  the
appeal and affirmed the judgment  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  dated  27th
March, 2002 in Sessions Trial No.17-S/7 of  2001  wherein  the  Trial  Court
convicted the appellant and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and  also
to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence  under  Section  302  IPC  and  in
default,  further  imprisonment  for  one  year.  The  appellant  was   also
sentenced by the Trial Court for  the  offence  under  Section  324  IPC  to
undergo imprisonment for  six  months  and  to  pay  fine  of  Rs.500/-,  in
default, further simple imprisonment for one month. The appellant  was  also
sentenced  for  the  offence  under  Section  27  of  Arms  Act  to  undergo
imprisonment for three months and to pay  fine  of  Rs.1000/-,  in  default,
further simple imprisonment for one month.  The  Trial  Court  ordered  that
all the aforesaid sentences shall run concurrently.=

 what is  the  nature
of offence that the accused has committed.  The  evidence  produced  against
the accused does not show that the accused had any motive to cause death  of
the deceased or have intended to  cause  such  bodily  injuries  which  were
sufficient in the ordinary course of  nature  to  cause  the  death  of  the
deceased. Evidence on record also  does  not  establish  that  the  injuries
caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause  his  death
or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat  of
exchange of words accused caused injuries on the body of the deceased  which
caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the  murder  as  defined  in
Section 300, IPC, have not been established  against  the  accused.  In  our
opinion, the accused was  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to
murder under Section 304, IPC, and considering the  fact  that  the  accused
had no intention to either cause the death of the  deceased  or  cause  such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death  of  the  deceased,  it  would  be
sufficient  to  impose  on  accused  a  sentence  of  seven  years  rigorous
imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs.5,000/-  and  in  default  of
payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months.

27.     We, accordingly, set aside  the  conviction  of  the  accused  under
Section 302, IPC but hold him guilty of the offence under Section  304,  IPC
and sentence him to seven years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/-
, in default of payment of fine a further imprisonment of  six  months.  The
conviction and sentences for the offence under Section 324, IPC and  Section
27 of the Arms  Act  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  are  affirmed.  All  the
sentences shall run concurrently. If the accused-Manjeet Singh has  not  yet
undergone the sentence imposed and affirmed by us, and is  not  in  custody,
he be taken into custody to serve the remainder.

2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41473            
A.K. PATNAIK, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA

                                                            REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1695 OF 2005

MANJEET SINGH                           … APPELLANT
                                        VERSUS
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                          … RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

        The appellant has assailed the judgment  dated  18th  October,  2004
passed by the High Court of Himachal  Pradesh,  Shimla  in  Criminal  Appeal
No.259 of 2002. By the  impugned  judgment  the  High  Court  dismissed  the
appeal and affirmed the judgment  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  dated  27th
March, 2002 in Sessions Trial No.17-S/7 of  2001  wherein  the  Trial  Court
convicted the appellant and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and  also
to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence  under  Section  302  IPC  and  in
default,  further  imprisonment  for  one  year.  The  appellant  was   also
sentenced by the Trial Court for  the  offence  under  Section  324  IPC  to
undergo imprisonment for  six  months  and  to  pay  fine  of  Rs.500/-,  in
default, further simple imprisonment for one month. The appellant  was  also
sentenced  for  the  offence  under  Section  27  of  Arms  Act  to  undergo
imprisonment for three months and to pay  fine  of  Rs.1000/-,  in  default,
further simple imprisonment for one month.  The  Trial  Court  ordered  that
all the aforesaid sentences shall run concurrently.

2.      The facts of the prosecution case as stated by Jai  Pal  (PW.5)  are
that he was carrying business of taxi in Shimla. On 31st December,  2000  at
about 9 p.m. he had gone to Hotel Apsara at Cart  Road,  Shimla  to  inquire
from Budhi Singh (PW.8), Manager of the Hotel Apsara regarding  the  booking
of his taxi by some passenger staying  in  the  Hotel.  Budhi  Singh  (PW.8)
asked Jai Pal (PW.5) to come  after  some  time.  Both  of  them  then  went
together to Hotel Basant for  celebrating  New  Year.  They  took  wine  and
dinner together and remained in the said Hotel till 12 o’clock.  Thereafter,
Budhi Singh(PW.8) returned  to  Hotel  Apsara  while  Jai  Pal  (PW.5)  came
towards Cart Road where he met Romi Kapoor (PW.6), Pawan Kumar (PW.7),  Deep
Chand and Rajnish alias Rintu who inquired about the booking of  a  room  in
the Hotel as earlier agreed upon. Jai Pal (PW.5) went to  the  Hotel  Apsara
where he did not find Budhi Singh (PW.8), Therefore,  he  went  upstairs  in
the Hall of the Hotel where  he  found  accused  Manjeet  Singh  along  with
Balraj and Surender Kumar were taking liquor. Jai Pal (PW.5)  inquired  from
the appellant-accused, Manjeet Singh about  the  Manager  of  the  Hotel  to
which the accused  was  alleged  to  have  retorted  that  he  was  not  the
Chowkidar of the Hotel so as to know and tell about  the  Manager.  Accused-
Manjeet Singh was further alleged to have started abusing Jai Pal (PW.5)  by
proclaiming that he was serving in Punjab Police. The  accused  was  further
alleged to have started beating Jai Pal (PW.5) by giving him a fist blow  on
his mouth.  Jai Pal (PW.5) ran outside. He met the above-named  Romi  Kapoor
(PW.6), Deep  Chand,  Pawan  Kumar  (PW.7)  and  Rajnish.  He  narrated  the
incident to them. Romi Kapoor (PW.6), Rajnish alias Rintu  and  Pawan  Kumar
(PW.7) went inside the Hall while Jai Pal (PW.5)  and  one  Roshan  remained
standing at the entrance of the Hotel. Rajnish  alias  Rintu  inquired  from
the accused-Manjeet Singh as to the cause of his having  given  beatings  to
Jai Pal (PW.5). The accused was alleged to have told his companions,  Balraj
and Surender Kumar to tell Rajnish and his friends about the  cause  of  the
beatings to Jai Pal (PW.5). Balraj and Surender Kumar were then  alleged  to
have abetted  and  instigated  the  accused  by  saying  “Carbine  Ka  Kamal
Dekhao”. Whereupon accused was alleged to have fired shots from his  Carbine
which hit Rajnish alias Rintu, Romi Kapoor (PW.6), Jai Pal (PW.5) and  Pawan
Kumar (PW.7). Rajnish alias Rintu sustained two shots on his  chest  and  he
fell down on the ground. The accused and Balraj were  alleged  to  have  run
away after the gun shots. Jai Pal (PW.5)  lifted  Rajnish  alias  Rintu  and
carried him to I.G.M.C. Hospital, Shimla, where he was declared dead.

3.      On  the  telephonic  message  of  one  Pradeep  Kumar,  Jagdish  Ram
(PW.25), Station House Officer,  Police  Station  Sadar  reached  the  spot.
Surender Kumar, a companion of the accused, was apprehended from the  toilet
of the Hotel. Since, the injured persons  had  already  been  taken  to  the
Hospital, Jagdish  Ram  (PW.25)  went  to  the  Hospital  and  recorded  the
statement of Jai Pal (PW.5), on the basis of which a case for  the  offences
under Section 302, 307 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC came to be  formally
registered vide F.I.R. No.1/2001.

4.      Post-mortem examination was conducted by  Dr.  V.K.  Mishra  (PW.24)
who found the following two ante-mortem bullet injuries  on  the  person  of
the deceased Rajnish alias Rintu:

           “(i) A circular wound of entry one centimeter in  diameter,  1.5
                 cm medial to right  nipple,  18  cm  below  right  shoulder
                 joint. Dry clotted blood  was  present  around  the  wound.
                 There was no blackening, tattooing, singeing, burning etc;


           (ii) A circular wound of entry 1 cm x ½ cm between the  base  of
                 1st and 2nd metatarsal bone of left foot, dorsum  with  dry
                 clotted blood present  around  the  wound.  No  blackening,
                 tattooing, singeing, burning etc. noticed over the skin.”

        In the opinion of Dr. V.K. Mishra (PW.24),  the  death  was  due  to
haemorrhagic shock as a result  of  laceration  of  lung  due  to  gun  shot
injury.
5.      On Medical Examination of Romi Kappor (PW.6), Dr.  M.P.  Singh(PW.1)
found the following injuries on the person of Romi Kapoor:
           “Local Examination


            1. A CLW 1 cm X 0.5 cm X 1 cm in  size  placed  horizontally  on
               little side of left  upper  arm  on  lower  part  of  deltoid
               muscle, red in colour  with  dark  edges  due  to  soot  with
               irregular margins which were depressed.


            2. A. CLW 1 cm   0.5  cm   1  cm  in  size  placed  horizontally
               approximately 2.5 cm lateral to first would on lateral inside
               of left upper arm  on  lower  part  of  deltoid  muscle  with
               irregular margins elevated and  margins  deliberated  red  in
               colour. Same marks were present over sweater and shirt worn.”

      As per the opinion of the doctor,  injuries  Nos.1  &  2  were  bullet
injuries and the same were dangerous to the life as per  rule  of  gun  shot
injuries. The Doctor has also issued MLC Ext. PW-2/B in respect of the  said
injuries.
6.      On the same day, Dr. M.P. Singh (PW.1)  has  also  examined  injured
Pawan Kumar and observed as under:
           “Local injuries:
A CLW   over right foot approximately 5  cm  about  tip  of  right  big  toe
placed horizontally 1 cm  0.5 cm  1 cm in size with  irregular  margins  red
in colour.


A bruise bluish in colour present 1 cm X 0.5 cm  in  size  placed  obliquely
over fifth metatars o-phalangel joint running lately on right foot.


              On the basis of x-ray report, the injury  Nos.1  and  2  were
              declared dangerous to the life and were fresh in duration and
              were caused by a blunt weapon.  The  Doctor  has  issued  MLC
              Ext.PW-1/C.”


        On the same day, Dr. M.P. Singh (PW.1)  has  also  examined  injured
Jai Pal (PW.5) and found as under:
           “Local Injuries
           1. A CLW 1.5 cm in size placed in the middle of  inner  side  of
              upper lip placed obliquely upwards and lately on  left  side,
              reddish scabbing over lip present with clotted blood.
           2. A bruise present over upper lip in the centre reddish blue in
              colour 1 cm X 0.5 cm in  size  placed  vertically.  No  other
              injury was present. Teeth were  normal.  Injuries  No.1and  2
              were simple and the duration of injuries was within 24  hours
              and were caused by blunt weapon.”

      After his examination Doctor has issued MLC Ext.PW-1/D.


7.      The accused-Manjeet Singh too was subjected to medical  examination,
which was carried out by Dr. Dinesh Rana (PW.2) on  1st   January,  2001  at
about 5.55 p.m.  The  accused  at  the  time  of  such  medical  examination
complained of pain in the fifth knuckle region of the left hand.  X-ray  was
advised. However, local examination revealed the presence of  a  red  colour
contusion and swelling on such knuckle region. The accused  also  complained
of breaking of upper incisor tooth. He was referred to  Dental  Surgeon.  On
the basis of dental opinion, such injury  was  opined  to  be  of  a  simple
nature having been caused within the probable duration of 24 hours.

8.      Balraj, a companion of the accused, was also medically  examined  by
Dr. Dinesh Rana (PW.2). Following injuries were found on his person:
           “(i) 4 cm 1 cm abrasion over the dorsum of right fore-arm;


           (ii) 1.5 cm x 1.5 cm round abrasion red  in  colour,  above  the
                 writ joint;


           (iii)        3.5 cm x 2 cm abrasion, read in colour with  linear
                 scratch in the mid. 3 cm outer  aspect  of  the  left  knee
                 joint;


           (iv)         Multiple irregular abrasions on the entire  lateral
                 aspect of the left lower leg. Red in colour, and


           (v)  Small irregular abrasion on the left side of the  forehead.
                 Red in colour.”




      All the injuries were opined to be of simple nature having been caused
with a blunt weapon within the probable duration of 24 hours.
9.      The other companion of  the  accused,  namely,  Surender  Kumar  was
medically examined by Dr. Rajneesh Sharma (PW.4) on  1st  January,  2001  at
about 4.35 a.m. One injury, that is, laceration over the fore-head 1.5 cm  x
1 cm x 0.5 cm was found. He was smelling of liquor and  there  was  slurring
of speech. The injury was simple in nature having been caused with  a  blunt
weapon with the probable duration of 6 hours.
10.     On having been produced by the  accused,  Carbine-Ex.P4  with  empty
magazine  vide  memo  Ex.PW5/C  were  taken   into   possession   by   Gulam
Mohammad(PW.26), Additional Station House Officer of Police  Station  Sadar,
who had partially investigated the case. Six live  cartridges  Ex.P1  to  P6
were also produced by the accused, which were  taken  into  possession  vide
memo Ex.PW5/D by Gulam Mohammad(PW.26).  Six  empty  cartridges  were  taken
into possession from the spot by Gulam Mohammad(PW.26) vide  memo  Ex.PW5/E.
Service belt of the accused, which was lying on the bed in the Hall  of  the
Hotel was also taken into possession vide memo Ex.PW5/F.
11.     The Ballistic Expert to whom the carbine, live and empty  cartridges
were sent for examination, vide report Ex.PW25/E has opined that  the  empty
cartridges were fired from the carbine Ex.P4.
12.     On completion of the investigation the accused along  with  his  two
companions Balraj and Surinder Kumar were sent up for trial.
        The accused was charged for the substantive offences  under  Section
302 and 307 IPC, and under Section 27  of  the  Arms  Act,  1959.   His  two
companions, Balraj and Surinder Kumar, were charged for  the  offence  under
Section 114 read with Sections 302 and 307  IPC,  for   having  abetted  and
instigated the commission of the offences under Section 302 and 307  IPC  by
the accused.

13.     The accused and his two companions pleaded not guilty to the  charge
and claimed trial. The prosecution in support of its case examined  as  many
as 26 witnesses.

14.     The learned Additional  Sessions  Judge,  on  consideration  of  the
evidence coming on the record,  by  the  impugned  judgment,  convicted  and
sentenced the accused- Manjeet Singh as mentioned above.

15.     The accused was acquitted of the offence under Section 307 IPC.  The
two companions of the accused, Balraj and Surinder Kumar were  acquitted  of
all the charges framed against them.

16.     By the impugned judgment the High Court noticed the submission  made
on behalf of the appellant and on appreciation of  the  evidence  on  record
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and  sentences  imposed  by
the Trial Court.

17.     Learned counsel for the accused  has  assailed  the  conviction  and
sentence on the ground that the accused had acted in exercise of  the  right
of private defence. It was submitted that the genesis of the occurrence  was
different from what the prosecution has suggested and highlighted. In  fact,
the occurrence had taken place in the manner suggested  by  the  accused  in
his defence. The deceased and his companions had made a forcible entry  into
the Hall of the Hotel and started beating the accused and  his  two  friends
and in such course they had tried to snatch the  carbine,  which  got  fired
during the scuffle.

18.     From the record, we find  that  neither  the  accused  nor  his  two
companions in the statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., has  stated
that the deceased and his  companions  were  the  aggressors  and  that  the
accused was acting in exercise of the right of  private  defence.  In  fact,
their case is that of total denial.  There  is  nothing  on  the  record  to
suggest that the accused or his companions received injuries  at  the  hands
of the deceased or the deceased tried to snatch the carbine of the  accused.
No evidence has been brought on record that the deceased and his  companions
entered the Hall of the Hotel with arms.
19.     Under Section 96, IPC, “Nothing is an offence which is done  in  the
exercise of the right of private defence”. Right of private defence  of  the
body and of property has been enumerated under Section 97, IPC,  subject  to
the restrictions contained in Section 99,  IPC.  As  per  the  said  section
every person has a right to defend-
               “First.  -      His own body,  and  the  body  of  any  other
                        person, against any  offence  affecting  the  human
                        body;


             Secondly   -The property, whether movable or    immovable,  of
                       himself or of any other person, against any act which
                       is an offence falling under the definition of  theft,
                       robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or  which  is
                       an attempt to  commit  theft,  robbery,  mischief  or
                       criminal trespass.”

        Section 102, IPC, deals with commencement  and  continuance  of  the
right of private defence of the body as follows:
             “Section 102. Commencement and continuance  of  the  right  of
             private defence of the body.- The right of private defence  of
             the body commences as soon as  a  reasonable  apprehension  of
             danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to  commit
             the offence though the offence may not  have  been  committed;
             and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the
             body continues.”



        The extent and limitations  of  the  right  of  private  defence  is
prescribed under Section 96 to 106, IPC. Such a right can be exercised  only
to defend the unlawful action and not to retaliate.
20.     This Court in  George Dominic Varkey v. The State of Kerala,  (1971)
3 SCC 275, has held:

             “6……Broadly stated, the right  of  private  defence  rests  on
             three ideas: first, that there must be no more harm  inflicted
             than is necessary for the purpose of defence;  secondly,  that
             there must be reasonable apprehension of danger  to  the  body
             from the attempt  or  threat  to  commit  some  offence;  and,
             thirdly,  the  right  does  not  commence  until  there  is  a
             reasonable apprehension. It is entirely a question of fact  in
             the circumstances of a case  as  to  whether  there  has  been
             excess of private defence within the meaning of the 4th clause
             of Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code, namely, that  no  more
             harm is  inflicted  than  is  necessary  for  the  purpose  of
             defence. No one can be expected to find any pattern of conduct
             to meet a particular case. Circumstances must  show  that  the
             court can find that there was apprehension to life or property
             or  of  grievous  hurt.  If  it  is  found  that   there   was
             apprehension to life or property or of grievous hurt the right
             of private defence is  in  operation.  The  person  exercising
             right of private defence is entitled to stay and overcome  the
             threat.”

21.     In  Moti Singh v. State of  Maharashtra,  (2002)  9  SCC  494,  this
Court held that dimension of the injuries may not  be  serious,  it  is  the
situs of  the  injuries  that  would  indicate  whether  the  accused  could
reasonably entertain the apprehension that at least  grievous  injuries/hurt
would be caused to him by the assaulters unless aggression is thwarted.
22.     In the present case during the course of  cross-examination  of  the
prosecution witnesses, especially Jai Pal(PW.5), Romi Kapoor  (PW.6),  Pawan
Kumar (PW.7), Satish Kumar (PW.9) and Charanjeet Singh  (PW.12)  an  attempt
has been made on behalf of the  accused  to  set  up  the  case  of  private
defence.
23.     In  Rajender Singh and others v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4  SCC  298,
dealing with the similar proposition this Court held as follows:
             “Non-explanation of the injuries on the person of the accused,
             ipso facto, cannot be held to  be  fatal  to  the  prosecution
             case. Ordinarily, the prosecution is not  obliged  to  explain
             each and every injury on  the  person  of  the  deceased  even
             though such injuries might have been caused during the  course
             of the occurrence and they are minor in nature. But where  the
             injuries are grievous, non-explanation of such injuries  would
             attract the Court to look at the prosecution case with  little
             suspicion on the ground that the  prosecution  has  suppressed
             the true version of the incident.”



24.     Evidence of eye-witnesses, especially of the  injured,  namely,  Jai
Pal  (PW.5),  Romi  Kapoor  (PW.6)  and  Pawan  Kumar  (PW.7),   which   are
trustworthy, when  read  together,  we  find  that  non-explanation  of  the
injuries on the person of the accused and his two companions cannot be  held
to be fatal to the prosecution case.
25.     Satish Kumar (PW.9), an independent witness, who  was  also  staying
and sleeping in the Hall where the occurrence had  taken  place,  though  he
was declared hostile, has admitted the correctness of the prosecution  story
in the following terms:
             “It is correct that when I woke up on hearing the noise, I saw
             a boy coming in the hall and inquiring about the Manager  from
             the accused Manjit. It is correct that one of  the  associates
             of accused Manjit, i.e., one driver stated  that  we  are  not
             Chowkidar, so you tell the Manager. It is  correct  that  upon
             this accused persons started beating that boy  and  thereafter
             other associates of that boy also came in  the  hall  of  that
             hotel after about 5-7 minutes.”

        In answer to Court question, PW.9 has staed:
             “The driver who was with accused Manjit was heavily drunk  and
             was also abusing the other party and Manjit accused  tried  to
             prevail upon him  and  thereafter  said  driver  attempted  to
             assault those 4-5 persons present in the hall  and  thereafter
             free fighting between the parties.”

        The above statement of Satish Kumar  (PW.9)  lends  support  to  the
prosecution story to show that it was the accused who was the aggressor  and
that the accused had not acted in private defence.
26.     The question now requires to determine is as to what is  the  nature
of offence that the accused has committed.  The  evidence  produced  against
the accused does not show that the accused had any motive to cause death  of
the deceased or have intended to  cause  such  bodily  injuries  which  were
sufficient in the ordinary course of  nature  to  cause  the  death  of  the
deceased. Evidence on record also  does  not  establish  that  the  injuries
caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause  his  death
or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat  of
exchange of words accused caused injuries on the body of the deceased  which
caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the  murder  as  defined  in
Section 300, IPC, have not been established  against  the  accused.  In  our
opinion, the accused was  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to
murder under Section 304, IPC, and considering the  fact  that  the  accused
had no intention to either cause the death of the  deceased  or  cause  such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death  of  the  deceased,  it  would  be
sufficient  to  impose  on  accused  a  sentence  of  seven  years  rigorous
imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs.5,000/-  and  in  default  of
payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months.

27.     We, accordingly, set aside  the  conviction  of  the  accused  under
Section 302, IPC but hold him guilty of the offence under Section  304,  IPC
and sentence him to seven years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/-
, in default of payment of fine a further imprisonment of  six  months.  The
conviction and sentences for the offence under Section 324, IPC and  Section
27 of the Arms  Act  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  are  affirmed.  All  the
sentences shall run concurrently. If the accused-Manjeet Singh has  not  yet
undergone the sentence imposed and affirmed by us, and is  not  in  custody,
he be taken into custody to serve the remainder.

28.     The appeal stands  disposed  of  with  the  above  observations  and
directions.

                                                      ……………………………………………………J.
                                       (A.K. PATNAIK)




                                                     …….……….……………………………………J.
NEW DELHI,                          (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
APRIL 25, 2014.



ITEM NO.1B               COURT NO.10             SECTION IIB
(For Judgment)

            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 1695 OF 2005

MANJEET SINGH                                     Appellant (s)
                 VERSUS
STATE OF H.P.                                     Respondent(s)

Date: 25/04/2014  This Appeal was called on for pronouncement of
    judgment today.
CORAM :
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. AGRAWAL

For Appellant(s)        Mr. Prashant Chaudhary,Adv.

For Respondent(s)    Ms. Pragati Neekhra,Adv.


         Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya  pronounced  the
   reportable judgment of the Bench comprising  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  A.K.
   Patnaik and His Lordship.
                The conviction of the accused under Section 302, IPC is set
   aside but he is held guilty of the offence under Section 304, IPC and is
   sentenced to undergo seven  years  rigorous  imprisonment  and  fine  of
   Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine a further imprisonment of  six
   months. The conviction and sentences for the offence under Section  324,
   IPC and Section 27 of the  Arms  Act  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  are
   affirmed. All the sentences shall  run  concurrently.  If  the  accused-
   Manjeet Singh has not yet undergone the sentence  imposed  and  affirmed
   and is not in custody, he be taken into custody to serve the remainder.
                The appeal stands  disposed  of  in  terms  of  the  signed
   reportable judgment.


              [RAJNI MUKHI]                       [USHA SHARMA]
               SR. P.A.                   COURT MASTER

        (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

Saturday, March 16, 2013

Sections 304B and 498A, IPC= In the alternative, the Trial Court and the High Court could have sought for an expert's opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act on whether the handwriting and signature were that of the deceased. But unfortunately, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court have resorted to these provisions of the Evidence Act and instead by their own imaginary reasoning disbelieved the defence of the appellant that Ext.D19 could not have been written by the deceased.- “While cleaning our house we found a chit on our dressing table. The said chit was written by my wife and it is in her handwriting and it also contains her signature. Ex. D 19 is the said chit. I identified the handwriting of my wife in Ex. D19 because my wife used to write chits for purchasing of monthly provisions as such on tallying the said chit and Ex. D19 I came to know that it was written by my wife only. Immediately I took the Ex. D19 to the P.S. Mangalhat and asked them to receive but they refused to take the same.” From the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that while cleaning the house the appellant came across a chit written in the handwriting of his wife and containing her signature. This chit has been marked as Ext. D19 and the appellant has identified the handwriting and signature of the deceased in Ext. D19 which is written in Hindi. The English translation of Ext.D19 reproduced in the impugned judgment of the High Court is extracted hereinbelow: “I, Meenakshi W/o Vipin Kumar, do hereby execute and commit to writing this in my sound mind, consciousness and senses and with my free will and violation to the effect that nobody is responsible for my death. My parents family members have harassed much to my husband. I am taking this step as I have fed up with his life. Due to me the quarrels are taking place here, as such I want to end my life and I beg to pardon by all.” It appears from Ext. D19 that the deceased has written the chit according to her free will saying that nobody was responsible for her death and that her parents and family members have harassed her husband and she was taking the step as she was fed up with her life and because of her quarrels were taking place. 8. When the appellant, who is the husband of the deceased, has said in his evidence as DW1 that the aforesaid chit (Ext. D19) has been written by the deceased herself and has been signed by her and it also appears from his evidence quoted above that he was acquainted with her handwriting and signature, the Trial Court and the High Court could have recorded a finding one way or the other by comparing her handwriting and signature with some of her other handwritings and signatures under Section 73 of the Evidence Act. In the alternative, the Trial Court and the High Court could have sought for an expert's opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act on whether the handwriting and signature were that of the deceased. But unfortunately, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court have resorted to these provisions of the Evidence Act and instead by their own imaginary reasoning disbelieved the defence of the appellant that Ext.D19 could not have been written by the deceased. 9. In our considered opinion, the evidence of DW1 (the appellant) and Ext.D19 cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution story that the deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. In our view, onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredient of Section 498A, IPC and the essential ingredient of offence under Section 498A is that the accused, as the husband of the deceased, has subjected her to cruelty as defined in the Explanation to Section 498A, IPC. Similarly, for the Court to draw the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act that the appellant had caused dowry death as defined in Section 304B, IPC, the prosecution has to prove besides the demand of dowry, harassment or cruelty caused by the accused to the deceased soon before her death. Since the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt this ingredient of harassment or cruelty, neither of the offences under Sections 498A and 304B, IPC has been made out by the prosecution. 10. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and that of the Trial Court and direct that the bail bond furnished by the appellant shall stand discharged.


Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 1431 OF 2007
VIPIN JAISWAL(A-I) Appellant (s)
VERSUS
STATE OF A.P. REP.BY PUB.PROSECUTOR Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
A.K. PATNAIK, J.
This is an appeal against the judgment dated 11th
December, 2006 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2003.
2. The facts briefly are that an FIR was lodged
by Gynaneshwar Jaiswal on 4.4.1999 at 2.15 p.m. in
Mangalhat Police Station, Hyderabad. In the FIR it was
stated by the informant that his daughter Meenakshi
Jaiswal was married to the appellant on 22.2.1996 and
at the time of marriage he gave sufficient goldPage 2
2
jewellery, silver items, furniture, electrophinic
gadgets etc., worth above Rs.2,50,000/- but ever since
her marriage, she was subjected to physical and mental
torture by her husband Vipin Jaiswal, her husband's
parents Prem Kumar Jaiswal and Yashoda Bai and her
husband's sister Supriya and her husband and they all
brutally assaulted her on innumerable occasions for not
getting sufficient dowry. It was further stated in the
FIR that on 2.4.1999 the informant received a call from
the appellant and he went to the house of the appellant
along with his relatives to find out what had happened
as well as to give invitation for a function at his
place but they all abused him and the appellant
physically assaulted and pushed him out from the house
but fearing the safety of his daughter and her welfare,
he did not report the matter to the police. It is
further stated in the FIR that on 4.4.1999 at about
1.00 p.m. when he came back home, he was informed on
telephone by his son that Meenakshi had received severe
burn injuries and as a result died in the house of the
appellant. The police registered a Criminal Case under
Section 304B, IPC and took up investigation and
submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant and his
other relatives under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC.Page 3
3
3. At the trial, besides other witnesses, the
prosecution examined the father of the deceased
(informant) as PW 1, the cousin of PW 1 as PW 2 and the
mother of the deceased as PW 4. The appellant
volunteered to be a witness and got examined himself as
DW 1 and took the defence that the deceased had left
behind a suicide note written by her one day before her
death in which she has stated that she had committed
suicide not on account of any harassment by the
appellant and her family members but due to the
harassment by her own parents. The Trial Court,
however, disbelieved the defence and convicted the
appellant and his other relatives under Sections 304B
and 498A, IPC. The Trial Court in particular held that
there was material that two days prior to the death of
the deceased, her father (PW1) and his relative (PW2)
were called by her and told that she has been harassed
by the appellant and her in laws for not being paid the
amount demanded by the appellant and when PWs 1 and 2
went to the house of the appellant, they were abused by
the appellant and on 4.4.1999, PW 1 and others were
informed by one Suresh Kumar, a neighbour of the
appellant, about the incident. From the aforesaid and
other evidence, the Trial Court came to the conclusion
that the deceased was subjected to torture andPage 4
4
harassment by the accused, mainly for the reason that
an amount of Rs.50,000/- was not given to the appellant
by PW 1. The appellant and other relatives of the
appellant carried Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2003
before the High Court and by the impugned judgment, the
High Court acquitted the two other relatives of the
appellant (A2 and A3) but maintained the conviction of
the appellant under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC.
4. At the hearing before us, learned senior
counsel for the appellant submitted that the findings
of the Trial Court and of the High Court with regard to
the demand of dowry are in relation to the demand of
Rs.50,000/-. He submitted that this demand of
Rs.50,000/- is not mentioned in the FIR (Ext. P1). He
further submitted that in any case, the evidence of PW1
and PW4 is clear that this demand of Rs.50,000/- by the
appellant was not a dowry demand but an amount which
the appellant wanted from the family of the deceased to
purchase a computer and set up his own business. He
further submitted that the Trial Court and the High
Court ought not to have disbelieved the suicide note
(Ext. D19) which was in the handwriting of the deceased
as proved by DW1. In this context, he explained that
the signature on the suicide note (Ext. D19) purportingPage 5
5
to be that of the deceased, tallied with the signature
of the deceased in Ext. D1 which was a hall ticket
issued by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University for an
examination which the deceased took in March, 1998.
5. Learned counsel for the State, on the other
hand, submitted that both the Trial Court and the High
Court have discussed the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, and in particular, the evidence of PWs 1, 2
and 4 to establish that there was demand of dowry of
not only Rs.50,000/- but other items as well. He
further submitted that Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 defines 'dowry' as any property
or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly at or before or any time after
the marriage in connection with the marriage of the
parties to the marriage. He submitted that the
expression “in connection with the marriage of the
parties to the marriage” is wide enough to cover the
demand of Rs.50,000/- made by the appellant for
purchase of a computer. He further submitted that so
far as the suicide note (Ext. D19) is concerned, the
same cannot be believed to have been written by the
deceased who was only a matriculate and the High Court
has given good reasons in the impugned judgment why thePage 6
6
suicide note cannot be believed to have been written
by the deceased. He argued that in any case only on the
basis of the evidence given by DW1, the Court cannot
hold that the suicide note had been written by
the deceased and not by someone else. He submitted that
since the prosecution has been able to prove that the
deceased had been subjected to not only a demand
of dowry but also cruelty soon before her death,
the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly
held the appellant guilty both under Sections 304B and
498A, IPC.
6. We have perused the evidence of PW 1 and
PW 4, the father and mother of the deceased
respectively. We find that PW 1 has stated that at the
time of marriage, gold, silver articles, ornaments,
T.V., fridge and several other household articles worth
more than Rs.2,50,000/- were given to the appellant and
after the marriage, the deceased joined the appellant
in his house at Kagaziguda. He has, thereafter, stated
that the appellant used to work in a xerox cum type
institute in Nampally and in the sixth month after
marriage, the deceased came to their house and told
them that the appellant asked her to bring Rs.50,000/-
from them as he was intending to purchase a computerPage 7
7
and set up his own business. Similarly, PW4 has stated
in her evidence that five months after the marriage,
the appellant sent her away to their house and when she
questioned her, she told that the appellant was
demanding Rs.50,000/- and that the demand for money is
to purchase a computer to start his own business. Thus,
the evidence of PW1 and PW4 is that the demand of
Rs.50,000/- by the appellant was made six months after
the marriage and that too for purchasing a computer to
start his own business. It is only with regard to this
demand of Rs.50,000/- that the Trial Court has recorded
a finding of guilt against the appellant for the
offence under Section 304B, IPC and it is only in
relation to this demand of Rs.50,000/- for purchase of
a computer to start a business made by the appellant
six months after the marriage that the High Court has
also confirmed the findings of the Trial Court with
regard to guilt of the appellant under Section 304B,
IPC. In our view, both the Trial Court and the High
Court failed to appreciate that the demand, if at all
made by the appellant on the deceased for purchasing a
computer to start a business six months after the
marriage, was not in connection with the marriage and
was not really a 'dowry demand' within the meaning of
Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. ThisPage 8
8
Court has held in Appasaheb & Anr. Vs. State of
Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721:
“In view of the aforesaid definition of
the word "dowry" any property or valuable
security should be given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly at or
before or any time after the marriage and in
connection with the marriage of the said
parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of
property or valuable security must have some
connection with the marriage of the parties
and a correlation between the giving or
taking of property or valuable security with
the marriage of the parties is essential.
Being a penal provision it has to be strictly
construed. Dowry is a fairly well known
social custom or practice in India. It is
well settled principle of interpretation of
Statute that if the Act is passed with
reference to a particular trade, business or
transaction and words are used which
everybody conversant with that trade,
business or transaction knows or understands
to have a particular meaning in it, then the
words are to be construed as having that
particular meaning. (See Union of India v.
Garware Nylons Ltd., AIR (1996) SC 3509 and
Chemicals and Fibres of India v. Union of
India, AIR (1997) SC 558).”
7. In any case, to hold an accused guilty of
both the offences under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC,
the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by the accused. From the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, and in particular PW1 and PW4,
we find that they have made general allegations of
harassment by the appellant towards the deceased and
have not brought in evidence any specific acts ofPage 9
9
cruelty or harassment by the appellant on the deceased.
On the other hand, DW1 in his evidence has stated that
on 4.4.1999, the day when the incident occurred, he
went to the nearby temple along with his mother (A2)
and his father (A3) went to the bazar to bring ration
and his wife (deceased) alone was present at the house
and at about 1.00 p.m., they were informed by somebody
that some smoke was coming out from their house and
their house was burning. Immediately he and his mother
rushed to their house and by that time there was a huge
gathering at the house and the police was also present.
He and his family members were arrested by the police
and after one month they were released on bail.
What
DW1 has further stated is relevant for the purpose of
his defence and is quoted hereinbelow:
“While cleaning our house we found a
chit on our dressing table. The said chit was
written by my wife and it is in her
handwriting and it also contains her
signature. Ex. D 19 is the said chit. I
identified the handwriting of my wife in Ex.
D19 because my wife used to write chits for
purchasing of monthly provisions as such on
tallying the said chit and Ex. D19 I came to
know that it was written by my wife only.
Immediately I took the Ex. D19 to the P.S.
Mangalhat and asked them to receive but they
refused to take the same.”
From the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that while
cleaning the house the appellant came across a chit
written in the handwriting of his wife and containing
Page 10
10
her signature. This chit has been marked as Ext. D19
and the appellant has identified the handwriting and
signature of the deceased in Ext. D19 which is written
in Hindi. The English translation of Ext.D19
reproduced in the impugned judgment of the High Court
is extracted hereinbelow:
“I, Meenakshi W/o Vipin Kumar, do hereby
execute and commit to writing this in my
sound mind, consciousness and senses and with
my free will and violation to the effect that
nobody is responsible for my death. My
parents family members have harassed much to
my husband. I am taking this step as I have
fed up with his life. Due to me the quarrels
are taking place here, as such I want to end
my life and I beg to pardon by all.”
It appears from Ext. D19 that the deceased has written
the chit according to her free will saying that nobody
was responsible for her death and that her parents and
family members have harassed her husband and she was
taking the step as she was fed up with her life and
because of her quarrels were taking place.
8. When the appellant, who is the husband of the
deceased, has said in his evidence as DW1 that the
aforesaid chit (Ext. D19) has been written by the
deceased herself and has been signed by her and it
also appears from his evidence quoted above that he
was acquainted with her handwriting and signature, 
the
Trial Court and the High Court could have recorded a
Page 11
11
finding one way or the other by comparing her
handwriting and signature with some of her other
handwritings and signatures under Section 73 of the
Evidence Act. 
In the alternative, the Trial Court and
the High Court could have sought for an expert's
opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act on
whether the handwriting and signature were that of the
deceased. But unfortunately, neither the Trial Court
nor the High Court have resorted to these provisions
of the Evidence Act and instead by their own imaginary
reasoning disbelieved the defence of the appellant
that Ext.D19 could not have been written by the
deceased.
9. In our considered opinion, the evidence of
DW1 (the appellant) and Ext.D19 cast a reasonable
doubt on the prosecution story that the deceased was
subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with
demand of dowry. In our view, onus was on the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
ingredient of Section 498A, IPC and the essential
ingredient of offence under Section 498A is that the
accused, as the husband of the deceased, has subjected
her to cruelty as defined in the Explanation to
Section 498A, IPC. Similarly, for the Court to draw
Page 12
12
the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act
that the appellant had caused dowry death as defined
in Section 304B, IPC, the prosecution has to prove
besides the demand of dowry, harassment or cruelty
caused by the accused to the deceased soon before her
death. Since the prosecution has not been able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt this ingredient of
harassment or cruelty, neither of the offences under
Sections 498A and 304B, IPC has been made out by the
prosecution.
10. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside
the impugned judgment of the High Court and that of
the Trial Court and direct that the bail bond
furnished by the appellant shall stand discharged.
............................J.
(A.K. PATNAIK)
............................J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
MARCH 13, 2013

Friday, February 15, 2013

Sections 306 and 498A, IPC -whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the 18Page 19 society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 15. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and the judgment of the trial court holding the appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 306 and 498A, IPC and direct that the bail bonds executed by the appellant be discharged.


Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 985 of 2004
Atmaram s/o Raysingh Rathod                           ……
Appellant
Versus
State of Maharashtra                                       …..
Respondent
J U D G M E N T
A. K. PATNAIK, J.
This  is  an  appeal  against  the  judgment  dated
03.12.2003 of the Bombay High  Court,  Nagpur Bench,  in
Criminal Appeal No.10 of 1991 by which the High Court has
maintained the conviction of the appellant for offences under
Sections 306 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code (for short
‘the  IPC’)  and  the  sentence  of  rigorous  imprisonment  ofPage 2
three years and a fine of Rs.5,000/- for each of the aforesaid
two offences by the Sessions Court.
2. The facts  very  briefly  are  that  a written  report was
lodged by Gorsing Shewa Pawar (hereinafter referred to as
‘the informant’) on 17.07.1988 in the Police Station, Pusad
(Rural).   In  this  report,  the  informant  stated  that  the
appellant got married for the second time to his daughter
Purnabai with the consent of his first wife with a hope to get
a son from Purnabai and he treated her well for the first 2 to
2½  years  but  when  she  delivered  a  female  child,  the
appellant  and  his  family  members  started  beating  and
harassing Purnabai and also did not provide her with meals
and on 16.07.1988, the informant received a message that
Purnabai died by drowning in the well at Bhandari.  The
informant has further stated in the report that he reached
Bhandari in the evening and came to know that Purnabai had
not been given food for two days and was ill-treated with an
intention to ensure that she leave the house and because of
such ill-treatment Purnabai jumped into the well along with
her daughter Nanda and committed suicide.  On the basis of
2Page 3
the written report, an FIR was registered under Sections 306
and 498A of the IPC and after investigation, a charge-sheet
was filed against the appellant, his first wife, his father and
his  mother  and  they  were  all  tried  for  offences  under
Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 of the IPC in
Sessions case No.29/1990.
3. At the trial, altogether eight witnesses were examined.
The informant was examined as PW-1, the sister of Purnabai
was examined as PW-4,  the Police Patil of Bhandari was
examined  as  PW-5  and  the  Investigating  Officer  was
examined as PW-8.  At the trial, a written undertaking dated
17.04.1988 signed by the appellant to give equal treatment
to  both  his  wives  was  marked  as  Ext.47  and  a  written
undertaking signed by Purnabai to behave properly in future
was  marked  as  Ext.  48.   The  learned  Sessions  Judge
considered the evidence and, in particular, the evidence of
PW-1  and  PW-4  as  well  as  Ext.47  and  held  that  the
presumption  as  to  abetment  by  the  husband  and  his
relatives  of  suicide  by  a  married  woman  as  provided  in
Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was attracted
3Page 4
and the appellant, his first wife, his father and his mother
were all guilty of the offences under Sections 306 and 498A
read with Section 34, IPC.  After hearing the accused persons
on the sentence, the learned Sessions Judge sentenced each
of the accused persons to rigorous imprisonment for three
years in respect of each offence and in addition, for a fine of
Rs.5,000/- each in respect of each offence by judgment and
order dated 09.01.1991. Aggrieved, all the accused persons
filed Criminal Appeal No.10 of 1991 before the High Court
and by the impugned judgment dated 03.12.2003, the High
Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the first wife,
the mother and the father of the appellant and acquitted
them of the offences, but maintained the conviction of the
appellant as well as the sentence imposed upon him by the
learned Sessions Judge.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
High  Court  has  relied  on  Ext.47  and  Ext.48  as  well  as
evidence of PW-1 and PW-4 to come to the conclusion that
the  appellant  had  ill-treated  the  deceased  Purnabai  on
account of which she had committed suicide by jumping into
4Page 5
the well along with her daughter.  She submitted that there
is nothing in Exts.47 and 48 to indicate that the appellant
had actually ill-treated Purnabai.  She submitted that Exts.47
and 48 would show that the appellant had undertaken before
the  Panchas to  give  equal  treatment  to  both  his  wives
Purnabai  and  Kesri  and  Purnabai  had  also  similarly
undertaken  before  the  Panchas that  she  would  behave
properly in  future even though  the appellant was having
another wife.  She submitted that the evidence of PW-1 and
PW-4  also  do  not  establish  any  specific  act  of  cruelty
committed  by  the  appellant  because  of  which  Purnabai
committed suicide.  She submitted that the  post mortem
report of the deceased Purnabai (Ext.35) does not show any
injury on her body and it also shows that she had her meals.
She submitted that the appellant has not committed any
cruelty of the nature defined in the Explanation to Section
498A, IPC.  She submitted that the Explanation to Section
113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is also clear that to
attract  the  presumption  as  to  abetment  of  suicide  by  a
married  woman,  the  husband  must  be  shown  to  have
5Page 6
subjected  the  married  woman  to  cruelty  of  the  nature
defined in Section 498A, IPC and, therefore, the presumption
under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was not
attracted in this case.  She submitted that the FIR (Ext.49)
was lodged on 17.07.1988, two days after the drowning took
place on 15.07.1988, because the appellant denied a share
in his properties to PW-1 and this was the defence of the
appellant in his statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C.  She
finally submitted that the evidence of PW-1 and PW-4 would
rather show that Purnabai was depressed and unhappy after
a female child instead of male child was born to her and it is
quite possible that she jumped into the well with the female
child on account of such depression and unhappiness.
5. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent-State,  on  the
other hand, submitted in his reply that the evidence of PW-1
and PW-4 clearly establishes that the appellant has been
beating the deceased Purnabai and has not been providing
her  with  food  and  because  of  these  cruel  acts  of  the
appellant she committed suicide by jumping into the well
with her daughter. He submitted that the evidence of PW-1
6Page 7
and PW-4 were also corroborated by the FIR lodged by PW-1
as well as the evidence of PW-8.  He submitted that the
presumption  in  Section  113A of the Indian  Evidence Act,
1872 as to abetment of suicide by a married woman is also
attracted  in  this  case  as  the  deceased  Purnabai  has
committed suicide within a period of seven years from the
date of her marriage and the appellant has subjected her to
cruelty.  He submitted that this is, therefore, not a fit case in
which concurrent findings of the trial court and the High
Court with regard to the guilt of the appellant under Sections
306 and 498A, IPC, should be disturbed.
6. Section  498A,  IPC,  and  Section  113A  of  the  Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 are extracted hereinbelow:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of
a  woman  subjecting  her  to  cruelty.--
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of
the husband of a woman, subjects such woman
to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years and
shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation-  For  the  purpose  of  this  section,
"cruelty" means-
7Page 8
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature
as  is  likely  to  drive  the  woman  to  commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman; or
(b)  harassment  of  the  woman  where  such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or
any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
“113A.  Presumption  as  to  abetment  of
suicide  by  a  married  woman.-  When  the
question is whether the commission of suicide
by a women had been abetted by her husband
or any relative of her husband and it is shown
that she had committed suicide within a period
of seven years from the date of her marriage
and that her husband or such relative of her
husband has subjected her to cruelty, the court
may presume, having regard to all the other
circumstances  of  the  case,  that  such  suicide
had been abetted by her husband or by such
relative of her husband.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section,
"cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in
section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860).”
7. A reading of Section 498A, IPC, would show that if the
husband or relative of the husband of a woman subjected
such  woman  to  cruelty,  they  shall  be  liable  for  the
8Page 9
punishment mentioned therein.  Moreover, the Explanation
to Section 498A, IPC, defines ‘cruelty’ for the purpose of
Section 498A, IPC, to mean (a) any willful conduct which is of
such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)
harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a
view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet
any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security
or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her
to meet such demand.   A reading of Section 113A of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 will show that for the purposes of
Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, ‘cruelty’ shall
have the same meaning as in Section 498A, IPC.  Hence, to
convict a husband or any relative of the husband of a woman
or to draw up presumption as to abetment of suicide by a
married  woman  by  her  husband  or  any  relative  of  her
husband in case of suicide committed by a woman within a
period of seven years from the date of her marriage, there
must first be evidence to establish that such husband or the
9Page 10
relative  of  her  husband  committed  cruelty  of  the  nature
described in clauses (a) or (b) of the Explanation to Section
498A, IPC.
8. Therefore, the main question, which we have to decide
in  this  case,  is  whether  there  is  any  such  evidence  to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had
subjected his second wife, Purnabai, to cruelty either of the
nature described in clause (a) or of the nature described in
clause (b) of the Explanation to Section 498A, IPC.  It is not
the case of the prosecution in this case that the appellant
had subjected Purnabai to cruelty of the nature described in
clause (b) of Explanation to Section 498A, IPC, as there is no
allegation  in  this  case  that  the  appellant  had  harassed
Purnabai with a view to coerce her or any person related to
her  to  meet  any  unlawful  demand  for  any  property  or
valuable  security  or  that  he  subjected  Purnabai  to
harassment  on  account  of  failure  by  her  or  any  person
related to her to meet such demand.  We have, therefore,
only to decide whether the appellant treated Purnabai with
10Page 11
cruelty  of  the  nature  described  in  clause  (a)  of  the
Explanation to Section 498A, IPC.  
9. Clause  (a)  of  the  Explanation  to  Section  498A,  IPC,
defines ‘cruelty’ to mean any wilful conduct which is of such
a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or
to  cause  grave  injury  or  danger  to  life,  limb  or  health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman.  Exhibit 47, on
which the High Court has relied on, is the English translation
of the written undertaking given by the appellant before the
Panchas, and is extracted hereunder:
“…. As I was not having son, I got married with
Purnabai from village Bhidongar, in Ganhar for
getting son, about 5 to 6 years back.  As I have
first wife, an bhangad (problems) used to take
place  (between  them)  at  my  home.   As  the
dispute  was  taken  (brought)  before  panchas.
On this day, the panchas advised me to treat
both the wives well.  Henceforth I will give equal
treatment to Purna as well as Kesari, the sisters.
If I commit any mistake in future, I will be bound
by the rules.  Hence this undertaking. ..”
A reading of Ext. 47 would only indicate that the appellant
got married with Purnabai for getting a son and as he had his
first wife also, some problems used to take place between
11Page 12
Purnabai and his first wife in his house and the dispute was
brought before the  Panchas and the  Panchas advised the
appellant to treat both the wives well.  The appellant had
stated in his undertaking that as the Panchas advised him to
treat both the wives well, he gave an undertaking that in
future he will give equal treatment to Purnabai as well as
Kesari (his first wife) and he will not commit any mistake in
this regard.  Exhibit 48 is an undertaking dated 17.04.1988
given by Purnabai in which she has assured that she would
behave  properly  in  future  but  her  husband  should  also
behave  properly  with  her.   Thus,  Exts.  47  and  48  are
evidence  of  some  misbehaviour  of  the  appellant  towards
Purnabai but the nature of the misbehaviour of the appellant
towards Purnabai has not been stated in these two Exhibits.
10. PW-1 in his evidence, however, has stated that since
the birth of a son from the first wife, the appellant started
beating and ill-treating Purnabai and they were not providing
her food and this he had come to learn from Purnabai.  He
has also stated in his evidence that he had gone to Paradha
12Page 13
at the house of Shantabai before the death of Purnabai and
some ladies from Bhandari had come there for grinding their
grains in the flour mill and they had reported to him that the
appellant and his family members were beating Purnabai
severely.   He has stated that he, therefore,  went to  the
house of the appellant and found marks of Shiwal on the
hands and thigh of Purnabai and he brought her to Paradha
and he was going to report the matter to the Police Station,
but the appellant and his family members and others came
and told him that the appellant is going to give in writing
that henceforth he will not beat Purnabai.  PW-1 has further
deposed  that  thereafter  the  appellant  executed  the
undertaking  (Ext.47)  dated  17.04.1988  and  Purnabai
executed the undertaking (Ext.48) dated 17.04.1988 before
the  Panchas and  Exts.  47  and  48  were  kept  with  the
Sarpanch and the Police Patil.
11. The aforesaid evidence of PW-1 establishes that the
appellant used to beat Purnabai and was not giving her food
before he executed the undertaking in Ext.47 on 17.04.1988.
13Page 14
The drowning of Purnabai took place three months thereafter
on  15.07.1988.   For  holding  the  appellant  guilty  of  the
offences under Sections 306 and 498A, IPC, there must be
evidence of wilful conduct of the appellant towards Purnabai
soon before her drowning which could have driven her to
commit  suicide  and  this  is  what  PW-1  has  said  in  his
Examination-in-Chief on what happened before the drowning
of Purnabai:
“Thereafter I took Purana to Bhandari in
the house of accused no.1.  Thereafter I
brought her back to my house for Rasai.
She  complained  that  there  is  illtreatment  going  on  though  it  is
lessened.   She  complained  me  that
accused  was  not  providing  her  with
meals and used to beat her.  She also
told  that  as  accused  do  not  give  her
food she begs for food from others even
then I reached her with the hope that
everything will be settled.   Later on I
received  the  news  of  her  death.   On
hearing dead news of Purana I went to
Bhandari.   I  found  Purana  and  her
daughter dead due to drowning in the
well.  I enquired there at Bhandari and I
came  to  know  that  there  was  lot  of
beating given to Purana and hence she
died on fall in the well.  I came to know
that there was accidental death.  I also
came to know that Purana died along
14Page 15
with her girl after falling  in the well due
to  ill-treatment  received  by  her  from
accused persons.  Then I went to Rural
P.S. Pusad and reported the matter.  The
report now read over to me is the same.
It’s contents are correct.  It bears my
thumb  impression.   It  is  at  exh.49.
Printed F.I.R. shown to me also bears my
signature.   It  is  at  exh.50.   Police
recorded my statement.”  
12. In the written report (FIR) lodged by PW-1 on which the
prosecution has relied upon for corroboration, it has been
similarly stated:
“So,  I  sent  my  daughter  again  to
Bhandari  and  then  I  brought  my
daughter on the occasion of Rosa.  At
that time I came to know that the said
four  non-applicants  were  again  illtreating and beating my daughter and
not providing her meals too.  I also came
to know that she is required to beg for
food.  Still then, I sent my daughter to
their  house.   On  16.7.88  I  received
message that my grand daughter died
on account of drowning into the well at
Bhandari.  On getting the said message,
I reached there at the time of evening
and  then  I  came  to  know  that  my
daughter Purnabai and grand daughter
died.  On enquiry in the village, I came
to know that my daughter was not given
food  since  last  two  days  and  was  illtreated with an intention that she should
15Page 16
leave the house and hence my daughter
Purnabai  jumped  into  the  well  and
committed  suicide  with  her  daughter
Nanda.”
It is thus clear from the evidence of the PW-1 and from the
FIR lodged by him that he had no personal knowledge about
the  cause  of  the  death  of  Purnabai  but  on  enquiry  at
Bhandari he had come to learn that there was lot of beating
of Purnabai and no food was given to her and for such illtreatment she had jumped into the well with her daughter.
13. No  witness  of  Bhandari  from  whom  PW-1  made  the
inquiry has been examined by the prosecution to prove such
beating  and  denial  of  food  to  Purnabai  soon  before  she
committed suicide.  PW-4, the sister of Purnabai, has not
deposed that there was any beating and denial of food to
Purnabai soon before her drowning in the well.  PW-5, the
Police Patil of Bhandari, has stated that Purnabai was illtreated by the appellant in his house and he came to learn of
this fact from the father of the appellant Raysingh who also
told him that Purnabai’s father had for this reason taken
16Page 17
Purnabai to Paradha three months back but the appellant
and his father took four  to five  Panchas to  Paradha and
brought  back  Purnabai.   PW-5  has,  therefore,  also  not
deposed that Purnabai was beaten or not given food because
of which  she jumped into  the well with her  daughter on
15.07.1988.  On the other hand, on a perusal of the  post
mortem examination report (Ext. 35) of deceased Purnabai,
we  find  that  the  Doctor  has  described  Purnabai  as  ‘well
nourished’ and the last meal appears to have been taken by
her  within  six  hours.   Moreover,  the  post  mortem
examination  report  (Ext.  35)  does  not  show  that  the
Purnabai was subjected to any severe beating before her
death.
14. From  the  discussion  of  the  aforesaid  evidence  on
record, we find that the prosecution has not been able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty
of any wilful conduct which was of such a nature as was
likely to drive Purnabai to commit suicide.  Rather, there
appears to be some evidence in the depositions of PW-1 and
17Page 18
PW-4 (father and sister of Purnabai) that Purnabai was sad
due to a daughter being born to her and a son being born to
the first wife of the appellant.  These circumstances may
have driven Purnabai to commit suicide by jumping into the
well along with her daughter.  Such a consequence from the
mental state of Purnabai cannot be a ground for holding that
the appellant was guilty of cruelty within the meaning of
clause (a)  of the Explanation  to  Section  498A,  IPC.  We,
therefore, hold that the presumption under Section 113A is
not attracted and the appellant cannot also be held guilty of
abetting the suicide of Purnabai.  We have to bear in mind
this note of caution in State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal
& Anr. [(1994) 1 SCC 73]:
“………the  Court  should  be  extremely
careful  in  assessing  the  facts  and
circumstances  of  each  case  and  the
evidence  adduced  in  the  trial  for  the
purpose of finding whether the cruelty
meted  out  to  the  victim  had  in  fact
induced  her  to  end  the  life  by
committing suicide. If it transpires to the
Court that a victim committing suicide
was  hypersensitive  to  ordinary
petulance,  discord  and  differences  in
domestic  life  quite  common  to  the
18Page 19
society  to  which  the  victim  belonged
and  such  petulance,  discord  and
differences were not expected to induce
a similarly circumstanced individual in a
given  society  to  commit  suicide,  the
conscience of the Court should not be
satisfied  for  basing  a  finding  that  the
accused charged of abetting the offence
of suicide should be found guilty.” 
15. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set
aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and the
judgment of the trial court holding the appellant guilty of the
offences under Sections 306 and 498A, IPC and direct that
the bail bonds executed by the appellant be discharged.
       
……...……………………….J.
                                                       (A. K. Patnaik)
……..………………………..J.
(Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)
New Delhi,
February 08, 2013.  
19