Accident claim - M.V.Act Section 149(2)(a)(i)(a) - Tractor and trolley with sand for tank bed in field - Not other than agriculture purpose - Hit the victim who died on the spot - claim granted against insurance company - High court held that company is not liable to pay and as such it can recover the amount from the owner - who has to pay compensation ? - Apex court held that as per record merely carrying sand in trolley for constructing a tank bed in the agriculture field does not amount to use of the tractor for commercial purpose and does not amount violation of terms and conditions of insurance policy and as such set aside the order of High court and allowed the appeal = FAHIM AHMAD & ORS. ... APPELLANTS VERSUS UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS = 2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41335

    Accident claim - M.V.Act Section 149(2)(a)(i)(a) - Tractor and trolley with sand  for tank bed in field - Not other than agriculture purpose - Hit the victim who died on the spot - claim granted against insurance company - High court held that company is not liable to pay and as such it can recover the amount from the owner - who has to pay compensation ? - Apex court held that as per record merely carrying sand in trolley for constructing a tank bed in the agriculture field does not amount to use of the tractor for commercial purpose and does not amount violation of terms and conditions of insurance policy and as such set aside the order of High court and allowed the appeal =

 who is liable  to  pay  the  amount  of  compensation
           awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Udham Singh Nagar
           (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) in M.A.C.P. No. 98/2003  vide  Award
           dated 06.08.2004.= 
When he reached the
           Station Road in front of godown,  suddenly  one  tractor  having
           registration No. UP-21-H-4596 coming at a high speed in  a  rash
           and negligent manner hit the deceased from behind, as  a  result
           of which, he became seriously injured  and  died  on  the  spot.
           Thus,   the   appellants-claimants   claimed   compensation   of
           Rs.5,00,000/- and averred that the deceased was  49  years’  old
           having monthly income of Rs.4,600/- (Rs.3,600/- from mason  work
           and Rs.1,000/- from selling of  milk  of  2–3  buffaloes).   The
           Tribunal  assessed  the  annual  income  of  the   deceased   at
           Rs.24,000/- and applying  the  multiplier  of  13,  awarded  the
           compensation  of  Rs.3,12,000/-  with  interest.   However,  the
           Tribunal held the Insurance  Company,  i.e.,  respondent  No.  1
           herein, liable to pay the said compensation because the  tractor
           was insured with it as per rule at the time of the accident.=
the High  Court
           of Uttranchal at Nainital was partly allowed  on  18.05.2006  to
           the extent that the amount of compensation  so  awarded  by  the
           Tribunal shall be paid by the insurance company,  but  it  shall
           have a right to recover the same from the owner of the offending
           tractor as there  was  breach  of  condition  of  the  insurance
           policy.  This was so held because at the time of  the  accident,
           the tractor was carrying sand.  It is this decision,  which  has
           been assailed in the present appeal.=
 A perusal of  the  records  shows  that,  at  the  time  of  the
           accident, a trolley was attached with  the  tractor,  which  was
           carrying sand for the purpose -
        7. of construction of underground  tank  near  the  farm  land  for
           irrigation purpose(s).  However, merely because it was  carrying
           sand would  not  mean  that  the  tractor  was  being  used  for
           commercial purpose and consequently, there was a breach  of  the
           condition of policy on  the  part  of  the  insured.   There  is
           nothing on record to show that the tractor was  being  used  for
           commercial purpose(s)  or  purpose(s)  other  than  agricultural
           purpose(s), i.e., for hire  or  reward,  as  contemplated  under
           Section 149(2)(a)(i)(a) of the said Act.=
We may also notice that this Court  in  National  Insurance  Co.
           Ltd. Vs. V. Chinnamma & Ors., JT 2004  (7)  SC  167,  held  that
           carriage of vegetables being agricultural produce would lead  to
           an inference that the tractor was being  used  for  agricultural
           purposes, but the same itself would not  be  construed  to  mean
           that the tractor and trailer can be used for carriage  of  goods
           by another person for his business activities.  Thus, a  tractor
           fitted with a trailer may or may not answer  the  definition  of
           ‘goods carriage’ contained in Section 2(14) of the said Act.


       11. In view of above, we are of the view  that,  in  the  facts  and
           circumstances of the case, the High Court was not  justified  in
           transferring the -
       12. burden of paying the amount of compensation from respondent  No.
           1-Insurance Company to the appellants herein.


       13. We, thus, allow the appeal.  Accordingly, the impugned  judgment
           dated 18.05.2006 is set aside, in so far as the right to recover
           the amount awarded from the owner of the tractor.  No orders  as
           to costs.     

 2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41335                  P SATHASIVAM, RANJAN GOGOI, N.V. RAMANA                                                                                                                                     NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6220 OF 2008

FAHIM AHMAD & ORS.                 ...      APPELLANTS
                                   VERSUS
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ORS.      ...RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T

N.V. RAMANA,J.

        1. The short question,  which  arises  for  consideration  in  this
           appeal, is who is liable  to  pay  the  amount  of  compensation
           awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Udham Singh Nagar
           (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) in M.A.C.P. No. 98/2003  vide  Award
           dated 06.08.2004.


        2. Brief facts of the case are thus : On 06.03.2003,  the  deceased
           Atma Singh, the husband of appellant -
        3. No. 1 and the father of appellants No. 2 and 3 herein, was going
           from Kashipur crossing towards Tada Ujjain.  When he reached the
           Station Road in front of godown,  suddenly  one  tractor  having
           registration No. UP-21-H-4596 coming at a high speed in  a  rash
           and negligent manner hit the deceased from behind, as  a  result
           of which, he became seriously injured  and  died  on  the  spot.
           Thus,   the   appellants-claimants   claimed   compensation   of
           Rs.5,00,000/- and averred that the deceased was  49  years’  old
           having monthly income of Rs.4,600/- (Rs.3,600/- from mason  work
           and Rs.1,000/- from selling of  milk  of  2–3  buffaloes).   The
           Tribunal  assessed  the  annual  income  of  the   deceased   at
           Rs.24,000/- and applying  the  multiplier  of  13,  awarded  the
           compensation  of  Rs.3,12,000/-  with  interest.   However,  the
           Tribunal held the Insurance  Company,  i.e.,  respondent  No.  1
           herein, liable to pay the said compensation because the  tractor
           was insured with it as per rule at the time of the accident.


        4. Against the award  of  the  Tribunal,  the  appeal  filed  under
           Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act,  1988  (for  short,  ‘the
           said Act’) registered as A.O. No. 425 of 2004 in the High  Court
           of Uttranchal at Nainital was partly allowed  on  18.05.2006  to
           the extent that the amount of compensation  so  awarded  by  the
           Tribunal shall be paid by the insurance company,  but  it  shall
           have a right to recover the same from the owner of the offending
           tractor as there  was  breach  of  condition  of  the  insurance
           policy.  This was so held because at the time of  the  accident,
           the tractor was carrying sand.  It is this decision,  which  has
           been assailed in the present appeal.


        5. We have heard arguments advanced  by  learned  counsel  for  the
           parties and perused the records.


        6. A perusal of  the  records  shows  that,  at  the  time  of  the
           accident, a trolley was attached with  the  tractor,  which  was
           carrying sand for the purpose -
        7. of construction of underground  tank  near  the  farm  land  for
           irrigation purpose(s).  However, merely because it was  carrying
           sand would  not  mean  that  the  tractor  was  being  used  for
           commercial purpose and consequently, there was a breach  of  the
           condition of policy on  the  part  of  the  insured.   There  is
           nothing on record to show that the tractor was  being  used  for
           commercial purpose(s)  or  purpose(s)  other  than  agricultural
           purpose(s), i.e., for hire  or  reward,  as  contemplated  under
           Section 149(2)(a)(i)(a) of the said Act.


        8. Although the plea of breach of  the  conditions  of  policy  was
           raised before the Tribunal, yet neither any issue was framed nor
           any evidence led to prove the same.   In  our  opinion,  it  was
           mandatory for respondent No. 1-Insurance  Company  not  only  to
           plead the  said  breach,  but  also  substantiate  the  same  by
           adducing positive evidence in  respect  of  the  same.   In  the
           absence of any such evidence, it cannot be presumed that -
        9. there was breach of the conditions of policy.  Thus,  there  was
           no reason to fasten the said liability of payment of the  amount
           of compensation  awarded  by  the  Tribunal  on  the  appellants
           herein.
       10. We may also notice that this Court  in  National  Insurance  Co.
           Ltd. Vs. V. Chinnamma & Ors., JT 2004  (7)  SC  167,  held  that
           carriage of vegetables being agricultural produce would lead  to
           an inference that the tractor was being  used  for  agricultural
           purposes, but the same itself would not  be  construed  to  mean
           that the tractor and trailer can be used for carriage  of  goods
           by another person for his business activities.  Thus, a  tractor
           fitted with a trailer may or may not answer  the  definition  of
           ‘goods carriage’ contained in Section 2(14) of the said Act.


       11. In view of above, we are of the view  that,  in  the  facts  and
           circumstances of the case, the High Court was not  justified  in
           transferring the -
       12. burden of paying the amount of compensation from respondent  No.
           1-Insurance Company to the appellants herein.


       13. We, thus, allow the appeal.  Accordingly, the impugned  judgment
           dated 18.05.2006 is set aside, in so far as the right to recover
           the amount awarded from the owner of the tractor.  No orders  as
           to costs.


                                         ..............C.J.I.
                                         (P. Sathasivam)




                                          ..................J.
                                 (Ranjan Gogoi)


                                            ..................J.
                                          (N.V. Ramana)
New Delhi;
March 25, 2014.

Sec.302 - vs- 326 I.P.C. - Absence of charge under sec.34 - five injuries - one say by Farsa on neck and another say by Ballam near the eye victim died - Doctor said due 5 injuries and due to loss of blood victim died - in the absence of a charge under sec.34 - who cause the death of victim not proved - the accused is liable to be convicted under sec. 326 for causing injury but not for death under sec.302 I.P.C. - Apex court sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years each and fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default to suffer imprisonment for six months. = VIJAY SINGH & ANR. …APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENT = 2014 (March.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41334

   Sec.302 - vs- 326 I.P.C. - Absence of charge under sec.34 - five injuries - one say by Farsa on neck and another say by Ballam near the eye victim died - Doctor said due 5 injuries and due to loss of blood victim died - in the absence of a charge under sec.34 - who cause the death of victim not proved - the accused is liable to be convicted under sec. 326 for causing injury but not for death under sec.302 I.P.C. - Apex court sentenced them  to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years  each  and  fine  of  Rs.5,000/- each, in default to suffer imprisonment for six months. =

 Nonetheless from the evidence of the  prosecution  witnesses  what  is
proved beyond doubt is that appellant Vijay Singh caused injury on the face
of the deceased by ballam and appellant Hari Singh on neck  by  farsa.   In
this backdrop, we proceed to consider the nature of offence. It is relevant
here to mention that no charge under Section 34 IPC has been framed against
the appellants.  Even if we assume in favour of the State, as contended  by
Mr. Singh, that it is possible to hold the appellants guilty under  Section
302 read with Section 34 of the IPC  in  the  absence  of  charge,  in  our
opinion, for  that  the  prosecution  will  have  to  prove  that  injuries
attributable to the appellants or any of them were the cause of death.   As
observed earlier, the appellants had caused one injury  each,  whereas  the
deceased had sustained five injuries.  According to the doctor,  death  had
occurred on account of shock and excessive bleeding  due  to  the  injuries
caused on the person of the deceased.  Therefore, the death had  not  taken
place as a result of the injuries caused by the appellants or  any  one  of
them.  Hence, they cannot be held guilty under Section 302 IPC  simplicitor
or with the aid of Section 34 IPC.


      However, the prosecution has been able to prove  that  the  appellants
have assaulted the deceased with ballam  and  farsa,  which  are  dangerous
weapons.  Further, the appellants  had  caused  grievous  injuries  on  the
person of the deceased.  Hence, they may not be held guilty  under  Section
302 or 302 read with Section 34 IPC, but surely their acts come within  the
mischief of Section 326  IPC.    Accordingly,  we  modify  the  appellants’
conviction and hold them guilty under Section 326 IPC and sentence them  to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years  each  and  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-
each, in default to suffer imprisonment for six months.  We have been  told
that both the appellants have already remained in custody for more than the
period of their sentence.  If that be so, they be released forthwith unless
required in any other case.


      In the result, the  appeal  is  partly  allowed,  the  conviction  and
sentence of the appellants under Section 302 IPC is set aside, instead they
are convicted under Section 326 IPC and sentenced to the  period  as  above
with the direction aforesaid.
2014 (March.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41334
                                                              REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.444 OF 2008


VIJAY SINGH & ANR.                        …APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                     …RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T


CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J.


      In the present appeal by way of special leave, we are  concerned  with
appellants Vijay Singh and Hari Singh.


      According to the prosecution, on 16th of  June,  1992  at  about  6.30
A.M., a report was lodged by the informant,  Pohap  Singh  (PW-1),  alleging
that while he  was  at  his  house,  his  father  Bhagirath  (deceased)  was
returning home after answering the  nature’s  call  and  at  that  time,  11
accused persons including appellant no. 2 Hari Singh armed  with  farsa  and
appellant no. 1 Vijay Singh armed with a  ballam  and  other  accused  armed
with axes surrounded him.  Seeing this,  according  to  the  informant,  his
mother Prema Bai (PW-2), his wife Sheela (PW-3)  and  grandfather  Jagannath
(PW-6) went to rescue him, whereupon informant Pohap Singh was assaulted  by
lathi by one of  the  accused.   Meanwhile,  appellant  no.  2,  Hari  Singh
inflicted an injury on the neck of the deceased with  farsa  upon  which  he
fell down.  Thereafter, all the accused  assaulted  the  deceased  with  the
weapons with which they were armed.  It is the case of the prosecution  that
appellant no. 1, Vijay Singh caused an injury with a ballam near the eye  of
the deceased and he died on the spot.


      On the basis of the report given by Pohap Singh, a case under  Section
147, 148 and 302/149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to  as
“the IPC”) was registered.  Police after usual investigation  submitted  the
charge-sheet against  all  11  accused  persons  and  ultimately  they  were
committed to the Court of Sessions to face the trial.   The  Sessions  Judge
acquitted 9 of the 11  accused  and  convicted  the  appellants  herein  for
commission of offence under Section 302 of the IPC  and  sentenced  them  to
imprisonment for life. The learned Judge found the  allegations  as  to  the
infliction of injuries, on the head and neck of  the  deceased  by  specific
weapon such as  ballam  by  appellant  no.1  and  farsa  by  appellant  no.2
respectively, to have been corroborated by  the  medical  evidence.   Hence,
the two appellants were convicted and sentenced as above.


      On appeal, the High Court confirmed their conviction and sentence  and
while doing so, observed as follows:
           “5………Dr. Kapil Dev Singh, who has performed  the  postmortem  of
           the deceased on 16.6.1992 and found as many as six  injuries  on
           the body of the deceased, out of which injury No.1 is caused  by
           some pointed object near the face of the  deceased.   Thus,  the
           injury attributed to Vijay Singh  is  corroborated.   The  other
           injury was incised wound on the body of the deceased.   All  the
           injuries were caused by sharp and edged weapons.  As per opinion
           of Doctor injury No. 1 was sufficient  to  cause  death  of  the
           deceased…………


           6. After perusal of the statements of PW-1, PW-2  and  PW-3,  we
           find that the  Sessions  Court  rightly  convicted  the  present
           appellants.  So far as  the  other  accused  are  concerned  the
           Doctor has specifically stated that except the injury No.1 which
           is attributed to Vijay Singh, all other injuries were caused  by
           the same weapon.  Thus, the other  injuries  are  attributed  to
           Hari Singh.  Moreso, the witness could not point  out  which  of
           the injuries were caused by other accused, hence, acquitted  the
           other accused.   But  so  far  as  the  present  appellants  are
           concerned,  there  are  specific  allegation  against  them  for
           causing injuries to the deceased.
                                                            “Underling ours”




      Aggrieved by the same, the appellants are before us.


      At the outset, while assailing the conviction of the  appellants,  Mr.
Rajesh learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submits that  the  High
Court erred in holding that excepting injury no. 1, all other  injuries  are
attributable to Hari Singh.  He draws our attention to the evidence of  PW-2
Prema Bai and PW-3  Sheela,  who  claim  to  be  the  eye-witnesses  to  the
occurrence and have clearly stated in  their  evidence  that  the  appellant
Hari Singh gave farsa blow on the neck of the  deceased  and  other  accused
persons (since acquitted) have also assaulted the deceased with farsa.
      We have gone through the evidence of the eye-witnesses and from  their
testimony it is evident that appellant Vijay Singh had caused one injury  to
the deceased by ballam whereas appellant Hari Singh  caused  one  injury  on
the neck by farsa.  They have also testified that  other  accused  had  also
given farsa blows to the deceased.  In  the  face  of  it,  the  High  Court
clearly erred in holding that excepting injury no.  1,  all  other  injuries
were caused by the appellant Hari Singh.


      Mr. Rajesh, then submits that the appellants can be held guilty  under
Section 302 of the IPC only when it is proved that  the  injuries  inflicted
by them have resulted into death.  He refers to the  evidence  of  PW-7  Dr.
Kapil Dev Singh and  submits  that  according  to  his  opinion,  the  death
occurred because of excessive bleeding and  shock  on  account  of  all  the
injuries found on the person of the  deceased.   He  points  out  that  this
doctor had found 5 injuries on the person of  the  deceased  and  all  those
injuries cannot  be  attributed  to  the  present  appellants.   Mr.  Rajesh
further points out that even if it is assumed  that  appellant  Vijay  Singh
had assaulted the deceased with ballam on the face and appellant Hari  Singh
by farsa on the neck, they cannot be held guilty under Section  302  of  the
IPC as those injuries only did not cause death.


      Mr. C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the  State,  on  the  other  hand,
submits that since the doctor in evidence has stated that injury no.  1  was
sufficient to have caused  death,  the  High  court  rightly  convicted  the
appellants.  In any  view  of  the  matter,  according  to  Mr.  Singh,  the
deceased died of various injuries caused to him during the  occurrence,  and
therefore, the appellants can well be convicted under Section 302  with  the
aid of Section 34 of the IPC.


      True it is that the High Court, while upholding the conviction of  the
appellants, has observed that “as per the opinion of the doctor, injury  no.
1 was sufficient to cause death of the deceased”.  We have gone through  the
evidence of PW-7 Dr. Kapil Dev Singh.  PW-7  in  his  evidence  stated  that
during the post-mortem examination, he found the following injuries  on  the
person of the deceased:


           “1.Depressed fracture with contusion  with  open  wound  cutting
           front parietal bone 4” x 1½” x bone deep on right side.


           2. Incised wound on cheek cutting auxiliary bone 5”x 1/2” x bone
           deep right side.


           3. Incised wound of the size 4” x ½” x muscle deep  and  cutting
           breathing pipe and major blood arteries on right side.




           4. Incised wound on superior collar bone right  side,  5”  x  ½”
           cutting breathing pipe.


           5. Incised wound right side on the face cutting right  jaw  bone
           size 3” x ½” x bone deep.”






      As regards the cause of death, he has stated as follows:


           “In my opinion, all the injuries were caused by sharp and  blunt
           weapon.  In my opinion cause of death is excessive bleeding  and
           shock….”


      Thus, the doctor has altogether found 5 injuries on the person of  the
deceased and the death had occurred due to excessive bleeding and shock  on
account thereof.  Therefore, it cannot be said that only  injury  no.1  was
the cause of the death.  Hence, we are constrained to observe that the High
Court committed serious error by holding that injury no. 1  was  sufficient
to cause death of the deceased.


      Nonetheless from the evidence of the  prosecution  witnesses  what  is
proved beyond doubt is that appellant Vijay Singh caused injury on the face
of the deceased by ballam and appellant Hari Singh on neck  by  farsa.   In
this backdrop, we proceed to consider the nature of offence. It is relevant
here to mention that no charge under Section 34 IPC has been framed against
the appellants.  Even if we assume in favour of the State, as contended  by
Mr. Singh, that it is possible to hold the appellants guilty under  Section
302 read with Section 34 of the IPC  in  the  absence  of  charge,  in  our
opinion, for  that  the  prosecution  will  have  to  prove  that  injuries
attributable to the appellants or any of them were the cause of death.   As
observed earlier, the appellants had caused one injury  each,  whereas  the
deceased had sustained five injuries.  According to the doctor,  death  had
occurred on account of shock and excessive bleeding  due  to  the  injuries
caused on the person of the deceased.  Therefore, the death had  not  taken
place as a result of the injuries caused by the appellants or  any  one  of
them.  Hence, they cannot be held guilty under Section 302 IPC  simplicitor
or with the aid of Section 34 IPC.


      However, the prosecution has been able to prove  that  the  appellants
have assaulted the deceased with ballam  and  farsa,  which  are  dangerous
weapons.  Further, the appellants  had  caused  grievous  injuries  on  the
person of the deceased.  Hence, they may not be held guilty  under  Section
302 or 302 read with Section 34 IPC, but surely their acts come within  the
mischief of Section 326  IPC.    Accordingly,  we  modify  the  appellants’
conviction and hold them guilty under Section 326 IPC and sentence them  to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years  each  and  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-
each, in default to suffer imprisonment for six months.  We have been  told
that both the appellants have already remained in custody for more than the
period of their sentence.  If that be so, they be released forthwith unless
required in any other case.


      In the result, the  appeal  is  partly  allowed,  the  conviction  and
sentence of the appellants under Section 302 IPC is set aside, instead they
are convicted under Section 326 IPC and sentenced to the  period  as  above
with the direction aforesaid.
                                                   ………………………………………………………………J
                                                   (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)




                                                   ………………………………………………………………J
                                        (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)

NEW DELHI,
MARCH 25, 2014.


-----------------------
11

NDPS Act - Sec.23 and 29 - trial court acquitted under sec. 29 but convicted under sec. 23 of NDPS Act - failure to prove transport from foreign land - High court set aside the conviction as the prosecution failed to prove that the alleged Ganja was imported from foreign country - interpretation of the words " import and export inter state and import and export out of India or Transhipment of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance " - Apex court held that the High court rightly acquitted the accused and dismiss the appeal = Union of India …Appellant Versus Sheo Shambhu Giri …Respondent = 2014 (March.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41332

    NDPS Act - Sec.23 and 29 - trial court acquitted under sec. 29 but convicted under sec. 23 of NDPS Act - failure to prove transport from foreign land -  High court set aside the conviction as the prosecution failed to prove that the alleged Ganja was imported from foreign country - interpretation of the words " import and export inter state and import and export out of India or Transhipment  of  any narcotic  drug  or  psychotropic  substance " - Apex court held that the High court rightly acquitted the accused and dismiss the appeal = 
The sole respondent  along  with  two  other  accused  was  tried  for
offences under Sections 23 and 29 of the NDPS Act.  The  trial  court  found
the respondent herein guilty of an offence under Section 23 of the NDPS  Act
but found that the charge under Section 29 of the Act is not proved  against
him. He was, therefore, convicted for an offence under  Section  23  of  the
NDPS Act and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years and also to pay a fine  of
Rs. 1 lakh for an offence under Section 23 of the NDPS Act.

4.    The High Court, allowed the appeal of the  respondent  and  set  aside
his conviction under Section 23 of the NDPS Act.  Relevant  portion  of  the
judgment reads as follows:-
          “17.   So far as appellant Sheo Shambhu Giri of Cr. Appeal No. 359
          of 2003 is concerned he has also assailed his conviction  on  many
          grounds  including  that  the  Ganja  was   recovered   from   his
          possession.   
His submission was also that though he  was  charged
          under sections 23 and 29 of the act but  he  was  acquitted  under
          Section 29 of the act and was not  considered  to  be  a  part  of
          conspiracy and admittedly he was only a carrier at the instance of
          other persons.   
As such his punishment under section  23  of  the
          Act is also not tenable in the eye of law.    
That  apart  it  has
          been submitted that the ingredients of section 23 of  the  Act  is
          not attracted in this case because there is no evidence  to  prove
          that the Ganja was  imported  from  foreign  land.    
As  per  the
          wording of the section there must be import of the  contraband  to
          attract punishment under this section but  the  prosecution  could
          not prove that the Ganja was of foreign origin.   
Even prosecution
          could not prove whether the substance so seized was actually Ganja
          or not because no chemical examination report has been produced in
          the court in original  form  neither  the  chemical  examiner  was
          examined to prove them.   
It has  also  been  submitted  that  the
          mandatory provision of, sections 42, 52 and 57 of the act has  not
          been strictly  complied  with.    
That  apart  it  has  also  been
          submitted that there is no  independent  witness  to  support  the
          recovery of contraband and the prosecution failed to examine them.
            Only independent witness is a witness to Panchnama (Ext. 18)” =

On the other hand, the learned counsel for  the  respondent  submitted
that Section 23 of the NDPS Act creates three offences  and  they  are;  (i)
import into India, (ii) Export out of India; and (iii) Transhipment  of  any
narcotic  drug  or  psychotropic  substance.    If  any  one  of  the  three
activities is undertaken in contravention of any one of  the  provisions  of
the Act or the Rules made thereunder or in contravention of  an  order  made
or condition of licence or permit granted or  certificate  or  authorization
issued either under the Act  or the  Rules.    The  explanation  “tranships”
occurring under Section 23 must necessarily be understood in the context  of
the scheme of the Section and the  preceding  expressions  of  “import  into
India” and “export out of India” to mean only transhipment for  the  purpose
of either import into India or export out of India. =

 “9. Power of Central Government to permit, control and regulate.
           -(1) Subject  to  the  provisions  of  section  8,  the  Central
           Government may, by rules-


           (a) permit and regulate-
           (i)  the  cultivation,  or  gathering  of  any   portion   (such
           cultivation or gathering being only on account  of  the  Central
           Government) of coca plant, or the production, possession,  sale,
           purchase, transport, import inter-State, export inter-State, use
           or consumption of coca leaves;
           (ii) the cultivation (such cultivation being only on account  of
           Central Government) of the opium poppy;
           (iii) the production and manufacture of opium and production  of
           poppy straw;
           (iv) the sale of opium and opium derivatives  from  the  Central
           Government factories for export from  India  or  sale  to  State
           Government or to manufacturing chemists;
           (v) the manufacture of manufactured drugs (other, than  prepared
           opium) but not including manufacture of medicinal opium  or  any
           preparation containing  any  manufactured  drug  from  materials
           which the maker is lawfully entitled to possess;
           (vi) the manufacture, possession, transport import  inter-State,
           export  inter-State,  sale,  purchase,  consumption  or  use  of
           psychotropic substances;
           (vii)  the  import  into  India  and  export  from   India   and
           transhipment of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
           (b) prescribe any other matter requisite to render effective the
           control of the  Central  Government  over  any  of  the  matters
           specified in clause (a)”


9.    It can be seen from the language  of  the  Section  that  the  Central
Government is authorized  to  make  rules  which  may  permit  and  regulate
various activities such as cultivation, gathering,  production,  possession,
sale, transport, inter state import or export  of  various  substances  like
coca leaves, poppy straw, opium poppy and opium derivatives etc., while  the
Parliament used the expression  transport  in  the  context  of  inter-state
import or export of such material in sub-Section 1(a)(vi),  in  the  context
of importing to India and export  out  of  India,  Parliament  employed  the
expression transhipment in Section 9(i)(a)(vii).

10.   Therefore, the High Court rightly concluded  that  the  conviction  of
the respondent under Section 23 of the NDPS Act cannot  be  sustained.    We
see no reason to interfere with the same.

11.   In view of such conclusion, we do not deem  it  necessary  to  examine
the correctness  of  other  conclusions  recorded  by  the  High  Court  for
acquitting the respondents.   The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

2014 (March.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41332

                                                             Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO. 1027 OF 2008



Union of India                                     …Appellant

                                  Versus
Sheo Shambhu Giri                                  …Respondent







                               J U D G M E N T



Chelameswar, J.


1.    Aggrieved by the judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 359 of  2003  of  the
High Court of Patna, the instant appeal is preferred by the Union of India.

2.    By the judgment under appeal, three appeals came to  be  preferred  by
the three different accused who were convicted for different offences  under
the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,  1985  (for  short  “the
NDPS Act”) by the Court of  5th  Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge,
Mothari of East Champaran District in Excise Case No.  31  of  2001  by  its
judgment  dated  12th  June,  2003.  By  the  judgment  under  appeal,   the
conviction of all the appellants was  set  aside.   It  is  not  very  clear
whether any appeals are preferred against the acquittal  of  the  other  two
accused except the respondent herein.

3.    The sole respondent  along  with  two  other  accused  was  tried  for
offences under Sections 23 and 29 of the NDPS Act.  The  trial  court  found
the respondent herein guilty of an offence under Section 23 of the NDPS  Act
but found that the charge under Section 29 of the Act is not proved  against
him. He was, therefore, convicted for an offence under  Section  23  of  the
NDPS Act and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years and also to pay a fine  of
Rs. 1 lakh for an offence under Section 23 of the NDPS Act.

4.    The High Court, allowed the appeal of the  respondent  and  set  aside
his conviction under Section 23 of the NDPS Act.  Relevant  portion  of  the
judgment reads as follows:-
          “17.   So far as appellant Sheo Shambhu Giri of Cr. Appeal No. 359
          of 2003 is concerned he has also assailed his conviction  on  many
          grounds  including  that  the  Ganja  was   recovered   from   his
          possession.   His submission was also that though he  was  charged
          under sections 23 and 29 of the act but  he  was  acquitted  under
          Section 29 of the act and was not  considered  to  be  a  part  of
          conspiracy and admittedly he was only a carrier at the instance of
          other persons.   As such his punishment under section  23  of  the
          Act is also not tenable in the eye of law.    That  apart  it  has
          been submitted that the ingredients of section 23 of  the  Act  is
          not attracted in this case because there is no evidence  to  prove
          that the Ganja was  imported  from  foreign  land.    As  per  the
          wording of the section there must be import of the  contraband  to
          attract punishment under this section but  the  prosecution  could
          not prove that the Ganja was of foreign origin.   Even prosecution
          could not prove whether the substance so seized was actually Ganja
          or not because no chemical examination report has been produced in
          the court in original  form  neither  the  chemical  examiner  was
          examined to prove them.   It has  also  been  submitted  that  the
          mandatory provision of, sections 42, 52 and 57 of the act has  not
          been strictly  complied  with.    That  apart  it  has  also  been
          submitted that there is no  independent  witness  to  support  the
          recovery of contraband and the prosecution failed to examine them.
            Only independent witness is a witness to Panchnama (Ext. 18)”

5.    Dr.  Ashok  Dhamija,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant
submitted that the High Court grossly erred  in  coming  to  the  conclusion
that in the absence of proof  that  the  Ganja  allegedly  seized  from  the
custody of the respondent is of foreign origin, Section 23 of the  NDPS  Act
is not attracted.

6.    The learned counsel further assailed the conclusion of the High  Court
that the prosecution could not prove  that  the  material  seized  from  the
respondent was ganja.

7.    On the other hand, the learned counsel for  the  respondent  submitted
that Section 23 of the NDPS Act creates three offences  and  they  are;  (i)
import into India, (ii) Export out of India; and (iii) Transhipment  of  any
narcotic  drug  or  psychotropic  substance.    If  any  one  of  the  three
activities is undertaken in contravention of any one of  the  provisions  of
the Act or the Rules made thereunder or in contravention of  an  order  made
or condition of licence or permit granted or  certificate  or  authorization
issued either under the Act  or the  Rules.    The  explanation  “tranships”
occurring under Section 23 must necessarily be understood in the context  of
the scheme of the Section and the  preceding  expressions  of  “import  into
India” and “export out of India” to mean only transhipment for  the  purpose
of either import into India or export out of India.    The  learned  counsel
further submitted that the High Court rightly concluded in  the  absence  of
any proof that the respondent was carrying contraband either in  the  course
of import into India or export out of India, section 23 is not attracted.

8.     We  agree  with  the  submission  made  by  the  respondent  on   the
construction of Section 23 of  the  NDPS  Act,  the  expression  “tranships”
occurring therein  must  necessarily  be  understood  as  suggested  by  the
learned counsel for the respondent.   There  is  yet  another  reason  apart
from the construction of the language of Section  23  which  compels  us  to
accept the submission made  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent.
Section 9(1)(a)(vii) also employs  the  expression  transhipment.    Section
9(1) reads as follows;

           “9. Power of Central Government to permit, control and regulate.
           -(1) Subject  to  the  provisions  of  section  8,  the  Central
           Government may, by rules-


           (a) permit and regulate-
           (i)  the  cultivation,  or  gathering  of  any   portion   (such
           cultivation or gathering being only on account  of  the  Central
           Government) of coca plant, or the production, possession,  sale,
           purchase, transport, import inter-State, export inter-State, use
           or consumption of coca leaves;
           (ii) the cultivation (such cultivation being only on account  of
           Central Government) of the opium poppy;
           (iii) the production and manufacture of opium and production  of
           poppy straw;
           (iv) the sale of opium and opium derivatives  from  the  Central
           Government factories for export from  India  or  sale  to  State
           Government or to manufacturing chemists;
           (v) the manufacture of manufactured drugs (other, than  prepared
           opium) but not including manufacture of medicinal opium  or  any
           preparation containing  any  manufactured  drug  from  materials
           which the maker is lawfully entitled to possess;
           (vi) the manufacture, possession, transport import  inter-State,
           export  inter-State,  sale,  purchase,  consumption  or  use  of
           psychotropic substances;
           (vii)  the  import  into  India  and  export  from   India   and
           transhipment of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
           (b) prescribe any other matter requisite to render effective the
           control of the  Central  Government  over  any  of  the  matters
           specified in clause (a)”


9.    It can be seen from the language  of  the  Section  that  the  Central
Government is authorized  to  make  rules  which  may  permit  and  regulate
various activities such as cultivation, gathering,  production,  possession,
sale, transport, inter state import or export  of  various  substances  like
coca leaves, poppy straw, opium poppy and opium derivatives etc., while  the
Parliament used the expression  transport  in  the  context  of  inter-state
import or export of such material in sub-Section 1(a)(vi),  in  the  context
of importing to India and export  out  of  India,  Parliament  employed  the
expression transhipment in Section 9(i)(a)(vii).

10.   Therefore, the High Court rightly concluded  that  the  conviction  of
the respondent under Section 23 of the NDPS Act cannot  be  sustained.    We
see no reason to interfere with the same.

11.   In view of such conclusion, we do not deem  it  necessary  to  examine
the correctness  of  other  conclusions  recorded  by  the  High  Court  for
acquitting the respondents.   The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.


                                      ………………………………J.
                                      ( Dr. B.S. Chauhan )






                                      ………………………………J.
                                      ( J. Chelameswar )
New Delhi;
March 25, 2014

                                                     -----------------------
7

Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - failure of complainant to plead - Directors, Manager, Secretary or other officers of the company for arraying as accused there must be specific pleadings that the accused were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company - High court rightly quashed the complaint = Mannalal Chamaria & Anr. ....Appellants Versus State of West Bengal and Anr. ...Respondents = 2014 (March.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41331

  Sections  138  and  141 of    the    Negotiable    Instruments    Act,    1881  - failure of complainant to plead  - Directors,  Manager, Secretary or other officers of the company for arraying as accused there must be specific pleadings that the accused were in charge of and  responsible for the conduct of the business of the company - High court rightly quashed the complaint =

 failure (and consequential effect) of Pradip Sarkar  to
specifically state in  his  complaint  filed  under  Sections  138  and  141
 of    the    Negotiable    Instruments    Act,    1881    that    the appellants/accused  persons  were  in  charge   of   and   responsible   for the  conduct  of  the  business  of  M/s.  Heritage  Herbs  Ltd.  of  which they were said to be Directors.=

 Insofar  as  the  first
complaint is concerned, the  appellants  were  not  even  made  parties  and
therefore there is no question of any allegations being  made  against  them
in that complaint.  
As far as the second complaint is  concerned,  the  only
allegation made is to be  found  in  paragraph  6  thereof  which  reads  as
follows:-
            “That in this context your petitioner refers to  the  provisions
            of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act,  where  it  has
            been specifically stated that if the  offender  is  the  company
            then the person who at the time of the offence was committed was
            in charge of and was responsible to the company for the  conduct
            of the  business  of  the  company,  other  Directors,  Manager,
            Secretary or other officers of the company shall  be  guilty  of
            the  offence,  unless  the  persons  referred  to  above   prove
            otherwise, as per the saving clause of  the  said  section.   In
            section 5  of  the  Companies  Act,  also  made  those  officers
            responsible for crime committed by the company.”

   The law on the subject  is  now  very  well-settled  by  a  series  of
decisions rendered by this Court and it  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  the
views expressed time and again.  Suffice it to say, that the  law  has  once
again been stated in 

A.K.Singhania  vs.  Gujarat  State  Fertilizer  Company Ltd.[1] to the effect that 
it is necessary for a  complainant  to  state  in
the complaint that the person accused was in charge of and  responsible  for
the conduct of the business of the company.  Although,  no  particular  form
for making such an allegation is prescribed, and it may not be necessary  to
reproduce the language of Section 138 of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act,
1881, but a reading of the complaint should show that the substance  of  the
accusation  discloses  that  the  accused  person  was  in  charge  of   and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at  the  relevant
time.  
From the averment made in the complaint, which is  reproduced  above,
it can safely  be  said  that  there  is  no  specific  or  even  a  general
allegation made against the appellants.
10.   Under  these  circumstances,  the  complaint  against  the  appellants
deserves dismissal.  A contrary view taken  by  the  High  Court  cannot  be
accepted.  Accordingly, the appeals are allowed and the order passed by  the
High Court is set aside.

2014 (March.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41331

                                                          NON-REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 213 OF 2006

Mannalal Chamaria & Anr.                                 ....Appellants

                                   Versus

State of West Bengal   and Anr                             ....Respondents

                                    WITH

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 215 OF 2006

                                     AND

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 217 OF 2006


                               J U D G M E N T

Madan B. Lokur, J.

1.    The question  arising  for  consideration  in  these  appeals  relates
      to the alleged failure (and consequential effect) of Pradip Sarkar  to
specifically state in  his  complaint  filed  under  Sections  138  and  141
       of    the    Negotiable    Instruments    Act,    1881    that    the
appellants/accused  persons  were  in  charge   of   and   responsible   for
the  conduct  of  the  business  of  M/s.  Heritage  Herbs  Ltd.  of   which
they were said to be Directors.
2.    In a complaint filed on 31st March, 2001, Pradip Sarkar  alleged  that
Heritage Herbs  had made an offer for collecting money from the market  with
a view to allot land to the intending  investors.    On  the  basis  of  the
offer made, Pradip Sarkar invested an amount of Rs.1,50,000/-  and  Heritage
Herbs  issued three receipt-cum-allotment letters for three  plots  of  land
to Pradip Sarkar.  At the time of  handing  over  the  receipt-cum-allotment
letters, Pradip Sarkar was also handed over three cheques  of  Rs.  61,000/-
each  post dated to 29th  October,  2000.   These  cheques  were  issued  by
Heritage Herbs and were signed by Raj Kumar  Chamaria  as  Chairman  of  the
said concern.
3.    All the three  cheques  were  deposited  by  Pradip  Sarkar  but  were
dishonoured by the concerned bank.  This led Pradip Sarkar to take steps  to
issue a notice to and initiate proceedings against  Heritage Herbs  and  Raj
Kumar Chamaria under the provisions of Section 138 read with Section 141  of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
4.    During the pendency of the proceedings  Raj  Kumar  Chamaria  died  on
10th December, 2003.
5.    Thereafter, Pradip Sarkar moved  an  application  for  impleading  the
appellants  as  accused  persons.   The  application  was  allowed  and  the
appellants were impleaded as accused persons by the concerned Magistrate  by
an order dated 28th April, 2004 and summons issued to them.
6.    Feeling aggrieved by their impleadment and summons   issued  to  them,
the appellants preferred Criminal Revision Petitions in  the  Calcutta  High
Court, which dismissed the petitions.
7.    The appellants have challenged the order of the  Calcutta  High  Court
and the only contention urged is that  no  specific  allegations  were  made
against them either in the complaint as  originally  filed  on  31st  March,
2001 or in the amended complaint filed on 28th April 2004.
8.    We have been taken through both the complaints by learned counsel  for
the appellants and find that there is no allegation worth the  name  against
any of the appellants in either of the complaints.   Insofar  as  the  first
complaint is concerned, the  appellants  were  not  even  made  parties  and
therefore there is no question of any allegations being  made  against  them
in that complaint.  As far as the second complaint is  concerned,  the  only
allegation made is to be  found  in  paragraph  6  thereof  which  reads  as
follows:-
            “That in this context your petitioner refers to  the  provisions
            of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act,  where  it  has
            been specifically stated that if the  offender  is  the  company
            then the person who at the time of the offence was committed was
            in charge of and was responsible to the company for the  conduct
            of the  business  of  the  company,  other  Directors,  Manager,
            Secretary or other officers of the company shall  be  guilty  of
            the  offence,  unless  the  persons  referred  to  above   prove
            otherwise, as per the saving clause of  the  said  section.   In
            section 5  of  the  Companies  Act,  also  made  those  officers
            responsible for crime committed by the company.”



9.    The law on the subject  is  now  very  well-settled  by  a  series  of
decisions rendered by this Court and it  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  the
views expressed time and again.  Suffice it to say, that the  law  has  once
again been stated in A.K.Singhania  vs.  Gujarat  State  Fertilizer  Company
Ltd.[1] to the effect that it is necessary for a  complainant  to  state  in
the complaint that the person accused was in charge of and  responsible  for
the conduct of the business of the company.  Although,  no  particular  form
for making such an allegation is prescribed, and it may not be necessary  to
reproduce the language of Section 138 of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act,
1881, but a reading of the complaint should show that the substance  of  the
accusation  discloses  that  the  accused  person  was  in  charge  of   and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at  the  relevant
time.  From the averment made in the complaint, which is  reproduced  above,
it can safely  be  said  that  there  is  no  specific  or  even  a  general
allegation made against the appellants.
10.   Under  these  circumstances,  the  complaint  against  the  appellants
deserves dismissal.  A contrary view taken  by  the  High  Court  cannot  be
accepted.  Accordingly, the appeals are allowed and the order passed by  the
High Court is set aside.


                                       ……………………………………J
                                          (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

                                          ……………………………………J
                                          (Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi;
March 25, 2014


-----------------------
[1]    MANU/SC/1081/2013

Tenancy Case - Land acquisition - suit for eviction - maintainable - as per the facts , there is no acquisition nor the possession was taken by corporation except mere pleadings of tenant - even as per sec.16 of Land Acquisition Act - Govt. is entitled for possession with out encumbrances - until possession was not taken , no right and title divest from the owner , a suit for eviction is maintainable - High court has to take an undertaking before granting time to vacate the site = Sheela Jawarlal Nagori & Anr. …..Petitioners Versus Kantilal Nathmal Baldota & Ors. …Respondents = 2014 ( March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41330

Tenancy Case - Land acquisition - suit for eviction - maintainable - as per the facts , there is no acquisition nor the possession was taken by corporation except mere pleadings of tenant - even as per sec.16 of Land Acquisition Act - Govt. is entitled for possession with out encumbrances - until possession was not taken , no right and title divest from the owner , a suit for eviction is maintainable - High court has to take an undertaking before granting time to vacate the site =

whether a landlord can maintain a  suit  for eviction of his tenant even after an award has been  passed  in  respect  of the tenanted property under the provisions  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,
1894. = 
In our opinion, the answer must be in the affirmative.
The question raised by the  tenant  is  that  the  suit  property  was
acquired by the Pune Municipal Corporation for  the  purpose  of  a  primary
school and the Special Land Acquisition  Officer  had  passed  an  award  in
respect  thereof  on  3rd  August,  1979.   Accordingly,  the  landlord  was
divested of his right, title and interest in the  suit  property  after  the
land acquisition proceedings and  therefore  a  suit  for  eviction  of  the
tenant was not maintainable.
11.   The High Court noted that there was no material on record  to  suggest
that the Pune  Municipal  Corporation  had  taken  possession  of  the  suit
property  from  the  landlord.   On  the  contrary,  the   Corporation   had
sanctioned a development plan submitted by the landlord in  respect  of  the
suit property through a notification issued on  5th  January,  1987.  It  is
clear, therefore, that the Corporation had not taken possession nor had  any
intention of taking possession of the suit property. =
That apart, Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  enables  the
acquiring authority to take possession of acquired land  and  when  that  is
taken, it would be free from  all  encumbrances.  
Section  16  of  the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as follows:
           
16. Power to take possession - When the Collector  has  made  an
           award under Section 11, he may  take  possession  of  the  land,
           which shall thereupon vest absolutely in  the  Government,  free
           from all encumbrances.


Therefore,  on  a  plain  reading  of  the  provision,  in  the  absence  of
possession of  the  suit  property  being  taken  by  the  Corporation,  the
contention of learned counsel for the tenant cannot  be  accepted  that  the
landlord was divested of his right, title or interest in the suit property.

13.   We may also note that it was brought out during the course of  hearing
that the tenant continues to pay rent to the landlord even though  according
to the tenant the landlord had no concern with the suit property  after  the
award was passed on  3rd  August,  1979  by  the  Special  Land  Acquisition
Officer.  
The stand of the tenant seems to be self-defeating for on the  one
hand it is submitted that the landlord had no right, title  or  interest  in
the suit property but on the other hand the tenant continues paying rent  to
him.
 He stated that  the  tenants  would
file an undertaking along with all others using  the  suit  property  on  or
before 19th November, 2013 incorporating therein the  following  terms:  (i)
that they are in possession of the suit  premises  and  nobody  else  is  in
possession; (ii) that they have neither created third  party  interests  nor
parted with possession; (iii) that they will hereafter neither create  third
party interests nor part with possession of the  suit  premises,  (iv)  that
they will clear all arrears of rent, if any, within four  weeks  subject  to
adjustment, (v) they will not apply for extension of time, and (vi) that  in
case they are unable to obtain suitable orders from  this  Court  within  12
weeks, they will hand over  vacant  and  peaceful  possession  of  the  suit
premises to the landlord.

15.   The tenants failed to file any such undertaking in the High  Court  on
or before 19th November, 2013.  This  was  brought  to  our  notice  by  the
landlord on 4th February, 2014 and we  directed  the  tenants  to  file  the
necessary undertaking as ordered by the High Court within a  week.  We  were
subsequently given to understand that the undertaking was filed.

16.   These cases  indicate  that  even  though  the  High  Court  trusts  a
litigant before it to comply with its orders, sometimes a litigant does  not
take the High Court  seriously.

2014 ( March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41330

                                                            REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.36518 of 2013


Sheela Jawarlal Nagori & Anr.                               …..Petitioners

                                   Versus

Kantilal Nathmal Baldota & Ors.                          …Respondents

                                     AND

                 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.37456 of 2013


                               J U D G M E N T

Madan B. Lokur, J.
1.    The question before us is whether a landlord can maintain a  suit  for
eviction of his tenant even after an award has been  passed  in  respect  of
the tenanted property under the provisions  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,
1894. In our opinion, the answer must be in the affirmative.
2.    The petitioners in both special leave petitions  are  the  tenants  of
the respondent landlord. For convenience we have taken the  facts  from  SLP
(C) No. 37456 of 2013, but note that the  issue  that  arises  in  both  the
cases is the same and the hearing proceeded on this basis.
3.    The landlord had instituted Civil Suit No. 433 of 2000  in  the  Court
of the 5th  Additional  Small  Cause  Judge  and  Jt.  Civil  Judge,  Senior
Division, Pune for vacant possession of the ‘suit property’  being  CTS  Old
99-B Raviwar  Peth,  New  767  Budhwar  Peth,  Pune  from  the  tenant.  The
contention of the landlord was that the suit property  was  open  space  let
out to the tenants and that it was not protected  by  the  Maharashtra  Rent
Control Act, 1999 (for  short  the  Act).   The  Trial  Court  accepted  the
contention of the landlord and passed a decree on 28th June, 2005  directing
the tenant to hand over vacant possession of the suit property.
4.    Feeling aggrieved, the tenant preferred Civil Appeal No. 515  of  2005
before the Additional District Judge, Pune. The  appeal  was  allowed  by  a
judgment and order dated 3rd February, 2006 and the  decree  passed  by  the
Trial Court set aside.  It was held that the suit property was an open  plot
and that the provisions of the Act were not  applicable,  but  it  was  held
that the tenancy was required to be terminated in terms of  Section  106  of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
5.    The judgment and order passed by  the  appellate  Court  has  attained
finality since neither the tenant nor the landlord has challenged it.
6.    Following up on the order passed by  the  Additional  District  Judge,
the  landlord  issued  a  notice  to  the  tenant  on  13th  February,  2006
terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of  Property  Act,
1882.  The tenant did not respond to the notice and that  led  the  landlord
to file Civil Suit No. 207 of 2006 in the Court of the Small  Causes  Judge,
Pune for eviction of the tenant.  The suit was decreed on  3rd  March,  2009
and the tenant was  directed  to  deliver  vacant  possession  of  the  suit
property to the landlord.
7.    Feeling aggrieved, the tenant preferred Civil Appeal No. 225  of  2009
before the District Judge but that  was  dismissed  by  judgment  and  order
dated 19th January, 2012. The tenant was given two  months  time  to  vacate
the suit property.
8.    Against  the  decision  passed  by  the  appellate  Court  the  tenant
preferred Writ Petition No. 2089 of 2012 which was dismissed by  the  Bombay
High Court by its judgment and order dated 24th October, 2013 (impugned).
9.    In all the proceedings, the finding of fact has  been  that  the  suit
property let out to the tenant  was  open  land.  We  are  not  inclined  to
disturb this finding of fact arrived at by several Courts  and  indeed  this
finding was not seriously challenged by learned counsel for the tenant.
10.   The question raised by the  tenant  is  that  the  suit  property  was
acquired by the Pune Municipal Corporation for  the  purpose  of  a  primary
school and the Special Land Acquisition  Officer  had  passed  an  award  in
respect  thereof  on  3rd  August,  1979.   Accordingly,  the  landlord  was
divested of his right, title and interest in the  suit  property  after  the
land acquisition proceedings and  therefore  a  suit  for  eviction  of  the
tenant was not maintainable.
11.   The High Court noted that there was no material on record  to  suggest
that the Pune  Municipal  Corporation  had  taken  possession  of  the  suit
property  from  the  landlord.   On  the  contrary,  the   Corporation   had
sanctioned a development plan submitted by the landlord in  respect  of  the
suit property through a notification issued on  5th  January,  1987.  It  is
clear, therefore, that the Corporation had not taken possession nor had  any
intention of taking possession of the suit property.
12.   That apart, Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  enables  the
acquiring authority to take possession of acquired land  and  when  that  is
taken, it would be free from  all  encumbrances.
Section  16  of  the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as follows:
           16. Power to take possession - When the Collector  has  made  an
           award under Section 11, he may  take  possession  of  the  land,
           which shall thereupon vest absolutely in  the  Government,  free
           from all encumbrances.




Therefore,  on  a  plain  reading  of  the  provision,  in  the  absence  of
possession of  the  suit  property  being  taken  by  the  Corporation,  the
contention of learned counsel for the tenant cannot  be  accepted  that  the
landlord was divested of his right, title or interest in the suit property.

13.   We may also note that it was brought out during the course of  hearing
that the tenant continues to pay rent to the landlord even though  according
to the tenant the landlord had no concern with the suit property  after  the
award was passed on  3rd  August,  1979  by  the  Special  Land  Acquisition
Officer.  The stand of the tenant seems to be self-defeating for on the  one
hand it is submitted that the landlord had no right, title  or  interest  in
the suit property but on the other hand the tenant continues paying rent  to
him.
14.   An issue that arises out of these cases, and which we  would  like  to
flag, relates to the purpose and effectiveness of an  order  passed  by  the
High Court granting time to the tenants to  vacate  suit  premises.  We  are
mentioning this because in these cases, the tenants had the  benefit  of  an
interim order passed by the High Court staying the execution of  the  decree
against them as well as a stay of operation of the judgments  of  the  Trial
Court and the appellate Court. On the dismissal of the  proceedings  by  the
High Court, learned counsel for the tenants applied for continuation of  the
interim order for a period of 12 weeks.  He stated that  the  tenants  would
file an undertaking along with all others using  the  suit  property  on  or
before 19th November, 2013 incorporating therein the  following  terms:  (i)
that they are in possession of the suit  premises  and  nobody  else  is  in
possession; (ii) that they have neither created third  party  interests  nor
parted with possession; (iii) that they will hereafter neither create  third
party interests nor part with possession of the  suit  premises,  (iv)  that
they will clear all arrears of rent, if any, within four  weeks  subject  to
adjustment, (v) they will not apply for extension of time, and (vi) that  in
case they are unable to obtain suitable orders from  this  Court  within  12
weeks, they will hand over  vacant  and  peaceful  possession  of  the  suit
premises to the landlord.

15.   The tenants failed to file any such undertaking in the High  Court  on
or before 19th November, 2013.  This  was  brought  to  our  notice  by  the
landlord on 4th February, 2014 and we  directed  the  tenants  to  file  the
necessary undertaking as ordered by the High Court within a  week.  We  were
subsequently given to understand that the undertaking was filed.

16.   These cases  indicate  that  even  though  the  High  Court  trusts  a
litigant before it to comply with its orders, sometimes a litigant does  not
take the High Court  seriously.  This  is  unfortunate  and  undermines  the
authority of the Court. We  feel  the  recurrence  of  a  situation  as  has
happened in these cases needs to  be  avoided.  Therefore,  the  High  Court
would  be  well  advised  to  consider  having  the  tenant  first  file  an
undertaking and placed on record before granting  any  interim  order  after
dismissal of the tenant’s petition. Otherwise this may place the High  Court
in a difficult position where its order  is  flagrantly  disobeyed,  as  has
happened in these cases.

17.   We  find  no  merit  in  these  petitions  and  they  are  accordingly
dismissed.  The interim applications are also dismissed.


                                       ……………………………………J
                                          (Ranjana Prakash Desai)


                                          ……………………………………J
                                          (Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi;
March 25, 2014