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Saturday, March 15, 2014

Hindu Law - Partition suit - Presumption of Joint family -Exclusion of property from partition-burden lies on whom- Trial court and High court found that there was a partition by metes and bounds in the year 1985 itself - then the burden lies on the plaintiff who wants to claim certain property still in joint status as it was excluded from partition but not on the defendants - Apex court held that .Therefore, the presumption would be that there was complete partition of all the properties. Consequently, the burden of proof that certain property was excluded from the partition would be on the party that alleges the same to be joint property. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court clearly committed an error in placing the burden of proof on the petitioners, who were defendants in the suit to prove that the Nageshwarwadi property at Aurangabad was a self-acquired property of Eknathrao. In view of the aforesaid, we allow the appeal and set aside the findings recorded by the trial court on Issue No. III.= Kesharbai @ Pushpabai Eknathrao Nalawade (D) by LRs. & Anr. …Appellants VERSUS Tarabai Prabhakarrao Nalawade & Ors. ...Respondents= 2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41325

 Hindu Law - Partition suit - Presumption of Joint family -Exclusion of property from partition- burden lies on whom  once the partition was proved - Trial court and High court found that there was a partition by metes and bounds in the year 1985 itself - then the burden lies on the plaintiff who wants to claim certain property still in joint status as it was excluded from partition but not on the defendants - Apex court held that .Therefore, the presumption would be that there  was  complete partition of all the properties.  Consequently, the burden of proof that certain property was excluded from  the  partition would be on the party that  alleges  the  same  to  be  joint  property.  Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court  clearly committed an error in placing the  burden  of  proof  on  the petitioners, who were defendants in the suit  to  prove  that the Nageshwarwadi property at Aurangabad was a  self-acquired property of Eknathrao. In view of the aforesaid, we allow the appeal and  set  aside the findings recorded by the trial court on  Issue  No.  III.=

The plaintiffs  filed  a  suit  for  partition  and  separate
        possession of half share of the plaintiffs in  the  following
        properties :-
           (I)   Agricultural land Gat No.453 whose survey  number  is  210
                 adms. 19 acre 1 guntha situated at village Chikalthana  Tq.
                 Kannad.
           (II)  Land bearing Gat No.146 of whose survey number is 65 adms.
                 27 acre 39 gunthas situated at Nimdongri Tq. Kannad.
           (III)       House property bearing No.725 adms. 26.39 sq. meters
                 situated at Chikalthana Tq. Kannad.
           (IV)  Open plot bearing CTS No.709 adms. 64.3 squ.  meter  known
                 as ‘Girnichi Jaga’ situated at Chikalthana Tq. Kannad.
           (V)   House bearing No.4.13.78 of whose CTS No.  is  4705  adms.
                 138.2  sq.  meters  along  with  house  structure  standing
                 thereon situated at Nageshwarwadi Aurangabad.=
After   the   death   of
        Prabhakarrao, the plaintiffs claimed to  have  requested  the
        petitioners i.e. defendants to undo  the  injustice  done  to
        Prabhakarrao at the time of the family  arrangement.  Instead
        of  partitioning  the  joint  properties  equitably,  it  was
        claimed that after the death of Eknathrao, defendant No.1  to
        12, which include petitioner No.1 and 2, were trying to enter
        their names  in  the  revenue  records  with  regard  to  the
        Nageshwarwadi Property at Aurangabad.  Since  the  defendants
        had declined the request for partition, the  plaintiffs  were
        constrained to file the suit.=
Writtenstatement
It was also claimed that the  partition  of
        the suit property had taken place on 22nd  April,  1985,  the
        respective shares were allotted, and  final  distribution  of
        the property was made. It was contended  that  the  partition
        having been completed, the suit ought to be dismissed.=
The trial court records the issues and the findings
        as follows:-
                       ISSUES                              FINDINGS
      1. Do plaintiffs prove that the suit
           Properties are the joint family
           Properties?                               In Negative


      2. Do defendants prove that there
          Was already partition on 22.4.85
          And all shares holders are in
          Possession of their respective
          Shares?                             In affirmative


      3.  Do they further prove that suit
           Property mention at Sr.No.5 is
           self acquired property of deceased
           Eknath?                                 In affirmative


      4.  Whether suit is maintainable?       In affirmative


      5.  Whether the suit is barred by
           limitation?                             In negative


      6. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to
           partition and possession of half
           share in the suit properties?           In negative


      7. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to
           future mesne profit?                    In negative


      8. What decree and order?               As per final order.


           On the basis of the aforesaid findings,  the  suit  of  the
      plaintiffs was dismissed with costs.
The High Court formulated the points for consideration
        in appeal which are as follows:
           (i)   Whether the property at Nageshwarwadi, Aurangabad is self-
                 acquired property of Eknathrao and as such  is  not  liable
                 for partition?
           (ii)  Whether the  transaction  entered  into  on  22.4.1985  by
                 Eknathrao,   Trimbakrao   and   Prabhakarrao   was   family
                 arrangement not amounting to partition?
           (iii)       Whether Civil Application No.10005 of 2007 filed for
                 filing additional evidence should be allowed and in case it
                 is allowed  can  the  partition  list  dated  22.4.1985  be
                 admitted in evidence?
     9. Upon consideration of the entire material, the High Court has
        answered point No.(i) in the negative and Point Nos.2  and  3
        in the affirmative. As a result of  the  aforesaid  findings,
        the suit in respect of agricultural lands and house  property
        at Chikalthan and Neem Dongri has  been  dismissed.  
However,
        the plaintiffs/respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are held to be entitled
        to partition of Nageshwarwadi House  at  Aurangabad.  It  has
        been further directed that  the  respondents  who  are  legal
        representatives of deceased Prabhakarrao are entitled to half
        share on the one hand and the remaining half share is  to  be
        divided equally by the petitioners and respondent No.1  to  6
        on the other.
Apex court held that

 It
        is a settled principle of law that once a  partition  in  the
        sense of division of right, title  or  status  is  proved  or
        admitted, the presumption is  that  all  joint  property  was
        partitioned or divided.  Undoubtedly the joint and  undivided
        family being the normal condition of a Hindu  family,  it  is
        usually presumed, until the contrary is  proved,  that  every
        Hindu family is joint and undivided and all its  property  is
        joint. This presumption,  however,  cannot  be  made  once  a
        partition  (of  status  or  property),  whether  general   or
        partial, is shown to have  taken  place  in  a  family. 
Bhagwati Prasad Sah &  Ors.  Vs.  Dulhin  Rameshwari  Kuer  &
        Anr.[1], wherein it was inter alia observed as under:
           “8. Before we discuss the evidence on the record, we  desire  to
           point out that on the admitted facts of this case neither  party
           has any presumption on his side either as regards  jointness  or
           separation of the family. The general principle  undoubtedly  is
           that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the  contrary
           is proved, but where it is admitted that one of the  coparceners
           did separate himself from the other members of the joint  family
           and had his share in the joint property partitioned off for him,
           there is  no  presumption  that  the  rest  of  the  coparceners
           continued to be joint. There is no presumption on the other side
           too that because one member of  the  family  separated  himself,
           there has been separation with regard to  all.  It  would  be  a
           question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence
           relating to the intention of the parties  whether  there  was  a
           separation amongst the other co-parceners or that they  remained
           united. The burden  would  undoubtedly  lie  on  the  party  who
           asserts the existence of a particular state  of  things  on  the
           basis of which he claims relief.”




    20. This principle has been reiterated by this Court in  Addagada
        Raghavamma & Anr. Vs. Addagada Chenchamma & Anr.[2]


    21. In this case, the trial court as well as the High  Court  has
        held that there was a complete partition in  the  year  1985.
        Therefore, the presumption would be that there  was  complete
        partition of all the properties.  Consequently, the burden of
        proof that certain property was excluded from  the  partition
        would be on the party that  alleges  the  same  to  be  joint
        property.  Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court  clearly
        committed an error in placing the  burden  of  proof  on  the
        petitioners, who were defendants in the suit  to  prove  that
        the Nageshwarwadi property at Aurangabad was a  self-acquired
        property of Eknathrao.
    22. In view of the aforesaid, we allow the appeal and  set  aside
        the findings recorded by the trial court on  Issue  No.  III.
        The judgment of the Trial Court is confirmed on Issue No. III
        also.  Consequently,  the  suit  filed  by   the   plaintiffs
        (respondents herein) shall stand dismissed.

2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41325
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, A.K. SIKRI
                             REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3867 OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.27916 of 2009)


      Kesharbai @ Pushpabai  Eknathrao
      Nalawade (D) by LRs. & Anr.                         …Appellants


                             VERSUS
      Tarabai Prabhakarrao Nalawade & Ors.        ...Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T
      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
     1. Leave granted.


     2. This appeal has been filed against the  judgment  and  decree
        dated  23rd  March,  2009  of  the  High  Court   of   Bombay
        (Aurangabad Bench) rendered in First Appeal  No.468  of  2004
        whereby the High Court has partly allowed the First Appeal of
        the plaintiffs/respondent   Nos. 1 to 3. The High  Court  has
        dismissed the suit  of  the  plaintiffs  in  respect  of  the
        agricultural lands and house property at Chikalthan and  Neem
        Dongri. At the same time, the High Court has  set  aside  the
        judgment of the trial court on Issue  No.3  relating  to  the
        question as to whether house bearing No.4.13.78  bearing  CTS
        No.4705  admeasuring  138.2  sq.   meters   alongwith   house
        structure  standing  therein   situated   at   Nageshwarwadi,
        Aurangabad  is  the  self  acquired  property   of   deceased
        Eknathrao.


     3. The admitted facts are that plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 to  4  are
        the wife and children of  deceased  Prabhakarrao  s/o  Saluba
        respectively. Defendant Nos. 7 and 8 to 12 are the  wife  and
        children of  deceased  Trimbakrao  s/o  Deorao  respectively.
        Defendant Nos. 13 to 15 are the subsequent purchasers of land
        from the plaintiff. For better understanding of the  inter-se
        relationship between the parties, it would be appropriate  to
        reproduce here the genealogy table of the family, as  noticed
        by the trial court:






                                  Mahipati
      Deorao             (son)             died             on
      Sauba (son) died
      15.7.1974
      on 6.10.1980


      Shewantabai                  (wife)                  died
       Ansabai (wife) died
      Prabhakar (son) died


      Eknathrao      (Son)                Trimbakrao      (son)
      Tarabai  Santosh  Satish  Manisha
      Died    on      /11/97             died    on    31.5.86
      (P-1)       (P-2)       (P-3)      (P-4)
      Indubai (wife) D-1                 Kamlabai (wife) D-7
      Kiran Kranti Asha Jyoti Bharti
      D-2     D-3     D-4    D-5     D-6
                                       Pramod   Vinod    Rajendra
      Vidya   Vijaya
                                     D-8           D-9       D-10
        D-11     D-12


     4. The plaintiffs  filed  a  suit  for  partition  and  separate
        possession of half share of the plaintiffs in  the  following
        properties :-
           (I)   Agricultural land Gat No.453 whose survey  number  is  210
                 adms. 19 acre 1 guntha situated at village Chikalthana  Tq.
                 Kannad.
           (II)  Land bearing Gat No.146 of whose survey number is 65 adms.
                 27 acre 39 gunthas situated at Nimdongri Tq. Kannad.
           (III)       House property bearing No.725 adms. 26.39 sq. meters
                 situated at Chikalthana Tq. Kannad.
           (IV)  Open plot bearing CTS No.709 adms. 64.3 squ.  meter  known
                 as ‘Girnichi Jaga’ situated at Chikalthana Tq. Kannad.
           (V)   House bearing No.4.13.78 of whose CTS No.  is  4705  adms.
                 138.2  sq.  meters  along  with  house  structure  standing
                 thereon situated at Nageshwarwadi Aurangabad.


     5. It was claimed that property at Sl.Nos.I and II were  jointly
        purchased by deceased Deorao and deceased Saluba in the  name
        of Deorao. The house at  Sl.No.III  was  said  to  have  been
        constructed on a plot jointly purchased by the two  brothers.
        Both the brothers were residing  in  the  same  house  during
        their life time. With regard to property at Sl.No.V,  it  was
        stated that both the brothers had purchased the plot on which
        the house is constructed. It was  further  claimed  that  the
        plot was purchased in the name of Eknathrao  and  his  family
        was residing in that house. In short,  it  was  claimed  that
        during the life time of Deorao and Saluba, all the properties
        were jointly cultivated and were jointly enjoyed by  all  the
        family  members.  Trimbakrao  was  residing  at  Kannad   and
        Eknathrao was residing at Aurangabad due to their employment.
        Similarly, Prabhakarrao was in service at  different  places.
        It was also the case of  the  plaintiffs  that  there  was  a
        family arrangement between Eknath, Trimbak and  Prabhakarrao.
        Property  at  Sl.No.I  was   allotted   to   Trimbakrao   and
        Prabhakarrao to the extent of  half  share  each.  Similarly,
        land at Sl.No.II was allotted to Trimbakrao (7 acres) and  to
        Prabhakarrao      (6 acres and  39  gunthas).  Eknathrao  was
        allotted 14 acres.  After  the  family  arrangement,  it  was
        alleged that everyone was in  possession  of  the  respective
        parts of land and their names were  entered  in  the  revenue
        record. It is the further claim of the plaintiffs that in the
        same family arrangement  house  at  Sl.No.III  was  given  in
        possession of Trimbakrao and Prabhakarrao to  the  extent  of
        half share each. Eknathrao  was  put  in  possession  of  the
        entire  open  space  known  as  ‘Girnichi  Jaga’.    It   was
        specifically  pleaded  that  house  at  Sl.No.V  (hereinafter
        referred to as Nageshwarwadi Property) was not  part  of  the
        family arrangement. It was exclusively in possession  of  the
        deceased Eknathrao  and  now  in  possession  of  petitioners
        herein, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the suit.


     6. The plaintiffs also claimed that Prabhakarrao during his life
        time did not raise any objection with regard to  the  unequal
        allotment in the share of the joint properties in the  family
        arrangement. It was stated that Prabhakarrao was an alcoholic
        and,  therefore,  remained  under  the  domination   of   the
        petitioners. It is also admitted in the plaint that after the
        death of Prabhakarrao, out of necessity to  survive,  certain
        agricultural lands are sold by the  plaintiffs  to  defendant
        No.13 to 16. This was necessary to clear up the dues  of  the
        co-operative societies and hand loan of other relatives taken
        by  the   deceased   Prabhakarrao.   After   the   death   of
        Prabhakarrao, the plaintiffs claimed to  have  requested  the
        petitioners i.e. defendants to undo  the  injustice  done  to
        Prabhakarrao at the time of the family  arrangement.  Instead
        of  partitioning  the  joint  properties  equitably,  it  was
        claimed that after the death of Eknathrao, defendant No.1  to
        12, which include petitioner No.1 and 2, were trying to enter
        their names  in  the  revenue  records  with  regard  to  the
        Nageshwarwadi Property at Aurangabad.  Since  the  defendants
        had declined the request for partition, the  plaintiffs  were
        constrained to file the suit.
     7. In the written statements filed by  the  defendants,  it  was
        pointed out that there was no ancestral joint family  nucleus
        to  purchase  the  agricultural  lands  and  the   house   at
        Sl.No.III. It is further claimed that the suit properties are
        not coparcenery properties in which  Deorao  and  Saluba  had
        equal shares. It was contended that at the most property  can
        be deemed as a joint property of  Deorao,  Saluba,  Eknathrao
        and Prabhakarrao. It was also claimed that the  partition  of
        the suit property had taken place on 22nd  April,  1985,  the
        respective shares were allotted, and  final  distribution  of
        the property was made. It was contended  that  the  partition
        having been completed, the suit ought to be dismissed. On the
        basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed
        8 issues. The trial court records the issues and the findings
        as follows:-
                       ISSUES                              FINDINGS
      1. Do plaintiffs prove that the suit
           Properties are the joint family
           Properties?                               In Negative


      2. Do defendants prove that there
          Was already partition on 22.4.85
          And all shares holders are in
          Possession of their respective
          Shares?                             In affirmative


      3.  Do they further prove that suit
           Property mention at Sr.No.5 is
           self acquired property of deceased
           Eknath?                                 In affirmative


      4.  Whether suit is maintainable?       In affirmative


      5.  Whether the suit is barred by
           limitation?                             In negative


      6. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to
           partition and possession of half
           share in the suit properties?           In negative


      7. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to
           future mesne profit?                    In negative


      8. What decree and order?               As per final order.


           On the basis of the aforesaid findings,  the  suit  of  the
      plaintiffs was dismissed with costs.

     8.  Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  judgment  and   decree,   the
        plaintiffs filed First Appeal No.468 of 2004 before the  High
        Court. The High Court formulated the points for consideration
        in appeal which are as follows:
           (i)   Whether the property at Nageshwarwadi, Aurangabad is self-
                 acquired property of Eknathrao and as such  is  not  liable
                 for partition?
           (ii)  Whether the  transaction  entered  into  on  22.4.1985  by
                 Eknathrao,   Trimbakrao   and   Prabhakarrao   was   family
                 arrangement not amounting to partition?
           (iii)       Whether Civil Application No.10005 of 2007 filed for
                 filing additional evidence should be allowed and in case it
                 is allowed  can  the  partition  list  dated  22.4.1985  be
                 admitted in evidence?
     9. Upon consideration of the entire material, the High Court has
        answered point No.(i) in the negative and Point Nos.2  and  3
        in the affirmative. As a result of  the  aforesaid  findings,
        the suit in respect of agricultural lands and house  property
        at Chikalthan and Neem Dongri has  been  dismissed.  However,
        the plaintiffs/respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are held to be entitled
        to partition of Nageshwarwadi House  at  Aurangabad.  It  has
        been further directed that  the  respondents  who  are  legal
        representatives of deceased Prabhakarrao are entitled to half
        share on the one hand and the remaining half share is  to  be
        divided equally by the petitioners and respondent No.1  to  6
        on the other.


    10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the  High  Court,  the
        petitioners who were defendants in the suit  have  filed  the
        S.L.P. (C) No.27916  of  2009  giving  rise  to  the  present
        appeal.


    11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
    12. Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing for the
        appellants submitted that in Paragraph  25  of  the  impugned
        judgment, the High Court has accepted the fact that there was
        a complete partition between the parties.  The High Court has
        held  that  the   family   arrangement   amounts   to   final
        distribution  of   property   amongst   sharers.   Plaintiffs
        themselves have also treated the property allotted to them as
        their exclusive property.  Treating the property allotted  to
        their share as their exclusive property, they have sold  some
        portions of the land to respondent Nos. 13 to 16.   The  High
        Court  also  held  that  the  plaintiffs  are  estopped  from
        challenging the  existence  and  validity  of  the  partition
        effected in the year 1985.  The High  Court  even  held  that
        they are not entitled to fresh partition  of  the  properties
        which were admittedly covered by the partition of 1985.   Mr.
        Naphade submitted that having held that  there  was  a  final
        partition between the parties, the High  Court  committed  an
        error of jurisdiction in reversing the findings  recorded  by
        the trial court on Issue No.III.  According to  Mr.  Naphade,
        the High Court has wrongly placed the burden of proof on  the
        petitioners, who were defendants in the suit  to  prove  that
        Nageshwarwadi  property   was   self-acquired   property   of
        Eknathrao. Learned senior counsel  also  submitted  that  the
        High Court ignored the  evidence  produced  by  the  parties,
        which would establish that the parties  had  always   treated
        the Nageshwarwadi property as the self-acquired  property  of
        Eknathrao.
    13.  On  the  other  hand,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
        respondents has submitted that the trial  court  had  wrongly
        decided  the  Issue  No.III  against  the  plaintiffs.    The
        defendants (petitioners herein) have  failed  to  prove  that
        Eknathrao had sufficient independent income to have  acquired
        the Nageshwarwadi property.  It is  submitted  that  although
        the defendants had claimed that Eknathrao was  employed  with
        the Indian Army, no proof with regard to the  employment  was
        produced.
    14. We have  considered  the  submissions  made  by  the  learned
        counsel for the parties.
    15. Mr. Naphade is quite correct in his submission that the  High
        Court having accepted the findings of the  trial  court  that
        there  was  completed  partition  between  the  parties,  has
        committed an error of jurisdiction in putting the  burden  of
        proof on the defendants on Issue No. III.
    16. The trial court on appreciation of the  entire  evidence  had
        concluded that “the evidence  on  record  discloses  that  as
        contended, family arrangement alleged to have taken place  in
        the year 1985 in presence of three brothers and by  accepting
        it, every one took possession of their respective shares  and
        was enjoying the same.  Not only this but  their  names  were
        mutated to revenue records.  Everything was done in  presence
        of deceased brother.”


    17. The trial court also finds that mutation entry bearing No.726
        and No. 1116 were effected on the strength of  the  partition
        deed dated  22nd  April,  1985.   Furthermore,  the  mutation
        entries were confirmed by issuing notices to the parties.  It
        was specifically noticed on  the  mutation  entries  that  no
        objection was taken by any of the parties.  The trial  court,
        in our opinion, has  rightly  concluded  that  no  objections
        having been taken at the time when the mutation entries  were
        confirmed, the plaintiffs are estopped from saying that these
        entries are effected on wrong basis of  partition.   Noticing
        the conduct of the parties, even  further,  the  trial  court
        held that the plaintiffs by  selling  the  land  allotted  to
        them, treating the same to be their exclusive property.  This
        property was sold without the consent of defendant Nos. 1  to
        12.  Thus treating the same to be  their  exclusive  property
        and not coparcenary property.


    18. On Issue No.III, the trial court has held that  there  is  no
        evidence except the bare words of the plaintiffs to show that
        Nageshwarwadi property is purchased by  the  deceased  Deorao
        and deceased Saluba in the  name  of  Eknathrao.   The  trial
        court, in our opinion, has correctly held that all the  other
        joint property had been  purchased  either  in  the  name  of
        Deorao  or deceased Saluba.  There was no explanation  as  to
        why the property  at  Nageshwarwadi  was  purchased  by  them
        exclusively in the name of Eknathrao.  On the  basis  of  the
        evidence, the trial court found that Eknathrao  was  residing
        exclusively  in  the  aforesaid  property.   At   that   time
        Prabhakarrao  himself  was  living  in  rented  premises.  No
        explanation is given as to why Prabhakarrao was not living in
        the aforesaid house,  in  case,  it  was  joint  property  of
        Eknathrao and Prabhakarrao.  The  trial  court  also  noticed
        that it was not only Nageshwarwadi property,  which  was  not
        made part of the partition but also the house  of  Trimbakrao
        at Kannad was kept outside partition.  The trial  court  also
        held  that  Eknathrao  had  independent  means  to   purchase
        Nageshwarwadi property.  He was employed with the Military as
        a Head Clerk from 1944 to 1956.  On the basis of  the  entire
        evidence,  the  trial  court  came  to  the  conclusion  that
        Nageshwarwadi property  was  the  self-acquired  property  of
        Eknathrao.   The  High  Court  had  reversed  the   aforesaid
        findings  on  the  basis  that  the  petitioners,  who   were
        defendants in the civil suit had not led any evidence to show
        that  Eknathrao  had  independently  purchased  Nageshwarwadi
        property at Aurangabad.  The  High  Court  has  reversed  the
        findings of the trial court on  the  basis  that  petitioners
        have failed to  prove  that  Eknathrao  was  working  in  the
        Ammunition Factory, Khadki, Pune from 1944 to 1956.  The High
        Court further held that in this  case,  a  presumption  would
        arise  that  Nageshwarwadi  property  was   joint   property,
        purchased from  the  income  derived  from  the  other  joint
        property, which form the nucleus. Therefore, it was  for  the
        petitioner to prove that Nageshwarwadi property was  acquired
        without the aid of the joint family.


    19. In our opinion, the aforesaid presumption is wrong in law  in
        view of the  fact  that  the  High  Court  has  affirmed  the
        findings of the  trial  court  that  in  1985,  there  was  a
        complete partition and the parties had acted on the same.  It
        is a settled principle of law that once a  partition  in  the
        sense of division of right, title  or  status  is  proved  or
        admitted, the presumption is  that  all  joint  property  was
        partitioned or divided.  Undoubtedly the joint and  undivided
        family being the normal condition of a Hindu  family,  it  is
        usually presumed, until the contrary is  proved,  that  every
        Hindu family is joint and undivided and all its  property  is
        joint. This presumption,  however,  cannot  be  made  once  a
        partition  (of  status  or  property),  whether  general   or
        partial, is shown to have  taken  place  in  a  family.  This
        proposition of law has been applied by this court in a number
        of cases.  We may notice here the judgment of this  Court  in
        Bhagwati Prasad Sah &  Ors.  Vs.  Dulhin  Rameshwari  Kuer  &
        Anr.[1], wherein it was inter alia observed as under:
           “8. Before we discuss the evidence on the record, we  desire  to
           point out that on the admitted facts of this case neither  party
           has any presumption on his side either as regards  jointness  or
           separation of the family. The general principle  undoubtedly  is
           that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the  contrary
           is proved, but where it is admitted that one of the  coparceners
           did separate himself from the other members of the joint  family
           and had his share in the joint property partitioned off for him,
           there is  no  presumption  that  the  rest  of  the  coparceners
           continued to be joint. There is no presumption on the other side
           too that because one member of  the  family  separated  himself,
           there has been separation with regard to  all.  It  would  be  a
           question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence
           relating to the intention of the parties  whether  there  was  a
           separation amongst the other co-parceners or that they  remained
           united. The burden  would  undoubtedly  lie  on  the  party  who
           asserts the existence of a particular state  of  things  on  the
           basis of which he claims relief.”




    20. This principle has been reiterated by this Court in  Addagada
        Raghavamma & Anr. Vs. Addagada Chenchamma & Anr.[2]


    21. In this case, the trial court as well as the High  Court  has
        held that there was a complete partition in  the  year  1985.
        Therefore, the presumption would be that there  was  complete
        partition of all the properties.  Consequently, the burden of
        proof that certain property was excluded from  the  partition
        would be on the party that  alleges  the  same  to  be  joint
        property.  Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court  clearly
        committed an error in placing the  burden  of  proof  on  the
        petitioners, who were defendants in the suit  to  prove  that
        the Nageshwarwadi property at Aurangabad was a  self-acquired
        property of Eknathrao.
    22. In view of the aforesaid, we allow the appeal and  set  aside
        the findings recorded by the trial court on  Issue  No.  III.
        The judgment of the Trial Court is confirmed on Issue No. III
        also.  Consequently,  the  suit  filed  by   the   plaintiffs
        (respondents herein) shall stand dismissed.


                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                              [Surinder Singh  Nijjar]








                                                            ………………………………..J.
                                               [A.K.Sikri]
      New Delhi;
      March 14, 2014.










































-----------------------
[1]    [1951] 2 SCR 603
[2]    AIR 1964 SC 136

-----------------------
17


It is settled proposition of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the plaint and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas.

  Service matter - conductor removed from service - Disproportion punishment and non supply of documents and no opportunity to cross examine the witness - Suit filed - with out proper pleadings and evidence - as no evidence was adduced by the respondent and as the point of jurisdiction was not pressed - the lower court decreed the suit and High court also in second appeal confirmed the same as it can not touch the fact - Apex court held that since there is no pleadings and evidence , still the burden on plaintiff not discharged and in such an event no court should decree the suit and Apex court set aside the order and judgement of lower courts and allowed the appeal =

Departmental proceedings 
Two  chargesheets   dated
      11.3.1988 were served upon him.  In  the  first  chargesheet,  it  was
      alleged that on 24.2.1988 while he was on duty  enroute  Kota-Rajpura,
      when his bus was  checked,  it  was  found  that  10  passengers  were
      traveling without tickets,  though he had collected the fare from each
      of them.  In the second chargesheet, it had been alleged that when  he
      was on duty on route Kota-Neemuch, his bus  was  checked  and  he  was
      found carrying two passengers traveling on tickets  of  lesser  amount
      though, he had collected the  full  fare  from  them.  The  respondent
      submitted separate reply to the said chargesheets which were not found
      satisfactory. Therefore, the enquiry officer was appointed to  enquire
      into the matter and a regular enquiry  ensued.   The  enquiry  officer
      after conclusion of the enquiry  submitted  the  report  holding  that
      charges leveled against the respondent in both the chargesheets  stood
      proved against him.
      B.    After considering the report, the  Disciplinary  Authority  vide
      order dated 5.8.1988 passed order of punishment of  removal  from  the
      service.  The respondent filed a Civil Suit  on  2.9.1988  challenging
      the order of removal alleging  that  he  was  not  supplied  with  the
      documents referred to in the chargesheets, nor was given  the  enquiry
      report nor other documents.  More so, the quantum  of  punishment  was
      disproportionate to the proved delinquency.
 Suit with out proper pleadings and facts

 Neither there is any specific pleading as to what document
      had not been supplied to him which has been relied upon by the enquiry
      officer or which witness was not permitted to be  cross-  examined  by
      him. The trial court did not make any reference to enquiry  report  or
      contents thereof.  The entire case is based on ipsi dixi.


      12.  It is settled proposition of law that a party has  to  plead  the
      case  and  produce/adduce  sufficient  evidence  to  substantiate  his
      submissions made in the plaint and  in  case  the  pleadings  are  not
      complete, the Court is under no obligation  to  entertain  the  pleas.
      (Vide: M/s. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Ors. v. State of  Gujarat  &  Ors.,
      AIR 1998 SC 1608; National Building  Construction  Corporation  v.  S.
      Raghunathan & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2779; Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani  &
      Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 141; Smt. Chitra Kumari v. Union of India  &  Ors.,
      AIR 2001 SC 1237; and State of U.P. v.  Chandra  Prakash  Pandey,  AIR
      2001 SC 1298.)
With all respect, we do not agree with such a conclusion reached
      by the High Court, as Second Appeal, in exceptional circumstances, can
      be entertained on pure questions of fact.  There is no prohibition for
      the High Court to entertain the Second Appeal even on question of fact
      where factual findings are found to be perverse.


      18.  In   Ibrahim Uddin (Supra), this Court held:
              “65. In Suwalal Chhogalal v. CIT, (1949) 17 ITR 269 (Nag) the
           Court held as under: (ITR p. 277)
              “… A fact is a fact irrespective of evidence by which  it  is
           proved. The only time a question of law can arise in such a case
           is when it is alleged that there is no  material  on  which  the
           conclusion can be based or no sufficient material.


              67. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even
           on question of fact provided the Court  is  satisfied  that  the
           findings of the courts below were vitiated by  non-consideration
           of relevant evidence or by showing  erroneous  approach  to  the
           matter and findings recorded in the court  below  are  perverse.



No  Disproportionate punishment

In Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh  v.  Krishnan  Behari,
    
       AIR 1996 SC 1249 this Court held as under: (SCC p. 715, para 4)


              “4. … In a case of such  nature—indeed,  in  cases  involving
           corruption—there cannot be any other punishment than  dismissal.
           Any sympathy shown in such cases is  totally  uncalled  for  and
           opposed to public interest. The amount  misappropriated  may  be
           small or large; it  is  the  act  of  misappropriation  that  is
           relevant.”
           Similar view has been reiterated  by  this  Court  in  Ruston  &
           Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B. Kadam, AIR 1975 SC 2025, U.P.  SRTC  v.
           Basudeo Chaudhary, (1997)  11  SCC  370,  Janatha  Bazar  (South
           Kanara  Central  Coop.  Wholesale  Stores  Ltd.)   v.   Sahakari
           Noukarara Sangha, (2000) 7  SCC  517,  Karnataka  SRTC  v.  B.S.
           Hullikatti, AIR 2001 SC 930  and  Rajasthan  SRTC  v.  Ghanshyam
           Sharma, (2002) 10 SCC 330.”


      20.   In view of the above, the contention raised  on  behalf  of  the
      respondent employee, that the punishment of removal  from  service  is
      disproportionate to the delinquency is not worth acceptance.  
The only
      punishment in case of the proved case of corruption is dismissal  from
      service.


      21.   As a result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.  The  judgments
      of the courts below are set  aside  and  the  order  of  removal  from
      service passed by the Disciplinary Authority is restored.  No order as
      to costs.
2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41321
B.S. CHAUHAN, J. CHELAMESWAR
                                                             REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4104 of 2007




      Rajasthan State TPT Corpn. & Anr.                        …Appellants




                                   Versus


      Bajrang Lal                                        …Respondent








                                  O R D E R


      Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.




      1.    This appeal has been  preferred  by  the  Rajasthan  State  Road
      Transport  Corporation  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  `Corporation’)
      against the judgment and order dated  8.11.2005  passed  by  the  High
      Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) in S.B. Civil  Second
      Appeal No. 449  of  2003  upholding  the  judgment  and  decree  dated
      28.1.2003 in Civil Regular Appeal No. 119 of 2002 passed by Additional
      District Judge, Jaipur, by which and whereunder, it has  affirmed  the
      judgment and decree dated 30.11.1994 passed by  the  Additional  Civil
      Judge (Jr. Div.) No. 2, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 1346 of 1988.


      2.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:
      A.    The  respondent while working as a trainee  conductor  on  daily
      basis was found carrying certain passengers without tickets and, thus,
      an  enquiry  was  initiated  against  him.   Two  chargesheets   dated
      11.3.1988 were served upon him.  In  the  first  chargesheet,  it  was
      alleged that on 24.2.1988 while he was on duty  enroute  Kota-Rajpura,
      when his bus was  checked,  it  was  found  that  10  passengers  were
      traveling without tickets,  though he had collected the fare from each
      of them.  In the second chargesheet, it had been alleged that when  he
      was on duty on route Kota-Neemuch, his bus  was  checked  and  he  was
      found carrying two passengers traveling on tickets  of  lesser  amount
      though, he had collected the  full  fare  from  them.  The  respondent
      submitted separate reply to the said chargesheets which were not found
      satisfactory. Therefore, the enquiry officer was appointed to  enquire
      into the matter and a regular enquiry  ensued.   The  enquiry  officer
      after conclusion of the enquiry  submitted  the  report  holding  that
      charges leveled against the respondent in both the chargesheets  stood
      proved against him.
      B.    After considering the report, the  Disciplinary  Authority  vide
      order dated 5.8.1988 passed order of punishment of  removal  from  the
      service.  The respondent filed a Civil Suit  on  2.9.1988  challenging
      the order of removal alleging  that  he  was  not  supplied  with  the
      documents referred to in the chargesheets, nor was given  the  enquiry
      report nor other documents.  More so, the quantum  of  punishment  was
      disproportionate to the proved delinquency.
      C.    The  Suit was  contested  by  the  appellants  denying  all  the
      averments made therein.  However, on conclusion of the trial, the Suit
      was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 30.11.1994.
      D.    Aggrieved, the Corporation filed Civil Regular Appeal No. 119 of
      2002, which stood dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 28.1.2003.
      E.    The Corporation  challenged  both  the  aforesaid  judgments  by
      filing Regular Second  Appeal  No.  449  of  2003,  which  also  stood
      dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree.
            Hence, this appeal.


      3.    Shri S. K. Bhattacharya, learned counsel appearing on behalf  of
      the appellants, has submitted that  none  of  the  courts  below  have
      examined the case in correct perspective.   The  stand  taken  by  the
      appellants that the Suit itself was  not  maintainable,  as  the  only
      remedy available to the respondent was to approach  the  Labour  Court
      under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter  referred  to  as
      the `Act 1947’) has not been properly examined by  the  courts  below.
      More  so,  the   pleadings   in   the   plaint   were   vague.     The
      respondent/plaintiff failed to prove any of the  allegations  made  in
      the plaint, therefore, the courts below have erred in holding that the
      enquiry stood vitiated due to violation of  statutory  provisions  and
      principles  of  natural  justice.   The  enquiry  had  been  conducted
      strictly in accordance with law, the provisions of Section 35  of  the
      Standing Order have been fully complied with and  the  respondent  was
      given full opportunity to defend himself.   Therefore, the findings of
      fact recorded by the courts below in this respect are  perverse.   The
      respondent was found to have embezzled money of  the  corporation  and
      the punishment of dismissal cannot be held to be  disproportionate  to
      the proved delinquency.  Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.


      4.    On the contrary, Shri Anis Ahmed Khan, learned counsel appearing
      on behalf of the respondent, has opposed the  appeal  contending  that
      there are concurrent findings of facts recorded by the  three  courts.
      The trial court as well as the first appellate court have recorded the
      findings of fact that the enquiry had not been conducted in accordance
      with  law  and  the  punishment  of   dismissal   from   service   was
      disproportionate to the delinquency proved. Therefore, no interference
      is called for.


      5.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties  and  perused  the
      record.


      6.    Undoubtedly,  the  appellant  corporation  had  taken  the  plea
      regarding  the  maintainability  of  suit  on  the  ground  that   the
      respondent  being  a  workman  ought  to  have  approached  the  forum
      available under the Act 1947 and the civil suit was not  maintainable.
      In order to fortify  this  submission  Shri  Bhattacharya  has  placed
      reliance on the judgments of this Court  in  The  Premier  Automobiles
      Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors., AIR 1975  SC  2238;
      Uttam Das Chela Sunder Das v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee,
      Amritsar,  AIR 1996 SC 2133; Rajasthan SRTC & Ors. v. Mohar Singh, AIR
      2008 SC 2553; Rajasthan SRTC & Anr. v. Bal Mukund Bairwa, (2009) 4 SCC
      299; and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation &  Ors.,  v.  Deen
      Dayal Sharma, AIR 2010 SC 2662 and asserted that the judgments of  the
      courts below  are without jurisdiction.


      7.    Be that as it may, before the trial court,  the  appellants  did
      not press the issue regarding the maintainability of suit even  though
      the issue in this regard had specifically been framed.  Thus,  we  are
      not inclined in delving into this controversy at all.


      8.    The relevant part of the plaint reads:
           “That the plaintiff was imposed with the charge sheet  no.  1158
           dated 11.3.88 that on date 24.2.88 on the route Kota-Rajpura his
           vehicle was checked and it was found during  the course  of  the
           inspection that he was carrying 10  passengers  without  tickets
           and another Charge sheet no. 1159 dated 11.3.88 was imposed with
           the statement that on date  27.11.88  the  plaintiff  was  found
           carrying 2 passengers without tickets during the course  of  his
           giving the duty on the route Kota-Neernuch in  the  capacity  of
           the conductor and  he  was  also  caught  in  the  case  of  the
           difference in the ticket amount. That if the bus was not checked
           in time then the plaintiff would have used  the  entire  sum  of
           money he recovered from the passengers found without tickets for
           his personal use. Whereas as per the terms and conditions of the
           Corporation the plaintiff is required to issue  the  tickets  to
           all the passengers and then to  get  the  same  entered  in  the
           waybill  and  that  then  only  the  vehicle  should  have  been
           departed.  The  aforesaid  charges  were   totally   wrong   and
           baseless.”


      9.    The  appellant/defendant  in  its  written  statement  basically
      stated:
           ?“?The Defendants have mentioned in the reply that  the  plaintiff
           had been appointed on the post of the  conductor  on  the  daily
           wage basis. The plaintiff  is  not  entitled  of  receiving  the
           salary of the regular pay scale from the  date  7.12.85  because
           the plaintiff was appointed as a daily wageworker and the salary
           in accordance with the law was given to the plaintiff.
               ? During the course of the inquiry the  plaintiff  was  given
           full opportunity of defence and of being heard. The copy of  the
           enquiry  report  was  supplied  to  the  plaintiff   after   the
           completion of the inquiry and he was also intimated  the  result
           of the inquiry. In this way no violation  of  the  principle  of
           natural justice was done as against the  plaintiff  whereas  the
           provisions of section 35  of  the  standing  orders  were  fully
           complied with. The Disciplinary Authority had by fully  applying
           its mind passed the order of termination of the  plaintiff.  The
           plaintiff has produced the  court  fee  at  his  own  risk.  The
           Defendant  Corporation  comes  within  the  definition  of   the
           "Industry" and for which  it  is  only  the  Hon'ble  Industrial
           Tribunal who has got the jurisdiction to  hear  and  decide  the
           case of such nature. The plaintiff is not entitled of  receiving
           the monetary benefits and other consequential benefits from  the
           defendants. Therefore, the suit of the  plaintiff  be  dismissed
           with costs.”




      10.   After appreciating the material on record, the trial court held:
             “In this way the plaintiff has clearly made the  allegation  in
           the plaint that in the inquiry the statement  of  the  witnesses
           were not recorded in front of the plaintiff. He was not given an
           opportunity to  cross-examine  the  witnesses  produced  by  the
           defendant corporation and nor he was  given  an  opportunity  to
           defend his case and lead the evidence. That he was not  supplied
           with the copies of the  documents  and  was  not  heard  on  the
           quantum of the punishment and he deposed the same by way of  the
           affidavit. That in order to contradict the same  the  defendants
           have not produced any evidence by way of deposition and nor  any
           other document in support of the same has been  produced.  Under
           these circumstances,  there  is  no  reason  to  disbelieve  the
           evidence of the plaintiff. That since the inquiry which has been
           initiated against the plaintiff  is  against  the  principle  of
           natural  justice,  under  these  circumstances,  the  order   of
           termination which has been  passed  is  also  against  the  law.
           Therefore, this suit issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff
           and             against             the             defendants.”
                 (Emphasis added)


      11.   The aforesaid findings recorded by the trial court is based only
      on the allegations made by the respondent in the plaint and on failure
      of the Corporation/defendant to rebut the same, though the trial court
      had proceeded with the case  clearly  observing  that  the  burden  of
      proving this issue was on the  respondent/plaintiff  and  not  on  the
      Corporation/defendant.  In  such  a  fact  situation,   no   reasoning
      whatsoever has been given  by  the  trial  court  in  support  of  its
      conclusion. Neither there is any specific pleading as to what document
      had not been supplied to him which has been relied upon by the enquiry
      officer or which witness was not permitted to be  cross-  examined  by
      him. The trial court did not make any reference to enquiry  report  or
      contents thereof.  The entire case is based on ipsi dixi.


      12.  It is settled proposition of law that a party has  to  plead  the
      case  and  produce/adduce  sufficient  evidence  to  substantiate  his
      submissions made in the plaint and  in  case  the  pleadings  are  not
      complete, the Court is under no obligation  to  entertain  the  pleas.
      (Vide: M/s. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Ors. v. State of  Gujarat  &  Ors.,
      AIR 1998 SC 1608; National Building  Construction  Corporation  v.  S.
      Raghunathan & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2779; Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani  &
      Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 141; Smt. Chitra Kumari v. Union of India  &  Ors.,
      AIR 2001 SC 1237; and State of U.P. v.  Chandra  Prakash  Pandey,  AIR
      2001 SC 1298.)


      13.   In M/s. Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, AIR 2001  SC
      1684, this Court observed as under:–
           “The  findings  in  the  absence  of  necessary  pleadings   and
           supporting evidence cannot be sustained in law.”


      (See also: Vithal N. Shetti & Anr. v.  Prakash  N.  Rudrakar  &  Ors.,
      (2003) 1 SCC 18; Devasahayam (Dead) by L.Rs. v. P. Savithramma & Ors.,
      (2005) 7 SCC 653; Sait Nagjee  Purushotam  &  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Vimalabai
      Prabhulal  &  Ors.,  (2005)  8  SCC  252,   Rajasthan   Pradesh   V.S.
      Sardarshahar  & Anr. v. Union of India  &  Ors.,  AIR  2010  SC  2221;
      Ritesh Tiwari & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 2010  SC  3823;  and
      Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr. (2012) 8 SCC 148).


      14.   Therefore, once the trial court has  held  that  the  burden  of
      proof was on the respondent/plaintiff, it could not have come  to  the
      aforesaid findings as there is nothing  on  record  to  show  how  the
      averments/allegations made by the respondent stood proved.


      15.   Even the First Appellate Court misdirected itself while  dealing
      with the issue as it held:?
           ? “That no evidence was produced  by  the  defendants/appellants.
           The statement given by the plaintiff is unrebutted. That as  per
           the statement of the plaintiff the statement  of  the  witnesses
           were not recorded in front of the plaintiff. The  plaintiff  was
           not  given  an  opportunity  of  cross-examining  the  witnesses
           produced by the Defendants/Appellants.  The  plaintiff  was  not
           given an opportunity of leading the evidence and  defending  his
           case. The copies of the  documents  were  not  supplied  to  the
           plaintiff.  He  was  also  not  heard  on  the  quantum  of  the
           punishment. In this way the deposition given  by  the  plaintiff
           are not rebutted  and  due  to  the  reason  of  the  same  been
           unrebuttable it can be said that  no  departmental  inquiry  was
           initiated as against the plaintiff. Due to  the  reason  of  not
           holding  the  departmental  inquiry  the  proceeding   initiated
           against the plaintiff was not in accordance with  the  principle
           of natural justice.  The order of  termination  which  has  been
           passed without holding the inquiry cannot be said to  be  passed
           in accordance with the law.  In this way the finding arrived  at
           by the learned subordinate court in respect of the issue  no.  1
           is just and proper and there is no  need  to  interfere  in  the
           same.”


      16.   The appellate court committed a grave  error  by  declaring  the
      enquiry as non-est. The termination order as  a  consequence  thereof,
      stood vitiated though there is no reference to any  material  fact  on
      the basis of which such a conclusion was reached.   The  finding  that
      copy of the documents was not supplied  to  the  respondent/plaintiff,
      though there is nothing on record to show that how the documents  were
      relied upon and how they were relevant to  the  controversy  involved,
      whether those documents had been relied upon by  the  enquiry  officer
      and  how  any  prejudice  had  been  caused  by  non-supply  of  those
      documents, is therefore without  any  basis  or  evidence.   When  the
      matter reached the High Court in Second Appeal, the High Court refused
      to examine the issue at all by merely observing  that  no  substantial
      question of law  was  involved  and  the  findings  of  fact,  however
      erroneous, cannot be disturbed in Second Appeal.


      17.   With all respect, we do not agree with such a conclusion reached
      by the High Court, as Second Appeal, in exceptional circumstances, can
      be entertained on pure questions of fact.  There is no prohibition for
      the High Court to entertain the Second Appeal even on question of fact
      where factual findings are found to be perverse.


      18.  In   Ibrahim Uddin (Supra), this Court held:
              “65. In Suwalal Chhogalal v. CIT, (1949) 17 ITR 269 (Nag) the
           Court held as under: (ITR p. 277)
              “… A fact is a fact irrespective of evidence by which  it  is
           proved. The only time a question of law can arise in such a case
           is when it is alleged that there is no  material  on  which  the
           conclusion can be based or no sufficient material.


              67. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even
           on question of fact provided the Court  is  satisfied  that  the
           findings of the courts below were vitiated by  non-consideration
           of relevant evidence or by showing  erroneous  approach  to  the
           matter and findings recorded in the court  below  are  perverse.
           [Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, AIR 1992 SC  1604,  Prativa
           Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1999) 5 SCC 353, Satya Gupta v.  Brijesh
           Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423, Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery
           & Co., AIR 2000 SC 534, Molar Mal v. Kay Iron  Works  (P)  Ltd.,
           AIR 2000 SC 1261,  Bharatha  Matha  v.  R.  Vijaya  Renganathan,
           (2010) 11 SCC 483 and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali,  (2010  12  SCC
           740]


              68. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala, AIR 2002 SC 1428, this  Court
           held that (SCC p. 638, para 6) it is  permissible  to  interfere
           even on question of fact but it may be only in
           “very exceptional cases  and  on  extreme  perversity  that  the
           authority to examine the same in extenso  stands  permissible—it
           is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can  be
           safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but
           the power to scrutiny  can  only  be  had  in  very  exceptional
           circumstances and upon proper circumspection”.
           Similar view has been taken in Kashmir Singh  v.  Harnam  Singh,
           AIR 2008 SC 1749.”




      19.    As regards  the  question  of  disproportionate  punishment  is
      concerned, the issue is  no  more  res-integra.   In  U.P  State  Road
      Transport Corporation v. Suresh Chand Sharma,  (2010) 6  SCC  555,  it
      was  held as under:
            “22. In Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh  v.  Krishnan  Behari,
           AIR 1996 SC 1249 this Court held as under: (SCC p. 715, para 4)


              “4. … In a case of such  nature—indeed,  in  cases  involving
           corruption—there cannot be any other punishment than  dismissal.
           Any sympathy shown in such cases is  totally  uncalled  for  and
           opposed to public interest. The amount  misappropriated  may  be
           small or large; it  is  the  act  of  misappropriation  that  is
           relevant.”
           Similar view has been reiterated  by  this  Court  in  Ruston  &
           Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B. Kadam, AIR 1975 SC 2025, U.P.  SRTC  v.
           Basudeo Chaudhary, (1997)  11  SCC  370,  Janatha  Bazar  (South
           Kanara  Central  Coop.  Wholesale  Stores  Ltd.)   v.   Sahakari
           Noukarara Sangha, (2000) 7  SCC  517,  Karnataka  SRTC  v.  B.S.
           Hullikatti, AIR 2001 SC 930  and  Rajasthan  SRTC  v.  Ghanshyam
           Sharma, (2002) 10 SCC 330.”


      20.   In view of the above, the contention raised  on  behalf  of  the
      respondent employee, that the punishment of removal  from  service  is
      disproportionate to the delinquency is not worth acceptance.  The only
      punishment in case of the proved case of corruption is dismissal  from
      service.


      21.   As a result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.  The  judgments
      of the courts below are set  aside  and  the  order  of  removal  from
      service passed by the Disciplinary Authority is restored.  No order as
      to costs.


      …………......................J.
                                                 (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)





      ……….........................J.
                                                  (J. CHELAMESWAR)
      NEW DELHI
      March 14, 2014.?


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