Declaration and for recovery of encroached portion - Amin commissioner report held incomplete as it failed to fix the encroached portion and failed to measure some points noted - Lower court dismissed the suit as excutant of sale deed not examined and also counter claim of defendants - Appeal too resulted in dismissal along with cross objection - in second appeal , high court partly allowed the appeal and declared the title but failed to grant recovery of encroached portion and also dismissed the review petition - Apex court set aside the review petition and remitted the case to trial court for fresh adjudication with regard to the reliefs of recovery of khas possession of schedule-2 property and permanent injunction, only and the parties are permitted to adduce evidence and the Trial Court after adjudication shall pass a comprehensive decree in respect of all the reliefs claimed in the suit. = Phanidhar Kalita .. Appellant(s) -vs- Saraswati Devi & Anr. .. Respondent(s) = 2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41320

  Declaration and for recovery of encroached portion -  Amin commissioner report held incomplete as it failed to fix the encroached portion and failed to measure some points noted - Lower court dismissed the suit as excutant of sale deed not examined and also counter claim of defendants - Appeal too resulted in dismissal along with cross objection - in second appeal , high court partly allowed the appeal and declared the title but failed to grant recovery of encroached portion and also dismissed the review petition - Apex court set aside the review petition and remitted the case to trial court for fresh adjudication  with  regard  to  the  reliefs  of  recovery  of  khas  possession  of schedule-2 property and permanent injunction, only and the parties are permitted to adduce evidence  and  the Trial Court after adjudication shall pass a comprehensive decree in  respect of all the reliefs claimed in the suit. =

  The appellant/plaintiff herein filed the  Title  Suit  no.11  of  1987
against the respondent/defendant no.1 herein in the  Court  of  Civil  Judge
(Junior Division) no.2, Mangaldoi for declaration of title in respect  of  1
katha 16 lechas of land described in schedule-1 to  the  plaint  covered  by
Dag no.52/575 of P.P. no.960 situated in village  Mangaldoi  gaon  and  also
for recovery of khas possession of the suit land  described  in  schedule-2,
which is a part of the land in schedule-1 by demolishing the  structure  put
by respondent no.1 herein/defendant no.1 and also for  permanent  injunction
restraining   the   respondents   herein/defendants   from    raising    new
constructions on the suit land.=
The Trial  Court  on  consideration  of  the
oral and documentary evidence dismissed the suit  as  well  as  the  counter
claim. 
The appellant/plaintiff preferred Second Appeal in  R.S.A.  no.116
of 2000 and the Guwahati High Court held that  the  appellant/plaintiff  had
title to the suit property in schedule-1  and  partly  allowed  the  appeal.
The appellant/plaintiff herein filed Review Petition no.1  of  2008  stating
that since the main relief had been granted, the  consequential  relief  for
khas possession of schedule-2 property ought to have been  granted  to  him.
The High Court dismissed the Review Petition.  
Challenging the rejection  of the relief of recovery of khas possession of  schedule-2  property  and  the relief of permanent injunction in  the  Judgment  as  well  as  Review,  the
appellant/plaintiff has preferred the present appeals to this Court.=

 Respondent no.1/defendant no.1 filed written  statement  stating  that
she purchased 1 bigha of land from Bati Ram on 4.8.1955  and  constructed  a
thatched house and she has not encroached on the suit  land  as  alleged  by
the appellant/plaintiff.

4.    Respondent no.2 herein/defendant no.2 impleaded himself  in  the  suit
and in his written statement he  took  the  identical  plea  raised  by  the
respondent  no.1/defendant  no.1  in  her  written  statement.   He  further
asserted that he never sold the suit  property  to  the  appellant/plaintiff
and the sale deed dated 12.7.1977 is a  forged  one  and  he  also  filed  a
counter claim  seeking  declaration  of  title  to  the  suit  property  and
recovery of possession of the same from the appellant/plaintiff.=


  “(i)  Whether the learned courts below were justified in holding
           that  Ext.4  sale  deed  was  not  proved,  merely  because  the
           executant of the deed was not examined?



           (ii)  Whether the learned courts below failed  to  consider  some
           relevant  materials  such  as  Ext.2,  Ext.5  and  whether   non-
           consideration of such material has vitiated the judgments?



           (iii) Whether the learned trial  court  was  justified  to  brush
           aside the amin commissioner’s report by  observing  that  it  was
           incomplete and biased?”

By an elaborate judgment the High  Court  held  that  the  findings  of  the
courts  below  that  the  appellant/plaintiff  had  failed  to   prove   his
registered sale deed dated 12.7.1977 are perverse and upheld  the  title  of
the appellant/plaintiff to the suit property in schedule-1  and  accordingly
partly allowed the appeal by setting aside the portion of the  judgment  and
decree of the courts below in that regard.  

In other words, the  High  Court
answered the substantial question of law no.1 only  and  omitted  to  answer
the  other  two   substantial   questions   of   law   cited   supra.    
The
appellant/plaintiff pointed out  the  said  omission  by  filing  Review  in
Review Petition no.1 of 2008.  However,  the  High  Court  dismissed  it  by
holding that no ground is made out for Review.

9.    The learned counsel for  the  appellant/plaintiff  contended  that  on
appellant/plaintiff’s petition Amin Commissioner was  appointed  to  measure
the land in possession of the  appellant/plaintiff  as  well  as  respondent
no.1/defendant no.1 and the said Amin Commissioner  was  examined  as  Court
witness no.1 and the Courts below were not  justified  to  brush  aside  the
Amin Commissioner’s report and  decree  ought  to  have  been  granted  with
regard to the other reliefs prayed  for  by  the  appellant/plaintiff.   
Per
contra the learned counsel for  the  respondents/defendants  contended  that
the Amin Commissioner has not measured the whole of surrounded dags of  suit
land and his report is incomplete, as rightly held by both the Courts  below
dealing on factual matrix.

10.   We carefully considered the rival contentions and  the  records.   The
title of  the  appellant/plaintiff  to  the  suit  schedule-1  property  has
already been declared by the High Court and that finding has  become  final.
The Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate  Court  held  that  the  Amin
Commissioner has not measured the dags falling north east-east west  of  the
appellant/plaintiff’s land and the respondent  no.1/defendant  no.1’s  land.
Whether schedule-2 is encroached property of the  respondent  no.1/defendant
no.1 as  alleged  by  the  appellant/plaintiff  has  to  be  determined  for
adjudicating the other reliefs claimed in the plaint.

11.   In the interest of justice, we deem it fit to remit the matter to  the
Trial Court for fresh adjudication with regard to the  reliefs  of  recovery
of possession and permanent injunction only.

12.   The appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment and  decree  of  the
High Court,  declining  the  reliefs  of  recovery  of  khas  possession  of
schedule-2 property and permanent injunction, are set aside and  the  matter
is remitted to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication  with  regard  to  the
said reliefs only and the parties are permitted to adduce evidence  and  the
Trial Court after adjudication shall pass a comprehensive decree in  respect
of all the reliefs claimed in the suit.  No costs.  Since the title suit  is
of the year 1987 the Trial Court shall endeavour to dispose of the  same  as
expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from  the
date of receipt of records.

2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41320
T.S. THAKUR, C. NAGAPPAN
                                                         NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2924 - 2925 OF 2014


Phanidhar Kalita                           ..       Appellant(s)


      -vs-



Saraswati Devi & Anr.                      ..    Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T

C. NAGAPPAN, J.



1.    These appeals are preferred against  the  judgment  and  decree  dated
23.3.2007 in R.S.A. No.116 of 2000 and the order dated  1.4.2008  in  Review
Petition no.1 of 2008 passed by the learned single  Judge  of  the  Guwahati
High Court, whereby the High Court has partly  allowed  the  Regular  Second
Appeal and dismissed the  Review  Petition,  both  filed  by  the  appellant
herein.

2.    The appellant/plaintiff herein filed the  Title  Suit  no.11  of  1987
against the respondent/defendant no.1 herein in the  Court  of  Civil  Judge
(Junior Division) no.2, Mangaldoi for declaration of title in respect  of  1
katha 16 lechas of land described in schedule-1 to  the  plaint  covered  by
Dag no.52/575 of P.P. no.960 situated in village  Mangaldoi  gaon  and  also
for recovery of khas possession of the suit land  described  in  schedule-2,
which is a part of the land in schedule-1 by demolishing the  structure  put
by respondent no.1 herein/defendant no.1 and also for  permanent  injunction
restraining   the   respondents   herein/defendants   from    raising    new
constructions on the suit land.  The  case  of  the  appellant/plaintiff  is
that he purchased 1 bigha of land, mentioned in schedule-1, from  one  Mukta
Ram  Saikia  by  Exh.4  registered  sale  deed  dated  12.7.1977  and   took
possession of the same and got mutation of his name in  the  revenue  record
and obtained patta Exh.5 also.  It is his further case that  the  respondent
no.1/defendant no.1 also purchased 1 bigha of land from the original  common
owner  Bati  Ram,  which  is  the   adjacent   northern   portion   of   the
appellant/plaintiff’s land in schedule-1 and in  November,  1978  respondent
no.1/defendant  no.1  constructed  a  thatched  house  by  encroaching  some
portion of the appellant/plaintiff’s land in schedule-1 and on  measurement,
it is found that respondent no.1/defendant no.1 had encroached an extent  of
1 katha 16 lechas which is described as schedule-2 in the plaint.



3.    Respondent no.1/defendant no.1 filed written  statement  stating  that
she purchased 1 bigha of land from Bati Ram on 4.8.1955  and  constructed  a
thatched house and she has not encroached on the suit  land  as  alleged  by
the appellant/plaintiff.

4.    Respondent no.2 herein/defendant no.2 impleaded himself  in  the  suit
and in his written statement he  took  the  identical  plea  raised  by  the
respondent  no.1/defendant  no.1  in  her  written  statement.   He  further
asserted that he never sold the suit  property  to  the  appellant/plaintiff
and the sale deed dated 12.7.1977 is a  forged  one  and  he  also  filed  a
counter claim  seeking  declaration  of  title  to  the  suit  property  and
recovery of possession of the same from the appellant/plaintiff.

5.    The said counter claim was  resisted  by  the  appellant/plaintiff  by
filing a written statement.

6.    The trial Court framed 17 issues and the appellant/plaintiff  examined
himself and examined 5 other witnesses and marked 22 documents on his  side.
 The respondents/defendant no.1 and 2 examined  themselves  and  examined  4
other witnesses on their side.  The Trial  Court  on  consideration  of  the
oral and documentary evidence dismissed the suit  as  well  as  the  counter
claim.  The appellant/plaintiff preferred an appeal  against  the  dismissal
of the suit in Title Appeal no.8 of 1998  before  the  Civil  Judge  (Senior
Division), Darrang at  Mangaldoi  and  the  respondent  no.2/defendant  no.2
preferred a cross objection and the Lower Appellate Court dismissed both  on
contest.  The appellant/plaintiff preferred Second Appeal in  R.S.A.  no.116
of 2000 and the Guwahati High Court held that  the  appellant/plaintiff  had
title to the suit property in schedule-1  and  partly  allowed  the  appeal.
The appellant/plaintiff herein filed Review Petition no.1  of  2008  stating
that since the main relief had been granted, the  consequential  relief  for
khas possession of schedule-2 property ought to have been  granted  to  him.
The High Court dismissed the Review Petition.  Challenging the rejection  of
the relief of recovery of khas possession of  schedule-2  property  and  the
relief of permanent injunction in  the  Judgment  as  well  as  Review,  the
appellant/plaintiff has preferred the present appeals to this Court.

7.    The learned counsel appearing for the  appellant  submitted  that  the
High Court held that the findings of the Courts below  with  regard  to  the
validity of sale deed of the appellant/plaintiff was  perverse  and  allowed
the Second Appeal in part but  erred  in  not  granting  the  other  reliefs
prayed for by the appellant/plaintiff in the suit namely  recovery  of  khas
possession of schedule-2 property and permanent injunction,  though  it  had
framed substantial questions of law with regard to them.  We also heard  the
learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

8.    The appellant/plaintiff herein  has  prayed  for  declaration  of  his
title to the suit property in schedule-1  and  also  for  recovery  of  khas
possession of the land described in schedule-2 which  is  part  of  land  in
schedule-1  by   demolishing   the   structure   put   by   the   respondent
no.1/defendant no.1 herein and also  for  permanent  injunction  restraining
the respondents/defendants herein from putting up new  construction  at  the
suit land.  By concurrent findings, the Trial Court and the Lower  Appellate
Court dismissed the entire suit.  The High Court admitted the Second  Appeal
preferred by the appellant/plaintiff by framing  the  following  substantial
questions of law :

           “(i)  Whether the learned courts below were justified in holding
           that  Ext.4  sale  deed  was  not  proved,  merely  because  the
           executant of the deed was not examined?



           (ii)  Whether the learned courts below failed  to  consider  some
           relevant  materials  such  as  Ext.2,  Ext.5  and  whether   non-
           consideration of such material has vitiated the judgments?



           (iii) Whether the learned trial  court  was  justified  to  brush
           aside the amin commissioner’s report by  observing  that  it  was
           incomplete and biased?”

By an elaborate judgment the High  Court  held  that  the  findings  of  the
courts  below  that  the  appellant/plaintiff  had  failed  to   prove   his
registered sale deed dated 12.7.1977 are perverse and upheld  the  title  of
the appellant/plaintiff to the suit property in schedule-1  and  accordingly
partly allowed the appeal by setting aside the portion of the  judgment  and
decree of the courts below in that regard.  In other words, the  High  Court
answered the substantial question of law no.1 only  and  omitted  to  answer
the  other  two   substantial   questions   of   law   cited   supra.    The
appellant/plaintiff pointed out  the  said  omission  by  filing  Review  in
Review Petition no.1 of 2008.  However,  the  High  Court  dismissed  it  by
holding that no ground is made out for Review.

9.    The learned counsel for  the  appellant/plaintiff  contended  that  on
appellant/plaintiff’s petition Amin Commissioner was  appointed  to  measure
the land in possession of the  appellant/plaintiff  as  well  as  respondent
no.1/defendant no.1 and the said Amin Commissioner  was  examined  as  Court
witness no.1 and the Courts below were not  justified  to  brush  aside  the
Amin Commissioner’s report and  decree  ought  to  have  been  granted  with
regard to the other reliefs prayed  for  by  the  appellant/plaintiff.   Per
contra the learned counsel for  the  respondents/defendants  contended  that
the Amin Commissioner has not measured the whole of surrounded dags of  suit
land and his report is incomplete, as rightly held by both the Courts  below
dealing on factual matrix.

10.   We carefully considered the rival contentions and  the  records.   The
title of  the  appellant/plaintiff  to  the  suit  schedule-1  property  has
already been declared by the High Court and that finding has  become  final.
The Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate  Court  held  that  the  Amin
Commissioner has not measured the dags falling north east-east west  of  the
appellant/plaintiff’s land and the respondent  no.1/defendant  no.1’s  land.
Whether schedule-2 is encroached property of the  respondent  no.1/defendant
no.1 as  alleged  by  the  appellant/plaintiff  has  to  be  determined  for
adjudicating the other reliefs claimed in the plaint.

11.   In the interest of justice, we deem it fit to remit the matter to  the
Trial Court for fresh adjudication with regard to the  reliefs  of  recovery
of possession and permanent injunction only.

12.   The appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment and  decree  of  the
High Court,  declining  the  reliefs  of  recovery  of  khas  possession  of
schedule-2 property and permanent injunction, are set aside and  the  matter
is remitted to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication  with  regard  to  the
said reliefs only and the parties are permitted to adduce evidence  and  the
Trial Court after adjudication shall pass a comprehensive decree in  respect
of all the reliefs claimed in the suit.  No costs.  Since the title suit  is
of the year 1987 the Trial Court shall endeavour to dispose of the  same  as
expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from  the
date of receipt of records.





                                                               ………………………….J.
                                                               (T.S. Thakur)






                                                                …………………………J.
                                                               (C. Nagappan)
New Delhi;
March  14, 2014.

The doctrine of estoppel by election - Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (in short ‘PUDA Act’) ,The Punjab Urban Estate (Development and Regulation) Act 1964 (in short ‘1964 Act’) and Punjab Housing Development Board Act, 1972 - plot allotted - as per the terms construction should be completed with in 3 years, else plot will be resumed - Demand notice issued an option to surrender the plot or to pay extension fee for the delay - Writ petitioner adopted payment of extension fee - after commencement of New Act , Writ petitioner issued notice for refund of the amount paid - commissioner rejected as Tehal singh case not applies - High court allowed the writ basing on Tehal singh judgment - Apex court held that Commissioner is rightly dismissed and set aside the order of High court as no party should blow hold and clod at the same time and as he availed the benefit from resumption of land by paying extension fee , can not go back and demanded for refund of the same = State of Punjab and Others …….Appellants Versus Dhanjit Singh Sandhu …..Respondent= 2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41318

 The doctrine of estoppel by election - Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development  Act, 1995 (in short ‘PUDA Act’)  ,The  Punjab  Urban  Estate (Development and Regulation) Act 1964  (in  short  ‘1964  Act’)  and  Punjab Housing Development Board Act, 1972  - plot allotted - as per the terms- construction should be completed with in  3 years, else plot will be resumed - Demand notice issued an option to surrender the plot or to pay extension fee for the delay - Writ petitioner adopted payment of extension fee - after commencement of  New Act , Writ petitioner issued notice for refund of the amount paid - commissioner rejected as Tehal singh case not applies - High court allowed the writ basing on Tehal singh judgment - Apex court held that Commissioner is rightly dismissed and set aside the order of High court as no party should blow hold and clod at the same time and as he availed the benefit from resumption of land by paying extension fee , can not go back and demanded for refund of the same =

writ petition filed by the  respondent  was   allowed  and
the  order  dated   23.12.2004  passed  by  appellant  no.3  rejecting   the
application for refund of the extension fee received  by  the  appellant  in
excess of the rates mentioned in Rule 13 of the  Punjab  Regional  and  Town
Planning and Development Act, 1995 (in short ‘1995 Act’)  in  the  light  of
the judgment passed in C.W.P. No.13648 of 1998 (Tehal  Singh  vs.  State  of
Punjab & Ors.) along with up-to-date  interest has been set aside.=
High court held that
 “15. When the facts of the present  case  are  examined  in  the
           light of the  principle laid down by the Division Bench judgment
           in Tehal Singh’s  case (supra), we are left with no  doubt  that
           the  show  cause  notices  issued   to    the    petitioner   on
           19.9.2006  (P-4)  and   12.12.2006 {P-7} requiring  him  to  pay
           extension fee of Rs. 1,32,958/- was violative of the  provisions
           of the 1995 Act and Rule 13 of the 1995 Rules,  as  has  already
           been noticed in the preceding paras. The controversy,  in  fact,
           stand settled by the Division Bench judgment  in  Tehal  Singh's
           case (supra) and the issue does not deserve to be reopened.  The
           respondents have failed to  consider  the  reply  filed  by  the
           petitioner wherein judgment rendered by the  Division  Bench  in
           Tehal Singh's case (supra) has been cited and  the  charging  of
           extension fee at exorbitant rate has been duly answered.
    16. In view of above, the writ petition succeeds.  The  impugned
           notice dated 12.12.2006 (P-7) is hereby quashed. The respondents
           are directed to calculate the extension fee as per  Rule  13  of
           the 1995 Rules. =
 As noticed above, the facts are quite  different  from  the  facts  in
Tehal  Singh’s  case.   
In  the  instant  case,  the   respondents-allottees
accepted the terms and conditions of the  allotment  letter  and  possession
were taken but they did not raise any construction upto 2000.  There  was  a
specific condition that non-construction  of  building  would  lead  to  the
resumption of the said plot under the provisions of the Acts and the  Rules.
 As noticed above, when the allottees did  not  raise  construction  on  the
plot, the demand was raised for payment  of  non-construction  fee/extension
fee in order to avoid resumption of the  plot  by  the  Authority,  allottee
paid the extension fee.  After availing the benefit of extension on  payment
of extension  fee,  the  allottee  sent  a  letter  to  the  Estate  Officer
demanding refund of the extension fee on the basis of  amended  Rule  13  of
1995 Rules.  The said demand was rejected by the Estate Officer  by  passing
the reasoned order in compliance of the directions of the  High  Court.   In
the facts of the instant case, we have no doubt in our mind in holding  that
the ratio decided in Tehal Singh’s case will not apply in the instant  case.
 In our considered opinion defaulting allottes of valuable plots  cannot  be
allowed to approbate and reprobate by first agreeing to abide by  terms  and
conditions of allotment and later seeking to deny  their  liability  as  per
the agreed terms.=

  It is settled proposition of law that once an order has  been  passed,
it is complied with, accepted by the other party  and  derived  the  benefit
out of it, he cannot challenge it on any  ground.  (Vide  Maharashtra  State
Road Transport Corporation vs. Balwant Regular  Motor  Service,  Amravati  &
Ors., AIR 1969 SC 329). In R.N. Gosain vs. Yashpal Dhir, AIR  1993  SC  352,
this Court has observed as under:–
            “Law does not permit a person to both approbate and  reprobate.
           This principle is  based  on  the  doctrine  of  election  which
           postulates  that  no  party  can  accept  and  reject  the  same
           instrument and that “a person cannot say  at  one  time  that  a
           transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which
           he could only be entitled on the footing that it is  valid,  and
           then turn round and say it is void for the purpose  of  securing
           some other advantage.”


23.    This Court in Sri Babu Ram Alias  Durga  Prasad  vs.  Sri  Indra  Pal
Singh (Dead) by Lrs., AIR 1998  SC  3021,  and  P.R.  Deshpande  vs.  Maruti
Balram Haibatti, AIR 1998 SC 2979, the Supreme Court has observed  that  the
doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel-  the  principle  that
one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine  of  estoppel
by election is  one of the   species  of  estoppel  in  pais  (or  equitable
estoppel), which is a  rule  in  equity.  By  that  law,  a  person  may  be
precluded by his actions or conduct or  silence  when  it  is  his  duty  to
speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.

24. The Supreme Court in The  Rajasthan  State  Industrial  Development  and
Investment Corporation and Anr. vs. Diamond and Gem Development  Corporation
Ltd. and Anr., AIR 2013 SC 1241, made an observation that a party cannot  be
permitted to “blow hot  and  cold”,  “fast  and  loose”  or  “approbate  and
reprobate”.  Where one knowingly accepts  the  benefits  of  a  contract  or
conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or  binding  effect
on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied  to  do
equity, however, it must not be applied  in  a  manner  as  to  violate  the
principles of right and good conscience.


25. It is evident that the doctrine of election is  based  on  the  rule  of
estoppel the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate  is  inherent
in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is  one  among  the  species  of
estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is  a  rule  of  equity.  By
this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or  conduct,  or
silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he  would
have otherwise had.

26.   Be that as it may, so far as the instant case is concerned,  the  High
Court has totally overlooked the facts of the present case and  allowed  the
writ petition.  The impugned order, therefore, cannot be  sustained  in  law
and is hereby set aside.  The appeals are accordingly allowed.  However,  in
the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41318
B.S. CHAUHAN, M.Y. EQBAL
                                                            REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                     CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5698-5699 OF 2009


State of Punjab and Others                   …….Appellants

                                   Versus

Dhanjit Singh Sandhu                         …..Respondent


                                  JUDGMENT

M.Y. EQBAL, J.:

1.    These appeals are  directed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated
8.1.2009 passed by the Punjab & Haryana High  Court  in  C.W.P.  No.8864  of
2007 and also order dated  27.3.2009 passed in Review Petition  No.  112  of
2009, whereby the writ petition filed by the  respondent  was   allowed  and
the  order  dated   23.12.2004  passed  by  appellant  no.3  rejecting   the
application for refund of the extension fee received  by  the  appellant  in
excess of the rates mentioned in Rule 13 of the  Punjab  Regional  and  Town
Planning and Development Act, 1995 (in short ‘1995 Act’)  in  the  light  of
the judgment passed in C.W.P. No.13648 of 1998 (Tehal  Singh  vs.  State  of
Punjab & Ors.) along with up-to-date  interest has been set aside.

2.    The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass.
3.    The respondent was allotted  a  plot  of  land  measuring  400  square
yards bearing No.2177 at Durgi Road, Urban Estate  Phase-II,  Ludhiana  vide
allotment letter dated 1.4.1986.  In terms of allotment, the respondent  was
required to complete the construction of building within  three  years  from
the date of issuance of the allotment letter after getting the plans of  the
proposed building approved by the  competent  Authority.  The  case  of  the
respondent-writ petitioner is that there was no condition in  the  allotment
letter for charging extension  fee  in  the  case  of  failure  to  complete
construction of the building  within  the  aforementioned  period  of  three
years nevertheless as per clause 15 of the allotment letter,  the  allotment
was subject to the provisions of Punjab Estates (Development and  Regulation
Act), 1964 and the Rules and Policies framed thereunder.

4.    It appears that in the year 1995, the State of Punjab  came  with  the
legislation known as Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development  Act,
1995 (in short ‘PUDA Act’).   By the  said  Act,  the  Punjab  Urban  Estate
(Development and Regulation) Act 1964  (in  short  ‘1964  Act’)  and  Punjab
Housing Development Board Act, 1972 were repealed.   In  exercise  of  power
conferred under the Act,  the  State  Government  framed  rules  called  the
Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development (General) Rules  1995  (in
short ‘1995  Rules’)  which  was  published  vide  Notification  dated  22nd
August, 1995.  Rule 13 of the Rules specified  the  time  within  which  the
building is to be constructed.  It  also  provides  for  extension  of  time
limit subject to payment of prescribed fee mentioned therein.

5.     The  Punjab  Urban  Planning  and  Development  Authority  (in  short
‘PUDA’) issued a circular dated 15.1.1998 revising  the  rate  of  extension
fee chargeable for the residential and commercial  plots  and  by  the  said
circular a very high rate of extension fee was proposed to be  charged.  The
respondent from time to time deposited the extension fee so demanded by  the
appellant.  It is alleged that an amount of Rs.1.20 lacs has been in  excess
charged from the respondent.   The appellant’s case is  that  the  appellant
in an attempt to nullify the  effect  of  the  judgment  rendered  in  Tehal
Singh’s case and to validate the demand of enhanced rate  of  extension  fee
purportedly framed the Rules called Punjab Regional and  Town  Planning  and
Development  (General) Second Amendment Rules, 2001 (in short ‘2001  Rules’)
giving retrospective effect.

6.    The respondent moved a writ petition being C.W.P.  No.  7934  of  2004
praying inter alia for the directions to refund the excess fee charged  from
the respondent.  It was disposed of with the directions to the appellant  to
reconsider the representation and to dispose of the same  in  the  light  of
the order passed in C.W.P.  No.13648  of  1998  (Tehal  Singh’s  case).   In
compliance with the aforesaid directions,  the  respondent’s  representation
was considered and came to be rejected by the  appellant  vide  order  dated
23.12.2004 on the ground that in the facts and  circumstances  of  the  case
the instant case was not similar to Tehal Singh’s case.

7.   The writ petition was finally heard by  the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High
Court and relying  on  the  ratio  decided  in  Tehal  Sing’s  case  (supra)
disposed  of  the  writ  petition,  quashed  the  notice  and  directed  the
appellant to calculate the extension fee as per Rule 13 of 1995 Rules.   For
better appreciation, the concluding paragraphs 15  to  17  of  the  impugned
order are quoted hereinbelow:-
           “15. When the facts of the present  case  are  examined  in  the
           light of the  principle laid down by the Division Bench judgment
           in Tehal Singh’s  case (supra), we are left with no  doubt  that
           the  show  cause  notices  issued   to    the    petitioner   on
           19.9.2006  (P-4)  and   12.12.2006 {P-7} requiring  him  to  pay
           extension fee of Rs. 1,32,958/- was violative of the  provisions
           of the 1995 Act and Rule 13 of the 1995 Rules,  as  has  already
           been noticed in the preceding paras. The controversy,  in  fact,
           stand settled by the Division Bench judgment  in  Tehal  Singh's
           case (supra) and the issue does not deserve to be reopened.  The
           respondents have failed to  consider  the  reply  filed  by  the
           petitioner wherein judgment rendered by the  Division  Bench  in
           Tehal Singh's case (supra) has been cited and  the  charging  of
           extension fee at exorbitant rate has been duly answered.


           16. In view of above, the writ petition succeeds.  The  impugned
           notice dated 12.12.2006 (P-7) is hereby quashed. The respondents
           are directed to calculate the extension fee as per  Rule  13  of
           the 1995 Rules. The needful shall be done within a period of two
           months from the date of receipt of  a  certified  copy  of  this
           order. The petitioner shall  pay  the  extension  fee  within  a
           period of two months from the date of receipt of the calculation
           given in the fresh notice to be issued by the  respondents.  The
           petitioner shall further be entitled to consequential benefit to
           get the  site  plans  approved.  The  petitioner  is  also  held
           entitled to his costs.


           17. The other connected writ petitions are also disposed  of  in
           the above terms. It is, however, clarified that in cases such as
           C.W.P. Nos. 8864 and 13765 of 2007, where the  petitioners  have
           already paid the extension fee as per the rates demanded by  the
           respondents, which are exorbitant and against the Division Bench
           judgment of this Court in Tehal Singh's  case,  the  respondents
           are directed to re-calculate the amount of extension fee as  per
           the provisions of Rule 13 of the  Rules  and  refund  the  over-
           payment alongwith interest 10% per annum.”

8.    We have heard Mrs. Rachna Joshi Issar, learned counsel  appearing  for
the appellant.

9.      As  noticed  above,  the  plot  in  question  was  allotted  to  the
respondent vide an  allotment  letter  dated  1.4.1986.   In  terms  of  the
allotment letter, the allottee had  to  fulfill  the  terms  and  conditions
enumerated in the said  letter.   The  terms  and  conditions  of  the  said
allotment are extracted hereinbelow:-
           “1. Plot No. 2177 Phase-II measuring 400 sq. yds. in Durgri  Rd.
           Urban Estate has been allotted to you. The  tentative  price  of
           the said plot is Rs. 51,000/-
           2. The plot is preferential one and additional price at the rate
           of 10% of the original normal price is Rs.


           3.   Total price of the plot (normal) plus preferential  is  Rs.
           51,000/-
           4.  The above price of the plot is  subject  to  variation  with
           reference to the actual measurement of the site as  well  as  in
           cost of enhancement of compensation by the  court  or  otherwise
           and you shall have to pay the additional price of  the  plot  if
           any, determined by the department, within 30 days of the date of
           demand of in case of sale by allotment.
           5.  You shall have to convey your acceptance/refusal unless  you
           refuse to accept the allotment by a registered A/D letter within
           30 days of the issue of this allotment order and have to pay 15%
           of the sale price amounting of Rs. 4750/- or such  other  amount
           with together with the amount already paid equal to at least 25%
           of the sale price of the site. In case of failure to deposit the
           sale amount the allotment shall be liable to  be  cancelled  and
           earnest money already paid forfeited.
           6.   In  case  you  refuse  to  accept  the  allotment   through
           acknowledgment  due   registered   letter   addressed   to   the
           undersigned within 30 days of the date  of  issue  of  allotment
           order. You will be entitled to the refund of the earnest money
           7.    On payment of 100% of the purchase price of the  plot  you
           shall have to execute in deed of conveyance  in  the  prescribed
           from in such manner as may be directed by the Estate Officer.
           8.   Balance 7.5% of the purchase price shall be payable  either
           lump-sum within 60 days of the issue of allotment order  without
           any interest  or  in  four  2  six  monthly  equated  instalment
           alongwith interest at  the  rate  of  7%  per  annum  The  first
           installment shall fall due after the expiry of six  months  from
           the date of issue of allotment order and shall be payable on the
           10th of the month following in which it falls due.
           9.  Each remittance shall be remitted to the Estate  Officer  by
           means of demand draft payable to him drawn on any Scheduled Bank
           situated at the nearest place to the Estate Officer.  Each  such
           remittance shall be accompanied by a letter showing  particulars
           of the site i.e. plot No. allotment No. and  date  of  issue  of
           allotment order etc. In the absence of  these  particulars,  the
           amount shall not deem to have been received.
           10.  You shall have to pay separately for any building
           material trees, structures and compound wall etc.
           existing in the plot at the time of allotment for which
           compensation has been assessed and paid by the
           Government in x case you want to make use of the
           same, failing which the government shall have the  right  remove
           or dispose of the same even after the delivery of possession.
           11.   The allotment shall be liable to cancellation in  case  of
           the declaration made in the application for the allotment of the
           plot is established to be incorrect.
           12.  You shall have to complete the building within three  years
           from the date of issue of allotment  order,  after  getting  the
           plans  of  the  proposed  building  approved  by  the  competent
           authority.
           13 The Government shall not  be  responsible  for  leveling  the
           uneven sites.
           14. No allottee under this policy shall dispose of his plot  for
           period of ten years from the date of transfer of  the  ownership
           to him. However the transfer of residential plot  in  the  Urban
           Estate shall be allowed to be made  in  case  of  death  of  the
           allottee in favour of his hairs.
                However, the transfer can be allowed before the  expiry  of
           ten years, in exceptional cases, with the prior approval of  the
           Government. In case an allottee contravenes provisions  of  this
           para, the plot will be resumed and price paid may  be  forfeited
           by the Government.
           15.  The allotment is subject to the  provision  of  the  Punjab
           Urban Estates (Development & Regulation) Act, 1964 and rules and
           policy framed thereunder as amended from time to  time  and  you
           shall have to accept and abide by  the  provision  of  the  Act/
           Rules/ policy. “






10.  Further, it is clear that the allotment of the plot was subject to  the
provisions contained in the 1964 Act.   Section  10  of  the  Act  envisages
provision for resumption and forfeiture of the land in  case  of  breach  of
conditions of allotment.  Section 10 reads as under:-
           “10. Resumption   and   forfeiture for breach of  conditions  of
           transfer.-  (i)  If  any  transferee  has  failed  to  pay   the
           consideration     money     or    any  installment  thereof   on
           account of the sale of any site  or  building,  or  both,  under
           section 3, or has committed a breach of any other  condition  of
           such sale, the Estate Officer may, by notice  in  writing,  call
           upon the transferee to show  cause    why    an     order     of
           resumption of the site or building, or both,   as    the    case
           may   be,   and forfeiture of the  whole  or  any  part  of  the
           money,   if any, paid  in  respect thereof  (which  in  no  case
           shall  exceed  ten  per  cent  of  the  total  amount   of   the
           consideration   money,   interest   and other  dues  payable  in
           respect of the sale of the site or building, or both) should not
           be made".

11.   In exercise of power conferred by 1964 Act, Rules were framed  in  the
year 1965 i.e. Punjab  Urban  Estate  (Development  and  Regulation)  Rules,
1964.  Rule 14 of the said Rules categorically provided that the  transferee
shall complete the building within three years from the  date  of  issue  of
the allotment letter.  In accordance  with  the  Rules  and  Regulations  of
erection of  the building, the time limit may  be  extended  by  the  Estate
Officer if he is satisfied that failure to complete the construction of  the
building within the said period was due to the reasons  beyond  the  control
of the allottee.
12.   Since the  respondent-allottee  failed  to  abide  by  the  terms  and
conditions and did not  raise  construction,  he  was  liable  to  pay  non-
construction fee/extension fee which was  demanded  from  him  in  order  to
enable him to avoid resumption of the plot to the appellant-authority.   The
aforesaid demand was made by letters dated  6.1.1997  and  27.10.1999.   The
said letter dated 6.1.1997 is extracted hereinbelow:-
      “PUNJAB URBAN, PLANNING DEVELOPMENT AUTHOR, SECTOR -32, SAMARALA
                  ROAD, PUDA COMPLEX, LUDHIANA  REGISTERED
           To,


           D.S. Sandhu Superintending Engineer (PWD) Office of the Chief
           Engineer, PWD B&R, Patna


           No. PUDA/E.O./Ludhiana (Endst. No. 2177)96/34478 Dated 06.01.97,
           Sub: Regarding payment of balance installment resumption of plot
           of  Urban  Estate  D  Road,  Sector/   Phase-II   at   Ludhiana,
           residential/ commercial plot no. 2177. area 400.


           With regard to the above subject.


        2. Res. 26712/- the detail of which is given below  is  recoverable
           from you as balance of  residential/commercial  plot  No.  2177,
           Urban Estate, D road, Sector/Phase-II, at  Ludhiana.  Therefore,
           deposit a bank draft of this amount  alongwith  18%interest  per
           annum which  should  be  in  favour  of  Estate  Officer,  PUDA,
           Ludhiana and may be payable at any scheduled bank upto  31.01.97
           in all circumstances and appear before the  undersigned  on  the
           date at 11.00 a.m. in case of failure to do so, action would  be
           initiated  for  resumption  of  allotment  of  plot  under   the
           conditions of allotment  and  under  Punjab  Regional  and  Town
           Planning and Development Act, 1995 and the rules made thereunder
           and no other opportunity would be given to you.


           1............amount of balance installments.
           2. amount of enhanced compensation
           3. extension fee 26712/-
           4. interest
           5. penalty
           Total 26712
                                     Sd/- Estate Officer  In  English  PUDA,
                                     Ludhiana.”


13.  In response to the aforesaid  letter  dated  6.1.1997,  the  respondent
agreed to pay the extension  fee  imposed  by  the  Estate  Officer  of  the
appellant authority in order to avoid resumption/auction of the plot.

14.   Meanwhile, the State  of  Punjab  enacted  Punjab  Regional  and  Town
Planning and Development Act, 1995.   Rules were also framed under the  said
Act.  By Section 183 of 1995 Act, earlier Act of  1964  and  Punjab  Housing
Development Board Act, 1972 were repealed with the saving clause.

15.   Subsequent to the aforesaid  Act,  by  Notification  dated  30.6.1995,
Punjab Urban Development Authority was established w.e.f. 1.7.1995  and  the
Board stood abolished with effect from that  date.   Many  other  Acts  were
also repealed.  By the said Act Authority was empowered  to  deal  with  the
land and prescribe the fee in case where extension of period for  completion
of building is set for by the allottee.

16.   Since the High Court passed the impugned order following the  decision
rendered by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Tehal Singh’s case, it  would
be proper to refer the facts of that case.

17.  In Tehal Singh vs. State of Punjab and Ors. (C.W.P. No.13648 of  1998),
the petitioner filed the writ petition seeking a writ for  quashing  certain
letters demanding  extension  fee  and  striking  down  condition  No.19  of
allotment letter,  insofar  as  it  relates  to  the  charging  of  separate
extension fee for  non  completion  of  construction  of  building.  Further
mandamus was sought for directing the respondents to  charge  extension  fee
from the petitioner under the provisions of Rule 13 of 1995 Rules. The  High
Court after referring  various  provisions  of  1995  Acts  and  Rules  made
thereunder observed as under:-
           “A conjoint reading of the various provisions of  the  1995  Act
           and the 1995 Rules shows that the transfer of  land  under  sub-
           section (1) of Section 43 is not only subject to the  directions
           which may be given by the State Government under  the  1995  Act
           but also the conditions which may be prescribed with  regard  to
           completion of building  of  part  thereof  and  with  regard  to
           extension of period for such completion and payment of  fee  for
           such extension. A perusal of rule 13 of  the  1995  Rules  along
           with Section 180 (2) (i) and Section 2  (zc)  of  the  1995  Act
           shows that the time within which the building is to be completed
           and other related  matters  are  governed  by  the  1995  Rules.
           Therefore, with the coming into force of these Rules, the  rates
           of extension fee prescribed by the Board stood superseded and in
           terms of sub-rule  (2)  of  Rule  13  of  the  1995  Rules,  the
           petitioners became eligible to seek extension of  the  specified
           time limit subject to payment of the fee prescribed  under  sub-
           rule (3) of Rule 13.”

18.    The Court further came to the following conclusions:-
           “We have thoughtfully considered the respective submissions.  In
           our  opinion,  Shri  Malhotra’s  contention  on  the  issue   of
           applicability of the 1995 Act  to  the  plots  allotted  to  the
           petitioners is clearly wide of the margin. A bare reading of the
           plain language of sub-section (4)of Section 183 of the 1995  Act
           makes it clear that the allotment of Section 183 of the 1995 Act
           makes it clear that the allotment made by  the  erstwhile  Board
           will be deemed to have been made under the 1995 Act.  Therefore,
           the construction of the building will have to  be  regulated  by
           the conditions of allotment read with Rule 13 of the 1995 Rules.
           As  a  logical  corollary,  the  extension  of  the  time  limit
           specified in the letter of allotment will also  be  governed  by
           the provisions  of  the  1995  Rules  and  the  petitioners  are
           entitled to seek extension of the time limit by paying  the  fee
           prescribed under Rule 13”.



19.    Consequently  the  Court  declared  the  notices  demanding  enhanced
extension fee as illegal and ultra vires  to  the  provisions  of  1995  Act
under the Rules made thereunder.

20.   It is worth to mention here that the aforesaid  judgment  rendered  in
Tehal Singh’s case  was  challenged  before  the  Supreme  Court  in  S.L.P.
No.18500-18501 of 1999 and was dismissed on 10.11.2000, but the  said  order
of dismissal was modified by the Supreme Court by order dated  12.2.2001  in
the following terms.
           “In the facts and circumstances of the case the order  does  not
           warrant in any interference of  this  Court.   The  appeals  are
           accordingly dismissed.”




21.   As noticed above, the facts are quite  different  from  the  facts  in
Tehal  Singh’s  case.   In  the  instant  case,  the   respondents-allottees
accepted the terms and conditions of the  allotment  letter  and  possession
were taken but they did not raise any construction upto 2000.  There  was  a
specific condition that non-construction  of  building  would  lead  to  the
resumption of the said plot under the provisions of the Acts and the  Rules.
 As noticed above, when the allottees did  not  raise  construction  on  the
plot, the demand was raised for payment  of  non-construction  fee/extension
fee in order to avoid resumption of the  plot  by  the  Authority,  allottee
paid the extension fee.  After availing the benefit of extension on  payment
of extension  fee,  the  allottee  sent  a  letter  to  the  Estate  Officer
demanding refund of the extension fee on the basis of  amended  Rule  13  of
1995 Rules.  The said demand was rejected by the Estate Officer  by  passing
the reasoned order in compliance of the directions of the  High  Court.   In
the facts of the instant case, we have no doubt in our mind in holding  that
the ratio decided in Tehal Singh’s case will not apply in the instant  case.
 In our considered opinion defaulting allottes of valuable plots  cannot  be
allowed to approbate and reprobate by first agreeing to abide by  terms  and
conditions of allotment and later seeking to deny  their  liability  as  per
the agreed terms.

22. The  doctrine  of  “approbate  and  reprobate”  is  only  a  species  of
estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of  parties.  As  in  the  case  of
estoppel it cannot operate  against  the  provisions  of  a  statute.  (vide
C.I.T. vs. Mr. P. Firm Maur, AIR 1965 SC 1216).
      It is settled proposition of law that once an order has  been  passed,
it is complied with, accepted by the other party  and  derived  the  benefit
out of it, he cannot challenge it on any  ground.  (Vide  Maharashtra  State
Road Transport Corporation vs. Balwant Regular  Motor  Service,  Amravati  &
Ors., AIR 1969 SC 329). In R.N. Gosain vs. Yashpal Dhir, AIR  1993  SC  352,
this Court has observed as under:–
            “Law does not permit a person to both approbate and  reprobate.
           This principle is  based  on  the  doctrine  of  election  which
           postulates  that  no  party  can  accept  and  reject  the  same
           instrument and that “a person cannot say  at  one  time  that  a
           transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which
           he could only be entitled on the footing that it is  valid,  and
           then turn round and say it is void for the purpose  of  securing
           some other advantage.”


23.    This Court in Sri Babu Ram Alias  Durga  Prasad  vs.  Sri  Indra  Pal
Singh (Dead) by Lrs., AIR 1998  SC  3021,  and  P.R.  Deshpande  vs.  Maruti
Balram Haibatti, AIR 1998 SC 2979, the Supreme Court has observed  that  the
doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel-  the  principle  that
one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine  of  estoppel
by election is  one of the   species  of  estoppel  in  pais  (or  equitable
estoppel), which is a  rule  in  equity.  By  that  law,  a  person  may  be
precluded by his actions or conduct or  silence  when  it  is  his  duty  to
speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.

24. The Supreme Court in The  Rajasthan  State  Industrial  Development  and
Investment Corporation and Anr. vs. Diamond and Gem Development  Corporation
Ltd. and Anr., AIR 2013 SC 1241, made an observation that a party cannot  be
permitted to “blow hot  and  cold”,  “fast  and  loose”  or  “approbate  and
reprobate”.  Where one knowingly accepts  the  benefits  of  a  contract  or
conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or  binding  effect
on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied  to  do
equity, however, it must not be applied  in  a  manner  as  to  violate  the
principles of right and good conscience.


25. It is evident that the doctrine of election is  based  on  the  rule  of
estoppel the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate  is  inherent
in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is  one  among  the  species  of
estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is  a  rule  of  equity.  By
this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or  conduct,  or
silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he  would
have otherwise had.

26.   Be that as it may, so far as the instant case is concerned,  the  High
Court has totally overlooked the facts of the present case and  allowed  the
writ petition.  The impugned order, therefore, cannot be  sustained  in  law
and is hereby set aside.  The appeals are accordingly allowed.  However,  in
the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.



                                                             …………………………...J.
                                                          (Dr. B.S. Chauhan)




                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                                (M.Y. Eqbal)
New Delhi,
March 14, 2014.

-----------------------
18

“14 Year Rule” = The Government Resolution No.RLP1006/CR621/PRS-3 dated 11.04.2008 issued by the Government of Maharashtra - the apex court confirmed the conviction and further the Apex court held that Since the appellant has already suffered 16 years of sentence without remission, the State Government is directed to consider as to whether he has satisfied the requirement of Resolution dated 11.04.2008 read with Annexure I and, if that be so, he may be set free if the period undergone by him without remission would satisfy the above-mentioned requirement.= Bhagwan Tukaram Dange …. Appellant Versus State of Maharashtra …. Respondent= 2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41317

  “14 Year Rule” =  The  Government  Resolution  No.RLP1006/CR621/PRS-3  dated
11.04.2008 issued by the Government of Maharashtra - the apex court confirmed the conviction and  further the Apex court held that Since the appellant has already suffered 16  years  of  sentence without remission, the State  Government  is  directed  to  consider  as  to
whether he has satisfied the  requirement  of  Resolution  dated  11.04.2008
read with Annexure I and, if that be so, he may be set free  if  the  period
undergone  by  him  without  remission  would  satisfy  the  above-mentioned
requirement.=

Appellant herein, accused No.1 (A-1) along with  his  father,  accused
No.2 (A-2) was charge-sheeted for the offences of murder of his  wife  under
Sections 302, 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.   A-1  and
A-2 were found guilty and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life, with  a
default sentence.  Aggrieved by the order of conviction and  sentence,  they
filed Criminal Appeal No.11 of 2000 before the High Court of Bombay and  the
same was dismissed vide judgment dated 09.02.2004.  A-2 later died and  A-1,
aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court has filed this appeal. =
Apex court also confirmed the Lower court conviction..................

“14 Year Rule” =  The  Government  Resolution  No.RLP1006/CR621/PRS-3  dated
11.04.2008 issued by the Government of Maharashtra has made  applicable  the
guidelines to convicts undergoing life imprisonment and  those  having  good
behavior while undergoing the sentence.

14.   Annexure 1  to  the  said  Government  Resolution  refers  to  various
categories of offences and  the  period  of  imprisonment  to  be  undergone
including set-off.  In the instant case, relevant category No.2 which  deals
with “the offences regarding the crimes against women and minors”  reads  as
under:
                                 Annexure I
|Categ|   |Categorization of crime           |Period of          |
|ory  |   |                                  |imprisonment to be |
|No.  |   |                                  |undergone including|
|     |   |                                  |remission subject  |
|     |   |                                  |to a minimum of 14 |
|     |   |                                  |years of actual    |
|     |   |                                  |imprisonment       |
|     |   |                                  |including set off  |
|     |   |                                  |period             |
|2    |   |Offences relating to crimes       |                   |
|     |   |against women and minors          |                   |
|     |a  |Where the convict has no previous |20                 |
|     |   |criminal history and committed the|                   |
|     |   |murder in an individual capacity  |                   |
|     |   |in a moment of anger and without  |                   |
|     |   |premeditation.                    |                   |
|     |b  |Where the crime as above committed|22                 |
|     |   |with premeditation                |                   |

15.   Resolution, referred to above read with  Annexure  I,  would  indicate
that the  appellant  has  to  serve  a  period  of  minimum  20  years  with
remission.  Since the appellant has already suffered 16  years  of  sentence
without remission, the State  Government  is  directed  to  consider  as  to
whether he has satisfied the  requirement  of  Resolution  dated  11.04.2008
read with Annexure I and, if that be so, he may be set free  if  the  period
undergone  by  him  without  remission  would  satisfy  the  above-mentioned
requirement.

16.   The appeal is disposed of with the above direction.

2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41317
K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, VIKRAMAJIT SEN
                                                                REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1823 OF 2008

Bhagwan Tukaram Dange                   …. Appellant


                             Versus


State of Maharashtra                    …. Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T


K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.


1.    Appellant herein, accused No.1 (A-1) along with  his  father,  accused
No.2 (A-2) was charge-sheeted for the offences of murder of his  wife  under
Sections 302, 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.   A-1  and
A-2 were found guilty and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life, with  a
default sentence.  Aggrieved by the order of conviction and  sentence,  they
filed Criminal Appeal No.11 of 2000 before the High Court of Bombay and  the
same was dismissed vide judgment dated 09.02.2004.  A-2 later died and  A-1,
aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court has filed this appeal.

2.    The prosecution story is as under:
      A-1 son and A-2 father returned to their house on 18.10.1998 at  about
7.00 PM, fully drunk.  On reaching home, they demanded Rs.200/- to  Rs.300/-
from the wife of A-1.  On refusal, she was severely beaten up and  asked  to
bring it from her parental  house.   A-2  then  sprinkled  kerosene  from  a
plastic can over the body of the deceased and A-1  then  lit  a  match-stick
and set fire on the saree of the deceased.  Deceased shouted  for  help  and
rolled down on the ground and  ultimately  succeeded  in  extinguishing  the
fire, but by the time she had suffered more than 80 per cent burns over  the
body.  On getting information, parents of the deceased came to the spot  and
took her to the nearby Public Health Centre, Mayani.  After first  aid,  the
deceased was referred to the Civil Hospital, Satara and  on  19.10.1998,  at
about 3.10 AM she was admitted  there.   Dr.  Barge,  PW1  treated  her  and
informed  Head  Constable  Shelar  (PW5)  regarding  the  admission  of  the
deceased, in an injured condition.  PW1 found that she was  fully  conscious
and was in a condition to give statement.  PW5,  in  the  presence  of  PW1,
recorded  the  dying  declaration  (Ext.P26).    Later,   Special   Judicial
Magistrate (PW4) reached the  Civil  Hospital,  Satara.   Dr.  Suresh  Pawar
(PW3) informed PW4 that the deceased  was  fully  conscious  and  was  in  a
condition to give statement.  PW4  recorded  the  second  dying  declaration
(Ext.P23) of the deceased, which was sealed in  an  envelope  (Ext.P24)  and
was deposited in the Court of the CJM,  Satara.   Father  of  the  deceased,
Rajaram Mahadu Tupe (PW6), also met the deceased, who had also narrated  the
same incident to him, which was considered as the third dying declaration.

3.    PW7, the investigating officer, came to the spot of the  incident  and
prepared the spot panchnama.  PW7 seized the plastic can,  match  stick  and
partly burnt cloths from the spot where the deceased extinguished  the  fire
by rolling on the ground.  The deceased succumbed to the  burn  injuries  on
21.10.1998 and accused were charge-sheeted.

4.    Mr. Ranjan  Mukherjee,  learned  amicus  curiae,  submitted  that  the
evidence recorded is insufficient to warrant a conviction in the absence  of
any direct evidence.  Learned counsel also pointed out that there are a  lot
of inconsistencies in the  dying  declarations  recorded  and  a  conviction
solely on those inconsistent versions cannot be sustained.  Learned  counsel
also submitted that unless there  is  corroborative  evidence,  no  reliance
could be placed on the inconsistent versions given by the  deceased  in  the
dying declarations.  Learned counsel also submitted that, in any  view,  the
present case would not fall under Section 302, and, at  best,  it  may  fall
either under Section 304 Part I or Section 304 Part II.  Reference was  made
to exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and stated  that  since  the  accused  was
under the influence of liquor, it has to be  perceived  that  there  was  no
intention to kill the deceased.  Reference was  made  to  the  Judgments  of
this Court in Sukhbir Singh v.  State  of  Haryana  (2002)  3  SCC  327  and
Sandesh alias Sainath Kailash Abhang v. State of Maharashtra  (2013)  2  SCC
479.

5.    Mr. Shankar Chillarge, learned counsel appearing for  the  respondent-
State, submitted that the  trial  court  as  well  as  the  High  Court  has
correctly appreciated the oral and  documentary  evidence  adduced  in  this
case, especially, the dying declarations.  Learned counsel pointed out  that
both the dying declarations have been properly recorded and the  doctor  had
certified that the deceased was in  a  sound  state  of  mind  to  give  her
version and the statements of the deceased were correctly  recorded  in  the
dying declarations. Learned counsel submitted  that  the  dying  declaration
made  before  the  Executive  Magistrate  is  consistent  with  the  earlier
statement made before the police in the presence  of  the  doctor,  who  had
deposed that the deceased was in a condition to  give  her  version  of  the
incident.


6.    We may indicate that in this case the conviction was recorded  on  the
basis of  the  dying  declarations,  Ext.P26  and  Ext.P23  corroborated  by
circumstantial evidence.  The first dying declaration was recorded  by  PW5,
the Head Constable on 19.10.1998 when  the  deceased  was  admitted  to  the
Civil Hospital, Satara.  PW1, who treated the deceased,  informed  PW5  that
the deceased was fully  conscious  and  was  in  a  condition  to  give  her
statement.  Ext.P26 was recorded by PW5, in the  presence  of  PW1.   Later,
the Special Magistrate (PW4) also reached  the  Civil  Hospital.   PW3,  who
examined the deceased,  also  informed  PW4  that  the  deceased  was  fully
conscious, well oriented and in a  fit  condition  to  give  the  statement.
PW4, therefore, recorded the second dying declaration  in  the  presence  of
PW3.  We have gone through Ext.P26 and Ext.P23 and noticed no  inconsistency
in the  statements  made  by  the  deceased  to  PW5  as  well  as  to  PW4.
Statements therein were further corroborated by the evidence of PW6,  father
of the deceased.  PW4, who conducted  the  post-mortem  examination,  stated
that burn injuries found on  the  body  of  the  deceased  were  ante-mortem
injuries, which were sufficient to cause death.

7.    Dying declaration is undoubtedly admissible under Section  32  of  the
Indian Evidence Act, but due care has to be given by the persons who  record
the statement.  Dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay  rule  when
it is made by the declarant at  the  time  when  it  is  believed  that  the
declarant’s death was near or certain.  Dying declaration is  based  on  the
maxim, “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” i.e. a man  will  not  meet  his
maker with a lie in his mouth.  Dying declaration is a statement made  by  a
dying  person  as  to  the  injuries  culminated  in  his   death   or   the
circumstances under which the injuries were  inflicted.    Hearsay  evidence
is not accepted by the  law  of  evidence  because  the  person  giving  the
evidence is not narrating his own experience or  story,  but  rather  he  is
presenting whatever he could gather from the statement  of  another  person.
That  other  person  may  not  be  available  for   cross-examination   and,
therefore, hearsay evidence  is  not  accepted.   Dying  declaration  is  an
exception to hearsay because, in many cases, it may  be  sole  evidence  and
hence it becomes necessary to accept the same to meet the ends of justice.

8.    The Court has to carefully scrutinize the evidence while evaluating  a
dying declaration since it is not a  statement  made  on  oath  and  is  not
tested on the touchstone of cross-examination. In   Harbans Singh &  another
v. State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 439 this Court held  that  it  is  neither  a
rule  of  law  nor  of  prudence  that  dying  declaration  requires  to  be
corroborated by other evidence before a conviction  can  be  based  thereon.
Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in State  of  Uttar
Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and others (1985) 1  SCC  552.    This  Court  in
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Suresh alias Chhavan and others (1981) 3  SCC  635
held that minor incoherence in the statement with regard to  the  facts  and
circumstances  would  not  be  sufficient  ground  for  not   relying   upon
statement, which was otherwise found to be genuine.  Hence,  as  a  rule  of
prudence, there is no requirement as to corroboration of  dying  declaration
before it is acted upon.

9.    Ext.P23, the first dying declaration in this case, as already  stated,
was recorded by PW5, the Head Constable, in the presence of PW1, the  doctor
who treated the deceased at the  hospital.   PW1  doctor  had  categorically
deposed that the deceased was fully conscious and  was  in  a  condition  to
give the statement.  Ext.P26, the second dying declaration was  recorded  by
the Special Judicial  Magistrate,  PW4.   The  deceased  at  that  time  was
examined  by  PW3,  who  had  also  deposed  that  the  deceased  was  fully
conscious, well oriented and was in a condition to give the  statement.   We
have gone through Ext.P26 and Ext.P23 and find  no  reason  to  discard  the
statements recorded in both the dying declarations, which, in our view,  are
consistent and minor variations here and there would not  be  sufficient  to
discard the entire statement  considering  the  fact  that  the  victim  was
suffering from more than 80% burn injuries.


10.   Learned counsel appearing for  the  accused-appellant  submitted  that
since the accused was under the influence of liquor, he had no intention  to
kill the deceased wife and, therefore,  at  best,  the  offence  would  fall
either under Section 304 Part I or Section 304 Part II of the  Indian  Penal
Code.  We find it difficult to accept this contention.   Assuming  that  the
accused was fully drunk,  he  was  fully  conscious  of  the  fact  that  if
kerosene is poured and a match-stick lit and  put  on  the  body,  a  person
might die due to burns.   A fully drunk person is also  sometimes  aware  of
the consequences of his action.  It cannot, therefore, be  said  that  since
the accused was fully drunk and under the influence of  liquor,  he  had  no
intention to cause death of the  deceased-wife.   Learned  counsel  for  the
Appellant made reference to Sandesh alias Sainath  Kailash  Abhang  (supra),
wherein even though it was stated that  committing  the  offence  under  the
influence of liquor is a mitigating circumstance, but  was  later  clarified
in an order passed in Review Petition (Crl.)  No.D8875  of  2013,  filed  in
that case, stating as follows :
      “… However our observations may not be  construed  to  generally  mean
      that drunkenness of an accused is a mitigating factor in the award  of
      punishment.”


11.   Intoxication, as such, is not a defence  to  a  criminal  charge.   At
times, it can be considered to be a mitigating circumstance if  the  accused
is not a habitual  drinker,  otherwise,  it  has  to  be  considered  as  an
aggravating circumstance.  The question, as to whether the drunkenness is  a
defence while determining sentence, came up for  consideration  before  this
Court in Bablu alias Mubarik Hussain v. State of  Rajasthan  (2006)  13  SCC
116, wherein this Court held that the defence of drunkenness can be  availed
of only when intoxication produces such a condition  as  the  accused  loses
the requisite intention for the offence and onus of proof  about  reason  of
intoxication, due to which  the  accused  had  become  incapable  of  having
particular  knowledge  in  forming  the  particular  intention,  is  on  the
accused.   Examining Section 85 IPC, this Court held that  the  evidence  of
drunkenness which renders the accused  incapable  of  forming  the  specific
intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into  account  with
the other facts proved in order to determine  whether  or  not  he  had  the
intention.  Court held that merely establishing that his mind  was  affected
by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion, does  not
rebut the presumption that a man intends the  natural  consequences  of  his
acts.  This Court, in that case, rejected  the  plea  of  drunkenness  after
noticing that the crime committed was a brutal and diabolic act.

12.   We find it difficult to accept the  contention  of  the  counsel  that
since the accused-Appellant was under the influence of liquor,  the  offence
will fall under Section 304  Part  I  or  Section  304  Part  II.   A-1  was
presumed to know the consequences of his action, of  having  lit  the  match
stick and set fire on the saree of deceased, after  A-2  sprinkled  kerosene
on her body.  In our view, the accused was  correctly  charge-sheeted  under
Section 302 IPC and we find no reason to interfere with the  conviction  and
sentence awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court.

13.   Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused further  submitted
that the appellant has already served the sentence for more  than  16  years
without remission, he should be set free.   Learned  counsel  appearing  for
the State brought to our knowledge the  guidelines  for  pre-mature  release
under the “14 Year Rule” of  Prisoners  serving  life  sentence  after  18th
December, 1978.   The  Government  Resolution  No.RLP1006/CR621/PRS-3  dated
11.04.2008 issued by the Government of Maharashtra has made  applicable  the
guidelines to convicts undergoing life imprisonment and  those  having  good
behavior while undergoing the sentence.

14.   Annexure 1  to  the  said  Government  Resolution  refers  to  various
categories of offences and  the  period  of  imprisonment  to  be  undergone
including set-off.  In the instant case, relevant category No.2 which  deals
with “the offences regarding the crimes against women and minors”  reads  as
under:
                                 Annexure I
|Categ|   |Categorization of crime           |Period of          |
|ory  |   |                                  |imprisonment to be |
|No.  |   |                                  |undergone including|
|     |   |                                  |remission subject  |
|     |   |                                  |to a minimum of 14 |
|     |   |                                  |years of actual    |
|     |   |                                  |imprisonment       |
|     |   |                                  |including set off  |
|     |   |                                  |period             |
|2    |   |Offences relating to crimes       |                   |
|     |   |against women and minors          |                   |
|     |a  |Where the convict has no previous |20                 |
|     |   |criminal history and committed the|                   |
|     |   |murder in an individual capacity  |                   |
|     |   |in a moment of anger and without  |                   |
|     |   |premeditation.                    |                   |
|     |b  |Where the crime as above committed|22                 |
|     |   |with premeditation                |                   |

15.   Resolution, referred to above read with  Annexure  I,  would  indicate
that the  appellant  has  to  serve  a  period  of  minimum  20  years  with
remission.  Since the appellant has already suffered 16  years  of  sentence
without remission, the State  Government  is  directed  to  consider  as  to
whether he has satisfied the  requirement  of  Resolution  dated  11.04.2008
read with Annexure I and, if that be so, he may be set free  if  the  period
undergone  by  him  without  remission  would  satisfy  the  above-mentioned
requirement.

16.   The appeal is disposed of with the above direction.




                                                               ………………………….J.
                            (K.S. Radhakrishnan)






                                                               ………………………….J.
                              (Vikramajit Sen)


New Delhi,
March 13, 2014