LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Wednesday, March 5, 2014

Section 37(1) of Arbitration and & Conciliation Act - Award of interest - “unless otherwise agreed by the parties” categorically clarifies that the arbitrator is bound by the terms of the contract insofar as the award of interest from the date of cause of action to the date of award. Award of interest beyond the agreement clauses by arbitrator is not valid in law- Apex court held that In view of the aforesaid, the appeals are allowed and it is directed that the respondents shall not be entitled to any interest on the amount which was recovered by the appellant, till the date of award and thereafter till the date when the amount awarded was deposited in the High Court, i.e. from 12th July, 1997.= Union of India …Appellant VERSUS M/s. Concrete Products & Const. Co. Etc. ...Respondents = 2014 (March . Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41289

 Section 37(1) of Arbitration and & Conciliation Act - Award of interest - “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”  categorically  clarifies  that the arbitrator is bound by the terms of the contract insofar  as the award of interest from the date of cause of  action  to  the date of award. Award of interest beyond the agreement clauses by arbitrator is not valid in law- Apex court held that In view of the aforesaid, the appeals are allowed and  it  is directed that the respondents shall not be  entitled  to  any interest on the amount which was recovered by the  appellant, till the date of award and thereafter till the date when  the amount awarded was deposited in the  High  Court,  i.e.  from 12th July, 1997.=


By  letter
        dated 12th July, 1997, the railways  administration  informed
        the respondents that the Railway Board had found that  excess
        payments had been made between 1989 and November, 1994  under
        escalation clause for HTS wires.   It  was  stated  that  the
        amounts paid to the contractors were more than the  prevalent
        market price.  Therefore, a  sum  of  Rs.  1,80,92,462/-  was
        recoverable  from  M/s  Concrete  Products  and  Construction
        Company, respondent in C.A. No. ____________ (arising out  of
        SLP(C) No. 5384 of 2013) and a sum  of  Rs.1,78,09,789/-  was
        recoverable from M/s. Kottukulam Engineers  Private  Limited,
        respondent in C.A. No. ______ (arising out of SLP(C) No. 5385
        of 2013). It was also pointed out  that  the  aforesaid  sums
        would be recoverable from the sums due and payable to them in
        the current/running contracts.=
The sole arbitrator directed the appellants  to  refund  the
        amount awarded as follows:-

           “In the result I direct the  Respondents  to  refund  a  sum  of
           Rs.1,78,09,789/- recovered from the Claimants and   interest  of
           Rs.2,38,28,960/-  and  subsequent  interest  at  18%  P.A   from
           1.9.2005 on Rs. 1,78,09,789/- till date of payment in Kottukulam
           Engineers Pvt. Ltd. matter.  Ana a sum of  Rs.1,69,78,883/-  and
           interest of Rs.2,25,25,513/- and subsequent interest at 18%  P.A
           from 1.09.2005 till date of payment in m/s  Concrete  Product  &
           Construction Company Trivalam.” =

Award of interest is challenged later  =

whether  the  contractors  are
        entitled to interest for the amount withheld  and  if  so  at
        what rate. =

Clause 2401 provides that the railways shall be  entitled  to
        withhold and also have a lien to retain any amount  deposited
        as security by the contractor to satisfy any  claims  arising
        out of or  in  the  contract.   In  such  circumstances,  the
        railways can withhold the amount deposited by the contractors
        as  security  and  also  have  lien  over  the  same  pending
        finalization or adjudication of  the  claim.   In  case,  the
        security deposit is insufficient to cover the  claim  of  the
        railways, it is entitled to withhold and  have  lien  to  the
        extent of the amount claimed from any  sum  payable  for  any
        works done  by  the  contractor  thereafter  under  the  same
        contract or any other  contract.   This  withholding  of  the
        money and the exercise of the lien is pending finalization or
        adjudication of any claim.  This clause further provided that
        the  amount  withheld  by  the  railways  over  which  it  is
        exercising lien will not entitle the contractor to claim  any
        interest or damages for such withholding or  retention  under
        lien by the railways.




    16. Clause 2403 again provides that any  sum  of  money  due  and
        payable to the contractor under the contract may be  withheld
        or retained by way of lien by the railway authorities or  the
        Government in respect of payment of a sum  of  money  arising
        out of or under any other contract  made  by  the  contractor
        with the railway authority or the Government.





    17. Clause 2403(b) further provides that it is an agreed term  of
        the contract that  against  the  sum  of  money  withheld  or
        retained under lien, the contractor shall have no  claim  for
        interest or damages whatsoever provided the  claim  has  been
        duly notified to the contractor.=

We are of the opinion that the sole  arbitrator  in  awarding
        interest to the contractors has failed to take  into  account
        the provisions contained in the aforesaid  two  clauses.   We
        find merit in  the  submission  made  by  learned  Additional
        Solicitor General that award of interest  at-least  from  the
        date when the  amount  was  deposited  in  Court  was  wholly
        unwarranted.  Therefore,  the  High  Court  as  well  as  the
        arbitrator, in  our  opinion,  have  committed  an  error  of
        jurisdiction in this respect.  This view of  ours  will  find
        support from the judgment of this Court in the case of Sayeed
        Ahmed & Company (supra), wherein it has been held as follows:-



           “16. In view of clause (a) of sub-section (7) of Section  31  of
           the Act, it is clear that the arbitrator could not have  awarded
           interest up to the date of the award, as the  agreement  between
           the parties barred payment of interest. The bar against award of
           interest would operate not only during the pre-reference period,
           that is, up to 13-3-1997  but  also  during  the  pendente  lite
           period, that is, from 14-3-1997 to 31-7-2001.”


    19. This view has been reiterated by this Court in Sree  Kamatchi
        Amman Construction (supra),  wherein  it  has  been  held  as
        follows:-

           “19. Section 37(1) of the new Act by  using  the  words  “unless
           otherwise agreed by the parties”  categorically  clarifies  that
           the arbitrator is bound by the terms of the contract insofar  as
           the award of interest from the date of cause of  action  to  the
           date of award. Therefore, where the parties had agreed  that  no
           interest shall be payable, the Arbitral  Tribunal  cannot  award
           interest between the date when the cause of action arose to  the
           date of award.”



    20. From the aforesaid it becomes apparent  that  the  arbitrator
        could not have awarded any interest from the  date  when  the
        recovery was made till the award was made. However,  interest
        would have been payable from the date when the award was made
        till the money was deposited in the High Court and thereafter
        converted to fixed deposit receipts.  Upon the  amount  being
        deposited in the High Court, no  further  interest  could  be
        paid to the respondents.




    21. In view of the aforesaid, the appeals are allowed and  it  is
        directed that the respondents shall not be  entitled  to  any
        interest on the amount which was recovered by the  appellant,
        till the date of award and thereafter till the date when  the
        amount awarded was deposited in the  High  Court,  i.e.  from
        12th July, 1997.


2014 (March . Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41289
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA

                             REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CIVIL APPEAL NO2950-2951 OF 2014
               (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 5384-5385 of 2013)


      Union                           of                            India
      …Appellant
      VERSUS
      M/s. Concrete Products & Const. Co. Etc.    ...Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T
      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
     1. Leave granted.

     2. These appeals impugn the final judgment and decree dated 21st
        March, 2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature at  Madras
        in OSA No. 44 & 45 of 2012 and M.P. No. 1  of  2012,  whereby
        the letters  patent  appeals  of  the  Union  of  India  were
        dismissed. The appellant had entered into agreements with the
        respondents on 30th January, 1983 and 30th  March,  1984  for
        supply of mono block concrete sleepers (in short “Sleepers”).
         The agreements were renewed from time to  time  under  which
        the Union of India agreed to pay specified rates  for  supply
        of each sleeper.  The agreements/contracts also provided that
        the rates payable shall be based on certain standard rates of
        principal raw materials, such as cement, High  Tensile  Steel
        (HTS)  wires,  molded  steel,  etc.  The  contracts   further
        provided  that  whenever  the  cost  of  the  principal   raw
        materials increased or  decreased,  the  contract  price  for
        sleepers shall also correspondingly be increased or decreased
        with effect from the date of such increase or decrease.   The
        agreements/contracts also provided for escalation, subject to
        certain  conditions  prescribed  under  Clause  11   of   the
        Contract.  The contracts/agreements further provided that the
        respondents must exercise utmost economy in the  purchase  of
        raw materials and that the escalation will be admitted on the
        basis of actual price paid for the respective  raw  material.
        This was subject to the ceiling on the price. As  per  Clause
        12.2(c), ceiling was fixed “in the case of raw materials  not
        covered by  either  of  the  above,  the  lowest  price  (for
        destination) arrived at  on  the  basis  of  at  least  three
        quotations obtained by the Contractor for  each  supply  from
        various established sources of supply of the  respective  raw
        materials”.




     3.  The  respondents/contractors  purchased   HTS   wires   from
        established sources in terms of the various  clauses  of  the
        contract.  The  material  was  used  in  the  manufacture  of
        sleepers.   Payment  for  the  sleepers  was  made   by   the
        contractors at the lowest price quoted by the suppliers.  The
        quotation  was  also  scrutinized  alongwith  the  supporting
        documents.  The Railway authorities release  the  payment  to
        the respondent contractors only upon their satisfaction, upon
        scrutiny of all the relevant documents.



     4. A new contract was entered into between the parties  in  May,
        1997. The  railway  administration  changed  the  policy  and
        allowed  the  respondents/contractors  to  purchase  the  HTS
        wires, subject to escalation as  noticed  above.   By  letter
        dated 12th July, 1997, the railways  administration  informed
        the respondents that the Railway Board had found that  excess
        payments had been made between 1989 and November, 1994  under
        escalation clause for HTS wires.   It  was  stated  that  the
        amounts paid to the contractors were more than the  prevalent
        market price.  Therefore, a  sum  of  Rs.  1,80,92,462/-  was
        recoverable  from  M/s  Concrete  Products  and  Construction
        Company, respondent in C.A. No. ____________ (arising out  of
        SLP(C) No. 5384 of 2013) and a sum  of  Rs.1,78,09,789/-  was
        recoverable from M/s. Kottukulam Engineers  Private  Limited,
        respondent in C.A. No. ______ (arising out of SLP(C) No. 5385
        of 2013). It was also pointed out  that  the  aforesaid  sums
        would be recoverable from the sums due and payable to them in
        the current/running contracts.



     5. The contractors (respondents herein) challenged the aforesaid
        recovery by filing Writ Petition No. 11805 and 10814 of 1999,
        before the High Court of Madras. The  railway  administration
        took up the preliminary objection,  pleading  that  the  writ
        petition is  not  maintainable  as  the  dispute  has  to  be
        referred to arbitration.  The objection of the appellant  was
        accepted.  The High Court appointed a  Former  Judge  of  the
        Madras  High  Court  as  the  arbitrator  to  adjudicate  the
        dispute.  The contractors/respondents herein  challenged  the
        aforesaid  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  by  filing
                              Writ Appeal Nos. 251 and 252  of  2000,
        on the plea that the arbitrator had to be appointed in  terms
        of the agreement.  By order dated 22nd March, 2000, the  writ
        appeals were allowed, and the order  of  the  learned  Single
        Judge was set aside.  The matter was  remanded  back  to  the
        Single Judge for disposal in terms of the agreement.

           On remand, the learned Single Judge, instead  of  referring
      matter to arbitration in  terms  of  the  contract  between  the
      parties allowed the writ  petitions  filed  by  the  respondents
      herein and directed the railway authorities to refund the sum of
      Rs.1,69,78,883/- and Rs.1,78,09,789/- to the  respondent  firms,
      respectively with interest thereon from the date of  withholding
      till the date the same is refunded. The order was directed to be
      complied within a period of 4 week from the date of the  receipt
      of the order.  This order was again challenged  by  the  railway
      administration by filing, first of all, Writ  Appeal  Nos.  2822
      and  2823  of  2001.  Subsequently,  writ  appeal  miscellaneous
      petition No. 21103 and 21104 of 2001  were  also  filed  in  the
      aforesaid two writ appeals, seeking stay of the judgments  under
      appeal. On 30th April, 2004, the Division  Bench  dismissed  the
      writ appeals as well as the miscellaneous petitions.







     6. The railway administration challenged the aforesaid order  of
        the Division Bench, before this Court by filing SLP No. 18244
        and 18245 of 2004.  Special leave was  granted  in  both  the
        special leave petitions and the same were converted to  Civil
        Appeal Nos. 2999 and 3000 of 2005.  By a short  order  passed
        on 2nd May, 2005,  the  disputes  between  the  parties  were
        referred by this court for  adjudication  by  an  Arbitration
        Tribunal consisting solely of Mr. Justice K. Venkataswami,  a
        former Judge of this Court.  This order  was  passed  without
        going into the merits of the  disputes  and  the  submissions
        made by the  learned  Solicitor  General  on  behalf  of  the
        railways, that in view of the specific condition contained in
        the contract, the dispute cannot be referred to an arbitrator
        other than the authority referred to in the  contract.   This
        Court directed that the  matter  shall  be  referred  to  Mr.
        Justice Venkataswami.  It was, however, made clear  that  the
        order shall not be treated as a precedent.  Pursuant  to  the
        aforesaid order of this Court, the matter ultimately  reached
        the  arbitrator.   At  the   conclusion   of   the   arbitral
        proceedings, the final award was rendered on 24th June, 2006.
         The sole arbitrator directed the appellants  to  refund  the
        amount awarded as follows:-

           “In the result I direct the  Respondents  to  refund  a  sum  of
           Rs.1,78,09,789/- recovered from the Claimants and   interest  of
           Rs.2,38,28,960/-  and  subsequent  interest  at  18%  P.A   from
           1.9.2005 on Rs. 1,78,09,789/- till date of payment in Kottukulam
           Engineers Pvt. Ltd. matter.  Ana a sum of  Rs.1,69,78,883/-  and
           interest of Rs.2,25,25,513/- and subsequent interest at 18%  P.A
           from 1.09.2005 till date of payment in m/s  Concrete  Product  &
           Construction Company Trivalam.”




           The counter claims made by the appellants  were  dismissed.
      The railway administration  challenged  the  common  arbitration
      award in O.P. No. 142 & 143 of 2007  under  Section  33  of  the
      Arbitration and Conciliation Act,  1996  before  High  Court  of
      Madras.  The learned  Single  Judge  dismissed  the  arbitration
      petitions filed by the railway administration by its order dated
      30th  November,  2010.    Thereafter   the   contractors   filed
      applications before the High Court for direction to the railways
      to make payments of the amount.   Thereafter  Application   Nos.
      780 & 781 of 2011 were filed in the O.P. Nos. 142 & 143 of  2007
      by the contractors seeking a direction from the Court  directing
      that the amounts awarded by the learned Sole Arbitrator be  paid
      from the amount deposited by the railway administration with the
      High Court along with the accrued interest as  on  date  on  the
      aforesaid amount.  These  applications  were  allowed  by  order
      dated 24th February, 2011.  The High  Court  directed  that  the
      awarded amount deposited  by  the  railways  in  the  Court  for
      satisfying the outcome  of  the  original  petitions  which  was
      subsequently converted into fixed deposit receipts, be dispersed
      to the respondent contractors.




     7. Again the railway administration filed  intra  court  appeals
        challenging the order of the learned Single Judge principally
        on the ground that the railway administration was not  liable
        to pay any interest for the period subsequent to the  deposit
        of the principal amount into Court.  The appeals filed by the
        railway administration were dismissed by the  High  Court  by
        the impugned order dated 21st March, 2012.   The  High  Court
        held that railway administration had not questioned the power
        of the sole arbitrator to award  interest.   The  issue  with
        regard to the award of interest was also  not  raised  before
        the learned Single Judge.  For  the  first  time  before  the
        Division Bench, a plea was raised that the award of  interest
        was contrary to  Clause  No.  2401  of  the  Indian  Railways
        Standard Conditions of Contract.  The Division Bench  of  the
        High Court came to the conclusion that the  aforesaid  clause
        has no application at all as  it  applies  only  to  amounts,
        which have been withheld or retained under lien.  The amounts
        having  already  been  paid  were  sought  to  be   illegally
        recovered from the contractors.  The  sole  arbitrator  found
        that such order of recovery can not be sustained in  law  and
        the  recoveries  affected  were  illegal.  The  High   Court,
        however,  concluded  that  Clause   No.   2401   would   have
        application only in respect of amounts  which  had  not  been
        paid to the contractors.  The railway administration can  not
        exercise  lien  over  the  amounts  already   paid   to   the
        contractors.  Therefore, award  of  the  arbitrator  did  not
        suffer from any error apparent.  It was further held that the
        learned Single Judge having upheld  the  award,  the  appeals
        deserve to be dismissed.




     8. The appeals having been dismissed, the  Union  of  India  has
        approached this Court in these Civil Appeals.





     9. We have heard Mr. Mohan Jain,  learned  Additional  Solicitor
        General, appearing for the appellants.



    10. It is submitted that  the  only  question  which  arises  for
        consideration of this Court is whether  the  contractors  are
        entitled to interest for the amount withheld  and  if  so  at
        what rate.  The contractors had claimed interest @18 per cent
        from the date of recovery till payment.   Mr. Jain  submitted
        that the High Court has wrongly held that the  appellant  had
        no authority to exercise lien  on  the  current  payments  in
        relation to the amount already released to  the  contractors.
        It is submitted by  Mr.  Jain  that  the  arbitrator  had  no
        authority to  award  interest  in  view  of  the  prohibition
        contained under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration  Act,  1996.
        Learned Additional Solicitor General  pointed  out  that  the
        contract entered into between the parties did not provide for
        any payment of interest.  Mr.  Jain  also  pointed  out  that
        under Clause 2403, the railway administration has a  lien  on
        all the amounts of money that may be due to the  contractors,
        in  praesenti  or  in  the  futuro.   Therefore,   when   the
        contractors were paid in excess of the amounts actually  due,
        the appellants were fully justified in recovering the  amount
        from the respondents by exercising the lien over  the  future
        bills in terms of               Clause No. 2403.  He  submits
        that the sole arbitrator was wholly unjustified  in  awarding
        interest, as under Clause No.  2403(b),  it  is  specifically
        provided  that  the  contractors  shall  have  no  claim  for
        interest or damages whatsoever, for the  amount  so  retained
        even in  case  the  arbitration  award  or  any  other  legal
        proceeding subsequently holds that the  amount  was  withheld
        illegally.  Mr. Jain submits that the  learned  Single  Judge
        erred in holding that the award did not suffer from an  error
        apparent on this short ground.  In support of the submission,
        he relies on judgment of this Court in the case  of  Himachal
        Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority  &  Anr.  Vs.
        Ranjit Singh Rana.[1]




    11. Mr. Jain further submitted that the principal amount  awarded
        was deposited in Court in 2007.  This amount was released  to
        the contractors on 24th April, 2011 alongwith  the  interest,
        but 30 per cent of the amount was duly withheld.  This was in
        agreement with the respondents.  He also pointed out that  in
        fact  the  recovery  of  the  amount   was   deferred   after
        discussions with the respondents.  In view of the agreements,
        the  respondents  had  no  justification  for  claiming   any
        interest and the award granting such relief  suffer  from  an
        error apparent as it was contrary to the contract. In support
        of this submission, he relies on judgment of  this  Court  in
        Sree  Kamatchi  Amman  Construction  Vs.  Divisional  Railway
        Manager (Works), Palghat & Ors.[2]  He also relied on  Sayeed
        Ahmed & Company Vs. State of Uttar  Pradesh  &  Ors.[3]   and
        Union of India Vs. Krafters Engineering and  Leasign  Private
        Limited[4].




    12. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel  appearing  for
        the respondents,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  the
        payments have been made to the  contractors  from  1989  till
        November,  1994.   The  High  Court  judgment  in  the   writ
        petitions challenging the recovery notice were set  aside  by
        the High Court.  The respondents had agreed to the  deduction
        of 30 per cent only  because  the  contractors  required  the
        money for execution of further works.  He submitted that  the
        appellants can not possibly be permitted to  claim  that  the
        respondents had agreed to the deduction of 30 per cent of the
        amount due.  He  pointed  out  that  the  recovery  was  made
        against   the   supplies   made    under    the    agreements
                of 9th December, 1991 in relation  to  the  contracts
        which were  being  performed  in  the  year  1996.   In  such
        circumstances, the appellants had no  authority  to  exercise
        lien on the amounts that accrued due to the  works  performed
        subsequent  to                  9th  December,   1991   under
        Clause(s) 2401 or 2403 of  the  Contract.   Mr.  Vaidyanathan
        emphasized that such recovery of the time  barred  claims  is
        clearly without any  justification.   The  appellants  having
        failed to notify that 30 per cent of the amount due had  been
        withheld, the invocation of  Clause       No.  2401  or  2403
        would be wholly  illegal.   Learned  senior  counsel  further
        submitted that the appellant can not justify the recovery  on
        the basis of the letter dated 22nd October, 1997  as  it  was
        written without prejudice to the rights of  the  contractors.
        The counter claims made by the appellant  were  clearly  time
        barred and hence, disallowed by  the  sole  arbitrator.   Mr.
        Vaidyanathan relied on a Constitution Bench decision of  this
        Court  in  Executive  Engineer,  Dhenkanal  Minor  Irrigation
        Division, Orissa & Ors. Vs. N.C. Budharaj (Deceased) by  LRs.
        & Ors.[5] Reliance was also placed upon Secretary, Irrigation
        Department, Government of Orissa & Ors. Vs.  G.C.  Roy[6]  in
        support of the submission that a person deprived of his money
        is entitled to be compensated by way of interest,  therefore,
        any provision in the contract which seeks to take away such a
        right has  to  be  strictly  construed.   The  ratio  in  the
        aforesaid  judgment   has   been   subsequently   reiterated,
        according to Mr. Vaidyanathan, in the case of  Sree  Kamatchi
        Amman Construction (supra).  Mr. Vaidyanathan submitted  that
        the railway administration  had  no  authority  either  under
        Clause 2401 or 2403 of the contract to  recover  the  amounts
        allegedly overpaid for the work done prior to 1991  from  the
        amounts  due  to  the  contractors   for   the   works   done
        subsequently.




    13. We have  considered  the  submissions  made  by  the  learned
        counsel for the parties.



    14. Clause Nos. 2401 and 2403 are as under:-

           “2401.     Whenever any claim or claims for payment of a sum  of
           money  arises  out  of  or  under  the  contract   against   the
           Contractor, the Purchaser shall be entitled to withhold and also
           have a lien to retain such sum or sums in whole or in part  from
           the security, if any, deposited by the Contractor  and  for  the
           purpose aforesaid, the Purchaser shall be entitled  to  withhold
           the  said  cash  security  deposit  or  the  security,  if  any,
           furnished as the case may be and also have a lien over the  same
           pending finalization or adjudication of any such  claim. In  the
           event of the security being insufficient to  cover  the  claimed
           amount or amounts or if no security  has  been  taken  from  the
           Contractor, the Purchaser shall be entitled to withhold and have
           lien to retain to the extent  of  the  such  claimed  amount  or
           amounts referred to supra, from any sum or sums found payable or
           which  at  any  time-thereafter  may  become  payable   to   the
           Contractor under the same contract or any  other  contract  with
           the  Purchaser  or  the  Government  pending   finalization   or
           adjudication of any such claim.

           

           It is an agreed term of the contract that the sum  of  money  or
           moneys so withheld or retained under the lien referred to above,
           by the Purchaser will be kept withheld or retained  as  such  by
           the Purchaser till  the  claim  arising  out  of  or  under  the
           contract is determined by the Arbitrator  (if  the  contract  is
           governed by the arbitration clause) or by the competent court as
           prescribed under Clause 2703 hereinafter provided, as  the  case
           may be, and that the Contractor will have no claim for  interest
           or  damages  whatsoever  on  any  account  in  respect  of  such
           withholding or retention under the lien referred  to  supra  and
           duly notified as such to the contractor.”

           




           “2403. Lien in respect of Claims in other Contracts:




                 a) Any sum of money due  and  payable,  to  the  Contractor
                    (including the  security  deposit,  returnable  to  him)
                    under the contract may withhold or retain by way of lien
                    by the Purchaser or Government against any claim of  the
                    Purchaser or Government in respect of payment of  a  sum
                    of money arising out of or under any other contract made
                    by the Contractor with the Purchaser or Government.




                 b) It is an agreed term of the contract  that  the  sum  of
                    money so withheld or retained under this clause  by  the
                    Purchaser  or  Government  will  be  kept  withheld   or
                    retained as such by the Purchaser or Government till his
                    claim arising out of the  same  contract  or  any  other
                    contract is either mutually settled or determined by the
                    arbitrator,  if  the  contract  is   governed   by   the
                    arbitration clause  or  by  the  competent  court  under
                    Clause 2703 hereinafter provided, as the  case  may  be,
                    and that the Contractor shall have no claim for interest
                    or damages whatsoever on this account or  on  any  other
                    ground in respect  of  any  sum  of  money  withheld  or
                    retained under this clause and duly notified as such  to
                    the Contractor.”



    15. Clause 2401 provides that the railways shall be  entitled  to
        withhold and also have a lien to retain any amount  deposited
        as security by the contractor to satisfy any  claims  arising
        out of or  in  the  contract.   In  such  circumstances,  the
        railways can withhold the amount deposited by the contractors
        as  security  and  also  have  lien  over  the  same  pending
        finalization or adjudication of  the  claim.   In  case,  the
        security deposit is insufficient to cover the  claim  of  the
        railways, it is entitled to withhold and  have  lien  to  the
        extent of the amount claimed from any  sum  payable  for  any
        works done  by  the  contractor  thereafter  under  the  same
        contract or any other  contract.   This  withholding  of  the
        money and the exercise of the lien is pending finalization or
        adjudication of any claim.  This clause further provided that
        the  amount  withheld  by  the  railways  over  which  it  is
        exercising lien will not entitle the contractor to claim  any
        interest or damages for such withholding or  retention  under
        lien by the railways.




    16. Clause 2403 again provides that any  sum  of  money  due  and
        payable to the contractor under the contract may be  withheld
        or retained by way of lien by the railway authorities or  the
        Government in respect of payment of a sum  of  money  arising
        out of or under any other contract  made  by  the  contractor
        with the railway authority or the Government.





    17. Clause 2403(b) further provides that it is an agreed term  of
        the contract that  against  the  sum  of  money  withheld  or
        retained under lien, the contractor shall have no  claim  for
        interest or damages whatsoever provided the  claim  has  been
        duly notified to the contractor.



    18. We are of the opinion that the sole  arbitrator  in  awarding
        interest to the contractors has failed to take  into  account
        the provisions contained in the aforesaid  two  clauses.   We
        find merit in  the  submission  made  by  learned  Additional
        Solicitor General that award of interest  at-least  from  the
        date when the  amount  was  deposited  in  Court  was  wholly
        unwarranted.  Therefore,  the  High  Court  as  well  as  the
        arbitrator, in  our  opinion,  have  committed  an  error  of
        jurisdiction in this respect.  This view of  ours  will  find
        support from the judgment of this Court in the case of Sayeed
        Ahmed & Company (supra), wherein it has been held as follows:-



           “16. In view of clause (a) of sub-section (7) of Section  31  of
           the Act, it is clear that the arbitrator could not have  awarded
           interest up to the date of the award, as the  agreement  between
           the parties barred payment of interest. The bar against award of
           interest would operate not only during the pre-reference period,
           that is, up to 13-3-1997  but  also  during  the  pendente  lite
           period, that is, from 14-3-1997 to 31-7-2001.”


    19. This view has been reiterated by this Court in Sree  Kamatchi
        Amman Construction (supra),  wherein  it  has  been  held  as
        follows:-

           “19. Section 37(1) of the new Act by  using  the  words  “unless
           otherwise agreed by the parties”  categorically  clarifies  that
           the arbitrator is bound by the terms of the contract insofar  as
           the award of interest from the date of cause of  action  to  the
           date of award. Therefore, where the parties had agreed  that  no
           interest shall be payable, the Arbitral  Tribunal  cannot  award
           interest between the date when the cause of action arose to  the
           date of award.”



    20. From the aforesaid it becomes apparent  that  the  arbitrator
        could not have awarded any interest from the  date  when  the
        recovery was made till the award was made. However,  interest
        would have been payable from the date when the award was made
        till the money was deposited in the High Court and thereafter
        converted to fixed deposit receipts.  Upon the  amount  being
        deposited in the High Court, no  further  interest  could  be
        paid to the respondents.




    21. In view of the aforesaid, the appeals are allowed and  it  is
        directed that the respondents shall not be  entitled  to  any
        interest on the amount which was recovered by the  appellant,
        till the date of award and thereafter till the date when  the
        amount awarded was deposited in the  High  Court,  i.e.  from
        12th July, 1997.



    22. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.






                                             ...………………….….….J.
                                                      [Surinder  Singh
                                             Nijjar]








                                                       ………….……….……………………….J.
                                          [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]


      New Delhi;
      March 3, 2014.




-----------------------
[1]   (2012) 4 SCC 505
[2]    (2010) 8 SCC 767
[3]    (2009) 12 SCC 26
[4]    (2011) 7 SCC 279
[5]    (2001) 2 SCC 721
[6]    (1992) 1 SCC 508

-----------------------
21


Service - High court order to add 10 marks “Uttaranchal Subordinate Service [Emergency Direct Recruitment (First Amendment)] Rules, 2003” in the selection held by UPSC; - All selection were made under 2001 rules - Apex court held that These rules were notified vide Gazette Notification No.1973/One-2001 dated 12th November, 2001.“The Rules shall become ineffective after the process of Recruitment is completed as it has never been promulgated. Candidates selected on the basis of Rules shall be governed by Service Rules and G.Os. as applicable before in the Govt.” and Under the 2001 Rules, there was no provision for adding 10 marks to the total marks of written test and interview in the category of trained apprentices. This was sought to be introduced by the 2003 Rules which came into force on 31st July, 2003. In such circumstances, it would be wholly impermissible to alter the selection criteria which was advertised on 27th November, 2001. and as such the Apex court set aside the order of High court = Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal …Appellant VERSUS Jagdish Chandra Singh Bora & Anr. Etc. …..Respondents = 2014 (March . Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41288

  Service -  High court order to add 10 marks “Uttaranchal Subordinate   Service   [Emergency   Direct   Recruitment    (First Amendment)] Rules, 2003” in the selection held by UPSC; - All selection were made under 2001 rules - Apex court held that These  rules  were  notified  vide   Gazette   Notification No.1973/One-2001 dated              12th November, 2001.“The  Rules  shall  become  ineffective  after  the  process  of Recruitment is completed  as  it  has  never  been  promulgated. Candidates selected on the basis of Rules shall be  governed  by  Service Rules and G.Os. as applicable before in the Govt.” and Under the 2001 Rules, there was no provision for adding 10 marks to the total marks of written test and interview in  the  category  of trained apprentices. This was sought to be introduced by  the  2003 Rules  which  came  into  force  on  31st  July,  2003.   In   such circumstances, it  would  be  wholly  impermissible  to  alter  the selection criteria which was advertised  on  27th  November,  2001. and as such the Apex court set aside the order of High court =

By  the  aforesaid  judgment,  the  High  Court  has  given  a
        direction to the appellant to give weightage of 10 bonus  marks  to
        the  trained  apprentice  candidates  as   per   the   “Uttaranchal
        Subordinate   Service   [Emergency   Direct   Recruitment    (First
        Amendment)] Rules, 2003” in the selection held by UPSC;  and  after
        adding 10 marks, merit list of the selected candidates be  prepared
        and recommended for the appointment to the Government.     
 It  has
        also been directed that all  the  successful  candidates  shall  be
        given  appointment  in  the  remaining  vacancies  of  the   Junior
        Engineers in the various departments  of  the  Government  and  the
        instrumentalities of the State  according  to  the  merit  list  of
        apprentices selected  in  the  merit  list.  It  has  been  further
        directed that the aforesaid order shall survive for one  year  from
        the date of its publication.=

The PSCU  had  been
        established in May, 2001 soon after the State of  Uttaranchal  came
        into existence  on 9th November, 2000. 
On 12th
        November, 2001, the Government of  Uttaranchal  framed  Uttaranchal
        Subordinate  Engineering  Service  (Emergency  Direct  Recruitment)
        Rules, 2001 under proviso to Article 309  of  the  Constitution  of
        India.  These  rules  were  notified  vide   Gazette   Notification
        No.1973/One-2001 dated              12th November, 2001.
 “The  Rules  shall  become  ineffective  after  the  process  of
           Recruitment is completed  as  it  has  never  been  promulgated.
           Candidates selected on the basis of Rules shall be  governed  by
           Service Rules and G.Os. as applicable before in the Govt.”
Conclusion 

In our opinion, it is not at  all  necessary  to  examine  all  the
        submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.  The  2001
        Rules were specifically framed to cater for  an  emergency  as  the
        State of Uttaranchal came into existence  on  9th  November,  2000.
        The State sent a letter/request on 2nd November, 2001  to  PSCU  to
        hold a written examination to fill up large number of  posts  which
        have become available on  creation  of  the  new  State.
As noticed earlier, the 2001 Rules specifically provided  that  the
        Rules are applicable only for the direct recruitment  in  the  year
        2002 for subordinate engineering service.   The Rules also make  it
        clear that the same shall become ineffective after the  process  of
        recruitment is  completed.   Thereafter,  the  selected  candidates
        shall be governed by the Service Rules and  the  Government  Orders
        applicable in the Government.  This makes it abundantly clear  that
        on 12th November, 2002, the 2001 Rules ceased to exist.
Under the 2001 Rules, there was no provision for adding 10 marks to
        the total marks of written test and interview in  the  category  of
        trained apprentices. This was sought to be introduced by  the  2003
        Rules  which  came  into  force  on  31st  July,  2003.   In   such
        circumstances, it  would  be  wholly  impermissible  to  alter  the
        selection criteria which was advertised  on  27th  November,  2001.
        Since no preference had been given to the trained apprentices, many
        eligible candidates in that category may  not  have  applied.  This
        would lead to a clear infraction of Article 14 of the  Constitution
        of India. To this extent, we accept  the  submission  made  by  Mr.
        Hansaria. Selection procedure can not be altered after the  process
        of selection had been completed. [See: K. Manjusree  Vs.  State  of
        Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 512 (para 27)].
We are of the opinion that  the  High
        Court committed an error, firstly, in holding that the  2003  rules
        are applicable, and secondly, not taking  into  consideration  that
        all the posts had been filled up by the time the decision had  been
        rendered.
For the reasons stated above,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the
        judgment rendered by the High Court is unsustainable in law and the
        same is hereby set aside. 
The appeals are allowed with no order  as to costs.


   2014 (March . Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41288

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI


                             REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3034 OF 2007




      Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal        …Appellant
      VERSUS
      Jagdish Chandra Singh Bora & Anr. Etc.     …..Respondents
                                    With
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3036 OF 2007




                               J U D G M E N T
      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
     1. These appeals have been filed by  the  Public  Service  Commission,
        Uttaranchal,  Haridwar  (hereinafter   referred   to   as   ‘PSCU’)
        challenging the judgment dated 2nd March, 2006 of the High Court of
        Uttaranchal at Nainital rendered in Writ Petition  Nos.  149,  129,
        135, 136, 137, 147, 148, 162, 169, 255, 302, 186, and 300 of  2004.
             By  the  aforesaid  judgment,  the  High  Court  has  given  a
        direction to the appellant to give weightage of 10 bonus  marks  to
        the  trained  apprentice  candidates  as   per   the   “Uttaranchal
        Subordinate   Service   [Emergency   Direct   Recruitment    (First
        Amendment)] Rules, 2003” in the selection held by UPSC;  and  after
        adding 10 marks, merit list of the selected candidates be  prepared
        and recommended for the appointment to the Government.      It  has
        also been directed that all  the  successful  candidates  shall  be
        given  appointment  in  the  remaining  vacancies  of  the   Junior
        Engineers in the various departments  of  the  Government  and  the
        instrumentalities of the State  according  to  the  merit  list  of
        apprentices selected  in  the  merit  list.  It  has  been  further
        directed that the aforesaid order shall survive for one  year  from
        the date of its publication.




     2. Civil Appeal No.3036 of 2007 impugns the judgment of the High Court
        of Uttaranchal at Nainital dated          31st March, 2006  wherein
        the High Court has allowed the Writ Petition Nos. 446 of 2006,  275
        of 2004, 166 of 2004, 138 of 2006, 333 of 2004 and 775 of  2006  in
        terms of the earlier  judgment  dated  2nd  March,  2006  which  is
        subject matter of Civil Appeal No.3034 of 2007.



     3. In the year 2001, large number of  vacancies  of  Junior  Engineers
        existed  in  various  departments  of  the  State  of  Uttaranchal.
        Therefore, a proposal was sent  by  the  State  Government  on  2nd
        November, 2001 to the PSCU for conducting  a  written  examination.
        The written examination had to be conducted by IIT, Roorkee as  the
        PSCU did not have the necessary infrastructure. The PSCU  had  been
        established in May, 2001 soon after the State of  Uttaranchal  came
        into existence                       on 9th November, 2000. On 12th
        November, 2001, the Government of  Uttaranchal  framed  Uttaranchal
        Subordinate  Engineering  Service  (Emergency  Direct  Recruitment)
        Rules, 2001 under proviso to Article 309  of  the  Constitution  of
        India.  These  rules  were  notified  vide   Gazette   Notification
        No.1973/One-2001 dated              12th November, 2001. It appears
        that these rules were framed only for filling up  large  number  of
        post of Junior Engineers which became available upon  the  creation
        of State of Uttaranchal. Therefore, the rules specifically provided
        as follows :-

           “The  Rules  shall  become  ineffective  after  the  process  of
           Recruitment is completed  as  it  has  never  been  promulgated.
           Candidates selected on the basis of Rules shall be  governed  by
           Service Rules and G.Os. as applicable before in the Govt.”







     4. Rule 5 which dealt with the manner in which the candidate was to be
        selected and the merit list was to be prepared reads as under :-

           “4. Conduct method of Examination

           (1) Appointing authorities shall inform the no. of  SC,  ST  and
           OBC vacancies in all the categories and decide the vacancies  to
           Dept. of Personnel of State Govt. who will publish the  same  in
           the newspapers.



`
           (2) The application for selection shall be invited in prescribed
           format of the Govt. for consideration.




           (3) Even if the relevant Service Rules regarding  the  issue  or
           Govt. Orders are contrary, then also with the permission of  IIT
           Roorkee shall conduct the examination for the Direct Recruitment
           of Senior Engineers for the candidates.




           (4)  The marks of interview to be added to marks of the  written
           examination for selection.




           (5) Written examination shall be conducted by  the  IIT  Roorkee
           according to Rules Prescribed by the State Govt.




           (6) Marks for the interview shall be  determined  by  the  State
           Govt. which shall not  be  more  than  12.5"/o  of  the  written
           examination.




           (7) Question papers of the written examination shall be  printed
           both in Hindi and English languages.




           (8) Written examination shall be conducted at place on  time  as
           decided by IIT Roorkee.




           (9) IIT Roorkee shall prepare  list  on  the  basis  of  written
           examination and shall make it available to  the  Public  Service
           Commission, Uttaranchal.




           (10) Commission shall call the candidates for interview  on  the
           basis of minimum qualifying marks in the written examination.




           (11) Commission shall prepare the merit list  as  shown  in  the
           written examination and interview. If  two  or  more  candidates
           score equal marks their the  candidate  scoring  more  marks  in
           written exam shall be preferred. If marks in  written  exam  are
           also equal the candidate of more age shall be preferred  and  to
           be kept in merit list accordingly. The names  of  candidates  in
           merit list shall not be more  than  25%  of  the  total  no.  of
           vacancies.




           (12)  Commission  shall  forward  the  merit  list   to      the
      Department of Personnel.”

     5. On 27th November, 2001,  the  State  issued  an  advertisement  for
        filling up the vacancies of Junior Engineers, which was accompanied
        by a prescribed format of the  application  form.   The  terms  and
        conditions of the advertisement were strictly  in  conformity  with
        the 2001 rules. The written examination was held by the IIT Roorkee
        on 12th January, 2002. The result of the  written  examination  was
        declared on 10th July, 2003.




     6. It appears that a notification was issued  on           31st  July,
        2003,  superseding  all  the  existing  rules  and  regulations  of
        selection  process  in  regard  to  direct  recruitment  of  Junior
        Engineer in various departments. The notification reads as under :

                                 “Govt. of Uttaranchal

                           Department of Personnel

                             Notification Misc.

                              Dated 31.07.2003

           No.  1097/one-2  2003  Hon’ble  Governor   under   Article   309
      Constitution  of  India  for  different  Engineering  Departments  the
      effective Services Rules are encroached  once  and  Rules  framed  for
      direct recruitment of Junior Engineers as follows:

           Uttaranchal Subordinate Engineering Services  (Emergency  Direct
      Recruitment) (First Amendment) Rules 2003.

           3. Brief name, Start and application/effect

             (i)  The  Rules  shall  be  called   Uttaranchal   Subordinate
      Engineering Services (Emergency Direct Recruitment) (First  Amendment)
      Rules 2003.

           (ii) The Rules shall be applicable-with immediate effect.

            (iii) Substitution of Rule 5 (4)

            (iv) Rule 5(4) given in column 1  to  be  substituted  by  Rule
      given in column 2  in  Uttaranchal  Subordinate  Engineering  Services
      (Emergency Direct Recruitment) Rules 2001.

|Present Rule                   |Substituted Rule               |
|5(4) The marks of              |5(4) for selection marks scored|
|interview to be added to marks |by the candidate in written    |
|of the written examination for |exam and interview to be added |
|selection.                     |but for the preparation of     |
|                               |merit list such candidates who |
|                               |had completed apprenticeship in|
|                               |the concerned department to    |
|                               |                               |
|                               |be given bonus of 10 marks in  |
|                               |the total marks scored in      |
|                               |written exam and  interview.   |



     7. The candidates who had cleared the written examination were  called
        for interview from                   18th December,  2003  to  22nd
        December, 2003. In the notification dated  31st  July,  2003,  Rule
        5(4) provided that for the purpose of selection, the marks obtained
        in the written examination would be added in the marks obtained  in
        the  interview,  but  for  preparing  the  final  merit  list,  the
        candidates who had completed apprenticeship would be given extra 10
        marks in addition to the marks obtained  by  them  in  the  written
        examination and  interview.  However,  by  letter  dated       29th
        April, 2004, it was clarified that 10 marks were to be added to the
        total  marks  obtained  by  the  candidates   who   had   completed
        apprenticeship, only where the direct  recruit  candidate  and  the
        apprentice  candidate  stood  on  equal  footing.  Thereafter,  the
        selected  list  of  the  successful  candidates  was  prepared  and
        forwarded to the State Government on 15th May, 2004.




     8. Aggrieved by the non-grant of additional 10 marks, large number  of
        unsuccessful candidates in  the  apprenticeship  category  filed  a
        number of petitions, seeking a  writ  in  the  nature  of  mandamus
        directing the appellant to make a selection after giving benefit of
        10 additional  marks  to  all  the  candidates  who  had  completed
        apprenticeship. In the writ petition filed before the  High  Court,
        the petitioners had claimed that the preference had to be given  to
        the trained apprentices in view of the directions by this Court  in
        the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation & Anr.  Vs.  U.P.
        Parivahan  Nigam  Shishukhs  Berozgar  Sangh  &  Ors.[1]    In  the
        aforesaid judgment, the following directions were given :-

              “(1) Other things being equal, a trained apprentice should be
              given preference over direct recruits.


              (2) For this, a trainee would not be required to get his name
              sponsored by any employment exchange. The  decision  of  this
              Court in Union of India v. N. Hargopal would permit this.
              (3) If age bar would come in the way of the trainee, the same
              would be relaxed in accordance with what is  stated  in  this
              regard, if any, in the service rule concerned. If the service
              rule be silent on this aspect, relaxation to  the  extent  of
              the period for which the apprentice  had  undergone  training
              would be given.


              (4) The training institute concerned would maintain a list of
              the persons trained yearwise.  The  persons  trained  earlier
              would be treated as senior to the persons trained  later.  In
              between the trained apprentices, preference shall be given to
              those who are senior.”



     9. These directions were reiterated by this Court in U.P. Rajya Vidyut
        Parishad Apprentice Welfare Association & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.  &
        Ors.[2]




    10. On the basis of the aforesaid judgments,  the  trained  apprentices
        claimed to be a class apart. It was claimed that the classification
        between the apprentices and  others  would  not  be  only  for  the
        purpose of giving preferential treatment in the selection but  also
        for giving relaxation in upper age limit, relaxation in the  matter
        of getting their names sponsored by the employment exchange.




    11. The High Court has allowed the writ petition solely on  the  ground
        that the clarification dated 29th April, 2004 could  not  have  the
        effect of amending the statutory rules framed under Article 309  on
        31st July, 2003. It is held  that  the  direction  issued  on  29th
        April, 2004 related to the same  selection  to  which  the  amended
        rules of 2003 were  applicable.  Therefore,  the  G.O.  dated  29th
        April, 2004 being in the nature of executive instructions could not
        supplant  the  statutory  rules  but  could  only  supplement   the
        statutory rules. With this reasoning, the High Court issued a  writ
        in the nature of mandamus directing the PSCU to give  weightage  of
        additional 10 marks to the apprentices by adding the  same  to  the
        total marks secured by them in  the  written  examination  and  the
        interview.




    12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.




    13. Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned counsel appearing  for  the  appellant,
        has submitted that the High Court has misread the directions issued
        by this Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport  Corporation
        & Anr.  (supra).  He  further  submitted  that  the  selection  was
        governed by the 2001 rules which had been framed  only  for  making
        selection on the large number of posts that have  become  available
        on the creation of Uttaranchal.  He submits  that  the  2001  Rules
        specifically provided that it shall  be  applicable  only  for  the
        direct  recruitment  in  the  year  2002.  The  process  for   this
        recruitment had commenced when the advertisement was issued in  the
        year  2001.  All  the  respondents  had  applied  pursuant  to  the
        aforesaid advertisement. Under these rules, no preference was given
        to the trained  apprenticeship.  Even  the  advertisement  did  not
        indicate any preference to the trained apprentices. Learned  senior
        counsel pointed out that 2001 rules became ineffective with  effect
                    from 11th November, 2002 as provided in Rule 6 thereof.
                        Mr. Hansaria further submits that  the  2003  rules
        have been wrongly read by the High Court to be an amendment of  the
        2001 rules. After making a reference to  the  2003  Rules,  learned
        senior counsel pointed out that the 2003 Rules came into  force  on
        31st July, 2003. Therefore, the High Court has  erred  in  treating
        the same to be as amendment of the  2001  rules,  which  no  longer
        existed.




    14. Learned senior counsel further submitted that 2003 rules cannot  be
        given retrospective effect as no such express  provision  has  been
        made to that effect. He relies on the judgment in N.T.Devin Katti &
        Ors. Vs. Karnataka Public Service Commission & Ors.[3]  P.Mahendran
        & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.[4]   and  Sonia  Vs.  Oriental
        Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.[5]      He  also  submits  that  all  the
        respondents having participated in the selection process cannot  be
        permitted to challenge the same. He submitted that the final select
        list was published on 15th May, 2004. Only when the respondents did
        not get selected on merit, they filed the writ petitions  in  June,
        2004. He relies on the judgments in Chandra Prakash Tiwari  &  Ors.
        Vs. Shakuntala Shukla & Ors.[6]  and Manish Kumar Shahi  Vs.  State
        of Bihar & Ors.[7]




    15. Mr. Hansaria further pointed out that 841 posts had been advertised
        on 27th November, 2001. All the posts have been duly filled up soon
        after selection. Therefore, the High Court committed  an  error  of
        jurisdiction in issuing the directions to prepare  the  merit  list
        after adding  10  marks  to  the  marks  obtained  by  the  trained
        apprentices.  He submitted that in any  event,  all  the  vacancies
        having been filled up immediately  after  the  publication  of  the
        select list, the mandamus issued by the High Court can not possibly
        be implemented.




    16. Mr. C.U. Singh, appearing for the respondents submitted that vested
        rights of the respondents under 2003  Rules  could  not  have  been
        taken away by issuance of  executive  instruments  issued  on  29th
        April, 2004.        He further  submitted  that  in  this  case  no
        retrospective effect is being given to  the  2003  Rules  as  these
        Rules were framed in respect of antecedent facts.  He relies on the
        judgment of this Court in Ramji Purshottam (dead) by  Lrs.  &  Ors.
        Vs. Laxmanbhai D. Kurlawala (dead) by Lrs. & Anr.[8]




    17. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel  for
        the parties.




    18. In our opinion, it is not at  all  necessary  to  examine  all  the
        submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.  The  2001
        Rules were specifically framed to cater for  an  emergency  as  the
        State of Uttaranchal came into existence  on  9th  November,  2000.
        The State sent a letter/request on 2nd November, 2001  to  PSCU  to
        hold a written examination to fill up large number of  posts  which
        have become available on  creation  of  the  new  State.   On  27th
        November, 2001, the State Government advertised 841  posts  of  Jr.
        Engineers in different departments throughout the State.  There was
        such an urgent need for recruitment that since  the  infrastructure
        of the PSCU was not in existence, a request was made that the posts
        be taken out of the purview of the PSCU on this one  occasion,  and
        the written examination be conducted by IIT, Roorkee.  PSCU  agreed
        to such procedure but limited only to the holding  of  the  written
        examination.  The interviews were still to be  held  by  the  PSCU.
        The Rules of 2001 were specifically framed for making the selection
        of the candidates, who would have applied for the available  posts.






    19. The Rules were notified on 12th November, 2001.  Within two  weeks,
        the necessary advertisement was issued on 27th November, 2001.  The
        2001 Rules specifically provided as under:-

           1.    Brief name, Start and application/effect

                 (i)   The Rules shall be called Service  (Emergency  Direct
                       Recruitment) Rules, 2001.

                 (ii)  The Rules shall be applicable with immediate effect.

                 (iii)       The Rules shall  be  applicable  only  for  the
                       direct recruitment in the year 2002  for  Subordinate
                       Engineering Services.

                 (iv)  The Rules shall be applicable to all  the  Department
                       for Direct Recruitment of Junior Engineers.

                 (v)   The rules shall have over riding effect  on  all  the
                       applicable service Rules for the  purpose  of  Direct
                       Recruitment of Junior Engineer for once only.

    20. A perusal  of  the  aforesaid  would  clearly  show  that  all  the
        candidates including the respondents, who applied  in  response  to
        the  advertisement  dated             27th  November,   2001   were
        governed by the 2001 Rules.  Rule 4 provides comprehensive criteria
        for making a selection to the post of Jr.  Engineer.   The  written
        examination was to be conducted by the IIT, Roorkee.  The selection
        was to be made on the basis of the  total  marks  obtained  by  the
        candidates in the written examination and the interview.  The  list
        of successful candidates of the written examination was to be  made
        available by IIT, Roorkee to PSCU.  Thereafter,  the  PSCU  was  to
        call  the  candidates  for  interview  on  the  basis  of   minimum
        qualifying  marks  in  the  written  examination.   Section   4(11)
        provides that the PSCU shall prepare a merit list by  adding  marks
        obtained by the candidates  in  the  written  examination  and  the
        interview.  If two or more  candidates  secured  equal  marks,  the
        candidates securing more marks in the written examination shall  be
        preferred.  In case,  the  marks  obtained  by  two  candidates  in
        written examination are also equal, the older  candidate  shall  be
        preferred  to  the  younger.   Therefore,  it   is   evident   that
        consciously the State had not provided for  any  preference  to  be
        given to the trained apprentices under the Rules. Keeping  in  view
        the provisions contained in the Rules, the State Government  issued
        an advertisement on 27th November, 2001.   The  advertisement  also
        did not provide for any  weightage  to  be  given  to  the  trained
        apprentices.  All  the   candidates   including   the   respondents
        participated in the selection process, being fully  aware  that  no
        preference will be given  to  the  trained  apprentices.  This  was
        inspite of the directions issued by this  Court  in  UPSRTC’s  case
        (supra).  Therefore, it cannot be said that any accrued  or  vested
        right had accrued to the trained apprentices, under the 2001 Rules.






    21. The result of the written examination was declared  on  10th  July,
        2003.  The interview was conducted by the PSCU from 18th  December,
        2003 to 22nd December, 2003.  Thereafter, only the result was to be
        declared and the appointments were to be made on the basis of merit
        obtained by the candidates in the selection process.




    22. As noticed earlier, the 2001 Rules specifically provided  that  the
        Rules are applicable only for the direct recruitment  in  the  year
        2002 for subordinate engineering service.   The Rules also make  it
        clear that the same shall become ineffective after the  process  of
        recruitment is  completed.   Thereafter,  the  selected  candidates
        shall be governed by the Service Rules and  the  Government  Orders
        applicable in the Government.  This makes it abundantly clear  that
        on 12th November, 2002, the 2001 Rules ceased to exist.




    23. However, on 31st July, 2003, the 2003 Rules were  framed.   A  bare
        perusal of the title of the Rules would show that  the  Rules  came
        into force on 31st July, 2003.  The Rules  supersede  all  existing
        Rules but Rule 5(4) of 2001 Rules is transposed by Rule 5(4) of the
        2003 Rules.  Rule 5(4) of the 2001 Rules  provided  that  marks  of
        interview shall be added to the marks of  written  examination  for
        selection.  But Rule 5(4) of the 2003 Rules provides that the marks
        obtained in the written examination and the marks obtained  in  the
        interview shall be increased by 10 extra marks in case  of  trained
        apprentices.  In our opinion, the respondents could have  taken  no
        advantage of these Rules.  The Selection process was under the 2001
        Rules.  The Rules of 2001 as well as advertisement did not  provide
        for any additional marks/weightage  to  be  given  to  the  trained
        apprentices.  The Rules of 2003 came into force on 31st July, 2003.
         No retrospective effect can be  given  to  the  same  without  any
        express provision to that effect being  made  in  the  Rules.  This
        apart, the 2001 Rules that were said to be amended were,  in  fact,
        non-existent.  The 2001 Rules expired on  11th  November,  2001  in
        terms of Rule 6 thereof.  The High Court, in our  opinion,  was  in
        error in holding that 2003 Rules were applicable to the process  of
        selection which had commenced in 2001 under the 2001 Rules.

    24. In our opinion, the High Court has wrongly concluded  that  as  the
        2003 Rules had been framed in obedience to the directions issued by
        a Single Judge of the Uttaranchal High Court in Writ Petition No.44
        (SB) of 2002 titled Subhash Chandra Vs. State of Uttaranchal,  they
        would relate to the selection which was governed by the 2001  Rules
        and the advertisement issued by the State on 27th  November,  2001.
        We have already earlier concluded  that  although  2003  Rules  are
        titled as ‘First Amendment Rules’, the same is a misnomer. The 2003
        Rules could not have the effect of amending the  2001  Rules  which
        had already ceased to exist in terms of            Rule  6  thereof
        with effect from 11th November, 2001. The  respondents,  therefore,
        cannot claim that any  accrued  or  vested  right  of  the  trained
        apprentices has been taken  away  by  the  2004  clarification,  in
        relation  to  the  selection  governed  by  the  2001  rules,   and
        advertisement dated 11th November, 2001.




    25. Furthermore, the High Court in Subhash Chandra’s case  (supra)  had
        only reiterated the directions which have been given by this  Court
        in the case of UPSRTC (supra).  Inspite of those  directions  being
        in existence, no  preference  had  been  provided  to  the  trained
        apprentices in the 2001 Rules. We had earlier also noticed that the
        respondents, unsuccessful candidates who were trained  apprentices,
        woke up only after the select list was published by  the  PSCU.  We
        may also point out that even if the 2003 Rules have been framed  on
        the directions of the High Court, the rules came into force on 31st
        July, 2003. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination can it be  said
        that the aforesaid rules were applicable to the selection which was
        governed under the 2001 Rules  and  the  advertisement  dated  11th
        November,  2001.  Candidates  had  applied  on  the  basis  of  the
        aforesaid advertisement. As noticed earlier, the  advertisement  in
        this case was issued on 27th November, 2001. It  had  set  out  the
        criteria of selection laid  down  in  the  2001  Rules  which  were
        notified on 12th November, 2001. Written examination in respect  of
        aforesaid advertisement was held by IIT, Roorkee on  12th  January,
        2002. The result of the written examination was  declared  on  10th
        July, 2003. The 2003 Rules were notified on 31st  July,  2003.  The
        interviews were conducted  between  18th  December,  2003  to  22nd
        December, 2003. Under the 2001 Rules, the marks to be given for the
        interview could not be more than 12.5% of the written  examination.
        Under the 2001 Rules, there was no provision for adding 10 marks to
        the total marks of written test and interview in  the  category  of
        trained apprentices. This was sought to be introduced by  the  2003
        Rules  which  came  into  force  on  31st  July,  2003.   In   such
        circumstances, it  would  be  wholly  impermissible  to  alter  the
        selection criteria which was advertised  on  27th  November,  2001.
        Since no preference had been given to the trained apprentices, many
        eligible candidates in that category may  not  have  applied.  This
        would lead to a clear infraction of Article 14 of the  Constitution
        of India. To this extent, we accept  the  submission  made  by  Mr.
        Hansaria. Selection procedure can not be altered after the  process
        of selection had been completed. [See: K. Manjusree  Vs.  State  of
        Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 512 (para 27)].




    26. We are not  able  to  accept  the  submission  of               Mr.
        Hansaria that the benefit of 10 additional  marks  to  the  trained
        apprentices is limited only to those trained apprentices  who  have
        secured equal marks with one or more candidates in the category  of
        direct recruits. The learned senior counsel seeks  to  support  the
        aforesaid submission from the directions issued by  this  Court  in
        the case of UPSRTC (supra) which was as follows :

           “Other things being equal, a trained apprentice should be  given
           preference over direct recruits.”




           The only natural meaning of the aforesaid phrase  ‘other  things
      being equal’ is that all the candidates must have  been  subjected  to
      the same selection process, i.e., same  written  test  and  interview.
      Further that their inter-se merit is determined on the same  criteria,
      applicable to both categories. In this case, it is  the  aggregate  of
      the marks secured by  the  candidate  in  the  written  test  and  the
      interview. The additional 10 marks are given  to  the  apprentices  as
      they are generally expected to secure lesser  marks  than  the  direct
      recruits in the written examination. Thus, by adding 10 marks  to  the
      total of the written examination of the trained apprentices, they  are
      sought  to  be  put  at  par  with  the  direct  recruits.  Therefore,
      necessarily this  preference  is  to  be  given  to  all  the  trained
      apprentices across the board. It cannot be restricted  only  to  those
      trained apprentices who fortuitously happen to secure the  same  marks
      as one or more of the direct recruits.

           In case the additional 10 marks  are  restricted  only  to  such
      trained  apprentice   candidates,   it   would   result   in   hostile
      discrimination.  This  can  be  best   demonstrated   by   giving   an
      illustration. Assume there are ten  candidates  belonging  to  trained
      apprentices category. Let us say that candidate No.1 secures 50% total
      marks on the basis of the marks obtained  in  the  written  test  plus
      interview, whilst candidates No.2 to 10  secure  total  marks  ranging
      from 51 to 59.  But candidate No.1 has secured total  marks  identical
      to a direct recruit, i.e., 50%; whereas candidates No.2 to 10 have not
      secured marks at par with any direct recruit candidate. On  the  basis
      of the clarification dated 29th April, 2004, candidate No.1  will  get
      the benefit of 10% weightage and  candidates  No.2  to  10  will  not.
      Therefore, after weightage is given to candidate No.1,  his/her  total
      marks would be 60%. This would put him/her over and above,  all  other
      candidates, i.e., candidates No.2 to 10 who have secured higher  marks
      than candidate No.1 who actually has lesser marks, if no weightage  is
      given to his/her. Therefore, candidate Nos. 2 to  10  securing  higher
      marks would be shown at a lower rank to candidate No.1 in the inter-se
      merit. In such a situation, a trained  apprentice  candidate  securing
      lesser marks than his colleague would not only steal a march over  the
      direct recruits but also over candidates who got more marks within his
      own  category.   Such  an  interpretation   would   lead   to   absurd
      consequences.  This is not the intention of giving the  preference  to
      the trained apprentices. The interpretation sought to be placed by Mr.
      Hansaria would, in fact, create a sub-classification within the  class
      of trained apprentice candidates. Such a sub-classification would have
      no rationale nexus, with the object sought to be achieved.  The object
      of the preference is to give weightage to the apprentices so that  the
      State does not lose the benefit of the training given to them, at  the
      State expense. This would be a clear  breach  of  Article  14  of  the
      Constitution of India.




    27. The only direction issued by this Court in  UPSTRC’s  case  (supra)
        was to give preference  to  the  trained  apprentices  over  direct
        recruits. No direction is given in  the  judgment  as  to  how  the
        preference is to be given. It was left entirely to  the  discretion
        of the Government to make the necessary provision in the  statutory
        rules. In that case, number  of  candidates  who  had  successfully
        completed apprenticeship under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 claimed
        appointment upon  completion.   In  support  of  their  claim,  the
        candidates relied on number of Government Orders,  which  according
        to them held  out  a  promise  that  on  successful  completion  of
        apprenticeship, they would be given  employment.   The  High  Court
        issued a writ  in  the  nature  of  Mandamus  directing  that  such
        candidate should  be  given  employment.   In  such  circumstances,
        UPSRTC came before this Court  and  submitted  that  there  was  no
        obligation on the State Government  to  ensure  employment  to  any
        trained apprentices. This Court  analyzed  the  various  Government
        Circulars and came to the conclusion that there is no promise  held
        out for the candidates of definite employment.  However,  in  order
        to ensure that the training given to the apprentices at  the  State
        expense is utilized, certain directions  were  issued,  which  have
        been  reproduced  earlier.  As  noticed  earlier,  inspite  of  the
        aforesaid directions,  no  preference  was  given  to  the  trained
        apprentices in the selection process which was governed by the 2001
        Rules, and the advertisement dated 27th November, 2001. Whilst  the
        process of selection was still in progress, the High Court rendered
        its judgment in the case of  Subhash  Chandra  (supra).    For  the
        reasons which are not made clear in the pleadings or by the learned
        counsel for any of the parties, the  2003  Rules  were  framed  and
        enforced with effect from 31st July, 2003. Consequently,  when  the
        interviews were being  conducted,  the  PSCU  was  faced  with  the
        ‘amendment rules’ of 2003. Therefore, the PSCU by  a  letter  dated
        5th April, 2004 sought clarification as to whether 2001 rules would
        be applicable  or  Rules  of  2003  would  be  applicable,  to  the
        selection process. In these  circumstances,  the  State  Government
        wrote to the PSCU on 29th April, 2004, on the basis of legal advice
        that preference to the trained apprentices is to be given  only  if
        the two candidates secured equal marks. The legal opinion clarified
        that the amended rules of 2003  would  not  be  applicable  to  the
        selection  process  which  had  already  started.  Therefore,   the
        selection process under the 2001 Rules was excluded.




    28. However, we find substance in the submission made by Mr. C.U. Singh
        that 2004 clarification would not have the effect of amending  2003
        Rules. Undoubtedly, 2004 clarification is only an executive  order.
        It is settled proposition of law that the executive  orders  cannot
        supplant the rules framed under the proviso to Article 309  of  the
        Constitution of India. Such executive orders/instructions can  only
        supplement the rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the
        Constitution of India.  Inspite of accepting the submission of  Mr.
        C.U. Singh that clarification dated     29th April, 2004 would  not
        have the effect of  superceding,  amending  or  altering  the  2003
        Rules; it  would  not  be  possible  to  give  any  relief  to  the
        respondents. The criteria under the 2003 Rules governs  all  future
        recruitments. We have earlier  already  concluded  that  no  vested
        right had accrued to  the  respondents,  the  trained  apprentices,
        under the 2001 Rules. We do not accept the submission of  Mr.  C.U.
        Singh that the claim of the respondents (trained apprentices) would
        be covered under  the  2001  Rules  by  virtue  of  the  so  called
        amendment made by 2003 Rules. We are of the opinion that  the  High
        Court committed an error, firstly, in holding that the  2003  rules
        are applicable, and secondly, not taking  into  consideration  that
        all the posts had been filled up by the time the decision had  been
        rendered.




    29. For the reasons stated above,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the
        judgment rendered by the High Court is unsustainable in law and the
        same is hereby set aside. The appeals are allowed with no order  as
        to costs.




                                                    ………………………….J.
                                             [Surinder Singh Nijjar]




                                                 …………………………..J.
                                                      [Ranjana Prakash
Desai]

      New Delhi;
      March 3, 2014.






-----------------------
[1]    (1995) 2 SCC 1
[2]    (2000) 5 SCC 438
[3]    (1990) 3 SCC 157
[4]    (1990) 1 SCC 411
[5]    (2007) 10 SCC 627
[6]    (2002) 6 SCC 127
[7]    (2010) 12 SCC 576
[8]    (2004) 6 SCC 455

-----------------------
32