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Saturday, March 1, 2014

Rajasthan Sales Tax Incentive Scheme 1989 & Central Excise duty -Central Excise Tariff Act 1985-Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act - Under the scheme for certain period the manufacturer is entitled to retain 75% of collected tax with him and has to pay 25% sale Tax out of it - Excise duty is payable at 2% for certain period on actual price but not included price of sale tax collected shown in invoice - show-cause notice was that the assessee had not paid the duty on the additional consideration collected towards the sales tax -The explanation of the assessee was that it was extended the benefit of the incentive scheme and not granted any exemption and, therefore, the sales tax collected was not includible in the assessable value and deduction was admissible under the Act - Commissioner negatived the plea of Assesses where as the Tribunal allowed the plea of Assesses - Apex court partly allowed the appeal of Revenue and remit the matter to Tribunal to fix the excise duty as per the observations of Apex court and dismissed the appeals of Assesses who claimed total exemption and held that On a perusal of the circulars dated 12.3.1998 and 1.7.2002 we do not find that they remotely relate to any exemption under the Central Sales Tax imposed on the goods. = Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II … Appellant Versus M/s. Super Synotex (India) Ltd. and others …Respondents =2014(Feb.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41272

Rajasthan Sales Tax Incentive Scheme 1989 & Central Excise duty -Central Excise Tariff Act 1985-Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act - Under the scheme for certain period the manufacturer is entitled to retain 75% of collected tax with him and has to pay 25% sale Tax out of it - Excise duty is payable at 2%  for certain period on actual price but not included price of sale tax collected shown in invoice - show-cause notice was that the assessee  had  not  paid  the duty on the additional consideration collected  towards  the  sales tax -The  explanation  of  the assessee was that it was extended  the  benefit  of  the  incentive scheme and not granted any exemption and, therefore, the sales  tax collected was not includible in the assessable value and  deduction was admissible under the Act - Commissioner negatived the plea of Assesses where as the Tribunal allowed the plea of Assesses - Apex court partly allowed the appeal of Revenue and remit the matter to Tribunal to fix the excise duty as per the observations of Apex court and dismissed the appeals of Assesses who claimed total exemption and held that  On  a  perusal  of  the circulars dated 12.3.1998 and 1.7.2002 we do  not  find  that  they remotely relate to  any  exemption  under  the  Central  Sales  Tax imposed on the goods.  =

 The  respondent  herein  is  engaged   in   the
        manufacture of yarn of manmade fibers falling under Chapter  55  of
        the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, chargeable  to
        duty.   
A show-cause notice was issued to  the  respondent-assessee
        on the ground that  for  certain  period  it  had  contravened  the
        various provisions of the Act, and the Central Excise  Rules,  1944
        which had resulted in evasion of Central Excise Duty.  
The  fulcrum
        of the show-cause notice was that 
the assessee  had  not  paid  the
        duty on the additional consideration collected  towards  the  sales
        tax.
The case of the Revenue was  that  though  the  assessee  was
        availing exemption from payment of sales tax, it was showing  sales
        tax in the invoices but assessable value was shown  separately  for
        payment of Central Excise Duty as a consequence of  which  the  net
        yarn value was invariably higher  than  the  assessable  value  and
        excise duty paid thereon.  
This led to the difference  between  the
        two amounts which was almost equal  to  the  amount  of  sales  tax
        applicable during  the  relevant  time.   
The  explanation  of  the
        assessee was that it was extended  the  benefit  of  the  incentive
        scheme and not granted any exemption and, therefore, the sales  tax
        collected was not includible in the assessable value and  deduction
        was admissible under the Act.=

whether the assessee was entitled to claim deduction under  Section
        4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act in respect  of  full  amount  of  sales  tax
        payable at the rate of 2%.  
The Tribunal took note of the fact that
        the assessee, being entitled for the benefit under  the  Sales  Tax
        New Incentive Scheme for Industries, 1989 (for short “the Scheme”),
        had availed the same with effect from 3.12.1996 and 
under the  said
        Scheme it was entitled to retain with  it  75%  of  the  sales  tax
        collected and pay only  25%  to  the  Government  and,  
accordingly
        claimed the deduction for the entire amount of sales tax payable at
        the rate of 2% and,  
accordingly,  it  did  not  approve  the  view
        adopted by the adjudicating authority that the benefit  granted  to
        the assessee in respect of the sales tax was in the  nature  of  an
        exemption and not an incentive and, therefore, not deductible under
        Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the  Act.   
The  Tribunal  referred  to  the
        circular dated 12.3.1998 issued by the Central Board of Excise  and
        Customs (CBEC) and came to hold that sales tax was deductible  from
        the wholesale price for determination  of  assessable  value  under
        Section 4 of the Act for levy of Central  Excise  Duty.   
Being  of
        this view, it set aside the order passed  by  the  Commissioner  of
        Excise  and  directed  for  refund  of  the  deposits  made  during
        investigation and the deposit made in pursuance of the order passed
        by the Tribunal.

Sec. 4 (4)(d)(ii)-
the  assessee  has  claimed  that  there  is
        difference between grant of incentive and extension of  benefit  of
        exemption, and the scheme, i.e., the “Rajasthan Sales Tax Incentive
        Scheme 1989” does  not  relate  to  exemption  but  incentive.   
To
        elaborate, the assessee, under the said  Scheme,  is  permitted  to
        retain 75% of the sales tax collected as incentive and is liable to
        pay 25% to the department.  75% of the  amount  retained  has  been
        treated as incentive by the State Government.  
It  is  pointed  out
        that such retention of sales tax is a deemed payment of  sales  tax
        to the State exchequer and for the said purpose reliance is  placed
        on Circular No. 378/11/98-CX dated 12.3.1998 issued by C.B.E.C.

    17. In the aforesaid circular, three situations were  envisaged,  viz.,
        (i) exemption from payment of sales tax for  a  particular  period;
        (ii) deferment of payment of sales tax for a particular period; and
        (iii) grant of incentive equivalent to sales  tax  payable  by  the
        unit.  
The aforestated three situations had been  examined  by  the
        Board in  consultation  with  the  Ministry  of  Law.   
As  far  as
        situation (iii) is concerned, the circular stated thus: -

           “6.   Examination of the  situation,  mentioned  above  in  para
           2(ii) & (iii), in the referring note  give  an  indication  that
           sales tax is payable by the assessee in both the situations.  
It
           is payable after a particular period in the second case.  
On the
           other hand, in the third situation, the sales tax is  considered
           payable by the assessee even though it  is  paid  by  the  State
           Government,  the  assessee  keeping  the  said  amount  as  cash
           incentive.  
In this situation sales tax would be  considered  as
           payable  within  the  meaning  of  the  provisions  of   Section
           4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act.

          
We are therefore, of the opinion that in the  category  of
           cases mentioned in  para  2(i),  sales  tax  is  not  deductible
           whereas in the category of cases mentioned  at  (ii)  and  (iii)
           sales  tax  is  deductible  from   the   wholesale   price   for
           determination of assessable value under Section 4 of the Act for
           levy of Central Excise duty.”

    18. To understand the purpose of the aforesaid  two  paragraphs  it  is
        also necessary to refer to the note  given  by  the  Board  seeking
        opinion of the Ministry of Law in respect of situation (iii)  which
        is a part of the said circular.  It reads as follows: -

           “In situation (iii), the manufacturer  collects  the  sales  tax
           from the buyers and retains the same with him instead of  paying
           it to the State Government.  
The State Government on  the  other
           hand grants a cash incentive equivalent to the amount  of  sales
           tax payable and instead of the case incentive being paid to  the
           manufacturer, is credited to State Government account as payment
           towards sales tax by the  manufacturer.  
 In  such  a  situation
           sales tax is also considered payable by the assessee within  the
           meaning of the provisions of Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the  Central
           Excise Act, 1944.  
Therefore, sales tax is deductible  from  the
           wholesale price for determination of assessable value  for  levy
           of Central Excise duty in category of cases  mentioned  in  para
           (ii) & (iii) above.”
In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the considered opinion
        that the assessees in all the  appeals  are  entitled  to  get  the
        benefit  of  the  circular  dated  12.3.1998  which  protects   the
        industrial units availing incentive scheme as there is a conceptual
        book adjustment of the sales tax paid to the Department.  
But  with
        effect from 1.7.2000 they shall only be entitled to the benefit  of
        the amount “actually paid” to the Department, i.e., 25%.   
Needless
        to emphasise, the set off shall operate  only  in  respect  of  the
        amount that has been paid on the raw material and inputs  on  which
        the sales tax/ purchase tax has been paid.  
That being the position
        the adjudication by the tribunal is not sustainable.  
Similarly the
        determination by the original adjudicating authority requiring  the
        assessees to deposit or pay the whole amount and the  consequential
        imposition of  penalty  also  cannot  be  held  to  be  defensible.
        
Therefore, we allow the appeals  in  part,  set  aside  the  orders
        passed by the tribunal as well  as  by  the  original  adjudicating
        authority and remit the matters  to  the  respective  tribunals  to
        adjudicate as far as excise duty is concerned  in  accordance  with
        the principles set out hereinabove.  
We further clarify that as far
        as imposition of penalty is concerned, it shall be  dealt  with  in
        accordance with law governing the field.  
In any  case,  proceeding
        relating to the period prior to 1.7.2000 would stand closed and  if
        any amount has been paid or deposited as per the direction  of  any
        authority in respect of the said period, shall be refunded.  
As far
        as  the  subsequent  period  is  concerned,  the   tribunal   shall
        adjudicate as per the principles stated hereinbefore.

Coming to the appeals preferred by  the  assessees,  the  challenge
        pertains to denial of benefit of the Central  Sales  Tax  Act,  the
        aforesaid reasoning will equally apply. =
On  a  perusal  of  the
        circulars dated 12.3.1998 and 1.7.2002 we do  not  find  that  they
        remotely relate to  any  exemption  under  the  Central  Sales  Tax
        imposed on the goods.  
What is argued by the  learned  counsel  for
        the assessees is that the benefit should be extended to the Central
        Sales Tax as the tax on sales has a broader concept.  
The aforesaid
        submission is noted to be rejected and we, accordingly,  repel  the
        same.  In view of the  aforesaid,  the  appeals  preferred  by  the
        assessees stand dismissed.

   2014(Feb.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41272   
ANIL R. DAVE, DIPAK MISRA

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITON


                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 9154-9156 OF 2003


      Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II          … Appellant


                                   Versus


      M/s. Super Synotex (India) Ltd. and others   …Respondents


                                    WITH


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4621 OF 2008




                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   2912  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 16248 of 2009)


                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2008-2009 OF 2010

                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 335-336 OF 2005


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4003 OF 2009


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4076 OF 2007


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5987 OF 2010

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6033 OF 2011

                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 778-779 OF 2009


                     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8095-8103 OF 2013



                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8105 OF 2013










                               J U D G M E N T




      Dipak Misra, J.



           Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 16248 of 2009.

     2. This batch of appeals preferred under Section 35L  of  the  Central
        Excise Act, 1944 (for brevity, the Act) being  inter-connected  and
        inter-linked was heard together and is  disposed  of  by  a  common
        judgment.   It  is  necessary  to  clarify  that  the  Revenue  has
        preferred  the  appeals  against  the  decisions  rendered  by  the
        Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (for short “the
        Tribunal”) at various Benches  whereby  the  assessee-manufacturers
        have been extended the benefit  of  deduction  of  excise  duty  in
        respect of sales tax  imposed  by  the  State  Government  but  not
        entirely  paid  to  the  State  exchequer  while  determining   the
        assessable value for the purpose of central excise, and some of the
        assessee-manufacturers have preferred appeals being grieved by  the
        rejection for grant of similar relief  pertaining  to  the  payment
        made under the Central Sales Tax Act.  For the sake of convenience,
        the facts from Civil Appeal Nos. 9154-9156 of 2003  are  adumbrated
        herein as far as appeals by the Revenue are concerned.  In  respect
        of the challenge made by the assessee-manufacturers we  shall  take
        the facts from Civil Appeal No. 4621 of 2008.

     3. First we shall advert to the issue involving the appeals  preferred
        by  the  Revenue.   The  respondent  herein  is  engaged   in   the
        manufacture of yarn of manmade fibers falling under Chapter  55  of
        the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, chargeable  to
        duty.   A show-cause notice was issued to  the  respondent-assessee
        on the ground that  for  certain  period  it  had  contravened  the
        various provisions of the Act, and the Central Excise  Rules,  1944
        which had resulted in evasion of Central Excise Duty.
The  fulcrum
        of the show-cause notice was that 
the assessee  had  not  paid  the
        duty on the additional consideration collected  towards  the  sales
        tax.
The case of the Revenue was  that  though  the  assessee  was
        availing exemption from payment of sales tax, 
it was showing  sales
        tax in the invoices but assessable value was shown  separately  for
        payment of Central Excise Duty as a consequence of  which  the  net
        yarn value was invariably higher  than  the  assessable  value  and
        excise duty paid thereon.  
This led to the difference  between  the
        two amounts which was almost equal  to  the  amount  of  sales  tax
        applicable during  the  relevant  time.   
The  explanation  of  the
        assessee was that it was extended  the  benefit  of  the  incentive
        scheme and not granted any exemption and, therefore, the sales  tax
        collected was not includible in the assessable value and  deduction
        was admissible under the Act.

     4. The Commissioner of Excise repelled  the  stand  of  the  assessee,
        interpreted  the  benefit  granted  to  the  assessee  as   partial
        exemption and, taking certain other facts into consideration,  came
        to hold that the assessee had deliberately with an intent to  evade
        payment of duty had suppressed the fact that though it was availing
        partial sales tax exemption under the Sales Tax Incentive Scheme of
        1989 for the relevant period upto 75% of tax liability, yet it  was
        paying only 25% of the tax leviable despite  collecting  additional
        consideration to the  extent  of  the  amount  of  sales  tax  and,
        therefore, the additional amount collected under the camouflage  of
        incentive tax had to be taken note of and, accordingly,  price  was
        to be declared and formed as a part of the value for  the  levy  of
        excise duty.

     5. Be it noted, in its reply  the  assessee  had  placed  reliance  on
        C.B.E. & C Circular No. 378/11-98-CX dated  12.3.1998  and  claimed
        that one of the situations as stipulated therein covered the  likes
        of the assessee and hence, it was not liable to  be  fastened  with
        any further liability.
The  Commissioner  distinguished  the  said
        circular and came to hold that the assessee, with an  intention  to
        evade payment of duty, had wilfully suppressed the  facts  that  it
        was  availing  partial  exemption  of  sales  tax  and   collecting
        additional consideration to the extent of the amount of  sales  tax
        not payable by it.  In this backdrop, the Commissioner  treated  it
        as short payment by the assessee and directed for recovery of  duty
        and imposed penalty under Sections 11A, 11AC and 11AB  of  the  Act
        and further imposed penalty on the persons responsible for the said
        suppression and evasion.

     6. Being grieved by the order passed by the  Commissioner  of  Central
        Excise, Jaipur,  the  assessee  preferred  three  appeals,  namely,
        Appeal NO. E/2279-2281 of 2002.  The Tribunal  posed  the  question
        whether the assessee was entitled to claim deduction under  Section
        4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act in respect  of  full  amount  of  sales  tax
        payable at the rate of 2%.  The Tribunal took note of the fact that
        the assessee, being entitled for the benefit under  the  Sales  Tax
        New Incentive Scheme for Industries, 1989 (for short “the Scheme”),
        had availed the same with effect from 3.12.1996 and under the  said
        Scheme it was entitled to retain with  it  75%  of  the  sales  tax
        collected and pay only  25%  to  the  Government  and,  accordingly
        claimed the deduction for the entire amount of sales tax payable at
        the rate of 2% and,  accordingly,  it  did  not  approve  the  view
        adopted by the adjudicating authority that the benefit  granted  to
        the assessee in respect of the sales tax was in the  nature  of  an
        exemption and not an incentive and, therefore, not deductible under
        Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the  Act.   The  Tribunal  referred  to  the
        circular dated 12.3.1998 issued by the Central Board of Excise  and
        Customs (CBEC) and came to hold that sales tax was deductible  from
        the wholesale price for determination  of  assessable  value  under
        Section 4 of the Act for levy of Central  Excise  Duty.   Being  of
        this view, it set aside the order passed  by  the  Commissioner  of
        Excise  and  directed  for  refund  of  the  deposits  made  during
        investigation and the deposit made in pursuance of the order passed
        by the Tribunal.

     7. We  have  heard  Mr.  K.  Radhakrishnan,  learned  senior  counsel,
        appearing for the Revenue and learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
        respondents in the appeals preferred by the Revenue.

     8. Mr. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel,  questioning  the  legal
        pregnability of the impugned order, has contended that the tribunal
        has clearly erred in applying the circular dated 12.3.1998  as  the
        stipulations in the said circular do not cover  the  cases  of  the
        present nature inasmuch as the assessee was extended the benefit of
        incentive scheme.  It is his further stand that  in  the  obtaining
        circumstances sales tax was collected but not  paid  to  the  State
        exchequer and, therefore, it  would  be  includible  in  assessable
        value.  Learned senior counsel would contend that the Tribunal  has
        not dealt with the issue pertaining to “payable”, for the issue  of
        “payability” depends on the language employed in the statute.   Mr.
        Radhakrishnan has urged that, in any case, after the amendment  has
        come into force effecting “transaction value” under Section 4(3)(d)
        of the Act with effect from 1.7.2000 there is  a  schematic  change
        but unfortunately the  same  has  not  been  addressed  to  by  the
        tribunal which makes  the  order  absolutely  vulnerable.   He  has
        commended us to the decision in Modipon Fibre  Company,  Modinagar,
        U.P. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut[1].

     9. Learned counsel appearing for the assessee submitted that the order
        passed by the tribunal is absolutely inexceptionable inasmuch as it
        has correctly applied the circular  issued  by  the  CBEC  and  the
        respondent being exempted under the incentive scheme issued by  the
        State  Government  is  entitled  to  avail  the  benefit.   He  has
        commended us to the Scheme  issued  by  the  State  Government  and
        brought on record the assessment orders passed  by  the  sales  tax
        authorities.  Learned counsel would further submit that as per  the
        Scheme they are entitled to retain 75% of the sales  tax  collected
        and pay only balance 25% to the State Government  and  despite  the
        same being the admitted position, the  adjudicating  authority  has
        committed grave illegality by treating it as an exemption which has
        been appositely corrected by the  tribunal  and  hence,  the  order
        impugned  is  impeccable.   It  is  propounded  that  the   amended
        provision that came on the statute book with effect  from  1.7.2000
        does not change the situation and, in fact, the earlier circular on
        principle has been reiterated  by  the  subsequent  circular  dated
        9.10.2002.

    10. Having regard to rivalised submissions raised at the Bar,  we  deem
        it appropriate to first refer to the ratio and principle stated  in
        Modipon Fibre Company (supra).  In the said case,  the  show  cause
        notice was dated 19th March, 1999 and related to the period  March,
        1994 to March, 1997.
Section  4(4)(d)(ii)  as  applicable  was  as
        under:-

           “4. Valuation of excisable goods for  purposes  of  charging  of
           duty of excise.—(1) to (3)   *    *     *

           (4) For the purposes of this section,—

           (a) to (c)  *    *     *

           (d) ‘value’, in relation to any excisable goods,—

                 (i)   *     *    *

                 (ii) does not include the amount of  the  duty  of  excise,
                 sales tax and other taxes, if any, payable  on  such  goods
                 and, subject to such  rules  as  may  be  made,  the  trade
                 discount (such discount not being refundable on any account
                 whatsoever) allowed in accordance with the normal  practice
                 of the wholesale trade at the time of removal in respect of
                 such goods sold or contracted for sale;

                 Explanation.—For  the  purposes  of  this  sub-clause,  the
                 amount of the duty of excise payable on any excisable goods
                 shall be the sum total of—

                       (a) the effective duty  of  excise  payable  on  such
                 goods under this Act; and


                      (b) the aggregate of the effective duties  of  excise
                 payable under other Central Acts, if  any,  providing  for
                 the levy of duties of excise on such goods under each  Act
                 referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) shall be,—

                 (i) in a case where a notification or order  providing  for
                 any exemption [not being an  exemption  for  giving  credit
                 with respect to, or reduction of duty of excise under  such
                 Act on such goods equal to, any duty of excise  under  such
                 Act, or the additional duty under Section 3 of the  Customs
                 Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975),  already  paid  on  the  raw
                 material or component  parts  used  in  the  production  or
                 manufacture of such goods] from the duty  of  excise  under
                 such Act is for the time being in force, the duty of excise
                 computed with reference to the rate specified in such  Act,
                 in respect of such goods as reduced so as to give full  and
                 complete effect to such exemption; and


                 (ii) in any other case, the duty of excise  computed  with
                 reference to the rate specified in such Act in respect  of
                 such goods.”

     11. The contention of the assessee  was  that  they  were  entitled  to
         deduction in respect of Turnover Tax (TOT) at the rate of 2% though
         Government of Gujarat by notification dated 19th October, 1993  had
         exempted sale of yarn under certificate in Form 26 to the extent of
         TOT exceeding .5% of the total turnover if the processed  yarn  was
         sold in the State of Gujarat.  Thus, there was dual rate of 2%  and
         .5% TOT in  the  State  of  Gujarat,  with  the  lower  rate  being
         applicable  to  sales  in  backward   area.  
 Relying   upon   the
         word/expression “payable”  used  in  Section  4(4)(d)(ii),  it  was
         submitted by the assessee that it refers to the duty payable in the
         tariff and not any concession or  exemption.
The  contention  was
         rejected by  the  Court  observing  that  the  word  “payable”  was
         descriptive and one has to see the context in which the  said  word
         finds place and accordingly proceeded to opine: -

           “As can be seen from the abovequoted section, excise duty can be
           deducted if it had not  been  included  in  the  invoice  price.
           According  to  the  Explanation,  what  is  deductible  is   the
           effective rate of duty.  Where any exemption has  been  granted,
           that exemption has to be deducted from the ad valorem duty.   In
           other words, it is only the net duty liability of  the  assessee
           that can be deducted in computing  the  assessable  value.   The
           said principle stands  incorporated  in  the  Explanation.   For
           example, if the assessee recovers duty at the  tariff  rate  but
           pays duty at concessional rate, then excise duty  has  to  be  a
           part of the assessable value.  Similarly, refund of excise  duty
           cannot be treated as net profit and added on  to  the  value  of
           clearances.  There is no provision in Section 4 of the 1944  Act
           to treat refund as part of assessable  value.   If  excise  duty
           paid  to  the  Government  is  collected  at  actuals  from  the
           customers and if,  subsequently,  exemption  becomes  available,
           such excise duty which is not passed on  to  the  assessee  (sic
           customer), would become part of assessable value  under  Section
           4(4)(d)(ii).”


    12. The aforesaid observations were made in the context  of  TOT  which
        could be deducted, if it had  not  been  included  in  the  invoice
        price.  The excise duty, it was observed, was the effective rate of
        duty and where any exemption was granted, the exemption was  to  be
        deducted from ad valorem duty.  Only the net duty liability of  the
        assessee was to be reduced from the invoice price for computing the
        assessable value.  Thus, where an assessee had recovered duty at  a
        higher rate but was paying duty at a concessional rate,  then  that
        part of unpaid excise duty was to be part of taxable or  assessable
        value.  But refund of excise duty was not to be added to the  value
        of clearances and similarly if subsequently an exemption had become
        available it could not be reduced to lower to the assessable value.

    13. After so stating the bench referred to the decisions of the  Bombay
        High Court in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India[2] and B.K.
        Paper Mills Pvt. Ltd.  v.  Union  of  India[3]  and  approving  the
        principle laid down therein, observed thus: -
           “In our view, the above two judgments of the Bombay  High  Court
           lay down the correct principle  underlying  the  Explanation  to
           Section 4(4)(d)(ii). As held in TOMCO case the exemption was not
           by way of a  windfall  for  the  manufacturer  assessee  but  on
           account of cotton seed oil used by TOMCO in the  manufacture  of
           Pakav. Similarly, in B.K. Paper Mills the Bombay High Court  has
           correctly analysed Section 4(4)(d)(ii) with the  Explanation  to
           say that only the reduced rate of duty can be excluded from  the
           value of the  goods  and  that  Explanation  explains  what  was
           implicit in that section. That, the said Section 4(4)(d)(ii) did
           not refer to duty  leviable  under  the  relevant  tariff  entry
           without reference to  exemption  notification  that  may  be  in
           existence at the time of clearance/removal. That, Section 47  of
           the Finance Act, 1982 which inserted the  Explanation  expressly
           sets out what is meant by the expression “the amount of duty  of
           excise payable on any excisable goods”. By the amount of duty of
           excise what is meant is the effective duty of excise payable  on
           such goods under the  Act  and,  therefore,  effective  duty  of
           excise is the duty calculated on the  basis  of  the  prescribed
           rate as reduced by the exemption  notification.  This  alone  is
           excluded from the normal price under Section 4(4)(d)(ii).”


      After so stating the Court stated: -
           Therefore, the test to be applied is that of the  “actual  value
           of the duty payable” and, therefore, there is no  merit  in  the
           argument advanced on behalf of the assessee that the Explanation
           is  restricted  to  the  duty  of  excise.  This  principle  can
           therefore apply also to actual value of any other tax  including
           TOT payable. Even without the Explanation, the scheme of Section
           4(4)(d)(ii) shows that in computing the  assessable  value,  one
           has to  go  by  the  actual  value  of  the  duty  payable  and,
           therefore, only the reduced duty was deductible from  the  value
           of the goods.

    14. It is seemly to note that the Court approved the ratio laid down in
        the judgment of Bombay High Court in Central India Spinning Weaving
        and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Union of India[4] by reproducing  the
        following observations: -
           “9. … It is true that according to Section  4(4)(d)(ii)  of  the
           Central Excise Act, the value does not  include  the  amount  of
           duty of excise, if any payable on such goods,  but  in  view  of
           Explanation to Section 4(4)(d)(ii), the ‘duty of  excise’  means
           the duty payable in terms of the Central Excise Tariff read with
           exemption notification issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise
           Rules. In this view of the matter, the only  deduction  that  is
           permissible is of the actual duty paid or payable  while  fixing
           the assessable value. Thus, where the company/manufacturer whose
           goods  were  liable  to  excise  duty  at  a  reduced  rate   in
           consequence of an exemption notification, while paying  duty  at
           reduced rate collected duty at a higher rate  i.e.  tariff  rate
           from its customers the authorities  were  justified  in  holding
           that what was being collected by the company as excise duty  was
           not excise duty but the value in substance  of  the  goods  and,
           therefore, the excess value collected by the petitioner from the
           customers was recoverable under  Section  11-A  of  the  Central
           Excises and Salt Act, 1944.”

            After explaining as aforesaid the Court  ruled  that  though  in
      respect of backward areas sales, the rate of TOT was .5%, whereas  TOT
      rate in normal area sales was 2%, yet the assessee had suppressed  the
      aforesaid data to claim TOT deduction @ 2% to compute  the  assessable
      value on the entire sales including sales made in backward area.  This
      was wrong and  the  department  was  justified  in  calling  upon  the
      assessee to pay the differential excise duty.

    15. The Court in the said decision has observed that by claiming higher
        deduction @ 2% instead of .5%, the assessee was gaining a  windfall
        and this was not justified.  It was further observed  that  TOMCO’s
        case was decided on 24th July, 1980 and at  that  time  there  were
        conflicting decisions and thereafter the Legislature  had  inserted
        explanation to Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act by  using  the  words
        “the effective duty of excise payable on goods under this Act”.

    16. In the case at  hand,
the  assessee  has  claimed  that  there  is
        difference between grant of incentive and extension of  benefit  of
        exemption, and the scheme, i.e., the “Rajasthan Sales Tax Incentive
        Scheme 1989” does  not  relate  to  exemption  but  incentive.   
To
        elaborate, the assessee, under the said  Scheme,  is  permitted  to
        retain 75% of the sales tax collected as incentive and is liable to
        pay 25% to the department.  75% of the  amount  retained  has  been
        treated as incentive by the State Government.
It  is  pointed  out
        that such retention of sales tax is a deemed payment of  sales  tax
        to the State exchequer and for the said purpose reliance is  placed
        on Circular No. 378/11/98-CX dated 12.3.1998 issued by C.B.E.C.

    17. In the aforesaid circular, three situations were  envisaged,  viz.,
        (i) exemption from payment of sales tax for  a  particular  period;
        (ii) deferment of payment of sales tax for a particular period; and
        (iii) grant of incentive equivalent to sales  tax  payable  by  the
        unit.  The aforestated three situations had been  examined  by  the
        Board in  consultation  with  the  Ministry  of  Law.   As  far  as
        situation (iii) is concerned, the circular stated thus: -

           “6.   Examination of the  situation,  mentioned  above  in  para
           2(ii) & (iii), in the referring note  give  an  indication  that
           sales tax is payable by the assessee in both the situations.  It
           is payable after a particular period in the second case.  On the
           other hand, in the third situation, the sales tax is  considered
           payable by the assessee even though it  is  paid  by  the  State
           Government,  the  assessee  keeping  the  said  amount  as  cash
           incentive.  In this situation sales tax would be  considered  as
           payable  within  the  meaning  of  the  provisions  of   Section
           4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act.

           7.    We are therefore, of the opinion that in the  category  of
           cases mentioned in  para  2(i),  sales  tax  is  not  deductible
           whereas in the category of cases mentioned  at  (ii)  and  (iii)
           sales  tax  is  deductible  from   the   wholesale   price   for
           determination of assessable value under Section 4 of the Act for
           levy of Central Excise duty.”

    18. To understand the purpose of the aforesaid  two  paragraphs  it  is
        also necessary to refer to the note  given  by  the  Board  seeking
        opinion of the Ministry of Law in respect of situation (iii)  which
        is a part of the said circular.  It reads as follows: -

           “In situation (iii), the manufacturer  collects  the  sales  tax
           from the buyers and retains the same with him instead of  paying
           it to the State Government.  The State Government on  the  other
           hand grants a cash incentive equivalent to the amount  of  sales
           tax payable and instead of the case incentive being paid to  the
           manufacturer, is credited to State Government account as payment
           towards sales tax by the  manufacturer.   In  such  a  situation
           sales tax is also considered payable by the assessee within  the
           meaning of the provisions of Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the  Central
           Excise Act, 1944.  Therefore, sales tax is deductible  from  the
           wholesale price for determination of assessable value  for  levy
           of Central Excise duty in category of cases  mentioned  in  para
           (ii) & (iii) above.”

    19. On perusal of the assessment orders brought on record, it is  quite
        clear that in pursuance of the Scheme 75% of the sales  tax  amount
        was credited to the account of  the  State  Government  as  payment
        towards sales tax by the manufacturer.  On a  studied  scrutiny  of
        the scheme we have no scintilla of doubt that  it  is  a  pure  and
        simple incentive scheme, regard being had to the language  employed
        therein.  In  fact,  by  no  stretch  of  imagination,  it  can  be
        construed as a Scheme pertaining  to  exemption.   Thus,  analysed,
        though 25% of sales tax is paid to the State Government, the  State
        Government instead of  giving  certain  amount  towards  industrial
        incentive, grants incentive in the form of retention of  75%  sales
        tax amount by the assessee.  In a case of exemption, sales  tax  is
        neither collectable nor payable and if still an  assessee  collects
        any amount on the head of sales tax, that would become the price of
        the goods.  Therefore, an incentive scheme of  the  present  nature
        has to be treated on a different footing because the sales  tax  is
        collected and a part of it is  retained  by  the  assessee  towards
        incentive which is subject to assessment under the local sales  tax
        law and, as a matter of fact,  assessments  have  been  accordingly
        framed.  In this factual backdrop, it has to be held that  circular
        entitles an assessee to claim deduction towards sales tax from  the
        assessable value.  The fact  situation  in  Modipon  Fibre  Company
        (supra), as is manifest, was different.  In our considered  opinion
        what has been stated in Modipon Fibre Company (supra) cannot not be
        extended to include the situation (iii).  We are inclined to  think
        so as the definition of term  “value”  under  Section  4(4)(d)  was
        slightly differently worded and the CBEC had clarified the same  in
        the circular dated 12.3.1998 and benefits were granted.

    20. The question that would still remain alive is that  what  would  be
        the effect of amendment of Section 4 which has come into force with
        effect  from  1.7.2000.   The   Section   4(3)(d)   which   defines
        “transaction value”, reads as follows: -

           “4.   Valuation of excisable goods for purposes of  charging  of
           duty of excise. –

           (1) & (2)   *          *

           (3) For the purposes of this section, -

           (a) to (cc)            *          *          *

           (d) “transaction value” means the price actually paid or payable
           for the goods, when sold, and includes in addition to the amount
           charged as price, any amount that the buyer is liable to pay to,
           or on behalf of, the assessee, by reason of,  or  in  connection
           with the sale, whether payable at the time of the sale or at any
           other time, including, but not limited to,  any  amount  charged
           for,  or  to  make  provision  for,  advertising  or  publicity,
           marketing and selling organization  expenses,  storage,  outward
           handling, servicing, warranty, commission or any  other  matter;
           but does not include the amount of duty of excise, sales tax and
           other taxes, if any, actually paid or actually payable  on  such
           goods.”

    21. After the substitution of the old Section 4 of the Act by Act 10 of
        2000 as reproduced hereinabove, the Central  Board  of  Excise  and
        Customs, New Delhi, issued certain circulars and vide circular  No.
        671/62/2000-CX dated 9.10.2002 clarified  the  circular  issued  on
        1.7.2000.  In the said circular reference was made to  the  earlier
        circular No. 2/94-CX 1 dated 11.1.1994.  It has  been  observed  in
        the circular that after coming into force of  new  Section  4  with
        effect from 1.7.2000 wherein the concept of transaction  value  has
        been incorporated and the earlier explanation has been deleted, the
        circular had lost its relevance.  However,  after  so  stating  the
        said circular addressed to the representations  received  from  the
        Chambers of Commerce, Associations, assessees as well as the  field
        formations and in the context stated thus: -

           “5.   The matter has been examined in the Board.  It is observed
           that assessees charge and collect sales tax from their buyers at
           rates  notified  by   the   State   Government   for   different
           commodities.   For  manufacture  of  excisable  goods  assessees
           procure raw materials, in  some  State,  by  paying  sales  tax/
           purchase tax on them (in  some  States,  like  New  Delhi),  raw
           materials are purchased against forms ST-1/ST-35 without  paying
           any tax).  While depositing sales tax with the Sales Tax  Deptt.
           (on a monthly or quarterly basis), the  assessee  deposits  only
           the net amount of  sales  tax  after  deducting  set  off/rebate
           admissible, either in full or in part, on the sales tax/purchase
           tax paid on the raw materials  during  the  said  month/quarter.
           The sales tax set off in such cases, therefore,  does  not  work
           like the central excise set off notifications where one  to  one
           relationship is to be established between the  finished  product
           and the raw materials and the assessee is allowed to charge only
           the net central excise duty from the buyer in the invoice.
The
           difference between the set off operating in respect  of  central
           excise duty and that for  sales  tax  can  be  best  illustrated
           through an example.  
If the sales tax on a product ‘A’ of  value
           Rs.100/- is, say 5% and the set off available in respect of  the
           purchase  tax/  sales  tax  paid  on  inputs  going   into   the
           manufacture of the product is, say, Re.1/-, then the  sales  tax
           law permits the assessee to recover sales tax  of  Rs.5/-.   But
           while paying to the sales tax deptt. be deposits  an  amount  of
           Rs.5-1 = Rs.4 only.  On the central excise  duty  payable  would
           have been Rs.5-1 = Rs.4, in view of the  set  off  notification,
           and the assessee would recover an amount of Rs.4 only  from  the
           buyer as Central Excise duty.  Thus, it is seen that the set off
           scheme in respect of sales tax operate in these  cases  somewhat
           like the CENVAT  Scheme  which  does  not  have  the  effect  of
           changing the rate of duty payable on the finished product.

           6.    Therefore, since the set off scheme of sales tax does  not
           change the rate of sales tax payable/ chargeable on the finished
           goods, the  set  off  is  not  to  be  taken  into  account  for
           calculating the amount of sales tax permissible as abatement for
           arriving at the assessable value u/s 4.   In  other  words  only
           that amount of sales tax will be permissible as deduction  under
           Section 4 as is equal to the amount  legally  permissible  under
           the local sales tax laws to be charged/billed from the customer/
           buyer.”

                                                            [Emphasis added]

    22. It is  evincible  from  the  language  employed  in  the  aforesaid
        circular that set off is to be taken into account  for  calculating
        the  amount  of  sales  tax  permissible  for   arriving   at   the
        “transaction value” under Section 4 of the Act because the set  off
        does not change the rate of sales tax payable/  chargeable,  but  a
        lower amount is in fact paid due to set off of the sales  tax  paid
        on the input.  Thus, if sales tax was not paid on the  input,  full
        amount is payable and has  to  be  excluded  for  arriving  at  the
        “transaction value”.  That is not the factual matrix in the present
        case.  The assessee in the present  case  has  paid  only  25%  and
        retained 75% of the amount which was collected as sales  tax.   75%
        of the amount collected was retained and became the profit  or  the
        effective cost paid to the assessee by the purchaser.   The  amount
        payable as sales tax was only 25% of the normal sales tax.  Purpose
        and objective in defining “transaction value” or value in  relation
        to excisable goods is obvious.  The  price  or  cost  paid  to  the
        manufacturer constitutes the assessable value on which excise  duty
        is payable.  It is also obvious that the excise duty payable has to
        be excluded while calculating transaction value for levy of  excise
        duty.  Sales tax or VAT or turnover tax is payable or paid  to  the
        State Government on the transaction, which  is  regarded  as  sale,
        i.e., for transfer of title in the manufactured goods.  The  amount
        paid or payable to the State Government  towards  sales  tax,  VAT,
        etc.  is  excluded  because  it  is  not  an  amount  paid  to  the
        manufacturer towards the price, but an amount paid  or  payable  to
        the State Government for the sale transaction,  i.e.,  transfer  of
        title from the manufacturer to a  third  party.   Accordingly,  the
        amount paid to the State Government is  only  excludible  from  the
        transaction value.  What is not payable or  to  be  paid  as  sales
        tax/VAT, should not be charged from the third  party/customer,  but
        if it charged and is not payable or paid, it is a part  and  should
        not be excluded from the transaction value.  This is  the  position
        after the amendment, for as per the  amended  provision  the  words
        “transaction value” mean payment made on actual basis  or  actually
        paid by the  assessee.   The  words  that  gain  signification  are
        “actually paid”.  The situation after 1.7.2000  does  not  cover  a
        situation which was covered under the circular dated 12.3.1998.  Be
        that as it may, the clear legislative intent, as it seems to us, is
        on “actually paid”.  The question of “actually  payable”  does  not
        arise in this case.

    23. In view of the aforesaid legal position, unless the  sales  tax  is
        actually paid to the Sales Tax Department of the State  Government,
        no benefit towards excise duty can be given under  the  concept  of
        “transaction  value”  under  Section  4(4)(d),  for   it   is   not
        excludible.  As is seen from  the  facts,  25%  of  the  sales  tax
        collected has been paid to the State exchequer by way  of  deposit.
        The rest of the amount has been retained by the assessee.  That has
        to be treated as the price of the goods under the basic fundamental
        conception of “transaction value” as substituted with  effect  from
        1.7.2000.  Therefore, the assessee is bound to pay the excise  duty
        on the said sum after the amended  provision  had  brought  on  the
        statute book.

    24. What is urged by the learned  counsel  for  the  assessee  is  that
        paragraphs 5 and 6 of the circular dated 9.10.2002 do protect them,
        as has been more clearly stated  in  paragraph  5.   To  elaborate,
        sales tax having been paid on the  inputs/raw  materials,  that  is
        excluded from the excise duty when price is computed.   Eventually,
        the amount of tax paid is less than the amount of tax  payable  and
        hence, the concept of “actually paid” gets  satisfied.   Judged  on
        this anvil the submission of the learned counsel for  the  assessee
        that it would get benefit  of  paragraph  6  of  the  circular,  is
        unacceptable.  The assessee can only get the benefit on the  amount
        that has actually been paid.  The circular does not  take  note  of
        any  kind  of  book  adjustment  and  correctly  so,  because   the
        dictionary clause has been amended.  We may, at  this  stage,  also
        clarify the position relating to circulars.  Binding  nature  of  a
        circular was examined by the Constitution Bench in  CCE  v.  Dhiren
        Chemicals  Industries[5],  and  it  was  held  that  if  there  are
        circulars issued by CBEC which placed different interpretation upon
        a phrase in  the  statute,  the  interpretation  suggested  in  the
        circular would  be  binding  on  the  Revenue,  regardless  of  the
        interpretation placed by this Court.  
In CCE  v.  Ratan  Melting  &
        Wire Industries[6], the Constitution Bench clarifying paragraph  11
        in Dhiren Chemicals Industries (supra) has stated thus: -
           “7.   Circulars and instructions issued  by  the  Board  are  no
           doubt binding in law on the  authorities  under  the  respective
           statutes, but when the Supreme Court or the High Court  declares
           the law on the question arising for consideration, it would  not
           be appropriate for the court to direct that the circular  should
           be given effect to and not the view expressed in a  decision  of
           this   Court   or   the   High   Court.   So    far    as    the
           clarifications/circulars issued by the Central Government and of
           the State Government are concerned they represent  merely  their
           understanding of the statutory provisions. They are not  binding
           upon the court.  It  is  for  the  court  to  declare  what  the
           particular provision of statute says  and  it  is  not  for  the
           executive. Looked at from another angle,  a  circular  which  is
           contrary to the statutory provisions has really no existence  in
           law.”

    25. The legal position has been reiterated in the State of  Tamil  Nadu
        and Anr. v. India Cement Ltd.[7]  Therefore, reliance placed on the
        circular dated 9.10.2002 by the tribunal is  legally  impermissible
        for two reasons, namely, the circular does not so lay down, and had
        it so stated that would  have  been  contrary  to  the  legislative
        intention.

    26. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the considered opinion
        that the assessees in all the  appeals  are  entitled  to  get  the
        benefit  of  the  circular  dated  12.3.1998  which  protects   the
        industrial units availing incentive scheme as there is a conceptual
        book adjustment of the sales tax paid to the Department.  But  with
        effect from 1.7.2000 they shall only be entitled to the benefit  of
        the amount “actually paid” to the Department, i.e., 25%.   Needless
        to emphasise, the set off shall operate  only  in  respect  of  the
        amount that has been paid on the raw material and inputs  on  which
        the sales tax/ purchase tax has been paid.  That being the position
        the adjudication by the tribunal is not sustainable.  Similarly the
        determination by the original adjudicating authority requiring  the
        assessees to deposit or pay the whole amount and the  consequential
        imposition of  penalty  also  cannot  be  held  to  be  defensible.
        Therefore, we allow the appeals  in  part,  set  aside  the  orders
        passed by the tribunal as well  as  by  the  original  adjudicating
        authority and remit the matters  to  the  respective  tribunals  to
        adjudicate as far as excise duty is concerned  in  accordance  with
        the principles set out hereinabove.  We further clarify that as far
        as imposition of penalty is concerned, it shall be  dealt  with  in
        accordance with law governing the field.  In any  case,  proceeding
        relating to the period prior to 1.7.2000 would stand closed and  if
        any amount has been paid or deposited as per the direction  of  any
        authority in respect of the said period, shall be refunded.  As far
        as  the  subsequent  period  is  concerned,  the   tribunal   shall
        adjudicate as per the principles stated hereinbefore.

    27. Coming to the appeals preferred by  the  assessees,  the  challenge
        pertains to denial of benefit of the Central  Sales  Tax  Act,  the
        aforesaid reasoning will equally apply.  The  submission  that  the
        concession of excise duty is granted by the  Excise  Department  of
        the Central Government is not acceptable.   On  a  perusal  of  the
        circulars dated 12.3.1998 and 1.7.2002 we do  not  find  that  they
        remotely relate to  any  exemption  under  the  Central  Sales  Tax
        imposed on the goods.  
What is argued by the  learned  counsel  for
        the assessees is that the benefit should be extended to the Central
        Sales Tax as the tax on sales has a broader concept.  The aforesaid
        submission is noted to be rejected and we, accordingly,  repel  the
        same.  In view of the  aforesaid,  the  appeals  preferred  by  the
        assessees stand dismissed.

    28. In the result, both sets of appeals stand disposed of  accordingly.
        There shall be no order as to costs.



                                                             ……………………………….J.

                [Anil R. Dave]



                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]

      New Delhi;
      February 28, 2014.
-----------------------
[1]    (2007) 10 SCC 3
[2]    1980 (6) ELT 768 (Bom)
[3]    1984 (18) ELT 701 (Bom)
[4]    1987 (30) ELT 217 (Bom)
[5]    (2002) 2 SCC 127
[6]    (2008) 13 SCC 1
[7]    (2011) 13 SCC 247


Friday, February 28, 2014

Quashing of complaint - Medical Negligence - Judicial Negligence - Private complaint against accused after two years of discharge of patient as the Hospital issued a cheque bounce notice against the cheque issued towards fee by patient - Accused filed a petition to quash the complaint - High court wrongly framed an issue that the patient was died and under the same impression dismissed the petition of accused - correction petition filed by accused was also allowed in review pending appeal with out notice to accused - Apex court held that it is nothing but a Judicial Negligence , other wise with out pleadings , how the high court come to a conclusion that the patient is dead and after judgment how the high court correct the mistake as typographical when the order itself based on that finding and as such set aside the order of the High court and allowed the petition = Daljit Singh Gujral & Ors. .. Appellants Versus Jagjit Singh Arora & Ors. .. Respondents = 2014(Feb.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41269

Quashing of complaint - Medical Negligence - Judicial Negligence - Private complaint against accused after two years of discharge of patient as the Hospital issued a cheque bounce notice against the cheque issued towards fee by patient - Accused filed a petition to quash the complaint - High court wrongly framed an issue that the patient was died and under the same impression dismissed the petition of accused - correction petition filed by accused was also allowed in review pending appeal with out notice to accused - Apex court held that it is nothing but a Judicial Negligence , other wise with out pleadings , how the high court come to a conclusion that the patient is dead and after judgment how the high court correct the mistake as typographical when the order itself based on that finding and as such set aside the order of the High court and allowed the petition = 

the  judgment  is
vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record, which goes  to  the
very root of the matter in a case relating to medical negligence.=

 We are dealing with the case of  medical  negligence  and  we  wonder
whether this case borders on judicial negligence or the  negligence  of  the
parties to point out that the issue was wrongly  framed.  
Pleadings  of  the
parties nowhere state that the patient is dead.  
Learned  Single  Judge,  it
is seen, has framed  two  issues,  after  perusing  the  records  and  after
hearing the arguments of the learned  counsel  for  the  parties.   
When  we
peruse the records, as already stated, we do not  find  any  statement  that
the wife of Respondent No. 1 is no more.  
The entire thought process of  the
Judge centered round  on  an  incorrect  premise  that,  due  to  the  gross
negligence on the part of the appellants,  the  wife  of  Respondent  No.  1
died.

14.   We may also  further  indicate  that  the  learned  Single  Judge  has
expressed the opinion so expressively  in  the  judgment  which  practically
forecloses all the defences available to the parties, who  are  supposed  to
face the trial.  The learned Single Judge, though ultimately indicated  that
the view is only a prima facie view, but a reading of the  entire  judgment,
it would show otherwise.   Judgment  cannot  be  sustained  on  any  ground.
Consequently, the judgment dated 16.11.2012 as well as the subsequent  order
11.2.2013 passed in the review petition, would stand set aside.    The  High
Court is directed to rehear Crl. Misc. Petition No.M-25733 of  2011  afresh.


15.   The Appeals are, accordingly, allowed.

2014(Feb.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41269
K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, VIKRAMAJIT SEN
                                                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 506-508 OF 2014
              [Arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos.2421-2423 of 2013]


Daljit Singh Gujral & Ors.              .. Appellants

      Versus

Jagjit Singh Arora & Ors.                    .. Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T



K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.


1.    Leave granted.


2.    We are of the  considered  view,  after  hearing  the  senior  counsel
appearing for the Appellant and the party-in-person, that  the  judgment  is
vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record, which goes  to  the
very root of the matter in a case relating to medical negligence.

3.    The Appellants herein approached the High Court of  Punjab  &  Haryana
under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short  “Cr.P.C.”)  for
quashing complaint Case  No.7506/09/11  dated  9.6.2008  and  the  summoning
order 26.7.2011 passed by the Court of Judicial  Magistrate  (First  Class),
Chandigarh.

4.    The Appellants herein are in  the  management  of  a  hospital  named,
INSCOL Multispecialty  Hospital,  Chandigarh.   On  1.8.2005,  the  wife  of
Respondent No.1, by name, Inderjeet Arora, approached  Dr.  Jayant  Banerjee
and, on his advice, she was referred to the above-mentioned  hospital.   She
was admitted in the ICU by Dr. Jayant Banerjee and was attended  by  doctors
of the hospital.  Later, she was discharged from the  hospital  on  2.8.2005
on the request of son of Respondent  No.1.  On  a  total  hospital  bill  of
Rs.1,01,858/- a sum of Rs.30,000/- was paid and, for rest of the  amount,  a
cheque was issued by Respondent No.1, husband of the patient.  On  9.8.2005,
the cheque was presented by the bankers of the hospital, but  the  same  was
dishonoured, which fact was brought to the notice of Respondent No.1 by  the
hospital  authorities.   Thereafter,  the  cheque  was  presented  twice  on
12.11.2005 as well as on 16.11.2005 but, on both occasions, the  cheque  was
dishonoured.   Later, a legal notice under Section  138  of  the  Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, was issued to Respondent  No.1  claiming  the  cheque
amount.  According to the Appellants, this annoyed  Respondent  No.1  and  a
complaint was filed against the doctors of the hospital  before  the  Punjab
Medical Council.   The Medical Board met on 3.10.2006 and,  after  examining
the complaint as well as the comments of the doctors,  passed  an  order  on
the same date exonerating Dr. Jayant Banerjee holding that proper  procedure
was followed and there was no gross negligence on the part of  the  hospital
authorities or the Doctors.   Respondent No.1, after a lapse of  two  years,
on 9.6.2008, filed a complaint  under  Section  156(3)  Cr.P.C.  before  the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, UT Chandigarh for  registration  of  FIR  against
the Appellants  for  the  commission  of  offence  under  various  sections,
including Section 15(2)(3) of the Indian Medical  Council  Act,  1956.   The
learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandigarh, on 13.6.2008 sent  the
complaint for registration as it was  under  Section  156(3)  Cr.P.C.    The
said order was challenged by the Appellants by filing  Crl.  Misc.  Petition
No.17013 of 2008 before the Punjab & Haryana High  Court.   The  High  Court
vide its order dated 19.2.2009  quashed  the  FIR  by  granting  liberty  to
Respondent  No.1  to  approach  the  Judicial   Magistrate,   First   Class,
Chandigarh.   Before  the  Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class,  Chandigarh,
Respondent No.1 submitted that he did not want to press the complaint  under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., but requested  that  the  complaint  be  treated  as
under Section 202 Cr.P.C.  The learned  Magistrate,  entertaining  the  said
request, passed the order dated 26.7.2011 and  summoned  the  Appellants  to
face the trial for the offences punishable  under  Section  420/467/468/471/
326/120-B IPC and under Section 15 of the Indian Medical Council Act.

5.    Aggrieved by the summoning order, as already  stated,  the  Appellants
preferred Crl. Misc. No.M-25733 of 2011 before the High Court  for  quashing
the complaint Case No.7506/09/11.   The  High  Court  vide  impugned  order,
dismissed  the  Crl.  Misc.  Petition.   Later,  Respondent  No.1  filed  an
application being Crl. Misc. No.7776 of 2013 in  Crl.  Misc.  No.M-25733  of
2011, requesting the Court to carry  out  the  correction  of  the  judgment
praying that the word “death” or “died” be stated to be read  as  “brink  of
death”.   Review Petition was allowed by  the  High  Court  vide  its  order
dated 11.2.2013,  without  notice  to  the  appellants.   Those  orders,  as
already indicated, are under challenge in these appeals.

6.     We  heard  Shri  P.S.  Patwalia,  learned  senior  counsel  for   the
Appellants, as well as Shri Jagjit Singh  Arora,  who  appeared  in  person.
Shri Patwalia submitted that the judgment  as  well  as  the  order  in  the
review petition is vitiated by serious error on the face of the  record  and
liable to be set aside and the High Court be directed to rehear  the  matter
in accordance with law. Respondent No.1, the party-in-person, on  the  other
hand, submitted, on facts as well as on  law,  that  the  judgment  and  the
order in the review petition are unassailable  and,  therefore,  the  matter
could be examined by this Court on merits.

7.    We have gone through the main judgment and the  order  passed  in  the
review petition in their entirety.  The learned Single  Judge  of  the  High
Court while deciding the case formulated  two  questions  ,  which  read  as
follows :-
      “1.    Whether  the  Managing  Director  and   the   Director,   being
           administrators of the Hospital can be made criminally liable and
           prosecuted under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and for
           having appointed unqualified doctor which  resulted  into  wrong
           treatment and consequential death of  a  patient  and  can  they
           claim immunity from prosecution for the offences in  which  they
           have been summoned in the present complaint?
                                                         (emphasis supplied)


      2.    Whether the offences of cheating, tampering with  the  documents
           and causing grievous hurt are made out in conspiracy  with  each
           other?

8.    On the first point, after going through the facts in detail and  after
hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge concluded as follows :
      “In the present case, Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 being  Managing  Director
      and Director are directly criminally liable and their liability  stems
      from failure to use reasonable care in the  maintenance  of  safe  and
      adequate facilities  and  equipment  i.e.  ventilator  which  was  not
      available at the time when the patient was in need.   Needless to say,
      it is the duty of the petitioner No.1 and 2 to select and retain  only
      competent physician/doctor and medical supporting staff.  But in  this
      case, they had retained petitioner no.3 who is an unqualified  doctor.
      It is the duty of the petitioner nos.1 and 2 to  oversee  all  persons
      who practice medicine within its faculty and also owe duty  to  ensure
      quality of health care services.   Here  in  this  case,  there  is  a
      glaring failure on the part  of  petitioner  nos.1  and  2  to  retain
      competent and qualified doctors and equipping  the  facility.  In  the
      present case, the standard of negligence, breach  of  duty,  causation
      and damage  is  no  different  than  in  any  other  case  of  forming
      negligence.  Hence, for that reason, petitioners are  directly  liable
      for the injury caused to the patient because the  doctor  in  question
      was not having State Medical Council licence to practice  medicine  as
      per the Medical Council of India Act,  1961  and  Medical  Council  of
      India Rules  under  which  Medical  Council  of  India  certifies  the
      doctors/physicians and regulate competency and professional standards.
      There is a clear failure on the part of  petitioner  nos.1  and  2  to
      evaluate the qualification of petitioner no.3 who has been inefficient
      to adequately determine his competency.  Since there has  been  breach
      of duty by petitioner nos.1 and 2, they are  prima  facie  responsible
      for injury resulting from  that  breach/incompetence  as  well  as  in
      forging the  documents.   There  is  a  clear  failure  to  check  the
      credentials and employment history of petitioner no.3.”


On the second question, after referring to the various  statements  made  by
Dr. Sudhir Saxena and the evidence of complainant (CW9) and  also  referring
to the invoices CW-9/2 and CW-9/12, the learned Single  Judge  concluded  as
follows:


      “This prima facie proves forgery and  cheating  on  the  part  of  the
      petitioners.   The documentary evidence prima facie  proves  that  Dr.
      N.P. Singh never visited the hospital and the record of  the  hospital
      has been manipulated to save themselves.   There is a clear conspiracy
      between the petitioners and Dr. Jayant Banerjee  for  fleecing  money.
      The principles of law laid down in  Jacob  Mathew  (supra)  and  Kusum
      Sharma (supra) are not applicable in the present case.


      In view of  the  above  discussion,  this  Court  does  not  find  any
      illegality or perversity in the impugned summoning order.  It is  well
      settled law that while summoning an accused, the trial  Court  is  not
      required to give detailed reasons, only  prima  facie  application  of
      mind is a necessity.   In the present case, the  learned  trial  Court
      has passed a reasoned order for summoning the petitioners.”


9.    We notice that on reaching those conclusions,  as  already  indicated,
the very first issue framed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  was  that  the
patient died due to wrong treatment and medical negligence.  Learned  Single
Judge was examining prima  facie  the  issue  of  medical  negligence  which
resulted in the death of the patient.  The entire approach  of  the  learned
Single Judge while entering a finding on the two questions framed  was  that
due to medical negligence, the patient died.  The said fact is reflected  in
the whole gamut of the judgment.   In  one  portion  of  the  judgment,  the
learned Single Judge has stated as follows :
      “The condition of Mrs. Arora extremely deteriorated  and  she  had  to
      remain hospitalized in ICU of Fortis Hospital for about 2  months  and
      thereafter, she was shifted to PGI,  Chandigarh,  where  she  remained
      admitted for one month. Ultimately, she died.”


Later, the learned Single Judge also opined as follows :-

      “The hospital authorities had  employed  unqualified  doctors  in  ICU
      which resulted into death of Mrs. Arora in spite of best  efforts  for
      shifting to other  hospital,  like  Fortis  and  PGI.   Initial  wrong
      treatment in the INSCOL Hospital where the  unqualified  doctors  were
      employed resulted into death of respondent no.1’s wife which certainly
      amounts to an offence under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code.”

10.   We, therefore, notice that the entire reasoning of the learned  Single
Judge was centered round the  fact  that  he  was  dealing  with  a  medical
negligence case in which the patient died.    In  fact,  the  very  question
framed by the Court itself  refers  to  the  death  of  the  patient.    The
learned Single Judge, as already indicated, finally dismissed  the  petition
filed by the Appellants on 16.11.2012.

11.   The Respondents herein then preferred Crl. Misc.  Application  No.7776
of 2013 praying for correcting  some  omission/typographical  error  in  the
judgment.   The  learned  Single  Judge  entertained  that  application  and
expressed  the  view  that  no   notice   need   be   sent   to   the   non-
applicants/appellants since the application is only for  the  correction  of
accidental  omission/typographical  errors  crept  in  the  judgment   dated
16.11.2012.  The  learned  Single  Judge  opined  that  the  Court  has  the
inherent power to correct the typographical/clerical mistake brought to  the
notice of the Court.   The  learned  Single  Judge,  therefore,  passed  the
following order on 11.2.2013 :
      “Registry is directed to make following corrections and put up a  note
      at the end of the judgment in the shape of  corrigendum  so  that  the
      same may be read as part of the judgment dated 16.11.2012:


      “1.   The word “died” at page No.3 be read as “was brought to brink of
           death.”


      2.    The word “death” be read as “condition to  brink  of  death”  at
           page nos.3, 7 and 16  and  where  the  word  “dead”  or  “death”
           appears in the judgment, it should be as “the brink of death”.


      3.    “Grewal” be read as “Gujral” at page no.5.


      4.    “rectified” be read as “ratified” at page no.6.


      5.    “Medical Council” be read as “Chandigarh Police” at page No.10.


      6.    “Section 14(2)” be read as “Section 15(2a)” at page no.11.


      7.    “and mind of” be read as “behind” at page no.12 and 22.


      8.    “nervous centre” be read as “nerve centre” at page no.13.


      9.    “Faculty” be read as “Facility” on Page No.19,


      10.   “Dr. N.P. Singh” be read as “Dr. Sudhir Saxena” at page 24.”


12.   We do not agree that the learned Single Judge  was  merely  correcting
an accidental omission or typographical error.  By correcting the  judgment,
the very foundation and the issue formulated, broken down and  fell  on  the
ground and the issue framed by the learned Single Judge, lost its  sanctity.
  The learned Single Judge cannot correct an issue  which  has  been  framed
and answered.  As already indicated, the first issue framed is  with  regard
to the “wrong treatment and consequential death of a  patient”  and  it  was
that issue which was answered, then we  fail  to  see  how  the  application
preferred by the Respondents for review can be  treated  as  an  application
for correcting accidental omission or typographical error, that too  without
notice to the appellants herein.

13.    We are dealing with the case of  medical  negligence  and  we  wonder
whether this case borders on judicial negligence or the  negligence  of  the
parties to point out that the issue was wrongly  framed.  Pleadings  of  the
parties nowhere state that the patient is dead.  Learned  Single  Judge,  it
is seen, has framed  two  issues,  after  perusing  the  records  and  after
hearing the arguments of the learned  counsel  for  the  parties.   When  we
peruse the records, as already stated, we do not  find  any  statement  that
the wife of Respondent No. 1 is no more.  The entire thought process of  the
Judge centered round  on  an  incorrect  premise  that,  due  to  the  gross
negligence on the part of the appellants,  the  wife  of  Respondent  No.  1
died.

14.   We may also  further  indicate  that  the  learned  Single  Judge  has
expressed the opinion so expressively  in  the  judgment  which  practically
forecloses all the defences available to the parties, who  are  supposed  to
face the trial.  The learned Single Judge, though ultimately indicated  that
the view is only a prima facie view, but a reading of the  entire  judgment,
it would show otherwise.   Judgment  cannot  be  sustained  on  any  ground.
Consequently, the judgment dated 16.11.2012 as well as the subsequent  order
11.2.2013 passed in the review petition, would stand set aside.    The  High
Court is directed to rehear Crl. Misc. Petition No.M-25733 of  2011  afresh.


15.   The Appeals are, accordingly, allowed.


                                                    eard Hear……………………………..J.
                                             (K. S. Radhakrishnan)



                                                    eard Hear……………………………..J.
                                            (Vikramajit Sen)
New Delhi,
February 27, 2014.

Sec. 302 / 201 and 376 of I.P.C. - Accused filed a certificate that he is a Juvenile - Trial court send him for Medical examination - Board opined that he is 17 years, giving margin 2 years, the trail court rejected his plea - High court allowed the plea as the certificate not held as forged one by trial court - Apex court allowed the additional evidence filed by appellant one is a certificate stating that the certificate filed by accused is a forged one and another certificate was about the date of birth of the accused - Apex court summoned both the principals and examined the records and find that accused is not juvenile and held that accused was 21 years by the date of offence and as such allowed the appeal = Sikander Mahto . ... APPELLANT (S) VERSUS Tunna @ Tunnu Mian @ Tunna Mian @ ... RESPONDENT(S) @ Mobin Ansari & Anr. = 2014(Feb.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41268

Sec. 302 / 201 and 376 of I.P.C. - Accused filed a certificate that he is a Juvenile - Trial court send him for Medical examination - Board opined that he is 17 years, giving margin 2 years, the trail court rejected his plea - High court allowed the plea as the certificate not held as forged one by trial court - Apex court allowed  the additional evidence filed by appellant one is a certificate stating that the certificate filed by accused is a forged one and another certificate was about the date of birth of  the accused  - Apex court summoned both the principals and examined the records and find that accused is not juvenile and held that accused was 21 years by the date of offence and as such allowed the appeal = 
The first respondent Tunna @ Tunnu Mian @ Tunna Mian @   Mobin  Ansari
was committed to the Court of Sessions to  face  trial  for  offences  under
Sections 302/201 and 376 of the Indian Penal  Code.   The  first  respondent
filed an application claiming to be a juvenile and  in  support  thereof  he
had enclosed a certificate issued by the  Government  Primary  Urdu  School,
Shekhawa,  Basantpur,  Block  Mainatand  wherein  his  date  of  birth   was
mentioned as 15.01.1991.  The date of occurrence of the offences alleged  in
the present case is 16.11.2006.
3.    The  learned  Trial  Court,  for  reasons  not  very  clearly  stated,
recorded the finding that the certificate produced by the  first  respondent
was a forged one.  Accordingly, the first respondent was  sent  for  medical
examination by a Board.  Though the report of the Board was  to  the  effect
that the first respondent was 17 years of age, the learned Trial Court  took
the view that the said opinion would admit the possibility  of  a  variation
of  2  years.   Consequently,  the  learned  Trial  Court  by  order   dated
24.12.2007 refused to accept the claim of juvenility  raised  on  behalf  of
the first respondent.
4.    Aggrieved, the first respondent moved the Patna High Court.  By  order
dated 14.11.2008 the High Court interfered with the  order  of  the  learned
Trial Court and allowed the  application  of  the  first  respondent  herein
declaring him to be a juvenile and to be of sixteen and a half years of  age
on the date of alleged occurrence.  Challenging  the  aforesaid  finding  of
the High Court, the complainant, who is the father  of  the  victim  of  the
crime, has approached this Court. =
Additional evidence

The first document that has been brought on the record of the  present
appeal is a letter/certificate  dated  3.4.2013  issued  by  the  Principal,
Government  Primary  Urdu  School,  Shekhawa,   Basantpur,   Block-Mainatand
wherein it is mentioned that no student having the name and  particulars  of
the first respondent had ever studied in the school  in  question  and  that
the certificate issued in the name of the school is a forged document.   
The
second document is another certificate issued by the  Principal,  Government
Primary School, Purbi  Paukuahwa,  Block-Mainatand,  West  Champaran,  Bihar
which states that the particulars of the first  respondent  are  entered  in
the records of the said school and that his date of birth  as  mentioned  in
the school admission register is 28.11.1985.  
As the controversy arising  in
the present case is capable of being resolved on the basis of the  aforesaid
two documents, reference to any other  document  would  be  superfluous  and
hence is avoided.
8.    The first  respondent  has  not  filed  any  affidavit  or  objections
denying the veracity of the two certificates referred  to  above.  
However,
as the Court had to be satisfied with  the  authenticity  of  the  said  two
documents, on 27.01.2014 the following order was passed.
           “In order to find out the age of Respondent No.1-accused on  the
           date of occurrence, we direct the Principal, Government  Primary
           Urdu  School,   Shekhawa,   Basantpur,   Block-Mainatand,   West
           Champaran, Bihar and Principal, Government Primary School, Purbi
           Paukuahwa, Block-Mainatand,  West  Champaran,  Bihar  to  appear
           alongwith the connected original record  before  this  Court  on
           24th February, 2014.


                 List on 24th February, 2014”

9.    Pursuant thereto the Principal of the two schools  appeared  in  Court
today alongwith the records in original.  The said  records  would  indicate
that there is no record of the first respondent  being  enrolled  or  having
studied in the Government Primary Urdu School, Shekhawa,  Basantpur,  Block-
Mainatand.  From  the  records  of  the  Government  Primary  School,  Purbi
Paukuahwa, Block-Mainatand, West Champaran, Bihar it  is  evident  that  the
first respondent had enrolled himself in the said school on  08.01.1996  and
his date of birth is recorded in the admission register as 28.11.1985.   The
relevant records placed before this Court  by  the  Principals  of  the  two
schools pursuant to the order dated 27.01.2014 therefore indicates that  the
claim of the first respondent to be a juvenile remains unsubstantiated  and,
in fact, the records of the school where  he  was  enrolled  would  indicate
that his date of birth is 28.11.1985.  Properly  calculated  with  reference
to the date of the alleged crime, the first respondent  was  aged  about  21
years on the relevant date and therefore he was not a juvenile.
10.   We, therefore, cannot sustain the order  dated  14.11.2008  passed  by
the High Court. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside  the  said
order dated 14.11.2008 passed by the High Court and restore the order  dated
24.12.2007 passed by the learned Trial Court.

2014(Feb.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41268
P SATHASIVAM, RANJAN GOGOI
                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL  NO.511 OF 2014
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 9028 OF 2011)


Sikander Mahto               .           ...    APPELLANT (S)

                                   VERSUS

Tunna @ Tunnu Mian @ Tunna Mian @    ...  RESPONDENT(S)
@ Mobin Ansari & Anr.



                               J U D G M E N T


RANJAN GOGOI, J.
1.    Leave granted.
2.    The first respondent Tunna @ Tunnu Mian @ Tunna Mian @   Mobin  Ansari
was committed to the Court of Sessions to  face  trial  for  offences  under
Sections 302/201 and 376 of the Indian Penal  Code.   The  first  respondent
filed an application claiming to be a juvenile and  in  support  thereof  he
had enclosed a certificate issued by the  Government  Primary  Urdu  School,
Shekhawa,  Basantpur,  Block  Mainatand  wherein  his  date  of  birth   was
mentioned as 15.01.1991.  The date of occurrence of the offences alleged  in
the present case is 16.11.2006.
3.    The  learned  Trial  Court,  for  reasons  not  very  clearly  stated,
recorded the finding that the certificate produced by the  first  respondent
was a forged one.  Accordingly, the first respondent was  sent  for  medical
examination by a Board.  Though the report of the Board was  to  the  effect
that the first respondent was 17 years of age, the learned Trial Court  took
the view that the said opinion would admit the possibility  of  a  variation
of  2  years.   Consequently,  the  learned  Trial  Court  by  order   dated
24.12.2007 refused to accept the claim of juvenility  raised  on  behalf  of
the first respondent.
4.    Aggrieved, the first respondent moved the Patna High Court.  By  order
dated 14.11.2008 the High Court interfered with the  order  of  the  learned
Trial Court and allowed the  application  of  the  first  respondent  herein
declaring him to be a juvenile and to be of sixteen and a half years of  age
on the date of alleged occurrence.  Challenging  the  aforesaid  finding  of
the High Court, the complainant, who is the father  of  the  victim  of  the
crime, has approached this Court.
5.    A reply has been filed on  behalf  of  the  first  respondent  in  the
present appeal wherein reliance has, once again, been placed on  the  school
certificate issued by the Government Urdu School Shekhwa, Basantpur,  Distt.
East Champaran  reference  to  which  has  been  made  earlier.   The  first
respondent in his reply has also contended that the report  of  the  medical
examination clearly indicates that he was a minor on the relevant  date  and
that there is no reason as to why the said  medical  report  should  not  be
accepted.
6.    The appellant has been allowed by this Court leave to bring on  record
certain documents which, according to  the  appellant,  have  a  significant
bearing to the issues arising in the present case.
7.    The first document that has been brought on the record of the  present
appeal is a letter/certificate  dated  3.4.2013  issued  by  the  Principal,
Government  Primary  Urdu  School,  Shekhawa,   Basantpur,   Block-Mainatand
wherein it is mentioned that no student having the name and  particulars  of
the first respondent had ever studied in the school  in  question  and  that
the certificate issued in the name of the school is a forged document.   The
second document is another certificate issued by the  Principal,  Government
Primary School, Purbi  Paukuahwa,  Block-Mainatand,  West  Champaran,  Bihar
which states that the particulars of the first  respondent  are  entered  in
the records of the said school and that his date of birth  as  mentioned  in
the school admission register is 28.11.1985.  As the controversy arising  in
the present case is capable of being resolved on the basis of the  aforesaid
two documents, reference to any other  document  would  be  superfluous  and
hence is avoided.
8.    The first  respondent  has  not  filed  any  affidavit  or  objections
denying the veracity of the two certificates referred  to  above.   However,
as the Court had to be satisfied with  the  authenticity  of  the  said  two
documents, on 27.01.2014 the following order was passed.
           “In order to find out the age of Respondent No.1-accused on  the
           date of occurrence, we direct the Principal, Government  Primary
           Urdu  School,   Shekhawa,   Basantpur,   Block-Mainatand,   West
           Champaran, Bihar and Principal, Government Primary School, Purbi
           Paukuahwa, Block-Mainatand,  West  Champaran,  Bihar  to  appear
           alongwith the connected original record  before  this  Court  on
           24th February, 2014.


                 List on 24th February, 2014”

9.    Pursuant thereto the Principal of the two schools  appeared  in  Court
today alongwith the records in original.  The said  records  would  indicate
that there is no record of the first respondent  being  enrolled  or  having
studied in the Government Primary Urdu School, Shekhawa,  Basantpur,  Block-
Mainatand.  From  the  records  of  the  Government  Primary  School,  Purbi
Paukuahwa, Block-Mainatand, West Champaran, Bihar it  is  evident  that  the
first respondent had enrolled himself in the said school on  08.01.1996  and
his date of birth is recorded in the admission register as 28.11.1985.   The
relevant records placed before this Court  by  the  Principals  of  the  two
schools pursuant to the order dated 27.01.2014 therefore indicates that  the
claim of the first respondent to be a juvenile remains unsubstantiated  and,
in fact, the records of the school where  he  was  enrolled  would  indicate
that his date of birth is 28.11.1985.  Properly  calculated  with  reference
to the date of the alleged crime, the first respondent  was  aged  about  21
years on the relevant date and therefore he was not a juvenile.
10.   We, therefore, cannot sustain the order  dated  14.11.2008  passed  by
the High Court. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside  the  said
order dated 14.11.2008 passed by the High Court and restore the order  dated
24.12.2007 passed by the learned Trial Court.


                                       ...…………………………CJI.
                                        [P. SATHASIVAM]



                                        .........………………………J.
                                        [RANJAN GOGOI]
NEW DELHI,
FEBRUARY  27, 2014.
-----------------------
6


Contempt petition - violating the interim order given in respect of sharing of MBBS AND BDS ETC, between private medical college and State government quota - private colleges made excess admissions - tendered unconditional apology - Apex court held that The excess 107 admissions made by the Medical College for the MBBS during the year 2011-12 and the previous year, be adjusted in the session 2014-15 in full taking note of the full sanctioned strength and the balance seats be adjusted in the year 2015-16. The unconditional and unqualified apology tendered by the contemnors is accepted, but the contemnors are directed to pay a fine of Rs.50 lakhs in two months from today, to the State Government. Ordered accordingly =State of M.P. & Anr. … Petitioners Versus Suresh Narayan Vijayvargiya & Ors. … Respondents = 2014(Feb.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41270

Contempt petition - violating the interim order given in respect of sharing of MBBS AND BDS ETC, between private medical college and State government quota - private colleges made excess admissions - tendered unconditional apology - Apex court held that The  excess  107
admissions made by the Medical College for the MBBS during the year  2011-12 and the previous year, be adjusted in the session  2014-15  in  full  taking note of the full sanctioned strength and the balance seats  be  adjusted  in the year 2015-16.  The unconditional and  unqualified  apology  tendered  by the contemnors is accepted, but the contemnors are directed to  pay  a  fine
of Rs.50 lakhs in two months from today, to the State Government.    Ordered
accordingly =

whether the contemnors have violated  the  interim  orders  passed  by  this
Court on 27.5.2009 and 27.1.2011 in Civil Appeal No. 4060  of  2009  in  the
matter of sharing of MBBS  seats  between  the  respondent  private  medical
college and the State Government. =

 We have already pointed out that the contemnors earlier  took  up  the
stand that, after notifying their institution as a  University  on  4.5.2011
under the Private University Act,  2007,  the  AFRC  Act  ceased  to  apply,
hence, they are not bound by the orders passed by this  Court.    Contemnors
cannot take refuse under a notification issued under  a  Statute  to  defeat
the interim orders passed by this Court which are binding  on  the  parties,
unless varied or modified by this Court.   In  the  instant  case,  all  the
appeals in which interim orders have been passed, are  pending  before  this
Court and if the contemnors had any doubt  on  the  applicability  of  those
orders, they could have sought clarification or modification of  the  order.
 Now, by tendering unconditional and  unqualified  apology,  the  contemnors
are trying to wriggle out of the possible  action  for  Contempt  of  Court,
after  violating  the  orders  causing  considerable  inconvenience  to  the
students and after enjoying the  fruits  for  the  illegality  committed  by
them.   It is trite law that apology is  neither  a  weapon  of  defence  to
purge the guilty of  their  offence;  nor  is  it  intended  to  operate  as
universal panacea, it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness.  (See
M.Y. Shareef & Anr. v. Hon’ble Judges of the High Court  of  Nagpur  &  Ors.
(1955) 1 SCR 757 and M.B.  Sanghi,  Advocate  v.  High  Court  of  Punjab  &
Haryana & Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 600.

16.   Contemnors have now tendered  unconditional  and  unqualified  apology
and volunteered to set right the  illegality  committed  by  them,  but  the
purpose for flouting the orders has been achieved, that  is  the  contemnors
wanted to fill up the entire seats by themselves.   Therefore,  to  maintain
the sanctity of the orders of this Court and to  give  a  message  that  the
parties  cannot  get  away  by  merely  tendering   an   unconditional   and
unqualified apology after enjoying the fruits of their  illegality,  we  are
inclined to impose a fine, which we quantify at Rs.50 lakhs.

We, therefore, order that the admission of students  under  the  State
quota for the academic year 2011-12 in Medical College is  valid  and  legal
and appropriate steps should be  taken  by  the  State  Government  and  the
Medical Council of India to  regularize  the  admission.    The  excess  107
admissions made by the Medical College for the MBBS during the year  2011-12
and the previous year, be adjusted in the session  2014-15  in  full  taking
note of the full sanctioned strength and the balance seats  be  adjusted  in
the year 2015-16.  The unconditional and  unqualified  apology  tendered  by
the contemnors is accepted, but the contemnors are directed to  pay  a  fine
of Rs.50 lakhs in two months from today, to the State Government.    Ordered
accordingly.

21.   The Contempt Petition is disposed of accordingly.


 2014(Feb.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41270
B.S. CHAUHAN, K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, S.A. BOBDE

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       ORIGINAL CONTEMPT JURISDICTION
                  CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.390 OF 2011
                                     IN
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.4060 OF 2009

State of M.P. & Anr.                         … Petitioners
      Versus
Suresh Narayan Vijayvargiya & Ors.           … Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T
K.S. Radhakrishnan

1.    We are,  in  this  contempt  petition,  concerned  with  the  question
whether the contemnors have violated  the  interim  orders  passed  by  this
Court on 27.5.2009 and 27.1.2011 in Civil Appeal No. 4060  of  2009  in  the
matter of sharing of MBBS  seats  between  the  respondent  private  medical
college and the State Government.

2.      Civil   Appeal   No.   4060   of   2009   was   preferred   by   the
respondents/contemnors herein, challenging the judgment of  the  High  Court
of Madhya Pradesh dated 15.5.2009, which upheld the validity of  the  Madhya
Pradesh (Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee) Act, 2007 (for short  “AFRC
Act”), empowering the State Government to fill all the seats (including  the
NRI seats) in  all  the  education  institutions  in  the  State  of  Madhya
Pradesh, including private medical  and  dental  collages.    Since  serious
disputes were raised with regard to seat sharing and fixation  of  quota  of
seats for MBBS/BDS, this Court felt that some interim arrangement should  be
made taking note of the interest of both the parties and also  that  of  the
students.  This Court, therefore, as an interim measure, passed an order  on
27.5.2009 in C.A. No.4060 of 2009 and the connected appeals, which reads  as
follows:

           “We, therefore,  direct  that  the  admissions  in  the  private
      unaided medical/dental colleges in the State of Madhya Pradesh will be
      done by first excluding 15% NRI seats (which can be filled up  by  the
      private institutions as per para 131 of Inamdar case),  and  allotting
      half of the 85% seats for admission to  the  undergraduate  and  post-
      graduate courses to be filled in by an open competitive examination by
      the State Government, and the remaining half by the Association of the
      Private Medical and Dental Colleges. Both the State Government as well
      as the Association of Private Medical and Dental  Colleges  will  hold
      their own separate entrance examination for this purpose.  As  regards
      “the NRI seats”, they will be filled as provided under the Act and the
      Rules, in the manner they were done earlier.


             We make it clear that the aforesaid  directions  will  for  the
      time being only be applicable for this Academic Year  i.e.  2009-2010.
      We also make it clear that if there are an odd number of seats then it
      will be rounded  off  in  favour  of  the  private  institutions.  For
      example, if there are 25 seats, 12 will be  filled  up  by  the  State
      Government and 13 will be filled up  by  the  Association  of  Private
      Medical/Dental Colleges. In specialities in PG courses also  half  the
      seats will be filled in by  the  State  Government  and  half  by  the
      Association of Private Medical/Dental Colleges and any  fraction  will
      be rounded off in favour of the Association. In other words if in  any
      discipline there are, say, 9 seats, then 5 will be filled  in  by  the
      Association  and  the  remaining  4  will  by  the  State  Government.
      Capitation fee is prohibited, both to the State Government as well  as
      the private institutions, vide para 140  of  Inamdar  case.  Both  the
      State  Government  and  the  Association  of  Private   Medical/Dental
      Colleges will separately hold single window examinations for the whole
      State (vide para 136 of Inamdar case).


             We make it clear that the solution we have arrived at  may  not
      be perfect, but we have tried to do our best to find out the best  via
      media. Although this order is only for  Academic  Year  2009-2010,  we
      recommend that it may also be considered for future sessions.


              Six weeks’ time is allowed for  filing  counter-affidavit  and
      four weeks thereafter for filing rejoinder.


             List these appeals for final hearing in September 2009. In  the
      meantime, pleadings may be completed by the parties.”




3.    The interim arrangement made continued  in  the  subsequent  years  as
well and in the year 2011-2012, this Court vide its  order  dated  27.1.2011
in I.A. No. 50 of 2011 passed the following order:
       “The order dated 27th May, 2009 made in Civil  Appeal  No.  4060  of
       2009 etc. shall be applicable for the academic year 2011-2012.

          There shall be an order accordingly.”

4.    This contempt petition has been preferred by the State Government  and
the Director of Medical Education Department alleging  that  the  contemnors
have filled up the entire  150  seats  available  for  the  year  2011-2012,
without sharing it with the State Government, violating the orders  of  this
Court dated 27.5.2009 and 27.1.2011.    Petitioners  pointed  out  that  the
contemnors had sent a letter dated 23.5.2011 stating that  they  would  fill
up the entire seats during the academic year 2011-2012 since their  colleges
would  be  functioning  under  the  Madhya  Pradesh   Niji   Vishwavidyalaya
(Sthapana Avam  Sanchalan) Adhiniyam, 2007  [for  short  “Adhiniyam  2007”],
consequent to the establishment of the Peoples’ University  under  M.P.  Act
No.18 of 2011 and the admission process of  those  constituent  institutions
would be governed by the statutes and ordinances  framed  under  the  above-
mentioned Act.   The State  Government  noticing  the  stand  taken  by  the
contemnors, wrote a letter dated 14.7.2011 to the Managing Director  of  the
Medical College stating that the admissions have to be made  only  following
the arrangement made by this Court vide order dated 27.1.2011  and,  if  any
change has to be made, the same could be done only with  the  permission  of
this Court.

5.    The Directorate of Medical Education  of  the  State  Government  also
wrote a letter dated 14.7.2011 to the Medical Council  of  India,  informing
the Council of the defiant attitude taken by the contemnors  by  not  giving
admission to any of the  students  included  in  the  State  quota  for  the
academic year 2010-11.

6.    The Directorate of Medical Education  then  wrote  a  detailed  letter
dated 8.8.2011 to the Secretary, Association of  Private  Dental  &  Medical
Colleges, in the State, specifically referring to the interim  order  passed
by  this  Court  on  27.1.2011  reminding  them  of  the  necessity  of  the
compliance of the Court’s directions in the matter  of  seat  sharing.   The
contemnors, ignoring those letters, published an advertisement  in  a  local
newspaper “People Samachar” on 9.8.2011 informing the public that 150  seats
would be available  with  them  for  admission  to  MBBS  course  under  the
management quota for the year 2011-12.

7.    The Directorate of Medical Education, in the meanwhile,  sent  a  list
of 66 students under the State quota to the Medical  College  for  admission
to MBBS course.  The contemnors refused to admit those  students  under  the
State quota and the State Government received several  complaints  from  the
students who were included in the State  quota,  but  not  admitted  by  the
contemnors. The State Government then sent a notice dated 17.8.2011, to  the
Dean of the Medical College to show cause why the following  action  be  not
initiated against the college:-
      (a)   withdraw the Desirability and Feasibility Certificates issued in
           favour of the college;


      (b)   report the matter to  the  Medical  Council  of  India  to  take
           suitable action against the college.


      (c)   report the  matter  to  the  concerned  authorities  for  action
           against Madhya Pradesh Niji Vyavsayik Shikshan Sanstha  (Pravesh
           Ka Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan) Adhiniyam, 2007.


8.    The contemnors, in total defiance of the Court’s order as well as  the
various directions issued by the Directorate of  Medical  Education,  filled
up the entire 150 seats in the management quota for the academic year  2011-
12.

9.    The students, who figured in the  State  quota,  then  approached  the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh.   The High Court directed  the  contemnors  to
admit students who were included in  the  State  quota.  Consequently,  they
admitted those students and the number of students admitted in  the  College
went up to 245 as against the sanctioned strength of 150 seats. The  Medical
College does not have the infrastructural facilities to admit 245  students,
which  has  adversely  affected  the  academic  standards  of  the  students
admitted.   The  State  Government,  as  also  the  Directorate  of  Medical
Education, in the above-mentioned circumstances, approached this  Court  and
filed the present Contempt Petition for taking  appropriate  action  against
the contemnors for violating the orders passed by this  Court  on  27.5.2009
and 27.1.2011 and also by not complying with the various  directions  issued
by the State Government as well as the Directorate of Medical Education.

10.   When the matter came up for hearing, this Court issued notice  to  the
contemnors. Learned senior counsel appearing for the  contemnors,  submitted
before  this  Court  on  3.2.2014  that  they  would  be   tendering   their
unconditional and unqualified apology for their actions and made a  proposal
to set right the illegalities committed, which reads as under :-
      (a)   None of the 245 students admitted in the Institution  –  Peoples
           College of Medical Sciences (PCMS) during the academic year 2011-
           12 shall be disturbed and they all will continue to pursue their
           course without any interruption. This would include the students
           allotted by the State who had been given provisional  admissions
           pursuant to the orders of the Hon’ble High Court.


      (b)   In the academic session  2011-12  on  the  basis  of  the  50-50
           admissions between the College and State after 15% NRI quota  is
           deducted as per the orders of  this  Hon’ble  Court,  the  State
           entitlement filled in by the  institution  was  63  seats.   The
           institution shall accordingly surrender 21 seats in each of  the
           following three academic years i.e. 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17
           to the State government to be filled in  through  the  procedure
           laid down in the order dated 27.5.2009.

11.   The contemnors on 13.2.2014, filed  a  written  note  wherein,  after
reiterating the proposals submitted on 3.2.2014, they stated as follows :
      “13.  Though admissions have already been made by  the  State  against
      the said 63 seats for the year 2011-12 in the said year  itself  still
      in deference to the orders of this Hon’ble  Court  the  Respondent  is
      willing to give up the said 63 seats. It is however requested that  if
      these 63 seats are adjusted only in one year, the college would suffer
      adversely.  Therefore, the Respondent again humbly submits that it  be
      permitted to surrender  21  seats  in  each  of  the  following  three
      academic years i.e. 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 as  submitted  before
      this Hon’ble Court on 3.2.2014 to the State Government to be filled in
      through the procedure laid down in the order dated 27.5.2009.


      14.   It is respectfully submitted  that  in  the  captioned  contempt
      petition of the Petitioner State only relates  to  its  50%  quota  of
      admissions i.e. 63 seats in the academic year 2011-12.


      15.   The respondents reiterate the proposal submitted on 3.2.2014 and
      again tender  an  unconditional  and  unqualified  apology  for  their
      actions.”

12.   In  the  written  note  filed  by  the  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  on
13.2.2014, in  response  to  the  submissions  made  by  the  contemnors  on
3.2.2014, the State of Madhya Pradesh stated as follows :-
      “20.  For the academic session 2011-12, the  State  Government  had  a
      quota of 107 students :-


               • 63 seats as per the 50:50 order of this Hon’ble Court.


               • 42 seats as per letter dated 19.9.2011 of MCI since Peoples
                 College made excess admissions in 2010-11.


               • 2 seats which were not filled in the NRI quota.


      21.   The aforesaid position of  State  quota  seats  for  2011-12  is
      explained in detail in the  letter  of  MCI  dated  5.3.2012  (annexed
      herewith as Annexure A-1).


      22.   For the academic session 2011-12


           Total sanctioned strength               150


           Total seats filled by College           245


           College authorized to fill                43


           State quota seats filled by College       95


           Excess seats filled by College          107

      23.   The issue of excess admissions made by  the  College  is  to  be
      considered as per the Regulations framed by the MCI under  the  Indian
      Medical Council Act, 1956 and the submissions made by the MCI in  that
      regard.


      24.   However, if the scheme formulated  by  the  Peoples  College  is
      considered by this Hon’ble Court, then the excess 107 admissions  made
      by the College in 2011-12 be adjusted in the  session  of  2014-15  in
      full and remaining seats be adjusted in 2015-16.


      25.     On   account    of    illegal    and    unlawful    acts    of
      Respondents/Contemnors,  not  only  the  State  Government,  but   the
      students of the State quota, who were illegally denied admissions were
      severely harassed and were drawn on a long  drawn  legal  battle  with
      uncertainty of their respective careers.”


13.   We have no hesitation in saying that  the  above  situation  has  been
created by the contemnors themselves by filling up of the entire  150  seats
in total defiance of the interim orders passed by this  Court  on  27.5.2009
and 27.1.2011 making an interim arrangement for  seat  sharing  between  the
State Government and the private  educational  institutions  from  the  year
2009-10 onwards in the State of Madhya Pradesh, which  are  binding  on  the
contemnors.   The contemnors  attempted  to  justify  their  action  on  the
ground that they are regulated by the  Private  Universities  Act  and  that
AFRC Act has ceased to apply and, after  the  notification  dated  4.5.2011,
the State Government has no right even to share seats in their  institution,
de hors the interim orders passed by this Court.   This stand taken  by  the
contemnors  is  also  not  correct,  since  Section  7(m)  of  the   Private
University Act, 2007 provides that admission shall not be started  till  the
concerned statutes and ordinances are approved as  per  Section  35  of  the
Act, which states that the statutes and ordinances  shall  come  into  force
only upon publication in the official Gazette.  Even otherwise,  once  there
is an order in force binding on the parties, they cannot violate  or  ignore
that  order,  taking  shelter  under  a  statutory  provision  and  if   any
modification of the orders is  warranted,  parties  should  have  approached
this Court and sought for clarification or  modification  of  those  orders.
However, without doing so, in total defiance of the orders  passed  by  this
Court, they filled up the entire seats, leaving the students who figured  in
the State list in the lurch.   Later,  though  they  were  admitted  in  the
College having the infrastructure for accommodating only  150  students,  it
has affected the quality and standard of medical  education.   After  having
convinced that they had violated the orders of this Court,  they  have  come
up  with  an  unconditional  and  unqualified  apology   and   making   some
suggestions to undo the illegality committed by them after eating  away  the
seats from the State quota.

14.   We have, on facts, found that there has been  a  willful  disobedience
by the contemnors of the orders passed by this Court, which is  nothing  but
interference with the administration of justice.  Disobedience of  an  order
of a Court, which is willful, shakes the very  foundation  of  the  judicial
system and can erode the faith and confidence reposed by the people  in  the
Judiciary and undermines rule of law.    The  Contemnors  have  shown  scant
respect to the orders passed by the highest Court of the land  and  depicted
undue haste to fill up the entire seats  evidently  not  to  attract  better
students or recognize merit, but possibly to make  unlawful  gain,  adopting
unhealthy practices, as noticed by this Court in TMA Pai Foundation  &  Ors.
v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2002) 8  SCC  481  and  various  other  cases.
Once the Court passes an order, the parties to the  proceedings  before  the
Court cannot avoid implementation of that order by seeking refuge under  any
statutory rule and it is not open to the parties to  go  behind  the  orders
and truncate the effect of those orders.  This Court in T.R.  Dhananjaya  v.
J. Vasudevan (1995) 5 SCC 619,  held  that  once  the  Court  directed  that
appeal be disposed of after giving  him  opportunity  of  hearing  and  such
direction was not appealed from, it is not open to the  concerned  authority
to deny the hearing on the ground that the Police Manual  does  not  provide
for the same.  This Court in Mohd. Aslam alias Bhure, Acchan Rizvi v.  Union
of India (1994) 6 SCC 442 held that circumvention of  an  order  can  be  by
‘positive  acts  of  violation’  or  ‘surreptitious  and  indirect  aids  to
circumvention and violation of orders.  In the instant case,  the  violation
is a positive act of violation,  which  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the
record.

15.   We have already pointed out that the contemnors earlier  took  up  the
stand that, after notifying their institution as a  University  on  4.5.2011
under the Private University Act,  2007,  the  AFRC  Act  ceased  to  apply,
hence, they are not bound by the orders passed by this  Court.    Contemnors
cannot take refuse under a notification issued under  a  Statute  to  defeat
the interim orders passed by this Court which are binding  on  the  parties,
unless varied or modified by this Court.   In  the  instant  case,  all  the
appeals in which interim orders have been passed, are  pending  before  this
Court and if the contemnors had any doubt  on  the  applicability  of  those
orders, they could have sought clarification or modification of  the  order.
 Now, by tendering unconditional and  unqualified  apology,  the  contemnors
are trying to wriggle out of the possible  action  for  Contempt  of  Court,
after  violating  the  orders  causing  considerable  inconvenience  to  the
students and after enjoying the  fruits  for  the  illegality  committed  by
them.   It is trite law that apology is  neither  a  weapon  of  defence  to
purge the guilty of  their  offence;  nor  is  it  intended  to  operate  as
universal panacea, it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness.  (See
M.Y. Shareef & Anr. v. Hon’ble Judges of the High Court  of  Nagpur  &  Ors.
(1955) 1 SCR 757 and M.B.  Sanghi,  Advocate  v.  High  Court  of  Punjab  &
Haryana & Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 600.

16.   Contemnors have now tendered  unconditional  and  unqualified  apology
and volunteered to set right the  illegality  committed  by  them,  but  the
purpose for flouting the orders has been achieved, that  is  the  contemnors
wanted to fill up the entire seats by themselves.   Therefore,  to  maintain
the sanctity of the orders of this Court and to  give  a  message  that  the
parties  cannot  get  away  by  merely  tendering   an   unconditional   and
unqualified apology after enjoying the fruits of their  illegality,  we  are
inclined to impose a fine, which we quantify at Rs.50 lakhs.

17.   We may now examine how the illegality committed by the contemnors  can
be rectified.  For the academic year 2011-12, the State  Government’s  quota
was 107 seats, details of which is given below :-
         • 63 seats as per the 50:50 order of this Hon’ble Court.


         • 42 seats as per letter dated  19.9.2011  of  MCI  since  Peoples
           College made excess admissions in 2010-11.


         • 2 seats which were not filled in the NRI quota.


18.   The total sanctioned strength for the academic year  2011-12  was  150
students, but the contemnors had filled up 245  seats,  though  the  college
was authorized to fill up only  43  seats.   The  contemnors  filled  up  95
seats, which would have gone to the State quota.  Consequently,  107  excess
seats were filled up by the college.  The contemnors, however, took  up  the
stand that if 63 seats are to be adjusted  for  the  academic  year  2014-15
that may seriously affect  the  functioning  of  the  College,  hence  their
suggestion is that they will compensate the lost seats in a  phased  manner,
that is 21 seats in the year 2014-15 and the rest  in  equal  proportion  in
the years 2015-16 and 2016-17, which we find difficult to accept.    We  are
of the view that the excess of 107 admissions made in the year 2011-12  have
to be adjusted by adjusting the same for the  academic  session  2014-15  in
full and remaining seats be  adjusted  in  the  year  2015-16,  because  the
illegality committed must be set right  at  the  earliest.   This  Court  in
Mridul Dhar (Minor) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2005) 2  SCC  65,  held
(Direction No.11) as follows :
      “11. If any private medical college in a given academic year  for  any
      reason grants admission in its  management  quota  in  excess  of  its
      prescribed quota, the management quota  for  the  next  academic  year
      shall stand reduced so as to set off the effect of excess admission in
      the management quota in the previous academic year.”



19.   We may reiterate that the above-mentioned situation has  been  created
by the contemnors themselves and due to their illegal and unlawful acts,  by
admitting students over and above the sanctioned strength, the students  who
were later admitted from the list of State quota, could not get the  quality
medical education, which otherwise they would have got. Further,  they  were
also driven  to  unnecessary  litigation  before  the  High  Court  creating
uncertainty to their future.

20.   We, therefore, order that the admission of students  under  the  State
quota for the academic year 2011-12 in Medical College is  valid  and  legal
and appropriate steps should be  taken  by  the  State  Government  and  the
Medical Council of India to  regularize  the  admission.    The  excess  107
admissions made by the Medical College for the MBBS during the year  2011-12
and the previous year, be adjusted in the session  2014-15  in  full  taking
note of the full sanctioned strength and the balance seats  be  adjusted  in
the year 2015-16.  The unconditional and  unqualified  apology  tendered  by
the contemnors is accepted, but the contemnors are directed to  pay  a  fine
of Rs.50 lakhs in two months from today, to the State Government.    Ordered
accordingly.

21.   The Contempt Petition is disposed of accordingly.

                                                              ……..……………………J.
                                        (Dr. B.S. Chauhan)

                                                              ……..……………………J.
                                        (K.S. Radhakrishnan)




                                                              ……..……………………J.
                                        (S.A. Bobde)
New Delhi,
February 27, 2014.