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Sunday, June 23, 2013

Hindu Law-Gift of ancestral property by the father in favour of his daughters through registered settlement deed-Father later claiming that the settlement deed got executed by misrepresentation and fraud-Plea by father that his signature was obtained as a witness to a sale deed and not for execution of settlement deed and that he has no capacity to gift to his daughters the Joint family property-Suit by daughters for permanent injunction for restraining the father from interfering with peaceful possession-Trial Court dismissed the suit-Confirmed by First Appellate Court and High Court Held, on facts and evidence, the gift was not vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation-Further, father has capacity to gift ancestral property to daughters to a reasonable extent. The respondent, by a registered settlement deed, settled the suit property to his appellant-daughters out of natural love and affection for them. After 5 years, the respondent asked the appellants to vacate the property and tried to trespass into the property. The appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction before trial court for restraining the respondent and his associates from interfering with the appellant's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The respond-ent resisted the suit contending that the suit property was an ancestral property; that settlement deed was not executed in favour of the respondents; that the appellants misrepresented the respondent taking advantage of his addiction to liquor for signing the sale deed of the property purchased by the appellants as an attesting witness and instead got the settlement deed signed. The trial court dismissed the suit of the appellants holding that the settlement deed was got executed by misrepresentation and that the respondent had no power to make a gift of a part of his ancestral properties in favour of his daughters. This was confirmed by the first appellate court and the High Court. In appeal, the appellants contended that the finding of fact by the lower courts regarding execution of settlement deed is vitiated due to misreading of the statement of one of the attesting witnesses: that the respondent, being the karta of the Joint Hindu family had the authority to make a gift of ancestral immoveable property to a reasonable extent to his daughters. The respondent contended that he had no authority to gift the only ancestral property possessed by the family in favour of his daughters. Citation: 2004 AIR 1284,2003(6 )Suppl.SCR605 ,2004(1 )SCC295 ,2003(10 )SCALE600 ,2003(10 )JT289= Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1. Finding recorded by the trial court clearly shows that the court misread and misconstrued the testimony of the attesting witness PW 2. In his deposition, PW 2 has clearly stated that he was invited by the respondent to be a witness. He has nowhere stated that the respondent was taken for affixing signatures as witness. If respond-ent was to be a witness, then there was no need to ask PW2 and other witness to accompany the respondent or for them to sign the document. PW 2 also deposed that the respondent affixed his signatures on the settlement deed (Ex Al) after reading the same, that he has signed Exhibit Al as a witness and that he knew the respondent. Suggestion put to him that signatures of the respondent on Exhibit Al were obtained by threat was denied. The trial court did not refer to this part of testimony of PW 2 at all. In the cross- examination, PW 2 has stated that the fact that the respondent had invited him for signing as a witness has been read to him as if PW 2 had stated that the respondent was taken for affixing signatures as a witness to some documents on the date when the deed of settlement Exhibit Al was executed. This is a clear misreading of the testimony of PW 2. The trial court also failed to note that the evidence of respondent lacked total credibility especially in the light of his conduct in denying his signature on the settlement deed, vakalatnama as well as on the summons served on him. Projection made by the respondent in his testimony that the appellants taking advantage of the fact that he was a drunkard got the settlement deed signed fraudulently cannot be accepted. Respondent took no steps to get the settlement deed cancelled though, the appellants had been living in the house for five years after the execution of the settlement deed. In his statement he does not say that he did not know about the execution of the settlement deed. Plea taken by him that he was taken to the Sub-Registrar's office to be a witness to a sale deed by his son-in-law cannot be accepted as it has not been proved on record that the respondent's son-in-law had in fact purchased any house site. Findings recorded by the trial court and upheld by the First appellate court and the High Court based on misreading of evidence are liable to be set aside. The findings recorded on misreading of evidence being perverse cannot be sustained by law. [612-E-H; 613-A-D] 2.1. A father can make a gift of ancestral immoveable property within reasonable limits, keeping in view, the total extent of the property held by the family in favour of his, daughter at the time of her marriage or even long after her marriage. [617-E-F] 2.2. Question as to whether a particular gift is within reasonable limits or not has to be judged according to the status of the family at the time of making a gift, the extent of the immoveable property owned by the family and the extent of property gifted. No hard and fast rule prescribing quantitative limits of such a gift can be laid down. The answer to such a question would vary from family to family. The question of reasonableness or otherwise of the gift made has to be assessed vis-a-vis the total value of the property held by the family. Simply because the gifted property is a house, it cannot be held that the gift made was not within the reasonable limits. It is basically a question of fact. If on facts, it is found that the gift was not within reasonable limits, such a gift would not be upheld. It was for the respondent to plead and prove that the gift made by the father was excessive and unreasonable keeping in view the total holding of the family. In the absence of any pleadings or proof on these points, it cannot be held that the gift made in this case was not within the reasonable limits of the property held by the family. The respondent has failed to plead and prove that the gift made was to unreasonable extent keeping in view, the total holding of the family. The first appellate court and the High Court thus erred in non-suiting the appellants on this account. [617-G-H; 618-A-E] 2.3. The respondent had the capacity to make a gift to a reasonable extent of ancestral immoveable property in favour of his daughters. The gift was not vitiated by fraud of misrepresentation. The appellants are held to be the absolute owners or the suit property and the respondent is injuncted from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the appellant perpetually. [618-F-G] Kamala Devi v. Bachulal Gupta, [1957] SCR 452; Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh AND ANOTHER v. Malappa, [1964] 4 SCR 497 and Ammathayee Ammal AND ANOTHER v. Kumaresan AND Ors., [1967] 1 SCR 353, referred to. Anivillah Sundararamaya v. Cherla Seethamma AND Ors., (1911) 21 MLJ 695; Pugalila Vettorammal AND ANOTHER v. Vettor Goundan, (1912) MLJ 321; Devalaktuni Sithamahalakshmamma AND Ors. v. Pamulpati Kotayya AND Ors., AIR (1936) Madras 825; Karuppa Gounder AND Ors. v. Palaniammal AND Ors., (1963) 1 MLJ 86; The Commissioner of Gift Tax v. Tej Nath, (1972) PLR (74) 1 and Tara Sabuani v. Raghunath, AIR (1963) Orissa 59, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 16757 of 1996.


http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7 
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 16757 of 1996
PETITIONER:
R. Kuppayee & Anr.
RESPONDENT:
Raja Gounder
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/12/2003
BENCH:
R.C. Lahoti & Ashok Bhan.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
BHAN, J.
 Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the courts
below in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellants (hereinafter
referred to as the "appellants"), the appellants have come up in this appeal.
 Shortly stated the facts are:
 The appellants are the daughters of the defendant-respondent
(hereinafter referred to as the "respondent"). By a registered settlement
deed, Exhibit A-1 dated 29th of August, 1985, the respondent hereinabove
settled an extent of 12 cents of land comprised in S.No.113/2, Thathagapatti
Village, Salem District in favour of the appellants. As per recitals in the
settlement deed, the settlement was made by the respondent out of natural
love and affection for the appellants and the possession of the property was
handed over to them on the day the settlement deed was executed. The
schedule of settlement deed shows that the total extent of the property
owned by the family was 3.16 acres. The gift was made of 12 cents along
with Mangalore tiled house standing on the gifted land. It was also stated in
the settlement deed that in future neither the respondent nor any other male
or female heirs would have a right over the settled property.
 After nearly 5 years, on 22nd April, 1990, respondent and his
associates asked the appellants to vacate the property and tried to trespass
into the property. Because of the attempt made by the respondent to trespass
into the property, the appellants filed the Original Suit No.451 of 1990 in the
Court of District Munsif, Salem seeking relief of restraining the respondent
and his associates from interfering with the appellant’s peaceful possession
and enjoyment of the suit property in any way by way of a permanent
injunction, or, for grant of relief deemed fit in the circumstances of the case.
Respondent resisted the suit and in the written statement filed by him, he
took the stand that he had not executed any settlement deed. That his son-inlaw i.e., husband of appellant No.1 had purchased a house site and the
respondent was taken to the Registrar’s office to witness the sale deed. That
he was used to taking liquor and taking advantage of his addiction to liquor
the appellants and their respective husbands fraudulently by
misrepresentation instead got the sale deed executed from him. The property
in dispute being Joint Hindu Family property consisting of himself and his
son could not be gifted under any circumstances.
 In support of their respective pleas, the parties led their
evidences. The appellant No.1 stepped into the witness box as PW-1. She
admitted that the property was ancestral. That her father had settled the
property on her and her sister of his own will out of nature love and affection http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7
for them. PW-2, the attesting witness to Exhibit A-1 stated that he knew the
respondent. While he was standing on the road and talking to some persons,
he was called by the respondent to witness the document. He went to SubRegistrar’s office along with the respondent. Respondent put his signatures
on Exhibit A-1 after reading the same. That he (himself) and Govindawamy
signed Exhibit A-1 as witnesses. Govindawamy has died. In the crossexamination he stated that he did not know the contents of the document,
Exhibit A-1. He showed his ignorance as to when, where or in whose name
the stamp papers were purchased. He denied having knowledge of the fact
as to whether the respondent was in the habit of drinking liquor. Respondent
in order to prove his case stepped in the witness box as DW-1. He stated that
the property was a Joint Hindu Family property as the same had been
purchased with the sale proceeds of the ancestral property. That his son-inlaw who was working in TVS had purchased some property and he was
taken by his son-in-law to sign as a witness. He denied having executed the
settlement deed in favour of the appellants. He denied that he knew PW-2.
It was stated that the possession of the appellants was permissive as they
were allowed to reside in the house to enable them to send their children to
the school. He denied his signatures on the settlement deed, on the
’vakalatnama’ given by him to his counsel as well as on the summons sent to
him by the court. It was denied that he knew English. It was also stated by
him that his signatures were obtained fraudulently on the pretext of signing
as a witness on the document by which his son-in-law had purchased a house
site. That the total extent of the family holding was 3.16 acres of land. He
admitted that his son was residing separately for the last 3 to 4 years but
denied that he was retracting from the settlement deed on the advise of his
son. That he was in the habit of drinking.
No other evidence was led by any of the parties.
 The trial court believed the evidence of the respondent. It was
held that the respondent was taken to the Sub-Registrar’s office to witness a
document whereas a deed of settlement was got executed from him.
Testimony of PW-2, the attesting witness was discarded. It was held that the
deposition of PW-2 in fact supported the case put forth by the respondent to
the effect that the respondent was taken to the Sub-Registrar’s office to sign
as a witness. The trial court further held that since the property in dispute
was ancestral in nature, the respondent had no power/authority to make a gift
of a part of the ancestral property in favour of his daughters. The suit was
dismissed. The order of the trial court was affirmed by the First Appellate
Court as well as by the High Court, aggrieved against which the present
appeal has been filed.
 It is submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the findings
recorded by the courts below are wrong on facts as well as in law. Finding
of fact regarding due execution of Exhibit A-1 is vitiated due to misreading
of the statement of the attesting witness, PW-2. That the father being the
Karta had the authority to make a gift of ancestral immovable property to a
reasonable extent out of the Joint Hindu Family property in favour of his
daughters. That such authority of the father is recognised in old Hindu Text
Books as well as by the courts in recent times. Counsel appearing for the
respondent has controverted the submissions made by the counsel for the
appellants. It was argued that there was no misreading of evidence and that
the finding recorded by the courts below on facts could not be interfered
with by this Court at this stage of the proceedings. The respondent had no
authority to make a gift of part of the ancestral immovable property and in
any case he could not have gifted the only residential house possessed by the
family.
 The two points which arise for consideration in this appeal are:
(i) whether the judgment of the courts below are vitiated because
of the misreading of the evidence of PW-2, the attesting witness
to the settlement deed;
(ii) whether the gift/settlement made by the father in favour of his
married daughters of a reasonable extent of immovable property http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7
out of the Joint Hindu Family property is valid.
 The trial court believed the evidence of the respondent and
dismissed the suit. For arriving at this conclusion the trial court held that if
the respondent had the intention of executing a deed of settlement in respect
of the suit property in favour of the appellants, then at least he would have
taken his son Ramasamy for affixing his signatures as a witness to the deed.
Since it was not done the document Exhibit A-1 could not be relied on. The
statement of PW-2 was construed to mean as if he had stated that the
respondent was taken for affixing his signatures as a witness on the date
when the settlement deed, Exhibit A-1 was executed. We have carefully
perused the statements made by PW-2 as well as DW-1 and in our view the
trial court misread and misconstrued the testimony of PW-2. In the course
of cross-examination PW-2 had stated as follows:-
"Only the defendant invited me for signing as witness.
On the way Govindasamy was also invited while he was
found standing there\005\005\005.. While going towards the
Sub-Registrar’s office, the Defendant saw and invited me
to sign as witness."
 The trial court in his judgment has misconstrued the above
statement and recorded the following finding:-
"PW-2 had given evidence that the Defendant was taken
for affixing signature as witness on the date when the
deed of settlement exhibit A1 was executed."
 The trial court also held that:-
"If only the Defendant had executed the deed of
settlement in respect of the suit property in favour of his
daughters i.e. the Plaintiffs, he would have atleast taken
his son Ramasamy for affixing his signature as witness.
This factor is also not in consonance with the true nature
and bona fides of exhibit A1."
 Finding recorded by the trial court clearly shows that the court
misread and misconstrued the testimony of PW-2. PW-2 in his deposition
has clearly stated that he was invited by the respondent to be a witness. He
has no where stated that defendant (respondent herein) was taken for
affixing signatures as a witness. If respondent was to be a witness then there
was no need to ask PW-2 and Govindasamy to accompany the respondent or
for them to sign the document. He also deposed that respondent affixed his
signatures on Exhibit A1 after reading the same. That he (himself) has
signed Exhibit A1 as a witness. That he knew the respondent. Suggestion
put to him that signatures of the respondent on Exhibit A1 were obtained by
threat was denied. The trial court did not refer to this part of testimony of
PW-2 at all. The question put to him in the cross- examination which has
been reproduced above wherein PW-2 has stated that the respondent had
invited him for signing as a witness has been read to him as if PW-2 had
stated that the respondent was taken for affixing signatures as a witness to
some documents on the date when the deed of settlement Exhibit A-1 was
executed. This is a clear misreading of the testimony of PW-2. The trial
court also failed to note that the evidence of respondent as DW-1 lacked
total credibility especially in the light of his conduct in denying his signature
on the settlement deed, vakalatnama as well as on the summons served on
him. Projection made by the respondent in his testimony that the appellants
taking advantage of the fact that he was a drunkard got the settlement deed,
Exhibit A-1 signed fraudulently cannot be accepted. Respondent took no
steps to get the settlement deed cancelled though, the appellants had been
living in the house for five years after the execution of the settlement deed.
In his statement he does not say that he did not know about the execution of http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7
the settlement deed. Plea taken by him that he was taken to the SubRegistrar’s office to be a witness to a sale deed by his son-in-law cannot be
accepted as it has not been proved on record that the respondent’s son-in-law
had in fact purchased any house site. Findings recorded by the trial court
and upheld by the First Appellate Court and the High Court based on
misreading of evidence are liable to be set aside. The findings recorded on
misreading of evidence being perverse cannot be sustained in law.
 Coming to the second point, the trial court held that since the
property was ancestral in nature, the respondent had no authority/power to
make a gift of a portion of the ancestral property in favour of his daughters.
In appeal the First Appellate Court accepted that the father could give away
a small portion of the ancestral property to his daughters out of the total
holding of the family property but since in this case the total extent of
property owned by the family had not been proved it could not be held that
the property gifted by the father was of a reasonable portion of the total
holding of the family. The High Court affirmed the finding recorded by the
First Appellate Court.
 The High Court of Madras in a series of judgments has taken
the view that father could make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral
immovable property to his daughter as a part of his moral obligation at the
time of her marriage or even thereafter.
 In Anivillah Sundararamaya vs. Cherla Seethamma and
others [1911 (21) MLJ 695], it was held that a small portion of the
ancestral immovable property could be given to the daughter at the time of
her marriage or thereafter and such a gift would be a valid gift. In this case
8 acres of ancestral immovable property out of 200 acres of land possessed
by the family were given in gift by the father to his daughter after her
marriage. Upholding the gift it was observed:-
"P. Narayana Murthi for 1st respondent:- The present case is
stronger than Kudutumma v. Narasimhacharyulu, as it is the
father that has given the property and not the brothers. A gift
made to the son-in-law belongs also to the daughter \026 vide
Ghose’s Hindu Law, 2nd Edn., p.313, Footnote. There is a text
of Vyasa to that effect. Se Ghose, p.389, for translation; vide
p.360 also vice versa. A gift to the daughter would belong to
the son-in-law. If it is proper to make gifts at the time of
marriage it would be equally proper if made afterwards.
Though the texts do not require gifts to be made to daughters at
the time of marriage, if made they are not invalid. Churamon
Sahu v. Gopi Sahu referred to, where Mookerji J. approves of
Kudutamma v. Narasimhacharyulu; Bachoo v. Mankuvarhai.
 The same view was taken by the Madras High Court in Pugalia
Vettorammal and another vs. Vettor Goundan, [1912 (22) MLJ 321]. In
this case it was held that a father could make gift to a reasonable extent of
the ancestral immovable property to his daughter. Gift made of 1/6th of the
total holding of the ancestral property was held to be a valid. The same view
has later been taken by the Madras High Court in Devalaktuni
Sithamahalakshmamma and others vs. Pamulpati Kotayya and others
[AIR 1936 (Madras) 825] and Karuppa Gounder and others vs.
Palaniammal and others [1963 (1) MLJ 86]. A Full Bench of Punjab &
Haryana High Court in The Commissioner of Gift Tax vs. Tej Nath [1972
PLR (74) 1] and the High Court of Orissa in Tara Sabuani vs. Raghunath
[AIR 1963 Ori. 59] have also taken the same view.
The powers of the father or the managing member of the joint Hindu
family vis-‘-vis coparcenary property have been summarised in paragraphs
225, 226 and 258 of Mulla’s Hindu Law which reads:-
"225. Although sons acquire by birth rights equal to those of a
father in ancestral property both movable and immovable, the http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7
father has the power of making within reasonable limits gifts of
ancestral movable property without the consent of his sons for
the purpose of performing ’indispensable acts of duty, and for
purposes prescribed by texts of law, as gifts through affection,
support of the family, relief from distress and so forth’.
226. A Hindu father or other managing member has power to
make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral immovable
property for ’pious purposes’. However, the alienation must be
by an act inter vivos and not by will. A member of a joint
family cannot dispose of by will a portion of the property even
for charitable purposes and even if the portion bears a small
proportion to the entire estate. However, now see section 30 of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
258. (1) According to Mitakshara law as applied in all the
States, no coparcener can dispose of his undivided interest in
coparcenary property by gift. Such transaction being void
altogether, there is no estoppel or other kind of personal bar
which precludes the donor from asserting his right to recover
the transferred property. He may, however, make a gift of his
interest with the consent of the other coparceners.
(2) As to disposition by will after the coming into operation of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, see section 30 of the Act."
 Combined reading of these paragraphs shows that the position
in Hindu law is that whereas the father has the power to gift ancestral
movables within reasonable limits, he has no such power with regard to the
ancestral immovable property or coparcenary property. He can, however
make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral immovable property for
"pious purposes". However, the alienation must be by an act inter vivos,
and not by will. This Court has extended the rule in paragraph 226 and held
that the father was competent to make a gift of immovable property to a
daughter, if the gift is of reasonable extent having regard to the properties
held by the family.
 This Court considered the question of extended meaning given
in numerous decisions for "pious purposes" in Kamla Devi vs. Bachulal
Gupta [ 1957 SCR 452]. In the said case a Hindu widow in fulfilment of an
ante-nuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of
marriage of her daughter, executed a registered deed of gift in respect of 4
houses allotted to her share in a partition decree, in favour of her daughter as
her marriage dowry, after two years of her marriage. The partition decree
had given her the right to the income from property but she had no right to
part with the corpus of the property to the prejudice of the reversioners. Her
step sons brought a suit for declaration that the deed of gift was void and
inoperative and could not bind the reversioners. The trial court and the High
Court dismissed the suit holding that the gift was not valid. This Court
accepted the appeal and held that the gift made in favour of the daughter was
valid in law and binding on the reversioners.
 This point was again examined in depth by this Court in
Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh and another vs. Malappa
1964 (4) SCR 497 and it was held:-
"The legal position may be summarized thus: The Hindu law
texts conferred a right upon a daughter or a sister, as the case
may be, to have a share in the family property at the time of
partition. That right was lost by efflux of time. But it became
crystallized into a moral obligation. The father or his
representative can make a valid gift, by way of reasonable
provision for the maintenance of the daughter, regard being had
to the financial and other relevant circumstances of the family.
By custom or by convenience, such gifts are made at the time of
marriage, but the right of the father or his representative to http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7
make such a gift is not confined to the marriage occasion. It is
a moral obligation and it continues to subsist till it is
discharged. Marriage is only a customary occasion for such a
gift. But the obligation can be discharged at any time, either
during the lifetime of the father or thereafter. It is not possible
to lay down a hard and fast rule, prescribing the quantitative
limits of such a gift as that would depend on the facts of each
case and it can only be decided by Courts, regard being had to
the overall picture of the extent of the family estate, the number
of daughters to be provided for and other paramount charges
and other similar circumstances. If the father is within his
rights to make a gift of a reasonable extent of the family
property for the maintenance of a daughter, it cannot be said
that the said gift must be made only by one document or only at
a single point of time. The validity or the reasonableness of a
gift does not depend upon the plurality of documents but on the
power of the father to make a gift and the reasonableness of the
gift so made. If once the power is granted and the
reasonableness of the gift is not disputed, the fact that two gift
deeds were executed instead of one, cannot make the gift
anytheless a valid one." (Emphasis supplied)
 Extended meaning given to the words "pious purposes"
enabling the father to make a gift of ancestral immovable property
within reasonable limits to a daughter has not been extended to the
gifts made in favour of other female members of the family. Rather it
has been held that husband could not make any such gift of ancestral
property to his wife out of affection on the principle of "pious
purposes". Reference may be made to Ammathayee Ammal &
Another vs. Kumaresan & Others [1967 (1) SCR 353]. It was
observed ’we see no reason to extend the scope of words "pious
purposes" beyond what has already been done in the two decisions of
this Court’ and rejected the contention that a husband could make any
such gift of ancestral property to his wife out of affection on the
principle of pious purposes.
 On the authority of the judgements referred to above it can
safely be held that a father can make a gift of ancestral immovable property
within reasonable limits, keeping in view, the total extent of the property
held by the family in favour of his daughter at the time of her marriage or
even long after her marriage.
 The only other point, which remains for consideration, is as to
whether a gift made in favour of the appellants was within the reasonable
limits, keeping in view, the total holding of the family. The total property
held by the family was 3.16 acres. 12 cents would be approximately 1/26th
share of the total holding. The share of each daughter would come to 1/52nd
or 1/26th share of the total holding of the family which cannot be held to be
either unreasonable or excessive under any circumstances. Question as to
whether a particular gift is within reasonable limits or not has to be judged
according to the status of the family at the time of making a gift, the extent
of the immovable property owned by the family and the extent of property
gifted. No hard and fast rule prescribing quantitative limits of such a gift
can be laid down. The answer to such a question would vary from family to
family.
This apart, the question of reasonableness or otherwise of the gift
made has to be assessed vis-‘-vis the total value of the property held by the
family. Simply because the gifted property is a house, it cannot be held that
the gift made was not within the reasonable limits. As stated earlier, it
would depend upon a number of factors such as the status of the family, the
total value of the property held by the family and the value of the gifted
property and so on. It is basically a question of fact. However, on facts, if it
is found that the gift was not within reasonable limits, such a gift would not http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7
be upheld. It was for the respondent to plead and prove that the gift made by
the father was excessive or unreasonable, keeping in view, the total holding
of the family. In the absence of any pleadings or proof on these points, it
cannot be held that the gift made in this case was not within the reasonable
limits of the property held by the family. The respondent has failed to plead
and prove that the gift made was to unreasonable extent, keeping in view,
the total holding of the family. The first appellate court and the High Court,
thus, erred in non-suiting the appellants on this account.
 For the reasons stated above we accept the appeal, set aside the
judgments and the decrees passed by the courts below. It is held that the
respondent had the capacity to make a gift to a reasonable extent of ancestral
immovable property in favour of his daughters. The gift was not vitiated by
fraud or misrepresentation. The appellants are held to be the absolute
owners of the suit property and the respondent is injuncted from interfering
with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the
appellant perpetually. Parties shall bear their own costs.

Section 41(h) provides that an injunction cannot be granted when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding. The relief of specific performance is equally efficacious, rather more efficacious, remedy than the suit for injunction simplicitor.= “Clause (e) of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act is relevant to the extent and in the context of the provisions of section 53­A of the Transfer of Property Act, which requires the plaintiff to satisfy that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is only when such readiness and willingness is there that the contract of agreement for sale can be specifically enforced. If this basic readiness and willingness is not established, then the performance could not be specifically enforced. It follows, therefore, that by reason of the principle underlying section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, when the plaintiff seeks injunction so as to prevent breach of a contract whose performance cannot be specifically enforced, such an injunction has to be refused. Similarly, when a suitor of such a type would have equally efficacious relief available so as to enforce the contracts by taking appropriate remedy, without recourse to it, it would be indeed difficult to extend the discretionary relief of permanent injunction. Clause (h) of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act would require the Court to refuse such a type of prayer for injunction. It is not as if that in a suit to enforce the agreement itself, such a relief is sought. On the other hand, although the plaintiff came to the Court with the allegation that the other party has repudiated the agreement for sale, he has omitted to seek its enforcement and is trying to hold the property obviously without seeking to complete his title by enforcing the agreement for sale. To such a case, the principles underlying Clause (h) of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act can be extended so as to refuse such an ancillary relief.”= Thus the legal position is well settled by this Court that when remedy of a suit for specific performance is available to the plaintiff, he cannot file a suit for injunction simplicitor nor he can claim temporary= In the present case the plaintiff could have filed suit for specific performance of the contract as soon as he found that defendant no.1 had repudiated contract and was trying to dispose of the property to somebody else. = In view of the above circumstances, as the suit for injunction simplicitor itself is not tenable in view of Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff is also not entitled to temporary injunction pending the suit. Therefore the appeal is allowed and impugned order stands set aside. Notice of Motion stands dismissed.

PUBLISHED IN judis/bitstream/123456789/31980/1/CAO1273110.pdf#

 :1: 616.10.ao.j
ata
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPEAL FROM ORDER  NO.616 OF 2010
IN
NOTICE OF MOTION NO. Ex.2 OF 2008
FROM
B. C. C. C. Suit No. 1602 OF 2008
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.193 OF 2012
Mr. Abdul Wahid
Residing at Room No.22,1st floor,
Ramzan Building, Hans Road,
Neara National Diary,
Byculla(W), Mumbai .. Appellant
               Vs.
1.Shri. Manish Hansraj Chandaria
Residing at Flat No.8,3rd Floor,
Link Corner,
Residential and Non­residential Premises
Co­operative Society(Prop.)Ltd,
Plot No.  231, T. P. S. III,
Linking Road, Bandra(W), Mumbai
2. Smt. Nasreen wd/o Yusuf Ibrahim Shaikh
Residing at Flat No.16 and 17,
Building No. 185, Nishant Pada,Dongri,
Mumbai .. Respondents :2: 616.10.ao.j
Mr. Jagdish N. Jayale,for the Appellant/Applicant..
Dr. Amod S. Tilak, for the Respondent No.1.
CORAM :­  J. H. BHATIA,J.
DATE     :­  FEBRUARY 17, 2012
 JUDGMENT
1 Rule.  Rule made returnable forthwith.  With the consent of  the
learned  counsel for both the parties, the appeal is heard forthwith.
2 The appeal is preferred by the original defendants challenging the
order dated 21.04.2010 passed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court in
Notice   of   Motion   whereby   the   defendants   are   restrained   from
dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit flat.
3 The plaintiff­respondent no.1 contended that the defendant no.1.
appellant is the owner of the suit flat.  On 6th June, 2008 the defendant
no.1 agreed to sell the suit flat to the plaintiff for consideration of Rs.40
lac.   Out of  the consideration amount, a sum of Rs.1 lac was paid by
cheque on the said date and amount of Rs.15 lac was paid in  cash on
that day.  Balance amount was to be paid on or before September 2008
before   registration   of   the   agreement.   According   to   the   plaintiff,
subsequent to the contract with the plaintiff, defendant no.1 agreed to :3: 616.10.ao.j
sell the property to defendant no.2. Therefore, the plaintiff filed suit the
for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing
the plaintiff from the suit flat without following due process of law.  The
plaintiff also took out Notice of Motion for temporary injunction of the
same nature.  Defendant no.1, contested the Notice of Motion denying
that  there was any agreement  for sale between him and  the plaintiff.
He also denied to have received any amount of consideration from the
plaintiff.  According to him, the agreement is a forged  document.  After
hearing parties, learned  trial Court allowed  the Notice of Motion and
granted temporary injunction against defendant no.1.
4 Learned   counsel   for   the   defendant/appellant   vehemently
contended that when the plaintiff claims possession of the suit property
on the basis of the agreement for sale, he could not have filed suit for
injunction simplicitor because equally, rather more, efficacious relief of
specific performance  of contact is available to him.  He contends that
had the plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of the contract he
could have claimed the relief of injunction and also temporary injunction
pending the suit, but when he has not filed suit for specific performance
of the contract, in view of Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, the
injunction  cannot  be  granted  and  therefore in  such  a  suit  temporary
injunction also cannot  be granted.  In support of his contention learned :4: 616.10.ao.j
counsel   placed   reliance   upon  Mathurabai   Kadu   Koli   and   Ors   v/s
Roopchand Lalji Koli and Anr 2000(I) Bom.C. R. page 133.  On the
other   hand   the   learned   counsel   for   the   plaintiff   contended   that
agreement for sale between the plaintiff and defendant no.1 was subject
to realization of certain cheques and consent terms to be filed in earlier
suit  no.  509  of  2008  filed  by  defendant  no.1  against  his vendor Zia
Safruddin Ali  and  as  per  the  consent  terms,  the  defendant  no.1 was
entitled to retain as well as to dispose of the suit premises.   The deal
between the plaintiff and defendant no.1 would be subject to realization
of the cheque and  consent terms of suit no. 509 of 2008.   From the said
agreement, it is clear that defendant no.1 was entitled  to retain the suit
property and also  to dispose of  the same.    In such circumstances,  the
plaintiff claims have entered into contract to purchase the suit property
from defendant no.1 for consideration of Rs. 40 lac.  Out of which, an
amount of Rs.16 lac  was allegedly paid by him.  Defendant no.1 denies
receipt of money as well as execution of the agreement.  That defence
need not be  taken into consideration at  this stage.   According  to  the
plaintiff, the balance of amount Rs.24 lac was to be paid on or before
September, 2008 at the time of registration of the agreement for sale.
According to him, as per clause ‘h’ of the terms of the said agreement
defendant   no.1   had   handed   over   possession   of   the   suit   flat   to   the :5: 616.10.ao.j
plaintiff, and on that basis he is in possession.  He contends that after he
had entered into an agreement, defendant no.1 was  trying  to sell  the
property to defendant no.2 and therefore he filed the suit. According to
him, in view of these circumstances, he was not in a position to file suit
for specific performance of the contract and therefore was required to
file the suit for perpetual injunction simplicitor to protect his possession
till sale deed is actually executed and registered.
5 From the pleadings and contention of the plaintiff, it is clear that
the plaintiff claims to have received possession of the suit premises in
part performance of the contract between the parties.  According to him,
the balance amount of Rs.24 lac was to be paid by September 2008 at
the time of execution and registration of agreement for sale, infact the
sale  deed  and  not  agreement  for   sale.    However,    even  before  that
defendant no.1 had repudiated the contract with the plaintiff and was
trying  to sell  the property  to  third person.   That shows  that cause of
action  for  filing  the suit  for specific performance   had accrued  to  the
plaintiff.
6 The   contract   for   sale   of   the   property   is   specifically   enforcible
under Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act and the plaintiff who claims
to   have   agreed   to   purchase   the   property   was   entitled   to   seek   such
specific performance under Section 15 of  the Specific Relief Act.   He :6: 616.10.ao.j
could file the suit for specific performance of the contract and in such
suit  he  could  also  claim   permanent injunction   as  well   as  temporary
injunction pending the suit.
Section 41(h) provides that an injunction
cannot   be   granted   when   equally   efficacious   relief   can   certainly   be
obtained by any other usual  mode of  proceeding. The relief of specific
performance is equally efficacious, rather more efficacious, remedy than
the suit for injunction simplicitor.
7 It is  settled  position  of law  that where  the  plaintiff  claims  the
possession on the basis of part  performance  of the agreement for sale,
his   remedy   is   to   file   the   suit   for   specific   performance   and   suit   for
injunction simplicitor is not tenable.  This position was clarified by the
learned single Judge of this Court in Mathurabai Kadu Koli (supra).
8 Learned Judge referred  to  Yeshwantrao Martandrao Mukane v
Khushal K. Bhatia  ­1986(1) Bom. C. R.  533  in which  the Division
Bench of this Court had observed thus:­
“Clause  (e)  of  section  41  of  the  Specific  Relief  Act is
relevant   to   the   extent   and   in   the   context   of   the
provisions  of  section  53­A  of  the  Transfer  of  Property
Act, which requires  the plaintiff  to satisfy  that he was
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 
It
is only when such readiness and willingness is there that
the  contract  of  agreement for  sale  can  be  specifically
:7: 616.10.ao.j
enforced.  If  this basic  readiness and willingness is not
established,   then   the   performance   could   not   be
specifically enforced. 
It follows, therefore, that by reason
of the principle underlying section 41(e) of the Specific
Relief Act, when  the plaintiff seeks injunction  so as  to
prevent breach of a contract whose performance cannot
be  specifically  enforced,  such  an injunction  has  to  be
refused. 
Similarly, when a suitor of such a type would
have equally efficacious relief available so as to enforce
the   contracts   by   taking   appropriate   remedy,   without
recourse to it, it would be indeed difficult to extend the
discretionary relief of permanent injunction. 
Clause (h)
of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act would require the
Court to refuse such a type of prayer for injunction. 
It is
not as if that in a suit to enforce the agreement itself,
such a relief is sought. 
On the other hand, although the
plaintiff came to the Court with the allegation that the
other party has repudiated  the agreement for  sale, he
has omitted to seek its enforcement  and is trying to hold
the property obviously without seeking  to complete his
title by enforcing the agreement for sale. 
To such a case,
the principles underlying Clause (h) of section 41 of the
Specific Relief Act can be extended so as to refuse such an
ancillary relief.”
9 Thus  the legal position is well  settled by  this Court  that when
remedy of a suit for specific performance is available to the plaintiff, he :8: 616.10.ao.j
cannot file a suit for injunction simplicitor nor he can claim temporary
injunction  in pending suit for injunction simplicitor. 
10 In the present case the plaintiff could have filed suit for specific
performance of the contract as soon as he found that defendant no.1 had repudiated     contract   and   was   trying   to   dispose   of   the   property   to somebody   else.      
The   plaintiff   filed   the   suit   on   the   basis   of   the
agreement  allegedly executed by defendant no.1 in his favour and that
agreement shows  that consent  terms in  the earlier suit were accepted
and defendant no.1 was entitled to retain and dispose of the premises.
The   defendant   no.1   denies     execution   of   this   agreement.   When
pleadings of the plaintiffs  show that  there was no impediment in filing
suit  for  specific performance, now he cannot  say  that because of  the
earlier suit he could not file suit for specific performance.  These aspects
were   not   considered   by   the   trial   court   while   granting   temporary
injunction in favour of the plaintiff.
11 In  view  of  the  above  circumstances,  
as  the   suit  for injunction
simplicitor itself is not tenable in view of Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief   Act,   the   plaintiff   is   also   not   entitled   to   temporary   injunction pending the suit.  
Therefore the appeal is allowed and impugned order
stands set aside.  Notice of Motion stands dismissed.
(J. H. BHATIA,J.)

Thursday, June 20, 2013

Land Acquisition - compensation on different classifications for unauthorized land owners as per G.O.Ms.No.639, Revenue (Assn-IV) Department, dated 29.09.2001 Challenged.= The petitioners are aggrieved by the classification of their lands into Category-D, and they challenge the rationality in denying the ex-gratia on par with A-Category lands, or in the alternative at least on par with B-Category lands. = Under the G.O., lands were classified into four categories - i) Category-A are assigned lands for which DKT pattas were granted; ii) Category-B are Government lands occupied without pattas, but occupations were recorded in 10(1) and Adangal Accounts; iii) Category-D lands are also Government lands occupied without pattas, but possessions were recorded only in Adangals; and iv) Category-C are assigned lands purchased by persons from the DKT patta holders. 3. According to the G.O., for Category-A lands, lumpsum ex-gratia is fixed at the value equivalent to the market value along with an amount equivalent to 15% (for the lands resumed prior to 30.04.1984) and 30% (for the lands resumed after 30.04.1984) on the market value payable under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The assignees were not entitled for a reference under the Land Acquisition Act. 4. For Category-B lands, the possession of which is reflected in entries in 10(1) and Adangal Accounts, ex-gratia is fixed equivalent to the market value but without solatium. 5. For Category-D lands, the possession of which is reflected only in theAdangals, ex-gratia equivalent to 50% of the market value without solatium is fixed, and Category-C lands are not entitled for any ex-gratia. 6. The lands of the petitioners fall under Category-D, and as such, according to the respondents, they are entitled for 50% of the market value without solatium towards the ex-gratia in terms of the G.O.= Thus, in the considered view of this Court, all the occupants of Government land without a patta covered both by 10(1) account and adangals on the one side and only by adangals on the other, are alike and are equally placed. 23. For the foregoing reasons, G.O.Ms.No.639, Revenue (Assn-IV) Department, dated 29.9.2001 insofar as the classification it has made relating to D-category lands is held not sustainable and the same is set aside. Consequently, it is held that D-category lands shall be treated as B-category lands. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioners for awarding exgratia treating their lands on par with B-category lands.

published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9853

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NOUSHAD ALI    

Contempt Case No.6883 of 2004

09.04.2013

1. Talreddy Yesanna and others.

Government of A.P., rep. by its Secretary, Revenue (Assn.IV) Department,
Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad and others.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri B.D. Maheswar Reddy Counsel for Respondents:
G.P. for Land Acquisition.

<Gist :

>Head Note:

?Cases referred:

ORDER:

1.      The petitioners were occupants of Government land in Alaganur village,Kurnool District. 
Their lands were acquired for construction of Alaganur
Balancing Reservoir along with some private lands. 
In this writ petition they
are seeking compensation/ex-gratia for their lands on par with the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act or in the alternative on par with 'B' category lands pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.639, Revenue (Assn-IV) Department, dated  
29.09.2001.
2.      The State Government issued orders in G.O.Ms.No.639, Revenue (Assn-IV)
Department, dated 29.09.2001 providing for payment of   ex-gratia towards
acquisition of government lands.
 Under the G.O., lands were classified into four
categories - i) Category-A are assigned lands for which DKT pattas were granted;
ii) Category-B are Government lands occupied without pattas, but occupations
were recorded in 10(1) and Adangal Accounts;
 iii) Category-D lands are also Government lands occupied without pattas, but possessions were recorded only in Adangals; and 
iv) Category-C are assigned lands purchased by persons from the
DKT patta holders.
3.      According to the G.O., for Category-A lands, lumpsum ex-gratia is fixed at the value equivalent to the market value along with an amount equivalent to 15% (for the lands resumed prior to 30.04.1984) and 30% (for the lands resumed after 30.04.1984) on the market value payable under Section 23(2) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. The assignees were not entitled for a reference under the Land Acquisition Act.
4.      For Category-B lands, the possession of which is reflected in entries in 10(1) and Adangal Accounts, ex-gratia is fixed equivalent to the market value but without solatium.
5.      For Category-D lands, the possession of which is reflected only in theAdangals, ex-gratia equivalent to 50% of the market value without solatium is fixed, and Category-C lands are not entitled for any ex-gratia.
6.      The lands of the petitioners fall under Category-D, and as such, according to the respondents, they are entitled for 50% of the market value without solatium towards the ex-gratia in terms of the G.O.
7.      The petitioners are aggrieved by the classification of their lands into Category-D, and they challenge the rationality in denying the ex-gratia on par with A-Category lands, or in the alternative at least on par with B-Category lands. 
The petitioners would contend that they were in occupation of the land
for more than three decades. Therefore their lands are similar to other
categories of lands in all respects and hence denial of compensation by
classifying the lands as Category-D is a discrimination.
8.      In the counter affidavit, the respondents admit the fact that the
petitioners were in possession of lands and their lands were resumed for the
purpose of construction of the reservoir. The counter, however, states that they
were not granted pattas and their possession was found recorded only in the
Adangals and there are no entries in 10(1) account. Therefore, the lands were
classified as D-Category lands and the petitioners were paid 50% of the market
value as ex-gratia. The petitioners were paid at Rs.30,000/- per acre for dry
lands and Rs.40,000/- per acre for irrigated dry lands under Award dated
13.10.2000 as per G.O.Ms.No.639, dated 29.09.2001. The respondents would contend
that it is not possible to treat the lands of the petitioners as B-Category
lands. According to them, B-Category lands stand on a different footing because
the lands which find entry both in 10(1) Account and Adangals are different from
the lands which find entry only in Adangals. The occupants whose names are
entered in 10(1) account will be prospective assignees whereas the other
occupants are not prospective assignees. In other words, an occupant, whose name
is reflected in 10(1) account, will be eligible for patta, but the same is not
the case with other category of occupants. Thus a distinction is maintained
between an occupant who is supported by the entries in 10(1) account and
Adangals and an occupant who is supported merely by the Adangals. Therefore,
according to the respondents there is no discrimination meted out to the
petitioners.
9.      I have heard Sri B.D. Maheswar Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners and the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition for
respondents.
10.     There is no dispute that the lands of the petitioners were resumed, and by
treating the lands as Category-D, ex-gratia amount at 50% of the market value
was paid to them under G.O.Ms.No.639, dated 29.09.2001.
11.     Principle of equality before law and equal protect of the laws is the
touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 ensures equality among
people and its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory
treatment. Though classification is permissible under   Article 14, the
classification must not be arbitrary but it must be rationale. It must be based
on some equalities or characteristics commonly found in the classified group.
The classification itself must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and that differentia
must have rationale relationship to the object sought to be achieved. Any
classification, which is not rationale, strikes at the root of Article 14. There
should be no substantial difference in between the two groups to classify them
into two groups. The difference which will warrant a reasonable classification
must be real and substantial and must bear some just and reasonable relation to
the object sought to be achieved. A classification in order to the
constitutional must rest upon distinctions that are substantial not merely
illusory.
The test is 
whether there is reasonable classification free from
artificiality and arbitrariness.
12.     The case of the petitioners has to be considered in the light of the
aforesaid principles.
13.     The petitioners firstly claim that they are entitled to be treated on par
with A-category lands. They seek to draw a parity of their lands with A-category
lands stating that both are Government lands and assignment of the lands does
not confer special rights on the landholders. According to them, the assigned
lands are only heritable but not alienable and can be resumed by the Government
whenever required for public purpose.
Therefore, the petitioners are entitled for ex-gratia on par with A-category lands.
14.     The said contention is devoid of merits. 
All occupations of Government
land without authorisation are unauthorised and all persons occupying such lands
are encroachers.
Such encroachers do not have any enforceable rights nor are
their rights protected under law.
They are liable to be evicted either under
A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905 or under the provisions of the A.P. Board
Standing Orders, whereas assignment of land confers title on the holders and
their rights are protected against eviction except for unauthorised alienations
under the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977.
The land of
an assignee may be resumed by Government but it has to be done for special
reasons to serve the public purpose.
The assigned lands are heritable. Thus
there is a clear discernible difference between the assigned lands falling under
category-A and the unassigned lands falling under category-B and D and there is
no similarity between    A-category lands on the one hand, and B, D and C
category lands on the  other.
Therefore, there is no discrimination in paying
higher exgratia to A-Category lands compared to other categories. 
In
T. NADIPI
SUNKANNA AND OTHERS VS. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (W.P.No.17183 of 2004,                    
dated 10.02.2011) a similar issue was dealt with and held that no discrimination
exists in classifying the lands as above.
15.     The alternate claim of the petitioners is that they are at least entitled
to be considered on par with  category-B lands and that since both are
unassigned lands, they are entitled for equal compensation and that the G.O to
the extent it has provided lesser compensation is discriminatory.
16.     It is to be noticed that both B-category and D-category lands are
unassigned lands and the persons in occupation of these categories of lands for
all legal and practical purposes are encroachers. They are not even licensees.
Therefore, the question is
  whether classification of these lands into two
categories is a permissible classification under law.
17.     G.O.Ms.No.639 dated 29.09.2001 seeks to distinguish B-category lands from
D-category on the basis of revenue records. Lands whose possession is confirmed
by entries in 10(1) Account and also Adangals are classified as category-B lands
and the lands whose possession is registered only in the Adangals are classified
as category-D lands.
Thus entries in revenue records is taken as the basis for
classification viz., two entries is the basis for category-B and one entry for
D-category.
Therefore it is necessary to examine the significance of 10(1)
Account and Adangals.
Both Accounts are village records maintained as per the
A.P. Board Standing Orders.
Adangal 
is the name given to a revenue register maintained in the villages. 
It is a book containing accounts of the whole
village showing cultivation in the village. It reflects the ground position
including the name of the cultivator, who actually cultivates the land and
whether the person in occupation of the land has violated any law and if so, the
details of the same. 
10(1) Account 
is the monthly register of cultivation of
village. 
It is also known as Cultivation Account. 10(1) Account contains the
details of crops including both Government and Inam lands. The area of
cultivation of each crop mentioned in 10(1) Account should be based on the
Adangal. 
18.     Thus both the aforesaid registers almost deal with the village accounts
relating to cultivation in the village. There is no additional advantage
conferred on an occupant on account of the entries made in 10(1) account.
10(1)
account does not create a special right in an occupant for grant of patta.
Therefore there is no rationale nor is there any object in conferring more
benefits in respect of the land on the basis that it finds entry in 10(1)
account in addition to the Adangal.
19.     The stand of the respondents that Adangal is not a permanent record and that there will be changes in every fasli year from 1st July to 30th June depending on the crop conditions and their names will not be included in 10(1) account, whereas the names of 10(1) account holders will be considered for grant
of pattas hardly makes a material difference to give a distinct status to B- Category lands.
20.     All lands at the disposal of the Government except those prohibited are assignable lands as per Standing Order 15 (4). 
The assignment of lands are
generally free of market value except in case of project affected lands or other
lands provided elsewhere in the Standing Orders.
The prohibited lands are -    
Poramboke (tank-beds, fore-shore of tank-beds, cattle stands, grazing lands and
reserved lands 
(reserved for depressed class members or for any public purpose, such as schools, hospitals etc.; 
lands 
adjoining forests subject to certain conditions; 
lands 
containing topes or valuable trees; 
lands 
within cantonment limits; 
lands 
reserved under Section 26 of the Forest Act; 
lands 
within Port Limits; 
lands 
near the sea coast within one furlong of high water mark of the sea;  water-course porambokes;
lands 
in the vicinity of aerodromes; 
lands 
containing minerals, quarries, etc.; padugais, i.e., land within the flood-bank of rivers, lanka rivers, lanka lands not held on ryotwari tenure etc.; 
lands
where "Pati  Matti" is available and; and 
any other lands 
which are required or likely to be required for any public or special purposes necessary for the provision of amenities to the community or connected with the development of the
village.

21.  The aforesaid prohibited lands are not available for assignment in favour
of any person and, except these lands all other lands are assignable lands.
As
noticed above, entries in 10(1) account do not confer any special rights or
benefits on the occupants.
On the other hand, order of preference among the
landless poor persons for being eligible for patta as provided byBoard Standing Order No.15(10) states that as between a sivoi jamadar and a non-sivoi jamadar, 
the sivoi jamadar, who has been in continuous occupation of the land, will get preference. 
'Sivoi jamadar' 
means a person who has been in occupation of the
land at the time of consideration of his assignment, provided he had been in
continuous occupation of the land from the fasli immediately preceding the one
in which his assignment is considered.
 Continuous occupation of land is thus one
of the criteria for granting pattas and it does not lay down that those
occupations supported by 10(1) account alone will be considered for assignment.
22.     Therefore, the distinction sought to be made out on the basis of the entries made in 10(1) account vis--vis the entries made in the Adangals is arbitrary and artificial in nature. There is no substantial difference between the two categories of occupations both being encroachments without pattas and the distinction is mere illusory. 
Thus, in the considered view of this Court,
all the occupants of Government land without a patta covered both by 10(1) account and adangals on the one side and only by adangals on the other, are alike and are equally placed.
23.     For the foregoing reasons, G.O.Ms.No.639, Revenue (Assn-IV) Department,  dated 29.9.2001 insofar as the classification it has made relating to D-category lands is held not sustainable and the same is set aside. 
Consequently, it is held that D-category lands shall be treated as             B-category lands.
Accordingly, the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioners for awarding exgratia treating their lands on par with B-category lands.
24.     The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs. As a
sequel, W.P.M.P.No.8946 of 2004 shall stand closed as unnecessary.

JUSTICE NOUSHAD ALI  
Date: 09.04.2013.

Tuesday, June 18, 2013

Mohammadan law: Hiba (gift) - Essential requisites of - Held: Are: (1) declaration of the gift by the donor, (2) acceptance of the gift by the donee and (3) delivery of possession -The rules of Mohammadan Law do not make writing essential to the validity of a gift and an oral gift fulfilling all the three essentials make the gift complete and irrevocable - However, the donor may record the transaction of gift in writing - In the instant case, as all the three essential requisites are satisfied by the gift deed - The gift in favour of defendant 2 became complete and irrevocable -Judgment of High Court set aside and that of trial court, holding the gift deed genuine and binding between the parties, restored -Transfer of Property Act - ss. 129 and 123. Transfer of Property Act, 1882: ss. 123 and 129 - Deed of gift executed by a Mohammadan - HELD: Is not the instrument effecting, creating or making the gift - Such writing is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence - Section 129 preserves the rule of Mohammadan Law and excludes the applicability of s. 123 to a gift of an immovable property by a Mohammadan - In the instant case, the gift deed is a form of declaration by the donor and not an instrument of gift as contemplated u/s 17 of the Registration Act - Registration Act, 1908 - s.17. In a suit for partition between the parties governed by Sunni Law, defendant no. 2 set up the defence that his father executed a hiba (gift deed) on 5.2.1968 and gifted his properties to him, and put him in possession of the hiba properties. The trial court held the hiba as true, valid and binding between the parties, and dismissed the suit. In the appeal, before the High Court it was contended for the plaintiffs that the gift deed dated 5-2-1968 being in writing was compulsorily required to be registered and stamped and in the absence thereof the gift deed could not be accepted and relied upon. The High Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court for passing a preliminary decree.= Allowing the appeal filed by heirs of defendant no.2, the Court HELD: 1.1. The position is well settled, which has been stated and restated time and again, that the three essentials of a gift under Mohammadan Law are: (1) declaration of the gift by the donor; (2) acceptance of the gift by the donee and (3) delivery of possession. The rules of Mohammadan Law do not make writing essential to the validity of a gift; and an oral gift fulfilling all the three essentials make the gift complete and irrevocable. However, the donor may record the transaction of gift in writing. [para 27] [1175-h; 1176-a-b] 1.2. Merely because the gift is reduced to writing by a Mohammadan instead of it having been made orally, such writing does not become a formal document or instrument of gift. When a gift could be made by Mohammadan orally, its nature and character is not changed because of it having been made by a written document. What is important for a valid gift under Mohammadan Law is that three essential requisites must be fulfilled. The form is immaterial. If all the three essential requisites are satisfied constituting a valid gift, the transaction of gift would not be rendered invalid because it has been written on a plain piece of paper. The distinction that if a written deed of gift recites the factum of prior gift then such deed is not required to be registered but when the writing is contemporaneous with the making of the gift, it must be registered, is inappropriate and does not seem to be in conformity with the rule of gifts in Mohammadan Law. [para 29] [1176-H; 1177-A-C] 1.3. A deed of gift executed by a Mohammadan is not the instrument effecting, creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence; such writing is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence. [para 32] [1178-A-B] Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail and others 1995 (2) SCR975= (1995) 3 SCC 693 - relied on. Nasib Ali v. Wajed Ali AIR 1927 Cal 197; Md. Hesabuddin and others v. Md. Hesaruddin and others AIR 1984 Gauhati 41; Jubeda Khatoon v. Moksed Ali AIR 1973 Gauhati 105; and Makku Rawther's Children: Assan Ravther and others v. Manahapara Charayil AIR 1972 Kerala 27- approved. Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Govt. of Hyderabad v. Smt. Tayyaba Begum AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 199; Sankesula Chinna Budde Saheb v. Raja Subbamma 1954 2 MLJ 113; Amirkhan v. Ghouse Khan (1985) 2 MLJ 136; Ghulam Ahmad Sofi v. Mohd. Sidiq Dareel and others AIR 1974 JammuAND Kashmir 59; and Chota Uddandu Sahib v. Masthan Bi (died) and others AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 271 - disapproved. Mohammad Abdul Ghani (since deceased)AND ANOTHERv. Fakhr Jahan BegamAND OTHERS 1922 (49) IA 195- referred to Mohammadan Law by Syed Ameer Ali; Mahomedan Law by Mulla, 19th Edition 5(pp.696-697); Asaf A. A. Fyzee in Outlines of Muhammadan Law, Fifth Edition (edited and revised by Tahir Mahmood) at page 182; and Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law (19th Edition), Page 120 -referred to. 2.1. Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act, 1908 leaves no manner of doubt that an instrument of gift of immoveable property requires registration irrespective of the value of the property. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 lays down the manner in which gift of immoveable property may be effected and prescribes that transfer of immovable property by gift must be effected by a registered instrument. However, an exception is carved out in s. 129 of the T.P. Act with regard to the gifts by a Mohammadan. [para 14,15 and 18] [1164-B-E; 1166-A] 2.2. Section 129 of T.P. Act preserves the rule of Mohammadan Law and excludes the applicability of s. 123 of T.P. Act to a gift of an immovable property by a Mohammadan. It is not the requirement that in all cases where the gift deed is contemporaneous to the making of the gift then such deed must be registered u/s. 17 of the Registration Act. Each case would depend on its own facts. [para 31] [1177-F-G] 2.3. In the inastant case, the gift was made by the father of defendant no. 2 by a written deed dated 5.2.1968 in his favour in respect of the properties `A' schedule and `B' schedule appended thereto. The gift - as is recited in the deed - was based on love and affection for defendant no. 2 as after the death of donor's wife, he has been looking after and helping him. Therefore, it cannot be said that because a declaration is reduced to writing, it must have been registered. The acceptance of the gift by defendant no 2 is also evidenced as he signed the deed. He was residing in the `B' schedule property consisting of a house and a kitchen room appurtenant thereto and, thus, was in physical possession of residential house with the donor. The trial court on consideration of the entire evidence on record has recorded a categorical finding that the donor, executed the gift deed dated 5-2-1968 in favour of donee, the donee accepted the gift and the donor handed over the properties covered by the gift deed to the donee, and thus all the three essentials of a valid gift under the Mohammadan Law were satisfied. The view of the trial court is in accord with the legal position. The gift deed dated 5.2.1968 is a form of declaration by the donor and not an instrument of gift as contemplated u/s 17 of the Registration Act. As all the three essential requisites are satisfied by the gift deed dated 5.2.1968, the gift in favour of defendant 2 became complete and irrevocable. [para 34] [1178-G-H; 1179-A] 2.4. The High Court in the impugned judgment relied upon the Full Bench decision in the case of Tayyaba Begum which is not a correct view and does not lay down the correct law. The judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside. The judgment and decree passed by the Principal Subordinate Judge is restored. [para 35-36] [1179-B-C] Case Law Reference: 1922 (49) IA 195 referred to para 12 1995 (2) SCR 975 relied on para 13 AIR 1927 Cal 197 approved para 19 1954 2 MLJ 113 disapproved para 20 AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 199 disapproved para 21 1972 Kerala 27 approved para 22 AIR 1974 JammuAND Kashmir 59 disapproved para 23 AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 271 disapproved para 24 (1985) 2 MLJ 136 disapproved para 27 AIR 1984 Gauhati 41 approved para 28 AIR 1973 Gauhati 105 approved para 28 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1714 of 2005. From the JudgmentAND Order dated 13.9.2004 of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in First Appeal No. 1685 of 1988. A.K. Srivastav, G.R.K. Paramahamsa, Lokesh Kumar (for M.K.Garg) for the Appellants. V. Mohana for the Respondents.


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1714 OF 2005
Hafeeza Bibi & Ors. …. Appellants
Versus
Shaikh Farid (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. ….Respondents
JUDGMENT
R.M. Lodha, J.
This appeal, by special leave, arises from the judgment
of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated September 13, 2004
whereby the Single Judge of that Court set aside the judgment and
decree dated April 27, 1988 passed by the Principal, Subordinate
Judge, Vishakhapatnam and remitted the matter back to the trial
1court for the purpose of passing a preliminary decree after
determining the shares to which each party would be entitled.
2. Shaik Dawood had three sons; Shaik Farid, Mehboob
Subhani and Mohammed Yakub. He also had five daughters;
Sappoora Bibi, Khairunnisa Begum, Noorajahan Begum, Rabia Bibi
and Alima Bibi.
All the five daughters were married.
His wife
predeceased him.
Shaik Dawood retired as Reserve Head Constable.
He was also a Unani Medical Practitioner.
3. Shaik Farid, Sappoora Bibi, Khairunnisa Begum,
Noorajahan Begum and Mohd. Iqbal (son of Alima Bibi) – hereinafter
referred to as ‘plaintiffs’ – filed a suit for partition against Mehboob
Subhani, Mohammed Yakub and Rabia Bibi (hereinafter referred to
as ‘defendant 1’, ‘defendant 2’ and ‘defendant 3’ respectively). The
son and daughters of Syed Ali, who was brother of Shaik Dawood,
were impleaded as other defendants (hereinafter referred to as
‘defendants 4 to 7’).
4. The parties are governed by Sunni Law.
The plaintiffs
averred in the plaint that Shaik Dawood died intestate on December
19, 1968 and the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 became entitled to
‘A’ schedule properties and half share in ‘B’ schedule properties. The
2plaintiffs stated that the defendants 4 to 7 are entitled to other half
share in ‘B’ schedule properties.
5. Mohammed Yakub — defendant 2 — contested the suit
for partition. 
He set up the defence that Shaik Dawood executed hiba
(gift deed) on February 5, 1968 and gifted his properties to him.
Shaik Dawood put him in possession of the hiba properties on that
day itself. The hiba became complete and the plaintiffs were fully
aware of that fact. 
The defendant 2 in his written statement also
referred to a previous suit for partition filed by some of the parties
which was dismissed in default.
6. Some of the original parties have died during the
pendency of the suit. Their legal representatives have been brought
on record.
7. The trial court framed four issues. The issue relevant for
the purpose of the present appeal is issue no.2 which is to the effect
whether hiba dated February 5, 1968 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiffs.
The trial court, after recording the evidence and on hearing
the parties, answered issue no. 2 in the affirmative and, held that
plaintiffs were not entitled to the shares claimed in the plaint.
3Consequently, vide judgment and decree dated April 27, 1988, the trial
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit.
8. The plaintiffs challenged the judgment and decree of the
trial court before the High Court. Inter alia, one of the arguments
raised before the High Court on behalf of the appellants was that the
gift dated February 5, 1968 being in writing was compulsorily required to be registered and stamped and in absence thereof, the gift deed could not be accepted or relied upon for any purpose and such unregistered gift deed would not confer any title upon the defendant 2.
The High Court was persuaded by the argument and held that the
unregistered gift deed would not pass any title to the defendant 2 as
pleaded by him. The High Court, as indicated above, allowed the
appeal; set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and sent
the matter back to that court for the purposes of passing a preliminary
decree.
9. The present appellants are legal heirs of the deceased
defendant 2.
10. As to whether or not the High Court is right in its view that
the unregistered gift deed dated February 5, 1968 is not a valid gift 4and conveyed no title to the defendant 2 is the question for
determination in this appeal.
11. There is divergence of opinion amongst High Courts on the
question presented before us.
12. The Privy Council in the case of Mohammad Abdul Ghani
(since deceased) & Anr.v. Fakhr Jahan Begam & Ors.1
referred to
‘Mohammadan Law’; by Syed Ameer Ali and approved the statement
made therein that three conditions are necessary for a valid gift by a
Muslim: (a) manifestation of the wish to give on the part of the donor;
(b) the acceptance of the donee, either impliedly or expressly; (c) the
taking of possession of the subject-matter of the gift by the donee,
either actually or constructively.
13. In Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail and others2
, this Court
referred to the Principles of Mahomedan Law by Mulla, 19
th Edition
and in paragraph 5 (pp. 696-697) noticed the legal position, in relation
to a gift by Muslim incorporated therein, thus :
“5. Under Section 147 of the Principles of Mahomedan
Law by Mulla, 19th Edn., edited by Chief Justice M.
Hidayatullah, envisages that writing is not essential to the
validity of a gift either of moveable or of immovable
property. Section 148 requires that it is essential to the
validity of a gift that the donor should divest himself
1
 1922 (49) IA 195
2
 (1995) 3 SCC 693
5completely of all ownership and dominion over the subject
of the gift. Under Section 149, three essentials to the
validity of the gift should be, (i) a declaration of gift by the
donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or
on behalf of the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession of
the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee as
mentioned in Section 150. If these conditions are complied
with, the gift is complete. Section 150 specifically mentions
that for a valid gift there should be delivery of possession of
the subject of the gift and taking of possession of the gift by
the donee, actually or constructively. Then only the gift is
complete. Section 152 envisages that where the donor is in
possession, a gift of immovable property of which the
donor is in actual possession is not complete unless the
donor physically departs from the premises with all his
goods and chattels, and the donee formally enters into
possession. It would, thus, be clear that though gift by a
Mohammedan is not required to be in writing and
consequently need not be registered under the Registration
Act; for a gift to be complete, there should be a declaration
of the gift by the donor; acceptance of the gift, expressed
or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and delivery of
possession of the property, the subject-matter of the gift by
the donor to the donee. The donee should take delivery of
the possession of that property either actually or
constructively. On proof of these essential conditions, the
gift becomes complete and valid. In case of immovable
property in the possession of the donor, he should
completely divest himself physically of the subject of the
gift…….”
14. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for
short, ‘T.P. Act’) lays down the manner in which gift of immoveable
property may be effected. It reads thus :
“S.123. Transfer how effected. — For the purpose of
making a gift of immoveable property, the transfer must be
effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf
of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses.
6For the purpose of making a gift of moveable
property, the transfer may be effected either by a
registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery.
Such delivery may be made in the same way as
goods sold may be delivered.”
15. However, an exception is carved out in Section 129 of the
T.P. Act with regard to the gifts by a Mohammadan. It reads as
follows:
“S.129. Saving of donations mortis causa and
Muhammadan Law. — Nothing in this Chapter relates to
gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death,
or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Muhammadan law.”
16. At this stage, we may also refer to Section 17 of the
Registration Act, 1908 which makes registration of certain documents
compulsory. Section 17 of the Registration Act, to the extent it is
necessary, reads as follows :
“S.17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.
—(1) The following documents shall be registered, if the
property to which they relate is situate in a district in which,
and if they have been executed on or after the date on
which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act,
1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian
Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into
force, namely:—
(a) instruments of gift of immovable property;
(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;
(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;
7(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ;
(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .”
17. Section 49 of the Registration Act deals with the effect of
non-registration of documents required to be registered. It reads thus:
“S.49. Effect of non- registration of documents
required to be registered.- No document required by
section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered shall—
 (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein or
 (b) confer any power to adopt, or
(c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting
such property or conferring such power, unless it has
been registered:
Provided that an unregistered document affecting
immovable property and required by this Act or the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882 ), to be
registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a
suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the
Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877 ), or as evidence of
any collateral transaction not required to be effected by
registered instrument.”
18. Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act leaves no manner
of doubt that an instrument of gift of immoveable property requires
registration irrespective of the value of the property. The question is
about its applicability to a written gift executed by a Mohammadan in
8the light of Section 129 of the T.P. Act and the rule of Mohammadan
Law relating to gifts.
19. In the case of Nasib Ali v. Wajed Ali3
, the contention was
raised before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the
deed of gift, not being registered under the Registration Act, is not
admissible in evidence. The Calcutta High Court held that a deed of
gift by a Mohammadan is not an instrument effecting, creating or
making the gift but a mere piece of evidence. This is what the High
Court said :
“………The position under the Mahomedan Law is this :
that a gift in order to be valid must be made in accordance
with the forms stated above; and even if it is evidenced by
writing, unless all the essential forms are observed, it is not
valid according to law. That being so, a deed of gift
executed by a Mahomedan is not the instrument effecting,
creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence. It
may so happen after a lapse of time that the evidence of
the observance of the above forms might not be
forthcoming, so it is sometimes thought prudent; to reduce
the fact that a gift has been made into writing. Such writing
is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence.
3. The law with regard to the gift being complete by
declaration and delivery of possession is so clear that in a
case before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee
Kamarunnissa Bibi v. Hussaini Bibi [1880] 3 All. 266, where
a gift was said to have been made in lieu of dower, their
Lordships held that the requisite forms having been
observed it was not necessary to enquire whether there
was any consideration for the gift or whether there was any
dower due. The case of Karam Ilahi v. Sharfuddin [1916]
3
 AIR 1927 Cal 197
938 All. 212 is similar in principle to the present case. There
also a deed relating to the gift was executed. The learned
Judge held that if the gift was valid under the Mahomedan
Law it was none the less valid because there was a deed
of gift which, owing to some defect, was invalid under
Section 123, Transfer of Property Act, and could not be
used in evidence.
4. The next, question that calls for consideration is whether
a document like the present one executed by a Mahomedan
donor after he made a gift to show that he had made it in
favour of the donee is compulsorily registrable under the
Registration Act. Under Section 17 of the Registration Act
an instrument of gift must be registered. By the expression
'instrument of gift of immovable property' I understand an
instrument or deed which creates, makes or completes the
gift, thereby transferring the ownership of the property from
the executant to the person in whose favour it is executed.
In order to affect the immovable property, the document
must be a document of transfer; and if it is a document of
transfer it must be registered under the provisions of the
Registration Act.
5. The present document does not affect immovable
property. It does not transfer the immovable property from
the donor to the donee. It only affords evidence of the fact
that the donor has observed the formalities under the
Mahomedan Law in making the gift to the donee. I am
prepared to go so far as to hold that a document like the
present one is not compulsorily registrable under the
Registration Act, or the Registration Act does not apply to a
so-called deed of gift executed by a Mahomedan. But for
purposes of the present case it is not necessary to go so far
because I hold that this document is only a piece of
evidence, and conceding that it should, have been
registered, the effect of its non-registration is to make it
inadmissible in evidence under Section 49 of the
Registration Act………”
1020. In Sankesula Chinna Budde Saheb v. Raja Subbamma4
,
the Andhra Pradesh High Court, after noticing the three essentials of a
gift under the Mohammadan Law, held that if a gift was reduced to
writing, it required registration under Section 17(1)(a) of the
Registration Act. It went on to hold that even if by virtue of Section
129 of the T.P. Act, a deed of gift executed by Mohammadan was not
required to comply with the provisions of Section 123 of the T.P. Act,
still it had to be registered under Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration
Act when the gift related to immoveable property.
21. A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case
of Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Govt. of Hyderabad
v. Smt. Tayyaba Begum5
, was called upon to decide on a reference
made by the Board of Revenue under Section 55 of the Hyderabad
Stamp Act whether the document under consideration therein was a
gift deed or it merely evidenced a past transaction. The High Court
applied the test – whether the parties regarded the instrument to be a
receptacle and appropriate evidence of the transaction; was it
intended to constitute the gift or was it to serve as a record of a past
event – and held as under :
4
 1954 2 MLJ 113
5
 AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 199
11“12. We have to examine the document in question in the
light of these rules.
 No doubt, there was recitals therein
which relate to past transaction.
But that is not decisive of the matter.
What is the purpose which it was designed to serve?
That the executant did not treat it as a
memorandum of a completed hiba is evident from some of
the sentences.
In the deed, such as “I deemed it
necessary to execute a deed also making a declaration in
favour of my son…in accordance with the Muslim law”, and
the last portion of the document. The anxiety of the donor
to free the title of the donee to the property from all doubts
and to save him from future litigation is clearly exhibited in
the last sentence.
“I pray that no one may have any kind of doubt
regarding the ownership of Syed Ehasan Hussain
and that if per chance any doubt at all should arise,
this deed of Ekrarnama may prove sufficient.”
This sentence is expressive of her intention to
silence all doubts regarding the ownership of the property
with the aid of this document. She did not want anyone to
challenge the title of the donee to the house in question.
This object could be attained only if it is regarded as a
conveyance, a document which effected the transfer by its
own force. If, on the other hand, if it is a mere record of a
past transaction, that would not have the desired effect.
There is one circumstance which gives some indication as
to the intention of the executant of the document. The
document is attested by two witnesses as required by
Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. No doubt, this
is not conclusive of the matter. But it is indicative of the
desire of the executant that it should serve as evidence of
the gift and not as a memorandum of a past transaction.”
22. In Makku Rawther’s Children: Assan Ravther and others v.
Manahapara Charayil6
, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as His Lordship then
6
 AIR 1972 Kerala 27
12was) did not agree with the test applied by the Full Bench of Andhra
Pradesh High Court and the reasoning given in Tayyaba Begum5
. He
held in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report thus :
“8. I regret my inability to agree with the reasoning in
these decisions. In the context of Section 17, a document
is the same as an instrument and to draw nice distinctions
between the two only serves to baffle, not to ill mine. Mulla
says: “The words ‘document’ and ‘instrument’ are used
interchangeable in the Act”. An instrument of gift is one
whereby a gift is made. Where in law a gift cannot be
effected by a registered deed as such, it cannot be an
instrument of gift. The legal position is well-settled. A
Muslim gift may be valid even without a registered deed
and may be invalid even with a registered deed.
Registration being irrelevant to its legal force, a deed
setting out Muslim gift cannot be regarded as constitutive
of the gift and is not compulsorily registerable.”
9. Against this argument counsel invoked the authority of
the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench. One may respect the
ruling but still reiect the reasoning. The Calcutta Bench in
AIR 1927 Cal 197 has discussed the issue from the angle I
have presented. The logic of the law matters more than the
judicial numbers behind a view. The Calcutta Bench
argued:
"The essentials of a gift under the Mahomedan law
are ..... A simple gift can only be made by going
through the above formalities and no written
instrument is required. In fact no writing is
necessary to validate a gift; and if a gift is made by
a written instrument without delivery of possession,
it is invalid in law ..... That being so, a deed of gift
executed by a Mahomedan is not the instrument
effecting, creating or making the gift but a mere
piece of evidence ..... Under Section 17 of the
Registration Act an instrument of gift must be
13registered. By the expression 'instrument of gift of
immovable property' I understand an instrument or
deed which creates, makes or completes the gift
thereby transferring the ownership of the property
..... The present document does not affect
immovable property. It does not transfer an
immovable property from the donor to the donee
which only affords evidence of the fact that the
donor has observed the formalities under the
Mahomedan law in making the gift ..... I am
prepared to go so far as to hold that a document
like the present one is not compulsorily registrable
under the Registration Act, or the Registration Act
does not apply to a so-called deed of gift executed
by a Mahomedan."
These observations of Suhrawardy, J. have my respectful
concurrence. So confining myself to this contention for the
nonce, I am inclined to hold that Ext. B1 is admissible
notwithstanding Ss. 17 and 49 of the Indian Registration
Act. This conclusion, however, is little premature if I may
anticipate my opinion on the operation of Section 129 of the
Transfer of Property Act expressed later in this judgment.
Indeed, in the light of my interpretation of Section 129, Ext.
B1 needs to be registered. For the present I indicate my
conclusion, if the law of gifts for Muslims were not to be
governed by Section 129.”
23. The Full Bench of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in
Ghulam Ahmad Sofi v. Mohd. Sidiq Dareel and others7 had an
occasion to consider the question whether in view of the provisions of
Sections 123 and 129 of the T.P. Act, the rule of gifts in
Mohammadan Law stands superseded; and whether it is necessary
that there should be a registered instrument as required by Sections
7
 AIR 1974 Jammu & Kashmir 59
14123 and 138 of the T.P. Act in the case of gifts made under that Law.
The Full Bench noticed the statutory provisions and also decisions of
different High Courts including the decision of Calcutta High Court in
the case of Nasib Ali3
. The Full Bench held as follows :
“14. The ratio of the above cited authorities is therefore in
favour of the proposition that an oral gift made under the
Muslim law would not be affected by Section 123 of the
Transfer of Property Act and the gift if it has otherwise all
the attributes of a valid gift under the Muslim Law would not
become invalid because there is no instrument in writing
and registered. Therefore the answer to the question
formulated would be in the negative i.e. that Sections 123
and 129 of the Transfer of Property Act do not supersede
the Muslim law on matters relating to making of oral gifts,
that it is not essential that there should be a registered
instrument as required by Sections 123 and 138 of the
Transfer of Property Act in such cases. But if there is
executed an instrument and its execution is
contemporaneous with the making of the gift then in that
case the instrument must be registered as provided under
Section 17 of the Registration
Act. If, however, the making of the gift is an antecedent act
and a deed is executed afterwards as evidencing the said
transaction that does not require registration as it is an
instrument made after the gift is made and does not
therefore create, make or complete the gift thereby
transferring the ownership of the property from the
executant to the person in whose favour it is executed.”
24. The Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the
case of Chota Uddandu Sahib v. Masthan Bi (died) and others8
, was
concerned with the question about the gift by Mohammadan. The
8
 AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 271
15Single Judge referred to some of the decisions noticed above and few
other decisions and held in paragraph 10 of the report thus :
“10. Under Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act,
nothing in Chapter VII relates to gifts of movable property
made in contemplation of death or shall be deemed to
affect any rule of Mohammadan Law. According to the
Mohammedan Law, there can be a valid gift, if three
essentials of the gift are satisfied. (1) a declaration of the
gift by the donor, (2) the acceptance of the gift express or
implied by or on behalf of the donee and (3) delivery of
possession of the subject of gift by the donor to the donee.
If these conditions are complied with the gift is complete.
According to Muslim law it is not necessary that there
should be a deed of gift in order to make it a valid gift, but
of course, if there is a deed it should be registered. But if
the deed is merely a memoranda of an already effected
gift, then it stands on a separate footing. In view of this
specific provision of Muslim Law, which is saved by Section
129, it cannot be held that the gifts amongst muslims also
should satisfy the provisions of Chapter VII. . . . . . . . . . . .
Hence if all the formalities, as prescribed by Muslim Law,
regarding the making of gifts are satisfied, the gift is valid
notwithstanding the fact that it is oral and without any
instrument. If there is a contemporaneous document it
should be registered. But if the gift is antecedent and the
deed is subsequent merely evidencing the past transaction,
it does not require registration, because it does not by itself
make or complete the gift. . . . . . . . . .”
25. In the case of Amirkhan v. Ghouse Khan9
, one of the
questions that arose for consideration before the Madras High Court
was : whether the gift of the immoveable property by Mohammadan, if
reduced to writing, required registration. The Single Judge of the
9
 (1985) 2 MLJ 136
16Madras High Court concluded that though a Mohammadan could
create a valid gift orally, if he should reduce the same in writing, the
gift will not be valid unless it is duly registered.
26. In the case of Md. Hesabuddin and others v. Md.
Hesaruddin and others10
, the question with regard to gift of
immoveable property written on ordinary unstamped paper arose
before the Gauhati High Court. That was a case where a
Mohammadan mother made a gift of land in favour of her son by a gift
deed written on ordinary unstamped paper. The Single Judge of the
High Court relying upon an earlier decision of that Court in Jubeda
Khatoon v. Moksed Ali11 held as under:
“….. But it cannot be taken as sine qua non in all cases
that wherever there is a writing about a Mahomedan gift of
immovable property, there must be registration thereof.
The facts and circumstances of each case have to be
taken into consideration before finding whether the writing
requires registration or not. The essential requirements, as
said before, to make a Mahomedan gift valid are
declaration by the donor, acceptance by the donee and
delivery of possession to the donee. It was held in Jubeda
Khatoon v. Moksed Ali, AIR 1973 Gau 105 (at p. 106)-
"Under the Mahomedan Law three things are necessary for
creation of a gift. They are (i) declaration of gift by the
donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift express or implied by or on
behalf of the donee and (iii) delivery of possession of the
subject of the gift by the donor to the donee. The deed of
10 AIR 1984 Gauhati 41
11 AIR 1973 Gauhati 105
17gift is immaterial for creation of gift under the Mahomedan
Law. A gift under the Mahomedan Law is not valid if the
above mentioned essentials are not fulfilled, even if there
be a deed of gift or even a registered deed of gift. In other
words even if there be a declaration of acceptance of the
gift, there will be no valid gift under the Mahomedan Law if
there be no delivery of possession, even though there may
be registered deed of gift." In that case there was a deed of
gift which was not produced during trial. Still it was found in
that case that had the defendants produced the deed of
gift, at best it would have proved a declaration of the gift by
the donor and acceptance thereof by the donee. It was
further held that despite this the defendants would have to
lead independent oral evidence to prove delivery of
possession in order to prove a valid gift. Therefore it was
found in that case that deed of gift under the Mahomedan
Law does not create a disposition of property. Relying on
this it cannot be said that whenever there is a writing with
regard to a gift executed by the donor, it must be proved as
a basic instrument of gift before deciding the gift to be
valid. In the instant case a mere writing in the plain paper
as aforesaid containing the declaration of gift cannot
tantamount to a formal instrument of gift. Ext. A (2) has in
the circumstances of the present case to be taken as a
form of declaration of the donor. In every case the intention
of the donor, the background of the alleged gift and the
relation of the donor and the donee as well as the purpose
or motive of the gift all have to be taken into consideration.
In the present case, it is recited in the said writings that the
3rd defendant has been maintaining and looking after the
donor and that the other children of the donor were
neglecting her. The gift was from a mother to a son and it
was based on love and affection for the son in whose
favour the gift was made. Therefore, it cannot be held that
because a declaration is contained in the paper Ext. A (2)
the latter must have been registered in order to render the
gift valid. Admittedly, the 3rd defendant has been
possessing the land and got his name mutated in the
revenue records with respect to the land. It is therefore
implied that there was acceptance on behalf of the donee
and also that the possession of the property was delivered
to the donee by the donor. It should be remembered that
unless there was possession on behalf of the 3rd
18defendant, no mutation would have taken place with regard
to the property. It may be repeated that Ext. A (2) has to be
taken in the present case as a mere declaration of the
donor in presence of the witnesses who are said to have
attested the writing.”
27. The position is well settled, which has been stated and
restated time and again, that the three essentials of a gift under
Mohammadan Law are; (i) declaration of the gift by the donor; (2)
acceptance of the gift by the donee and (3) delivery of possession.
Though, the rules of Mohammadan Law do not make writing essential
to the validity of a gift; an oral gift fulfilling all the three essentials make
the gift complete and irrevocable. However, the donor may record the
transaction of gift in writing. Asaf A. A. Fyzee in Outlines of
Muhammadan Law, Fifth Edition (edited and revised by Tahir
Mahmood) at page 182 states in this regard that writing may be of two
kinds : (i) it may merely recite the fact of a prior gift; such a writing
need not be registered. On the other hand, (ii) it may itself be the
instrument of gift; such a writing in certain circumstances requires
registration. He further says that if there is a declaration, acceptance
and delivery of possession coupled with the formal instrument of a gift,
it must be registered. Conversely, the author says that registration,
19however, by itself without the other necessary conditions, is not
sufficient.
28. Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law (19th Edition), Page
120, states the legal position in the following words :
“Under the Mahomedan law the three essential requisites
to make a gift valid : (1) declaration of the gift by the donor:
(2) acceptance of the gift by the donee expressly or
impliedly and (3) delivery of possession to and taking
possession thereof by the donee actually or constructively.
No written document is required in such a case. Section
129 Transfer of Property Act, excludes the rule of
Mahomedan law from the purview of Section 123 which
mandates that the gift of immovable property must be
effected by a registered instrument as stated therein. But it
cannot be taken as a sine qua non in all cases that
whenever there is a writing about a Mahomedan gift of
immovable property there must be registration thereof.
Whether the writing requires registration or not depends on
the facts and circumstances of each case.”
29. In our opinion, merely because the gift is reduced to
writing by a Mohammadan instead of it having been made orally, such
writing does not become a formal document or instrument of gift.
When a gift could be made by Mohammadan orally, its nature and
character is not changed because of it having been made by a written
document. What is important for a valid gift under Mohammadan Law
is that three essential requisites must be fulfilled. The form is
immaterial. If all the three essential requisites are satisfied constituting
20valid gift, the transaction of gift would not be rendered invalid because
it has been written on a plain piece of paper. The distinction that if a
written deed of gift recites the factum of prior gift then such deed is not
required to be registered but when the writing is contemporaneous
with the making of the gift, it must be registered, is inappropriate and
does not seem to us to be in conformity with the rule of gifts in
Mohammadan Law.
30. In considering what is the Mohammadan Law on the
subject of gifts inter vivos, the Privy Council in Mohammad Abdul
Ghani1
stated that when the old and authoritative texts of
Mohammadan Law were promulgated there were not in contemplation
of any one any Transfer of Property Acts, any Registration Acts, any
Revenue Courts to record transfers of possession of land, and that
could not have been intended to lay down for all time what should
alone be the evidence that titles to lands had passed.
 31. Section 129 of T.P. Act preserves the rule of
Mohammadan Law and excludes the applicability of Section 123 of
T.P. Act to a gift of an immovable property by a Mohammadan. We
find ourselves in express agreement with the statement of law
reproduced above from Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law (19th
21Edition), page 120. In other words, it is not the requirement that in all
cases where the gift deed is contemporaneous to the making of the
gift then such deed must be registered under Section 17 of the
Registration Act. Each case would depend on its own facts.
32. We are unable to concur with the view of the Full Bench of
Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Tayyaba Begum5
. We
approve the view of the Calcutta High Court in Nasib Ali3
that a deed
of gift executed by a Mohammadan is not the instrument effecting,
creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence, such writing
is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence.
33. We also approve the view of the Gauhati High Court in the
case of Md. Hesabuddin10
 . The judgments to the contrary by Andhra
Pradesh High Court, Jammu and Kashmir High Court and Madras High Court do not lay down the correct law.
34. Now, as regards the facts of the present case, the gift was
made by Shaik Dawood by a written deed dated February 5, 1968 in
favour of his son Mohammed Yakub in respect of the properties ‘A’
schedule and ‘B’ schedule appended thereto. The gift – as is recited
in the deed – was based on love and affection for Mohammed Yakub
22as after the death of donor’s wife, he has been looking after and
helping him.
Can it be said that because a declaration is reduced to
writing, it must have been registered? We think not.
The acceptance
of the gift by Mohammed Yakub is also evidenced as he signed the
deed.
Mohammed Yakub was residing in the ‘B’ schedule property
consisting of a house and a kitchen room appurtenant thereto and,
thus, was in physical possession of residential house with the donor.
The trial court on consideration of the entire evidence on record has
recorded a categorical finding that
Shaik Dawood (donor), executed
the gift deed dated February 5, 1968 in favour of donee (Mohammed
Yakub), 
the donee accepted the gift and 
the donor handed over the
properties covered by the gift deed to the donee. 
The trial court
further held that all the three essentials of a valid gift under the
Mohammadan Law were satisfied.
The view of the trial court is in
accord with the legal position stated by us above.
 The gift deed dated
February 5, 1968 is a form of declaration by the donor and not an instrument of gift as contemplated under Section 17 of the Registration Act. 
As all the three essential requisites are satisfied by the gift deed
dated February 5, 1968, the gift in favour of defendant 2 became
complete and irrevocable.
2335. The High Court in the impugned judgment relied upon the
Full Bench decision in the case of Tayyaba Begum5 but we have
already 
held that the view of the Full Bench in Tayyaba Begum5 is not a correct view and does not lay down the correct law.
36. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and
order dated September 13, 2004 passed by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh is set aside. The judgment and decree dated April 27, 1988
passed by the Principal, Subordinate Judge, Vishakhapatnam is
restored. The parties shall bear their own costs.
 .………………….. J.
 (R.M. Lodha)
 …………………….. J.
 (Surinder Singh Nijjar)
NEW DELHI.
MAY 5, 2011.
24