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Saturday, May 4, 2013

MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIM = i) No amount can be deducted towards Provident Fund, Pension and Insurance amount from the actual salary of the victim for calculating compensation. (ii) In the absence of any evidence, the Court suo motu cannot deduct any amount towards income tax from the actual salary of the victim. (iii) On the facts of the present case, the Tribunal and the High Court should have doubled the salary by allowing 100% increase towards the future prospects and (iv) The Tribunal and the High Court failed to ensure payment of just and fair compensation. Reliance was also placed on decisions of this Court which will be discussed later in this judgment.= “whether the salary receivable by the claimant on compassionate appointment comes within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” liable for deduction.” “Compassionate appointment” can be one of the conditions of service of an employee, if a scheme to that effect is framed by the employer. In case, the employee dies in harness i.e. while in service leaving behind the dependents, one of the dependents may request for compassionate appointment to maintain the family of the deceased employee dies in harness. This cannot be stated to be an advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one’s death and have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned on account of accidental death. Compassionate appointment may have nexus with the death of an employee while in service but it is not necessary that it should have a correlation with the accidental death. An employee dies in harness even in normal course, due to illness and to maintain the family of the deceased one of the dependents may be entitled for compassionate appointment but that cannot be termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” that comes under the periphery of Motor Vehicles Act and any amount received on such appointment is not liable for deduction for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. ; “whether the income tax is liable to be deducted for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act” In the case of Sarla Verma & Anr.(Supra), this Court held “generally the actual income of the deceased less income tax should be the starting point for calculating the compensation.” This Court further observed that “where the annual income is in taxable range, the word “actual salary” should be read as “actual salary less tax”. Therefore, it is clear that if the annual income comes within the taxable range income tax is required to be deducted for determination of the actual salary.; He was only 28 years 7 ½ month old at the time of death. In normal course, he would have served the State Government minimum for about 30 years. Even if we do not take into consideration the future prospect of promotion which the deceased was otherwise entitled and the actual pay revisions taken effect from 1st January, 1996 and 1st January, 2006, it cannot be denied that the pay of the deceased would have doubled if he would continued in services of the State till the date of retirement. Hence, this was a fit case in which 100% increase in the future income of the deceased should have been allowed by the Tribunal and the High Court, which they failed to do. = the monthly income of the deceased Sajjan Singh at Rs.9,000 x 2 = Rs.18,000/­ per month. From this his personal living expenses, which should be 1/3rd, there being three dependents has to be deducted. Thereby, the ‘actual salary’ will come to Rs.18,000 – Rs.6,000/­ = Rs.12,000/­ per month or Rs.12,000 x 12 =1,44,000/­ per annum. As the deceased was 28 ½ years old at the time of death the multiplier of 17 is applied, which is appropriate to the age of the deceased. The normal compensation would then work out to be Rs.1,44,000/­ x 17 =Rs.24,48,000/­ to which we add the usual award for loss of consortium and loss of the estate by providing a conventional sum of Rs. 1,00,000/­; loss of love and affection for the daughter Rs.2,00,000/­, loss of love and affection for the widow and the mother at Rs.1,00,000/­ each i.e. Rs.2,00,000/­ and funeral expenses of Rs.25,000/­. 31. Thus, according to us, in all a sum of Rs.29,73,000/­ would be a fair, just and reasonable award in the circumstances of this case. 32. The rate of interest of 12% is allowed from the date of the petition filed before the Tribunal till payment is made. 33. Respondent No.3 is directed to pay the total award with interest minus the amount (if already paid) within three months. The appellant No.2­daughter who was aged about 2 years at the time of accident of the deceased has already attained majority; money may be required for her education and marriage. In the circumstances, we direct respondent No.3 to deposit 25% of the due amount in the account of appellant no.1­the wife. Out of the rest 75% of the due amount, 35% of the amount be invested in a Nationalized Bank by fixed deposit for a period of one year in the name of the daughter­appellant No.2. Out of the rest 40% of the due amount, 20% each be invested in a Nationalized Bank by fixed deposit for a period of one year in the name of the appellant Nos. 1 and 3, the wife and the mother respectively. 34. The award passed by the Tribunal dated 21st June, 2003 and the judgment dated 29th July, 2011 of the Rajasthan High Court stand modified to the extent above. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observation and direction. No separate order as to costs.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5513 OF 2012
(arising out of SLP(C)No.6367 of 2012)
VIMAL KANWAR & ORS. …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
KISHORE DAN & ORS.           ….RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
The present appeal is filed against the judgment of
the   Rajasthan High Court,   Jaipur Bench in S.B. Civil
Misc.   Appeal   No.   1831   and   2071   of   2003.       By   the
impugned   judgment   dated   29th  July,   2011,   the   Rajasthan
High Court  upheld the compensation awarded by the Motor
Accident   Claims   Tribunal,   Jaipur   (hereinafter   referred
to as the ‘Tribunal’)  and observed as  follows:
“13. In   the   situation,   in   the   light   of   the
above   detail   and   analysis   it   appears   that   the
learned tribunal’s basis of calculating amount of
compensation  might be erroneous  but  in totality
determined, assessed and awarded total amount of
compensation   Rs.14,93,700/­   is   proper   and
justified,   and   there   is   no   adequate   basis   for
increasing   or   reducing   it.   Therefore,   judgment
dated   21.06.2003   by   Motor   Accident   Claims
Tribunal, Jaipur is affirmed and appeals by the
appellants and Insurance Company are dismissed.”
1Page 2
2.   The   factual   matrix   of   the   case   is   that   on   14th
September,   1996   one   Mr.   Sajjan   Singh   Shekhawat   was
sitting on his scooter which was parked on the side of
the   road   and   was   waiting   for   one   Junior   Engineer,   N.
Hari Babu and another whom he had called for discussion.
At that time, the non­applicant No.1, driver of the Jeep
No.RJ­10C­0833   came   driving   from   the   Railway   Station
side with high speed, recklessly and negligently and hit
the   scooter.   Sajjan   Singh   along   with   his  scooter   came
under the Jeep and was dragged with the vehicle.  Due to
this accident fatal injuries was caused to him and on
reaching the Hospital he expired.  The scooter was also
damaged completely.
3.  Appellant no. 1, the wife of the deceased was aged
about 24 years;  appellant no. 2, the  daughter was aged
about 2 years and appellant no. 3,   the   mother   was
aged   about   55   years   at   the   time   of     death   of   the
deceased.   They jointly  filed an application to the Tribunal alleging that
negligent and rash driving by non-applicant no. 1 caused the death of Sajjan Singh and
claimed compensation of Rs.80,40,160/­.   It was brought
to the notice of the Tribunal that non­applicant no. 1,
the   jeep   driver   was   in   the   employment   of   the   non­
2Page 3
applicant no. 2 and the non­applicant no. 3, the United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. was the insurer of the vehicle.
4. The   non­applicant   No.3,   Insurance   Company   on
appearance filed written statement and alleged that the
vehicle   owner   has   violated   the   conditions   of   the
Insurance   Policy   by   not   informing   them   about   the
accident.  Further,  according to the Insurance Company
the vehicle owner should prove the fact that at the time
of   accident,   the   Jeep   driver,   non­applicant   No.1   was
holding a valid and effective driving licence.
5. Altogether five issues were framed by the Tribunal:
 “1. Whether due to the vehicle in question Jeep
No. RJ 10C 0833 being driven by driver, non­
applicant   No.1   on   14.09.1996,   in   front   of
Assistant   Engineer   Office,   PWD,   within   the
jurisdiction   of   Police   Station   Churu,
negligently   and   recklessness   and   caused
accident   and   injuries   due   to   which   Sajjan
Singh Shekhawat S/o Bhanwar Singh expired.
2. Whether above said vehicle driver at the time
accident   was   in   employment   of   non­applicant
No.2   and   was   working   for   his   benefit   and
profit.
3. Whether   the   non­applicant   No.3,   Insurance
Company in view of the preliminary objections
and preliminary statement in their reply, are
relieved of their liability and if not what
is the effect thereon.
4 Whether the applicant are entitled to get the
claim   amount   or   any   other   justified   amount,
and if yes which applicant is entitled to how
much   compensation   and   from   which   non­
applicant.
5. Relief.”.
3Page 4
6. The first issue was answered by the Tribunal in an
affirmative manner.  It was  held that the reckless and
negligent driving of the driver of  Jeep No.RJ 10C 0833
caused   the   accident   which   resulted   in   the   death   of
Sajjan Singh Shekhawat.   Issue Nos. 2 and 3 were also
decided in favour of the applicants.
7. Issue Nos. 4 and 5 were related to the entitlement
of appellants towards the claims and the relief to be
granted.     The Tribunal determined the compensation to
be granted in favour of the appellants at Rs.14,93,700/­
jointly.
8. The   actual   salary   of   the   deceased   was   reduced   by
the   Tribunal   by   deducting   certain   amounts   towards
Provident   Fund,   Pension   and   Insurance.     Without   any
reason,   the   Tribunal   also   reduced   the   salary   at   Rs.
8,000/­ per month though actual salary of the deceased
as per Last Pay Certificate (for short ‘LPC’) was Rs.
8,920/­. Out of such reduced salary of Rs. 8,000/­,  the
Tribunal further deducted a sum of Rs.1,000/­ per  month
towards   Provident   Fund,   Pension   and   Insurance   and
thereby   considered   the   actual salary of deceased to
be   Rs.7,000/­ per month.  An amount of Rs. 4500/­ was
added to it towards future income and, thereby the net
4Page 5
income   of  deceased   was  assessed   at  11,500/­   per  month
(Rs.7,000/­ + Rs.4,500/­).
9. Admittedly,   Sajjan   Singh   died   at   the   age   of   28
years and 7 ½  months .  He was in the services of the
State  Government   posted   as  an  Assistant  Engineer.     In
the   normal   course,     he   would   have   continued   in   the
services   of   the   State   Government   upto   February,   2026,
until   attaining   58   years   or     upto     February,   2028,
until attaining 60 years. As per the decision of this
Court   in   the   case   of  Sarla   Verma   &   Ors.     v.   Delhi
Transport Corporation & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 121,   Sajjan
Singh having died at the age of   28 years 7 ½ months,
the   multiplier   of  17   is  applicable   in  calculating   the
compensation.     But   the   Tribunal   applied   the   lower
multiplier of 15 on the ground   that the wife would be
getting   family   pension   and   would   get   job   on   the
compassionate   ground   and   the   daughter,   aged   about   2
years would get married in future.
10. Though the High Court noticed the aforesaid mistake
it upheld the compensation.       A notional deduction of
income tax was made by the High Court from the salary of
the deceased apart from the deduction of  annual pension
and came to the conclusion that the award passed by the
5Page 6
Tribunal was just and proper as  apparent from paragraph
11 of the judgment which reads as under:
“11. If   calculate   according   to   the   rate   of
tax   in   the   year   1996,   we   find   that   in   the
assessment year 1996­97 on Rs.40,000/­ no tax was
payable.   On further income of Rs.20,000/­, 20%
was   payable,   on   further   income   of   Rs.60,000/­,
30% of income was taxed.   1/3rd  of the salary or
Rs.15,000/­   which   ever   was   less   was   standard
deduction.   Accordingly deducting Rs.15,000/­ as
standard   deduction   taking   into   account   the
savings   and   on   applying   rebate   of   Rs.12,000/­
under   Section   80C   of   the   Income   Tax   Act,   the
amount   which   remains,   on   that   Rs.5812/­   is
payable   as   tax.   Thus,   deducting   taxable   amount
out   of   income   is   Rs.1,01,228/­.   The   appellant
Vimal Kanwar has herself stated that after death
of her husband she receives Rs.1460/­ per month
as   pension.     The   pension   received   on   death   of
husband   should   also   be   deducted.     Thus,   on
deducting   annual   pension   of   Rs.17,520/­   the
income  is Rs.1,83,708/­  per  annum.  According  to
Sarla Verma judgment increasing 50%   for future
prospects   the   amount   becomes   Rs.1,25,562/­   per
annum,   out   of   this   deducting   1/3rd  for   personal
expenses of the deceased and applying multiplier
of   17   according   to   age   of   the   deceased   this
amount is Rs.14,23,036/­. The tribunal on account
of   being   deprived   of   income   the   deceased   has
granted Rs.14,78,700/­ to the deceased.”
11. The   High   Court   noticed   that   the   Tribunal   wrongly
applied   the  multiplier   of  15  but   refused   to  interfere
with the award on the following grounds:
“12.   IT is correct, that despite the revise
LPC being on record and showing salary to be
Rs.8920/­ the tribunal has accepted salary to
be Rs.8000/­ only out of this on account of
GPF   and   State   Insurance   Rs.1000/­   has   been
deducted   and   monthly   income   is   assessed   as
Rs.7,000/­.   Thereafter,   taking   into   account
increasing   income   in   future   etc.   Rs.4500/­
has been added and monthly income is assessed
6Page 7
to be Rs.11500/­ this assessment according to
evidence on record and established law, does
not   appear   to   be   proper.   It   is   also   worth
mentioning   that   the   tribunal   for   granting
compensation to the appellants has taken unit
method   has   basis   but   while   doing   so   the
amount that the deceased would have spent on
his personal expenses which is deductable as
per judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the Sarla Verma case and other cases has not
been   deducted,   because   of   which   the
dependency   is   not   properly   assessed.
Thereafter,  the  multiplier  of  15  applied   by
the   tribunal   also   does   not   seen   to   be   in
accordance   to   law.   It   is   also   worth
mentioning that assessing amount in the said
manner   the   tribunal   had   not   deducted   the
payable income tax and the amount of pension
received by Smt. Vimal Kanwar due to death of
deceased.   Similarly,   while   assessing
dependency   deduction   for   GPF   and   State
Insurance, addition of Rs.4,500/­ in monthly
income   and   multiplier   of   15   etc.   is   not   in
accordance   with   law.     But   it   is   worth
mentioning that taking income of the deceased
at   the   time   of   the   accident   is   Rs.8,920/­,
deducting   payable   income   tax   and   amount   of
pension received by the wife of the deceased,
the amount on account of loss of income to be
given   to   the   appellant   comes   to
Rs.14,23,036/­. It appears that the tribunal
on   account   of   loss   of   income   has   granted
Rs.14,78,700/­   and   for   all   the   remaining
heads a total of Rs.15,000/­ only, which is
definitely too less. All the three appellants
should   be   granted   proper   compensation   under
heads of cooperation from the deceased, loss
of   love   and   affection   and   service,
protection, last rites, lost of estate and on
doing   this   the   situation   that   emerges   is
that,   the   total   amount   of   Rs.14,93,700/­
awarded   by   tribunal   as   compensation   is
justified and therefore, any interference in
the   amount   of   awarded   compensation   is   not
proper desirable or necessary.”
7Page 8
12. Two   appeals,   one   preferred   by   the   appellants­
claimants   and   another   by   the   Insurance   Company,   were
dismissed by the High Court by common impugned judgment
dated 29th July, 2011.
13. From the facts and circumstances of the case,  the
grievance   of   the   appellants   can   be   summarized   as
follows:­
(i)     No   amount   can   be   deducted   towards   Provident
Fund,   Pension   and   Insurance   amount   from   the   actual
salary of the victim for calculating compensation.
(ii)     In   the   absence   of   any   evidence,   the   Court
suo motu   cannot deduct any amount towards income tax
from the actual salary of the victim.
(iii)   On   the   facts   of   the   present   case,   the
Tribunal   and   the   High   Court   should   have   doubled   the
salary   by   allowing   100%   increase   towards   the   future
prospects and 
(iv)   The   Tribunal   and   the   High   Court   failed   to
ensure payment of just and fair compensation.
Reliance was also placed on decisions of this Court
which will be discussed later in this judgment.
14. The   respondents   have   appeared   but   no   counter
affidavit has been filed by them.   Learned counsel for
8Page 9
the respondents merely justified the award passed by the
Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court.
15. The issues involved in this case are:
(i) Whether   Provident   Fund,   Pension   and   Insurance
receivable by the claimants come within the periphery of
the   Motor   Vehicles   Act   to   be   termed   as   “Pecuniary
Advantage” liable for deduction.
(ii) Whether   the   salary   receivable   by   claimant   on
compassionate appointment comes within the periphery of
the   Motor   Vehicles   Act   to   be   termed   as   “Pecuniary
Advantage” liable for deduction.
(iii) Whether   the   income   tax   is   liable   to   be
deducted   for   determination   of   compensation   under   the
Motor Vehicles Act and
(iv)  Whether   the   compensation   awarded   to   the
appellants is just and proper.
16. For   determination   of   the   aforesaid   issues,   it   is
necessary   to   notice   the   relevant   facts   as   mentioned
hereunder.
17. Smt.   Vimal   Kanwar,   PW­3   (appellant   no.1   herein),
who   is   the   wife   of   the   deceased   has   stated   in   her
examination in chief that her husband obtained BE Degree
from   Jodhpur   University   in   First   Class   and   he   was
directly appointed to the post of Assistant Engineer in
9Page 10
the year 1994. At the time of accident he was 28 years
old and was getting salary of Rs.9,000/­ per month.  If
he had been alive he would have got promoted upto the
rank of Chief Engineer.
18. Ram   Avtar   Parikh,   PW­2   is   an   employee   of   Public
Works  Department,   where   the  deceased   was   working.     He
stated   that   Sajjan   Singh   was   working   on   the   post   of
Assistant Engineer and at that time his monthly salary
was   Rs.8,920/­.     In   support   of   his     statement   he
produced the Last Pay Certificate and the Service Book
(Exh. 1.) of the deceased.
19. The first issue is “whether Provident Fund, Pension
and   Insurance   receivable   by   claimants   come   within   the
periphery   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act   to   be   termed   as
“Pecuniary Advantage” liable for deduction.”
The   aforesaid   issue   fell   for   consideration   before
this   Court   in    Helen   C.   Rebello   (Mrs)   and   others  vs.
Maharashtra   State   Road   Transport   Corporation   &   Anr.
reported in   (1999) 1 SCC 90.    In the said case, this
Court held that  Provident   Fund,   Pension,   Insurance
and   similarly   any   cash,   bank   balance,   shares,   fixed
deposits,   etc.   are   all   a   “pecuniary   advantage”
receivable by the heirs on account of one’s death but
all these have no correlation with the amount receivable
1Page 11
under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental
death.     Such   an   amount   will   not   come   within   the
periphery   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act   to   be   termed   as
“pecuniary   advantage”   liable   for   deduction.     The
following was the observation and finding of this Court:
  “35.  Broadly,   we   may   examine   the   receipt   of   the
provident  fund which is a deferred  payment  out of
the   contribution   made   by   an   employee   during   the
tenure  of his service.  Such employee or his heirs
are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of
the   accidental   death.   This   amount   is   secured,   is
certain to be received, while the amount under the
Motor   Vehicles   Act   is   uncertain   and   is   receivable
only on the happening of the event, viz., accident,
which may not take place at all. Similarly, family
pension   is   also   earned   by   an   employee   for   the
benefit   of   his   family   in   the   form   of   his
contribution in the service in terms of the service
conditions receivable by the heirs after his death.
The   heirs   receive   family   pension   even   otherwise
than   the   accidental   death.   No   correlation   between
the   two.   Similarly,   life   insurance   policy   is
received either by the insured or the heirs of the
insured   on   account   of   the   contract   with   the
insurer,   for   which   the   insured   contributes   in   the
form   of   premium.   It   is   receivable   even   by   the
insured if he lives till maturity after paying all
the   premiums.   In   the   case   of   death,   the   insurer
indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in
terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again,
this   amount   is   receivable   by   the   claimant   not   on
account   of   any   accidental   death   but   otherwise   on
the   insured's   death.   Death   is   only   a   step   or
contingency   in   terms   of   the   contract,   to   receive
the   amount.   Similarly   any   cash,   bank   balance,
shares,   fixed   deposits,   etc.   though   are   all   a
pecuniary   advantage   receivable   by   the   heirs   on
account   of   one's   death   but   all   these   have   no
correlation   with   the   amount   receivable   under   a
statute   occasioned   only   on   account   of   accidental
death.   How   could   such   an   amount   come   within   the
periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as
“pecuniary advantage” liable for deduction. When we
seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be
on a similar and same plane having nexus, inter se,
1Page 12
between them and not to which there is no semblance
of   any   correlation.   The   insured   (deceased)
contributes his own money for which he receives the
amount which has no correlation to the compensation
computed   as   against   the   tortfeasor   for   his
negligence   on   account   of   the   accident.   As
aforesaid,   the   amount   receivable   as   compensation
under the Act is on account of the injury or death
without   making   any   contribution   towards   it,   then
how   can   the   fruits   of   an   amount   received   through
contributions of the insured be deducted out of the
amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The
amount   under   this   Act   he   receives   without   any
contribution.   As   we   have   said,   the   compensation
payable   under   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act   is   statutory
while   the   amount   receivable   under   the   life
insurance policy is contractual.”
20. The second issue is
  “whether the salary receivable
by   the   claimant   on   compassionate   appointment   comes
within   the   periphery   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act   to   be
termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” liable for deduction.”
  “Compassionate   appointment”   can   be   one   of   the
conditions   of   service   of   an   employee,   if   a   scheme   to
that   effect   is   framed   by   the   employer.     In   case,   the
employee dies in harness i.e. while in service leaving
behind the dependents, one of the dependents may request
for compassionate appointment to maintain the family of
the deceased employee dies in harness.   This cannot be
stated   to   be   an   advantage   receivable   by   the   heirs   on
account of one’s death and have no correlation with the
amount receivable under a statute occasioned on account
of accidental death.  Compassionate appointment may have
1Page 13
nexus with the death of an employee while in service but
it is not necessary that it should have a correlation
with the accidental death.  An  employee dies in harness
even in normal course, due to illness and to maintain
the family of the deceased one of the dependents may be
entitled for compassionate  appointment but that cannot
be termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” that comes under the
periphery of Motor Vehicles Act and any amount received
on   such   appointment   is   not   liable   for   deduction   for
determination  of compensation  under  the Motor Vehicles
Act.  
21. The   third   issue   is
“whether   the   income   tax   is
liable to be deducted for determination of compensation
under the Motor Vehicles Act”
In the case of   Sarla Verma & Anr.(Supra),    this
Court held “generally the actual income of the deceased
less   income   tax   should   be   the   starting   point   for
calculating the compensation.”
This Court further observed that “where the annual
income is in taxable range,   the word “actual salary”
should be read as “actual salary less tax”.  Therefore,
it is clear that if the annual income comes within the
taxable range income tax is required to be deducted for
determination of the actual salary.  But while deducting
1Page 14
income­tax   from  salary,   it  is  necessary  to   notice   the
nature of the income of the victim.   If the victim is
receiving   income   chargeable   under   the   head   “salaries”
one should keep in mind that under Section 192 (1) of
the   Income­tax   Act,   1961   any   person   responsible   for
paying any income chargeable under the head “salaries”
shall   at   the   time   of   payment,   deduct   income­tax   on
estimated  income   of  the  employee   from     “salaries”   for
that financial year.   Such deduction is commonly known
as tax deducted at source (‘TDS’ for short).   When the
employer   fails   in   default   to   deduct   the   TDS   from
employee salary, as it is his duty to deduct the TDS,
then the penalty for non­deduction of TDS is prescribed
under Section 201(1A) of the Income­tax Act, 1961.
Therefore, in case the income of the victim is only
from   “salary”,   the   presumption   would   be   that   the
employer   under   Section   192  (1)   of  the  Income­tax   Act,
1961 has deducted the tax at source from the employee’s
salary.  In case if an objection is raised by any party,
the objector is required to prove by producing evidence
such   as   LPC   to   suggest   that   the   employer   failed   to
deduct the TDS from the salary of the employee.  
1Page 15
However, there can be cases where the victim is not a salaried person
i.e. his income is from sources other than salary, and the annual income falls
within taxable range, in such cases, if any objection as to deduction of tax is
made by a party then the claimant is required to prove that the victim has
already paid income tax and no further tax has to be deducted from the
income.
22. In   the   present   case,   none   of   the   respondents
brought to the notice of the Court that the income­tax
payable by the deceased Sajjan Singh was not deducted at
source   by   the   employer­   State   Government.       No   such
statement was made by Ram Avtar Parikh, PW­2 an employee
of Public Works Department of the State Government who
placed   on   record   the   Last   Pay   Certificate   and   the
Service Book of the deceased.  The Tribunal or the High
Court on perusal of the Last Pay Certificate, have not
noticed that the income­tax on the estimated income of
the   employee   was   not   deducted   from   the   salary   of   the
employee during the said month or Financial Year.     In
absence of such evidence, it is presumed that the salary
paid   to   the   deceased   Sajjan   Singh   as   per   Last   Pay
Certificate   was   paid   in   accordance   with   law   i.e.   by
deducting the income­tax on the estimated income of the
deceased   Sajjan   Singh   for   that   month   or   the   Financial
1Page 16
Year.     The   appellants   have   specifically   stated   that
Assessment Year applicable in the instant case is 1997­
98 and not 1996­97 as   held by the High Court.   They
have   also   taken   specific   plea   that   for   the   Assessment
Year   1997­98   the   rate   of   tax   on   income   more   than
40,000/­   and   upto   Rs.60,000/­   was   15%   and   not   20%   as
held by the High Court.  The aforesaid fact has not been
disputed by the respondents.
23. In   view   of   the   finding   as   recorded   above   and   the
provisions of the Income­tax Act, 1961, as discussed, we
hold that the High Court was wrong in deducting 20% from
the   salary   of   the   deceased   towards   income­tax,   for
calculating   the   compensation.     As   per   law,   the
presumption   will   be   that   employer­State   Government   at
the time of payment of salary deducted income­tax on the
estimated   income   of   the   deceased   employee   from   the
salary and in absence of any evidence, we hold that the
salary   as   shown   in   the   Last   Pay   Certificate   at
Rs.8,920/­ should be accepted which if rounded off comes
to   Rs.9,000/­   for   calculating   the   compensation   payable
to the dependent(s).
24. The   fourth   issue   is   “whether   the   compensation
awarded to the appellants is just and proper.”
1Page 17
For determination of this issue, it is required to
determine   the   percentage   of   increase   in   income   to   be
made towards prospects of advancement in future career
and revision of pay.   In  General Manager, Kerala State
Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas
(1994) 2 SCC 176  this Court noticed the age and income
of the deceased for determination of future prospects of
advancement   in   life   and   career.     The   Court   held   as
follows:
“19. In the present case the deceased was 39 years
of age. His income was Rs 1032 per month. Of course,
the   future   prospects   of   advancement   in   life   and
career should also be sounded in terms of money to
augment   the   multiplicand.   While   the   chance   of   the
multiplier is determined by two factors, namely, the
rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy and
the age of the deceased or of the claimant whichever
is higher, the ascertainment of the multiplicand is
a more difficult exercise. Indeed, many factors have
to   be   put   into   the   scales   to   evaluate   the
contingencies   of   the   future.   All   contingencies   of
the   future   need   not   necessarily   be   baneful.   The
deceased   person   in   this   case   had   a   more   or   less
stable job. It will not be inappropriate to take a
reasonably   liberal   view   of   the   prospects   of   the
future and in estimating the gross income it will be
unreasonable to estimate the loss of dependency on
the present actual income of Rs 1032 per month. We
think, having regard to the prospects of advancement
in   the   future   career,   respecting   which   there   is
evidence   on   record,   we   will   not   be   in   error   in
making   a   higher   estimate   of   monthly   income   at   Rs
2000 as the gross income.”
25. In   New India Assurance Co.Ltd. v. Gopali & ors.
reported in AIR 2012 SC 3381 this Court noticed that the
1Page 18
High Court determined the compensation by granting 100%
increase   in   the   income   of   the   deceased.     Taking   into
consideration  the fact that in the normal  course, the
deceased would have served for 22 years and during that
period   his   salary   would   have   certainly   doubled,   this
Court, upheld the judgment of the High Court.
26. In  K.R.   Madhusudhan   v.   Administrative   Officer
(2011)   4   SCC  this   Court   observed   that   there   can   be
departure from the rule of thumb and held as under:­
“10.  The   present   case   stands   on   different   factual
basis   where   there   is   clear   and   incontrovertible
evidence   on   record   that   the   deceased   was   entitled
and in fact bound to get a raise in income in the
future, a fact which was corroborated by evidence on
record.  Thus,  we  are  of the  view   that  the  present
case   comes   within   the   “exceptional   circumstances”
and not within the purview of the rule of thumb laid
down   by   Sarla   Verma1   judgment.   Hence,   even   though
the deceased was above 50 years of age, he shall be
entitled   to   increase   in   income   due   to   future
prospects.”
27. Recently   in  Santosh   Devi   v.   National   Insurance
Company   Ltd.  reported   in  (2012)   6   SCC   421  this   Court
found   it   difficult   to   find   any   rationale   for   the
observation   made   in   paragraph   24   of   the   judgment   in
Sarla Verma’s case and observed as follows:
“14.  We   find   it   extremely   difficult   to   fathom   any
rationale for the observation made in para 24 of the
judgment   in   Sarla   Verma   case2   that   where   the
deceased was self­employed or was on a fixed salary
without   provision   for   annual   increment,   etc.,   the
1Page 19
courts will usually take only the actual income at
the   time   of   death   and   a   departure   from   this   rule
should   be   made   only   in   rare   and   exceptional   cases
involving   special   circumstances.   In   our   view,   it
will   be   naïve   to   say   that   the   wages   or   total
emoluments/income   of   a   person   who   is   self­employed
or   who   is   employed   on   a   fixed   salary   without
provision   for   annual   increment,   etc.,   would   remain
the same throughout his life.
15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone
across the board. It does not make any distinction
between   rich   and   poor.   As   a   matter   of   fact,   the
effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the
cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on
those   who   are   self­employed   or   who   get   fixed
income/emoluments.   They   are   the   worst   affected
people.   Therefore,   they   put   in   extra   efforts   to
generate additional income necessary for sustaining
their families.
18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the
observations in the last three lines of para 24 of
Sarla   Verma’s   judgment,   the   Court   had   intended   to
lay   down   an   absolute   rule   that   there   will   be   no
addition   in   the   income   of   a   person   who   is   self­
employed   or   who   is   paid   fixed   wages.   Rather,   it
would   be   reasonable   to   say   that   a   person   who   is
self­employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also
get 30% increase in his total income over a period
of   time   and   if   he/she   becomes   the   victim   of   an
accident   then   the   same   formula   deserves   to   be
applied for calculating the amount of compensation.”
28. In the case of  New India Assurance Co.Ltd.(Supra),
this   Court   noticed   that  the   High   Court   determined   the
compensation by granting 100% increase in the income of
the deceased.   Taking into consideration the fact that
in the normal course, the deceased would have served for
22 years and during that period his salary would have
1Page 20
certainly doubled, upheld the judgment of the High Court
with following observation:
“20.We are also of the view that the High Court
was  justified  in      determining the amount
of   compensation   by   granting     100%     increase
in             the income of the deceased. In the
normal   course,   the     deceased     would       have
served for 22 years and during that period his
salary would  have   certainly doubled because
the employer was paying 20% of his salary as
bonus per year.”
29. Admittedly,   the   date   of   birth   of   deceased   Sajjan
Singh being 1st  February, 1968;   the submission that he
would have continued in service upto 1st February, 2026,
if   58  years   is  the   age  of  retirement   or  1st  February,
2028, if 60 years is the age of retirement is accepted.
He was only 28 years 7 ½ month old at the time of death.
In   normal   course,   he   would   have   served   the   State
Government minimum for about 30 years.   Even if we do
not   take   into   consideration   the   future   prospect   of
promotion which the deceased was otherwise entitled and
the actual pay revisions taken effect from 1st  January,
1996 and 1st January, 2006, it cannot be denied that the
pay   of   the   deceased   would   have   doubled   if   he   would
continued   in   services   of   the   State   till   the   date   of
retirement.   Hence, this was a fit case in which 100%
increase   in   the   future   income   of   the   deceased   should
2Page 21
have been allowed by the Tribunal and the High Court,
which they failed to do.  
30. Having regard to the facts and evidence on record,
we estimate
 the monthly  income  of the deceased Sajjan
Singh  at   Rs.9,000  x  2  =  Rs.18,000/­   per  month.    
From
this his personal living expenses, which should be 1/3rd,
there   being   three   dependents   has   to   be   deducted.
Thereby, the ‘actual salary’  will come to Rs.18,000  –
Rs.6,000/­   =   Rs.12,000/­   per   month   or   Rs.12,000   x   12
=1,44,000/­ per annum.   
As the deceased was 28 ½ years
old   at   the   time   of   death   the   multiplier   of   17   is
applied,   which   is   appropriate   to   the   age   of   the
deceased.   
The normal compensation would then work out
to be Rs.1,44,000/­ x 17 =Rs.24,48,000/­ to which 
we add
the usual award for loss of consortium and loss of the
estate   by   providing   a   conventional   sum   of   Rs.
1,00,000/­; 
loss of love and affection for the daughter
Rs.2,00,000/­, 
loss of love and affection for the widow
and the mother at Rs.1,00,000/­ each i.e. Rs.2,00,000/­
and funeral expenses of Rs.25,000/­.  
31. Thus,   according   to   us,   in   all   a   sum   of
Rs.29,73,000/­  would   be   a   fair,   just   and   reasonable
award in the circumstances of this case.  
2Page 22
32. The   rate   of   interest   of   12%   is   allowed   from   the
date   of   the   petition   filed   before   the   Tribunal   till
payment is made.  
33. Respondent No.3 is directed to pay the total award
with interest minus the amount (if already paid) within
three months.  
The appellant No.2­daughter who was aged
about 2 years at the time of accident of the deceased
has already attained majority; money may be required for
her education and marriage.   
 In the circumstances, we
direct respondent No.3 to deposit 25% of the due amount
in the account of appellant no.1­the wife.   Out of the
rest   75%     of   the   due   amount,   35%   of   the   amount   be
invested in a Nationalized Bank by fixed deposit for a
period of one year in the name of the daughter­appellant
No.2.  
Out of the rest 40% of the due amount, 20% each
be invested in a Nationalized Bank by fixed deposit for
a period of one year in the name of the appellant Nos. 1
and 3, the wife and the mother respectively. 
34. The  award   passed   by  the  Tribunal   dated   21st  June,
2003   and   the   judgment   dated   29th  July,   2011   of   the
Rajasthan High Court stand modified to the extent above.
The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observation and
direction.  No separate order as to costs.
2Page 23
………..………………………………………..J.
 (G.S. SINGHVI)
………………………………………………….J.
    (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
MAY 03, 2013.
2

On 04.06.2005, A newspaper by name “Tarun Bharat” published an article in which it was alleged that the petitioners have purchased agricultural land showing Ramesh as alive while he was dead. It was further alleged that one Ramesh Shikaji Rathod had signed the sale deed as Ramesh Shika Jadhav. = On 07.07.2005, the officials of Ghatanji P.S. registered offences punishable under Sections 420, 419, 468 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) for the acts of fraud, criminal breach of trust and impersonation against the said accused persons vide Crime No. 88 of 2005. (g) On 09.09.2005, one Rajnikant Deluram Borele, claiming himself to be a Social Worker, filed a Criminal Complaint in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ghatanji, which was registered as Case No. 92 of 2005 against the appellants-herein, Sub-Registrar and few more persons. In the complaint it was alleged that the accused had purchased the land from a dead person, namely, Ramesh Shikaji Jadhav, while the appellants were acting in their official capacity under the said Scheme. (h) Learned Magistrate, by order dated 27.09.2005, directed the Police to investigate the matter under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in 5Page 6 short the “Code”) and to submit a detailed report within one month. -It is clear that any judicial magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. = 14) Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives: (a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightaway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of Section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses. (b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police. 15) In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint. 16) Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking cognizance under Section 156(3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightaway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under Section 190 of the Code.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 684 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7293 of 2009)
Madhao & Anr. .... Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Anr. .... Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 685 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7324 of 2009)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 686 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7332 of 2009)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 687 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7693 of 2009)
J U D G M E N T
P.Sathasivam,J.
1) Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.
1Page 2
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7293 of 2009)
2) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and
order dated 02.09.2009 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Criminal
Application No. 3112 of 2006 whereby the High Court
dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants herein while
confirming the order dated 27.09.2005, passed by the Court
of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ghatanji in Criminal
Complaint Case No. 92 of 2005.
3) Brief facts:
(a) The Government of Maharashtra has published a
Government Resolution on 02.06.2004 wherein it was
informed to the public at large that the percentage of
educated un-employed amongst the Scheduled Caste and
neo-Buddhist are on the higher side and those who are below
poverty line are required to work under different schemes
and their standard of living is consequently adversely
affected. For the said reason, it was resolved that land
should be made available to such people to create a source
2Page 3
of income for them. For the said purpose, a scheme was
framed by name Karamveer Dadasaheb Gaikwad
Sabalikaran and Swabhiman Yojana Samiti. As per the
Scheme, a Committee was constituted in each district and
the Collector of the district was to act as Head of the
Committee. The said Scheme was made applicable with
effect from 01.04.2004. As per the Scheme, land was to be
purchased by the Government and was to be made available
to the persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste and neoBuddhist who were below poverty line.
(b) Madhao Rukhmaji Vaidya-Appellant No.1 herein while
working as Special District Welfare Officer and Member
Secretary of the Samiti under the Scheme, did several
transactions under the supervision of District Collector,
Yavatmal. Sau. Sadhana Mahukar Yavalkar-appellant No.2, a
Warden at Government Hostel, Ghatanji, District Yavatmal
was working as Assistant of appellant No.1 in the said
Scheme. She was authorized by appellant No.1 to get the
Sale deeds executed in favour of the Government of
Maharashtra under the Scheme.
3Page 4
(c) On 04.04.2005, the State Government purchased
agricultural land situated at village Koli-Bujruq. The said land
was jointly owned by eight persons. The appellants, after
perusing the revenue records of the said land purchased it
from the Vendors by getting executed a registered sale
deed. At the time of execution of sale deed, on 07.05.2005,
an affidavit was sworn by the Vendors that they were
residents of Mouza Koli-Buzruq, Tahsil Ghatanji, District
Yavatmal and were the owners of Gut No. 43 of the said
property.
(d) On 04.06.2005, A newspaper by name “Tarun Bharat”
published an article in which it was alleged that the
petitioners have purchased agricultural land showing
Ramesh as alive while he was dead. It was further alleged
that one Ramesh Shikaji Rathod had signed the sale deed as
Ramesh Shika Jadhav. 
(e) On coming to know about the said publication, appellant
No. 1 on 29.06.2005 made an enquiry and recorded the
statements of the said eight Executants and on 02.07.2005
4Page 5
lodged a report in Ghatanji P.S. against them for an offence
of impersonation and cheating. 
(f) On 07.07.2005, the officials of Ghatanji P.S. registered
offences punishable under Sections 420, 419, 468 and 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) for the acts of
fraud, criminal breach of trust and impersonation against the
said accused persons vide Crime No. 88 of 2005. 
(g) On 09.09.2005, one Rajnikant Deluram Borele, claiming
himself to be a Social Worker, filed a Criminal Complaint in
the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ghatanji,
which was registered as Case No. 92 of 2005 against the
appellants-herein, Sub-Registrar and few more persons. In
the complaint it was alleged that the accused had purchased
the land from a dead person, namely, Ramesh Shikaji Jadhav,
while the appellants were acting in their official capacity
under the said Scheme. 
(h) Learned Magistrate, by order dated 27.09.2005,
directed the Police to investigate the matter under Section
156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in
5Page 6
short the “Code”) and to submit a detailed report within one
month. 
(i) On 15.09.2006, the appellants (Madhao Rukhmaji
Vaidya and Sau. Saudhana Mahukar Yavalkar) filed an
application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. being Criminal
Application No. 3112 of 2006 before the Bombay High Court
seeking quashing of the prosecution of the applicants
(appellants herein) in Crime No. 92 of 2005.
(j) On 02.09.2009, after hearing the parties, the High Court
dismissed the Criminal Application preferred by the
appellants-herein by holding that the procedure adopted and
the power exercised by the Magistrate ordering investigation
under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. is just and proper.
(k) Being aggrieved, appellants herein filed SLP No. 7293 of
2009.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7324 of 2009)
4) On 27.09.2006, one of the accused, namely, Akash
Dattatraya Marawar (A-1), business man, also filed Criminal
6Page 7
Application No. 3242 of 2006 before the High Court seeking
quashing of the prosecution in Crime No. 92 of 2005. The
High Court, by order dated 02.09.2009, dismissed the
application. Being aggrieved, he filed special leave petition
No. 7324 of 2009.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7332 of 2009)
5) On 24.10.2006, another accused, namely, Omprakash
Hiralal Jaiswal, Sub-Registrar, also filed Criminal Application
No. 3526 of 2006 before the High Court seeking quashing of
the prosecution in Crime No. 92 of 2005. The High Court, by
order dated 02.09.2009, dismissed the application. Being
aggrieved, he filed special leave petition No. 7332 of 2009.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7693 of 2009)
6) On 29.10.2006, one of the accused, namely, Aslam
Shakil Julphikar Khan, employee of Akash Dattatraya
Marawar (A-1), business man, also filed Criminal Application
No. 3240 of 2006 before the High Court seeking quashing of
the prosecution in Crime No. 92 of 2005. The High Court, by
7Page 8
order dated 02.09.2009, dismissed the application. Being
aggrieved, he filed special leave petition No 7693 of 2009.
7) Heard Mr. Uday U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Shankar Chillarge, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent-State of Maharashtra.
8) The only point for consideration in all these appeals is
whether the learned Magistrate is justified in directing the
Police to investigate and submit a detailed report within one
month under Section 156(3) of the Code.
9) The order of the learned Magistrate shows that before
passing the direction for investigation under Section 156(3),
heard the counsel for the complainant, perused the
allegations made against the accused in the complaint and
documents annexed therewith. It also shows that taking
note of the fact that some of the accused are public officers
and after observing that it needs proper investigation prior to
the issue of process against the accused under Section
156(3) of the Code directed the P.S.O. Ghatanji to investigate
the matter and submit a detailed report within one month.
8Page 9
10) Chapter XIV of the Code speaks about conditions
requisite for initiation of proceedings. Section 190 deals with
cognizance of offences by Magistrates. In terms of subsection (1) subject to the provisions of the said Chapter, any
Magistrate of first class, and any Magistrate of the second
class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section
(2), may take cognizance of any offence – (a) upon receiving
a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a
police report of such facts; (c) upon information received
from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own
knowledge, that such offence has been committed.
11) Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code enables any
Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an
investigation in terms of sub-section (1) of that section.
12) In CREF Finance Ltd. vs. Shree Shanthi Homes (P)
Ltd. and Another, (2005) 7 SCC 467, while considering the
power of a Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence, this
Court held:
9Page 10
“10. …. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the
Magistrate peruses the complaint with a view to ascertain
whether the commission of any offence is disclosed. The
issuance of process is at a later stage when after
considering the material placed before it, the court
decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a
prima facie case is made out. It is possible that a
complaint may be filed against several persons, but the
Magistrate may choose to issue process only against some
of the accused. It may also be that after taking cognizance
and examining the complainant on oath, the court may
come to the conclusion that no case is made out for
issuance of process and it may reject the complaint. It may
also be that having considered the complaint, the court
may consider it appropriate to send the complaint to the
police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure….”
It is clear that any judicial magistrate before taking
cognizance of the offence can order investigation under
Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to
examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking
cognizance of any offence therein. 
13) When a magistrate receives a complaint he is not bound
to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint
disclose the commission of an offence. 
The magistrate has
discretion in the matter. 
If on a reading of the complaint, he
finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable
offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for
1Page 11
investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to
justice and save the valuable time of the magistrate from
being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily
the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in
adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance
of the offence itself. 
As said earlier, in the case of a
complaint regarding the commission of cognizable offence,
the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the
Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under
Section 190(1)(a). 
However, if he once takes such
cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in
Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back to the pre cognizance stage
 and avail of Section 156(3).
14) Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can
adopt any of the following alternatives:
(a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that
there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can
straightaway issue process to the accused but before he
does so he must comply with the requirements of
1Page 12
Section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant
or his witnesses.
(b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process
and direct an enquiry by himself.
(c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process
and direct an enquiry by any other person or an
investigation by the police.
15) In case the Magistrate after considering the statement
of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the
investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that
there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss
the complaint.
16) Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police
before taking cognizance under Section 156(3) of the Code
and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report
and discharge the accused or straightaway issue process
against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed
before him and take action under Section 190 of the Code.
1Page 13
17) The above principles have been reiterated in
Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Others vs. V.
Narayana Reddy and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 252 and Tula
Ram and Others vs. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459 
18) Keeping the above principles,
if we test the same with
the direction issued by the magistrate for investigation under
Section 156(3) of the Code and facts of these cases, we are
satisfied that the magistrate has not exceeded his power nor
violated any of the provisions contained in the Code. 
As
observed earlier, the magistrate need not order any
investigation if he pre-supposes to take cognizance of the
offence and once he takes cognizance of the offence, he has
to follow the procedure provided in Chapter XV of the Code.
It is also settled position that any judicial magistrate before
taking cognizance of the offence can order investigation
under Section 156(3) of the Code.
19) As rightly observed by the High Court, the magistrate
before taking cognizance of the offence can order
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, 
we are of the
1Page 14
view that the procedure adopted and the power exercised by
the magistrate in this case is acceptable and in accordance
with the scheme of the Code. 
We are also satisfied that the
High Court rightly refused to exercise its power under Section
482 of the Code. 
20) In the light of the above discussion and conclusion, we
find no merit in all these appeals, consequently, the same
are dismissed. 
………….…………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
 ………….…………………………J.
(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 03, 2013.
1

whereby the High Court disposed of the appeal preferred by the appellant-herein by confirming his conviction and altering the sentence of death to imprisonment for life passed by the Court of Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur at North Lakhimpur dated 18.03.2006 in Sessions Case No. learned senior counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 34 of 2009 dated 07.09.2009 wherein the order passed by the Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh for release on remission of the petitioners therein was set aside by a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad and the same was challenged before this Court by way of a writ petition. It was also pointed in the above said writ petition that a number of convicts who had undergone actual sentence of 14 years were directed to be released forthwith by this Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 553 of 2006 dated 09.05.2006. This Court, following the same, issued a similar order in the said writ petition for the release of the petitioners therein. As stated earlier, the case on hand relates to commuting the sentence of death into imprisonment for life and we have already preserved the right of the executive for ordering remission taking note of the gravity of the offence. Hence, the said decision is not helpful to the facts of this case and the contention of learned senior counsel is liable to be rejected. 20) In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any valid ground for interference, on the other hand, we are in entire agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court, consequently, the appeal is dismissed.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 194 OF 2008
Bhaikon @ Bakul Borah .... Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Assam .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P.Sathasivam,J.
1) This appeal is filed against the judgment and order
dated 26.09.2006 passed by the Division Bench of the
Gauhati High Court in Criminal Death Reference No. 1 of
2006 along with Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2006 whereby the
High Court disposed of the appeal preferred by the
appellant-herein by confirming his conviction and altering
the sentence of death to imprisonment for life passed by the
Court of Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur at
North Lakhimpur dated 18.03.2006 in Sessions Case No.
1Page 2
40(NL) 03 for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and
307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘IPC’).
2) Brief facts:
(a) As per the prosecution case, on 29.03.2000, at around
12 noon, one Rupamoni Dutta (the deceased), aged about
22 years, r/o Mauza Talwa, Village Kakattiup, PS Lakhimpur,
Assam went to the field near an embankment to attend her
goats. When she did not return home, Ganesh Dutta (PW-2),
father of the deceased, went in search for her. After
enquiring about her daughter in the house of his elder
brother, Khira Dutta, PW-2 started searching for her along
the embankment. While returning, he heard a loud laughter
at the farm house of the appellant-accused. Thereafter, he
returned home and called for his daughter but when he
found that she did not return, he again went to the
embankment and shouted for her. On hearing this, the
appellant came out of the farm house and looked at him.
Then, PW-2 came down the embankment by a path where he
saw his daughter lying dead on the left side. There was cut
injury on her chin and blood was also oozing from her body.
2Page 3
(b) On seeing this, he raised alarm and his son - Bhaba
Kanta (PW-3) came there and they tried to lift her. By that
time, other people from the village also gathered there. The
appellant-accused also came and enquired. Thereafter, they
brought home the dead body. On being informed, Anand
Ozah, Sub-Inspector of Police, Panigaon Police Outpost, came
and seized the wearing apparels of the deceased and
prepared a seizure list. After holding inquest over the dead
body, the same was sent for post-mortem examination.
(c) On the same day, PW-3, brother of the deceased,
lodged a written complaint with the police at Panigaon police
out-post. A case was registered vide G.D. Entry No. 389, at
North Lakhimpur P.S. During the course of investigation, the
police seized the underwear of the deceased stained with
semen on that very day. The appellant-accused Bhaikon @
Bakul Bora and Balin Saikia (PW-1) were also apprehended
and interrogated.
(d) On 30.03.2000, at about 9.30 a.m., the police alleged
to have seized a blue underwear of the appellant-accused
suspected to have been stained with semen. They also
3Page 4
seized one bed sheet, a sporting and a ‘dao’ from the farm
house of the appellant-accused and prepared a seizure list.
The seized underwears of both the appellant and the
deceased were sent to FSL for examination. The post
mortem was conducted on the dead body by Dr. Tulen Pagu
(PW-9), who submitted a report stating that the victim died
of asphyxia as a result of throttling. He also stated that the
vaginal smear showed no spermatozoa.
(e) On 31.03.2000, the Magistrate recorded the statement
of PW-1 under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code). After conclusion of the
investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against the
appellant-accused under Sections 376 and 302 of the IPC.
The case was committed to the Court of Ad-hoc Additional
Session Judge, Lakhimpur and numbered as Sessions Case
No. 40 (NL) of 2003.
(f) The Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur, by order
dated 18.03.2006, convicted the appellant under Sections
376 and 302 of IPC and sentenced him to death for the
offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and rigorous
4Page 5
imprisonment (RI) for life for the offence punishable under
Section 376 of IPC along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in
default, to further undergo RI for a period of 1 (one) year.
(g) Challenging the order of conviction and sentence, the
appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2006 and the
trial Court preferred Death Reference No. 1 of 2006 before
the High Court.
(h) By impugned judgment dated 26.09.2006, the High
Court disposed of the appeal preferred by the appellantaccused by confirming his conviction and altering the
sentence of death to imprisonment for life for the
commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC
along with a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to further undergo
imprisonment for 1 (one) month and for the offence under
Section 376 of IPC, the High Court sentenced him to
imprisonment for 7 years.
(i) Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred this appeal by
way of special leave petition before this Court and leave was
granted on 18.01.2008.
5Page 6
3) Heard Mr. Parmanand Katara, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant-accused and Mr. Navnit Kumar,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State.
4) Mr. Katara, learned senior counsel for the appellantaccused, raised the following contentions:-
(i) Since the evidence of PW-1 is not reliable, the
conviction and sentence based upon his sole testimony
cannot be sustained.
(ii) Inasmuch as the High Court has modified the death
sentence into imprisonment for life, after expiry of the period
of 14 years, the authorities ought to have released the
appellant.
5) Mr. Navnit Kumar, learned counsel for the State, after
taking us through the entire material relied on by the
prosecution submitted that the evidence of PW-1, who
witnessed the occurrence is reliable and is corroborated by
PW-2, father of the deceased and the doctor (PW-9), who
conducted the post mortem. He also submitted that
inasmuch as the sentence of death was commuted to
imprisonment for life, there cannot be automatic release
6Page 7
after the expiry of the period of 14 years as claimed by the
appellant-accused.
6) We have carefully considered the rival contentions and
perused all the relevant materials.
7) Let us deal with the first contention raised by learned
senior counsel for the appellant. It is not in dispute that the
appellant was charged for the offence punishable under
Sections 376 and 302 of the IPC. In other words, according
to the prosecution, the appellant along with another person
committed rape and, thereafter, murdered the deceased.
The entire prosecution case rests on the solitary evidence of
the eye-witness PW-1. According to PW-1, the accusedappellant engaged him as a labourer in his farm house and
all along he was working under compulsion. Regarding the
incident, he narrated that the incident took place about 4
years ago. He further deposed that on the date of
occurrence, he saw the appellant-accused and his friend
following the deceased and on seeing the same, he also
followed them and saw that the appellant-accused and his
companion behaving indecently with the girl, committed
7Page 8
rape on her and, thereafter, the appellant-accused assaulted
the girl by throttling her neck. He further noticed that
because of the acts of the appellant-accused, the girl died on
the spot and he also noticed that the appellant-accused
along with the accomplice dragged her to the nearby place
surrounded by shrubs and bushes and left the body there.
Thereafter, the appellant-accused returned home and PW-1
went to the wheat field in order to show that he was busy in
attending the goats. He also explained that since both them
were having ‘Khukri’ in their hands, he did not raise alarm
out of fear. Though PW-1 remained silent, after 2 hours,
when PW-2, father of the victim, raised a commotion at the
place of occurrence, the appellant-accused also came there
and saw the dead body of the girl. The conduct of PW-1, in
view of the above, cannot be doubted because of refusal on
his part to open his mouth in the presence of his master.
Even the trial Court found him trustworthy that he had
nothing to falsely implicate his master and rightly held him
to be a reliable witness. Further, the evidence of PW-1
clearly shows that he was forced to work in the house of the
8Page 9
appellant-accused. The fact that he was working in the
house of the appellant-accused was admitted by him in his
statement under Section 313 of the Code. There is no
reason to disbelieve the version of PW-1, who is an
independent eye-witness to the incident.
8) The next witness relied on by the prosecution is Ganesh
Dutta–father of the victim who was examined as PW-2. In
his evidence, he explained that his daughter went to the
field to attend the goats but she did not return. He further
narrated that when he went in search of her, he found her
lying dead with injury on the neck.
9) The prosecution has also relied on the evidence of two
brothers of the deceased viz., Bhaba Kanta Dutta as PW-3
and Mahendra Dutta as PW-4 who also corroborated the
statement made by PW-2. Apart from the above evidence,
the co-villagers, viz., PWs 7 and 8 were also examined who
deposed that they had seen the dead body of the deceased.
10) The other evidence relied on by the prosecution is of
the doctor (PW-9) who conducted the post mortem. He
noted the following injuries:-
9Page 10
“ A dead body of an average built, female, rigor mortis
present.
1. A cut injury over lower part of the chin, size
3”x1”x1/2”.
2. Lower part of the mandibular bone was cut at the
side of injury size 2”x1/4”x1/4”.
3. Bruise mark over middle part of the front of the right
side of the back size 11/2”x1”.
4. Bruise mark in the middle of the front of the left side
of the neck size 21/2”x11/2”.
5. Trachea fractured at the level of the bruise marks.
6. Multiple bruises on left side of the neck overlying
each other.
Heart was healthy containing dark fluid blood, left side
empty.
Above injuries (in No. 1) were ante mortem in nature.
Injury Nos. 1 and 2 were caused by sharp cutting weapon.
Injury Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 caused by blunt weapon. Vaginal
smear show no spermatozoa. Smear was taken
immediately and the pathologist examined the
sample/smear on 01.04.2000. Uterus non-gravid. (No sign
of pregnancy).
In my opinion, the person died of asphyxia as result of
throttling.”
PW-9, in his evidence has stated that no mark of sexual
violence was found on the genital organs of the body.
11) Learned senior counsel for the appellant, by drawing
our attention to the remarks of PW-9 that there was no mark
of injury on the genital organs of the body of the deceased
contended that conviction under Section 376 of IPC is
unsustainable. In the light of overwhelming materials placed
by the prosecution, we are unable to accept the said
10Page 11
contention. As rightly observed by the trial Court and the
High Court, there is no reason to disbelieve the version of
PW-1 and the corroborative evidence of PW-2, father of the
deceased. In the same way, the injuries noted by PW-9 also
support the prosecution story though he has noted that
there was no sign of injury on the genital organs of the
deceased.
12) Taking note of oral and documentary evidence led in by
the prosecution, particularly, the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 9
as well as the statement of co-villagers, we agree with the
conclusion arrived at by the trial Court and affirmed by the
High Court regarding the death of Rupamoni Dutta and
reject the claim made by learned senior counsel for the
appellant-accused.
13) Coming to the second contention, it is not in dispute
that considering the heinous crime of committing rape and
murder and throwing the dead body in a place surrounded
by bushes and shrubs, the trial Court has awarded the
sentence of death, however, the High Court, taking note of
the fact that the accused is a young man of 33 years of age
11Page 12
and also finding that the case does not come under the
purview of the “rarest of rare” category, declined to confirm
the sentence of death and altered the same to the
imprisonment for life while upholding the conviction under
both the counts.
14) Mr. Katara, learned senior counsel for the appellantaccused, by taking us through various sections of the Penal
Code viz., Sections 121, 121A, 122, 128, 131, 194, 224 and
238 and the sentences which the Court of Magistrates,
Sessions Judges and High Courts may pass and also some of
the sections which mention life imprisonment as maximum
punishment or imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to 10 years or lesser than 10 years
contended that when statute provides imprisonment for life
for an offence and in alternative imprisonment for a term
which may extend to 10 years, in that case, incarceration of
14 years should be held sufficient and the appellant is
entitled to be released on that ground. After hearing his
arguments patiently and noting the same, we are of the view
that the case on hand relates to commuting the sentence of
12Page 13
death into imprisonment for life and all the contentions
raised by learned senior counsel relating to the sentence are
unacceptable or irrelevant.
15) This Court, in a series of decisions has held that life
imprisonment means imprisonment for whole of life subject
to the remission power granted under Articles 72 and 161 of
the Constitution of India. [Vide Life Convict @ Khoka
Prasanta Sen vs. B.K. Srivastava & Ors. (2013) 3 SCC
425, Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2013) 3 SCC
294, Sangeet and Anr. vs. State of Haryana (2013) 2
SCC 452, Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod (2) vs. State
of Gujarat (2011) 2 SCC 764, Chhote Lal vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2011) 8 SCR 239, Mulla and Another
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 3 SCC 508, Maru Ram
vs. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 107, State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Others (1976) 3 SCC
470 and Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra
AIR 1961 SC 600].
16) In view of the clear decisions over decades, the
argument of learned senior counsel for the appellant-
13Page 14
accused is unsustainable, at the same time, we are not
restricting the power of executive as provided in the
Constitution of India. For adequate reasons, it is for the said
authorities to exercise their power in an appropriate case.
17) It is also relevant to point out that when death sentence
is commuted to imprisonment for life by the Appellate Court,
the concerned Government is permitted to exercise its
executive power of remission cautiously, taking note of the
gravity of the offence. [Vide Swami Shraddananda (2) @
Murli Manohar Mishra vs. State of Karnataka (2008) 13
SCC 767 and Sahib Hussain @ Sahib Jan vs. State of
Rajasthan 2013 (6) Scale 219.
18) In view of the categorical and consistent decisions of
this Court on the point, we are unable to accept the
argument of learned senior counsel for the appellantaccused.
19) Learned senior counsel for the appellant also placed
reliance on a decision of this Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.
34 of 2009 dated 07.09.2009 wherein the order passed by
the Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh for release on
14Page 15
remission of the petitioners therein was set aside by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad and the same
was challenged before this Court by way of a writ petition.
 It
was also pointed in the above said writ petition that a
number of convicts who had undergone actual sentence of
14 years were directed to be released forthwith by this Court
in SLP (Crl.) No. 553 of 2006 dated 09.05.2006. 
This Court,
following the same, issued a similar order in the said writ
petition for the release of the petitioners therein. 
As stated
earlier, the case on hand relates to commuting the sentence
of death into imprisonment for life and we have already
preserved the right of the executive for ordering remission
taking note of the gravity of the offence. 
Hence, the said
decision is not helpful to the facts of this case and the
contention of learned senior counsel is liable to be rejected.
20) In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any
valid ground for interference, on the other hand, we are in
entire agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the High
Court, consequently, the appeal is dismissed. 
15Page 16
………….…………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
 ………….…………………………J.
(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 3, 2013.
16

under Sections 147, 148, 149, 364, 307, 302 IPC= “But it is well settled that interested evidence is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. Nor can it be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon. Although in the matter of appreciation of evidence, no hard and fast rule can be laid down, yet, in most cases, in evaluating the evidence of an interested or even a partisan witness, it is useful as a first step to focus attention on the question, whether the presence of the witness at the scene of the crime at the material time was probable. If so, whether the substratum of the story narrated by the witness, being consistent with the other evidence on record, the natural course of human events, the surrounding circumstances and inherent probabilities of the case, is such which will carry conviction with a prudent person. If the answer to these questions be in the affirmative, and the evidence of the witness appears to the court to be almost flawless, and free from suspicion, it may accept it, without seeking corroboration from any other source. Since perfection in this imperfect world is seldom to be found, and the evidence of a witness, more so of an interested witness, is generally fringed with embellishment and exaggerations, however true in the main, the court may look for some assurance, the nature and extent of which will vary according to the circumstances of the particular case, from independent evidence, circumstantial or direct, before finding the accused guilty on the basis of his interested testimony. We may again emphasise that these are only broad guidelines which may often be useful in assessing interested testimony, and are not iron-cased rules uniformly applicable in all situations.”= the prosecution has succeeded in proving the place of occurrence, the time of occurrence as well as the manner of assault made on injured persons who are all examined by the Court and their evidence fully corroborates the prosecution case. We notice, in this case, that there is sufficient evidence to show that the incident had happened on 5.7.1983, as projected by the prosecution. The prosecution has successfully proved that it was the appellants and others who had committed the crime, so found by the trial Court as well as the High Court. Large number of persons were involved in the incident that occurred on 5.7.1983. Several injuries were caused by the appellants on the vital parts of the deceased and the injured persons, with dangerous weapons and the injuries are sufficient, as certified by the doctor, in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and the accused persons intended to inflict the injuries that were found on the person of the deceased and injured persons. Appellants caused the injuries with deadly weapons, therefore, intention can be presumed regarding causing injuries as are likely to cause death, which falls under Section 304 Part I IPC and hence the conviction ordered by the trial court under Section 302 IPC is converted to Section 304 Part I IPC.


Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1421 OF 2007
Md. Ishaque and Others .. Appellants
Versus
State of West Bengal and Others ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
1. This appeal arises out of a common judgment and order
dated 14.8.2006 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in CRA
No. 425 of 2001and CRA No. 463 of 2001, whereby the High
Court confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded to the
appellants.
2. The prosecution version is that on 5.7.1983 at about 5 AM
to 5.30 AM, some 200-250 villagers, which included the accused
persons as well, armed with various weapons like Lathi, Ladna,
Farsa, Hasua and Ballam surrounded the village Siktahar. ThePage 2
2
accused persons forced out a number of persons from their
houses, assaulted them in various ways and ultimately took four
of them in tie-bound condition to a place called Hijul Pakur Field
which is some distance away from village Siktahar and they
assaulted them with various weapons causing serious injuries.
The injured persons were admitted to Ratua Public Health
Centre and later, shifted to Malda Sadar Hospital. One of the
injured, namely Azad Ali, succumbed to his injuries. The
remaining injured persons, viz. the informant - Md. Yasin PW1,
Hasan Ali PW4 and Farjan Ali PW2 sustained serious injuries.
During the course of occurrence, accused persons also
assaulted Mohammed Badaruddin PW3, Mohamed Sabiruddin
PW5 and Mohammed Kalimuddin PW6. However, those
persons could escape from the clutches of the accused persons
and flee from the place of assault.
3. Md. Yasin PW1 lodged the FIR on 8.7.1983, which was
recorded by N. N. Acherjee, S.I., C.I.D. and forwarded to Ratuna
P.S. and a case was registered being Crime No. 9 dated
5.7.1983 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 364, 307, 302 IPC at
Ratuna P.S. and the investigation was taken up by the police.
Later, investigation was handed over to the C.I.D. and, afterPage 3
3
completion of the investigation, police submitted the chargesheet against 31 accused persons. (Of the charge-sheeted
persons, accused Ajahar Moral and Tabjul died during the
course of trial and the accused No. 25 died during the pendency
of the appeal before the High Court). Two other charge-sheeted
persons, namely, Hafijuddina and Safijuddin, were not sent up
and discharged by S.D.J.M. vide his order dated 9.12.1993.
Vide order dated 27.8.1983, the S.D.J.M. committed the case to
the Court of Sessions.
4. Charges were framed against 28 accused persons on
10.4.1995, which were read over and explained to accused
persons, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried. The prosecution examined 20 witnesses and produced
various documents. On defence side, one witness was
examined and also produced few documents. The defence
took up the stand that the entire incident was stated to have
taken place at Malo Para on 4.7.1983 and no occurrence, as
alleged, took place either at village Siktahar or at Hajul Pakur
Field on 5.7.1983. Further, it was stated that the case was
falsely foisted due to political rivalry between two groups.Page 4
4
Accused persons belong to the Congress party and the
deceased and injured persons belong to CPM.
5. The trial Court, after considering the oral and documentary
evidence, found that the prosecution has succeeded in proving
the case and convicted 27 accused persons (out of 28 accused
persons) and one Abdul Taub found not guilty and was
acquitted.
6. Three appeals were filed against the order of conviction
passed by the trial Court. CRA No. 425 of 2001 was filed by
Md. Ishaque and another, CRA 463 of 2001 filed by Hefjur
Rahaman and 24 others and CRA N. 700 of 2006 was filed by
Jinnatual Haque, son of deceased, appellant no. 22, Md. Nurul
Islam under Section 394 CrPC. The High Court took the view
that the trial Court has rightly convicted all the accused
persons, except appellants Yasin, Daud Hazi, Mannan, Islam
Maulavi and Alauddin. CRA 425 of 2002 and CRA 463 of
2001were, therefore, allowed in part. Since Islam Maulavi was
acquitted, CRA 700 of 2006 was also allowed.
7. Aggrieved by the same, 21 accused persons have
preferred the present appeal. This Court granted bail to 14Page 5
5
appellants vide its orders dated 19.8.2009 and 27.1.2012.
While the appeal was pending, appellants Haji Md. Belal Hossain
and Aaiyab Ali died.
8. Shri Pradip Ghosh, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellants, submitted that the prosecution has failed to
establish the case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellants
deserve acquittal. Learned senior counsel pointed out that the
accused persons were falsely implicated due to political rivalry
and the case was framed as a counter-blast to the incident that
took place on 4.7.1983, a day earlier, wherein 13 persons from
the village of the accused persons were brutally murdered.
Learned senior counsel submitted that, on cross-examination of
the material witnesses namely PW1 to PW6, with reference to
the statement of the investigating officer, it would appear that
there were serious omissions and contradictions in their
statements, hence, the prosecution story cannot be believed.
The prosecution had also failed to establish the place of
occurrence, time of the alleged assault and the manner of the
alleged assault and there was no corroborative medical
evidence to support the various injuries alleged to have been
sustained by few of the witnesses. Further, it was pointed outPage 6
6
that the doctor who conducted the post-mortem, was not
examined. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the High
Court has rightly acquitted few of the accused persons and the
reasoning adopted by the High Court equally applies in the case
of the appellants as well.
9. Shri Bijan Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the State,
on the other hand, submitted that the High Court, after
examining the evidence of the eye witnesses and other
corroborative evidence, has rightly come to the conclusion that
the appellants are guilty and deserve the sentence awarded by
the trial Court. Learned counsel submitted that there is nothing
on record, wherefrom, it can be gathered that the place of
occurrence was not the village Siktahar and, thereafter, at Hijul
Pakur Field, where the injured persons and the deceased were
assaulted. Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution has
succeeded in proving the place of occurrence, the time of
occurrence and also the assault on injured persons and the
cause of death of the deceased Azad Ali.
10. We heard the parties at length and have also gone
through the evidence, especially the evidence of PW1 to PW6Page 7
7
and also minutely and meticulously examined the entire gamut
of the prosecution case. PW1, in his statement, has
categorically stated that the incident had occurred on 5.7.1983
at Siktahar and that his evidence finds full support from the
evidence adduced by the Investigating Officer PW20. Facts
indicate that an incident had taken place on 4.7.1983 at village
Malopara coming under the same P.S. Ratua, which resulted in
the death of 13 persons and due to that occurrence, there was
an atmosphere of terror over the surrounding villages and also
as a sequel of that massacre of Malopara, Siktahar village was
attacked. PWs1 and 6 were directly affected by the incident
that had occurred at Siktahar, in which the involvement of the
appellants was clearly established. PWs 1 to 6, particularly PW1
to PW4, who had deposed, narrating both the occurrences of
Siktahar and Hizul Pakur Field, was subjected to lengthy crossexamination, but nothing significant was brought out to
discredit their evidence. Further, there is nothing in the
statement of PW18 to indicate that he found the injured persons
of this case at Malopara village, on the contrary, if the
statement of PWs 18 and 19 are considered together, it would
indicate that the injured persons were found at a field, but notPage 8
8
certainly at Malopara. Injured persons, including the deceased
Azad Ali, were treated at Ratua Primary Health Centre and,
subsequently, at Malda Sadar Hospital. PW14 to 16 attended
those injured persons and from the reports prepared by the
doctors, it would be clear that on 5.7.1983 all the persons,
including the deceased Azad Ali, who were injured, were treated
at Ratua Primary Health Centre and thereafter at Malda Sadar
Hospital. Ex.14, the post-mortem report of the deceased
indicates that the deceased suffered homicidal death and the
injuries sustained by him were all ante-mortem in nature and
that was the result of assault by several persons with sharp
cutting weapons as well as the blunt weapons like Lathi.
11. We also fully endorse the view of the High Court that the
mere fact that some of the witnesses are interested witnesses,
that by itself is not a ground to discard their evidence, the
evidence taken as a whole supports the case of the prosecution.
In Hari Obula Reddy and Ors. v. The State of Andhra
Pradesh (1981) 3 SCC 675, this Court laid down certain broad
guidelines to be borne in mind, while scrutinising the evidence
of the eye-witnesses, in para 13 of the judgement, this Court
held as follows:Page 9
9
“But it is well settled that interested evidence is
not necessarily unreliable evidence.
 Even
partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for
discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. 
Nor can
it be laid down as an invariable rule that
interested evidence can never form the basis of
conviction unless corroborated to a material
extent in material particulars by independent
evidence. 
All that is necessary is that the
evidence of interested witnesses should be
subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with
caution. 
If on such scrutiny, the interested
testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or
inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient,
in the circumstances of the particular case, to
base a conviction thereon. 
Although in the matter
of appreciation of evidence, no hard and fast rule
can be laid down, yet, in most cases, in evaluating
the evidence of an interested or even a partisan
witness, it is useful as a first step to focus
attention on the question, whether the presence
of the witness at the scene of the crime at the
material time was probable.
 If so, whether the
substratum of the story narrated by the witness,
being consistent with the other evidence on
record, the natural course of human events, the
surrounding circumstances and inherent
probabilities of the case, is such which will carry
conviction with a prudent person. 
If the answer to
these questions be in the affirmative, and the
evidence of the witness appears to the court to be
almost flawless, and free from suspicion, it may
accept it, without seeking corroboration from any
other source. 
Since perfection in this imperfect
world is seldom to be found, and the evidence of a
witness, more so of an interested witness, is
generally fringed with embellishment and
exaggerations, however true in the main, the
court may look for some assurance, the nature
and extent of which will vary according to the
circumstances of the particular case, from
Page 10
10
independent evidence, circumstantial or direct,
before finding the accused guilty on the basis of
his interested testimony. 
We may again
emphasise that these are only broad guidelines
which may often be useful in assessing interested
testimony, and are not iron-cased rules uniformly
applicable in all situations.
12. PW1, PW2, PW4 in case sustained serious injuries, their
evidence was believed by the court. It is trite law that the
testimony of injured witnesses entitled to great weight and it is
unlikely that they would spare the real culprit and implicate an
innocent person. Of course, there is no immutable rule of
appreciation of evidence that the evidence of injured witnesses
should be mechanically accepted, it also be in consonance with
probabilities (Refs: Makan Jivan and Ors. v. The State of
Gujarat (1971) 3 SCC 297; Machhi Singh and Ors. v. State
of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470; Jangir Singh and Chet Singh
and Ors. v. State of Punjab (2000) 10 SCC 261.
13. In this respect, reference may be made to the judgment of
this Court in Jaishree v. State of U.P. (2005) 9 SCC 788,
wherein this Court held that whether witnesses are interested
persons and whether they had deposed out of some motive
cannot be the sole criterion for judging credibility of a witness,Page 11
11
but the main criterion would be whether their physical presence
at the place of occurrence was possible and probable.
14. We are of the view that 
the prosecution has succeeded in
proving the place of occurrence, the time of occurrence as well
as the manner of assault made on injured persons who are all
examined by the Court and their evidence fully corroborates the
prosecution case. 
We notice, in this case, that there is
sufficient evidence to show that the incident had happened on
5.7.1983, as projected by the prosecution. 
The prosecution has
successfully proved that it was the appellants and others who
had committed the crime, so found by the trial Court as well as
the High Court.
15. Large number of persons were involved in the incident that
occurred on 5.7.1983. 
Several injuries were caused by the
appellants on the vital parts of the deceased and the injured
persons, with dangerous weapons and the injuries are sufficient,
as certified by the doctor, in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death and the accused persons intended to inflict the
injuries that were found on the person of the deceased and
injured persons. 
Appellants caused the injuries with deadly
Page 12
12
weapons, therefore, intention can be presumed regarding
causing injuries as are likely to cause death, which falls under
Section 304 Part I IPC and 
hence the conviction ordered by the
trial court under Section 302 IPC is converted to Section 304
Part I IPC.
16. Consequently, the appellants are found guilty under
Section 304 Part I IPC and are sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment of 10 years with a fine of Rs.5,000/-each. On
default of payment of fine, they will undergo rigorous
imprisonment for another six months. 50% of the money
recovered as fine has to be paid to the wife of the deceased as
compensation. We further order that if any of the appellants
had already undergone sentence of 10 years, they would be let
free, on payment of fine and the remaining accused appellants
would serve the balance period of sentence and bail granted to
them would, therefore, stand cancelled and they will surrender
within a week. Appeal is disposed of accordingly. 
 …………………………..J.
(K.S. Radhakrishnan)Page 13
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…………………………..J.
(Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
May 3, 2013