LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Thursday, October 18, 2012

On 21.08.2005, Jupiter-6 along with its crew comprising 10 Indians and 3 Ukrainians, left Walvis Bay in Namibia and was towing a dead ship Satsung on its way to Alang in Gujarat in India. On 05.09.2005, Jupiter-6 went missing in the high seas. On 10.10.2005, respondent no. 4 informed the Director General of Shipping, Bombay, that it had received a distress signal from Jupiter-6 via its life saving radio equipment on board and a search was conducted from the place where distress signal originated, which was 220 nautical miles South of Port Elizabeth, South Africa, but Jupiter-6 could not be located. Pursuant to reports in a section of the media about the missing of Jupiter-6 since 08.10.2005, the Director General of Shipping, Bombay, issued a press release on 15.10.2005 that the Ministry of Shipping and Road Transport and Highways had alerted the Indian Coast guard which, in turn, has alerted the South African Search and Rescue Region as Jupiter-6 was last sighted near Cape Town in South Africa and that all efforts are being made to trace the crew members. On 25.04.2006, however, the respondent no. 4 sent a letter to the petitioners saying that all efforts to search the missing Jupiter-6 and her 13 crew members have proved unproductive and that the owners of the vessel are coordinating with the underwriters for nomination of local P & I correspondent who will deal with them for requisite compensation package and on getting further information from the local P & I correspondent, the petitioners will be informed of the further follow-up action to process the claims. Finally, the petitioners received the communication dated 17.08.2006 from the Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, Government Shipping Office, Mumbai, certifying that their husbands/sons were presumed to be dead.


                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 505 OF 2006

Sabeeha Faikage & Ors.                          … Petitioners

                                   Versus

Union of India & Ors.                            … Respondents




                                  O R D E R

A. K. PATNAIK, J.



      The petitioners have lost their husbands/sons  in  a  marine  casualty
and have filed this writ petition  under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution
complaining of the breach of the fundamental right to life under Article  21
of the Constitution.

2.    The facts very briefly are that the husbands of petitioner nos.  1,  2
and 3 and the sons of petitioner nos. 4 and  5  were  recruited  and  placed
through respondent nos. 4 and 5 to work as Seafarers  on  tugboat  Jupiter-6
carrying the flag of Saint  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines.   On  21.08.2005,
Jupiter-6 along with its crew comprising 10 Indians and 3  Ukrainians,  left
Walvis Bay in Namibia and was towing a dead  ship  Satsung  on  its  way  to
Alang in Gujarat in India.  On 05.09.2005, Jupiter-6  went  missing  in  the
high seas.  On 10.10.2005, respondent no. 4 informed  the  Director  General
of Shipping, Bombay, that it had received a distress signal  from  Jupiter-6
via its life saving radio equipment on board  and  a  search  was  conducted
from the place where distress signal  originated,  which  was  220  nautical
miles South of Port Elizabeth, South Africa,  but  Jupiter-6  could  not  be
located.  Pursuant to reports in a section of the media  about  the  missing
of Jupiter-6 since 08.10.2005, the Director  General  of  Shipping,  Bombay,
issued a press release on 15.10.2005 that the Ministry of Shipping and  Road
Transport and Highways had alerted the Indian Coast guard  which,  in  turn,
has alerted the South African Search and  Rescue  Region  as  Jupiter-6  was
last sighted near Cape Town in South Africa and that all efforts  are  being
made to trace the crew members.  On 25.04.2006, however, the respondent  no.
4 sent a letter to the petitioners saying that all  efforts  to  search  the
missing Jupiter-6 and her 13 crew members have proved unproductive and  that
the owners  of  the  vessel  are  coordinating  with  the  underwriters  for
nomination of local P  &  I  correspondent  who  will  deal  with  them  for
requisite compensation package and on getting further information  from  the
local P & I correspondent, the petitioners will be informed of  the  further
follow-up  action to process the claims.  Finally, the petitioners  received
the communication dated 17.08.2006 from the Government  of  India,  Ministry
of Shipping, Government  Shipping  Office,  Mumbai,  certifying  that  their
husbands/sons were presumed to be dead.

3.     The  petitioners   have   prayed   for   inter   alia   a   writ   of
mandamus/direction to the respondents to conduct an investigation  into  the
mysterious disappearance of their husbands/sons who were on  board  Jupiter-
6.  The petitioners have also  prayed  for  an  enquiry  to  find  out  what
transpired between the Government of India and the  Saint  Vincent  and  the
Grenadines on account of which the Government of India  has  certified  that
their husbands/sons are presumed to be dead.  After  perusing  the  Merchant
Shipping Notice No.26 of 2002 dated 10.10.2002 issued by the  Government  of
India,  Ministry  of  Shipping,  Directorate  of  the  Director  General  of
Shipping, (for short “M.S. Notice 26 of 2002”), this Court issued notice  on
10.11.2006 in the writ petition to the respondents confined to the  question
as to whether the Maritime Administration of the State (India)  was  invited
to take part in the marine casualty investigation as provided in para  4  of
M.S. Notice 26 of 2002.  In response to the notice, a counter affidavit  was
filed on 03.01.2008 on behalf of respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 stating  therein
that they became aware  of  the  casualty  for  the  first  time  when  they
received  a  communication  dated  10.10.2005  about   the   incident   from
respondent no.4 and that the administration of the  State  (India)  was  not
invited to participate in the investigation as per para 4 of M.S. Notice  26
of 2002.

4.    The matter was thereafter heard and on 24.09.2008  this  Court  passed
an order, paragraph 4 of which is extracted hereinbelow:


       4.     The  office  of  Director  General  of  Shipping  has  issued
       M.S.Notice No.26 of 2002 dated 10.10.2002 in regard to the procedure
       to be followed in the  event  of  marine  casualties  and  incidents
       involving Indian citizens on  board  of  foreign  flag  vessels.  To
       ascertain whether there is any basis for the grievance put forth  by
       the petitioners, we, therefore, direct the Directorate  to  collect,
       analyze and  prepare  a  report  with  reference  to  the  following
       information and file the same with an  affidavit  of  a  responsible
       officer from the office of the Director General of Shipping.


       (a)     How many reports of marine casualties have been received  by
       the Indian Government after 10.10.2002 involving Indian citizens  on
       board of foreign flag vessels and how many are  received  within  48
       hours  of  the  occurrence  of  the  incident  as  required  by  the
       Directorate?
       (b)     In how many of such cases reports have been received by  the
       Directorate from the manning  agents  of  the  ships  in  India  who
       recruited the seafarers as required by clause 5(a) and (b)  of  M.S.
       Notice dated 10.10.2002?


       (c)     In how many cases, Indian Government  has  been  invited  to
       participate in the marine casualty investigation by the  lead  State
       or the flag State (as required by paras 5.2, 6.3 and 9.1 of the Code
       for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents)?


       (d) In how many cases the Indian Government has  sent  its  comments
       within 30 days from the date of receiving the  draft  of  the  final
       report from the lead investigating State (as required by clause 12.1
       of  the  Code  for  the  Investigation  of  Marine  Casualties   and
       Incidents)    to    enable    the     lead   investigating     State
           to incorporate/ amend / modify the final report?


       (e) In how many cases the Indian Government has  made  available  to
       the public the final report in regard to marine  casualty  incidents
       and, if so, the period and the manner in which it has been  so  made
       public (as required by clause 12.3 of the Code for the Investigation
       of Marine Casualties and Incidents)?


       (f)  In how many cases Indian Government has  taken  action  against
       the recruiting agents/manning agents/managers of  the  foreign  flag
       ships  which  employed  Indian  crew  and  in  what  manner  it  has
       safeguarded the interest of the Indian crew (particularly in view of
       its M.S. Notice No.13 of 2005 dated 25.10.2005  of  the  Directorate
       which admits the receipt of several complaints about the failure  of
       shipping companies and recruiting  agents  of  Indian  seafarers  in
       reporting marine casualties involving them to the Government and the
       family members) for non-compliance with its direction?


                The above information, if made available, will enable us to
       decide whether there is really implementation or compliance  of  the
       Conventions and Codes relating to marine casualty incidents. We find
       that the counter affidavit filed by the Indian Government  does  not
       furnish necessary and sufficient details.


                Learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel  for
       the ship  managers  and  the  learned  ASG  may  also  submit  their
       suggestions for proper and better  implementation  of  the  existing
       Conventions and Codes.


                The pendency of this petition or any further  investigation
       in the matter by any agency should not come in the way of either the
       Insurers/owners/managers of  the  tug  paying  compensation  to  the
       family members of the missing crew. In  fact,  learned  counsel  for
       respondent  No.4  and  5  stated  that  they  have  offered  interim
       compensation to the families.   The petitioners deny that  any  such
       offer was made. The learned counsel for respondents 4 and  5  stated
       that even now respondents 4 and 5 are willing and ready to make  the
       interim payment without prejudice to the rights and  contentions  of
       both the parties and the same will be despatched within 10 days from
       today and that they will get in touch with the insurers for  release
        of   the   amounts   to   the    missing   crew   family    members
       expeditiously.   We make it clear that receipt of any amount by  the
       family members of the missing  crew  may  receive  any  compensation
       tendered or paid  by  the  managers  or  insurers  will  be  without
       prejudice and receipt of such payment will not prejudice their  case
       in any manner.”


   5. A reading of the para 4 of the order dated 24.09.2008 would show  that
      this Court limited the scope of the writ petition to two  issues:  (i)
      the safety of Indian citizens on board of  foreign  flag  vessels  and
      (ii) in case such Indian citizens on board a foreign flag vessel  lost
      their lives, the compensation payable to their kith and kin.   On  the
      first issue, the Court called upon the Union of India to  furnish  the
      necessary and sufficient details with regard to implementation of  the
      Conventions and Codes relating to marine casually incidents and on the
      second issue, the Court called upon respondents 4  and  5  to  release
      interim compensation to the family members of  the  missing  crew  and
      clarified that the compensation paid by respondents 4  and  5  or  the
      insurers will be without prejudice to the claim of the family  members
      of the crew.

   6. Pursuant to the aforesaid order passed on 24.09.2008, respondents 1, 2
      and 3 filed affidavits from time to time referring to the steps  taken
      by the Government of India  to  ensure  the  safety  and  security  of
      seafarers including a chart showing the position  of  various  welfare
      measures and safety measures relating to seafarers in 2006  and  2011.
      Pursuant to  the  order  passed  on  24.09.2008  of  this  Court,  the
      respondent nos. 4 and 5  also  informed  this  Court  that  M/s  James
      Mckintosh Company Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai, have on behalf of the  owners  of
      Jupiter-6 offered to pay a compensation  at  the  rate  of  40,000  US
      Dollars for the death of each of the officers on board  Jupiter-6  and
      at the rate of 25,000 US Dollars for the death of  each  of  the  non-
      officers on board Jupiter-6.  They further informed  this  Court  that
      out of the thirteen crew members of  Jupiter-6,  the  three  Ukrainian
      nationals have been paid compensation by the owners of the vessel  and
      the  widow  of  one  non-officer  Mr.  Subhash  Das  has   been   paid
      compensation of 25,000 US Dollars.   Accordingly,  on  15.11.2010  the
      Court directed that a sum of 2,85,000 US  Dollars  for  the  remaining
      nine  Indian  seafarers  (four  officers  and  five  non-officers)  be
      deposited in  Court  for  payment  to  their  family  members  without
      prejudice to their claims for higher compensation.  Thereafter, a  sum
      of Rs.1,29,29,386/- equivalent to 2,85,000 US Dollars was deposited by
      respondents 4 and 5 and by order dated 28.03.2011, the Court permitted
      the legal heirs/representatives of the officers/seamen to lodge  their
      claims for disbursement of compensation with the Registrar  (Judicial)
      who was required to verify the claims and  submit  a  report  to  this
      Court with regard to disbursement.  Registrar (Judicial) is now in the
      process of verifying the claims and  disbursing  the  amounts  to  the
      legal heirs of the deceased Indian seafarers.

   7. At  the  hearing  of  the  writ  petition,  learned  counsel  for  the
      petitioners Mr. P. Soma Sundaram and Mr.  Vipin  Nair  submitted  that
      under Article 21 of the Constitution every person has been  guaranteed
      the right to life and this right has been violated in the case of  the
      seafarers on board Jupiter-6.  They submitted  that  though  Jupiter-6
      went missing in the  high  sea  on  05.09.2005,  the  respondent  no.4
      informed the Government about the loss  of  Jupiter-6  35  days  after
      05.09.2005, i.e. on 10.10.2005, and the Government did not conduct any
      investigation into the  incident  and  issued  death  certificates  on
      17.08.2006 saying that the crew members of Jupiter-6 are  presumed  to
      be dead.  They submitted that under M.S. Notice 26 of 2002 the manning
      agents who have recruited the seafarers  on  board  the  foreign  flag
      vessel, in the present case respondent nos.4 and 5, were  required  to
      inform the Government about the marine casualty within three  days  of
      the incident and as the Indian nationals were involved in  the  marine
      casualty, the Government of India was required  to  conduct  a  marine
      casualty investigation  forthwith.   They  submitted  that  under  the
      Merchant Shipping (Recruitment and Placement of Seafarers) Rules, 2005
      (for short ‘the Rules 2005) and in  particular  Rule  3  thereof,  the
      Government was also  required  to  conduct  an  investigation  when  a
      complaint is received against the Recruitment  and  Placement  service
      providers, but no such enquiry has been conducted by the Government on
      the complaint regarding  missing  of    Jupiter-6  despite  complaints
      having been made to the Government.  They also referred  to  the  Flag
      State Report of the Maritime Investigation Branch, Saint  Vincent  and
      the Grenadines, Report No.5  of  September  2005,  which  states  that
      disappearance of Jupiter-6 along with  her  crew  remains  an  enigma.
      They submitted that this report would go to show that respondent  nos.
      4 and 5 had been indicted for the incident and yet no action has  been
      taken by the Government against respondent nos. 4 and 5.

   8. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that under  Rule  4
      (3)(a) of the Rules 2005 read with Form-III prescribed  by  the  Rules
      2005, it is  mandatory  for  the  Recruitment  and  Placement  service
      providers to provide insurance cover to  the  seafarers  they  employ.
      They submitted that it will be clear from the declaration to be  filed
      by the Recruitment and Placement service providers in  Form-III  along
      with the application for licence that they are required to ensure that
      all seafarers recruited and placed with the ship owners are adequately
      covered by insurance cover.  They submitted that under Rule  3  (1)(j)
      of the Rules 2005, the Recruitment  and  Placement  service  providers
      also have the legal  obligation  to  inform  the  seamen’s  employment
      office concerned and next of kin of the  seafarer  of  each  death  or
      disability of the seafarer within forty-eight hours of such  death  or
      disability as well as the details of the  insurance  coverage  of  the
      seafarers but in spite of such legal requirements, respondent  nos.  4
      and 5 have not disclosed the details of the insurance coverage to  the
      seafarers.   They  submitted  that  respondent  nos.  4  and   5   are
      responsible for providing adequate  insurance  coverage  as  they  had
      assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship as  Managers  and
      were  actually  the  ship  owners  and  were  thus  liable   for   the
      compensation  payable  to  the  petitioners.   They  argued  that  the
      insurance amounts of 40,000 US Dollars for each of  the  officers  and
      25,000 US Dollars for each of the non-officers deposited by respondent
      nos. 4 and 5 in this Court  are  not  adequate  and  the  compensation
      amounts should have  been  much  higher  as  indicated  in  the  Model
      Collective Bargaining Agreements for Indian seafarers filed along with
      the letter dated 02.11.2010 of the Government of  India  addressed  to
      the Registrar of this Court annexed to the affidavit filed  on  behalf
      of respondent nos.1, 2 and 3  on  19.07.2011.    They  relied  on  the
      decision of this Court in Lata Wadhwa & Ors. v. State of Bihar &  Ors.
      [(2001) 8 SCC 197] in which this Court, while  exercising  its  powers
      under Article 32 of  the  Constitution,  directed  payment  of  higher
      compensation for each of the claimants on account of deaths in a  fire
      tragedy by Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited.  They also  relied  on
      the recent decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
      Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy & Ors. [AIR 2012 SC  100]  in
      which this Court enhanced the compensation payable to the claimants on
      account of death and injury in a fire tragedy in Uphaar  Cinema  Hall.
      They submitted that similar directions for determination of the higher
      compensation by the Registrar of this Court may be given in this  case
      also.

   9. Learned counsel for the  petitioners  finally  submitted  that  though
      Rules 2005 mandates that insurance coverage  has  to  be  provided  to
      Indian seafarers, it  does  not  mention  the  amount  for  which  the
      insurance coverage is to be done.  According to  the  learned  counsel
      for the petitioners, this lacuna in  law  in  respect  of  quantum  of
      insurance coverage should be filled up by this Court by  invoking  its
      powers under Article 142 of the  Constitution.   In  support  of  this
      submission, they relied on the  judgments  of  this  Court  in  Indian
      Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India & Ors. [(2011) 8 SCC
      161], Union of India v. Association for Democratic  Reforms  and  Anr.
      [(2002) 5 SCC 294], Ashok Kumar Gupta & Anr. v. State of U.P.  &  Ors.
      [(1997) 5 SCC 201] and Vineet Narain & Ors. v. Union of India  &  Anr.
      [(1998) 1 SCC 226].  They submitted that  this  Court  should  declare
      that in case of a  marine  casualty  involving  Indian  citizens,  the
      amount payable in case of death of an officer would be 89,100 plus  US
      Dollars and the amount payable in case of  death  of  a  child  of  an
      officer under 18 years would be  17,820  US  Dollars  and  the  amount
      payable in case of death of a non-officer would be 82,500  US  Dollars
      plus and the amount payable in case of death of  a  child  of  a  non-
      officer under 18 years 16,500 US Dollars.

  10.  Mr. Rajeev Dutta, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos.4  and
      5, submitted that notice in the writ petition was initially limited to
      the question as to whether the Maritime Administration  of  the  State
      (India) was invited to take part in the marine casualty  investigation
      as provided in para 4 of M.S. Notice 26 of 2002, but  subsequently  by
      order dated 24.09.2008 of this Court the scope of the enquiry  in  the
      writ petition has been widened to include the safety of the  seafarers
      and disbursement of compensation to the seafarers on  board  Jupiter-6
      who have lost their lives.   Relying on the counter affidavit filed by
      respondent no.4, he submitted that respondent no.4 came to know  about
      Jupiter-6 going missing  on  08.10.2005  at  about  2100  hrs.  Indian
      Standard Time (Saturday) and immediately thereafter,  respondent  no.4
      informed the Director General of Shipping on 10.10.2005 at about  1100
      hrs. Indian Standard Time (Monday) about the incident, i.e. within the
      stipulated time as per M.S. Notice 26 of 2002.  He argued  that  there
      was, therefore, no delay on the part of respondent no.4 to inform  the
      Government of  India  about  the  incident.   He  submitted  that  the
      seafarers, who were employed and placed on board Jupiter-6, were bound
      by the terms of the employment contract which provided that they  will
      be governed by the law of Flag State and the employment  contract  did
      not stipulate for compensation in case of death or disability nor  was
      the employment contract governed by the provisions of  the  Collective
      Bargaining Agreements.  He submitted that under  Section  338  of  the
      Shipping Act, 2004 of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Flag State
      of Jupiter-6, the limits of liability of  the  ship  owner  have  been
      fixed for claims arising on any distinct occasion and the compensation
      deposited in this Court at the rate of 40,000 US Dollars  in  case  of
      death of officers and 25,000 US Dollars  in  case  of  death  of  non-
      officers is in accordance with the provisions of Section  338  of  the
      Shipping Act, 2004 of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.  He vehemently
      argued that since the aforesaid compensation amount has been deposited
      for disbursement  to  the  legal  heirs  of  the  deceased  seafarers,
      respondent nos.4 and 5 are not liable for any amount  of  compensation
      and this Court should not, therefore, direct for any higher amount  of
      compensation than what has been deposited.

  11.  Mr. H.P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General  for  respondent
      nos.1, 2 and 3, submitted that the Merchant Shipping  Act,  1958  does
      not apply to seamen on board of a  ship  or  a  vessel  of  a  foreign
      country.  He referred to the counter  affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of
      respondent nos.1, 2 and 3 on 03.01.2008 and the annexure  thereto  and
      submitted that the respondent no.4  by  its  letter  dated  10.10.2005
      informed the Director General of Shipping about  the  Jupiter-6  going
      missing and on 19.10.2005, the Surveyor  Incharge-cum-Deputy  Director
      General of Shipping requested Saint  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines  to
      carry out investigation into the casualty  as  Indian  nationals  were
      involved in the casualty.  He referred  to  the  additional  affidavit
      filed on behalf of the Union of India in December 2009  in  which  the
      various measures taken by the Government of India for  the  safety  of
      the seafarers have been detailed.  He submitted that  the  Rules  2005
      make it obligatory for Recruitment and Placement service providers  to
      declare that all seafarers recruited and placed on board by them would
      be  adequately  covered  by  insurance  cover,  but  the  quantum   of
      compensation for which the seafarers are to  be  insured  in  case  of
      injury or death have not been indicated therein and this has  resulted
      in variable amounts of compensation being  paid  to  Indian  seafarers
      working  in  different  shipping   companies,   often   resulting   in
      exploitation of categories  which  are  lesser  in  demand.   He  also
      referred to the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent nos.1, 2 and 3
      on 20. 09.2011 in which a chart has been extracted  to  show  how  the
      Government of  India  proposes  to  improve  the  welfare  and  safety
      measures relating to seafarers over what existed in 2006.  He  finally
      submitted that so far as respondent no.4 is concerned its  application
      for registration as Recruitment and Placement  service  providers  has
      been rejected by the speaking order dated 16.06.2008 of the  Director,
      Seamen’s Employment Office, Department of  Shipping,  for  default  in
      paying compensation to the crew of  a  vessel  other  than  Jupiter-6,
      namely, M.V. RAZZAK, which also went missing.

  12.   We have considered  the  submissions  of  learned  counsel  for  the
      parties and we find that in P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank  of  India
      [AIR 1952 SC 59] a Constitution Bench of  this  Court  has  held  that
      right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of  the
      Constitution is only available against the State and that  Article  21
      was not intended to afford protection to  life  and  personal  liberty
      against violation by private individuals.  Hence,  the  main  question
      that we have to really decide in this case is  whether  the  Union  of
      India (not  respondent  no.4  nor  respondent  no.5)  was  liable  for
      violation of the right to life guaranteed  under  Article  21  of  the
      Constitution and was liable for any compensation  to  the  petitioners
      for not causing a marine casualty investigation  when  Jupiter-6  went
      missing in the high seas.  Jupiter-6 was carrying the  flag  of  Saint
      Vincent and the Grenadines, although it had on its board  some  Indian
      seafarers.  The Director General of Shipping has issued M.S. Notice 26
      of 2002, which lays down the procedure with regard to marine  casualty
      investigation involving Indian citizens on board foreign flag vessels.
       M.S. Notice 26 of 2002 states that  India  is  a  major  supplier  of
      manpower to global shipping  and  in  the  recent  past  it  has  been
      observed with concern that many of the  accidents/  incidents  at  sea
      involving Indian citizens on board foreign flag vessels have not  been
      reported to the Indian Maritime Administration.  It also  states  that
      the Code for Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents had been
      adopted on 27.11.1997 by the IMO Assembly in its 20th Session and  the
      code provides for  casualty  investigation  with  the  involvement  of
      different interested States.  It has been further clarified in para  2
      of M.S. Notice 26 of 2002 that this Code applies to either one or more
      interested States that are substantially interested in marine casualty
      and the substantially  interested  States  includes  the  State  whose
      nationals have lost their lives or  received  serious  injuries  as  a
      result of the marine casualty.  It is  provided  in  para  2  of  M.S.
      Notice 26 of 2002 that the onus of conducting the  investigation  into
      the marine casualty lies with the flag  State  or  the  coastal  State
      within whose territorial sea the casualty has  occurred.   Para  4  of
      M.S. Notice 26 of 2002,  however,  states  that  for  the  purpose  of
      effective casualty investigation, it is imperative that  the  Maritime
      Administration of the State,  whose  nationals  are  involved  in  the
      marine casualty, by virtue of being ship’s crew,  is  required  to  be
      invited to take part  in  the  marine  casualty  investigation,  as  a
      substantially  interested  State,  by   the   State   conducting   the
      investigation.  It is also stated in para 4 of M.S. Notice 26 of  2002
      that our Maritime Administration should be proactively involved in the
      investigation and should take part in it as a substantially interested
      State in  order  to  facilitate  effective  investigation  and  proper
      analysis of all marine casualties involving Indian nationals  and  for
      correctly identifying the causes of said casualties.

  13.    In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent  nos.  1,  2
      and 3 on 03.01.2008, it is stated that on receipt of the letter  dated
      10.10.2005 from respondent no.4, Surveyor Incharge-cum-Deputy Director
      General of Shipping by letter dated 19.10.2005 requested Saint Vincent
      and the Grenadines to carry out the investigation  into  the  casualty
      and submit the investigation report along with  the  findings  of  the
      casualty as that would alleviate the sufferings of the families of the
      Indian crew members.  It is further stated in  the  aforesaid  counter
      affidavit  of  respondent  nos.  1,  2  and  3   that   the   maritime
      investigation branch, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines sent  a  report
      of the investigation which was carried out in September 2005,  but  in
      this report it  is  stated  that  no  definite  conclusion   could  be
      ascertained about the events but there  could  be  following  possible
      scenarios:


      “1.   The crew was trying to reconnect the tow again under  conditions
           of significant swell, the tug capsized and sunk.


           Released  EPIRB  signal  33  days   after   m.v.   “JUPITER   6”
           disappearance cannot be connected with this scenario.


      2.    Piracy/hijacking
           Piracy/hijacking is not common in this area.


           Suspicion of Piracy/hijacking remains valid as there was 180  MT
           of diesel oil on board the tug.


           For the time being our conclusion about  the  Manager’s  actions
           regarding this accident are as follows:


           The disappearance of  m.v.  “Jupiter  6”  along  with  her  crew
           remains an enigma.”


Thus, respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 became aware of the casualty for the  first
time when  they  received  the  communication  dated  10.10.2005  about  the
incident from respondent no.4 and the Surveyor Incharge-cum-Deputy  Director
General of Shipping by letter dated 19.10.2005 requested Saint  Vincent  and
the Grenadines to carry out the investigation into the  casualty  as  Indian
nationals were part of the  crew  of  Jupiter-6.   On  these  facts,  it  is
difficult for us to hold that the Union of India was guilty of violation  of
the right to life and was liable for compensation to the petitioners.

14.     In Municipal Corporation of  Delhi  v.  Association  of  Victims  of
Uphaar Tragedy  &  Ors.  (supra)  cited  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the
petitioners, the Delhi High Court had held  the  theatre  owner  (licensee),
Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB), Municipal  Corporation  of  Delhi  (MCD)  and  the
licensing authority liable for the fire incident in Uphaar Cinema  Hall  and
severely compensated the victims of the accident, but this Court  held  that
the  MCD  and  the  licensing  authority  could  not  be  held  liable   for
compensation merely because there has been some inaction in  performance  of
the statutory duties or because the  action  taken  by  them  is  ultimately
found to be without authority of law and they would be liable only if  there
was some malice or conscious abuse on  their  part.   This  Court,  however,
held in the aforesaid case that DVB was liable because direct negligence  on
its part had been established and this negligence was a proximate cause  for
the injuries to and death of the victims.  Para 32 of the  opinion  of  R.V.
Raveendran, J., in the aforesaid case is quoted hereinbelow:
      “It is evident from the decision of this Court as also  the  decisions
      of the English and Canadian Courts that it  is  not  proper  to  award
      damages against public authorities merely because there has been  some
      inaction in the performance of their statutory duties or  because  the
      action taken by them is ultimately found to be  without  authority  of
      law. In regard to performance of statutory functions and  duties,  the
      courts will not award damages unless  there  is  malice  or  conscious
      abuse. The cases where damages have been awarded for direct negligence
      on the part of the statutory authority or cases involving doctrine  of
      strict liability  cannot  be  relied  upon  in  this  case  to  fasten
      liability against MCD or the Licensing Authority. The position of  DVB
      is different, as direct negligence on its part was established and  it
      was a proximate cause for the injuries to and death of victims. It can
      be said that insofar as the licensee and DVB are concerned, there  was
      contributory negligence. The position of licensing authority  and  MCD
      is different. They were not the owners  of  the  cinema  theatre.  The
      cause of the fire was not attributable to them  or  anything  done  by
      them. Their actions/omissions were not the  proximate  cause  for  the
      deaths and injuries. The  Licensing  Authority  and  MCD  were  merely
      discharging their statutory functions (that is granting licence in the
      case of licensing authority and submitting  an  inspection  report  or
      issuing a NOC by the MCD). In such circumstances, merely on the ground
      that the Licensing Authority and MCD could have performed their duties
      better or  more  efficiently,  they  cannot  be  made  liable  to  pay
      compensation to the victims of the  tragedy.  There  is  no  close  or
      direct proximity to the acts of the Licensing Authority and MCD on the
      one hand and the fire accident and the death/injuries of the  victims.
      But there was close and direct  proximity  between  the  acts  of  the
      Licensee and DVB on the one  hand  and  the  fire  accident  resultant
      deaths/injuries of victims. In view of the well settled principles  in
      regard to public law liability, in regard to  discharge  of  statutory
      duties by public authorities, which  do  not  involve  mala  fides  or
      abuse, the  High  Court  committed  a  serious  error  in  making  the
      licensing authority and the MCD liable  to  pay  compensation  to  the
      victims jointly and severally with the Licensee and DVB.”

K. S. Radhakrishnan, J, while fully endorsing the reasoning as well  as  the
conclusions reached by R.V.  Raveendran,  J,  was  also  of  the  view  that
Constitutional Courts can, in appropriate  cases  of  serious  violation  of
life and liberty of  individuals,  award  punitive  damages,  but  the  same
generally requires the malicious intent on  the  side  of  the  wrong  doer,
i.e., an intentional doing of some  wrongful  act.   In  the  facts  of  the
present case, as we have noticed, the Surveyor Incharge-cum-Deputy  Director
General  of  Shipping  has  requested  the  flag  State  to  carry  out  the
investigation  into  the  casualty  within  nine  days  of  the  information
received about the casualty and we are not in a position to hold that  there
was any inaction with malicious intent or  conscious  abuse  or  intentional
doing of some wrongful act or negligence on the part of respondent  nos.  1,
2 and/or 3which was the proximate cause of the  disappearance  or  death  of
the Indian seafarers on board Jupiter-6.

15.   In  Lata  Wadhwa  &  Ors.  v.  State  of  Bihar  &  Ors.  (supra)  the
petitioners had filed a writ petition under Article 32 of  the  Constitution
on the ground that right to life under Article 21 of  the  Constitution  had
been violated and had prayed for inter alia a writ of mandamus or any  other
writ or direction in prosecution of the Tata  Iron  and  Steel  Company  and
their agents and servants, for the  alleged  negligence  in  organizing  the
function, held on 03.03.1989 in  Jamshedpur  in  which  fire  accident  took
place and to  direct  that  appropriate  compensation  be  provided  to  the
victims by the State Government as well  as  the  Company.   When  the  writ
petition came up before this Court, the senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
company stated before the Court  that  notwithstanding  several  objections,
which have been raised in the counter affidavit, the company  did  not  wish
to treat the litigation as an adverse one and  left  it  to  the  Court  for
determining  the  monetary  compensation  to  be  paid  after  taking   into
consideration all the  benefits  and  facilities  already  extended  to  the
victims or their family members.  On the aforesaid submission  made  by  the
company, the Court directed the Registry  of  the  Court  to  determine  the
compensation taking into account the enhancement made in the  judgment.   In
the facts of the present case, respondent nos. 4 and  5  have  deposited  in
this Court the  compensation  amount  made  available  by  the  insurers  of
Jupiter-6 and their counsel has not made any  submission  before  the  Court
that they are prepared to pay to the petitioners any  enhanced  compensation
as may be fixed by this Court.  As a matter of fact,  it  appears  from  the
provisions of the Shipping Act, 2004 of Saint  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines
and, in particular,  Sections  332,  333,  334  and  335  thereof  that  the
liability for compensation of any claim  in  respect  of  life  or  personal
injuries is of the ship owners/salvors  or  their  insurers  and  respondent
nos. 4 and 5 are neither the ship owners/salvors nor their insurers.

16.     As far as respondent nos. 4 and 5 are concerned, they are holding  a
recruitment and placement service licence issued under Rule 4 of  the  Rules
2005.  Rule 3(1)(j) provides that the inspecting authority shall  carry  out
an inspection of recruitment and placement service so as to ensure that  the
seamen’s employment office concerned and next of  kin  of  the  seafarer  is
informed of each death or disability of the  seafarer  within  48  hours  of
such death or disability in Form-V.   Rule  6  of  the  Rules  2005  further
provides that where there is an adverse report of the  inspecting  authority
or complaint by a seafarer or otherwise, the Director  General  of  Shipping
can authorize the Director to issue a show cause notice in Form-VII  to  the
recruitment and placement service licence  provider  requiring  it  to  show
cause within a period of thirty days from the date of issue of  such  notice
as to why the licence shall not be suspended or withdrawn and to suspend  or
withdraw the licence  after  considering  the  reply.   In  this  case,  the
licence of respondent no.4 has already been withdrawn by the speaking  order
dated 16.06.2008  of  the  Director  General,  Seamen’s  Employment  Office,
Department of Shipping, for  default  in  paying  compensation  to  crew  of
vessel M.V. RAZZAK.  Hence, even if respondent no.4  has  not  reported  the
casualty to the Director General of Shipping, Mumbai, within a period of  48
hours as stipulated in the Rules 2005 as alleged by the petitioners  in  the
writ petition, no further direction can be given by this Court in this  case
because the licence of respondent no.4 already stands withdrawn.

17.      On the quantum of  compensation,  Rule  4(3)  of  the  Rules  2005,
provides that the application for recruitment and placement service  licence
shall be accompanied by a declaration in Form III and Form III requires  the
application to inter alia make the following declaration:

       “(xi)        I/We shall ensure that all ships on which seafarers are
       recruited and placed are covered adequately by the P & I Insurance.”



All that the aforesaid declaration requires  is  that  all  ships  on  which
seafarers are recruited and placed are covered  adequately  by  the  P  &  I
Insurance.  In the present case, Jupiter-6 was a ship bearing  the  flag  of
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and was also covered by insurance  and  the
insurers have deposited Forty Thousand Dollars  (40,000  Dollars)  for  each
deceased officer seafarer and Twenty Five Thousand Dollars (25,000  Dollars)
for each deceased non-officer seafarer.  40,000  Dollars  is  equivalent  to
Rs.18,14,800/-  and  25,000  Dollars  is  equivalent  to  Rs.11,34,250/-  as
mentioned in the report of Registrar (J).  It is difficult for  us  to  hold
that the aforesaid amount of compensation is not adequate in the absence  of
sufficient materials produced before us to  show  the  age,  income  of  the
seafarers and all other factors which  are  relevant  for  determination  of
compensation in the case of death of seafarers (officers and  non-officers).
 We cannot also direct respondent nos.3 and 4 to  pay  the  compensation  as
per the Collective Bargaining Agreements in the  absence  of  any  materials
placed before the Court to show that the respondent nos. 4 and 5 were  bound
by the Collective Bargaining Agreements.

18.   Regarding the submission of the learned counsel  for  the  petitioners
that this Court should declare law in exercise of its powers  under  Article
142 of the Constitution, we do not think that we should venture to do so  in
this case considering the numerous  factors  which  are  to  be  taken  into
consideration in making the  law  relating  to  maritime  casualty  and  the
compensation payable in  case  of  death  of  Indian  seafarers.   We  have,
however,  taken  note  of  the  additional  affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of
respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 on 19.07.2011 in which the proposal  for  setting
up an Indian Maritime Casualty Investigation Cell and for amending the  2005
Rules have been indicated.  In our  view,  it  will  be  enough  for  us  to
recommend to the respondent no.1 to expedite the proposals which  have  been
under consideration of the Government and to take immediate steps  to  amend
the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 and the Rules 2005 in  a  manner  they  deem
proper to ensure that the life of seafarers employed in different  ships  in
high seas are made more secure and safe and in case of loss of  life,  their
kith and kin are paid adequate amount of compensation.

19.      This writ petition is disposed of with the  aforesaid  observations
and with a direction to  the  Registrar  (J)  to  expedite  the  payment  of
compensation to the legal heirs  of  the  victims  in  accordance  with  the
orders passed in this case as early as  possible,  in  any  case,  within  a
period of four months from today.  We make it clear  that  the  compensation
received by the legal heirs of the Indian seafarers on board Jupiter-6  will
be  without  prejudice  to  their  claim  for  higher  compensation  in  any
appropriate proceedings.
                                                               .……………………….J.


                                            (A. K. Patnaik)



                                                               ………………………..J.

(Swatanter Kumar)
New Delhi,
October 18, 2012.
-----------------------
29


“On that day of the alleged occurrence Krishna deceased was preparing tea and incidentally caught fire. I extinguished the fire, as a result of which I received burn injuries and immediately brought her to General Hospital, Sonepat, and on the advice of the M.O. I was taking her for better treatment to Delhi but unfortunately she died.”


                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 636 of 2009

Devinder @ Kala Ram & Ors.                         …… Appellants

                                   Versus

The State of Haryana                                    ….. Respondent





                               J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.


      This is an appeal by way of special leave under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution of India against the judgment  dated  28.02.2008  of  the  High
Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No.157-SB of 1997.

2.   The facts very briefly are that an FIR was lodged by  Chhotu  Ram  (the
informant) in P.S. Gannaur on 07.08.1992 at  4.45  P.M.   In  the  FIR,  the
informant stated thus: He got his daughter Krishna  married  to  Devinder  @
Kala Ram of village Rajpur  on  19.05.1989.   From  after  a  month  of  the
marriage, Krishna kept coming to the  house  of  the  informant  at  village
Tihar Malik complaining of demands of dowry and harassment  by  the  members
of the family of Devinder.  On  06.08.1992,  Jai  Beer  Singh  informed  the
informant that Krishna was dead.  The  informant  came  straightway  to  the
hospital at Sonepat and found Krishna dead because of  burns.   A  case  was
registered in P.S. Gannaur under Section 304B/341 of the Indian  Penal  Code
(for short ‘the IPC’).  Investigation was  conducted  and  charge-sheet  was
filed against Devinder,  his  mother  Chand  Kaur  and  his  brother’s  wife
Roshni.  The appellants were put on trial in the Court of  learned  Sessions
Judge, Sonepat.  At the trial, amongst other witnesses the informant  Chottu
Ram was examined as PW-2, his wife Smt. Shanti was examined as PW-3 and  his
two sons, namely, Balraj and Jai  Beer,  were  examined  as  PW-4  and  PW-5
respectively.  By the judgment dated 06.02.1997,  the  Sessions  Court  held
all the three appellants guilty of the offences under Sections 498A as  well
as 304B, IPC.  By order dated 08.02.1997, the Sessions Court sentenced  them
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three  years  each  and  to
pay  a  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-  each  and  in  default  to  undergo   rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 498A, IPC,  and  for
ten years rigorous imprisonment  and  a  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-  each  and  in
default to undergo rigorous imprisonment  for  two  years  for  the  offence
under  Section  304B,  IPC,  and  directed  that  the  sentences  shall  run
concurrently.  Aggrieved, the appellants filed Criminal Appeal No.157-SB  of
1997 before the High Court,  but  by  the  impugned  order  the  High  Court
maintained the convictions and sentences under Sections 498A and 304B, IPC.

3. At the hearing  of  this  appeal,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants
   submitted that Dr. B.D. Chaudhary,  the  Medical  Officer  of  the  Civil
   Hospital, who was examined as PW-7, has said in his evidence that Krishna
   was brought to the hospital by her husband Kala Ram and there  was  smell
   of kerosene in the body of Krishna when she was brought to the  hospital.
   He also referred to Ext. DD, which is the bed-head ticket  pertaining  to
   Krishna in the hospital in which PW-7 has endorsed that the  patient  had
   told him that she has sustained the burns while cooking meals on a stove.
    He submitted that Devinder has stated in his statement under Section 313
   of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) that on
   the day of the alleged occurrence  Krishna  caught  fire  while  she  was
   preparing tea and he extinguished the fire and as a  result  he  received
   burn injuries and  he  immediately  brought  her  to  the  hospital.   He
   submitted that this is, therefore, a case of the deceased  getting  burnt
   by kerosene from a stove and the appellant no.1 had rushed  the  deceased
   to the hospital with a view to save her and this is  not  a  case  of  an
   offence under Section 304B, IPC.

4. Learned counsel for the appellants next submitted that PW-1, PW-2,  PW-3,
   PW-4 and PW-5 are all near relatives of the deceased and  are  interested
   witnesses and their evidence on the demands of dowry and  harassment  and
   cruelty to the deceased ought not to have been believed by  the  Sessions
   Court and  the  High  Court.   He  argued  that  the  evidence  of  these
   interested witnesses moreover  are  only  bald  statements  and  are  not
   supported by any material.  He submitted  that  in  the  absence  of  any
   material produced to show that the deceased  was  subjected  to  electric
   shock, the Trial Court and the High Court could not have  held  that  the
   prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that  the  appellants  had
   subjected the deceased to cruelty soon before her death.   He  relied  on
   the decision of this Court in Durga Prasad & Anr. v. State of M.P.  [2010
   CRL. L. J. 3419] in which it has been held  that  cruelty  or  harassment
   soon before death must be proved not just  by  bald  statements,  but  by
   concrete evidence to  establish  the  offences  under  Section  304B  and
   Section 498A, IPC.    He submitted that although  the  prosecution  cited
   Umed Singh, Tara Chand, Randhir Singh and Dariya Singh as  its  witnesses
   in the charge-sheet, these witnesses have not been examined in Court and,
   thus, an adverse inference should not be drawn by the Court  against  the
   prosecution.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants finally submitted that  the  appellant
   no.3, Roshni, was the wife of the  brother  of  Devinder,  namely,  Attar
   Singh, and the case of the defence before the  Sessions  Court  was  that
   Roshni lived separately with her husband Attar Singh  in  another  house.
   He submitted that PW-8, the Investigating Officer, has  admitted  in  his
   evidence that he had come to know that Roshni had been living  separately
   with her husband in another house.  He argued that there  was  absolutely
   no evidence before the Court that Roshni, appellant no.3, was  living  in
   the family house of the appellant nos. 1 and 2 and she has  been  falsely
   implicated as an accused in this case.

6. In reply, learned counsel for the State submitted  that  the  High  Court
   has held in the impugned judgment that PW-7 before making any endorsement
   was required to certify that Krishna was fit  and  conscious  to  make  a
   statement, but PW-7, while making the endorsement in  Ext.  DD  that  the
   patient herself told her that she sustained burn injuries  while  cooking
   meals on a stove, has not given this certificate.  He submitted that  the
   High Court has, therefore, held that the endorsement was wrongly made  so
   as to ensure that the truth did not come to the  surface.   He  submitted
   that the High Court has further taken note of the scaled map (Ext. PC) of
   the place where Krishna was preparing tea on the stove which has an  open
   courtyard and had she caught fire while preparing tea on the stove in the
   open courtyard, she would have certainly run for safety and the flames of
   the fire would not have engulfed her to such an extent as  to  cause  95%
   burns.  He vehemently argued that Section 113B  of  the  Indian  Evidence
   Act, 1872 is clear that when the question as  to  whether  a  person  has
   committed dowry death of a woman and it is shown  that  soon  before  her
   death such woman  has  been  subjected  by  such  person  to  cruelty  or
   harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for  dowry,  the  Court
   shall presume that such person had caused the  dowry  death.   He  argued
   that in this case, as there was sufficient evidence  brought  before  the
   Court through PW-2 and PW-3 that Krishna was being subjected  to  cruelty
   or harassment for and in connection with demand for  dowry,  there  is  a
   presumption of dowry death caused by the appellants and this  presumption
   has not been rebutted by the appellants.  He  submitted  that  the  Trial
   Court and the High Court are, therefore, right in holding the  appellants
   guilty of the offences under Section 498A as well as Section  304B,  IPC.



7. The first question that we have to decide is whether the Trial Court  and
   the High Court are right in convicting the appellants under Section  498A
   of IPC.  We have gone through the evidence of PW-2, PW-3, PW-4  and  PW-5
   and we find that the evidence therein fully support the  finding  of  the
   High Court that from a few  days  after  marriage  till  her  death,  the
   deceased was subjected to harassment in connection  with  the  demand  of
   dowry by all the three appellants.  We find from the evidence of PW-2, PW-
   3, PW-4 and PW-5 that the deceased was subjected  to  harassment  by  the
   appellants in connection with demands of TV, sofa  set,  electric  press,
   sewing machine, tables and chairs, utensils and cash of  Rs.20,000/-  for
   recruitment of Devinder and Rs.15,000/- for construction  of  house.   In
   the lengthy cross-examinations  of  PW-2,  PW-3,  PW-4  and  PW-5,  their
   evidence with regard to such demands of dowry and harassment has not been
   shaken.  Moreover, in this case, there is evidence to show  that  Roshni,
   the appellant No.3, also caused harassment to the deceased in  connection
   with demand of dowry.  Therefore, the fact that she was living separately
   with her husband even if true, does not  make  her  not  liable  for  the
   offence under Section 498-A, IPC.  Hence, the Sessions Court and the High
   Court, in our considered opinion, have rightly held the appellants guilty
   of the offence under Section 498A, IPC.

8. The second question that we have to decide is whether the Sessions  Court
   and the High Court were right in holding the  appellants  guilty  of  the
   offence under Section 304B, IPC.  Section 304B of  the  IPC  and  Section
   113B of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 are to  be  read  together  and  are
   quoted hereinbelow:

       “304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by  any
       burns or  bodily  injury  or  occurs  otherwise  than  under  normal
       circumstances within seven years of her marriage  and  it  is  shown
       that  soon  before  her  death  she  was  subjected  to  cruelty  or
       harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or  in
       connection with, any demand for dowry, such death  shall  be  called
       “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to  have
       caused her death.


       Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have
       the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,  1961
       (28 of 1961).


       (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with  imprisonment
       for a term which shall not be less than seven years  but  which  may
       extent to imprisonment for life.”




       “113B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a
       person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that
       soon before her death such woman has been subjected by  such  person
       to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand  for
       dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry
       death.


       Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry  death”  shall
       have the same meaning as in section 304B of the  Indian  Penal  Code
       (45 of 1860).”


9. On a plain reading of Section 304B of the IPC, it  is  clear  that  where
   the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury within seven
   years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she  was
   subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of  her
   husband for, or in connection with, any demand for  dowry,  such  husband
   shall be deemed to have caused dowry death.  Thus, where death of a woman
   has been caused by burns as in the present case, the prosecution  has  to
   show: (i) that such death has taken  place  within  seven  years  of  her
   marriage and (ii) that soon before her death she has  been  subjected  to
   cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband  for,
   or in connection with, any demand for dowry.  Once these  two  facts  are
   established by the prosecution, the husband  or  the  relative  shall  be
   “deemed” to have caused the dowry death of the woman.  The word  “deemed”
   in Section 304B, IPC, however,  does  not  create  a  legal  fiction  but
   creates a presumption that the husband or relative  of  the  husband  has
   caused dowry death.

10.    Section 113B of the Indian Evidence  Act,  1872  also  provides  that
   once it is shown that soon before her death a woman has been subjected by
   such person to cruelty or harassment for,  or  in  connection  with,  any
   demand for dowry, the Court “shall presume” that such person  had  caused
   the dowry death.  The expression “shall  presume”  has  been  defined  in
   Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, relevant  part  of  which  is
   extracted hereinbelow:




      “’Shall presume’.—Whenever it is directed by this Act that  the  Court
      shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless  and
      until it is disproved.”


Thus, Section 113B read with Section 4 of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872
would mean that unless and until it is proved  otherwise,  the  Court  shall
hold that a person has caused dowry death of a woman if  it  is  established
before the Court that soon before her death such woman  has  been  subjected
by such person to cruelty or harassment for,  or  in  connection  with,  any
demand for dowry.

11.   Section 3 of the Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872  states  that  unless  a
contrary intention appears from the  context,  the  word  “disproved”  would
mean a fact is said to be disproved  when,  after  considering  the  matters
before it, the Court either believes that it does not  exist,  or  considers
its  non-existence  so  probable  that  a  prudent  man  ought,  under   the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the  supposition  that  it
does not exit.  Thus, if after considering the matters before it, the  Court
believes that the husband or the relative of  the  husband  has  not  caused
dowry death, the Court cannot convict  such  person  or  husband  for  dowry
death under Section 304B of the IPC.  Section 304B, IPC,  and  Section  113B
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in other  words,  only  provide  what  the
Court shall presume if the ingredients of the provisions are satisfied,  but
if the evidence in any case is such that the  presumptions  stand  rebutted,
the Court cannot hold that the accused was guilty  and  was  punishable  for
dowry death.

12.  In the facts of the present  case,  we  find  that  PW-7,  the  Medical
Officer of the  Civil  Hospital,  examined  the  case  of  the  deceased  on
06.08.1992 at 6.30 A.M. and he has clearly stated in his  evidence  that  on
examination she was conscious and that there were superficial to deep  burns
all over the body except some areas on feet, face  and  perineum  and  there
was smell of kerosene on her body.  He also stated in his evidence that  the
deceased was brought to the hospital by  her  husband  Kala  Ram  (appellant
no.1).  He has proved the bed-head ticket pertaining to the deceased in  the
hospital (Ext. DD) as well as his endorsement at Point ‘A’ on Ext. DD,  from
which it is clear  that  he  was  told  by  the  patient  herself  that  she
sustained burns while cooking meals on  a  stove.   This  statement  of  the
deceased recorded by  PWs  is  relevant  under  Section  32  of  the  Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that statements,  written  or  verbal,  of
relevant facts made by a person who is dead, are themselves  relevant  facts
when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death,  or  as
to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his  death,
in cases in which the cause of that  person’s  death  comes  into  question.
Moreover, the appellant no.1 in his statement under  Section  313,  Cr.P.C.,
has stated:

       “On  that  day  of  the  alleged  occurrence  Krishna  deceased  was
       preparing tea and incidentally  caught  fire.   I  extinguished  the
       fire, as a result of which I received burn injuries and  immediately
       brought her to General Hospital, Sonepat, and on the advice  of  the
       M.O.  I  was  taking  her  for  better  treatment   to   Delhi   but
       unfortunately she died.”




 13.    The evidence of PW-7 and the endorsement marked ‘A’ in Ext. DD  are
 evidence produced by the prosecution before the Court  and  such  evidence
 produced by the prosecution before the Court supports the  explanation  of
 the appellant no.1 in his statement under section 313, Cr.P.C.,  that  the
 deceased caught fire while she  was  preparing  tea  on  the  stove.   The
 presumption in Section 304B of the IPC and  Section  113B  of  the  Indian
 Evidence Act, 1872 that they had caused dowry death of the deceased, thus,
 stood rebutted by the evidence in this case.  We find that the High  Court
 has disbelieved the evidence of PW-7 and the  endorsement  marked  ‘A’  in
 Ext. DD merely on suspicion and has ignored the relevant provisions of the
 Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which we have discussed.


 14.       In the result, we allow this  appeal  in  part,  set  aside  the
 conviction and sentences for the offence  under  Section  304B,  IPC,  and
 sustain the  conviction  and  sentences  under  Section  498A,  IPC.   The
 appellant no.2 is already on bail.  If appellant nos.1 and 3 have  already
 undergone the sentence under Section 498A, IPC,  they  shall  be  released
 forthwith.


                                                               .……………………….J.
                                                                  (A. K.
Patnaik)


                                                               ………………………..J.

(Swatanter Kumar)
New Delhi,
October 18, 2012.


-----------------------
14


whether it was a fit case to send the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima facie case against them regarding the allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. when the brother and unmarried sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them, inter-alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as also on the ground that no case was made out against them under Sections 498A,/323/504/506 including Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the legal duty of the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie material against the appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial, besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in physical and mental torture of the complainant-respondent No.2 without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant’s husband, we are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings in so far as these appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The appeal accordingly is allowed.


                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.    1674          OF 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10547/2010)



    Geeta Mehrotra & Anr.                         ..Appellants


                                   Versus


    State of U.P. & Anr.                              . Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T


    GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.


    1.           This appeal by special leave in which we granted leave has
    been filed by the appellants against  the order dated  6.9.2010  passed
    by the High Court of Judicature at  Allahabad   in  Crl.  Miscellaneous
    Application No.22714/2007 whereby the High Court  had been  pleased  to
    dispose of the application moved by the appellants  under  Section  482
    Cr.P.C. for quashing the order  of  the  Magistrate  taking  cognizance
    against the appellants under Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC   read  with
    Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act with an observation  that  the
    question of territorial jurisdiction cannot be properly decided by  the
    High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for want of  adequate  facts.   It
    was, therefore, left open to the  appellants to move  the  trial  court
    for dropping the  proceedings on the ground  of   lack  of  territorial
    jurisdiction.   The High Court however granted  interim  protection  to
    the appellants by directing the  authorities  not  to   issue  coercive
    process against the appellants until disposal of the application  filed
    by the  appellants with a further direction  to  the  trial  court   to
    dispose  of the  application if  moved  by  the  appellants,  within  a
    period of two months from the date  of  moving  the  application.   The
    application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was thus disposed of  by the High
    Court.
    2.           The appellants in spite of the liberty granted to them  to
    move  the  trial  court,  have  filed  this  appeal  for  quashing  the
    proceedings which had been initiated on the basis of a case  lodged  by
    the respondent No.2 Smt.  Shipra  Mehrotra  (earlier  known  as  Shipra
    Seth) against her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law
    and sister-in-law.  This appeal has been preferred  by  the  sister-in-
    law, who is appellant No.1 and brother-in-law of the  complainant,  who
    is appellant No.2.
    3.           The case emerges  out  of  the  first  information  report
    lodged by respondent  No.2  Smt.  Shipra Mehrotra       under  Sections
    498A/323/504/506 IPC  read with Section 3/4 of  the  Dowry  Prohibition
    Act bearing  F.I.R.No. 52/2004.  The F.I.R. was  registered  at  Mahila
    Thana Daraganj, Allahabad wherein the complainant alleged that she  was
    married to Shyamji Mehrotra s/o Balbir  Saran   who was living  at Eros
    Garden, Charmswood Village, Faridabad, Suraj  Kund  Road  at  Faridabad
    Haryana as per  the  Hindu  marriage   rites  and  customs.   Prior  to
    marriage the complainant and her family members were  told  by  Shyamji
    Mehrotra and his elder brother Ramji Mehrotra   who is  appellant  No.2
    herein and their mother Smt.  Kamla  Mehrotra  and  her  sister   Geeta
    Mehrotra who is appellant No.1 herein that Shyamji is  employed   as  a
    Team Leader in a top I.T. Company in Chennai and is getting  salary  of
    Rs.45,000/- per month.  After negotiation between the parents  of   the
    complainant  and the accused parties, the marriage of  the  complainant
    Shipra Seth (later Shipra Mehrotra)  and Shyamji Mehrotra was performed
    after which the respondent-complainant left for the house  of  her  in-
    laws.
    4.           It was  stated  that  the  atmosphere  in  the  house  was
    peaceful for  sometime  but  soon  after  the  wedding,  when  all  the
    relatives left, the maid who cooked meals was first of all paid-off  by
    the aforesaid four persons who then told the complainant that from  now
    onwards, the complainant will have to prepare food for the family.   In
    addition, the above mentioned people started taunting and scolding  her
    on trivial issues.  The complainant also came to know that Shyamji  was
    not  employed  anywhere  and  always  stayed  in  the  house.   Shyamji
    gradually took away all the money which the complainant  had  with  her
    and then told her  that  her  father  had  not  given  dowry  properly,
    therefore, she should get Rupees five lakhs from her father in order to
    enable him to start business, because  he  was  not  getting  any  job.
    When the complainant clearly declined and stated that she will not  ask
    her parents for money, Shyamji, on instigation of other  accused-family
    members, started beating her occasionally.  To escape every day torture
    and financial status of the family, the complainant took up a job in  a
    Call Centre at Convergys on 17.2.2003 where the complainant had  to  do
    night shifts due to which she used to come back home at around  3  a.m.
    in the morning.  Just on her return from  work,  the  household  people
    started playing bhajan cassettes after which she had to  getup  at  7’o
    clock in the morning to prepare and serve food to all  the  members  in
    the family.  Often on falling asleep in  the  morning,  Shyamji,  Kamla
    Devi and Geeta Mehrotra tortured the complainant every day mentally and
    physically.   Ramji Mehrotra often  provoked  the  other  three  family
    members to torture and often used to make the complainant feel  sad  by
    making inappropriate statements about the complainant and her  parents.
    Her husband Shyamji also took away the salary from the complainant.
    5.           After persistent efforts, Shyamji finally  got  a  job  in
    Chennai and he went to Chennai for the job in May, 2003.   But,  it  is
    alleged that there was no change in his behaviour even after  going  to
    Chennai.  The complainant often called him on phone to talk to him  but
    he always did irrelevant conversation.  He never  spoke  properly  with
    the complainant whenever he visited home and often used to hurl  filthy
    abuses.  The complainant states that she often wept and  tolerated  the
    tortures of the accused persons for a long time but did not complain to
    her family members, as that would have made them feel  sad.   At  last,
    when the complainant realized that even her life was in danger, she was
    compelled to tell everything to her father on phone who was very  upset
    on hearing her woes.  On 15.7.2003 complainant heard some  conversation
    of her mother-in-law and sister-in-law from which it  appeared  to  her
    that they want to kill the complainant in the  night  only.   Thereupon
    the complainant apprised her father of the situation on phone to  which
    her father replied that he will call back  her  father-in-law  and  she
    should go with him immediately and he will come in  the  morning.   The
    father-in-law Satish Dhawan and his  wife  who  were  living  in  NOIDA
    thereafter came in the night and somehow took the complainant to  their
    home who also came to know of everything.  The complainant’s father and
    brother later went to her matrimonial home on 16.7.2003.  On seeing her
    father and brother, Kamla Mehrotra and Geeta Mehrotra started  speaking
    loudly and started saying that Shyamji would be coming by  the  evening
    and so he should come in the evening for talking to them.   Her  father
    and brother then went away from there.   That  very  day,  her  husband
    Shyamji and brother-in-law Ramji also reached home.  On reaching there,
    Shyamji abused her on phone and told her to send her father.
    6.           When father and brother of the complainant  went  home  in
    the evening, they were also insulted by all the four and  video  camera
    and tape were played and in the end they were  told  that  they  should
    leave from here.  Insulted, they came back from  there  and  then  came
    back to Allahabad with the complainant.  For many days the  complainant
    and her family members hoped that the situation would  improve  if  the
    matter was resolved.  Many times other people tried to persuade the  in
    – laws but to no avail.  Her brother went to their house to talk to her
    in – laws but it came to his knowledge that the in – laws  had  changed
    their house.  After much effort, they came to know that the  father-in-
    law and mother-in-law started living at B-39, Brahma cooperative  group
    housing  society,  block  7,  sector-7,  Dwarka,  Delhi.   On  19.09.04
    evening, her  father  talked  to  Kamla  Mehrotra  and  Geeta  Mehrotra
    regarding the complainant using bad words and it was said that  if  her
    daughter came there she will be kicked out.  After  some  time  Shyamji
    rang up at complainant’s home but on hearing the  complainant’s  voice,
    he told her abusively that now she should not  come  his  way  and  she
    should tell her father not to phone him in  future.   At  approximately
    10:30 pm in the night Ramji’s phone came to the complainant’s home.  He
    used bad words while talking to her father and in the end said that  he
    had got papers prepared in his defence and he may do whatever he  could
    but if he could afford to give Rs.10 lakhs then it should  be  conveyed
    after which he will reconsider the matter.  If the girl was sent to his
    place without money, then even her dead body will not be found.
    7.           On hearing these talks of  the  accused,  the  complainant
    believed that her in-laws will not let the complainant enter their home
    without taking ten lakhs and if the complainant went there on her  own,
    she will not be safe.  Hence, she lodged the report wherein she  prayed
    that the SHO Daraganj  should  be  ordered  to  do  the  needful  after
    registering  the  case  against  the  accused  Shyam  Mehrotra,   Ramji
    Mehrotra, Kamla Mehrotra and Geeta Mehrotra.   Thus, in substance,  the
    complainant related the bickering at her matrimonial  home  which  made
    her life miserable in several ways and compelled her to leave  her  in-
    law’s place in order to live with her father where she lodged a  police
    case as stated hereinbefore.
    8.            On  the  basis  of  the  complaint,   the   investigating
    authorities at P.S. Daraganj, Allahabad started  investigation  of  the
    case and  thereafter  the  police  submitted  chargesheet  against  the
    appellants and other family members of the complainant’s husband.
    9.           Hence, the appellants who are sister and  brother  of  the
    complainant’s husband filed petition  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  for
    quashing  of the chargesheet and the entire proceedings pending in  the
    court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Court  No.IV,  Allahabad,  inter-
    alia,  on the ground that FIR has been lodged with mala fide intentions
    to harass the appellants and that  no case was  made  out  against  the
    appellants as well as other family members.  But the  principal  ground
    of challenge to the  FIR was that the incident although was alleged  to
    have taken place at Faridabad and the investigation  should  have  been
    done there only, the complainant with mala fide intention in connivance
     with the father  of the complainant, got the   investigating   officer
    to record the statements by visiting  Ghaziabad which  was  beyond  his
    territorial jurisdiction   and cannot be construed  as legal and proper
    investigation.   It  was   also  alleged   that  the  father   of   the
    complainant got the  arrest warrant issued through  George Town  Police
    Station, Allahabad, in spite of the cause of  action  having arisen  at
    Allahabad.
    10.          This appeal has been preferred by  Kumari  Geeta  Mehrotra
    i.e. the sister of the complainant’s husband  and Ramji  Mehrotra  i.e.
    the elder brother of the complainant’s husband assailing the order   of
    the High Court and it was submitted that the Hon’ble High Court   ought
    to have appreciated that the complainant who had already   obtained  an
    ex-parte decree of divorce,  is pursuing  the present case through  her
    father with the sole purpose to  unnecessarily  harass  the  appellants
    to extract money from them as all efforts of mediation had failed.
    11.          However, the grounds of challenge before  this   Court  to
    the order of the High Court, inter alia is that  the  High  Court   had
    failed to appreciate that  the  investigation  had  been  done  by  the
    authority without following  due  process  of  law  which  also  lacked
    territorial jurisdiction.  The  relevant  documents/parcha  diary   for
    deciding the territorial jurisdiction  had been overlooked as  the  FIR
    has been lodged at Allahabad although  the  cause  of  action   of  the
    entire incident is alleged to have taken place at Faridabad  (Haryana).
    It was, therefore, submitted that the investigating authorities of  the
    Allahabad have  traversed  beyond  the  territorial   limits  which  is
    clearly an abuse of the process of law and the High Court has failed to
    exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the facts and
    circumstances of this case and allowed the proceedings to  go on before
    the trial court although it  had  no  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  the
    same.
    12.          It was further  averred  that the High Court   had  failed
    to examine the  facts of the FIR to see whether the facts stated in the
    FIR constitute any prima facie case  making out an offence  against the
    sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the complainant and  whether  there
    was  at  all  any  material  to  constitute   an  offence  against  the
    appellants and their family  members.   Attention  of  this  Court  was
    further  invited  to  the  contradictions  in  the  statement   of  the
    complainant and  her  father  which  indicate  material  contradictions
    indicating that the complainant and her father have concocted the story
    to implicate the appellants as well as all their family  members  in  a
    criminal case merely with a mala fide intention to  settle  her  scores
    and extract money from  the family  of her ex-husband Shyamji  Mehrotra
    and his family members.
    13.          On a perusal of  the  complaint  and  other  materials  on
    record as also analysis of the arguments  advanced  by  the  contesting
    parties in the light of the settled principles of law  reflected  in  a
    catena of decisions, it is  apparent  that  the  High  Court   has  not
    applied its mind on the question  as to whether the case was fit to  be
    quashed against the appellants and  has merely disposed of the petition
    granting liberty to the appellants  to move  the trial court  and raise
    contentions  on  the  ground   as  to  whether   it   has   territorial
    jurisdiction to continue with the trial in the light  of  the  averment
    that no part of the cause of action had arisen  at  Allahabad  and  the
    entire incident even as per the FIR  had taken place at Faridabad.
    14.          The High Court further overlooked the fact that during the
    pendency of this  case, the complainant-respondent  No.2  has  obtained
    an ex-parte decree of divorce against her husband Shyamji Mehrotra  and
    the High Court  failed to apply its mind whether  any  case   could  be
    held to  have been made out against  Kumari Geeta  Mehrotra  and  Ramji
    Mehrotra, who are  the  unmarried  sister  and  elder  brother  of  the
    complainant’s ex-husband.   Facts of the FIR even as it stands indicate
    that although a prima facie case against the husband  Shyamji  Mehrotra
    and some other accused persons may or may not be constituted, it surely
    appears  to be a case where no ingredients making out  a  case  against
    the unmarried sister of the accused Shyamji Mehrotra  and  his  brother
    Ramji Mehrotra  appear to be existing for  even  when  the  complainant
    came to her in-law’s house after her wedding, she has alleged  physical
    and mental  torture by stating in general that she had been  ordered to
    do household activities of cooking meals for  the  whole  family.   But
    there appears to be no  specific  allegation  against  the  sister  and
    brother of the complainant’s husband as to how they could be implicated
    into the mutual bickering  between  the  complainant  and  her  husband
    Shyamji Mehrotra including his parents.
    15.          Under the facts and circumstance of similar nature in  the
    case  of  Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu  reported in (2005) SCC (Crl.)
    735 at 738 allegations were made in a complaint  against  the  husband,
    the in-laws, husband’s brother and sister who were all the  petitioners
    before the High Court wherein after registration  of   the  F.I.R.  and
    investigation, the charge sheet  was filed by the Inspector  of  Police
    in the court  of  Judicial  Magistrate  III,  Trichy.   Thereupon,  the
    learned magistrate  took cognizance  of the offence and issued warrants
    against the appellants on 13.2.2002.  Four  of  the  accused-appellants
    were arrested and released on bail by the magistrate  at  Mumbai.   The
    appellants had filed petition  under Section 482,  Cr.P.C.  before  the
    Madras High Court   for quashing the proceedings in complaint  case  on
    the  file of the Judicial Magistrate III, Trichy.  The High  Court   by
    the impugned order dismissed the petition observing  that  the  grounds
    raised by the petitioners  were all  subject matters to  be  heard   by
    the trial court for better appreciation after conducting  full trial as
    the High Court was of the view  that it was only desirable  to  dismiss
    the criminal  original  petition  and  the  same  was  also  dismissed.
    However, the High Court had directed the Magistrate  to  dispense  with
    the personal attendance   of the appellants.
    16.           Aggrieved  by  the   order  of  the  Madras  High   Court
    dismissing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,  the  special  leave
    petition was filed in this Court  giving rise to  the  appeals  therein
    where threefold contentions were raised viz., (i) that the  allegations
    are frivolous  and without any basis; (ii)  even according to the  FIR,
    no incriminating  acts were done within  the jurisdiction  of    Trichy
    Police Station and the court at Trichy   and,  therefore,  the  learned
    magistrate lacked territorial jurisdiction  to take cognizance  of  the
    offence and (iii)  taking cognizance of the  alleged  offence  at  that
    stage was barred under Section 468(1) Cr.P.C.  as  it  was  beyond  the
    period of   limitation prescribed under Section 468(2)  Cr.P.C.   Apart
    from the subsequent  two contentions, it was urged that the allegations
    under the FIR  do not make out  any offence  of which cognizance  could
    be taken.
    17.          Their Lordships of the Supreme Court  in this  matter  had
    been pleased to hold that the bald allegations made against the  sister
    in law by the complainant  appeared  to  suggest  the  anxiety  of  the
    informant to rope in as many  of the husband’s relatives  as  possible.
    It was held that  neither the FIR nor the charge  sheet  furnished  the
    legal basis  for the magistrate to  take  cognizance  of  the  offences
    alleged against the appellants.   The learned  Judges were  pleased  to
    hold that  looking to the allegations in the FIR and  the  contents  of
    the charge sheet,  none of the  alleged offences under Section  498  A,
    406 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were  made  against  the
    married sister of the complainant’s husband who  was  undisputedly  not
    living with the family of the complainant’s husband.   Their  Lordships
    of the Supreme Court  were pleased to hold that the High  Court   ought
    not to have  relegated  the sister in law   to  the  ordeal  of  trial.
    Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellants  were  quashed  and
    the appeal was allowed.
    18.          In so far as  the  plea  of  territorial  jurisdiction  is
    concerned, it is no doubt true  that the High Court  was correct to the
    extent that  the  question  of  territorial  jurisdiction    could   be
    decided by the trial  court itself.   But this ground was just  one  of
    the grounds  to quash the proceedings initiated against the  appellants
    under Section 482 Cr.P.C. wherein it was also  alleged  that  no  prima
    facie  case was made out against  the  appellants  for  initiating  the
    proceedings  under the Dowry Prohibition Act and  other  provisions  of
    the IPC.  The  High Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in so
    far as the consideration of the case of the appellants  are  concerned,
    who are only brother and sister of the complainant’s  husband  and  are
    not alleged even  by the complainant to have demanded dowry  from  her.
    The High Court, therefore, ought to have considered that  even  if  the
    trial court at Allahabad had the jurisdiction to hold  the  trial,  the
    question  still remained as  to whether the trial against  the  brother
    and sister of the husband  was fit to be  continued  and  whether  that
    would amount to abuse of the process of  the court.
    19.          Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of the
    FIR is perused, it is apparent that there are  no  allegations  against
    Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra  except  casual  reference  of
    their names who have been included in the FIR but mere casual reference
    of the names of the family members in  a  matrimonial  dispute  without
    allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking
    cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne  out  of  experience
    that there is a tendency to involve the entire family  members  of  the
    household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute
    specially if it happens soon after the wedding.
    20.          It would  be  relevant at this stage to take  note of   an
    apt observation of this Court recorded in the matter of  G.V.  Rao  vs.
    L.H.V. Prasad & Ors. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693 wherein  also   in  a
    matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that  the  High  Court  should
    have quashed the complaint   arising  out  of   a  matrimonial  dispute
    wherein all  family  members  had  been  roped  into  the   matrimonial
    litigation which was quashed and set aside.  Their  Lordships  observed
    therein with  which we entirely agree that:


           “there has been an outburst of  matrimonial  dispute  in  recent
           times.  Marriage is a sacred  ceremony, main purpose of which is
            to  enable  the young couple to  settle down in life  and  live
           peacefully.   But  little     matrimonial   skirmishes  suddenly
           erupt which  often   assume  serious  proportions  resulting  in
           heinous  crimes  in which elders of the family are also involved
           with the result  that  those  who  could  have   counselled  and
           brought about rapprochement  are  rendered   helpless  on  their
           being  arrayed as accused  in the criminal case.  There are many
           reasons which need not be  mentioned here  for  not  encouraging
           matrimonial litigation so that   the  parties  may  ponder  over
           their defaults  and terminate  the disputes amicably  by  mutual
           agreement  instead of fighting  it out in a court of  law  where
           it takes years and years to  conclude and in  that  process  the
           parties lose  their   “young” days  in chasing  their  cases  in
           different  courts.”


    The view taken by the judges in this matter was that the  courts  would
    not encourage such disputes.
    21.          In yet another case reported in AIR 2003 SC 1386   in  the
    matter of B.S. Joshi & Ors.  vs.  State  of  Haryana  &  Anr.   it  was
    observed that there is no doubt that the object of introducing  Chapter
    XXA containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code   was  to  prevent
    the torture to a woman by her  husband or by  relatives of her husband.
    Section 498A was added  with a  view to  punish the  husband   and  his
    relatives who harass or torture  the wife  to coerce her  relatives  to
    satisfy   unlawful demands  of  dowry.   But  if  the  proceedings  are
    initiated by the wife  under Section 498A against  the husband and  his
    relatives and  subsequently  she has  settled  her  disputes  with  her
    husband  and his relatives and the wife and husband  agreed for  mutual
    divorce, refusal    to exercise inherent   powers  by  the  High  Court
    would not  be proper as it would prevent woman from  settling  earlier.
    Thus for the purpose of securing  the ends of justice  quashing of  FIR
     becomes necessary, Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not  be a   bar   to  the
    exercise of power of quashing.   It  would  however    be  a  different
    matter  depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether
     to exercise or not  to exercise such a power.
    22.          In the instant  matter,  when  the  complainant   and  her
    husband  are divorced  as  the  complainant-wife  secured  an  ex-parte
    decree of divorce, the same could have weighed  with the High Court  to
    consider whether proceeding initiated prior  to the divorce decree  was
    fit to be  pursued in spite of  absence  of  specific   allegations  at
    least against the  brother and sister  of  the  complainant’s   husband
    and whether continuing   with this  proceeding could not have  amounted
    to abuse of the process of the court.  The High Court, however,   seems
    not to have  examined these  aspects  carefully  and  have  thus  side-
    tracked all  these  considerations   merely  on  the  ground  that  the
    territorial  jurisdiction  could be raised only  before the  magistrate
    conducting the trial.
    23.           In  the  instant  case,  the  question   of   territorial
    jurisdiction  was  just  one   of  the  grounds  for    quashing    the
    proceedings along with the other grounds   and,  therefore,   the  High
    Court should have examined  whether the  prosecution case was fit to be
     quashed on other grounds or not.  At this stage,  the  question   also
    crops up whether the matter is fit to be remanded to the High Court  to
    consider  all these aspects.  But in matters arising out of a  criminal
    case, fresh consideration by remanding the same  would  further  result
    into a protracted and vexatious proceeding which  is   unwarranted   as
    was held by this Court  in the case of  Ramesh vs. State of Tamil  Nadu
    (supra)  that such  a  course  of  remand  would  be  unnecessary   and
    inexpedient as there was no need  to  prolong  the  controversy.    The
    facts in this matter on this aspect  was  although  somewhat  different
    since the complainant had lodged the complaint  after seven  years   of
    delay, yet in the instant matter the factual position remains that  the
    complaint as it  stands   lacks ingredients  constituting  the  offence
    under Section 498A and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition  Act  against  the
    appellants who are sister and brother of the complainant’s husband  and
    their involvement  in the whole incident  appears  only  by  way  of  a
    casual inclusion of their names.  Hence, it cannot be  overlooked  that
    it would be total abuse of the process of law if  we  were  to   remand
    the matter to the High Court to  consider whether there were  still any
    material to hold that the trial should proceed against them in spite of
    absence of  prima  facie  material  constituting  the  offence  alleged
    against them.
    24.          However, we deem it appropriate to add by way  of  caution
    that we may not be misunderstood  so as to infer that even if there are
    allegation of overt act indicating the complicity  of  the  members  of
    the family named in the FIR  in  a  given  case,  cognizance  would  be
    unjustified but what we wish to emphasize by highlighting is  that,  if
    the FIR as it stands does  not  disclose  specific  allegation  against
    accused more so against the co-accused specially in  a  matter  arising
    out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal  and
    judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the  FIR  to
    undergo  the  trial  unless  of  course  the  FIR  discloses   specific
    allegations which would  persuade the court  to take cognisance of  the
    offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima
    facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of  the
    complainant-wife.  It is the well settled principle laid down in  cases
    too numerous  to  mention,  that  if  the  FIR  did  not  disclose  the
    commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing  the
    proceedings   preventing   the   abuse   of   the   process   of   law.
    Simultaneously, the  courts are expected to adopt a  cautious  approach
    in matters of  quashing  specially  in  cases  of  matrimonial  dispute
    whether the FIR in fact discloses commission  of  an   offence  by  the
    relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie  discloses  a
    case of over-implication  by  involving   the  entire   family  of  the
    accused at the instance of  the complainant, who is out to  settle  her
    scores arising out of the teething  problem  or  skirmish  of  domestic
    bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.
    25.          In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried sister
    of the principal accused  Shyamji Mehrotra approached  the  High  Court
    for quashing the proceedings against them, inter-alia,   on the  ground
    of lack of territorial jurisdiction   as also on the  ground  that   no
    case  was  made  out  against  them  under  Sections  498A,/323/504/506
    including Sections 3/4 of the  Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the  legal
    duty of the High Court  to examine   whether  there  were  prima  facie
    material against the appellants so  that  they  could  be  directed  to
    undergo the trial, besides the question  of  territorial  jurisdiction.
    The High Court seems to have overlooked  all the pleas that were raised
    and rejected  the  petition  on  the  solitary  ground  of  territorial
    jurisdiction giving liberty to the appellants  to  approach  the  trial
    court.
    26.          The High Court in our considered opinion  appear  to  have
    missed that assuming the trial court  had territorial jurisdiction,  it
    was still left to be decided whether it was a  fit  case  to  send  the
    appellants  for trial when the FIR failed to make  out  a  prima  facie
    case against them regarding the allegation of inflicting  physical  and
    mental   torture   to  the  complainant  demanding   dowry   from   the
    complainant.  Since the High Court  has failed to consider   all  these
    aspects, this Court as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted
    the matter to  the High Court to consider whether a case was  made  out
    against the appellants to proceed against them.  But as the contents of
    the FIR does not disclose specific allegation against the  brother  and
    sister of the complainant’s  husband except casual reference  of  their
    names, it would not be just to direct them  to  go  through  protracted
    procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all  over  again
    by the High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and
    his elder brother to suffer the ordeal   of  a  criminal  case  pending
    against them specially when the FIR does not  disclose  ingredients  of
    offence under  Sections 498A/323/504/506, IPC and Sections 3/4  of  the
    Dowry Prohibition Act.
    27.          We, therefore, deem it just  and  legally  appropriate  to
    quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants  Geeta  Mehrotra
    and Ramji  Mehrotra   as the FIR does not disclose any  material  which
    could be held to  be  constituting   any  offence   against  these  two
    appellants.  Merely by making  a general allegation that they were also
    involved in physical and mental torture of  the  complainant-respondent
    No.2 without  mentioning even a single  incident against them  as  also
    the  fact  as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when  they
    are only  related  as brother and sister of the complainant’s  husband,
    we are pleased to quash and set aside  the criminal proceedings   in so
    far as these appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed
    by the High Court shall stand overruled.   The  appeal  accordingly  is
    allowed.


                                                                ……………………………J
                                                               (T.S. Thakur)




                                                                ……………………………J
                                                          (Gyan Sudha Misra)
    New Delhi,
    October 17, 2012
-----------------------
25