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Saturday, October 13, 2012

As far as payment under the counter BG isCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 20 of 21 concerned, it had to follow the payment made under the APG. The order passed by this Court was not a mandamus issued to Canara Bank. It only restrained Gulf from encashing the BG but the number given was of the counter BG to which Gulf was not a party and therefore it was incapable of being complied with by Gulf. Since the direction was to Gulf, Canara Bank could also not have complied with it.


CCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 1 of 21
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
(Reportable)
CCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008
Reserved on: 7
th
September, 2012
Decision on: 12
th
October, 2012
TECON PROJECTS PVT. LTD. ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Harish Malhotra, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Vikas Sharma,
Advocate.
Versus
SANJAY MEHTA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Y.P. Narula, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Aniruddha Choudhury,
Advocate for Canara Bank.
CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
JUDGMENT
12.10.2012
1. Contempt Petition C.C.P. No. 16 of 2009 has been filed by Tecon Projects
Private Limited (‘Tecon’), the Petitioner in O.M.P. No. 495 of 2008, under
Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 complaining of
wilful breach, disobedience and violation by the Respondents of the order
dated 18
th
September 2008 passed by the Court in O.M.P. No. 495 of 2008.
Background facts
2. The background to the contempt petition is that Tecon specializes in
design, engineering, manufacture, supply, erection and commissioning of
bulk material handling systems. M/s Kolsons International (‘Kolsons’) hadCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 2 of 21
been awarded the work of design, engineering, manufacture, supply erection
and commissioning of material handling system for the Respondent in
O.M.P. No. 495 of 2008 Gulf Sponge Iron Company Limited (‘Gulf’) at
ICAD-1 Mussfah Abu Dhabi, UAE. For this purpose, Kolsons entered into
an agreement dated 29
th
May 2007 with Gulf. The stipulated date of
completion was 30
th
April 2008. Tecon stated that it was approached by
Kolsons immediately thereafter for execution of the said work on its behalf.
In terms of the agreement, the contract could be assigned by Kolsons in
favour of Tecon subject to the approval by Gulf. This was formalized by a
letter dated 30
th
May 2007 awarded to Tecon which was accepted by it on 1
st
June 2007.
3. It is not necessary to set out in detail the dispute that arose between the
parties in relation to the execution of the said work by Tecon. What is
relevant is that Gulf opened a Letter of Credit (‘LC’) dated 22
nd
October
2007 in favour of Tecon for US Dollar (‘USD’) 1,646,800 after 100 days.
Under Clause 4.4 of the agreement entered into between the parties, the LC
was to be received by Tecon within 40 days of the agreement. Since there
was delay in approval of the designs and drawings, meetings were held
between the parties. As a result the time schedules got revised.
4. On 23
rd
February 2008, Tecon furnished a Bank Guarantee (‘BG’) in the
sum of USD 411,700 in favour of Gulf through Tecon’s bankers i.e. Canara
Bank, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi. This was to secure the advance that
was released by Gulf to Tecon which was to be adjusted as and when
payment was made of the bills raised by Tecon for the work done under the
contract. One of the conditions in the BG was that “this guarantee shall standCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 3 of 21
reduced to the extent of advance adjusted against the bill raised on the
buyer.” The disputes between the parties remained unresolved and the
contract could not proceed as scheduled.
Tecon’s case in the Section 9 petition
5. In O.M.P. No. 495 of 2008, filed in this Court under Section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Act’), Tecon stated that even while
it was executing the work “suddenly for no justification” they were informed
by their bankers that by letter dated 30
th
July 2008 Gulf informed HSBC
bank that it had cancelled the contract. However, no formal intimation was
sent to Tecon. According to Tecon, till that date it had raised bills of the
value of USD 460,023.38 on Gulf against which it had received a sum of
USD 50,683.39. Consequently, there was a balance of USD 409,339.99.
Gulf was accordingly informed on 3
rd
September 2008. In addition Tecon
also claimed that it was entitled to USD 500,000 towards its claim against
Gulf. However, Tecon apprehended that Gulf would encash the BG and use
the drawings and designs prepared by Tecon for executing and completing
the contract in violation of the agreement.
6. According to Tecon, Gulf was trying to take undue advantage of its
dominant position by arm twisting Tecon to agree to a mutual cancellation.
Further, Tecon alleged that in view of the fluctuating dollar price Gulf had
become dishonest and it had, therefore, cancelled the contract with Tecon.
In para 31 of O.M.P. No. 495 of 2008 Tecon stated that the advance for
which the BG was furnished was liable to be adjusted against the bill dated
1
st
August 2008 for USD 205,850 raised by it. No payment had been
received from Gulf. Consequently, if USD 409,339.99 due from Gulf wasCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 4 of 21
adjusted against the advance BG then the amount payable thereunder would
stand reduced to USD 2,360. In the circumstances, it was stated that action
of Gulf threatening to invoke the BG was illegal and fraudulent. In paras 34
to 36 of O.M.P. No. 495 of 2008 Tecon repeatedly pleaded that it had
suffered on account of fraud and misrepresentations of Gulf. Tecon’s prayer
in O.M.P. No. 495 of 2008 inter alia read as under:
“restrain the respondent their agents assigns, successors,
executors, employees from encashing the advance bank
guarantee bearing No. 0179FOG0082008 dated 23/2/08
for USD 411700 issued by Canara Bank, Barakhamba
Road, New Delhi and send the intimation to Manager,
Canara Bank, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi to not to
remit any amount to the respondent.”
The order dated 18
th
September 2008
7. On 18
th
September 2008 this Court passed the following order:
“Issue notice to the respondent, upon the petitioner taking
requisite steps through all modes, including electronic
media, returnable on 28
th
November, 2008.
The senior counsel for the petitioner has, at this stage,
prayed for interim relief with respect to the encashment of
the bank guarantee. The bank guarantee has been given in
pursuance to the agreement, as per Clause 5.1 whereof the
bank guarantee was against the advance of 20% paid by
the respondent to the petitioner and to secure the said
advance. It is further provided that the advance bank
guarantee shall stand reduced to the extent of advance
adjusted against the bill raised by the petitioner on the
respondent. It is contended that the petitioner has already
raised bills of USD 460023.38 against the bank guarantee
for a sum of USD 411700 and it is argued that the said
bills have not been disputed or controverted by the
respondent and the respondent has not denied the liability
to pay the said bills. The bank guarantee also,
though providing for payment by the bank without anyCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 5 of 21
demur and merely on the first demand from the
respondent, also provides that the guarantee shall stand
reduced to the extent of advance adjusted against the bills
raised on the respondent. It is, therefore, argued that the
threatened action of the respondent of invoking the bank
guarantee for the entire amount is contrary to the terms
of the bank guarantee itself, since as per its terms the
guarantee was to stand reduced to the extent of the bills
raised and which are stated to have been raised.
Considering that the respondent is a foreign party and in
the event of the petitioner succeeding, irretrievable injury
may be caused to the petitioner and further since the
rights of the respondent can be protected by imposing
the conditions on the petitioner to renew and keep the
bank guarantee alive and to also pay interest to the
respondent for the delay, if any, in release of the amount
under the bank guarantee to the respondent, I deem it
appropriate to grant ad interim ex parte order. The
respondent, till the next date of hearing, is restrained from
encashing the advance bank guarantee
No.0179FOG0082008 dated 23.02.2008 for USD 411700
issued by Canara Bank, Barakhamba Road, New
Delhi. This shall, however, be subject to the petitioner
immediately taking steps for renewal of the extension of
bank guarantee and having the same
so renewed/extended, at least, for a period of three
months from today and to pay interest for delay, if the
stay is vacated and to which the counsel for the petitioner
has agreed.
A copy of this order be given dasti to the petitioner under
signature of court master for communication to the bank.”
The counter Bank Guarantee issued by Canara Bank
8. In the documents enclosed with the petition of Tecon was a copy of the
(counter) BG dated 23
rd
February 2008 issued by Canara Bank. The said
BG was sent to the HSBC Bank, Middle East Limited, Dubai. The relevantCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 6 of 21
portion of the said BG read as under:
“At the request of our customer M/s. Tecon Projects
Private Limited, B159 Sector 63, Noida, District Gautam
Budh Nagar – 201307, UP, India, we request you to issue
your advance payment guarantee for USD 411,700.00
(USD four hundred eleven thousand seven hundred only)
against our counter guarantee No. 0179FOG0082008
dated 23-Feb-2008.
Quote
To Gulf Sponge Iron Co. Ltd.,
P O Box No. 8795
Mussafah
Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.
In Consideration of Gulf Sponge Iron Co. Ltd., P.O. Box
No. 8795, Mussaffah, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E. (hereinafter
called the ‘Overseas Buyer’) and Tecon Projects Private
Limited, having its registered office at C-516, Sarita
Vihar, New Delhi 110 044, India (hereinafter called ‘the
Said Supplier’) entered into a contract for design,
engineering, manufacturing, supply, erection and
commissioning of material handling system for
USD20,58,500 (USD two million fifty eight thousand
five hundred only) as per contract No. GSPI/MH/1 dated
29-May-2007. The supplier has agreed to furnish a bank
guarantee for USD411,700.00 (USD four hundred eleven
thousand seven hundred only) being 20 per cent of the
contract price to cover the advance. We ……………
(Bank’s name and address) do hereby undertake to pay
the damage caused to or suffered by the overseas buyer
by reason of any breach by the said supplier.”
9. The above counter BG also stated that “this guarantee shall stand reduced
to the extent of advance adjusted against the bill raised on the buyer” and
that “this letter of guarantee is subject to Uniform Rules for Demand
Guarantee 1992 revision International Chamber of Commerce Publication
No. 458.” The said counter guarantee was valid up to 7
th
June 2008 and
thereafter up to 22
nd
September 2008.CCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 7 of 21
Events leading to the contempt petition
10. The contempt petition came to be filed in the following circumstances.
HSBC by an affidavit filed on 6
th
April 2010 in O.M.P. No. 495 of 2008
informed the Court that pursuant to the assignment of the supply contract by
Kolsons in favour of Tecon, Gulf had given Tecon an advance on the sum of
USD 411,700 being 20% of the contract price against the supply of
equipment. Tecon had to furnish Gulf a BG for the aforementioned sum.
HSBC received a request from Canara Bank through a swift message dated
24
th
February 2008 to issue an advance payment guarantee (‘APG’) and in
lieu thereof Canara Bank would execute a counter BG in the same sum in
favour of HSBC. Accordingly, Canara Bank executed the counter BG No.
0179FOG0082008 dated 23
rd
February 2008 in favour of HSBC.
11. In response to the swift message, HSBC wrote to Canara Bank asking it
to carry out certain amendments as suggested by HSBC. The amended terms
were confirmed by Canara Bank by its swift message dated 22
nd
March
2008. Pursuant to the above communication, HSBC issued an APG being
Guarantee No. APG/GTY/081813/C dated 25
th
March 2008 for a sum of
USD 411,700 in favour of Gulf. This APG was extended from time to time
up to 22
nd
September 2008.
12. By letter dated 8
th
September 2008 Gulf lodged a valid claim with HSBC
on 15
th
September 2008 asking it to encash the APG and credit the proceeds
to its account. Pursuant thereto HSBC sent an intimation to Canara Bank by
swift message dated 18
th
September 2008 invoking the counter BG and
asking Canara Bank to make arrangements to pay HSBC a sum of USD
411,700.CCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 8 of 21
13. In response to HSBC’s said swift message, Canara Bank sent its first
swift message on 20
th
September 2008 informing HSBC that the Court had
restrained the beneficiary from encashing the APG dated 23
rd
February 2008
issued by Canara Bank till the next date of hearing. HSBC understood the
number of the BG in the Canara Bank’s swift message as actually referring
to Canara Bank’s counter BG and not the APG. Therefore, HSBC was not
clear whether in fact the Court had stayed payment of the APG. By a second
swift message on the same date i.e. 20
th
September 2008 Canara Bank
informed HSBC that there was a Court order restraining Canara Bank from
making payment of the BG without specifying which BG was being
referred.
14. On 22
nd
September 2008 HSBC advised Canara Bank that it had made
payment of USD 411,700 to Gulf “towards a valid claim received from them
as the beneficiary under the Advance Bank Guarantee.” HSBC therefore
called upon Canara Bank to reimburse USD 411,700 to HSBC’s account in
New York. On 23
rd
September 2008 HSBC received another swift message
from Canara Bank which stated that Canara Bank had couriered a copy of
the order passed by the Court to HSBC. On 24
th
September 2008 for the first
time Canara Bank informed HSBC that since Tecon had raised certain bills
on Gulf the amount under the APG stood reduced by USD 409,340. Canara
Bank requested HSBC to recall the amount paid to Gulf to the above extent.
Since by then the payment under the APG had already been made by it,
HSBC sent a swift message to Canara Bank on 24
th
September 2008
pointing out that the alleged bill raised by Tecon upon Gulf had not been
notified in time to HSBC and was therefore not binding on HSBC. Canara
Bank pressed Tecon to make payment. On 31
st
October 2008, Canara BankCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 9 of 21
informed Tecon that it had made payment to HSBC. When Tecon failed to
deposit the amount in its account, Canara Bank froze Tecon’s account. In the
above circumstances, Tecon filed the present contempt petition.
Proceedings in the contempt petition
15. In the contempt petition Tecon arrayed the Chief Executive Officer
(‘CEO’) and Deputy General Manager of Gulf as Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
Canara Bank was arrayed as Respondent No.3 and HSBC Bank as
Respondent No.4. Tecon’s main grievance was that despite the order passed
by this Court on 18
th
September 2008, the Respondents had proceeded to
encash “the bank guarantee” and therefore they should be held to be in
contempt and asked to refund/return USD 411,700 to Tecon.
16. In its reply to the contempt petition, Canara Bank narrated the entire
sequence of events. In particular, it highlighted Clause No.4 of the
clarifications/confirmations that was incorporated in the counter BG which
read: “our counter guarantee and your guarantee is governed by and
construed in all respects in accordance with the laws of UAE”. It was Tecon
which conveyed to Canara Bank by its letter dated 3
rd
March 2008 that
HSBC required the above confirmation. Therefore, Tecon was fully aware of
the requirement of HSBC as regards furnishing of a counter BG by Canara
Bank. In its affidavit dated 16
th
April 2010, Canara Bank pointed out that
HSBC had forwarded to Canara Bank a copy of APG issued by it in favour
of Gulf on 25
th
March 2008 which, apart from stating that the APG would be
governed and construed in accordance with the laws of UAE provided as
under:
“We undertake to pay the Overseas Buyer any money soCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 10 of 21
demanded notwithstanding any disputes raised by the
Supplier in any suit or proceeding pending before any
court or tribunal relating thereto our liability under the
present being absolute and unequivocal. The payment so
made by us under this Bond shall be valid discharge to
our liability for payment thereunder and the Supplier shall
have no claim against us for making such payments.”
17. Canara Bank contended that despite being aware of the above facts,
Tecon failed to implead either Canara Bank or HSBC as parties to O.M.P.
No.495 of 2008; Tecon did not inform the Court that an APG favouring Gulf
was issued by HSBC and that Canara Bank had only issued a counter BG
and that too in favour of HSBC and not Gulf. In particular, Canara Bank
pointed out that Tecon could not have sought any restraint order against Gulf
from encashing the counter BG issued by Canara Bank in favour of HSBC.
Further such remedy if at all was available only before the Courts in the
UAE.
18. Referring to the correspondence following the orders passed by the
Court, Canara Bank stated that by its swift message dated 29
th
September
2008 HSBC took the stand that the order passed by the Court was in respect
of Canara Bank’s counter BG in favour of HSBC and not the BG issued by
HSBC in favour of Gulf. It was in these circumstances that Canara Bank
paid the amount under the counter BG to HSBC on 31
st
October 2008 in
order to safeguard its interest and to avoid its other liabilities to HSBC.
The order dated 19
th
January 2011
19. This Court has passed a detailed order in the contempt petition on 19
th
January 2011. After noticing some of the above facts the Court held thatCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 11 of 21
there was no case for proceeding in contempt against Gulf inasmuch as they
had invoked the APG on 8
th
September 2008 prior to the order dated 18
th
September 2008. It had not been shown by Tecon that “Gulf had been served
either with the stay order passed by this Court, or even informed of the
details of the said OMP”. It was held that the mere acceptance of the funds
by Gulf from HSBC Bank, Dubai in respect of the APG which had already
been invoked on 8
th
September 2008 could not be said to be wilful
disobedience of the order passed by this Court.
20. As far as HSBC was concerned, the Court observed that “its action in
making payment under its guarantee to Gulf appears to be questionable”. It
could not strictly be held that HSBC was in wilful disobedience of the order
“inasmuch as there was no restraint in relation to the bank guarantee issued
by HSBC Bank, Dubai and they had not been served with the copy of the
order by 22
nd
September 2008, when they made the payment under their own
guarantee.”
21. As regards Canara Bank, the Court observed as under:
“21. So far as the Canara Bank is concerned, I find
absolutely no justification for its conduct of making
payment under its own guarantee which had been
squarely stayed by this court and the Canara Bank had
been duly served with the order passed by this court.
Merely because HSBC Bank, Dubai was pressing
for payment under the said guarantee was no ground for
Canara Bank to disregard the order passed by this Court.
If it were so minded, it should have approached this court
for clarification or vacation of the injunction order. The
stand taken by the Canara Bank in its letter dated
31.10.2008 that its higher authorities had advised the
bank to pay the invoked amount is in the teeth of theCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 12 of 21
interim order of injunction granted by this court. No
authority is above the law, and once there was an order
passed by this court - whether right, wrong or indifferent,
that order was bound to be obeyed by all authorities
including those of the Canara Bank.
22. It is clear that the second communication dated
10.12.2008, whereby the petitioner is claimed to have
absolved the Canara Bank of its liability in making
payment under its guarantee, was extracted from the
petitioner. This is evident from the first communication
dated 10.12.2008 issued by the petitioner to the Canara
Bank wherein the petitioner stated as follows:
“Gulf Sponge Iron Co. Bank Guarantee
Encashment: We have time and again informed
Canara Bank that the encashment of the Bank
Guarantee done by our clients is wrong and
illegal and the payment against the same should
not be sent to them. However, as per your
performa we are enclosing the letter required by
the bank to op0erate our bank normally.”
23. As the Canara Bank has made payment despite the
injunction being granted by this court, it is not entitled to
recover the said amount from the petitioner. It is,
therefore, accordingly, directed that the amount of US
$411700/- debited to the petitioner’s account by
conversion of US $411700/- should be credited to the
petitioner’s account and status quo ante should be
restored in all respects. This is, however, without
prejudice to the rights and obligations of the parties.
24. The contempt petition is dismissed so far as
respondents No. 1, 2 and 4 are concerned.
25. Issue notice to the Manager, Canara Bank,
Barakhamba Road Branch, New Delhi requiring him to
be present in person in court on the next date to show
cause as to why he should not be punished for contemptCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 13 of 21
of court.”
Order of the Division Bench
22. Aggrieved by the above order, Canara Bank filed Contempt Appeal (C)
Nos.8-9 of 2011, in which, the Division Bench while issuing notice on 10
th
May 2011 stayed the order and directed status quo to be maintained “in
respect of the amounts deposited by the Bank in the accounts of the
Respondent”.
23. Thereafter, on 5
th
March 2012, the Division Bench passed the following
order:
“Learned counsel for R-3 states that R-4 has received the
services of Gulf Sponge Iron Co. Ltd and thus she will
not be able to represent R-4 and the service of R-4 has
been effected on her as she was the counsel earlier. The
lis in the present appeal is, however, really between the
appellant and R-4.
The occasion for the appellant to file the appeal arose on
account of the directions contained in para 23 of the
impugned order dated 19.01.2011 passed on CCP(O)
No.16/2009 as it has civil consequences. To that extent,
the interim order dated 10.05.2011 directing status quo to
be maintained in respect of the amount deposited by the
Bank in the account of R-1, takes care of the position.
However, there cannot be stay of the contempt
proceedings itself as it is for the appellant to persuade the
learned Single Judge that no case of contempt is made out
and it is naturally open to the appellant to urge whatever
pleas are permissible in this behalf before the learned
Single Judge.
It is, thus, agreed that the present appeal be disposed of
with the direction that the CCP(O) No.16/2009 be heard
on merits and insofar as the directions contained in theCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 14 of 21
order dated 19.01.2011, which have civil consequences,
are concerned till the decision of the CCP(O) No.16/009,
the interim arrangement envisaged by the order dated
10.05.2011 would continue to enure for the benefit of the
appellant.
The appeal and the applications stand disposed of.
The parties to appear before the learned Single Judge in
CCP (O) No.16/2009 on 30.03.2012.”
Was Canara Bank in contempt of the Court’s order?
24. At the outset it must be pointed out that in the light of the order passed
by the Division Bench on 5
th
March 2012, it is clear that the observations
made by this Court in its order dated 19
th
January 2011 were tentative and at
a stage prior to Canara Bank showing cause. Canara Bank has on 10
th
March
2011 filed a reply to the show cause notice issued by this Court on 19
th
January 2011. Tecon has filed a response thereto.
25. This Court has heard the submissions of Mr. Harish Malhotra, learned
Senior counsel appearing for Tecon and Mr. Y.P. Narula, learned Senior
counsel appearing for Canara Bank.
26. An examination of the submissions made should begin with reiterating
the settled legal position that the question whether a party is in contempt of
the Court’s order is essentially one between the Court and the contemnor.
The Court has to be satisfied that the disobedience, if at all, by the party of
the Court’s order was wilful and intended to obstruct the administration of
justice. In exercising its power under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 the
Court has to be cautious in ensuring that the order originally passed by theCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 15 of 21
Court the breach of which is complained is not interpreted in the manner
inconsistent with what the order actually states. It is not open to the Court to
expand the scope of the order of which disobedience by the contemnor is
alleged.
27. In R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik (2000) 4 SCC 400, the Supreme
Court held as under (SCC, p.404):
“We may reiterate that the weapon of contempt is not to
be used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be
used for execution of the decree or implementation of an
order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for.
Discretion given to the Court is to be exercised for
maintenance of the Court’s dignity and majesty of law.
Further, an aggrieved party has no right to insist that the
Court should exercise such jurisdiction as contempt is
between a contemner and the Court.”
28. There are some disconcerting aspects of the present case which were
perhaps not noticed in their entirety by the Court when it issued notice to
Canara Bank on 19
th
January 2011. The foremost is that Tecon failed to
place the complete facts before the Court which first heard O.M.P. No. 495
of 2008 on 18
th
September 2008. Tecon knew there were two BGs involved.
One was an APG issued by HSBC in favour Gulf. The second was the
corresponding counter-BG issued by Canara Bank in favour of HSBC. This
basic fact was kept back from the Court for reasons best known to Tecon.
29. A perusal of O.M.P. No.495 of 2008 as was presented before the Court
when it passed the order dated 18
th
September 2008 shows that therein
reference was made only to the counter BG issued by Canara Bank (without
referring to it as a counter BG) and stay was also sought of encashment ofCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 16 of 21
the said counter BG. While the copy of the BG enclosed with the petition did
refer to it being a counter BG, in the absence of Tecon drawing the Court’s
attention specifically to that fact and explaining the context in which such
counter BG was issued it could not be expected that the Court would on its
own discern it. On the basis of the petition in O.M.P. No. 495 of 2008, it was
not possible for the Court to have on its own realised that there was an APG
issued by HSBC in favour of Gulf and a corresponding counter BG issued
by Canara Bank in favour of HSBC. Tecon made it appear as if Gulf was
threatening to encash a BG issued in its favour by Canara Bank and which
therefore was required to be stayed. This was contrary to the correct factual
position and led to further unnecessary litigation arising out of the order
dated 18
th
September 2008 passed by this Court. This deliberate, incorrect
and incomplete presentation of facts by Tecon has serious consequences.
30. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1, the
Supreme Court emphasized as under (SCC, p.5):
“A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to
produce all the documents executed by him which are
relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document
in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would
be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the
opposite party.”
31. A second aspect was that the entire correspondence between the parties
which was material to the case was not produced before the Court or
adverted to by Tecon. In particular, it did not bring to the notice of the Court
the letter written by it to Canara Bank on 3
rd
March 2008 which drew Canara
Bank’s attention to HSBC requiring the incorporation in the counter BGCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 17 of 21
certain specific clauses. The relevant portions of the said letter read as under:
“Sub: FBG of USD 411,700/- in favour of GULF
SPONGE IRON CO. LTD. UAE
Dear Sir,
As our request and the advise of your branch, foreign
deptt. Main New Delhi Of Canara Bank advise to HSBC
Bank middle East Ltd. Dubai to issue advance guarantee
USD 411,700/- in favour of GLF SPONGE IRON CO.
LTD. UAE against their counter Guarantee
No.0179FOGOO82008 dated 23.02.2008 on dated
23.02.2008 itself.
Against the above mentioned counter guarantee, HSBC
Bank middle East Ltd., Dubai requires the confirmation
of the following:
1. Your Guarantee will be issued against our
irrevocable an unconditional counter guarantee in
your favour, under our full risk and responsibility.
2. ........
3. Our counter guarantee will be valid until 22 June
2008 (one month from expiry date of your
guarantee).
4. Our counter guarantee and your guarantee is
governed by and construed in all respects in
accordance with the laws of UAE.
....
10. We hereby confirm the above mentioned clauses
and request you to kindly advise to your Foreign
Department, Main, New Delhi.”
32. There was no justifiable reason for Tecon to have kept back the above
information from the Court. A party which suppresses material facts and
obtains an order considerably weakens its case for persuading the Court toCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 18 of 21
proceed against another party for disobedience of such an order. The Court
will be reluctant to exercise its power under the contempt jurisdiction at the
instance of a litigant who acts irresponsibly.
33. Mr. Malhotra, learned Senior counsel for Tecon sought to point out that
during the course of arguments Tecon had pointed out to the Court about it
having raised bills in the sum of USD 460,023.38 and to that extent the BG
would stand reduced. This however does not still explain why reference was
being made in the Court to an “advance bank guarantee” issued by Canara
Bank when in fact what had been issued was a counter BG. The Court was
not told that such counter BG was in fact issued by Canara Bank in favour of
HSBC and not Gulf. No mention was made of the APG issued by HSBC in
favour of Gulf. In respect of the said APG there was in fact no interim order
sought by Tecon or passed by this Court. It is impossible to read into the
order dated 18
th
September 2008 something that even Tecon had not prayed
for. Without making HSBC or Canara Bank parties to the petition no interim
order restraining either of them from making payment under the counter BG
or the APG could have been sought. If Tecon wanted to restrain Gulf from
encashing the APG issued by HSBC in its favour, Tecon should have in the
first place pleaded that as a fact giving such details of APG, made HSBC a
party, and then sought a specific order restraining HSBC from making
payment under the APG, by giving the precise number of the APG. There
was no such pleading and there was no such prayer.
34. While examining if Canara Bank acted in wilful disobedience of the
Court’s order dated 18
th
September 2008 it is important to note in the first
place that Canara Bank was not a party to that order. Further Canara BankCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 19 of 21
was in any event not going to make any payment to Gulf under the counter
BG issued by it. Therefore the direction in the order dated 18
th
September
2008 was not capable of being complied with by Canara Bank. The Court
while exercising jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 when
an allegation is made of civil contempt, i.e. wilful disobedience of an order
passed by the Court, has to be cautious in first ascertaining what precisely
was the scope of the order of which the disobedience is alleged and whether
the party against whom the allegation is made, was obliged to obey such
order.
35. In this context the following observations of the Supreme Court in Bihar
Finance Service H.C. Coop. Soc. Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami AIR 2008 SC
1975 regarding the exercise of power by the Court in the contempt
jurisdiction are relevant (AIR, p.1980):
“22. While exercising the said jurisdiction this Court does
not intend to reopen the issues which could have been
raised in the original proceeding nor shall it embark upon
other questions including the plea of equities which could
fall for consideration only in the original proceedings.
The Court is not concerned with as to whether the
original order was right or wrong. The Court must not
take a different view or traverse beyond the same. It
cannot ordinarily give an additional direction or delete a
direction issued. In short, it will not do anything which
would amount to exercise of its review jurisdiction.”
36. It is plain to the Court that there was no disobedience of the order passed
by this Court on 18
th
September 2008 as a result of HSBC making payment
to Gulf under the APG issued by it in favour of Gulf. That was not the
subject matter of O.M.P. No.495 of 2008 or the interim order passed by this
Court on 18
th
September 2008. As far as payment under the counter BG isCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 20 of 21
concerned, it had to follow the payment made under the APG. The order
passed by this Court was not a mandamus issued to Canara Bank. It only
restrained Gulf from encashing the BG but the number given was of the
counter BG to which Gulf was not a party and therefore it was incapable of
being complied with by Gulf. Since the direction was to Gulf, Canara Bank
could also not have complied with it. In any event there was no order
restraining Canara Bank from making payment to HSBC although the
number in the order of the Court refers to the counter BG. In other words, it
was an order incapable of being complied with either by Gulf, which alone
was party to it, or by Canara Bank which was not a party to the order.
Significantly, at no point in time did Tecon seek modification of the order
dated 18
th
September 2008.
37. As already noted in the order dated 19
th
January 2011, the Court’s order
dated 18
th
September 2008 was not communicated to Gulf prior to its
invoking the APG. Even HSBC stood absolved because there was no
reference to the APG issued by it in favour of Gulf in the order dated 18
th
September 2008. With Tecon not seeking any amendment of the order
passed by the Court, Canara Bank could not have on its own restrained
HSBC from proceeding to pay Gulf the amount under the APG. All that
Canara Bank could do within its means, and which it did, was to
communicate the order of this Court to Gulf. Even when Canara Bank made
payment to HSBC on 31
st
October 2008 it was not acting in disobedience of
any order of the Court.
38. This Court is, therefore, satisfied that there was no disobedience of the
order dated 18
th
September 2008 by Canara Bank. The contempt noticeCCP (O) No.16 of 2009 in O.M.P. 495 of 2008 Page 21 of 21
issued to Canara Bank is discharged and the contempt petition is dismissed.
Consequently, the order passed by this Court on 19
th
January 2011 requiring
Canara Bank to credit the account of Tecon with a sum of USD 411,700
does not survive and is hereby vacated.
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
OCTOBER 12, 2012
AK/bs

The O.P. is filed under Section 23 of Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 before the trial Court seeking a direction to respondents 2 and 3 to furnish correct audited accounts of respondent No.1 society from the period of their taking charge, convene the general body meeting and to conduct the elections, and if finds any misappropriation, respondents 2 and 3 may be directed to make good of the amounts by depositing the same with interest in the account of respondent No.1- society. However, the O.P. was dismissed for non-prosecution on 16.07.2010. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed the present I.A. under Order IX, Rule 9, read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'CPC') for restoration of the O.P. - So far as the observation of the trial Court at the interlocutory stage that the main O.P. has become infructuous is concerned, the trial Court while coming to the conclusion that there are no merits in the restoration application, appears to have observed that the O.P. has become infructuous by relying on some authentic information that general body meeting was conducted, elections were held and respondents 2 and 3 had placed the accounts before the general body meeting in respect of respondent No.1 society. Therefore, this Court does not find fault with the observation of the trial Court.


HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N. RAO NALLA      

C.M. A. No.54 OF 2012

04.10.2012    

1)Musam Hari Prasad, 2) Ravirala Mallaiah

1) Pattana Padmashali Sangam, 2) Appam Srinivas, 3) Yelagadula Sudarshan  

Counsel for the Appellants: Sri K.Narasimha Chari

Counsel for Respondents  : Sri K.Mahipathy Rao

<GIST :

>HEAD NOTE :  

?Cases referred :

JUDGMENT:  
             This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is preferred assailing the order
dated 15.09.2011 in I.A. No.937 of 2010 in O.P. No.183 of 2009 on the file of
the Court of II Additional District Judge, Nalgonda at Suryapet.  The appellants
herein are the petitioners and the respondents herein are the respondents in the
I.A. as well as in the O.P.

2.      For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter referred to as they
arrayed in the I.A. as well as in the O.P.

3.      The O.P. is filed under Section 23 of Andhra Pradesh Societies
Registration Act, 2001 before the trial Court seeking a direction to respondents
2 and 3 to furnish correct audited accounts of respondent No.1 society from the
period of their taking charge, convene the general body meeting and to conduct
the elections, and if finds any misappropriation, respondents 2 and 3 may be
directed to make good of the amounts by depositing the same with interest in the
account of respondent No.1- society.  However, the O.P. was dismissed for
non-prosecution on 16.07.2010.  Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed the
present I.A. under Order IX, Rule 9, read with Section 151 of Code of Civil
Procedure (for short 'CPC') for restoration of the O.P.

4.      It is the case of the petitioner that the O.P. was posted on 16.07.2010
for filing chief examination affidavit of petitioner No.1 as PW.1, but due to
ill-health of his wife at Hyderabad, he stayed back at Hyderabad and that
petitioner No.2 was also out of station due to his business work, as such, they
could not appear before the Court on 16.7.2010 and the same was informed to
their counsel and instructed him to take adjournment, and as such, their counsel
filed an application under Section 148 read with 151 of CPC to grant fifteen
(15) days time to lead the evidence, however, the trial Court without passing
any order in the application, has dismissed the O.P. for non-appearance of the
petitioners on 16.07.2010 holding that the O.P. was posted conditionally to lead
evidence.  After coming to know about the dismissal of the O.P., the petitioners
filed the present I.A. for restoration of the O.P.

5.      It is the case of the respondents that the application filed for
restoration of the O.P. by the petitioners is only to drag on the matter and
that the reasons assigned in the affidavit filed in support of the application
are not tenable in the eye of law or facts of the case.  The petitioners neither
gave justifiable reasons nor produced any substantial proof with regard to their
absence on 16.07.2012 before the Court.

6.       After enquiry, the trial Court dismissed the I.A. holding that the
petitioners have taken several adjournments from 10.08.2009 to 01.07.2010 and
that even when the O.P. was posted conditionally on 16.07.2010, they could not
turn up, and as such, the petitioners are not interested to proceed with the
O.P.  Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed the present Civil Miscellaneous
Appeal.

7.     Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the material
available on record.

8.      It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the trial
Court erred in dismissing the application for restoration of the O.P. without
taking into consideration its serious repercussions on the welfare of respondent
No.1 society and that the trial Court ought to have given ample opportunity to
adjudicate the O.P. on merits.  It is contended that the trial Court ought not
to have observed in the interlocutory application that the O.P. has become
infructuous without there being any material on record. It is also contended
that the trial Court ought not to have dismissed the O.P. on 16.07.2010 without
passing any order in the application filed by the counsel for the petitioners
under Section 148 read with Section 151 of CPC on the same day to grant fifteen
(15) days time.  It is further contended that the trial Court ought to have seen
that there are serious allegations against respondents 2 and 3, as president and
secretary of respondent No.1 society respectively, with regard to
misappropriation of funds of respondent No.1 society, not convening the general
body meeting and not conducting the elections to the working committee.

9.      The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the impugned order
passed by the trial Court needs no interference at the hands of this Court as
the matter was adjourned several times at the behest of the petitioners and even
when the matter was posted conditionally on 16.07.2010, they could not come
forward to prosecute the O.P.  Under these circumstances, the trial Court has
dismissed the application for restoration of the O.P.  Therefore, there are no
merits in the C.M.A. and the same is liable to be dismissed.

10.     It is seen from the record that the petitioners filed the O.P. seeking a
direction from the trial Court to respondents 2 and 3 to furnish correct audited
accounts of respondent No.1 society from the period of their taking charge, to
convene a general body meeting and to conduct elections to the working
committee, and if the Court finds any misappropriation by respondents 2 and 3,
they may be directed to make good of the amounts by depositing the same in the
account of respondent No.1 society with interest.  The O.P. was of the year
2009.  The respondents appeared on 30.06.2009, and filed their counter on
10.08.2009 and the O.P. was ripe for trial.  Instead of prosecuting the O.P.
diligently, the petitioners took several adjournments, and when the matter was
called on 01.07.2010, the petitioners again sought for adjournment and the same
was adjourned to 16.07.2010 on condition that if the petitioners fail to proceed
with the matter on that day, the O.P. stands dismissed.  On 16.07.2010, when the
O.P. was called, none appeared for the petitioners though the O.P. was posted
conditionally.  In that view of the matter, the trial Court dismissed the O.P.
The contention of the petitioners is that they filed application under Section
148 read with Section 151 of CPC on 16.07.2010 to grant fifteen days time.  As
held by the trial Court there is no such application on the record.  Even if it
is assumed that the petitioners filed such an application for adjournment, it
cannot be entertained since the O.P. was posted conditionally.   Further, in the
affidavit filed in support of the restoration application, it is stated that
they were out of station on 16.07.2010 due to their respective personal work,
but they have not filed any authentic proof to show that they were not in a
position to attend the Court and lead the evidence on 16.07.2010.

11.     So far as the observation of the trial Court at the interlocutory stage
that the main O.P. has become infructuous is concerned, the trial Court while
coming to the conclusion that there are no merits in the restoration
application, appears to have observed that the O.P. has become infructuous by
relying on some authentic information that general body meeting was conducted,
elections were held and respondents 2 and 3 had placed the accounts before the
general body meeting in respect of respondent No.1 society. Therefore, this
Court does not find fault with the observation of the trial Court.

12.     In view of the above discussion and having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity warranting
interference, and as such, the C.M.A. is liable to be dismissed.

13.     In the result, the C.M.A. is dismissed. No order as to costs.


_________________  
B.N. RAO NALLA, J  
Date:04.10.2012

For seeking temporary injunction, the petitioner has to prove that she is in possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property on the date of filing of the suit and that she has to comply the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC i.e., prima facie case, balance of convenience in her favour and irreparable loss being caused to her if temporary injunction is not granted. The petitioner in order to prove her possession over the petition schedule property has filed documents - Exs.A.3, A.4 and A.5. But, Exs.A.3 to A.5 are issued based on Exs.A.1 and A.7, and these documents do not in any way establish the possession of the petitioner over the petition schedule property. Except, Exs.A.3 to A.5, the petitioner has not filed any authentic material to show that she is in possession of the petition schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. As such, it cannot be said that the petitioner has prima facie proved her possession over the petition schedule property. So far as the admission of respondent No.1 in his deposition and the report of the Advocate Commissioner in O.S.No.234 of 1979 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur are concerned, the petitioner has to bring the same on record during the course of the trial in the suit and it cannot be dealt with at this interlocutory stage.


HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N. RAO NALLA      

C.M. A. No.437 of 2005

04.10.2012    

Urumula Yellamma w/o.late Venkatappa Reddy  

1)Pullapati Raja Rao, 2)Pullapati Rupadhar, 3) Pullapati Lata, 4)Pullapati
Usharani

Counsel for the Appellant: Sri K.S.Murthy

Counsel for Respondent No.1:   Sri P.Thirumala Rao

^Counsel for Respondents 2 to 4 : Sri Upendra Chakravarthy

<GIST :

>HEAD NOTE :  

?Cases referred :

JUDGMENT:  

             This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is preferred assailing the order
dated 11.03.2005 in I.A. No.1205 of 2004 in O.S. No.497 of 2004 on the file of
the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Guntur.

2.      The appellant herein is the petitioner - plaintiff and the respondents
herein are the respondents - defendants in the I.A.   Suit is filed for
declaration and for consequential injunction restraining the respondents -
defendants, their men from interfering with possession and enjoyment of the
petitioner - plaintiff over the suit schedule property.

3.      For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter referred to as they
arrayed in the I.A.

4.      The petitioner filed the present I.A. under Order 39
Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'CPC') for temporary
injunction restraining the respondents, their men, agents etc. in any way
interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioner over
the petition schedule property or from entering into any transactions of
alienation or lien or charge pending disposal of the suit.  After enquiry, the
trial Court dismissed the I.A. holding that the petitioner has not proved prima
facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable loss.  Aggrieved thereby, the
petitioner filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal.

5.      It is the case of the petitioner before the trial Court that originally
her mother - Challa Narasamma had purchased the petition schedule property from
respondent No.1 - Pulipati Raja Rao and his mother under notarized agreement of
sale dated 15.11.1974 and possession was also delivered to her.  Thereafter,
petitioner's mother - Challa Narasamma and  brother - Sambireddy had sold the
property in favour of the petitioner under sale deed dated 2.4.2002 and  she has
been in possession and enjoyment of the same.  The respondents without any
manner of right are trying to interfere with peaceful possession of the
petitioner over the petition schedule property.  Hence the petitioner preferred
the present I.A.

6.      It is the case of the respondents before the trial Court that respondent
No.1 or his mother never sold any property under the alleged agreement of sale
dated 15.11.1974 to the petitioner's mother - Challa Narasamma and they never
delivered possession of the petition schedule property to her.   In fact, the
respondents are in possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property.
The petitioner is making all efforts to mutate her name in the revenue records
in respect of the petition schedule property.   Further, with regard to the
petition schedule property,
O.S. No.34 of 1999 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge, Guntur, is
pending.

7.      Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the material
available on record.

8.       It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner (appellant
herein) that the trial Court should have seen that from the date of agreement of
sale, the mother of the petitioner was in possession and thereafter pursuant to
the sale deed, the petitioner is in possession of the petition schedule property
and the same is evident from Exs.A.1 to A.8.  The trial Court failed to notice
that respondent No.1 admitted in his deposition in O.S.No.234 of 1979 on the
file of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur that he and his mother sold away Ac.2-00
to the mother of the petitioner about 10 years back.  The trial Court, while
dealing with a temporary injunction application, ought not to have gone into
title, and it ought to have seen who is in actual possession of petition
schedule property.  Further, the trial Court failed to notice that in O.S.No.234
of 1979, the advocate commissioner in his report stated that petitioner herein
purchased the petition schedule property and has been in possession of the same.

9.      The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the impugned order
passed by the trial Court needs no interference at the hands of this Court as
the trial Court has given cogent and convincing reasons for dismissing the
application filed by the petitioner under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC.  As
such, there are no merits in the C.M.A. and the same is liable to be dismissed.

10.     It is seen that the petitioner claiming title and possession over the
petition schedule property by mainly relying on documents Exs.A.7- agreement of
sale dated 15.11.1974 and
A.1 -sale deed dated 02.04.2002.   It is the contention of the petitioner that
originally her mother - Challa Narasamma purchased the petition schedule
property from respondent No.1 and his mother under notarized agreement of sale
dated 15.11.1974 and that they delivered possession of the same to her mother -
Challa Narsamma and thereafter, petitioner's mother and brother - Sambireddy
sold the property to the petitioner vide registered sale deed dated 2.4.2002 and
since then she has been in possession of the same.   The order under appeal does
not indicate the extent of the petition schedule property.  It is the contention
of the respondents that the petitioner is never in possession of the petition
schedule property. For seeking temporary injunction, the petitioner has to prove
that she is in possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property on the
date of filing of the suit and that she has to comply the provisions of  Order
39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC i.e., prima facie case, balance of convenience in her
favour and irreparable loss being caused to her if temporary injunction is not
granted.  The petitioner in order to prove her possession over the petition
schedule property has filed documents - Exs.A.3, A.4 and A.5.   But, Exs.A.3 to
A.5 are issued based on Exs.A.1 and A.7, and these documents do not in any way  
establish the possession of the petitioner over the petition schedule property.
Except, Exs.A.3 to A.5, the petitioner has not filed any authentic material  to
show that she is in possession of the petition schedule property as on the date
of filing of the suit.  As such, it cannot be said that the petitioner has prima
facie proved her possession over the petition schedule property.  So far as the
admission of respondent No.1 in his deposition and the report of the Advocate
Commissioner in O.S.No.234 of 1979 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur
are concerned, the petitioner has to bring the same on record during the course
of the trial in the suit and it cannot be dealt with at this interlocutory
stage.

11.     In view of the above discussion and having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
impugned order passed by the trial Court does not suffer from any illegality or
irregularity warranting interference from this Court, and as such, the C.M.A. is
liable to be dismissed.

12.   In the result, the C.M.A. is dismissed.  There shall be no order as to
costs. Since the suit is of the year 2004, the trial Court is directed to
dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible, uninfluenced by any of the
observations made by this Court in this order.

_________________  
B.N. RAO NALLA, J  
Date:04.10.2012

in the absence of the report of Sperm Detection Test, the conclusion regarding rape cannot be accepted. It is true that PW-4 has stated that the 1Page 16 slide containing sperms which had been sent for examination has not returned so far along with the examination report. In the absence of such a report, the case of the prosecution cannot be doubted about rape, particularly, in the light of categorical findings of the doctor that her hymen was found to have been ruptured. The other prosecution witnesses have also stated injury on her private part and oozing of blood. The medical evidence proved that the victim was raped before her death and she died on 05.03.2002. In other words, the prosecution story is fully corroborated with the medical evidence on record and, unfortunately, the High Court failed to give importance to the said evidence. failure to recover chunni (dupatta) which was alleged to have been used for pressing the neck goes against the prosecution case. It is true that the prosecution has not collected the same but, in the light of the material objects, the evidence of prosecution witnesses, statement of the doctor who conducted the post mortem, his opinion etc. amply prove the prosecution case and we reject the claim of the counsel for the respondent. The primary concern both at national and international level is about the devastating increase in rape cases and cases relating to crime against women in the world. India is no exception to it. Although the statutory provisions provide strict penal action against such offenders, it is for the Courts to ultimately decide whether such incident has occurred or not. The Courts should be more cautious in appreciating the evidence and the accused should not be left scot-free merely on flimsy grounds. In the instant case, the accused had committed rape, which repels against moral conscience as he 1Page 18 chose a girl of 11 years to satisfy his lust and subsequently murdered her. In the light of the acceptable materials in the form of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution, particularly, the eye-witnesses PWs 2 and 3 who are independent witnesses coupled with the evidence of the doctor (PW-4), we accept the conclusion of the trial court and disagree with the conclusion of the High Court. The analysis and the ultimate conclusion of the High Court is contrary to the acceptable and reliable material placed by the prosecution and we hold that the accused has first committed the offence of rape and then murdered the deceased. We are satisfied that the prosecution has established both the charges under Sections 376 and 302 of IPC. 21) In view of the same, the conclusion arrived by the High Court is set aside. Taking note of the fact that the incident occurred in the year 2002, we feel that rigorous imprisonment for life would meet the ends of justice. 1Page 19 22) In view of the same, the respondent-accused is directed to surrender before the concerned authority/Court within a period of two weeks failing which the trial Judge is directed to take necessary effective steps for sending him to prison. The appeal preferred by the State is allowed.


Page 1
        REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CRIMINAL   APPEAL   NO.   180   OF   2007
State of U.P.                   .... Appellant(s)
Versus
Munesh                  .... Respondent(s)
  J  U  D  G   M  E  N  T
P.Sathasivam,J.
1) This appeal is filed by the State of U.P. against the final
judgment and order dated 16.10.2003 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 737
of 2003 whereby the High Court allowed the appeal filed by
the respondent herein and acquitted him of the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 376 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and set aside the
judgment and order dated 15.02.2003 passed by the
1Page 2
Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (E.C. Act),
Bulandshahar in Sessions Case No. 748 of 2002.
2) Prosecution case in a nutshell is as follows:
(a) On 05.03.2002, at about 04.30 p.m., Roshni (the
deceased), aged about 11 years, had gone alone from her
house in Kalander Garhi, PS Khurja Nagar, Bulandshahar,
U.P. to prepare cow-dung cakes in the cremation ground of
Jatavs’  and while she was doing her work, the respondentaccused forcibly took her in the wheat field of one Jalil Khadar
with bad intentions. She raised cries and on hearing the same,
Madanlal (PW-2) and Suresh Chandra (PW-3), who were
passing through at a short distance, came to the said field and
saw that the respondent-accused was strangulating her with a
Dupatta.  On seeing them, the respondent-accused ran away
and when they tried to chase him, he could not be caught.
When they returned back, Roshni was seen lying dead at the
site in naked condition.  Both of them informed Kanchhi Lal
(PW-1), the father of the deceased-the complainant about the
said incident and at 11.05 p.m., PW-1 lodged an F.I.R. being
Crime No. 66 of 2002 at Police outpost Khurja Junction,
2Page 3
District Bulandshahar and a case under Sections 376, 302
and 511 of IPC was registered against the appellant.
(b) After investigation, Kshetrapal Singh, S.I. (PW-7) arrested
the accused on 14.03.2002.  After filing of the charge sheet,
the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and
numbered as Sessions Case No. 748 of 2002.
(c) The Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (E.C. Act)
Bulandshahar, by judgment dated 15.02.2003, convicted the
respondent-accused and sentenced him to death under
Section 302 of IPC and to imprisonment for life under Section
376 of IPC.
(d) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the respondent-accused
preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 737 of 2003
before the High Court.  For confirmation of death sentence of
the accused, Capital Sentence Reference No.7 of 2003 was
also filed which was heard along with the appeal filed by the
accused.  The High Court, by impugned judgment dated
16.10.2003, allowed the appeal filed by the respondentaccused and acquitted him of all the charges and also rejected
the Capital Sentence Reference.
3Page 4
(e) Against the order of acquittal passed by the High Court,
the State has filed this appeal by way of special leave.
3) Heard Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel for the
appellant-State and Mr. G.S. Mani, learned counsel for the
respondent-accused.
4) Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for
the State of U.P. submitted as under:-
(a) the High Court has committed an error by disbelieving
the statement of two independent eye-witnesses, namely,
Madanlal (PW-2) and Suresh Chandra (PW-3) merely on the
ground that there are some contradictions between the
statements made under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) and in
their evidence before the court;
(b) the High Court has failed to appreciate the vital facts that
these two statements i.e. statement before the I.O. and the
statement before the Court were made after some interval and
there is bound to be some variance in the statements.
However, the omission in the statement is not fatal to the
prosecution case;  
4Page 5
(c) the High Court was not correct in holding that there is
delay in lodging of the FIR.  Even if there is delay, it has been
properly explained by the complainant - PW-1, father of the
deceased; and
(d) Since the prosecution story is fully corroborated with the
medical evidence on record that the victim was raped before
her death and she had died on 05.03.2002 at 4.30 p.m. due to
injuries, all these aspects have not been properly considered
and the High Court committed a grave error in acquitting the
accused.
5) On the other hand, Mr. G.S. Mani, learned counsel for
the respondent-accused submitted that in view of the
contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses,
particularly, their statements before the I.O. under Section
161 of the Code and their evidence before the Court, the High
Court was fully justified in disbelieving their version.  He
pointed out that non-recovery of chunni (dupatta) is fatal to
the prosecution case.  He also pointed out that the
prosecution failed to prove the motive and it is highly
impossible to commit rape and murder at the same time.
5Page 6
According to the counsel, there was inordinate delay in lodging
the complaint and inquest was not made on the same night.
He further pointed out that all these aspects were correctly
appreciated by the High Court and ordered acquittal.  Finally,
Mr. Mani submitted that inasmuch as the High Court, on
appreciation of evidence ordered acquittal, the same cannot be
lightly interfered by this Court exercising jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
6) We have carefully considered the rival submissions and
gone through the relevant materials as well as the reasoning of
the trial Court and the High Court.
7) As to the evidentiary value of eye-witnesses - PWs 2 and
3, it is not in dispute that both of them are not related to the
deceased.  On the other hand, they are independent eyewitnesses who actually witnessed the occurrence.  Madanlal
(PW-2), in his evidence has stated that Kanchhi Lal – (PW-1)
father of the deceased victim, belongs to his village and his
daughter by name Roshni was just 11 years old when the said
incident occurred.  He also stated that the accused Muneshrespondent herein too belongs to his own village.  He narrated
6Page 7
before the Court that on 05.03.2002, at 4.30 p.m. he was
passing through their field leading towards his village Manna
along with one more villager Suresh Chandra (PW-2) and,
ultimately, when they reached near the tube well fitted in the
field of Jalil Khadar in which standing wheat crop was grown,
at that time, they heard shrieking sound.  On hearing the
same, they immediately rushed towards the said direction.  On
reaching the spot, they saw Roshni lying down there and, at
that time, Munesh-the accused tied a noose around her neck
and tightened its knot.  On seeing his action, both of them
asked him “what are you doing”.  He further stated that after
strangulating her, he ran away in the direction of south and
they too followed him, but the accused could not be caught.
Thereafter, they returned back to the spot and found that
Roshini was lying on the ground in a naked state and the
noose was around her neck.  Her salwar and underwear were
lying nearby her body.  Immediately, they informed the same
to her father PW-1.  PW-2 identified Munesh-accused in the
Court and asserted that it was he who committed the said act.
7Page 8
8) Though, learned counsel for the accused brought to our
notice that certain statements have not been stated by him
before the I.O., on verification of his statement under Section
161 of the Code and his evidence before the Court as well as
the statement of I.O. (PW-6), we are satisfied that the
contradiction, if any, is not much and the same would not
affect the credibility of his statement.  It is not in dispute that
he is not related to the deceased, on the other hand, he is an
independent eye-witness belonging to the same village as that
of PW-1 and the accused.
9) The next eye-witness relied on by the prosecution is
Suresh Chandra - PW-3.  In his evidence, he has stated that
PW-1 belongs to his own village and at the time of the
incident, his daughter was aged about 11 years.  He also
admitted that even the accused-Munesh belongs to their
village.  Like PW-2, PW-3 also mentioned that the occurrence
took place on 05.03.2002, between 4.30 to 5.00 p.m. He
further stated that he along with PW-2 was passing through
their field and when they reached near the tube-well of Jalil
Khadar, they heard shrieking sound, due to which, they
8Page 9
rushed towards the said direction.  They saw Munesh-accused
has already got down Roshni, due to which, they shouted at
him.  In the meanwhile, the accused put around her neck a
noose of her chunni (dupatta) and tightened it by pulling.
Thereafter, he ran away towards the south.  Like PW-2, he
also chased him but the accused could not be caught.  When
they returned back, they saw that she was lying naked on the
ground.  Her salwar and underwear were lying near her body.
Her vaginal area had bleeding and her hands were full of cowdung.  Thereafter, they informed the same to Kanchhi Lal –
PW-1, father of the deceased.  Like PW-2, he also identified the
accused in the Court.  Even in the cross-examination, he
asserted that when they saw her at the first instance itself, a
noose was tied around her neck and the accused was holding
both the ends of the said noose and was pulling it to tighten it
around her neck.  He denied the suggestion that in order to
support the family of the deceased, he was making a false
statement.  Here again, the counsel pointed out certain
discrepancies in the statement before the police officer and his
evidence before the Court.  We have carefully verified the same
9Page 10
and we are satisfied that the alleged contradictions are trivial
in nature and have not affected the case of the prosecution.
10) The High Court, taking note of minor discrepancies,
particularly, their statements recorded by the I.O. and their
evidence before the Court, disbelieved their version.  We are
satisfied that the High Court has committed an error in
rejecting their evidence.  We have already stated that they are
independent witnesses and witnessed the occurrence at a
short distance and there is no reason to disbelieve their
version.
11) Now, let us see the evidence of PW-1, father of the victim.
It is true that he is not an eye-witness but his statement
corroborates with the statements made by PW-2 and PW-3.  It
is his evidence that the deceased-Roshni was his daughter and
she was aged about 11 years at the time of occurrence.  He
further deposed that on 05.03.2002, at about 4.30 p.m., she
went alone to the place of cremation ground of Jatavs’  for
preparing cow-dung cakes.  At that time, Munesh-the accused
who also belongs to his village forcibly dragged her with bad
intentions to the wheat field of Jalil Khadar.  He also stated
1Page 11
that on hearing the cries of her daughter, Madanlal (PW-2) and
Suresh Chandra (PW-3), who were passing through nearby the
field, shouted at him and tried to catch hold of him.  He also
explained how PWs 2 and 3 chased the accused and informed
about the incident to him.  Thereafter, according to him, he
rushed to the spot along with the villagers and saw that his
daughter was not only lying in naked condition but her chunni
was also lying around her neck as a noose.  After searching for
the accused in his village and after finding that he was not
traceable, he submitted the written complaint to the P.S.
Khurja Junction which is Exh. A-1.  He also identified the
accused who was present in the dock.  He denied the
allegation that he falsely implicated the accused due to some
election dispute.  There is no reason to disbelieve the version
of PW-1 and the trial court has rightly relied on him along with
the statements of eye-witnesses PWs 2 and 3.  Unfortunately,
the High Court has rejected his evidence also on flimsy
ground.
1Page 12
12) Coming to the next contention about the delay in lodging
of the FIR, it is not in dispute that the incident occurred at
4.30 p.m. on 05.03.2002 and the complaint was made by PW-
1 at 11.05 p.m. on the same day itself.  It has also come in
evidence that the distance between the place of incident and
the police station is 2 kms.  Though the High Court has
commented that there was delay in lodging the complaint, it
must be noted that PW-1 - father of the victim is a villager and
on hearing the incident through PWs 2 and 3, he rushed to
the spot, made arrangements to cover the body of his
daughter, searched for some time to trace the accused, and
thereafter, reached the P.S. which is at a distance of 2 kms. at
11.05 p.m.  If we consider the entire incident as narrated by
PW-1, it cannot be construed that there was any unreasonable
and unexplained delay which goes to the root of the
prosecution case.  On the other hand, considering the
materials placed, we hold that the delay has been properly
explained by PW-1, even otherwise, the same cannot be
construed as abnormal as erroneously observed by the High
Court.
1Page 13
13) Though it is stated that all the details as spoken to by
PWs 1, 2 and 3 were not mentioned in the FIR, as rightly
observed by the trial Court, FIR is not an encyclopedia.  It is
just an intimation of the occurrence of an incident and it need
not contain all the facts related to the said incident.
14) Coming to the contention about variance in the
statement recorded by I.O. under Section 161 of the Code and
the evidence before the Court, we have already expressed that
the contradictions are not much and the same have not
affected the prosecution story.  It is to be noted that the
statement before the I.O. and the statement before the Court
were made after some interval and there is bound to be some
variance in the statements.  After verification of both the
statements, we are satisfied that the omission is not much and
not fatal to the prosecution case and it should not prejudice
prosecution evidence.  Accordingly, we reject the stand taken
by the counsel for the accused.  We have already concluded
that the evidence of both the eye-witnesses, viz., PWs 2 and 3
are not only reliable but they are independent witnesses.
Further, in the absence of any previous enmity with the
1Page 14
accused, the question of falsely implicating the accused does
not arise.
15) Finally, let us consider the evidence of the doctor who
conducted the post mortem on the body of the deceased.  Dr.
Awdesh Kumar (PW-4) attached to District Hospital,
Bulandshahar, in his evidence has stated that on 06.03.2002
Constables Jagat Singh and Usman brought the dead body of
Kum. Roshni, daughter of Kanchhi Lal along with the relevant
papers, specimen seal impression etc., for conducting post
mortem examination of the dead body.  Both of them also
identified the said dead body before him.  He compared the
seal stamped on the dead body package and found it to be
correct and packing too was found to be in tact.  He further
deposed that at 3.30 p.m. on 06.03.2002, he conducted the
post mortem on the dead body.  The age of the deceased
Roshini was about 11 years and she was of average physical
built-up by appearance.  He noted the following ante-mortem
injuries on the dead body of the victim-Roshni.
1Page 15
“1.  Ligature marks 20 cm x 2.5 cm all around neck and also
on that part of lower neck below thyroid cartilage.
2.  Multiple linear abrasions on the back of left leg wholly, in
its back side of sizes varying in between 10 cm to 3 cm.  The
face was congested and on her private part, blood was
visible.
In her internal examination, it was found that brain and
membranes of the brain, both long sacks, trachea, liver
tissues, kidney were found to be congested.  Hyoid of neck
was found to have been fractured.  Her hymen has been
ruptured.  Its smear slide was prepared.  It was then sent for
pathological examination.”
In his opinion, the cause of the death of the deceased was due
to asphyxia due to strangulation and also due to pre-mordial
injuries.  The post mortem report was marked as Exh. A-2.  For
a specific question, PW-4 has stated that “prior to her death,
the deceased was raped and due to that reason only, her
hymen has been found to be ruptured”.  The above conclusion
of PW-4 fully supports the case of the prosecution that the
deceased was raped before strangulation.  He also stated that
blood was seen in the vagina of the deceased and her hymen
was found to have been ruptured.  
16) Mr. Mani has pointed out that in the absence of the
report of Sperm Detection Test, the conclusion regarding rape
cannot be accepted.  It is true that PW-4 has stated that the
1Page 16
slide containing sperms which had been sent for examination
has not returned so far along with the examination report.  In
the absence of such a report, the case of the prosecution
cannot be doubted about rape, particularly, in the light of
categorical findings of the doctor that her hymen was found to
have been ruptured.  The other prosecution witnesses have
also stated injury on her private part and oozing of blood.  The
medical evidence proved that the victim was raped before her
death and she died on 05.03.2002.  In other words, the
prosecution story is fully corroborated with the medical
evidence on record and, unfortunately, the High Court failed to
give importance to the said evidence.
17) The I.Os PWs 6 and 7 prepared panchnama Exh. No. A-5
and related papers which are Exh. Nos. A-6 to A-9.  Exh. No.
A-10 contains the list of articles confiscated by the I.O. viz.,
Salwar, panty and Hawai slippers which are marked as
material object Nos. 1 to 3.  PW-6 has prepared a spot map
which is Exh. A-11.
1Page 17
18) Finally, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that failure to recover chunni (dupatta) which was alleged to
have been used for pressing the neck goes against the
prosecution case.  It is true that the prosecution has not
collected the same but, in the light of the material objects, the
evidence of prosecution witnesses, statement of the doctor who
conducted the post mortem, his opinion etc. amply prove the
prosecution case and we reject the claim of the counsel for the
respondent.
19) The primary concern both at national and international
level is about the devastating increase in rape cases and cases
relating to crime against women in the world. India is no
exception to it.  Although the statutory provisions provide
strict penal action against such offenders, it is for the Courts
to ultimately decide whether such incident has occurred or
not.  The Courts should be more cautious in appreciating the
evidence and the accused should not be left scot-free merely
on flimsy grounds.  In the instant case, the accused had
committed rape, which repels against moral conscience as he
1Page 18
chose a girl of 11 years to satisfy his lust and subsequently
murdered her.
20) In the light of the acceptable materials in the form of oral
and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution,
particularly, the eye-witnesses PWs 2 and 3 who are
independent witnesses coupled with the evidence of the doctor
(PW-4), we accept the conclusion of the trial court and
disagree with the conclusion of the High Court.  The analysis
and the ultimate conclusion of the High Court is contrary to
the acceptable and reliable material placed by the prosecution
and we hold that the accused has first committed the offence
of rape and then murdered the deceased.  We are satisfied that
the prosecution has established both the charges under
Sections 376 and 302 of IPC.  
21) In view of the same, the conclusion arrived by the High
Court is set aside.  Taking note of the fact that the incident
occurred in the year 2002, we feel that rigorous imprisonment
for life would meet the ends of justice.  
1Page 19
22) In view of the same, the respondent-accused is directed
to surrender before the concerned authority/Court within a
period of two weeks failing which the trial Judge is directed to
take necessary effective steps for sending him to prison.  The
appeal preferred by the State is allowed.         
………….…………………………J.
                (P. SATHASIVAM)                                
        ………….…………………………J.
               (RANJAN GOGOI)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 12, 2012.
1

The doctrine of finality of judgment or the principles of res judicata are founded on the basic principle that where a Court of competent jurisdiction has decided an issue, the same ought not allowed to be agitated again and again. Such a doctrine would be wholly inapplicable to cases where the two forums have separate and independent jurisdictions. In the instant case, the High Court decided the petition of the detenu under Article 226 which was a discretionary jurisdiction whereas the jurisdiction to grant relief in a petition under Article 32 filed in the Supreme Court is guaranteed by the Constitution and once the court finds that there has been a violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, then it has no discretion in the matter but is bound to grant the relief to the detenu by setting aside the order of detention. The doctrine of res judicata or the principles of finality of judgment cannot be allowed to whittle down or override the express constitutional mandate to the Supreme Court enshrined in Article 32 of the Constitution.


Page 1
          REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CRIMINAL   APPEAL   NO.   866   OF   2008
Baby Devassy Chully @ Bobby                  .... Appellant(s)
Versus
Union of India & Ors.          .... Respondent(s)
   
  J  U  D  G   M  E  N  T
P.Sathasivam,J.
1) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and
order dated 16.03.2006 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1500 of
2005 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition filed by
the appellant herein.
2) Brief facts:
(a) According to the appellant, the Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence (DRI), Mumbai Zonal Unit, Mumbai, received an
intelligence that one sea-faring vessel by name M.T. AL
SHAHABA (a motor tanker) carrying approximately 700 metric
1Page 2
tons (MT) of Diesel Oil of foreign origin is arriving into Indian
Customs Waters on or around 20
th
or 21
st December, 2004 and
the said diesel oil would be smuggled into India.  The officers of
the DRI, Mumbai, therefore, kept surveillance in that area and
on 21.12.2004, the officers spotted the said vessel.  They
noticed two self propelled barges and two dumb barges each
towed by a tow boat were around the said vessel.  They also
noticed that pipes were attached from the said vessel to the
barges and oil was being pumped into the barges from the
vessel.  The officers of the DRI boarded the said vessel and
took control of the same.  The vessel and barges were found to
be of Mumbai coast within the Indian territorial waters.  When
the officers made enquiry with the Captain of the vessel -
Fouad Ahmed Al Manie, he informed that the vessel was
carrying High Speed Diesel (HSD) from Muscat.  The Captain
was not holding any legal documents for import of the said
diesel oil into India.  The Captain informed the officers that he
has already discharged around 250 MTs of oil from the vessel
into three barges before they boarded the vessel.  The officers,
therefore, brought the said vessel and barges to the P and V
Anchorage of Port Trust, Mumbai.  Two independent panchas
2Page 3
were brought and detailed inventory was prepared and after
conducting search of the said vessel and barges, panchnamas
were drawn.  The officers of the DRI seized the said diesel oil
weighing about 770 MTs, worth Rs. 2 crores, under the
Customs Act, 1962.
(b) During the course of investigation, the officers came to
know the name of the appellant-detenu and one Chand as the
persons behind the said smuggling.  On 22/23.12.2004, the
statement of the Captain of the vessel was recorded wherein he
stated that he was asked by his master to take the vessel to
the Indian Coast and to deliver the consignment to one Bobbythe detenu in India.  On the same day, the statement of Sayyed
Hussain Madar @ Chand was also recorded wherein he, inter
alia, stated that he was to purchase the said Diesel Oil brought
by Bobby in India and sell the same.
(c) During the course of follow-up action of the said seizure
of the vessel, the officers of the DRI, Mumbai seized about
5.127 MTs of previously smuggled diesel oil stored in two
barges at Reti Bunder, Belapur and arrested Chand, Captain
Fouad Ahmed Al Manie, Shaikh Ahmedali, Murugan
Murugeshan and Sadiq Anwar under Section 104 of the
3Page 4
Customs Act, 1962 on 23.12.2004 and were produced before
the Addl. CMM, Esplanade, Mumbai on 24.12.2004 and were
later released on bail on 09.02.2005.  However, subsequently,
all of them retracted their statements.  On 04.03.2005,
residential premises of the appellant-Bobby were searched and
finally he was traced on 14.03.2005.  On the same day, he
moved an anticipatory bail application in the Sessions Court,
Mumbai which was rejected on 24.03.2005.  On 24.03.2005,
the statement of Bobby was recorded under Section 108 of the
Customs Act, 1962.  On the basis of his statement, the officers
arrested the appellant on 25.03.2005.  On 12.04.2005, he was
granted bail by the Addl. CMM, Mumbai but he did not avail of
the same.  On 03.05.2005, the Joint Secretary to the
Government of India, after considering the appellant’s high
propensity and potentiality to indulge in prejudicial activities
and with a view to prevent him from abetting the smuggling of
goods in future, passed the detention order against him under
Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter
referred to as “the COFEPOSA Act”).
4Page 5
(d) Being aggrieved by the said order, on 02.06.2005, the
appellant filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 1500 of 2005 before
the Bombay High Court.  The High Court, finding no substance
in the writ petition, by impugned judgment dated 16.03.2006,
dismissed the same.
(e) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has filed
this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.  On
09.05.2008, leave was granted.
3) Heard Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the appellant,
Mr. K. Swami, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and
Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, learned counsel for Respondent No.4-
State.
4) Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the appellant, after
taking us through the detention order dated 03.05.2005 and
the grounds of detention as well as the impugned order of the
High Court dismissing the writ petition raised the following
contentions:
(i) inasmuch as on the date of passing of the detention
order, i.e., 03.05.2005, the appellant was in jail, in that event
there is no compelling necessity to detain him under the
provisions of the COFEPOSA Act ;
5Page 6
(ii) the Detaining Authority failed to take note of relevant
aspect, i.e., the detenu was in custody, hence, the Detention
Order is liable to be quashed on the ground of non-application
of mind; and
(iii) the Detaining Authority relied upon the retraction
statement of co-accused without adverting to their confessional
statement which vitiates the detention order.
5) Mr. K. Swami, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 & 2-
Detaining Authority, submitted as under:-
(i)   taking note of prejudicial activities and with a view to
prevent the appellant from involving/abetting the smuggling of
goods, the Detaining Authority rightly invoked the provisions of
the COFEPOSA Act;
(ii) all the procedural safeguards have been strictly adhered
to by the Detaining Authority; and
(iii) all the points raised by the learned counsel for the
appellant before this Court had already been considered and
negatived by the High Court, hence, there is no ground for
interference.
6Page 7
6) We have carefully considered the rival contentions,
perused the detention order, grounds of detention and all the
connected materials.
7) At the foremost, Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the
appellant pressed into service the decision of this Court in
Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu Through Secretary to
Government and Anr., (2011) 5 SCC 244.  He very much
relied on paragraph 29 of the said decision which reads as
under:
“29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to
democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. No
such law exists in the USA and in England (except during
war time). Since, however, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution
of India permits preventive detention, we cannot hold it
illegal but we must confine the power of preventive detention
within very narrow limits, otherwise we will be taking away
the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution of India which was won after long, arduous and
historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinary
law of the land (the Penal Code and other penal statutes) can
deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law
will be illegal.”
We are conscious of the fact that the right to liberty is
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  At the
same time, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution permits
preventive detention.  Keeping the above principles in mind, let
7Page 8
us consider whether the impugned detention order is
sustainable in law or not.
8) In a series of decisions, this Court has held that it is the
subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority whether a
person has to be detained for a particular period of time or not.
In the impugned grounds of detention, the Detaining Authority
has narrated all the reasons for passing the detention order
detaining the appellant with a view to prevent him from
abetting the smuggling of goods in future.
9) With regard to non-application of mind, Mr. K.K. Mani,
learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that on the date
of passing of the detention order, i.e., 03.05.2005, the detenu
was in prison though he was granted bail on 12.04.2005, he
had not availed the same and continued in prison on the date
of order.  According to him, this aspect was not reflected in the
detention order which, according to him, vitiates the detention
on the principle of non-application of mind.  It is true that
though the detenu was granted bail on 12.04.2005, for the
reasons best known to him, he did not avail such benefit and
continued to be in jail on the date of the detention, i.e.,
03.05.2005.  It is true that this aspect has not been mentioned
8Page 9
in the detention order, however, on the other hand, it is not in
dispute that the grounds of detention which forms part of the
Detention Order dated 03.05.2005 clearly mention the details
about the bail order dated 12.04.2005 and non-availing of the
same on the date of detention order, i.e., 03.05.2005.  In this
regard, learned counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of
this Court in Binod Singh vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad,
Bihar & Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 416 wherein the contention of the
petitioner therein was that the order of preventive detention
could only be justified against a person in detention if the
Detaining Authority was satisfied that his release from
detention was imminent and the order of detention was
necessary for putting him back in jail.  He also contented that
the service of order of detention on the petitioner while he was
in jail was futile and useless since such an order had no
application under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act,
1980.  While considering the said claim, this Court, in
paragraph 7, held as under:
“7. It is well settled in our constitutional framework that
the power of directing preventive detention given to the
appropriate authorities must be exercised in exceptional
cases as contemplated by the various provisions of the
different statutes dealing with preventive detention and
should be used with great deal of circumspection. There
9Page 10
must be awareness of the facts necessitating preventive
custody of a person for social defence. If a man is in custody
and there is no imminent possibility of his being released,
the power of preventive detention should not be
exercised……..”
10) It is clear that if a person concerned is in custody and
there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the rule
is that the power of preventive detention should not be
exercised.   In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that on
12.04.2005 itself, the competent Court has granted bail but
the appellant did not avail such benefit.  In other words, on the
date of the detention order, i.e., 03.05.2005, by virtue of the
order granting bail even on 12.04.2005, it would be possible
for the detenu to come out without any difficulty.  In such
circumstances, while reiterating the principle of this Court
enunciated in the above decision and in view of the fact that
the detenu was having the order of bail in his hand, it is
presumed that at any moment, it would be possible for him to
come out and indulge in prejudicial activities, hence, the said
decision is not helpful to the case of the appellant.  In view of
the above circumstances and of the fact that the Detaining
Authority was aware of the grant of bail and clearly stated the
same in the grounds of detention, we reject the contra
arguments made by the learned counsel for the appellant.  On
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the other hand, we hold that the Detaining Authority was
conscious of all relevant aspects and passed the impugned
order of detention in order to prevent the appellant from
abetting the smuggling of goods in future.
11) For the same reason, the other contention, namely, that
no compelling necessity to pass the order of detention is to be
rejected.  As a matter of fact, learned counsel for the Detaining
Authority took us through various grounds/details/materials
adverted to in the impugned order and we are satisfied that it
cannot be claimed that there was no compelling necessity to
pass the order of detention.  We have already pointed out that
it is the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority
whether the order of detention is to be invoked or not.
Accordingly, we reject the above contention also.
12) The next contention, namely, the Detaining Authority
relied on the retraction statement of co-accused without
looking into their confession, it is argued by the learned
counsel for the appellant that without adverting to confessional
statement of the co-accused, reliance based upon the
retraction statement is not maintainable.  It is true that in
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paragraph 10 of the grounds of detention, the Detaining
Authority has stated as under:-
“Chand, Capt. Fouad Ahmed and Sadruddin B. Khan
have retracted their statements after arrest before the
Magistrate.  However, a rebuttal to these retractions was
filed before the Magistrate.  No correspondence has been
received from the said persons or the Advocate’s on the
rebuttal filed by DRI.”
It is equally true that there is no reference to confessional
statement of the co-accused.  As rightly pointed out by the
learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 & 2 that what the
Detaining Authority has stated in paragraph 10, extracted
above, is only mere reference or narration of fact for
completion of the proceedings.  In other words, we are satisfied
that it is not relied upon statement/document as claimed by
the learned counsel for the appellant.  No doubt, by drawing
our attention to the decision in A. Sowkath Ali vs. Union of
India & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 148, Mr. K.K. Mani, learned
counsel for the appellant contended that both the confessional
and retraction statements ought to have been placed and
furnished to the appellant.  In the said decision, this Court has
held that the confessional statement and the retraction
statement both constituting a composite relevant fact should
have been placed.  It was further held that if any one of the
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two documents alone is placed, without the other, it would
affect the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority.
Therefore, it was held that non-placement of the retraction
affects the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority.
There is no quarrel as to the proposition, in fact, the
sponsoring authority has to place all the relevant documents
before the Detaining Authority.  We reiterate that all the
documents which are relevant, which have bearing on the
issue, which are likely to affect the mind of the Detaining
Authority should be placed before it.  Further, a document
which has no link with the issue cannot be construed as
relevant.  In the case on hand, we have already observed that
what the Detaining Authority has stated in paragraph 10 of the
grounds is only a mere reference and no reliance can be based
on the same.  However, it is not in dispute that the appellantdetenu was supplied even the retraction statement referred to
in paragraph 10 along with the grounds of detention.  In such
circumstance, this contention is also rejected.
13) Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 & 2 has
brought to our notice that on earlier occasion, i.e., 27.02.2006,
the present appellant challenged the very same detention order
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by way of filing a writ petition being W.P.(Crl.) No. D-5620 of
2006 under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court.
By order dated 06.03.2006, this Court dismissed the said
petition, hence, according to the learned counsel for the
respondents, the appellant is debarred from filing the present
appeal against the dismissal of the writ petition by the High
Court of Bombay.  Similar issue was considered by this Court
relating to filing of Habeas Corpus petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India in Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal
Kundaliya vs. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 436
wherein this Court held in paragraph 10 as under:
“10. ……………….The doctrine of finality of judgment or
the principles of res judicata are founded on the basic
principle that where a Court of competent jurisdiction has
decided an issue, the same ought not allowed to be agitated
again and again. Such a doctrine would be wholly
inapplicable to cases where the two forums have separate
and independent jurisdictions. In the instant case, the High
Court decided the petition of the detenu under Article 226
which was a discretionary jurisdiction whereas the
jurisdiction to grant relief in a petition under Article 32 filed
in the Supreme Court is guaranteed by the Constitution and
once the court finds that there has been a violation of Article
22(5) of the Constitution, then it has no discretion in the
matter but is bound to grant the relief to the detenu by
setting aside the order of detention. The doctrine of res
judicata or the principles of finality of judgment cannot be
allowed to whittle down or override the express
constitutional mandate to the Supreme Court enshrined in
Article 32 of the Constitution. In a recent decision in the
case of Santosh Anand v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 420
this Court has pointed out that the concept of liberty has
now been widened by Maneka Gandhi case (1978) 1 SCC 248
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where Article 21 as construed by this Court has added new
dimensions to the various features and concepts of liberty as
enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. For
these reasons, therefore, we overruled the preliminary
objection taken by the respondents.”
In view of the same and in the light of the additional grounds
raised and also of the fact that the issue relates to personal
liberty of a citizen, we reject the objection of the respondents
and hold that the present appeal cannot be dismissed on the
grounds of res judicata.  
14) Before winding up, it is our duty to refer one factual
aspect pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant.  It
is seen that immediately after passing of the detention order on
03.05.2005, a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was filed before the High Court of
Bombay on 02.06.2005.  It is the claim of the appellant that
after hearing all the parties, the High Court reserved its orders
on 24.10.2005 and according to the learned counsel for the
appellant, the High Court pronounced its orders only on
16.03.2006, i.e., nearly after a period of 5 months.  He pointed
out that because of the same, the detenu could not know the
fate of his petition for a period of 5 months when the detention
period was for one year.  
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15) By this appeal, we remind all the High Courts that in a
matter of this nature affecting the personal liberty of a citizen,
it is the duty of the Courts to take all endeavours and efforts
for an early decision.  In the case on hand, we feel that keeping
the writ petition pending after hearing the parties and
compelling the detenu to wait for 5 months to know the result
of his petition, cannot be accepted.  We request all the High
Courts to give priority for the disposal of the matters relating to
personal liberty of a citizen, particularly, when the detention
period is for one year or less than a year and, more so, after
hearing the parties, the decision must be known to the affected
party without unreasonable delay.  
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16) In the light of the above discussion, we are unable to
accept any of the contentions raised by the appellant.
Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
...…………….…………………………J.
          (P. SATHASIVAM)                                
..…....…………………………………J.
  (RANJAN GOGOI)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 12, 2012.
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