LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Monday, October 8, 2012

In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. With a view to ensure that the illegal construction raised by respondent No.7 is pulled down without delay, we issue the following directions: 1. Within three months from today, respondent No.7 shall pay the price of the flats etc. to the purchasers with interest @ 18% per annum from the date of payment. 2. The occupiers of illegal/unauthorized construction shall vacate such portions of the building within next one month. 3. Within next one month, the Corporation shall demolish unauthorized construction after taking adequate precautionary measures. 4. Respondent No.7 shall pay cost of Rs.25,00,000/- for brazen violation of the sanctioned plan and continuance of illegal construction despite ‘stop work notice’. The amount of cost shall be deposited with the Kolkata State Legal Service Authority within three months and the same be utilized for providing legal aid in deserving cases.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7356   of 2012
                   (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 23780/2011)


Dipak Kumar Mukherjee                                         …Appellant


                                   versus


Kolkata Municipal Corporation and others
…Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.     In  last  four  decades,  the  menace  of  illegal  and  unauthorised
constructions of buildings and other structures in different  parts  of  the
country has  acquired  monstrous  proportion.   This  Court  has  repeatedly
emphasized the importance of planned development of the  cities  and  either
approved the orders passed by the High Court or itself gave  directions  for
demolition of illegal  constructions  -  (1)  K.  Ramadas  Shenoy  v.  Chief
Officers, Town Municipal Council (1974) 2 SCC  506;  (2)  Virender  Gaur  v.
State of Haryana (1995) 2 SCC 577; (3) Pleasant Stay Hotel v.  Palani  Hills
Conservation Council (1995) 6 SCC 127; (4)  Cantonment  Board,  Jabalpur  v.
S.N. Awasthi 1995 Supp.(4) SCC 595; (5) Pratibha Coop. Housing Society  Ltd.
v. State of Maharashtra (1991) 3 SCC 341; (6) G.N. Khajuria  (Dr)  v.  Delhi
Development Authority (1995) 5 SCC  762;  (7)  Manju  Bhatia  v.  New  Delhi
Municipal Council (1997) 6 SCC 370; (8) M.I. Builders Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  Radhey
Shyam Sahu (1999) 6 SCC 464; (9) Friends  Colony  Development  Committee  v.
State of Orissa (2004) 8 SCC 733; (10) Shanti Sports Club v. Union of  India
(2009) 15 SCC 705 and (11)  Priyanka  Estates  International  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.
State of Assam (2010) 2 SCC 27.

3.    In K.  Ramadas  Shenoy  v.  Chief  Officers,  Town  Municipal  Council
(supra), the  resolution  passed  by  the  Municipal  Committee  authorising
construction of a cinema theatre was challenged on the ground that the  site
was earmarked for the construction of  Kalyan  Mantap-cum-Lecture  Hall  and
the same could not have been used for any  other  purpose.  The  High  Court
held that the cinema theatre could not be constructed at the  disputed  site
but declined to quash the resolution  of  the  Municipal  Committee  on  the
ground that the theatre owner had spent huge  amount.  While  setting  aside
the High Court’s order, this Court observed:

           “An illegal construction of a cinema building materially affects
           the right to or enjoyment of the property by persons residing in
           the residential area. The Municipal Authorities owe a  duty  and
           obligation under the statute to see that the residential area is
           not spoilt by unauthorised construction. The Scheme is  for  the
           benefit of the residents of the locality. The Municipality  acts
           in aid of the Scheme. The rights of the residents  in  the  area
           are invaded by an illegal construction of a cinema building.  It
           has to be remembered that a scheme in a residential  area  means
           planned orderliness in accordance with the requirements  of  the
           residents. If the scheme  is  nullified  by  arbitrary  acts  in
           excess and derogation of the  powers  of  the  Municipality  the
           courts will quash orders passed by Municipalities in such cases.

           The Court enforces the performance of statutory duty  by  public
           bodies as obligation to rate payers who have a  legal  right  to
           demand compliance by a local authority with its duty to  observe
           statutory rights alone. The Scheme here is for  the  benefit  of
           the public. There is special interest in the performance of  the
           duty. All the residents in the area have their personal interest
           in the performance of the  duty.  The  special  and  substantial
           interest of the residents in the area is injured by the  illegal
           construction.”



4.    In Pratibha  Coop.  Housing  Society  Ltd.  v.  State  of  Maharashtra
(supra), this Court approved  the  order  passed  by  the  Bombay  Municipal
Corporation for demolition  of  the  illegally  constructed  floors  of  the
building and observed:

           “Before parting with the case we would like to observe that this
           case should be a pointer to all  the  builders  that  making  of
           unauthorised  constructions  never  pays  and  is  against   the
           interest of the society at large. The rules, regulations and bye-
           laws are made by the  Corporations  or  development  authorities
           taking in view the larger public interest of the society and  it
           is the bounden duty of the citizens  to  obey  and  follow  such
           rules which are made for their own benefits.”



5.    In Friends Colony Development Committee v. State  of  Orissa  (supra),
this  Court  noted  that  large   number   of   illegal   and   unauthorised
constructions were being  raised  in  the  city  of  Cuttack  and  made  the
following significant observations:

           “………Builders violate with impunity the sanctioned building plans
           and indulge in deviations much to the prejudice of  the  planned
           development of the city and at the peril of the occupants of the
           premises constructed or of the inhabitants of the city at large.
           Serious threat is posed to ecology and environment and,  at  the
           same  time,  the  infrastructure  consisting  of  water  supply,
           sewerage and  traffic  movement  facilities  suffers  unbearable
           burden and is often thrown out of  gear.  Unwary  purchasers  in
           search of roof over their heads and purchasing  flats/apartments
           from builders, find themselves having  fallen  prey  and  become
           victims to the designs of  unscrupulous  builders.  The  builder
           conveniently walks away having pocketed the money leaving behind
           the unfortunate occupants to face the  music  in  the  event  of
           unauthorised  constructions  being  detected  or   exposed   and
           threatened with demolition. Though the  local  authorities  have
           the staff consisting of engineers and inspectors whose  duty  is
           to keep a watch on building activities and to promptly stop  the
           illegal constructions or deviations coming up, they  often  fail
           in discharging their duty. Either they don't act or do  not  act
           promptly  or  do  connive  at  such  activities  apparently  for
           illegitimate considerations. If such activities are to stop some
           stringent  actions  are  required  to  be  taken  by  ruthlessly
           demolishing  the  illegal  constructions  and   non-compoundable
           deviations. The unwary purchasers who  shall  be  the  sufferers
           must be adequately compensated by the builder. The arms  of  the
           law  must  stretch  to   catch   hold   of   such   unscrupulous
           builders………….

           In all developed and developing countries there is  emphasis  on
           planned development of cities which is sought to be achieved  by
           zoning, planning and regulating building construction  activity.
           Such planning, though highly  complex,  is  a  matter  based  on
           scientific   research,   study   and   experience   leading   to
           rationalisation of laws by way  of  legislative  enactments  and
           rules and regulations framed thereunder. Zoning and planning  do
           result in  hardship  to  individual  property  owners  as  their
           freedom to use their property in the way they like, is subjected
           to regulation and control. The private owners are to some extent
           prevented from making the most profitable use of their property.
           But for this reason alone the controlling regulations cannot  be
           termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. The private interest stands
           subordinated to the public good. It can be stated in a way  that
           power to plan development of city and to regulate  the  building
           activity therein flows from the police power of the  State.  The
           exercise of such governmental power is justified on  account  of
           it being reasonably necessary for  the  public  health,  safety,
           morals or general welfare and ecological considerations;  though
           an unnecessary or unreasonable intermeddling  with  the  private
           ownership of the property may not be justified.

           The municipal laws regulating the building construction activity
           may provide for regulations as to  floor  area,  the  number  of
           floors, the extent of height rise and the nature of use to which
           a built-up property may be subjected in any particular area. The
           individuals as property  owners  have  to  pay  some  price  for
           securing peace, good order, dignity, protection and comfort  and
           safety of the community. Not only filth,  stench  and  unhealthy
           places have to be eliminated, but the layout helps in  achieving
           family values, youth values, seclusion and clean air to make the
           locality a better place to live. Building regulations also  help
           in reduction or elimination of fire hazards,  the  avoidance  of
           traffic dangers and  the  lessening  of  prevention  of  traffic
           congestion  in  the  streets  and  roads.  Zoning  and  building
           regulations are also legitimised from the point of view  of  the
           control of community development, the prevention of overcrowding
           of land, the furnishing of recreational  facilities  like  parks
           and playgrounds and the availability of adequate water, sewerage
           and other governmental or utility services.

           Structural and lot  area  regulations  authorise  the  municipal
           authorities to regulate  and  restrict  the  height,  number  of
           storeys and other structures; the percentage of a plot that  may
           be occupied; the size of yards,  courts  and  open  spaces;  the
           density of population; and the location and use of buildings and
           structures. All these have in our view and do achieve the larger
           purpose of the public health, safety or general welfare. So  are
           front setback  provisions,  average  alignments  and  structural
           alterations. Any violation of zoning and regulation  laws  takes
           the toll in  terms  of  public  welfare  and  convenience  being
           sacrificed apart from the risk, inconvenience and hardship which
           is posed to the occupants of the building.”



                                             (emphasis supplied)
6.    In Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India (supra), this  Court  approved
the order of the Delhi High Court which had  declared  the  construction  of
sports  complex  by  the  appellant  on  the  land  acquired   for   planned
development of Delhi to be illegal and observed:

           “In the last four decades, almost all cities, big or small, have
           seen unplanned growth.  In  the  21st  century,  the  menace  of
           illegal and unauthorised  constructions  and  encroachments  has
           acquired monstrous proportions  and  everyone  has  been  paying
           heavy price for the same. Economically affluent people and those
           having support of the political and executive apparatus  of  the
           State  have   constructed   buildings,   commercial   complexes,
           multiplexes, malls, etc. in blatant violation of  the  municipal
           and town planning laws, master plans,  zonal  development  plans
           and even the sanctioned building plans. In most of the cases  of
           illegal or  unauthorised  constructions,  the  officers  of  the
           municipal and other regulatory bodies turn blind eye either  due
           to the influence of higher functionaries of the State  or  other
           extraneous reasons. Those who construct buildings  in  violation
           of the relevant statutory  provisions,  master  plan,  etc.  and
           those who  directly  or  indirectly  abet  such  violations  are
           totally unmindful of the grave  consequences  of  their  actions
           and/or omissions on the present as well as future generations of
           the country which will be forced to live in unplanned cities and
           urban areas. The people belonging to this class do  not  realise
           that the constructions made in violation of the  relevant  laws,
           master plan or zonal development  plan  or  sanctioned  building
           plan or the building is used for a purpose other  than  the  one
           specified in the relevant statute or the master plan, etc., such
           constructions   put   unbearable   burden    on    the    public
           facilities/amenities like  water,  electricity,  sewerage,  etc.
           apart from creating chaos on the roads. The pollution caused due
           to traffic congestion affects the health of the road users.  The
           pedestrians and people  belonging  to  weaker  sections  of  the
           society, who cannot afford the luxury of  air-conditioned  cars,
           are the worst  victims  of  pollution.  They  suffer  from  skin
           diseases of different types, asthma,  allergies  and  even  more
           dreaded diseases like  cancer.  It  can  only  be  a  matter  of
           imagination  how  much  the  Government  has  to  spend  on  the
           treatment of such persons and also for controlling pollution and
           adverse impact on the environment due to traffic  congestion  on
           the roads and chaotic conditions  created  due  to  illegal  and
           unauthorised constructions. This Court has, from time  to  time,
           taken  cognizance  of  buildings  constructed  in  violation  of
           municipal and other  laws  and  emphasised  that  no  compromise
           should be made with the  town  planning  scheme  and  no  relief
           should be given to the violator of  the  town  planning  scheme,
           etc. on the ground that  he  has  spent  substantial  amount  on
           construction of the buildings, etc.


           Unfortunately, despite repeated judgments by this Court and  the
           High Courts, the builders and other affluent people  engaged  in
           the construction activities, who  have,  over  the  years  shown
           scant  respect  for  regulatory  mechanism  envisaged   in   the
           municipal and other similar laws,  as  also  the  master  plans,
           zonal development plans, sanctioned plans, etc.,  have  received
           encouragement and support from the State apparatus. As and  when
           the Courts have passed orders or the officers of local and other
           bodies have taken action for ensuring rigorous  compliance  with
           laws relating to planned development of  the  cities  and  urban
           areas   and   issued   directions   for   demolition   of    the
           illegal/unauthorised constructions, those  in  power  have  come
           forward  to   protect   the   wrongdoers   either   by   issuing
           administrative orders or enacting  laws  for  regularisation  of
           illegal and unauthorised constructions in the name of compassion
           and hardship. Such actions have done  irreparable  harm  to  the
           concept of planned development of the cities and urban areas. It
           is high time that the executive and political apparatus  of  the
           State  take  serious  view  of  the  menace   of   illegal   and
           unauthorised constructions and stop their support to the lobbies
           of affluent class of builders and others, else  even  the  rural
           areas  of  the  country  will  soon  witness   similar   chaotic
           conditions.”



 7.   In Priyanka  Estates  International  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  State  of  Assam
(supra),  this  Court  refused  to  order  regularisation  of  the  illegal
construction raised by the appellant and observed:
           “It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge   that   illegal   and
           unauthorised constructions beyond the sanctioned  plans  are  on
           rise, may be  due  to  paucity  of  land  in  big  cities.  Such
           activities are required to be dealt with by firm hands otherwise
           builders/colonisers would continue to build or construct  beyond
           the sanctioned and approved plans and would still go  scot-free.
           Ultimately, it  is  the  flat  owners  who  fall  prey  to  such
           activities as the ultimate desire of a common man is to  have  a
           shelter of his own. Such unlawful constructions  are  definitely
           against the public interest  and  hazardous  to  the  safety  of
           occupiers and residents  of  multistoreyed  buildings.  To  some
           extent both parties can be said to be  equally  responsible  for
           this. Still the greater loss would be of those flat owners whose
           flats are to be demolished as compared to the builder.”



8.    What  needs  to  be  emphasised  is  that  illegal  and  unauthorised
constructions of  buildings  and  other  structure  not  only  violate  the
municipal laws and the concept of planned  development  of  the  particular
area but also affect various fundamental and constitutional rights of other
persons.  The common man feels cheated when  he  finds  that  those  making
illegal  and  unauthorised  constructions  are  supported  by  the   people
entrusted with the duty of preparing and executing master  plan/development
plan/zonal plan.  The reports of demolition of hutments and jhuggi  jhopris
belonging to poor and  disadvantaged  section  of  the  society  frequently
appear in the print media but one seldom gets to read about  demolition  of
illegally/unauthorisedly  constructed  multi-storied  structure  raised  by
economically affluent people.  The failure of the State apparatus  to  take
prompt action to demolish such  illegal  constructions  has  convinced  the
citizens that  planning  laws  are  enforced  only  against  poor  and  all
compromises are made by the State machinery when it  is  required  to  deal
with those who have money power or unholy nexus with the power corridors.

9.    We have prefaced disposal of this appeal by taking cognizance of  the
precedents in which this Court  held  that  there  should  be  no  judicial
tolerance of illegal and unauthorized constructions by those who treat  the
law to be their sub-servient, but are happy to note that the  functionaries
and  officers  of  Kolkata   Municipal   Corporation   (for   short,   ‘the
Corporation’) have been extremely vigilant and taken  steps  for  enforcing
the provisions of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980  (for  short,
‘the 1980 Act’) and the rules framed thereunder for demolition  of  illegal
construction raised by respondent No.7.  This has given a ray  of  hope  to
the residents of Kolkata that there will be zero tolerance against  illegal
and unauthorised constructions and those indulging in such activities  will
not be spared.

10.   The appellant is an enlightened resident of Kolkata. He succeeded  in
convincing the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta  High  Court  to  order
demolition  of  unauthorised  construction  of  multi-storied  building  by
respondent No.7 – M/s. Unique Construction on the plot owned by  respondent
No.8 – Sarjun Prasad Shaw but could not  persuade  the  Division  Bench  to
affirm the order of the learned Single Judge and this is the reason why  he
has approached this Court.

11.   Mohammad Shahid, (the sole  proprietor  cum  attorney  of  respondent
No.7) entered into an agreement with respondent  No.8  for  development  of
plot bearing  No.8/1F,  Gopal  Doctor  Road,  Kolkata.  The  building  plan
submitted by respondent No.7 for construction of two storied  building  was
sanctioned by the Corporation on 11.4.1990 and five years  time  was  given
for completing the construction.   When  the  site  was  inspected  by  the
officers of the Corporation in October, 2009, they  found  that  respondent
No.8 had raised unauthorised construction by erecting RCC column  upto  3rd
floor along with staircase in deviation of the sanctioned plan.  Thereupon,
stop work notice was issued by the  Executive  Engineer  (Civil),  Building
under Section 401 of the  1980  Act.   However,  instead  of  stopping  the
construction, respondent No.7 added one more floor.  This  brazen  defiance
of law by respondent No.7 led to the issuance of notices  dated  15.10.2009
and   10.11.2009   under   Sections   400(1)   and   401(A)   respectively.
Simultaneously, a report was submitted by Deputy Chief Engineer  (Building)
to the Director General (Building) – II, for demolition of the unauthorised
construction on  the  ground  that  structural  stability  of  the  illegal
construction was doubtful and existence of the same was  dangerous  to  the
lives of the people.   The issue  was  then  considered  by  the  Mayor-in-
Council on 14.1.2010 and  it  was  decided  to  demolish  the  unauthorised
construction. Accordingly, about 600 sq. ft. out of the  total  constructed
area measuring 1500 sq. ft. was demolished on 4.2.2010.
12.   In the meanwhile, the appellant filed WP No. 23741/2009 in  the  High
Court for issue of a direction to the Corporation to demolish  the  illegal
construction by respondent No.7.  The same was disposed of by  the  learned
Single Judge on 3.3.2010 with the direction that the  objection  raised  by
the appellant against the  unauthorised  construction  be  decided  by  the
competent authority after hearing the affected parties.  Simultaneously, it
was ordained that no illegal construction be carried out in the premises in
question.

13.   Notwithstanding the decision of the Mayor-in-Council and the order of
the  High  Court,  respondent  No.7  continued  with  the  construction  of
building, albeit in  violation  of  the  sanctioned  plan.  Therefore,  the
appellant filed fresh writ petition which  came  to  be  registered  as  WP
No.13815/2010 for demolition of the unauthorised construction and for issue
of a direction to the Corporation not to issue  completion  certificate  in
favour of respondent Nos.7 and 8. The second writ petition was disposed  of
by the learned Single  Judge  vide  order  dated  28.7.2010,  the  relevant
portions of which are extracted below:

           “It appears from the submissions that the construction has  been
           raised up to ground  plus  fourth  floor  which  is  beyond  the
           sanctioned plan. It is evident from  the  photo  copies  of  the
           records that it was resolved on 14th January, 2010 in the M.I.C.
           meeting of  the  Corporation  that  as  the  person  responsible
           continued with the unauthorised construction which might lead to
           an  accident,  appropriate  action  towards  demolition  of  the
           unauthorised  construction  should  be  taken  forthwith   under
           section 400(8) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act with the
           help of the local administration.

           Since admittedly, unauthorized  construction  has  been  raised,
           that is, construction has been carried out beyond the sanctioned
           plan, I  direct  the  Director  General  (Buildings-II)  Kolkata
           Municipal  Corporation  and  the  Executive  Engineer   (Civil),
           Building Department, Borough-IX, the respondent  nos.  3  and  4
           respectively,  to  demolish  the  unauthorized   structure,   as
           resolved, within eight weeks from the date of  communication  of
           this order. During such demolition, if need  be  the  respondent
           nos. 3 and 4 are at liberty to seek assistance of the Officer-in-
           Charge, Watgunge Police Station, Kolkata,  the  respondent  no.6
           shall render all assistance in implementing the  order  of  this
           Court.”



14.   Immediately thereafter,  Mohammad  Shahid  submitted  an  application
dated 13.8.2010 for regularisation of unauthorised portion of the  building
under Section 400(1) of the 1980 Act.  That application reads as under:
                                                   Date: 13.08.2010
           “To:
           The Executive Engineer (Civil)
           Building Department Br.-IX,
           The Kolkata Municipal Corporation,
           11, Belvedere Road, Kolkata-700027.




                 Sub:  Regularisation of additional floor over
                       Sanctioned Building.


                 Re:    Pre: No. 8/ 1 F, Gopal Doctor Road,
                       Ward No.76, Br.-IX.


           Dear Sir,


                 I Md. Shahid, attorney of the above mentioned premises, am
           submitting herewith one copy of ammonia print  of  five  storied
           building plan. The said building was sanctioned of two  storied,
           and additional three  more  storied  has  been  constructed  for
           accommodation of existing tenants and our family members.


                 Now I do request and pray to your goodself  to  regularize
           the unauthorized portion of  the  said  building  under  section
           400(1). For that I am ready to pay the penalty and  charges  for
           the same.


                 Hope your honour would extend your  co-operation  in  this
           respect and oblige me.

                 Thanking you.

                                                       Yours faithfully,

                                                        Sd/-
                                                   Md. Shahid.”


15.    Simultaneously, respondent No.7 challenged the order of the  learned
Single Judge by filing an appeal.   During  the  pendency  of  the  appeal,
Mohammad Shahid filed an additional affidavit dated 16.9.2010, paragraphs 5
to 10 whereof are reproduced below:

           “5.    I state that a plan dated 11.04.2009 vide building permit
           no.2009090004 was sanctioned for premises no. 8/1F, Gopal Doctor
           Road,  Kidderpore,  Kolkata-700023,  by  the  Kolkata  Municipal
           Corporation, for erection of a two storied building, covering  a
           sanctioned  area  measuring  about  145.82  square  meter.   The
           proposed F.A.R for the said plan was 0.99  over  land  measuring
           about  145.927  square  meter.  But  the   building   has   been
           constructed upto five storied. Presently, the total  constructed
           cover area for the five  storied  building  is  measuring  about
           559.57 square meter and the present F.A.R is 3.83.


           6.    I say that according to Clause (b) Sub-Rule 2 of  Rule  25
           of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Building  Rules  1990,  "if
           during the erection or execution of work any external  deviation
           beyond the sanctioned covered space is intended to be  made  and
           which does not violate the provisions of the  Act  or  the  said
           Rules, the person erecting such construction, prior to  carrying
           out such erection or execution of works, submit,  in  accordance
           with  the  provisions  of  the  said  rules,  a   revised   plan
           incorporating the deviation intended  to  be  carried  out,  for
           obtaining necessary sanction thereof.”


           7.    I further say that Clause (b) Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 25 of the
           Kolkata Municipal Corporation Building Rules, 1990, empowers the
           Municipal authorities to allow a person to construct beyond  the
           sanctioned covered area, which means construction exceeding  the
           Floor Area Ratio can be allowed to be carried on.




           8.    I say that there is no express provision  in  the  Kolkata
           Municipal Corporation Act 1980 and  also  in  Kolkata  Municipal
           Corporation   Building   Rules,   1990,   stopping   a    person
           from constructing beyond the Floor Area  Ratio.  I  further  say
           that though none of the  provisions  of  the  Kolkata  Municipal
           Corporation Act, 1980 and Kolkata Municipal Corporation Building
           Rules, 1990,  empowers  the  Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation  to
           regularize the construction made in  excess  of  the  sanctioned
           plan, but the Kolkata Municipal Corporation gets the said  power
           of regularization by virtue of the Full Bench Judgment  of  this
           Hon'ble Court delivered in the case  of  Ramesh  Prasad  Agarwal
           (Supra) reported in All India Reporter 1972 Calcutta 459. In the
           said case this Hon'ble Court was pleased to decide that 'even in
           respect of matters which involve  violation  of  an  unrelaxable
           building rules the Commissioner  has  discretion  not  to  order
           demolition if the violation is not of a serious nature.’


           9.    I say that I, on 13th August, 2010, have  already  applied
           before the Kolkata Municipal Corporation for  regularization  of
           the construction erected beyond the  sanctioned  plan  and  have
           submitted a revised  plan  for  sanction  before  the  concerned
           authority. Copy of the letter dated 13th August,  2010  and  the
           revised plan is collectively annexed hereto and marked with  the
           letter "R-l".


           10.   I say that the construction erected by me in  the  present
           case is not of a serious nature and there is no immediate threat
           that the building may fall down  and  the  said  fact  shall  be
           proved from the structural stability certificate issued  by  Sri
           Prabir Kumar Mitra, Civil Engineer, after due inspection of  the
           premises in question.


                 A copy of the structural stability certificate is  annexed
           hereto and marked with the letter "R-2".



16.   The  appellant  filed  detailed  counter  affidavit  dated  17.1.2011
reiterating his plea that the construction  made  by  respondent  No.7  was
illegal.  Thereafter, respondent No.8 filed affidavit dated  22.2.2010  and
questioned the locus standi of the appellant to  file  the  writ  petition.
Shri Tapas Chandra and Smt.  Asha  Devi  Shaw,  to  whom  the  unauthorised
portions of the building  are  said  to  have  been  sold,  got  themselves
impleaded as parties to the appeal filed by respondent No.7.  On  1.3.2011,
the Division Bench of the High Court  suo-motu  directed  issue  of  notice
under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure and publication thereof
in two daily newspapers, one in Bengali and another in  English  so  as  to
enable other purchasers of the unauthorised portions  of  the  building  to
present their cause before the Court.  The relevant portion of  that  order
reads as under:
                  “01.03.2011


                  Mr. Bhaskar Ghosh, learned Advocate, has filed  a  report
           of the Officer-in-Charge of the Watgunge Police Station.


                  Let 1st and 2nd pages of the said report be  endorsed  by
           the learned Advocate, Mr. Ghosh


                 Let the said report be kept on record.


                  From the said report it appears that in  an  unauthorized
           construction without sanction plan above 2nd floor, in terms  of
           the complaint filed by the Kolkata Municipal  Corporation,  Case
           No. 320 dated  14.10.2010  under  Section  401(A)  KMC  Act  was
           started and Developer/appellant  and  the  respondent/Owner  are
           accused in the said proceeding.


                  It is submitted by the learned Advocate, Mr.  Chatterjee,
           appearing  for  the  Developer  and  Mr.  Bhattacharya,  learned
           Advocate appearing for the owner that their clients already have
           been granted bail in  that  criminal  proceeding  and  trial  is
           continuing.


                 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate  appearing
           for the Developer/appellant and the learned  Advocate  appearing
           for the respondent/Owner that the  concerned  premises,  as  has
           been constructed, though on breach of the sanction plan  of  the
           Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation  but  many  persons  have   been
           provided with occupation  in  different  flats  by  selling  the
           concerned flats of said property or providing  their  occupation
           on considering their earlier tenancy right.


                 Let affidavits be filed by them disclosing the total number
           of flats of the concerned premises, the names of  the  occupants
           therein, if any, detailing the particulars, namely  their  right
           and  the  instruments  executed  by  the  appellant  and/or  the
           respondent/  Owner  concerned,  so  that  the  Court  may   pass
           appropriate order was to whether those persons should  be  heard
           to not before passing any decision in this appeal.


                 Let such affidavits be filed within 10 days from date.


                 The matter is posted for hearing on  15th  March,  2011  at
           10.30 A.M. as fixed matter.


                 Since it is the submission of the appellant that there  are
           many occupants above the 2nd floor  of  the  concerned  premises
           upto 5th floor which have been constructed without any  sanction
           plan, for effective adjudication, let notice under Order 1  Rule
           8 of the Code of Civil Procedure be published by  the  appellant
           within a week in the  two  daily  Newspapers  having  State-wide
           publication; one in Bengali and  another  in  English  and  will
           submit a Supplementary Affidavit disclosing his action  to  that
           effect.”



17.   On 15.3.2011, the High Court, after taking note of the fact that none
of the occupants had come forward to espouse their cause, directed  that  a
fresh notice  be  published  under  Order  1  Rule  8  C.P.C.   The  second
opportunity given by the High Court was also not availed by  the  occupants
of the illegally constructed portion of the building. The appeal  filed  by
respondent No.7 was finally disposed of by the Division Bench of  the  High
Court on 2.5.2011 and  the  competent  authority  of  the  Corporation  was
directed  to  take  appropriate  decision  in  accordance  with  law  after
complying with the principles of natural justice.  This is evinced from the
following extracts of the impugned order:
            “Having heard the learned Counsel appearing  for  the    parties
           and   considering   the   facts and circumstances of  the  case,
           We are of the view that the  competent    authority    of    the
           Kolkata Municipal Corporation should take  appropriate  decision
           under the provisions of the Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation  Act
           and Building Rules framed thereunder  while  dealing   with  the
           allegations of  unauthorized  construction  in  respect  of  any
           building. In the present case, specific allegation has been made
           to the effect, that two floors of the building in question  were
           constructed even in absence of sanctioned building plan.


            In the aforesaid circumstances, the competent authority  of  the
           Kolkata Municipal Corporation must take appropriate decision  in
           respect of the building in  question  upon  complying  with  the
           provisions of the Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation  Act  and  the
           Building Rules framed thereunder.


            The Court cannot usurp the authority of  the  Kolkata  Municipal
           Corporation in this regard. The validity and/or legality of  the
           decision  of  the  Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation   authorities
           regarding demolition  and/or   retention   of  any  unauthorized
           structure can be challenged before this  Court  but  this  Court
           under  normal  circumstances  should  not  dictate  the  Kolkata
           Municipal Corporation authorities to take any specific  decision
           regarding demolition  or  retention  of  any  structure  without
           allowing the competent authority to take appropriate decision in
           this regard.


             The  Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation  authorities  should  take
           appropriate decision in  respect  of  the  fate  of  an  illegal
           structure at the first instance and the  Court  will  thereafter
           adjudicate the correctness of such  decision.  The  Court  under
           normal circumstances should not either direct retention  of  any
           illegal structure or demolition of the same before allowing  the
           competent  authority  of   the   concerned   Kolkata   Municipal
           Corporation to take appropriate decision in accordance with law.


             For  the  aforementioned  reasons,  we  direct  the   competent
           authority of  Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation  to  consider  the
           nature and magnitude of the  unauthorised  construction  at  the
           premises  in  question  and  take  specific  decision  regarding
           retention or demolition of the same or any part thereof.


            Needless to mention that the competent authority of the  Kolkata
           Municipal Corporation will take appropriate decision strictly in
           accordance with law and upon observing the principles of natural
           justice without any further delay but positively within a period
           of two months from date.”





18.   Shri Bhaskar P. Gupta,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
appellant argued that the direction given by the Division Bench is  legally
unsustainable because while deciding the  appeal  preferred  by  respondent
No.7, the Division Bench of the High Court overlooked  the  fact  that  the
Mayor-in-Council had, after giving notice and opportunity of hearing to the
representative of respondent No.7, already passed order  on  14.1.2010  for
demolition  of  the  unauthorised  construction.   Learned  senior  counsel
emphasised that respondent No.7 had defied the ‘stop work notice’, decision
taken by Mayor-in-Council and continued with the construction  of  building
even after demolition of unauthorised portion thereof and argued  that  the
Division Bench of the High  Court  committed  serious  error  by  ordaining
compliance of the rule of audi alteram partem ignoring that respondent No.7
had never contested the factum of unauthorised construction.  Shri  Bhaskar
P. Gupta relied upon  the  judgments  of  this  Court  in   Friends  Colony
Development Committee v. State  of  Orissa  (supra)  and  Priyanka  Estates
International (P) Ltd. v. State of  Assam  (supra)   and  argued  that  the
Division Bench of the High Court committed  serious  error  by  interfering
with the direction given by the learned Single Judge for demolition of  the
construction which was raised  by  respondent  No.7  in  violation  of  the
sanctioned plan and by showing total contempt for the notices issued by the
Corporation under Sections 400 and 401 of the 1980 Act.

19.    Shri  Kalyan  Bandopadhyay,  learned  counsel  for  the  Corporation
extensively referred to the pleadings of  the  parties  to  show  that  the
representative of respondent No.7 had admitted construction of building  in
violation of the sanctioned plan and argued that such  construction  cannot
be regularised under Rule 25  (2)  of  the  Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation
Building Rules, 1990 (for short, ‘the Rules’).

20.    Learned  counsel  for  respondent  No.7  fairly  conceded  that  the
construction raised by his client is contrary to the  sanctioned  plan  but
argued that the Corporation is duty bound to pass appropriate order on  the
application filed for regularisation of such construction. Learned  counsel
submitted that even though Rule 25(2) of the  Rules  may  not  be  strictly
applicable to the case of his client, the  Corporation  possesses  inherent
power to regularise the illegal construction and there is no  justification
to demolish the unauthorised portion of the building without  deciding  the
application submitted on 13.8.2010.

21.   We have considered the respective arguments and carefully perused the
record.  Since, respondent No.7 has not  disputed  that  the  building  was
constructed in violation of the sanctioned plan  and  the  Mayor-in-Council
passed order dated 14.1.2010 for demolition of the  disputed  construction,
the direction given by  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  to  the
competent authority of the Corporation  to  pass  appropriate  order  after
giving opportunity of hearing to respondent No.7 cannot be  sustained.   It
appears that attention of the Division Bench was not drawn to  the  notices
issued by the competent authority of the Corporation  under  Sections  400,
401 and 401A of the 1980 Act and order dated 14.1.2010 passed by the Mayor-
in-Council, else it would not have decided the appeal by assuming that  the
competent authority had not passed an order for demolition of  the  illegal
construction. The factum of illegal  construction  having  been  raised  by
respondent No.7 is also evinced from the counter affidavits filed on behalf
of respondent Nos.1 to 5 and respondent No.7 respectively.  In paragraphs 4
(a) to (c), (e) to (h), (j) and (k), Shri Amitava Roy Chaudhary,  Executive
Engineer (Civil), Building Department, Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation  has
explained the Corporation’s stand in the following words:
           “ 4.  I crave leave  of  this  Hon'ble  Court  to  set  out  the
           following facts in connection with the present S.L.P. :-

        a)       A Building plan being Building Sanction Plan No. 200909004
           was sanctioned on 11.04.2009 by the concerned authority  of  the
           Corporation in favour of one Md. Sahid for construction  of  two
           storied residential building in respect of the premises No.8/1F,
           Gopal Doctor Road, Kolkata-700023 (hereinafter  referred  to  as
           the said premises) and the same  to  be  completed  within  five
           years from the date of sanction i.e. 10.04.2014 as per the  said
           sanction.

        b)       On or about October, 2009 the concerned  officers  of  the
           Corporation  inspected  the  said  premises  after  receiving  a
           complaint over telephone  about  the  unauthorized  construction
           being made in the said premises. Upon  the  said  complaint  the
           concerned officials inspected the said premises and  found  that
           R.C.C.  columns  were  erected  upto  3rd   floor   level   with
           projections of some columns above 3rd floor level and casting of
           R.C.C. slab were made upto 3rd floor level along with  staircase
           in deviation from the said sanction  plan  for  which  a  notice
           under section  401  of  the  K.M.C.  Act,  1980  was  served  on
           08.10.2009 to  Md.  Shahid,  the  person  responsible,  to  stop
           forthwith further progress of construction work and the same was
           received by the person responsible. Moreover, an intimation  was
           sent to the Officer-in-charge, Watgunge Police Station, Kolkata,
           requesting him  for  follow  up  action  in  the  prevention  of
           unauthorized construction at the  said  premises  which  was  in
           deviation and beyond sanction plan.
                 A true copy of Notice u/s. 401 of the  K.M.C.  Act  and  a
           copy of the  intimation  given  to  Officer  in-charge  Watgunge
           Police Station, Kolkata, are annexed as Annexures P-l &  P-2  at
           pages 23-27 of the SLP Paper Book.

        c)       It appeared from the records of the K.M.C. that inspite of
           service of notice u/s. 401 of  the  K.M.C.  Act,  1980  to  stop
           construction forthwith, the person  responsible  continued  with
           the construction works defying the  said  stop-work  notice  for
           which  first  time  Municipal  guard  watch  was   posted   from
           12.10.2009 in respect of the said premises and an intimation  of
           the said  posting  of  guard  watch  was  given  to  the  person
           responsible for prevention of the  continuance  of  unauthorized
           construction thereon.

           e) On or about November, 2009  the  concerned  officers  of  the
              Building Department of the Corporation further inspected  the
              said premises and found  that  the  construction  works  were
              going on up to 4th floor level in spite of posting  of  guard
              watch. Accordingly, considering the gravity of the  situation
              and safety of the adjoining structure as well as  the  safety
              of the public in general the  concerned  authority  suggested
              that action under section 401-A of the K.M.C. Act,  1980  may
              be taken against the said person responsible and  a  proposal
              was made by  the  concerned  officials  of  the  Corporation,
              besides to it the same was sent to  Watgunge  Police  Station
              for taking action against the person responsible or any other
              person who  has  conspired  to  make  the  said  unauthorized
              construction.  A  true  copy  of  the  said  proposal   dated
              10.11.2009 is annexed as Annexure P-4 at pg. 30 of the S.L.P.
              Paper Book.



           (f)   After considering the said statement  and  the  demolition
           sketch the Deputy Chief Engineer (Building) submitted  a  report
           to the Director General (Building)-II, K.M.C. In the said report
           the Deputy Chief Engineer (Building) mentioned  that  since  the
           nature of the unauthorized construction works  are  massive  and
           there was defiant attitude of the person responsible  and  since
           the premises is situated in congested area, the construction had
           been done in a haphazard manner without following the norms  and
           practice of Civil Engineering. It was felt that  the  structural
           stability of the impugned construction is doubtful  which  would
           create several hazards like traffic  congestion,  fire  hazards,
           environmental hazards etc. Accordingly, it was recommended  that
           action under section 400(8) of the K.M.C. Act, 1980 may be taken
           against the said unauthorized construction in the said  premises
           to cause such building or work to be demolished  forthwith,  and
           the same was placed  before  the  Member,  Mayor-in-Council  for
           approval.

           (g)     The   Member,   Mayor-in-Council   approved   the   said
           recommendation. On 14.01.2010, upon such approval the  Mayor-in-
           Council resolved that unauthorized construction/  structures  at
           the said premises be demolished forthwith under section 400  (8)
           of  the  K.M.C.  Act,  1980  with  the   help   of   the   local
           administration. A true copy of the said  proposal  of  the  said
           premises  and  the  resolution  of  the  Mayor-in-Council  dated
           14.10.2010 is annexed as Annexure P-5 (Colly) at pages 31-32  of
           the S.L.P. Paper Book.

           (h)   In accordance with the said resolution  of  the  Mayor-in-
           Council the demolition squad of the Corporation went to the said
           premises on 04.02.2010 and was able to demolish a portion of the
           unauthorized construction about  600  sq.  ft.  approx.  out  of
           approx. 1500 sq. ft. of the said  unauthorized  construction  in
           the said premises. The demolition squad also submitted a  report
           of the said structure in the said premises. In the  said  report
           the reason for  not  being  able  to  demolish  the  entire  un-
           authorized structure  was  also  stated.  A  true  copy  of  the
           demolition report  and  the  demolition  sketch  is  annexed  as
           Annexure P-6 at page 33 of the S.L.P. Paper Book.


           j)     Pursuant to the directions of the  Calcutta  High  Court,
           the concerned Executive Engineer gave a hearing on 08.04.2010 to
           the petitioner and the  respondent,  M/s.  Unique  Constructions
           represented  by  its  Proprietor  -  Md.  Shahid,   the   person
           responsible  for  making  unauthorized  constructions   and   on
           16.04.2010 the concerned Executive Engineer passed an order  and
           communicated the same to the respective parties. A true copy  of
           the said Order dated 16.04.2010 is annexed as Annexure  P-8  (at
           pages 36-37) of the S.L.P. Paper Book.



           k) Thereafter, on the basis of the said order of  the  Executive
           Engineer, on 20.07.2010 the concerned Assistant  Engineer  along
           with the Sub-Assistant Engineer inspected the said premises  and
           found that the demolished portion of the said building has  been
           repaired by the said person responsible and also found that  the
           said building is full of occupancy.”



22.   In paragraphs 4, 5 and  6  of  his  affidavit,  Mohammad  Shahid  has
averred as under:

           “4. That since the Premises No. 8/1F, Gopal Doctor Road,  Police
           Station Watgunge, Kolkata having an area of about 2  Cottahs  11
           Chittacks 33 Square feet was covered with  temporary  structures
           and some  of  which  were  tiles  and  asbestos  etc.  The  said
           structures were occupied by various tenants and  partly  by  the
           landlord. Therefore the owner/landlord decided to enter into  an
           agreement  with  the  answering   respondent   for   undertaking
           necessary  construction  works   since   the   property   became
           uninhabitable. Thus necessary agreements were  executed  by  and
           between the answering  respondent  and  owner/landlord  for  the
           construction work in the premises in question.

           Accordingly, thereafter a Plan dated  11.04.2009  vide  Building
           Permit No. 2009090004 was  sanctioned  for  premises  No.  8/1F,
           Gopal Doctor Road, Kidderpore, Kolkata- 700 023, by the  Kolkata
           Municipal Corporation for erection of a  two  storied  building,
           covering a sanctioned area measuring about 145.82 Square  Meter.
           The proposed F.A.R.  for  the  said  plan  was  0.99  over  land
           measuring about 145.927 Square Meter. But the building has  been
           constructed upto five storied. Presently the  total  constructed
           cover area for the five  storied  building  is  measuring  about
           55.57 square meter and the present F.A.R. is 3.83.

           5.    That subsequent thereto as  per  the  requirement  of  the
           owner and tenants in the said  premises  construction  upto  the
           floor more than sanctioned was  constructed.  Upon  construction
           the answering respondent filed an application with  the  Kolkata
           Municipal Corporation under Rule 25(2)(b) of the Building  Rules
           on 13.08.2010 for regularization  of  the  construction  erected
           beyond sanctioned plan and a  revised  plan  was  submitted  for
           sanction before the competent authority.



           6.    That according to Clause (b) Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 25 of  the
           Kolkata Municipal Corporation Building rules 1990 it is provided
           that if during the erection or execution of  work  any  external
           deviation beyond the sanctioned covered space is intended to  be
           made and which does not violate the provisions of the Act or the
           said Rules, the person  erecting  such  construction,  prior  to
           carrying out such erection or execution  of  works,  submit,  in
           accordance with provisions of the said  rules,  a  revised  plan
           incorporating the deviation intended  to  be  carried  out,  for
           obtaining necessary sanction thereof.  Further  the  Clause  (b)
           Sub-Rule 2 of Rule  25  of  the  Kolkata  Municipal  Corporation
           Building  Rules, 1990,   empowers the Municipal  authorities  to
           allow a person to construct the sanctioned covered  area,  which
           means construction exceeding the floor area ratio can be allowed
           to be carried on.”




23.   In view of  the  pleadings  filed  before  the  High  Court  and  the
affidavits filed before this Court, there is no escape from the  conclusion
that respondent No.7 had raised  construction  in  violation  of  the  plan
sanctioned under Section 396 of  the  1980  Act  and  continued  with  that
activity despite the order  of  the  Mayor-in-Council.  In  the  prevailing
scenario, the representative of respondent No.7 might have thought that  he
will be able to pull strings in the power corridors and get  an  order  for
regularisation of the illegal construction but he did not know  that  there
are many mortals in the system who are prepared to take the  bull  by  horn
and crush it with iron hand.

24.   Rule 25 of the Rules, on which reliance was placed by respondent No.7
for seeking regularisation of the illegal construction, reads as under:



            “25. Deviation during execution of works.—(1) No deviation from
           the sanctioned plan shall be made during erection  or  execution
           of any work.


           (2) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-rule  (1),  if
           during erection or execution of work any internal alterations or
           external additions which do not violate the  provisions  of  the
           Act or these rules  is  made,  the  Municipal  Commissioner  may
           without prejudice to any action that may be  taken  against  the
           person at whose instance such alteration or additions have  been
           made, allow the person referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 4  to
           submit, in accordance with the  provisions  of  these  rules,  a
           revised plan showing the deviation and may sanction such plan.


           (3) Any departure made during the execution of any  work  or  at
           any time thereafter without sanction shall be deemed  to  be  in
           contravention of the provisions of the Act and these  rules  and
           shall be dealt with accordingly.”


25.   A reading of the plain language of Rule 25(1) makes it clear  that  a
person, who erects any structure or executes any work is  not  entitled  to
deviate from the sanctioned plan.  Rule 25(2) which contains a non-obstante
clause and provides for sanction of revised plan to  be  submitted  by  the
person engaged in erection of building or execution of work lays down  that
if during erection or  execution  of  work,  any  internal  alterations  or
external additions which do not violate the provisions of the  Act  or  the
Rules is made, the Municipal Commissioner can, at an  application  made  in
that behalf sanction the revise plan showing the deviation. Rule  25(3)  is
declaratory in nature.  It lays down that any  departure  made  during  the
execution of any work or at any time thereafter without sanction  shall  be
deemed to be in contravention of the Act and the Rules shall be dealt  with
accordingly.

26.   In our view, respondent No.7 cannot take benefit of  Rule  25  because
the disputed construction was in clear violation of the sanctioned plan  and
the notices issued by the competent authority of the  Corporation  and  also
because the application was made after completion of the construction.

27.   Before parting with the case, we  consider  it  necessary  to  observe
that respondent No.7 is guilty not only of  violating  the  sanctioned  plan
and the relevant provisions of the 1980 Act and the Rules framed  thereunder
but  also  of  cheating  those  who  purchased  portions   of   unauthorized
construction under a bona fide belief that respondent No.7  had  constructed
the  building  as  per  the  sanctioned  plan.  With   the   demolition   of
unauthorized construction some of such persons will become shelterless.   It
is, therefore, necessary that respondent  No.7  is  directed  to  compensate
them by refunding the cost of the flat,  etc.,  with  interest.   Respondent
No.7 must also pay for raising construction in violation of  the  sanctioned
plan. It must be remembered that while preparing master  plans/zonal  plans,
the Planning Authority takes into consideration  the  prospectus  of  future
development and accordingly provides for  basic  amenities  like  water  and
electricity lines, drainage, sewerage, etc.   Unauthorized  construction  of
buildings not only destroys the concept  of  planned  development  which  is
beneficial to the public but also places  unbearable  burden  on  the  basic
amenities and facilities provided  by  the  public  authorities.  At  times,
construction of such buildings becomes hazardous for the public and  creates
traffic congestion. Therefore, it is imperative  for  the  concerned  public
authorities not only to demolish such construction but also impose  adequate
penalty on the wrongdoer.

28.   In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is  set
aside.  With a view to  ensure  that  the  illegal  construction  raised  by
respondent No.7 is  pulled  down  without  delay,  we  issue  the  following
directions:

1.    Within three months from today, respondent No.7 shall  pay  the  price
      of the flats etc. to the purchasers with interest @ 18% per annum from
      the date of payment.

2.    The occupiers of illegal/unauthorized construction shall  vacate  such
      portions of the building within next one month.

3.           Within  next  one  month,  the   Corporation   shall   demolish
      unauthorized   construction  after   taking   adequate   precautionary
      measures.

4.    Respondent No.7 shall pay cost of Rs.25,00,000/- for brazen  violation
      of the sanctioned plan and continuance of illegal construction despite
      ‘stop work notice’.  The amount of cost shall be  deposited  with  the
      Kolkata State Legal Service Authority within three months and the same
      be utilized for providing legal aid in deserving cases.

29.   Reports showing compliance of the aforesaid  directions  be  filed  by
the Corporation and respondent No.7 in the Registry  of  the   Kolkata  High
Court within six months.   Thereafter,  the  matter  be  placed  before  the
learned Single Judge who had passed order dated 28.7.2010.  If  the  learned
Single Judge finds that  any  of  the  aforesaid  directions  has  not  been
implemented then  he  shall  initiate  proceedings  against  the  defaulting
officers and/or respondent No.7 under the Contempt of Courts Act,  1971  and
pass appropriate order.

                                                …..……….....……..….………………….…J.
                                            [G.S. SINGHVI]



                                                    …………..………..….………………….…J.
                                   [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
New Delhi,
October 8, 2012.

Sunday, October 7, 2012

Until and unless the petitioner pays stamp duty and penalty on the agreement of sale, it cannot be looked into - " It is now well settled that there is no prohibition under Section 49 of the Registration Act, to receive an unregistered document in evidence for collateral purpose. But the document so tendered should be duly stamped or should comply with the requirements of section 35 of the Stamp Act, if not stamped, as a document cannot be received in evidence even for collateral purpose unless it is duly stamped or duty and penalty are paid under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. Section 35 of the Stamp Act mandates that an instrument chargeable with duty should be stamped so as to make it admissible in evidence. Proviso A to Section 35 of the Stamp Act enables a document to be received in evidence on payment of stamp duty and penalty if the document is chargeable, but not stamped or on payment of deficit duty and penalty if it is insufficiently stamped. The bar against the admissibility of an instrument which is chargeable with stamp duty and is not stamped is of course absolute whatever by the nature of the purpose, be it for main or collateral purpose, unless the requirements of proviso (A) to Section 35 are complied with. It follows that if the requirements of proviso (A) to Section 35 are satisfied, then the document which is chargeable with duty, but not stamped, can be received in evidence".


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.SESHASAYANA REDDY          
Civil Revision Petition No.1210 of 2011


10-08-2011

Rajoli Siva Rami Reddy, Kadapa District

Malepati Subba Rangiah and others

Counsel for the petitioner      :    Sri V.Sunil Babu

Counsel for the Respondents     :    Sri P.Veera Reddy

ORDER:

        This revision is directed against the order dated 23.9.2010 passed in
I.A.No.1241 of 2008 in O.S.No.116 of 2007 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge,
Proddatur, whereby and whereunder, the learned Senior Civil Judge dismissed the
application filed by the petitioner-plaintiff seeking a direction to the 3rd
respondent to deposit 100 bags of paddy crop into the Court.

2.      Background facts, in a nutshell, leading to filing of this revision by the
plaintiff in O.S.No.116 of 2007, are: -
        The petitioner herein filed O.S.No.116 of 2007 on the file of the Senior
Civil Judge, Proddatur for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated
28.2.2007 and also for injunction.   According to him, respondents 1 and 2 are
owners of the suit schedule property and they agreed to sell the property for
Rs.2,31,600/- and accordingly, executed an agreement of sale  dated 28.2.2007.
The petitioner-plaintiff filed I.A.No.1241 of 2008 under Section 151 CPC seeking
direction to the 3rd respondent to deposit 100 bags of paddy.  According to the
petitioner-plaintiff, respondent No.3 cut the standing crop in the suit schedule
property and taken away the entire crop and thereby, he interfered in the civil
disputes between the petitioner on one hand and respondents 1 and 2 on the other
hand.   For better appreciation, I may   refer paragraphs (3) and (10) of the
affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.1241 of 2008, which reads as hereunder:-
"       3) I submit that the respondents 1 and 2 came to me on 28-02-2007 offering
the schedule properties for sale stating that they have got the right, title and
possession over the schedule property under a registered partition deeds,
bearing No.50 and 58 of 1998 dated     14-10-1998, for which I have accepted
their offer to purchase the schedule properties, while the mediators namely (01)
Malkigari Bashamia and (02) Marthala Jayarami Reddy negotiated the issue and
fixed the sale consideration for Rs.80,000-00 per acre and Rs.02,31,600-00 for
entire  extent of schedule properties, while myself and the respondents agreed
for the sale consideration fixed  by the mediators, then I have paid  the entire
sale consideration   of Rs.02,31,600-00 to the both of the respondents on the
very same day. In turn, the respondents have received the sale consideration in
the presence of above said mediators and scribe namely B.P.Kullayappa Yadav and
executed an agreement of sale in my favour  on the very same day  acknowledging
the receipt of  total sale consideration and delivered  the schedule  property
into my possession on the very same day,  the respondents  further agreed to
execute  a regular registered  sale deed in my favour at my risk  and costs on
my demand as and when I demand.  As such  the part performance is over.
               xxx                 xxxxx                 xxx
10.     I submit that the crop of 100 bags of paddy  raised and harvested by me
are  with the custody of respondent No.3, the said crop  has to be recovered
from the possession of respondent No.3 or its worth from the respondent No.3,
the value of the paddy of 100 bags is Rs.01,00,000/-  for which the respondent
No.3  has to deposit the cash to the worth of the crop  or paddy of 100 bags
with the Honourable Court, I am entitled  to receive the said  paddy of 100 bags
or cash  of Rs.01,00,000-00, however  the Honorable Court  has to enquire  the
matter  and adjudicate  whether I am entitled  to receive the same  or note.
Till then  the paddy  or amount  has to be kept  with the custody   of Honorable
Court.  Hence this petition."

        Respondents 1 and 2 filed counter resisting the application.   They denied
of execution of the agreement of sale dated 28.2.2007.

3.      The learned Senior Civil Judge, on considering the material brought on
record and on hearing the counsel appearing for the parties, and placing
reliance on the decision of this Court in B.Ratnamala v. G.Rudramma1 and the
decision of the Supreme Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan v.  Vijay Krishna
Mishra2, proceeded to dismiss the petition   on the ground that the agreement of
sale dated 28.2.2007 is not properly stamped, by order dated 28th September
2010.   Paragraph (11) of the  order passed in I.A.No.1241 of 2008  need to be
noted  and it is thus:-
"       When we consider the case of the petitioner in the light of the above law
stated by the Hon'ble Apex Court and also the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra
Pradaesh, the petitioner cannot claim any relief in this case, since the suit
agreement of sale dt.28.2.07 as evidenced by its recitals about the delivery of
possession of the suit schedule property to the petitioner which was agreed to
be sold by the respondents 1 and 2.   Therefore the said agreement of sale
dt.28.2.07 is inadmissible   in evidence and it cannot be looked into for any
purpose unless the petitioner pays stamp duty and penalty.   It is immaterial
for this Court about the prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour
of the petitioner unless he pays stamp duty and penalty on the said agreement of
sale".
        Hence this revision.

4.      Notice to respondents came to be ordered on 11.4.2011.   The respondents
entered appearance through a counsel.

5.      Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the relief
sought for is against the 3rd respondent and the 3rd respondent is not a party
to the agreement of sale and therefore, the application filed by the petitioner
seeking a direction to the 3rd respondent to deposit 100 bags of paddy or its
equivalent value is maintainable. The claim of the petitioner-plaintiff is that
he purchased the suit schedule property under an agreement of sale dated
28.2.2007 from respondents 1 and 2.

6.      Respondents 1 and 2 have denied execution of the agreement of sale in the
counter and stated that until and unless the suit agreement is marked, there is
no material to substantiate the case of the petitioner-plaintiff regarding his
possession over the suit schedule property.

7.      A Division Bench of this Court in B. Ratnamala v. G.Rudramma (1 supra) has
held that where an agreement of sale contains a specific recital or indicating
delivery of possession, it is liable for stamp duty as a sale, under Explanation
1 to Article 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act.  The apex Court in Avinash Kumar
Chauhan's case (2nd supra), held that the unregistered deed of sale was an
instrument which required payment of the stamp duty applicable to a deed of
conveyance.  The court, therefore, was empowered to pas an order in terms of
Section 35.  It was further held that--
"       It is now well settled that   there is no prohibition under Section 49 of
the Registration Act, to receive an unregistered document in evidence for
collateral purpose.   But the document so tendered should be duly stamped or
should comply with the requirements of section 35 of the Stamp Act, if not
stamped, as a document cannot be received in evidence even for collateral
purpose unless it is duly stamped   or duty and penalty are paid under Section
35 of the Stamp Act.   Section 35 of the Stamp Act mandates that an instrument
chargeable with duty should be stamped so as to make it admissible in evidence.
Proviso A to Section 35 of the Stamp Act enables a document to be received in
evidence on payment of stamp duty and penalty if the document is chargeable, but
not stamped or on payment of deficit duty and penalty if it is insufficiently
stamped. The bar against the admissibility of an instrument which   is
chargeable   with  stamp duty  and is not stamped  is of course absolute
whatever by the nature  of  the purpose, be  it for main or collateral  purpose,
unless the requirements of proviso (A)  to  Section 35  are complied with.  It
follows that  if the requirements  of proviso (A)  to Section 35 are satisfied,
then the document which is chargeable  with duty, but not stamped,  can be
received in evidence".

8.      Indisputably, the agreement contains a recital regarding delivery of
possession. The petitioner-plaintiff claims that he has been put in possession
of the suit property under an agreement of sale dated 28.2.2007 executed by
respondents 1 and 2.   Until and unless the petitioner pays stamp duty and
penalty on the agreement of sale, it cannot be looked into. The trial Court
is, therefore, justified in dismissing the application.   However, the
petitioner is at liberty to move an application for impounding the agreement of
sale. After payment of the stamp duty and penalty, the petitioner is at liberty
to make a fresh application seeking the relief as sought for in I.A.No.1241 of
2008, in which event, such an application has to be considered uninfluenced by
any of the observations made earlier.

9.      In that view of the matter, I find no error in the order impugned in the
revision warranting interference of this Court in exercise of powers under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India and accordingly, the revision is
dismissed. No order as to costs.
_____________________  
B.SESHASAYANA REDDY, J

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982: Suit land purchased by appellant/applicant by way of a registered sale deed - Challenge not made by anyone as to the validity of the sale deed - In earlier proceedings, respondents claiming right over suit land - However, not producing any document to show their right, interest or title in the suit land - Order attaining finality to the effect that there was no misrepresentation or fraud or suppression of material fact on the part of the appellant in respect of his claim over suit land - Fresh proceedings by respondents raising issue of fraud - Held: Would be tantamount to malicious prosecution as the issue had earlier been adjudicated upon - Finding of facts was recorded in earlier proceedings that the appellant was in actual possession of land and was illegally dispossessed by the respondents - Land grabbing. s.10 - Allegation of land grabbing - Burden to prove innocence - Held: Is on the accused - It is not like any other criminal case where accused is presumed to be innocent unless the guilt is proved - Criminal law - Burden of proof . Review: Review application - Maintainability of - Held: In case a review application is filed before filing the special leave petition and the review application remains pending till the dismissal of the special leave petition, then the review application deserves to be considered - However, if a review application is filed subsequent to dismissal of the special leave petition, the process of filing review application would amount to abuse of process of the court and such an application is not maintainable - Administration of justice - Abuse of process of law. Judgment/order: Obtained by playing fraud on court - Validity of - Held: An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously - Order obtained by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent authority not valid in the eyes of law - Fraud is an anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata - Equity - Fraud on court. The suit land was purchased by the appellant/applicant by way of registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980. The appellant filed a complaint under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 against the respondents stating that they grabbed his land and raised construction thereon. The plea raised by the respondents was that in respect of the suit land, there was an agreement to sell dated 23.01.1976, in favour of a Society which had allotted the land in their favour, therefore, the vendors of the appellant had no right to transfer the land in favour of the appellant. The Special Court by order dated 4.11.1997 held that the appellant was the owner of the suit land and that the respondents were land grabbers. The respondents filed a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed. Thereafter the respondents filed special leave petition before this Court which was dismissed as withdrawn giving liberty to the respondents to file review petition before the High Court. The respondents filed a review petition before the High Court which was dismissed. Thereafter, in pursuance of the order in execution proceedings passed on 7.11.2002, the appellant was put into possession of the suit land on 16.12.2002. The respondents filed writ petitions challenging the order dated 7.11.2002 which were dismissed by the High Court by order dated 17.12.2002. The review petitions filed thereagainst before the High Court, were also dismissed. In 2005, the respondents filed a review application before the Special Court seeking review of the order dated 4.11.1997. The respondents subsequently filed the applications before the Special Court for fresh declaration that they were the owners. The Special Court dismissed the said applications. The High Court allowed the writ petitions filed by the respondents and directed the Special Court to decide the applications afresh on merits, as in the opinion of the High Court, the applications required certain inquiry on factual matters and the claim of the respondents could not have been rejected merely on the determination and attaining finality of orders in earlier proceedings. The instant appeals were filed challenging the order of the High Court. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. In case a litigant files a review application before filing the special leave petition before this Court and it remains pending till the special leave petition stands dismissed, the review application deserves to be considered. However, if a review application is filed subsequent to dismissal of the special leave petition, the process of filing review application amounts to abuse of process of the court. Filing of such a review application by the respondents at a belated stage amounts to abuse of process of the court and such an application is not maintainable. Thus, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition against the order of dismissal of the review application by the Special Court and the order of the High Court to that extent is liable to be set aside. [Para 17-18] [66-D-G] M/s. Kabari Pvt. Ltd. v. Shivnath Shroff & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 742; State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle AIR 1996 SC 3069; Raj Kumar Sharma v. Union of India (1995) 2 Scale 23; Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust v. Swami Prakasananda & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3277; K. Ajit Babu & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 473; Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1872; Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K. Santhakumaran & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1486; Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr. AIR 2000 SC 2587; National Housing Coop. Society Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 149; K. Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N. Swamy AIR 2001 SC 2316; M/s. Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector, Golaghat, Assam & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 1738; Kumaran Silk Trade (P) Ltd. v. Devendra AIR 2007 SC 1185, relied on. 2.1. The applications filed by the respondents before the Special Court for fresh declaration that they were the owners, were based on the grounds that the earlier judgment and order were obtained by the appellant/applicant suppressing the material facts and the suit land was not identified properly. However, the respondents had never been able to show as to under what circumstances they were interested in the suit land because before the Special Court in the first round, they failed to show any document that land had ever been transferred by the tenure-holders/owners in favour of the Society or the Society had made any allotment in their favour or they were members of the said Society or they obtained any sanction from statutory authority to raise the construction. [Paras 19, 30] [66-G-H; 70- B-C] 2.2. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by making at misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a way of cheating intended to get an advantage. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is an anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. Even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be taken away. In such an eventuality, the questions of non-executing of the statutory remedies or statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court. Every court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by fraud, as the order so obtained is non est. [Paras 20, 25, 26, 27, 28] [67-B; 68-D-E; G-H; 69-A-F] S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853; Lazarus Estate Ltd. v. Besalay 1956 All. E.R. 349; Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling Mills & Anr. AIR 1994 SC 2151; State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481; Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. M/s. Shaw Brothers AIR 1992 SC 1555; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1165; District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram & Anr. v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655; Union of India & Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran (1995) Suppl. 4 SCC 100; Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr. v. Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6 SCC 325; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar (2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Company AIR 2007 SC 2798; Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2009) 8 SCC 751; Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration AIR 1963 SC 1572; Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550; State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Suryachandra Rao AIR 2005 SC 3110; K.D. Sharma v Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 481; Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170; Gowrishankar & Anr. v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2202; Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 319; Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal AIR 2002 SC 33; Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education AIR 2003 SC 4628; Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 2836; Kinch v. Walcott (1929) AC 482 28 - relied on. 2.3. There was a registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980 in favour of the appellant/applicant. Nobody had ever filed any application before the competent court to declare said sale deed as null and void. The issue of mis-representation/fraud, suppression of material fact and identification of land was in issue in earlier review petitions before the Special Court and in the writ petitions before the High Court. In this regard, the Special Court in execution proceedings was fully satisfied regarding the identity of land on the basis of revenue record and came to the conclusion that there was no mis-representation or fraud on the part of the appellant/applicant. The Society claimed to have an agreement to sell in its favour which did not confer any title in favour of the Society. A finding of fact had been recorded in earlier proceedings that the appellant/applicant was in actual physical possession of the land and he was illegally/forcibly dispossessed by the respondents. [Paras 31, 33] [72- B-C; 70-E-G] 3. A person in illegal occupation of the land has to be evicted following the procedure prescribed under the law. Even a trespasser cannot be evicted forcibly. The State authorities cannot become the law unto themselves. Even they cannot dispossess a person by an executive order. Government can resume possession only in a manner known to or recognised by law and not otherwise. The forcible eviction of the appellant/applicant by the respondents was unwarranted and unlawful. The proceedings were initiated under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. It is a special Act to prevent illegal activities of land grabbing. The Legislature, in its wisdom, constituted a Special Court presided over by a person who is or is eligible to be the Judge of the High Court, and consisting of Members who are or are eligible to become a District Judge and District Collector. Therefore, persons having enough experience and who have acquired a higher status have been given responsibility to adjudicate upon the disputes under the Act. That Special Court has been conferred with the powers of civil or criminal courts. As per the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, the burden of proof is on the accused to prove that he is not guilty. Thus, it is not like any other criminal case where accused is presumed to be innocent unless the guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right, however, it is subject to the statutory exceptions, and the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence. For this purpose, the nature of offence, its seriousness and gravity thereof has to be taken into consideration. Statutes like Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, provide for presumption of guilt if the circumstances provided in those statutes are found to be fulfilled and shift the burden of proof of innocence on the accused. Thus, the Legislature has adopted a deviating course from ordinary criminal law shifting the burden on the accused to prove that he was not guilty. The High Court while deciding these cases has not considered the issue of the locus standi of the respondents to maintain the application for eviction of the appellant/applicant. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. [Paras 34, 36, 37] [72-D-H; 73-B-H; 74-A-B] Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy AIR 1924 PC 124; Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors. AIR 1968 SC 620; Ram Ratan v. State of U.P. AIR 1977 SC 619; Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 872; Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Shobha Vankat Rao AIR 1989 SC 2097; Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh AIR 1995 SC 1377; Bishan Das v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1570; State of U.P. & Ors. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors. AIR 1989 SC 997; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 134, relied on. Case Law Reference: AIR 1996 SC 742 relied on Para 9 AIR 1996 SC 3069 relied on Para 10 (1995) 2 Scale 23 relied on Para 11 AIR 1997 SC 3277 relied on Para 11 (1997) 6 SCC 473 relied on Para 11 AIR 1998 SC 1872 relied on Para 11 AIR 1999 SC 1486 relied on Para 12 AIR 2000 SC 2587 relied on Para 13 (2005) 12 SCC 149 relied on Para 14 AIR 2001 SC 2316 relied on Para 15 AIR 2004 SC 1738 relied on Para 15 AIR 2007 SC 1185 relied on Para 16 AIR 1994 SC 853 relied on Para 20 1956 All. E.R. 349 relied on Para 20 AIR 1994 SC 2151 relied on Para 21 (1994) 2 SCC 481 relied on Para 21 AIR 1992 SC 1555 relied on Para 22 AIR 2000 SC 1165 relied on Para 23 (1990) 3 SCC 655 relied on Para 24 (1995) Suppl. 4 SCC 100 relied on Para 24 (2004) 6 SCC 325 relied on Para 24 (2007) 1 SCC 80 relied on Para 24 AIR 2007 SC 2798 relied on Para 24 (2009) 8 SCC 751 relied on Para 24 AIR 1963 SC 1572 relied on Para 25 (1996) 5 SCC 550 relied on Para 25 AIR 2005 SC 3110 relied on Para 25 (2008) 12 SCC 481 relied on Para 25 (2008) 13 SCC 170 relied on Para 25 AIR 1996 SC 2202 relied on Para 26 (2003) 8 SCC 319 relied on Para 26 AIR 2002 SC 33 relied on Para 26 AIR 2003 SC 4628 relied on Para 26 AIR 2004 SC 2836 relied on Para 26 (1929) AC 482 relied on Para 27 AIR 1924 PC 124 relied on Para 34 AIR 1968 SC 620 relied on Para 34 AIR 1977 SC 619 relied on Para 34 AIR 1986 SC 872 relied on Para 34 AIR 1989 SC 2097 relied on Para 34 AIR 1995 SC 1377 relied on Para 35 AIR 1961 SC 1570 relied on Para 36 AIR 1989 SC 997 relied on Para 36 (2002) 4 SCC 134 relied on Para 36 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6656-6657 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 26.04.2007 of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Petition Nos. : 19963 and 19962 of 2006. P. Vishwanatha Shetty, G. Seshagiri Rao, Sridhar Potaraju for the Appellants. M.V. Durga Prasad, G. Ramakrishna Prasad, B. Suyodhan, Amar Pal, Bharat J. Joshi, T. Anamika, D. Rama Krishna Reddy, Sanjai Kumar Pathak for the Respondents.


                                                                    Reportable

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  Civil Appeal Nos. 6656-6657 of 2010
            (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14447-14448 of 2007)


Meghmala & Ors.                                      ..Appellants

                                    Versus

G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors.                          ..Respondents


                              JUDGMENT

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    Judicial pronouncements unlike sand dunes are known for their

stability/finality. However, in this case, in spite of the completion of several

rounds of litigation upto the High Court, and one round of litigation before

this Court, the respondents claim a right to abuse the process of the Court

with the perception that whatever may be the orders of the High Court or

this Court, inter-se parties the dispute shall be protracted and will never

come to an end.
3.    These appeals have been preferred against the Judgment and Order

dated 26.04.2007 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad,

passed in Writ Petition Nos. 19962-19963 of 2006, by which the High Court

has allowed the said petitions against the Judgment and order of the Special

Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982

(hereinafter called, "Act 1982"), dismissing the review application No.

397/2005 in LGC No. 76/1996 and in LGCSR 357/2005.

4.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present cases are as under :-

(A)   V. Ram Chandra Reddy and his brother (vendors) had a huge chunk

of land and a part of it could have been the subject matter of the provisions

of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the

Act 1976).    The said vendors entered into an agreement to sell dated

23.01.1976 for selling a part of the land (hereinafter called `suit land') to a

cooperative society namely, Gruha Lakshmi Cooperative Housing Society

Ltd. (hereinafter called, "the Society").    The vendors, V. Ram Chandra

Reddy and his brother executed a sale deed in favour of A. Sambashiva Rao

(hereinafter called the appellant/applicant) which was registered on

21.05.1980 vide document No. 4758/80 and the appellants were put in

possession of the suit land.




                                                                            2
(B)   The appellant/applicant- vendee filed LGC No. 76/1996 against the

respondents under the provisions of the Act, 1982 alleging that he had been

working in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and was

mostly out of station, and the respondents had forcibly grabbed his land and

raised construction thereon. Thus, he sought the relief of their dispossession

and action against them under the provisions of the Act, 1982.

(C)   After complying with the requirements of the statutory provisions i.e.

taking the sanction etc., the respondents were issued a show cause notice.

The respondents filed their reply submitting that in respect of the suit land,

there was an agreement to sell, dated 23.01.1976, in favour of the society

and once such an agreement to sell had been executed, vendors had no right

to transfer the land in favour of the appellant/applicant. The society had

allotted the suit land in their favour, therefore, the application was liable to

be rejected.

(D)   The Special Court after appreciating the evidence, vide Judgment and

order dated 4.11.1997 came to the conclusion that the appellant/applicant

was the owner of the suit land and that the respondents had no right, title or

claim over the suit land. They had forcibly occupied the land and they were

land grabbers, thus, they were liable to be evicted and orders for that purpose

were passed.



                                                                             3
(E)   Being aggrieved by the order of the Special Court dated 4.11.1997,

the respondents preferred writ petition No. 33572/1997 before the High

Court of Andhra Pradesh, which was dismissed vide Judgment and Order

dated 3.07.2001.

(F)   Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the respondents

preferred Special Leave Petition (c) No. 18218/2001 before this Court,

which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 2.11.2001 giving liberty

to the respondents to file review petition before the High Court.

(G)   The respondents filed review petition No. 31506/2002 before the High

Court. However, the said review petition was dismissed by the High Court

vide order dated 16.12.2002.

(H)   In the intervening period, when the review petition was pending

before the High Court, the appellant/applicant filed execution proceedings

by moving IA No. 518/2002. The Respondents also moved an application to

summon the record of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Secundrabad,

pertaining to the survey of the suit land along with an application for the stay

of Execution proceedings. The Special Court vide order dated 7.11.2002

allowed the Execution Application filed by the appellant/applicant but

dismissed the application filed by respondents directing the Revenue

Divisional Officer to implement the order dated 4.11.1997.



                                                                             4
(I)   The respondents being aggrieved by the common order dated

7.11.2002, filed writ petition nos. 22953 and 23105 of 2002, which were,

dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 17.12.2002.

(J)   In pursuance of the order in Execution Proceedings dated 7.11.2002,

the appellants were put into possession of the suit land on 16.12.2002.

(K)   The respondents being aggrieved by the order of the High Court dated

17.12.2002, preferred review petitions before the High Court, which were

dismissed by the Court vide order dated 17.11.2003.

(L)   The respondents filed Review Application no. 397/2005 in LGC No.

76 after an inordinate delay, seeking review of the order dated 4.11.1997.

The respondents subsequently filed an application in LGCSR No. 357/2005

before the Special Court for fresh declaration that they were the owners and

that the appellants, who had succeeded throughout the litigation, were the

land grabbers. The respondents in the said application impleaded persons

other than the appellant/applicant also, i.e. the vendors of the

appellant/applicant and govt. officials etc., who are the other appellants in

these cases. The Special Court dismissed the said applications vide orders

dated 6.7.2006 and 11.7.2006.

(M)   The respondents, being aggrieved by both the orders, filed Writ

Petition Nos. 19962 and 19963 of 2006, which have been allowed by the



                                                                          5
High Court vide impugned Judgment and order dated 26.04.2007, directing

the Special Court to decide both the applications afresh on merit, as in the

opinion of the High Court, the applications required certain inquiry on

factual matters and the claim of the respondents could not have been rejected

merely on the determination and attaining finality of orders in earlier

proceedings. Hence, these appeals.

5.    Sh. P. Vishwanatha Shetty, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellants, has submitted that even if there was an agreement to sell by the

vendor of the appellants in favour of the society, such an agreement did not

confer any title in the suit land in their favour. The respondents had not

been the members of the said Society, nor had any allotment ever been made

by the Society in their favour. The earlier proceedings came to an end after

having several rounds of litigation upto the High Court and one round upto

this Court. The orders passed therein attained finality and in pursuance of

the same, the appellant/applicant came into possession of the suit land.

Issues of fraud and identification of land had been in issue in some of the

earlier proceedings. Once the respondents had approached this Court, the

question of entertaining the review petition after an inordinate delay of 7-8

years does not arise. The respondents have no locus standi to ask the

Special   Court    to   determine       under   what    circumstances     the



                                                                          6
appellant/applicant had obtained the suit land. An application to call for

certain records in respect of the suit land from 1972 to 2002, the survey

reports etc. cannot be made by them. The High Court has gravely erred in

interfering with the orders of the Special Court rejecting both the

applications. Thus, the appeals deserve to be allowed.

6.       Per contra, Sh. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the

respondents submitted that the transfer of land in favour of the

appellant/applicant vide registered sale deed dated 21.05.1980 was itself a

fraudulent transaction and material in this regard was suppressed from the

Special Court while obtaining the orders in their favour. Fraud vitiates

everything. The respondents have raised the issue of the identification of the

suit land. Thus, the applications filed by the respondents were maintainable

and the High Court has rightly reversed the orders passed by the Special

Court. The appeals lack merit and no interference is warranted by this

Court.

7.       We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned

counsel for the parties and perused the record.

         Admittedly, there is a registered sale deed in favour of the

appellant/applicant dated 21.05.1980 and there may be an agreement to sell

in favour of the society dated 23.01.1976. It is settled legal proposition that



                                                                            7
an agreement to sell does not create any right, or title in favour of the

intending buyer. The Society did not file suit for specific performance

against the vendors prior to the execution of sale deed in favour of the

appellant/applicant on 21.05.1980. The Special Court, after appreciating the

entire    evidence   on   record,    came   to   the   conclusion   that   the

appellant/applicant was the owner and was in actual physical possession of

the land and that the respondents had grabbed the said land. The Special

Court has observed as under :-

              "In the cross-examination, RW1 (respondent No.1
              herein) had to admit that they have not filed any
              document to show that the said plot was allotted in
              their favour by the society and that they have not
              filed any document to show that they are the
              members of the said society. He also admitted that
              without any municipal sanction or permission, they
              raised the construction in the scheduled land."


         The Special Court further held that the respondents were land

grabbers within the meaning of the Act, 1982 and thus, they were directed to

restore the premises to the appellant/applicant. These findings of fact had

been affirmed upto the High Court.

8.       The record of the case reveals that respondents have filed review

petitions before the Special Court as well as before the High Court.

However, all the applications had been dismissed by the Courts concerned.



                                                                           8
The respondents again filed an application seeking review of the order dated

4.11.1997. Section 17-A of the Act, 1982 provides that in order to prevent

the miscarriage of justice, a review application can be entertained on the

grounds that the order has been passed under a mistake of fact, ignorance of

any material fact or an error apparent on the face of law. Limitation for

filing the review application before the Special Court has been prescribed

under Rule 18 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules,

1988, as 30 days from the date of the order of which the review is sought.

The respondents    had earlier challenged the said order dated 4.11.1997

before the High Court, as well as before this Court. Review petitions had

been filed before the Special Court, as well as before the High Court. Thus,

question does arise as to whether it is permissible for a litigant to file a

review application after approaching the superior forum/court.



Review - After approaching the Higher Forum:-

9.    In M/s. Kabari Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shivnath Shroff & Ors. AIR 1996 SC

742, this Court had taken a view that the court cannot entertain an

application for review if before making the review application, the superior

court had been moved for getting the self-same relief, for the reason that for




                                                                           9
the self-same relief two parallel proceedings before the two forums cannot

be taken.

10.   In State of Maharashtra & Anr. Vs. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle AIR

1996 SC 3069, this Court held that when a special leave petition from the

order of the Tribunal was dismissed by a non-speaking order, the main order

was confirmed by the Court. Thereafter, the power of review cannot be

exercised by the Tribunal as it would be "deleterious to the judicial

discipline".

11.   Same view has been reiterated by this Court in Raj Kumar Sharma

Vs. Union of India (1995) 2 Scale 23; Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom

Trust Vs. Swami Prakasananda & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3277; K. Ajit

Babu & Ors. Vs.        Union of India & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 473; and

Gopabandhu Biswal Vs. Krishna Chandra Mohanty & Ors. AIR 1998

SC 1872.

12.   In    Abbai    Maligai    Partnership     Firm     &    Anr.    Vs.   K.

Santhakumaran & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1486, a three Judge Bench of this

Court considered the issue afresh and held that filing of the review petition

after dismissal of the special leave petition by it against the self-same order

amounted to an abuse of process of the court and the entertainment of such a




                                                                            1
review application was in affront to its order and it was subversive of

judicial discipline.

13.   In Kunhayammed & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala & Anr. AIR 2000 SC

2587, a three Judge Bench of this Court reconsidered the issue and all above

referred judgments and came to the conclusion that dismissal of special

leave petition in limine by a non-speaking order may not be a bar for

entertaining a review petition by the court below for the reason that this

Court may not be inclined to exercise its discretion under Article 136 of the

Constitution. The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 where

the matter has been decided on merit by a speaking judgment. In that case

doctrine of merger would come into place and lay down the following

principles:-

               (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided
               against an order passed by a court, tribunal or
               any other authority before superior forum and
               such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms
               the decision put in issue before it, the decision by
               the subordinate forum merges in the decision by
               the superior forum and it is the latter which
               subsists, remains operative and is capable of
               enforcement in the eye of law.


               (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the
               Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first
               stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special
               leave to file an appeal. The second stage
               commences if and when the leave to appeal is

                                                                          1
granted and the special leave petition is converted
into an appeal.


(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of
universal or unlimited application. It will depend
on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the
superior forum and the content or subject-matter
of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be
determinative of the applicability of merger. The
superior jurisdiction should be capable of
reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in
issue before it. Under Article 136 of the
Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse,
modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order
appealed against while exercising its appellate
jurisdiction and not while exercising the
discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for
special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger
can therefore be applied to the former and not to
the latter.


(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may
be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In
either case it does not attract the doctrine of
merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal
does not stand substituted in place of the order
under challenge. All that it means is that the Court
was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to
allow the appeal being filed.


(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a
speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the
grant of leave, then the order has two
implications. Firstly, the statement of law
contained in the order is a declaration of law by
the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article
141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the


                                                       1
            declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order
             are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court
             which would bind the parties thereto and also the
             court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings
             subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline,
             the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the
             country. But, this does not amount to saying that
             the order of the court, tribunal or authority below
             has stood merged in the order of the Supreme
             Court rejecting the special leave petition or that
             the order of the Supreme Court is the only order
             binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings
             between the parties.


14.   The Court came to the conclusion that where the matter has been

decided by a non-speaking order in limine the party may approach the High

Court by filing a review petition.

      Similar view has been reiterated in National Housing Coop. Society

Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 149.

15.   In K. Rajamouli Vs. A.V.K.N. Swamy AIR 2001 SC 2316, this

Court considered the ratio of the judgment in Kunhayammed (supra); and

Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm          (supra) and held that if a review

application has been filed before the High Court prior to filing the special

leave petition before this Court and review petition is decided/rejected,

special leave petition against that order of review would be maintainable. In

case the review application has been filed subsequent to dismissal of the



                                                                          1
special leave petition it would amount to abuse of process of the court and

shall be governed by the ratio of the judgment in Abbai Maligai

Partnership Firm (supra). The said judgment has been approved and

followed by this Court in M/s. Green View Tea & Industries Vs.

Collector, Golaghat, Assam & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 1738.

16.   In Kumaran Silk Trade (P) Ltd. Vs. Devendra AIR 2007 SC 1185,

this Court held as under :-

      "As a matter of fact at the earlier stage this Court did
      not consider the question whether one of the appeals
      against the order dismissing the Review Petition on
      merits was maintainable. At best the order of remand
      and the decision in Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of
      Kerala & Anr. (2000) 6 SCC 359 would enable the
      petitioner to get over the ratio of the three Judge Bench
      decision in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. v.
      K. Santhakumaran & Ors. (1998) 7 SCC 386 that the
      seeking of a review after the petition for special leave to
      appeal was dismissed without reserving any liberty in the
      petitioner was an abuse of process."

17.   Thus, the law on the issue stands crystallized to the effect that in case

a litigant files a review petition before filing the Special Leave Petition

before this Court and it remains pending till the Special Leave Petition

stands dismissed, the review petition deserves to be considered. In case it is

filed subsequent to dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the process of

filing review application amounts to abuse of process of the court.




                                                                            1
18.    In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that filing of

such a review application by the respondents at a belated stage amounts to

abuse of process of the Court and such an application is not maintainable.

Thus, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition against

the order of dismissal of the review application by the Special Court and the

order of the High Court to that extent is liable to be set aside.

19.    So far as the other application filed by the respondents before the

Special Court is concerned, it is based on the grounds that earlier judgment

and order had been obtained by the appellant/applicant suppressing material

facts and the suit land had not been identified properly, and therefore, the

judgment of the Special Court duly affirmed by the High Court stood

vitiated.



Fraud/Misrepresentation: -

20.    It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an

order/office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the

competent Authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

"Fraud avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P.

Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. &

Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853). In Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Besalay 1956 All.


                                                                          1
E.R. 349), the Court observed without equivocation that "no judgment of a

Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained

by fraud, for fraud unravels everything."

21.   In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s. GAR

Re-Rolling Mills & Anr. AIR 1994 SC 2151; and State of Maharashtra &

Ors. Vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481. this Court observed that a writ Court,

while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent

perpetration of a legal fraud as the courts are obliged to do justice by

promotion of good faith. "Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the

crafty evasions and sub-letties invented to evade law."

22.   In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan Vs. M/s. Shaw Brothers. AIR 1992 SC

1555, it has been held as under:-

            "Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn
      proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is
      a concept descriptive of human conduct."

23.   In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors.

AIR 2000 SC 1165, this Court observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell

together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which

has never lost its temper over all these centuries.




                                                                          1
24.   The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty

should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who

played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court

should not perpetuate the fraud. (See District Collector & Chairman,

Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram

& Anr. Vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655; Union of India

& Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran (1995) Suppl. 4 SCC 100; Vice Chairman,

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr. Vs. Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6

SCC 325; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar

(2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. Vs. Coal Tar

Refining Company AIR 2007 SC 2798; and Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors.

Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2009) 8 SCC 751).


25.   Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature

would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an

act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is

otherwise not due. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and

injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage.

(Vide Dr. Vimla Vs. Delhi Administration AIR 1963 SC 1572; Indian

Bank Vs. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550; State of

Andhra Pradesh Vs. T. Suryachandra Rao AIR 2005 SC 3110; K.D.

                                                                          1
Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 481; and

Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Madhulika Guruprasad

Dahir & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170).

26.   An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or

conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a

property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are

synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud,

fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud

cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine

including res judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false

representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth,

or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a

material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (Vide S.P.

Changalvaraya Naidu (supra); Gowrishankar & Anr. Vs. Joshi Amba

Shankar Family Trust & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2202; Ram Chandra Singh

Vs. Savitri Devi & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 319; Roshan Deen Vs. Preeti Lal

AIR 2002 SC 33; Ram Preeti Yadav Vs. U.P. Board of High School &

Intermediate Education AIR 2003 SC 4628; and Ashok Leyland Ltd. Vs.

State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 2836).




                                                                             1
27.   In kinch Vs. Walcott (1929) AC 482, it has been held that "....mere

constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient but such a

judgment will not be set aside upon mere proof that the judgment was

obtained y perjury."

      Thus, detection/discovery of constructive fraud at a much belated

stage may not be sufficient to set aside the judgment procured by perjury.

28.   From the above, it is evident that even in judicial proceedings, once a

fraud is proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be taken away.

In such an eventuality the questions of non-executing of the statutory

remedies or statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted.

Suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court.

Every court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by fraud

as the order so obtained is non est.

29.   The instant case required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid

settled legal propositions.

      The case of the respondents has been that transfer by the vendor in

favour of the appellant was not genuine. Material information had been

suppressed from the Special Court. More so, there was no proper

identification of the suit land in the earlier litigation. The reports submitted

in this regard were not correct.



                                                                             1
30.   Respondents have never been able to show as under what

circumstances they are interested in the suit land because before the Special

Court in the first round they failed to show any document that land had ever

been transferred by the tenure holders/owners in favour of the Society or the

Society had made any allotment in their favour or they were member of the

said Society or they obtained any sanction from statutory authority to raise

the construction.

      Shri M.V. Durga Prasad, Ld. Counsel appearing for the said

respondents was repeatedly asked by us to show any document on record

linking the said respondents with the suit land. Though, he argued for a long

time, raised large number of issues but could not point out a single document

which may reflect that respondents could have any claim on the suit land.

Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the application at their

behest was not maintainable.

31.   The issue of mis-representation/fraud, suppression of material fact and

identification of land had been in issue in earlier review petitions before the

Special Court and in the Writ Petitions before the High Court. In this regard,

the Special Court in execution proceedings was fully satisfied regarding the

identity of land on the basis of revenue record and came to the conclusion

that there was no mis-representation or fraud on the part of the



                                                                            2
appellant/applicant. The order of the Special Court dated 11th July, 2006

made it clear that all these issues had been agitated in earlier proceedings.

The Special Court has held as under:

      "The applicants herein as contended in this L.G.C. have filed
      IA No.869/2002 for stay of proceedings and IA No. 861/2002
      for summoning the record in File No.B/9815/97 from the office
      of the Revenue Divisional Officer on the ground of alleged
      fraud played by the Mandal Revenue Officer and the Mandal
      Surveyor. Those petitions were heard at length and were
      dismissed holding that the alleged fraud as contended by the
      applicants herein was not made out and the property which is
      the subject matter of L.G.C. No.76/96 should be delivered to
      the respondents herein by evicting the applicants. As mentioned
      already, in execution of the said order, applicants herein were
      evicted and possession was delivered to the respondents.

            Admittedly, the common order passed in IA Nos.
      518/2002, 861/2002 and 869/2002, by this Court was
      questioned by the applicants herein by filing Writ Petitions
      before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. and the same was also
      dismissed holding that the applicants herein are trying to
      protract the litigation and to delay the delivery of possession of
      the property in question to the respondents."(emphasis added)


32.   In another case decided by the Special Court vide order dated 6th July,

2006 the Court had taken note of the pleadings in respect of identification of

land and mis-representation/fraud/collusion in the earlier proceedings and

the observations made by the Writ Court in its order dated 17th December,

2002 that the said respondents were interested in protracting the litigation

and obstructing the implementation of the order of the Special Court dated



                                                                           2
4.11.1997. The said order had been passed in Application No. 51 of 2002

where one of the main grounds had been that the appellant/applicant had

played fraud in obtaining the said order as is taken note of in paragraph 13

of the said order by the Special Court. The Special Court also took note of

earlier direction to the Revenue Divisional Officer to identify the land and

possession of the same was delivered to the decree holder. The said order

was under challenge before the High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 22953/2002

and 23105/2002 wherein pleading of the alleged fraud and mis-identification

of suit land were taken. The Special Court came to the conclusion that there

was no suppression of any fact by the revenue authorities or the court was

misled at the time of obtaining such orders.

33.   There is a registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980 in favour of the

appellant/applicant.   Nobody has ever filed any application before the

competent court to declare said sale deed as null and void. Respondents

have no right or interest in the suit property. The Society claimed to have an

agreement to sell in its favour which did not confer any title in favour of the

Society. A finding of fact had been recorded in earlier proceedings that the

appellant/applicant was in actual physical possession of the land and he was

illegally/forcibly dispossessed by the respondents.




                                                                            2
Forcible dispossession:-

34.   Even a trespasser cannot be evicted forcibly. Thus, a person in illegal

occupation of the land has to be evicted following the procedure prescribed

under the law.     (Vide Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Naresh

Narayan Roy AIR 1924 PC 124; Lallu Yeshwant Singh Vs. Rao Jagdish

Singh & Ors. AIR 1968 SC 620; Ram Ratan Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1977

SC 619; Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.

AIR 1986 SC 872; and Krishna Ram Mahale Vs. Mrs. Shobha Vankat

Rao AIR 1989 SC 2097) .

35.   In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh AIR 1995 SC 1377, this

Court observed that Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 is based on the

principle that even a trespasser is entitled to protect his possession except

against the true owner and purports to protect a person in possession from

being dispossessed except in due process of law.

36.   Even the State authorities cannot dispossess a person by an executive

order. The authorities cannot become the law unto themselves. It would be

in violation of the rule of law. Government can resume possession only in a

manner known to or recognised by law and not otherwise. (Vide Bishan Das

Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1570; Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd.

(supra); State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh


                                                                          2
& Ors. AIR 1989 SC 997; and State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs.

Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 134).

37.   The forcible eviction of the appellant/applicant by the respondents

was unwarranted and unlawful. Proceedings had been initiated under the

Act, 1982. It is a special Act to prevent illegal activities of land grabbing.

The Legislature, in its wisdom, constituted a Special Court presided over by

a person who is or eligible to be the Judge of the High Court, and consisting

of the Members who are or eligible to become District Judge and District

Collector.   Therefore, persons having enough experience and who have

acquired a higher status have been given responsibility to adjudicate upon

the disputes under the Act 1982. That Special Court has been conferred with

the powers of Civil or Criminal Courts.

      As per the provisions of Section 10 of the Act 1982, the burden of

proof is on the accused to prove that he is not guilty. Thus, it is not like any

other criminal case where accused is presumed to be innocent unless the

guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right, however,

subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of

Criminal Jurisprudence.      For this purpose, the nature of offence, its

seriousness and gravity thereof has to be taken into consideration. Statutes

like Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988;


                                                                             2
and Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, provide for

presumption of guilt if the circumstances provided in those Statutes are

found to be fulfilled and shift the burden of proof of innocence on the

accused. Thus, the Legislature has adopted a deviating course from ordinary

criminal law shifting the burden on the accused to prove that he was not

guilty. The High Court while deciding these cases has not considered the

issue of the locus standi of the respondents to maintain the application for

eviction of the appellant/applicant. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should

not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the

jurisdiction of the court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to

degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution.

38.    In view of the above factual position, we reach the following

conclusions:

(i)    There has been a registered sale deed in favour of the

appellant/applicant by the vendors which was registered on 21.5.1980 and

he was put in possession.

(ii)   Prior to the execution of the said sale deed there has been an

agreement to sell dated 23.1.1976 in favour of the Society.




                                                                           2
(iii)   In respect of the said agreement to sell the litigation remained pending

before the Civil Court but there is nothing on record to show as to what had

been its outcome.

(iv)    An agreement to sell did not confer any right on the Society, though

the appellant acquired the title over the suit land by execution and

registration of the sale deed dated 21.5.1980.

(v)     The respondents had not been the members of the Society nor Society

made any allotment in their favour.

(vi)    Before the Special Court, the respondents could not show as under

what circumstances they could stake their claim on the suit land and no

document worth the name could be shown which may link them to the suit

land.

(vii) Respondents grabbed the suit land forcibly and raised a construction

without any authorisation.

(viii) In spite of our repeated queries, learned counsel for the respondents

could not point out a single document on record to show that they could

have any right, interest or title in the suit land.

(ix)    The litigation completed several rounds before the High Court and

this is the second round of litigation before this Court.




                                                                             2
(x)    All the courts proceedings reveal that after proper adjudication the

declaration had been made that suit land belonged to the appellant/applicant

and respondents were merely land grabbers.

(xi)   In earlier review petitions filed by the respondents before the Special

Court and further taking the matter to the High Court in Writ Petitions and

Review Applications before the High Court the issue of mis-

representation/fraud/collusion and mis-identification of the suit land had

been raised but they could not succeed.

(xii) In execution proceedings, the appellant/applicant succeeded and came

in possession of the suit land in 2002.

(xiii) Respondents filed frivolous application raising the issue of fraud and

mis-identification of the suit land which had earlier been adjudicated upon.

The review application was filed at much belated stage.

(xiv) The review application was certainly not maintainable as the

respondents had approached the higher forum and it merely amounted to

abuse of process of the court.

(xv) The respondents had been interested only to protract the litigation by

one way or the other.

(xvi) Fresh proceedings taken by the respondents before the Special Court

in fact, is tantamount to malicious prosecution.



                                                                           2
39.   The High Court failed to take all aforesaid factors into consideration

before passing impugned judgment and order.

40.   In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that judgment

and order of the High Court impugned herein, is not sustainable in the eyes

of law. The appeals are allowed. The judgment of the High Court dated

26.4.2007 is set aside and the judgments and orders dated 6.7.2006 and

11.7.2006 passed by the Special Court are restored. No costs.




                                            ..................................J.
                                                     (P. SATHASIVAM)



                                            ..................................J.
New Delhi,                                  (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
August 16, 2010




                                                                                   2

compensation for arrest - the prayer of the appellant has been, that her detention being illegal, she deserved to be adequately compensated. the travel time between Bhubaneswar and Banapur is about three hours. Accordingly, after having detained the appellant at Bhunbaneswar, she was produced before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Banapur at 7:00 PM on 16.1.2010. If the travel time is taken into consideration, it is apparent that it would be unjust for the appellant to contend, that she was produced before the concerned Court well after 24 hours of her arrest.the arrest of the appellant was not unauthorized, since she had been arrested well before sunset. We are also satisfied in affirming the reasons recorded by the High Court, that the detention of the appellant did not substantially exceed 24 hours i.e., after her arrest and before her production before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Banapur. In view of the aforesaid conclusions, the claim of the appellant for compensation for unauthorized arrest and detention is clearly unwarranted. We, therefore, hereby confirm the order passed by the High Court declining compensation to the appellant. 11. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in the instant appeal. The same is, accordingly, dismissed.


                                                            “NON-REPORTABLE”

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1601 OF 2012
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) NO. 1957 of 2012)


Subhashree Das @ Milli                             …. Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Orissa & Ors.                             …. Respondents


                                  O R D E R

1.    Leave granted.

2.    First Information Report no.  8  dated  14.1.2010  was  registered  at
police station Balugaon under Sections  120B,  121,  121A,  124A  read  with
Section 34 of the  Indian  Penal  Code,  Section  17  of  the  Criminal  Law
(Amendment) Act, Section 63 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, and  Sections
10, 13, 18 and 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,  1967.  According
to the  complainant  (Balabhadra  Pradhan,  Sub  Inspector  of  Police),  on
14.1.2010 he alongwith Assistant Sub Inspectors of Police D.K. Pathnaik  and
B.K Behera, were on motor vehicle checking duty on National Highway  no.  5.
The complainant and  his  companions  were  also  keeping  a  watch  on  the
movement of anti social criminals.  At about 5:20 PM,  one  Bollero  pick-up
van bearing registration no. PR-02 BA 5327, was seen by  the  police  party,
coming at a high speed from Bhubaneswar side.  On being signalled, the  said
vehicle stopped, but one of its occupants  alighted  therefrom  and  started
running away. The complainant chased him and  was  successful  in  detaining
him.  In view of the conduct of one of the occupants of the vehicle, and  in
view of the smell emanating  from  the  vehicle,  the  complainant  and  his
companions became suspicious, and therefore, decided to search the  vehicle.
 In the vehicle, they found  two  persons  including  the  driver.   In  the
presence of the occupants, the vehicle was searched  by  the  police  party.
Four packed cartons, one air  bag  and  one  hand  bag  were  found  in  the
vehicle.  On opening the cartons, the complainant and his  companions  found
“Maoist” leaflets and “Maoist” literature.  The  air  bag  contained  jungle
shoes.  The small bag contained Naval related  literature,  one  diary,  and
one Naxal secret letter.  Cash of Rs.21,175/- was recovered from one of  the
occupants on his personal  search.   The  police  also  found  three  mobile
phones with SIM cards bearing numbers 9692197593, 9439071458 and  9692231528
in possession of the occupants  of  the  van.   The  vehicle  and  materials
aforementioned were  seized  by  the  police  party.   A  seizure  memo  was
prepared, which was got signed from the occupants of the  van,  and  a  copy
thereof was also handed over to them.

3.    On  being  questioned,  the  occupants  of  the  Bollero  pick-up  van
allegedly disclosed to the police party, that the confiscated materials  had
been handed over to them by the appellant, who was  allegedly  the  wife  of
Naxal leader, Sabyasachi Panda.  According to the occupants of the  vehicle,
the aforesaid material was being taken to Bhanjanagar and the  same  was  to
be handed over to some unknown “Naxalites”.  The  material  would  thereupon
be used for subversive activities in different parts of Orissa.

4.    According to the  appellant,  she  was  arrested  on  account  of  her
alleged involvement in the crime  case  arising  out  of  First  Information
Report no. 8  dated  14.1.2010.   She  also  asserted,  that  she  had  been
arrested after sunset and before sunrise i.e., during the night  intervening
14/15.1.2010.  It was also the assertion of  the  appellant,  that  she  was
arrested without the permission of the Judicial Magistrate First Class.   It
was, therefore, contented that her  arrest  was  illegal.   It  was  further
submitted, that the appellant was not produced before  the  concerned  Court
within 24 hours of her arrest.  Accordingly, the  prayer  of  the  appellant
has been, that her detention being illegal, she deserved  to  be  adequately
compensated.  In fact, it is for the aforesaid reason,  that  the  appellant
had approached the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, by filing Writ  Petition
(Crl.) no. 130 of 2010.

5.    It was  the  vehement  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
appellant, that the crime case arising out of First Information  Report  no.
8 dated 14.1.2010, in which the appellant was  arrested,  has  already  been
quashed by the  High  Court  of  Orissa,  and  as  such,  according  to  the
appellant, it is  obvious  that  her  detention  on  the  night  intervening
    14/15.1.2010  was  wholly  baseless  and  illegal.   In  order  to  seek
compensation, two pleas were  pressed  by  the  appellant  before  the  High
Court.  Firstly, that her arrest after sunset  but  before  sunrise,  having
not been made in terms of  the  procedure  prescribed  by  law,  was  wholly
unwarranted.  Secondly, it was also the contention of  the  appellant,  that
she had been produced before the concerned Court, well beyond  24  hours  of
her arrest, and as such, her detention was also  illegal  and  unauthorized.
It is on the aforesaid two counts, that the appellant  claimed  compensation
through the writ petition filed before the High Court.

6.    A perusal of the pleadings filed by the appellant before  this  Court,
as also the factual position depicted in the impugned order  passed  by  the
High Court of Orissa dated 24.11.2011 reveals, that the  contention  of  the
appellant was, that she was detained at 3:00 AM on 15.1.2010,  whereas,  the
assertion of the functionaries  of  the  police  department  was,  that  her
arrest had been made at 3:00 PM on the said date.   The  instant  aspect  of
the matter was gone into by the High Court.  The  High  Court  examined  the
matter in the following manner:-

      “So far as the date and time of arrest is concerned, undisputedly, the
      date of arrest has been mentioned as 15.01.2010 in the arrest memo but
      time has been reflected as 3 A.M.  On verification of the  case  diary
      produced before us, we find that time of arrest as  indicated  in  the
      case diary has been corrected from 3 A.M to  3  P.M.   Therefore,  the
      question as to whether the petitioner was arrested on 15.01.2010 at  3
      A.M or 3 P.M is a disputed question of fact.  On further  scrutiny  of
      the case diary, we find  that  the  petitioner  was  examined  by  the
      Investigating Officer on 15.01.2010 in between 8.15 A.M to  2.45  P.M,
      Thereafter the petitioner appears to have been arrested at 3 P.M.  The
      subsequent entry also reflects that at  3.15  P.M  on  15.01.2010  the
      petitioner was shifted to Bhubaneswar Mahaila Police Station  and  the
      rest of the entries made in the case diary bear  the  time  3.50  P.M,
      5.45 P.M etc.  Therefore, the entry before  the  time  of  arrest  and
      entry made after the arrest prime- facie indicate the  petitioner  had
      been arrested at 3 P.M on 15.01.2010.  Therefore, entry in the memo of
      arrest indicating the time of arrest to be 3 A.M prime- facie  appears
      to be an error and not supported by  the  entries  made  in  the  case
      diary.

It is apparent from the conclusion drawn by the High Court, that the  arrest
of the appellant at 3:00 AM was erroneously recorded, whereas, actually  she
had been arrested at 3:00 PM on 15.1.2010.  This  conclusion  drawn  by  the
High Court is subject matter of challenge at the hands of the appellant.

7.    Having given due consideration  to  the  contention  advanced  at  the
hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the view that  the
claim of the appellant under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of  India
before the High Court of Orissa, could  not  have  been  determined  on  the
basis of disputed facts.  In a case where a petitioner/appellant  wishes  to
press his/  her  claim  before  a  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the
Constitution of India, the claim raised by such a petitioner/appellant  must
be determined on the basis of  the  factual  position  acknowledged  by  the
respondent.  This is so because a High Court  in  exercise  of  jurisdiction
under Article 226  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  would  ordinarily  not
adjudicate a matter, where the foundational  facts  are  disputed.   It  is,
therefore, apparent that the High Court would  have  ordinarily  been  fully
justified in determining  the  claim  of  the  appellant  by  accepting  the
factual position depicted by the functionaries  of  the  police  department,
namely, that the appellant was arrested at 3:00 PM on 15.1.2010.   The  High
Court, however, chose not to fully rely upon the assertions made  on  behalf
of the respondents.  The  High  Court,  in  fact,  personally  verified  the
factual position from the case diary and on its  scrutiny,  arrived  at  the
conclusion  extracted  above.   We  find  absolutely  no  infirmity  in  the
conclusion rendered by the High Court.   In  the  absence  of  any  material
(relied upon by the appellant) to the contrary, we find no infirmity in  the
determination rendered by  the  High  Court,  in  so  far  as  the  time  of
detention of the appellant is concerned.

8.    The second aspect of the matter  relates  to  the  production  of  the
appellant before the competent Court well after 24 hours of her arrest.   In
so far as the instant  aspect  of  the  matter  is  concerned,  the  factual
determination of the High Court is being reproduced below:-

      “So far as the second question is concerned, the case diary  indicates
      that the petitioner was arrested at  3  PM  on  15.01.2010.   She  was
      produced before the learned J.M.F.C. Banapur at 7  PM  on  16.01.2010.
      Bhubaneswar is connected with Banapur mostly by National  Highway  and
      the time  consumed  ordinarily  for  travelling  from  Bhubaneswar  to
      Banapur should be near about three hours.  Under these  circumstances,
      if the petitioner admittedly was produced before the learned J.M.F.C.,
      Banapur on 7 P.M on 16.01.2010, no grievance can be made by her to the
      effect that she was not produced before the learned Magistrate  within
      24 hours.   On  both  the  issues  having  found  that  claim  of  the
      petitioner has no substance, the question  of  grant  of  compensation
      does not arise.”

9.    It has not been disputed before us during the course of hearing,  that
the travel time between  Bhubaneswar  and  Banapur  is  about  three  hours.
Accordingly, after having detained the appellant at  Bhunbaneswar,  she  was
produced before the Court of Judicial Magistrate  First  Class,  Banapur  at
7:00 PM on 16.1.2010.  If the travel time is taken  into  consideration,  it
is apparent that it would be unjust for the appellant to contend,  that  she
was produced before the concerned Court well after 24 hours of  her  arrest.
It may be noted that her contention would have been  of  substance,  if  she
could have established that she was arrested at 3:00 AM  on  15.1.2010.   We
have, however, accepted the determination rendered by the High  Court,  that
the appellant was arrested at 3:00 PM on 15.1.2010.   It  is  not  disputed,
that the appellant was produced before the Judicial Magistrate First  Class,
Banapur at 7:00 PM on  16.1.2010.   Taking  into  consideration  the  travel
time, it cannot be stated that she remained  in  detention  well  beyond  24
hours from  her  arrest  i.e.,  till  her  production  before  the  Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Banapur.

10.   In view of the conclusions drawn by us hereinabove, we  are  satisfied
that the High Court was fully justified in concluding, that  the  arrest  of
the appellant was not unauthorized, since she had been arrested well  before
sunset.  We are also satisfied in affirming  the  reasons  recorded  by  the
High Court, that the  detention  of  the  appellant  did  not  substantially
exceed 24 hours i.e., after her arrest and before her production before  the
Judicial  Magistrate  First  Class,  Banapur.   In  view  of  the  aforesaid
conclusions, the claim of the appellant for  compensation  for  unauthorized
arrest and detention is clearly unwarranted.  We, therefore, hereby  confirm
the order passed by the High Court declining compensation to the appellant.

11.   For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in the  instant
appeal.  The same is, accordingly, dismissed.


                                       …………………………….J.
                                        (B.S. CHAUHAN)


                                        …………………………….J.
                                        (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)

New Delhi;
October 5, 2012
-----------------------
8